guns, weapons & ammunition safety manual (2000)

Swedish Defence Materiel Administration

Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual

Stock name: H VAS-EStock number: M7762-000242Approved: FMV:InspectorateEdition: 2000Central storage: Armed Forces book and form store

1 Introduction

2 Safety activities and requirements com-mon to all materiel

3 Methodology

4 Weapons

5 Ammunition

6 Definitions

7 References

8 Checklists

0 To our Foreign Reader

5

Foreword

This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual supersedes previous editions ofthe Ammunition Safety Manual (FMV Amsäkhandbok 1990).

The Ammunition Safety Manual contained a chapter on ammunition safetymethods. As such methodology is a core feature and shall be applied to all safetywork concerning materiel and systems this chapter has been excluded from thecurrent manual as it was found to be more appropriate to incorporate a method-ology chapter in the Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual (H SystSäkE). Bothmanuals are co-ordinated and are designed to be used together. This Weaponsand Ammunition Safety Manual should thus be used as a complement to theSystem Safety Manual.

Comments on the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual will be gratefullyreceived and should be submitted to FMV: Inspectorate, SE-115 88 Stockholm, Sweden.

7

Content

0 To our Foreign Reader ........................................................................... 150.1 Purpose of this chapter ................................................................... 150.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ....................................... 150.3 About the manual ........................................................................... 15

1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 171.1 General ............................................................................................. 171.2 Instructions for use ......................................................................... 201.3 Weapons and ammunition safety .................................................. 21

1.3.1 General .................................................................................. 211.3.2 Concepts ................................................................................ 23

1.4 Objectives for safety activities ....................................................... 25

1.4.1 General .................................................................................. 251.4.2 Peacetime and wartime .......................................................... 251.4.3 Integration of safety work with other activities ..................... 25

1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV .................... 251.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting

authorities ........................................................................................ 261.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ... 26

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ................. 272.1 General ............................................................................................. 272.2 Safety activity requirements .......................................................... 282.3 Requirements common to all materiel .......................................... 322.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to

all materiel ....................................................................................... 34

3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 353.1 General ............................................................................................. 353.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO ........................ 35

3.2.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 353.2.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 363.2.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 363.2.4 Activity description ............................................................... 36

3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ..... 37

3.3.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 373.3.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 373.3.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 373.3.4 Activity description ............................................................... 38

3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ............................................................................... 39

3.4.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 393.4.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 39

8

3.4.3 Time frame ............................................................................403.4.4 Activity description ...............................................................40

3.4.4.1 Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements ..........40

3.5 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ...........................41

3.5.1 Purpose ..................................................................................413.5.2 Responsibility ........................................................................413.5.3 Time frame ............................................................................413.5.4 Activity description ...............................................................42

3.6 Obtaining advice from advisory groups .......................................43


3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and checklists for reviews .......................................443.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems ....453.6.4.1.2 Advisory Group for Explosives ...........463.6.4.1.3 Advisory Group for Warheads and

Propulsion Devices ..............................48

3.7 Safety testing ...................................................................................50


3.8 Test directives for safety surveillance ...........................................52


3.9 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) .............................................................................................53


3.9.4.1 Background .............................................................543.9.4.2 Subdivision of materiel publications .......................55

4 Weapons ....................................................................................................574.1 General .............................................................................................57

4.1.1 Purpose ..................................................................................574.1.2 Structure of chapter ...............................................................574.1.3 Purpose of the requirements ..................................................57

9

4.1.4 Risks and system safety ......................................................... 58

4.2 Common requirements ................................................................... 60

4.2.1 Requirements of International Law ....................................... 604.2.2 General requirements ............................................................ 60

4.2.2.1 Danger area ............................................................. 614.2.2.2 Safety of friendly forces .......................................... 62

4.2.3 Toxic substances .................................................................... 644.2.4 Electrical and magnetic fields ............................................... 664.2.5 Water and moisture resistance ............................................... 674.2.6 Extreme climatic conditions .................................................. 674.2.7 Fire ......................................................................................... 684.2.8 Blast pressure ........................................................................ 694.2.9 Backblast ............................................................................... 694.2.10 Vibration dose ....................................................................... 704.2.11 Pressure ................................................................................. 704.2.12 Forces .................................................................................... 70

4.2.12.1 General .................................................................... 704.2.12.2 Requirements .......................................................... 71

4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical) ................. 714.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics .................. 724.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces ........................................ 724.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements ...................... 73

4.2.13 Lasers ..................................................................................... 744.2.14 Stability – mechanical ........................................................... 744.2.15 Transport ............................................................................... 75

4.2.15.1 General .................................................................... 754.2.15.2 Requirements .......................................................... 76

4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back ....... 764.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects ............................... 76

4.3 System requirements ...................................................................... 77

4.3.1 Launchers .............................................................................. 774.3.1.1 Weapon installation ................................................ 774.3.1.2 Recoil systems ........................................................ 78

4.3.1.2.1 General ................................................. 784.3.1.2.2 Breech mechanisms ............................. 794.3.1.2.3 Firing mechanisms ............................... 794.3.1.2.4 Breech ring ........................................... 814.3.1.2.5 Obturation ............................................ 814.3.1.2.6 Backflash ............................................. 814.3.1.2.7 Barrels and sub-calibre barrels ............ 824.3.1.2.8 Fume extractors .................................... 844.3.1.2.9 Muzzle brakes, flame guards and

recoil amplifiers ................................... 84

10

4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash .........................................854.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre

adapters ................................................854.3.1.2.12 Ramming ..............................................864.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers .......................................86

4.3.1.3 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems ...................874.3.1.3.1 General .................................................874.3.1.3.2 Requirements .......................................88

4.3.1.4 Composite and compound barrels ...........................894.3.1.5 Other weapon systems ............................................90

4.3.1.5.1 Minelayers for landmines .....................904.3.1.5.2 Minelayers for naval mines and

depth charges ........................................914.3.1.5.3 Launch tubes for torpedoes ..................91

4.3.2 Pylons and dispensers ............................................................934.3.3 Weapon platforms .................................................................944.3.4 Hatches and doors ..................................................................954.3.5 Sighting and laying systems ..................................................96

4.3.5.1 General ....................................................................964.3.5.2 Requirements ..........................................................96

4.3.5.2.1 System accuracy ...................................964.3.5.2.2 Sight tests and adjustments ..................964.3.5.2.3 Firing ....................................................974.3.5.2.4 Aiming and firing limitations ...............97

4.3.6 Guidance systems ..................................................................974.3.7 Miscellaneous requirements ................................................100

4.3.7.1 Pressure vessels .....................................................1004.3.7.2 Lifting devices .......................................................1004.3.7.3 Fire-fighting equipment ........................................100

4.4 Requirement checklist for weapons ............................................102

5 Ammunition ............................................................................................1135.1 Joint ammunition requirements ..................................................113

5.1.1 General ................................................................................1135.1.2 Requirements of International Law .....................................1145.1.3 Materiel specific requirements ............................................1145.1.4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements ......................116

5.2 Warheads .......................................................................................118

5.2.1 General ................................................................................1185.2.1.1 Description ............................................................1185.2.1.2 Materiel environment ............................................1195.2.1.3 Requirements ........................................................120

5.2.2 Warheads containing high explosive (HE) ..........................122

11

5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition ....... 1225.2.2.2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles ...... 1245.2.2.3 HE warheads for bombs ........................................ 1255.2.2.4 HE warheads for landmines .................................. 1265.2.2.5 HE warheads for large underwater ammunition ... 1275.2.2.6 HE warheads for other ammunition ...................... 129

5.2.3 Pyrotechnic warheads .......................................................... 1305.2.3.1 General .................................................................. 1305.2.3.2 Requirements ........................................................ 1325.2.3.3 Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched

ammunition ........................................................... 1325.2.3.4 Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs ....... 1345.2.3.5 Other pyrotechnic warheads ................................. 134

5.2.4 Other warheads .................................................................... 1355.2.5 Requirement checklist for warheads ................................... 136

5.3 Propulsion systems ........................................................................ 138

5.3.1 General ................................................................................ 1385.3.1.1 Description of function ......................................... 1395.3.1.2 Safety aspects ........................................................ 1395.3.1.3 Materiel environment ............................................ 1405.3.1.4 Joint requirements ................................................. 141

5.3.2 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition ............... 1425.3.2.1 General .................................................................. 142

5.3.2.1.1 Safety aspects ..................................... 1445.3.2.1.2 Requirements ..................................... 145

5.3.3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets, guided missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), torpedoes, etc. ...................................................................... 1455.3.3.1 General .................................................................. 1455.3.3.2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas

generators .............................................................. 1465.3.3.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas

generators .............................................................. 1495.3.3.4 Jet engines ............................................................. 150

5.3.3.4.1 General ............................................... 1505.3.3.4.2 Requirements ..................................... 151

5.3.3.5 Ram rocket engines ............................................... 1525.3.3.5.1 General ............................................... 152

5.3.3.6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes .......................... 1535.3.3.6.1 Requirements ..................................... 154

5.3.4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices .................... 154

5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ............... 157

5.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 157

12

5.4.1.1 General ..................................................................1575.4.1.2 Materiel environment ............................................162

5.4.1.2.1 Mechanical stress ...............................1625.4.1.2.2 Physical and chemical stress ..............163

5.4.1.3 Technical solutions ...............................................1645.4.1.3.1 Electrical subsystems .........................164

5.4.1.4 Other fuzing systems .............................................1675.4.1.4.1 Fuzing systems for explosives etc. .....1675.4.1.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic

explosives, demolition sticks, Bangaloretorpedoes and linear charges) .............167

5.4.1.4.3 Signal and spotting agents ..................1675.4.1.4.4 Hand-grenades ...................................1685.4.1.4.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and

explosive cutters .................................1685.4.1.4.6 Self-destruction ..................................1685.4.1.4.7 Submunitions .....................................1685.4.1.4.8 Multi-purpose ammunition ................1695.4.1.4.9 Tandem systems .................................1695.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices .............................169

5.4.2 General requirements ...........................................................1705.4.2.1 Common requirements ..........................................1705.4.2.2 Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) .......................1725.4.2.3 The arming process ...............................................1735.4.2.4 Arming safety features including semiconductor

switches .................................................................1745.4.2.5 Application specific requirements ........................1745.4.2.6 Testing ...................................................................1765.4.2.7 Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and

disposal ..................................................................1775.4.2.8 Requirements of International Law .......................177

5.4.3 Requirements for systems with interrupters ........................1785.4.3.1 Design requirements .............................................1785.4.3.2 Testing interrupters ...............................................178

5.4.4 Requirements for systems without interrupters ...................1795.4.5 Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming

functions ..............................................................................1805.4.5.1 Fuzing systems where unique, application specific,

environmental factors are not available ................1805.4.5.2 Signal and spotting agents .....................................1805.4.5.3 Initiation devices and demolition charges .............1815.4.5.4 Propulsion devices ................................................182

5.4.6 Requirement checklist for fuzing systems ...........................182

13

5.5 Packaging for ammunition ........................................................... 188

5.5.1 General ................................................................................ 1885.5.2 Environmental factors ......................................................... 1895.5.3 Consequences of environmental stress ................................ 189

5.5.3.1 Mechanical environmental stress .......................... 1895.5.3.2 Electrical environmental stress ............................. 1905.5.3.3 Chemical environmental stress ............................. 1905.5.3.4 Climatic environmental stress ............................... 1905.5.3.5 Other environmental stress ................................... 190

5.5.4 Requirements ....................................................................... 1905.5.5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings ............ 192

6 Definitions ............................................................................................... 1936.1 Terminology .................................................................................. 1936.2 Key to abbreviations ..................................................................... 218

7 References ............................................................................................... 2237.1 Documents governing safety ........................................................ 2257.2 Standards relating to design and testing .................................... 2267.3 Design principles and experience ................................................ 2307.4 Textbooks ....................................................................................... 2337.5 Documents relating to the environment ..................................... 2357.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of

ammunition ................................................................................... 237

7.6.1 System specific specifications ............................................. 2377.6.2 Environment specific specifications .................................... 237

7.6.2.1 Mechanical testing ................................................ 2377.6.2.2 Climatic testing ..................................................... 2387.6.2.3 Chemical testing .................................................... 2387.6.2.4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing .................. 2387.6.2.5 Fire and explosion testing ..................................... 2397.6.2.6 Combined testing .................................................. 239

7.7 Accident investigations ................................................................. 239

8 Checklists ................................................................................................ 2418.1 Checklist example 1 ...................................................................... 2418.2 Checklist example 2 ...................................................................... 242

Index ........................................................................................................ 243

To our Foreign Reader 0

15

0

0 TO OUR FOREIGN READER

1

0.1 Purpose of this chapter

The purpose of this chapter is to inform our Foreign Reader on some facts aboutthe role-play in Sweden concerning Weapons and Ammunition procurement.

0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement

The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) is a separate agency forprocurement of materiel for the Armed Forces on assignment from the HeadQuarters (HQ). FMV has no funding of its own, everything is financed throughthe assignments.

An assignment is formulated as an agreement between the HQ and FMV in eachcase, defining the scope of work and reached after a dialogue regarding techni-cal, financial and time aspects. To define the task, HQ issues a tactical, techni-cal, financial objective (TTFO), which could be compared with a specificationin a business agreement.

The responsibility for the defence procurement extends to the technical process-ing (e.g. producing technical specifications), negotiating contracts, purchasing,testing and inspection of equipment. But as a governmental authority, FMVdoes neither manufacture nor sell anything, nor has it basically any resources fordesign (but quite a lot for testing). FMV contracts the industry, mostly in com-petition and strictly obeying the public procurement act, based on EU directives.After contracting a supplier, FMV monitors and controls the safety work per-formed by the supplier.

0.3 About the manual

During the late sixties and early seventies, a number of ammunition related acci-dents occurred in Sweden. As a result of the investigation of the accidents, anAmmunition Safety Manual was issued. The purpose of the manual was to pre-

1. This chapter is added to the English edition only and does not exist in the Swedish edition.

0 To our Foreign Reader

16

0

scribe a procedure that would ensure an acceptable level of safety throughoutthe life of the ammunition and to lay down basic safety requirements for ammu-nition.

The manual was based on a record of experience gained over the years. It con-tained a list of technical requirements, some mandatory and some desired. Manyof the requirements were of the prohibiting type. The manual has been updatedregularly and also been issued in English versions.

A couple of years ago we had reports on some failing artillery pieces. We alsocarried out safety investigations on some older artillery systems. Reflecting theobvious advantages of the ammunition safety methodology Sweden had untilthen, the natural question was ‘Why only ammunition?’. We were also aware ofthe growing complexity of modern systems and also the impact from the use ofsoftware. This manual hence includes requirements and experiences from bothammunition and weapons.

Introduction 1

17

1

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 General

The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual (H VAS-E) is a record of theexperience accumulated over the years relating to weapons and ammunitionsafety, particularly during the development stages of projects. This manual com-plements the Swedish Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual, 1996 English edi-tion (H SystSäkE) M7740-784851. The System Safety Manual shall always beapplied. If the defence materiel system contains weapons and/or ammunitionthis manual, H VAS-E, shall also be applied.

As a result of a proposal in the final report dated 1970-09-28 from the Ammuni-tion Safety Working Group (ASWG) with representatives from the DefenceMateriel Administration (FMV), the Defence Research Establishment (FOA)and the Swedish defence companies concerned, a manual was compiled ofexperience accumulated from the ammunition sector. This has now beenextended to include a weapons section. This is a natural progression as theboundary between weapons and ammunition is becoming increasingly fuzzy. Itcan even be difficult to categorize certain types of defence materiel as eitherweapons or ammunition. If there is any doubt use both Chapter 4 and 5.

The purpose of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is:

• to complement the System Safety Manual in respect of weapons and ammu-nition,

• to state appropriate activities for providing weapons and ammunition withthe required level of safety throughout their service life,

• to state basic requirements concerning weapons and ammunition,

• to constitute a guide and checklist for personnel in the Armed Forces, FMV,FOA and the defence industry in matters concerning weapons and ammuni-tion safety during development, acquisition, manufacture, use and disposal.

This manual states both the requirements for operations in the form of activitiesthat are necessary primarily during development/acquisition of weapons andammunition, and the materiel specific requirements for weapons and ammuni-tion.

1 Introduction

18

1

Safety requirements in this manual are subdivided into mandatory (SHALL) anddesired (SHOULD) requirements. The requirement specification in the order/contract shall state which requirements, and the type of requirement (mandatoryor desired), shall apply for specific weapons and/or specific ammunition.

Figure 1.1 illustrates schematically how the Weapons and Ammunition SafetyManual interrelates with other documents etc. that govern and affect weaponsand ammunition safety activities.

The System Safety Manual states how system safety activities can be appropri-ately conducted and contains certain materiel specific requirements.

The REQDOC Technical Specification Manual (H Kravdok) states how require-ments shall be formulated in the work undertaking (VÅ) and technical (materielrelated) requirements in a technical specification (TS).

The Software Safety Manual (H ProgSäk) states directives relating to the pro-gramming of safety critical software.

The Vehicle Safety Manual (H FordonSäk) states the design principles for, andexperience accumulated from, the development of vehicles as well as regula-tions governing road worthiness.

The Submarine Safety Manual (H UbåtSäk) states the design principles for, andexperience accumulated from, the development of submarines.

These manuals are used as a complement to the Weapons and AmmunitionSafety Manual when formulating technical requirements and requirements foroperational undertakings. For example, if a weapon contains safety critical soft-ware the Software Safety Manual shall be applied in addition to the Weaponsand Ammunition Safety Manual.

Introduction 1

19

1

Figure 1.1 The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual relative to other docu-ments.

Weapons and ammunition safety activities are governed within FMV by FMVService Regulations (TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated via TjF-FMV 1999:46). Thesestate that the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual shall be applied duringthe acquisition of weapons and ammunition.

Safety work in a defence industry is often governed by internal company docu-ments that relate to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual. These docu-ments often specify the entire materiel development process with safety work asan integral part. This approach is also supported inter alia in ISO 9000-1:1994and AQAP 110.

When a defence materiel system is to be acquired the contract stipulates that aSystem Safety Program Plan (SSPP) shall be established. The SSPP then gov-erns other safety-related activities. The System Safety Manual and the Weaponsand Ammunition Safety Manual provide support concerning which activitiesand overall requirements should/shall apply. Refer also to the System SafetyManual, Chapters 2 and 3.

H VAS

RequirementsDocumentationManual

SoftwareSafetyManual

SubmarineSafetyManual

VehiclesSafetyManual

System SafetyManual

1 Introduction

20

1

1.2 Instructions for use

This manual comprises both descriptive and requirement based chapters asdescribed below.

Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’ describes the background, preconditions and objectiveof the manual.

Chapter 2, ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ specifiesweapon and ammunition related safety activities as well as the common materielrequirements for the project.

Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’ describes how the activities specified in Chapter 2can be managed.

Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’ specifies materiel specific requirements for weapons ofwhich the main parts are Common requirements and System requirements.

Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’ specifies materiel specific requirements for ammuni-tion. With regard to ammunition the specific subsystem requirements also applythat are specified under the respective headings Warheads, Propulsion systems,Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges and Packaging for ammu-nition.

Chapter 6, ‘Definitions’ defines certain materiel specific terminology and lists akey to the abbreviations and acronyms used in the manual.

Chapter 7, ‘References’ lists references to literature relating to defence materiel.

Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’ contains examples of how checklists of requirementscan be formulated for inter alia issuing reports to FMV advisory groups.

In all the chapters where safety requirements are specified (chapters 2, 4 and 5)checklists are provided that can be used to check that each requirement isobserved. Other chapters (1, 3, 6, 7 and 8) are of a descriptive nature.

For some defence materiel systems it may be difficult to determine the boundarybetween weapons and ammunition. In such cases both Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’and Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’ must be applied.

Introduction 1

21

1

The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is based on – and is a comple-ment to – the System Safety Manual. It can mainly be read and applied indepen-dently but certain sections in the text, however, refer directly to the SystemSafety Manual.

1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety

1.3.1 General

All activities with technical systems involve risk. Complete freedom from risk isthus an unattainable ‘ideal condition’ which is why the goal of risk reducingactivities and measures in general can only be to reduce the risks to a so-calledtolerable risk level, which means a real ‘acceptable level of safety’. The purposeof the weapons and ammunition in the Armed Forces is to inflict the maximumpossible damage on the enemy in wartime. Consequently, weapons and ammu-nition often constitute a potential major hazard even to the user. The require-ments specified for performance and reliability can be mutually exclusive torequirements stipulated for safety since complex safety devices can entail alower level of reliability and operational availability. When designing weaponsand ammunition it shall always be assured that they have a tolerable level of riskthroughout their service life.

The Armed Forces, FMV, and the defence industry are enjoined to conductactive safety work through legislation such as the Work Environment Act, Flam-mable and Dangerous Goods Act, and Transport of Dangerous Goods Act.

As accidents with weapons and ammunition often have serious consequencesfor personnel, materiel and the environment, the requirements governing safetyshall be stringent. Accidents with weapons and ammunition, moreover, also tendto erode confidence in military materiel in general. Consequently, the materielmust be acceptable safe to handle throughout its life, which includes storage,transport, handling, use, maintenance and disposal. The Armed Forces stipulaterequirements in the TTFO for the achievement of a tolerable level of risk.

The National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI) examines andapproves all explosive goods developed and manufactured by the industry formilitary or civil use. In addition, the National Inspectorate of Explosives andFlammables examines and approves all explosives, determines transport codes,and establishes storage codes in consultation with FMV.

1 Introduction

22

1

The following prerequisites are necessary to meet the requirements pertaining toa tolerable level of risk:

• Relevant materiel specific safety requirements and requirements for safetyactivities are formulated by the Armed Forces in the form of Tactical Tech-nical Financial Objectives (TTFO) or equivalent.

• FMV formulates the requirements of the Armed Forces into technical re-quirements with the aid of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manualand other applicable specifications. All the safety requirements are specifiedby FMV in the Request for Proposal (RFP).

• FMV ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirementsspecified in the RFP or equivalent as well as those specified in this manual,and ensures that safety activities stated in the SSPP are performed in a sat-isfactory manner and that documentation for Armed Forces’ activities areproduced.

• The supplier ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety require-ments stated in requirement specifications and that the activities agreed inthe SSPP are properly performed.

• The Armed Forces ensure that training materiel and training plans, safetyregulations, and restrictions on the use of the materiel are available so thatmilitary units can use the materiel in a safe manner.

• Military units provide users with sufficient training and ensure that condi-tions during usage are such that weapons and ammunition do not cause ac-cidents or ill-health.

• The user complies with the instructions given during training and with safe-ty regulations when handling the weapon and ammunition.

• The Armed Forces assign to FMV the task of disposal of weapons and am-munition.

It is essential that all parties involved are aware of their responsibility for ensur-ing that weapons and ammunition are acceptably safe to handle throughout theirservice life.

In the weapon and ammunition sectors the system safety activities consist of anumber of risk reducing activities that are to be performed during development,production, transport, storage, use, maintenance and disposal. These specificweapon and ammunition activities are described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2,while the general activities are described in the System Safety Manual.

Introduction 1

23

1

1.3.2 Concepts

The term ‘accident’ is used in the Work Environment Act. A hazardous eventshall result in someone being injured or something being damaged for it to bedeemed an accident. (Example: If a shell detonates at an undesired point in timeit is a hazardous event, but if no person is injured and no materiel/property or theenvironment is damaged by the detonation the event is not designated as an acci-dent but as an incident.)

Figure 1.2 The ‘accident’ concept

Weapons and ammunition safety is the property of materiel to be handled underspecified conditions without a hazardous event occurring or parts incorporatedin the materiel being affected in such a way that a hazardous event may occurduring subsequent handling.

Examples of such stated conditions (preconditions) for materiel safety are:

• that the safety of devices for handling weapons and ammunition are satis-factory,

• that users have undergone the specified training,

• that the specified environmental severities are not exceeded,

&

HazardousEvent

Person injuredor objectdamaged

Accident

1 Introduction

24

1

• that the materiel is used and operated in the intended manner, i.e. that in-structions for use have been complied with,

• that safety inspections and status checks are performed as required.

Handling refers to handling during all phases throughout the life of the product,e.g. storage, transport, use, maintenance and disposal.

Weapons and ammunition safety is only one of many safety concepts. An expla-nation of how this safety concept can be related to other safety concepts is givenbelow.

The concepts below may constitute parts within a major system such as a navalvessel. In such a case seaworthiness, ammunition safety, and weapons safety areconstituent parts of the wider system safety concept for the vessel. Systemsafety may also encompass further concepts such as software safety, resistanceto environmental conditions, and activities for the protection of the environ-ment. Equivalent concepts apply to vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, self-propelledartillery guns and missile launchers for example.

Figure 1.3 System safety exemplified by a naval vessel system

Seaworthiness in this example is directly affected by weapons and ammunitionsafety insofar as defects and deficiencies in these could impact on seaworthi-ness. For example, if it was possible to fire a gun onboard a vessel towards thedeck resulting in holes in the hull, or if ammunition stored in the ammunitionhold was unable to withstand environmental stresses (e.g. vibration) resulting inhazard detonation.

Ammunition safety

Weapons safety

System safety

Seaworthiness

Introduction 1

25

1

1.4 Objectives for safety activities

1.4.1 General

Weapons and ammunition safety activities shall be performed to an extent that:

• applicable legislation and requirements governing the materiel are compliedwith and provide adequate safety against ill-health and accidents duringhandling and that the materiel is provided with instructions for use, safetyregulations and marking,

• requirements specified in the Armed Forces’ TTFO are met,

• system safety will not be degraded by the use of new technology or new sys-tem solutions.

1.4.2 Peacetime and wartime

It is of decisive importance for combat morale that the user has full confidencefrom the safety aspect in the materiel that is used.

Safety requirements for newly developed weapons and newly developed ammu-nition should specify that the materiel can be used with the same restrictions inpeacetime and in wartime alike.

1.4.3 Integration of safety work with other activities

Safety cannot be managed independently but only in combination with the otheractivities involved during the life of the materiel.

Neither can responsibility for safety be removed from the line organization atthe Armed Forces, FMV or manufacturer level.

1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV

Responsibility for weapons and ammunition safety devolves upon the functionat FMV which is:

• responsible for acquisition or modification of the weapon or ammunition inquestion,

• responsible for integration of the weapon or ammunition into existing mate-riel or system.

1 Introduction

26

1

After completion of weapons and ammunition safety work or system safetywork a Safety Statement (SS) shall be issued as specified in the Armed Forces’System Safety Manual.

Advice concerning weapons and ammunition safety can be obtained from theInspectorate advisory groups (and such advice shall be procured in cases whereexplosive goods require transport and storage classification). Advice obtaineddoes not alter the line organization responsibility stipulated above.

Regulations governing ammunition safety activities within FMV are disclosedin TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated 1999-12-27 via TjF-FMV 1996:46.

1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at inter-acting authorities

This manual does not govern delegations and responsibility for weapon andammunition safety activities within the Defence Research Establishment orother supporting authorities.

1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manu-facturers

The application of this manual by manufacturers shall be governed by the provi-sions stipulated in the relevant order contract.

Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2

27

2

2 SAFETY ACTIVITIES AND REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL MATERIEL

2.1 General

This chapter specifies the safety activities and materiel requirements that arespecific to weapons and ammunition. It is necessary to carry out a selection ofthese activities in order to achieve the required level of safety. Section 2.2 speci-fies safety activity requirements and Section 2.3 the requirements common to allmateriel. Requirements and activities are subdivided into three different projecttypes according to whether they deal with:

• P1: Development.

• P2: Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems.

• P3: Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems.

These project types are henceforth referred to as P1, P2 and P3:

• Project type P1, Development, here refers both to development of newweapon and ammunition systems and to modification or renovation of ex-isting systems.

• Project type P2, Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and AmmunitionSystems, here refers to purchase of off-the-shelf goods. Within the frame-work of a large-scale type P2 acquisition the adaptation of subsystems maybe necessary. Such an adaptation is carried out as a P1 project type.

• Project type P3, Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems,here refers to an investigation of the status of materiel in existence withinthe Armed Forces with the objective of creating the basis for a decision re-garding the most appropriate measures to be taken with the system, e.g.modification, renovation or disposal.

Activities that are specific to weapons and ammunition shall be integrated withoverall materiel system activities. It is appropriate that this integration be carriedout by incorporating the specific activities in the System Safety Program Plan(SSPP) of the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual. Some of theweapon and ammunition specific activities form a natural basis for the overallactivities. For example, only weapon and ammunition specific materiel require-ments are stated in this manual while the overall requirements are stated in theSystem Safety Manual.

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

28

2

While drafting this manual consideration was given to the procedures and stan-dards that are in use internationally, and consequently the manual is applicablein its entirety even for international use.

When a development project is assigned to a foreign manufacturer the safetyactivities shall be performed in the same way as they would be during develop-ment by a Swedish manufacturer. It may, however, be necessary to take intoconsideration procedures in use in the country in which development is takingplace.

When purchasing fully developed materiel from abroad it shall always beensured that information/documentation is obtained to enable an evaluation ofsafety to be performed. In some cases such documentation can be obtained viathe authorities of a country with whom a Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) has been established.

Prior to each decision on an acquisition a thorough evaluation of the safety ofthe product shall be performed. Pertinent documentation must be available toform a basis for making a decision on acquisition.

2.2 Safety activity requirements

The principles for weapon and ammunition safety activities are illustrated inFigure 2.1.

With regard to their nature and purpose, weapons and ammunition often containhazards that are essential for their objectives to be achieved. It is for reasonssuch as this that it is impossible to create completely safe systems.

However, the risks pertaining to a weapon and ammunition system during itsvarious phases can partially be eliminated or limited. During design and manu-facture most risks are limited by the design measures taken and by good produc-tion control.

Certain hazards may remain after manufacture such as blast pressure, thermalradiation during firing, and fragments from detonation. Such hazards can belimited through restriction on use, and by providing users with training in thehandling and operation of systems etc.


29

2

Figure 2.1 System safety activities

Figure 2.2 shows the safety activities that can be performed during the variousphases in the life of the system for the various types of project (P1, P2 or P3).The activities selected and the interflow between them varies depending on thespecific project. This is stipulated in the SSPP for the materiel system. The sub-stance of the activities – often denoted in this manual by abbreviations – areexplained in more detail in the System Safety Manual. Abbreviations arederived from English language expressions.

The objective of these activities is to obtain an acceptable level of safety for per-sonnel, equipment, property and the surrounding environment.

Materiel systemMateriel systemPossiblehazards

Defence industries activities

FMV activitiesFMV activities

Armed Force activitiesArmed Force activities

Defence industries activities


30

2

Figure 2.2 Safety activities during the various phases

Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the information flow between the ArmedForces, FMV, and the manufacturer involved in the P1, P2 and P3 programs.

Requirements for the safety activities to be performed in the various programs(P1, P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for themateriel system.

Each requirement is assigned a unique number to facilitate references. Further-more, each mandatory (SHALL) requirement is written in bold type on a darkyellow background and each desired (SHOULD) requirement is written in nor-mal typeface on a light yellow background. Requirements for the safety activi-ties to be performed for the various programs (P1, P2 and P3) are incorporatedinto the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. The words ‘shall’and ‘should’ are used in the running text as explanations. Cases where the textdoes not have a requirement number shall not be interpreted as strict require-ments but as a general guideline and explanation.

In the activity flows below the circles with ‘A’ indicate who bears the mainresponsibility for performance of the activity, while an empty circle denotes par-ticipation in the activity or that a document/activity moves, and the arrows indi-cate the intended direction of the information flow.

Activity

Phase Studies Planning andprocurement

Operation Disposal

Study/Development

Verification/Testing

Manufacture Use/ConsumptionMaintenance

Disposal

Supplement to RFP

Supplement to SRP

Supplement to PHL

Advising Group Check(Advisory Group)

Safety Testing

Directives for safety inspection

Directives for PHST

Supplement to TTFO

Transport/Storage


31

2

Figure 2.3 Example of activity flow forP1: Development

Figure 2.4 Example of activity flow for P2: Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Materiel

Figure 2.5 Example of activity flow for P3: Review of Existing Materiel

How, when, and by whom the activities stated below shall be performed in eachprogram (P1, P2 and P3) is described in Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’. Most activi-ties conclude with a clearly identifiable documentation.

1.22001

Supplement to safety requirements in the

TTFO

(Tactical Techni-cal Financial Objectives) shall be performed as specified in Section 3.2.

1.22002

Supplement to safety requirements in the

RFP

shall be performed as specified in Section 3.3.

Supplement to RFP

Supplement to SRP

Supplement to PHL


Safety Testing


Directives for PHST

Supplement to TTFO

FM FMV IndustryActivity

AA

AA

AA

AA

Supplement to RFP

Supplement to SRP



Supplement to TTFO

FM FMV IndustryActivity

Directives for PHST

A

AAAA

A

Supplement to RFP

Supplement to PHL

Safety Testing

Supplement to TTFO

FM FMVActivity

AAAA


32

2

1.22003 Supplement to

supplier’s Safety Requirements Proposed

(SRP) performed as specified in Section 3.4.

1.22004 Supplement to

Preliminary Hazard List

(PHL) performed as spec-ified in Section 3.5.

1.22005

For explosive goods advice shall be obtained from FMV’s

Adviso-ry Group for Explosives

. Refer also to Section 3.6.

1.22006 Advice from FMV’s

Advisory Groups

should be obtained as per the instructions issued by the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety. Refer also to Section 3.6.

1.22007 Safety testing

shall be performed by the manufacturer as part of safety verification. Refer also to Section 3.7.

1.22008

Test directives for

safety inspections

(part of the In-Service Sur-veillance of Ammunition) shall be produced by FMV in conjunction with ammunition development. Refer also to Section 3.8.

1.22009

Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (

PHST) should be established as specified in Section 3.9.

2.3 Requirements common to all materiel

Requirements that apply to all weapons and ammunition have been collated inthis section to avoid the need for repetition in Chapter 4 and 5. Further require-ments are stated in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. Theserequirements shall be incorporated into requirement specifications together withother applicable weapon and ammunition requirements.

It is the aim of weapons and ammunition development to create a design thatsatisfies safety requirements. During the development phases safety require-ments are verified by means of audits, analyses and tests. As the failure proba-bility values to be verified are very low it is not sufficient to use only testing –instead, several methods of verification must be used in parallel.

1.23001

Weapons shall not be designed so that they violate the applicable Rules of International Law. Thus it is forbidden to design weapons with

non-discriminatory effect

that cause unnecessary suffering or excessive injury.

Comment:

Refer also to requirements in Section 4.2.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 5.4.2.8.


33

2

1.23002

Each project concerning new acquisition or modification of weap-onry or conventional weapons mainly for use against personnel shall be reported to the

Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects

.

1.23003 Explosives

incorporated in the materiel shall be

approved

by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI).

Comment

:Approval is based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables statute book (SÄIFS 1986:2). SÄI determines transport and storage codes in consultation with FMV and establishes UN codes.

1.23004 Explosives

incorporated in the materiel shall be

qualified

in accor-dance with FSD 0214.

Comment

: Appraisals of the scope of qualification are performed by the Advi-sory Group for Explosives, see Section 3.6.

1.23005

Materials incorporated shall be

compatible

so that the product re-mains safe during its lifetime.

Comment

:Incompatible materials are to be avoided even if their reaction prod-ucts are harmless. Compatibility testing often tests all organic ma-terials with the explosives incorporated and with other safety critical components. This applies to materials that are in direct con-tact with each other or that can be affected via an interchange of gas-ses.

1.23006

The product shall retain its safety properties for at least as long as its specified

service life

.

1.23007 Testing of ‘chemical life’ should be performed as specified in FSD 0223.


34

2

2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advi-sory groups. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chap-ter 8, ‘Checklists’.

Table 2:1 Checklist of requirements for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content Comment

Activities

1.22001 SHALL Requirements in TTFO

1.22002 SHALL Requirements in RFP

1.22003

a)

a) Becomes mandatory (SHALL) requirement if specified in the SSPP.

Requirements in SRP

1.22004

a)

PHL

1.22005 SHALL Advisory Group for Explo-sives

1.22006 SHOULD Advice

1.22007 SHALL Safety testing

1.22008 SHALL Safety inspections

1.22009 SHOULD PHST

Requirements common to all materiel

1.23001 SHALL Non-discriminatory effect

1.23002 SHALL Scrutiny by Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects

1.23003 SHALL Explosives approved by SÄI

1.23004 SHALL Explosives qualified

1.23005 SHALL Compatibility

1.23006 SHALL Service life

1.23007 SHOULD Chemical life

Methodology 3

35

3

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 General

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide for the implementation of theactivities described in Chapter 2.

The activities do not have to be carried out in the manner stated in this chapter,but if other methods are used they must be described, preferably in the SystemSafety Program Plan (SSPP) as specified in the System Safety Manual.

It is appropriate to produce the draft SSPP at the same time as the draft require-ment specification.

Each section in this chapter embraces the following areas:

Purpose: Gives a brief description of what the activity intendsto achieve for each project type: P1, P2 and P3.

Responsibility: Determines which authority – FMV or the manufac-turer – bears prime responsibility for ensuring that theactivity is carried out.

Time frame: To state in which phase during the life of the systemthat the activity shall be started or carried out.

Description of activity: Describes the way in which the activity can most suit-ably be carried out.

3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO

3.2.1 Purpose

The Armed Forces are responsible for ensuring that all requirements stipulatedfor the weapon system are disclosed in the TTFO. FMV participates in a dia-logue with the Armed Forces to generate proposals for supplementary require-ments concerning system safety aspects for weapons and ammunition for aspecific materiel system. To these are appended selected requirements from theSystem Safety Manual.

3 Methodology

36

3

3.2.2 Responsibility

P1: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorpo-rated in the TTFO.



3.2.3 Time frame

P1: At project start, study phase.

P2: When acquisition is necessary.

P3: In conjunction with review of existing materiel.

3.2.4 Activity description

The safety requirements are specified in the DTTFO (Draft version of Tactical,Technical and Financial Objectives), PTTFO (Preliminary Tactical, Technicaland Financial Objectives), and finally in the TTFO (Tactical, Technical andFinancial Objectives). In the DTTFO and PTTFO the requirements are dividedinto mandatory (SHALL) requirements and desired (SHOULD) requirements.The safety requirements are used by FMV as the basis for the formulation ofrequirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the manufacturer.

Changes in the general operative conditions, operative focus, or operative capa-bility and tactical guidelines, etc. may create the need for revisions to estab-lished requirements. This leads to a new TTFO process.

Requirements for weapons and ammunition safety may comprise

inter alia

thefollowing:

• Maximum restrictions during use such as the maximum size of the dangerarea in peacetime and wartime.

• Restrictions concerning firing conditions such as rate of fire, permittedcharges for artillery, permitted safety distances when firing.

Methodology 3

37

3

• Maximum restrictions concerning storage such as compatibility groups forammunition.

• Insensitive munition (IM) requirements. Regarding policy and testing referto FSD 0060.

Safety requirements can be stated qualitatively or quantitatively. They mustcomprise all phases of use throughout the life of the system.

More information is available in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3,Section 3.2.

3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Pro-posal (RFP)

3.3.1 Purpose

To formulate the specific safety requirements that shall apply during the RFPprocess on the basis of the weapon and ammunition related requirements in theTTFO. FMV also formulates the safety requirements necessary for FMV’s ownwork such as for review of existing materiel.


P1: FMV.

P2: FMV.

P3: FMV.

3.3.3 Time frame

P1: During RFP for each phase.

P2: During RFP.

P3: Before review of existing materiel.

3 Methodology

38

3


Safety requirements for the materiel are stated in the requirement specificationto be included in the RFP. The format for the requirement specification is speci-fied in the REQDOC Technical Specification Manual and in the REQDOCStatement of Work Undertakings Manual.

Safety requirements stated in the TTFO are given a more ‘industry-friendly’wording, e.g. with reference to the concrete requirements specified in Chapter 2,‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’, Chapter 4, ‘Weap-ons’ and Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’. Environmental design and test requirementsfor extreme environments shall be formulated as per the applicable military orother standards.

There must, however, be a balance between live ammunition with catastrophicconsequences in the case of a hazardous event, and less complex training ammu-nition.

The Armed Forces’ safety requirements for a complete system may need to bebroken down to subsystem level, at which the various manufacturers/suppliersof subsystems must share responsibility for the overall safety requirements.

In addition to the materiel specific safety requirements further safety activitiesshall be stipulated, preferably as specified in the System Safety Manual,Chapter 2 Safety activities and materiel requirements, Section 2.2, and fromother manuals such as the Software Safety Manual and the Vehicle Safety Man-ual. These shall be stated in the RFP. Proposals from the manufacturer regardingthe activities that should be included in the system safety program shall bestated in the SSPP for the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual,Chapters 2 and 3.

Examples of safety requirements:

• Safety margins for structural strength such as compressive strength forlaunchers.

• Criteria for qualification when insensitive munition is required.

• Prohibited materials and combinations of materials.

• Danger areas for ammunition.

• Approved classes of laser (e.g. laser class as per IEC 60825-1, so-called eye-safe lasers).

Methodology 3

39

3

Figure 3.1 Allocation of requirements

3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP)

3.4.1 Purpose

To formulate weapon and ammunition safety requirements in a requirementspecification that shall apply to the materiel and whose fulfilment shall be veri-fied. For the purchase of off-the-shelf goods this means the specificationrequirements that apply to the purchase of the goods.


P1: The manufacturer.


Vehicle SafetyManual

Software SafetyManual

H VAS

SSPP- Activities

RequirementSpecification

- Performance req

- Activities- Performance req

System SafetyManual

- Activities- Performance req

3 Methodology

40

3

3.4.3 Time frame

P1: During the tender stage and product definition phase.

P2: During the tender stage.


The supplier shall respond to the requirements in the RFP in a way that enablesFMV to evaluate the planned system safety program and compare the tendersreceived from the various suppliers. Refer also to the System Safety Manual,Chapter 3, Section 3.7 ‘Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP)’.

Each requirement shall be described in such a way that it is possible to follow upthe requirement, and so that it is easy to understand how the requirement is to beverified. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.16‘Safety Verification (SV)’.

This activity also includes reformulating environmental design and test prereq-uisites into specified environmental design and test requirements. The operatingenvironment is specified in the RFP, and the planned verification is stated in theverification specification, environmental design and test specification or equiva-lent.

3.4.4.1 Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements

System requirements for a development project must be allocated to subsystemsand components before the actual design work starts. This is often a process thatis internal to the manufacturer since the manufacturer has overall responsibilityfor the safety of the complete system.

The safety requirements in the overall requirement specification shall preferablybe reformulated into more concrete requirements to facilitate the task of theadministrator in incorporating them into subsystem specifications.

This involves two things:

• Allocation of safety requirements stipulated at overall level (completeweapon systems) to weapon and ammunition safety requirements at sub-system level (barrel, platform, ammunition, fuze, cast charge, artillery prim-er, etc.).

Methodology 3

41

3

• A re-formulation of an overall requirement to more concrete characteristicsfor the subsystems.Example:System requirement: copper azide must not be formed. Subsystem require-ment for fuze: copper alloy and lead azide igniter must not be used simulta-neously.

3.5 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

3.5.1 Purpose

A Preliminary Hazard List shall be compiled early in the operation (and be con-tinuously updated) to identify hazards and their potential hazardous events.Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Section 3.8. This section states certainhazards based on experience that can result in hazardous events.



P3: FMV.

3.5.3 Time frame

P1: At Product Definition Phase.

P3: Prior to start of review of existing materiel.

3 Methodology

42

3


To identify hazards one should analyze equivalent materiel, accident and inci-dent reports, previous experience and the checklist below. This can never becomplete, however, but must be supplemented over time.

Table 3:1 Example of hazards

HAZARD FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE

Aiming system Incorrect direction of fire Impact or fragments outside danger area

High barrel pressure Barrel rupture or fragmen-tation

Blast injuries

Firing system Inadvertent firing Impact or fragments outside danger area

Moving parts Inadvertent movementCrushing

Personnel injured by crushing

Laser transmitter Inadvertent transmission Eye injuries to personnel

High explosives in war-heads

Premature burst: in depot store, during transport, dur-ing handling or loading, in the bore or in trajectory

Blast, fragmentation or hol-low-charge effectOpen fire

Chemical substances in illuminating, smoke and incendiary ammunition

Premature initiation/effect Blast or fragmentation effectOpen fireEmission of corrosive agents or toxic gases

High explosives in explo-sive trains

Premature initiation Initiation of warheadBlast or fragmentation effectOpen fire

Primary explosives Premature initiation Initiation of warheadOpen fire

Propellants (propellant charges for tube-launched ammunition, solid or liquid rocket fuel, powder charges for actuator car-tridges)

Premature initiation

Excessive pressure result-ing in rupture of combus-tion chamber

Escape of gas rearwards from gun

Excessive forward or rear-ward recoil in recoilless weapons

Open fire, shatter effect

Blast and fragmentation effect when chamber ruptures

Facial injuries to gunner

Gunner injured

Methodology 3

43

3

3.6 Obtaining advice from advisory groups

3.6.1 Purpose

To obtain advice from advisory groups with technical expertise and experiencein the weapons and ammunition sectors.

The objective of advisory operations is to provide advice and recommendationsto project managers, line managers and administrators within FMV, based on thetechnical expertise and experience of the relevant advisory group.


P1: FMV.

P2: FMV.

3.6.3 Time frame

P1: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with theSSPP or equivalent.

P2: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with theSSPP or equivalent.

Projectiles, rockets or mis-siles at launch, release or in flight

Body ruptures, guidance failure, or fins etc. detach in flight

Shatter or fragmentation effect

High electric voltage Flash-over Electric shock

High electric current Short-circuit Fire in cables

Hydraulic pressure Leakage Injuries caused by release of pressure

Rotating parts Parts detach Impact injuries

Vibration Inherent resonance Internal injuries to driver

Electromagnetic radiation Inadvertent radiation Injuries to internal organs

Table 3:1 Example of hazards

HAZARD FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE

3 Methodology

44

3


The preliminary number of reviews in which the participation of the manufac-turer is required shall be specified in the SSPP and in the contractual undertak-ing.

The aim is to obtain advice relating to the project from the advisory groups asearly as possible. The Advisory Group for System Safety can state which otheradvisory groups ought to review the project.

More reviews than those originally planned may be needed. Separate reviewsmay be necessary prior to special tests.

The current advisory groups are listed below:

• Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T)

• Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl)

• Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D)

• Advisory Group for System Safety (Rg SystSäk)

• Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering (Rg M).

The advisory groups written in italics are described in the System Safety Man-ual, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4.

In practical terms advice is given in the form of responses to concrete questionssubmitted in respect of a specific project.

It shall be possible to use the responses as a basis for the project or line organi-zation decisions in the project.

This advice also includes the safety principles (norms for ensuring ammunitionsafety) that the project or line organization intends to use as a basis for its workwith concrete objects, plans, regulations, etc.

When requesting advice the checklist issued by the relevant advisory groupshall be adhered to.

3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and check-lists for reviews

Section 3.6.4.1.1 through 3.6.4.1.3 state the tasks for each advisory group andthe data required for review by each advisory group.

Methodology 3

45

3

If it is unclear as to which groups should review a project the question can besubmitted to the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety.

3.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems

3.6.4.1.1.1 Tasks

• To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of fuzing systemsThe advisory group operates in the following areas:– fuzing systems for warheads,– fuzing systems for propulsion devices,– design and production methods for fuzing systems for propulsion de-

vices,– compatibility.Advice may inter alia concern:– action to be taken with existing fuzing systems and fuzing systems un-

dergoing development,– project specifications and technical documentation.

• To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the pro-duction of documentation for fuzing systems (for reviews, analyses, assess-ments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extentpossible, or on assignment, to participate in the above.

• To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experienceacquired concerning fuzing systems to FMV departments and the authoritiesconcerned as well as to companies.

3.6.4.1.1.2 Procedure

Section 5.4 in the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes thebasis for advisory group assessments.

Scope of report:

• Brief general information about the object:– field of application,– weapon platform,– weapon (or equivalent),– ammunition,– danger areas.

• Description of the object or functional description:– drawings or diagrams,– wiring diagram / block diagram / printed circuit board assembly layout,

3 Methodology

46

3

– model or hardware,– safety critical software,– function of fuzing system,– arming conditions,– initiation conditions,– explosive trains or transmitters including characteristics,– safety devices.

• Statement disclosing materials and components:– type,– composition,– treatment (e.g. surface treatment, heat treatment),– compatibility.

• Statement disclosing requirement verification for Section 5.4 performed inaccordance with Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’.

• Statement disclosing safety verifications performed:– safety analyses,– environmental analyses,– tests (as specified in FSD 0112, 0212, 0213 and 0214).

• Statement disclosing the quality plan for the object.

• Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of therelevant documentation shall be submitted.

• Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than threeweeks prior to review of the object.

3.6.4.1.2 Advisory Group for Explosives

3.6.4.1.2.1 Tasks

• To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of explosives.The advisory group operates in the following areas:– selection of explosive,– testing of explosive,– classification of explosive (UN code and Transport and Storage codes),– production methods for the explosive,– compatibility.Advice may inter alia concern:– action to be taken with existing explosives and explosives undergoing

development,– project specifications and technical documentation.

Methodology 3

47

3

• To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the pro-duction of documentation for explosives (for reviews, analyses, assess-ments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extentpossible, or on assignment, to participate in the above.

• To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experienceacquired concerning explosives to FMV departments and the authoritiesconcerned as well as to companies.


The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and FSD 0214 shall constitutethe basis for advisory group assessments.

When presenting a submission to the Advisory Group for Explosives concerningthe recommendation of Transport and Storage codes and UN code the specialaspects that are of importance to transport and storage shall be elucidated.

Scope of report:

• Brief general information about the object:– field of application,– weapon platform,– weapon (or equivalent),

• Description of the object concerning:– design (drawings, diagrams and possible model),– function,– data on all explosives, pyrotechnic compositions, and other active sub-

stances incorporated in the object. Weights and compositions shall bedisclosed and adequate denominations shall be used, i.e. not so-calledbrand names. If new explosives are used they shall be qualified in ac-cordance with FSD 0214,

– compatibility analyses performed concerning the compatibility of thevarious components incorporated with the explosives or pyrotechniccompositions, as well as the compatibility of the various explosives andpyrotechnic compositions with each other and with the surroundingfabrication material,

– fuzing system with safety devices and arming conditions (advice fromsubmission to the Advisory Group for Fuzes, including an account ofthe risk for copper azide formation resulting from the presence of ma-terials with copper content and lead azide),

– anti-humidity protection,– electrical screening.

3 Methodology

48

3

• Packaging:– design,– location of the object in the packaging,– total quantities of explosives etc.,– total weight,– anti-humidity protection.

• Testing of ammunition:– mandatory testing must always be performed as specified in FSD 0060

and shall be disclosed, provided no comparison can be made with asimilar object that has undergone such testing,

– all informative testing performed that can provide information con-cerning the sensitivity of the ammunition shall be disclosed, such as:fragment impact (FSD 0121),small arms bullet attack (FSD 0117),bump (FSD 0113),shock (FSD 0114),cook-off (FSD 0166).

3.6.4.1.3 Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices

3.6.4.1.3.1 Tasks

• To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of launchers, propul-sion devices and warheads. The advisory group shall be able to operate inthe following areas:– launchers and propulsion devices,– structural strength,– wear in launchers,– materials,– design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices,– compatibility.

• Advice can inter alia relate to:– action to be taken concerning existing weapons, launchers and war-

heads or suchlike that are undergoing development,– project specifications and technical documentation.

• To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the pro-duction of documentation for launchers, propulsion devices and warheads(for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation,etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in theabove.

Methodology 3

49

3

• To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experienceacquired concerning launchers, propulsion devices and warheads to FMVdepartments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies.


Members present in the advisory group may vary according to which of thegroup’s sectors of expertise is relevant to the advice sought.

The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisorygroup assessments.

Scope of report:

• Brief general information about the object:– field of application,– weapon platform,– weapon (or equivalent).

• A detailed review of the launchers or propulsion devices and warheads:– Launchers or propulsion devices,– structural strength,– wear in launchers,– materials,– design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices.– compatibility.

• Statement disclosing safety analyses performed.

• Statement disclosing safety testing, design type testing and other safety test-ing performed (as specified in FSD 0060).

• Statement disclosing verification of requirements for Section 5.2 and 5.3performed in accordance with Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’.

• Review of proposals for technical requirement specifications.

• Review of the quality plan for the object.

• Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of rel-evant documentation shall be submitted.

• Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than threeweeks prior to review of the object.

3 Methodology

50

3

3.7 Safety testing

3.7.1 Purpose

In combination with the safety analysis to constitute a verification of the safetyrequirements for the product.



P3: FMV.

3.7.3 Time frame

P1: During verification.

P3: During review of existing materiel.


Safety testing is a comprehensive and extensive activity, see Figure 3.2.

The purpose of safety testing embraces three areas:

• It is one of several methods for verifying that safety requirements are met(analysis, inspection, etc. are others).Example:3-metre drop test to demonstrate resistance to an environmental condition.

• It is a method of generating input data for the safety analyses that are usedto verify other safety requirements.Example:Testing to find out what happens with an incorrectly fitted spring in a fuzingsystem when that system falls from a truck platform, so-called FMEA test-ing.

Methodology 3

51

3

• It is a method for providing the authorities with decision data for qualifica-tion/classification.Example:Fuel fire test and 12-metre drop test to provide data for classification of am-munition according to UN and Transport and Storage coding by the Advi-sory Group for Explosives / SÄI.

Figure 3.2 Example of scope of safety testing

Safety testing as specified in FSD 0060 shall always be performed. FSD 0060contains a section that defines extreme environments, how high and low temper-ature sequences shall be dimensioned, and a section on the testing of insensitivemunitions (IM), as well as testing in accordance with UN regulations for theclassification of explosive goods. If ammunition incorporates a fuzing system,FSD 0213 shall also be applied. If ammunition incorporates an electric igniter,FSD 0112 and FSD 0212 shall be applied. Since all ammunition contains explo-sive in some form, FSD 0214 shall also be applied.

Verification FMEA-testing Qualification

Testing:

• 5 m drop• arming distance

Testing ofdefective

units

Classification:

• 12 m drop• fuel fire test

Analysis

Inspection

FSD 0060

FSD 0213

3 Methodology

52

3Figure 3.3 Safety testing for qualification

3.8 Test directives for safety surveillance

3.8.1 Purpose

To produce test directives for safety surveillance. This is the documentation thatenables surveillance of ammunition in depot storage to obtain data to decidewhether the ammunition is still safe to use. Safety surveillance constitutes partof the overall in-service surveillance of ammunition.


P1: FMV.

P2: FMV.

EnvironmentalresistanceEnv EngineeringManualSeparate testing

Sequential testing

-FSD-FSD

FSD 0060Abnormal environmentHot sequentialCold sequential

UN-classificationIM-testing

FSD 0213Fuze systems

FSD 0212EED in systems

FSD 0112EED’s

FSD 0214Explosives

Methodology 3

53

3

3.8.3 Time frame

P1: During the development phase.



The basis for test directives should contain the following parts:

• description of the product,

• applicable documents (references),

• product requirements,

• method of implementation,

• criteria for assessment of results,

• formulation of the results in the documentation,

• allocation of undertakings between FMV and possible suppliers.

The method for safety inspection is based on the concept that assessment is acomparison between the characteristics of ageing ammunition and the equiva-lent characteristics of newly manufactured, safety approved or newly developedammunition.

The need for comparative data for newly developed ammunition thus places anequivalent requirement on development operations to generate ‘zero values’ bysuch means as so-called shelf life testing.

For further information refer to the FMV Manual of Regulations for In-ServiceSurveillance of Ammunition.

3.9 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regula-tions (PHST)

3.9.1 Purpose

To provide a basis for the handling and storage regulations that contribute toreducing the remaining risks of the weapon system to a tolerable level.

3 Methodology

54

3


P1: FMV and the Armed Forces.

P2: FMV and the Armed Forces.

3.9.3 Time frame

P1: During the development phase.



3.9.4.1 Background

A basis for handling and storage regulations shall be produced at an early stagein the materiel development process. An integral part of development – togetherwith representatives from the Armed Forces – shall be to develop a product thatmeets the requirements stipulated by the Armed Forces concerning handling inpeacetime and wartime.

The handling and storage regulations produced by FMV in collaboration withthe Armed Forces during development subsequently constitute the basis for theitem headed ‘Restrictions’ in the FMV Safety Statement (SS).

The restrictions in Section 4 of the Safety Statement are issued by the ArmedForces and FMV in accordance with the regulations stated in the Manual Gov-erning Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids (H PubL), and is regu-lated under Chapter 6 ‘Co-ordination with other authorities etc.’.

Methodology 3

55

3

3.9.4.2 Subdivision of materiel publications

The following table is reproduced from the Manual for Armed Forces Publica-tions and Instructional Aids, 1996, where it is published as Table 6:1. It illus-trates the co-ordination between publications from Armed Forces headquartersand materiel publications from FMV regarding content and denomination.

The work of producing and allocating information between the various publica-tions should always be co-ordinated between FMV and the Armed Forces.

Table 3:2 Publications overview

Content Armed Forces HQ publications

Materiel publications from FMV

Solely directives = compulsory - Instructions - Technical orders- Materiel instructions

Diverse directives, guidelines, etc. =compulsory or advisory

- Manuals- Regulations

- Technical orders (some)- Materiel manuals- Materiel charts

Solely information / elucidation - Manuals- Regulations

- Technical orders (some)- Materiel manuals- Materiel charts

Weapons 4

57

4

4 WEAPONS

4.1 General

4.1.1 Purpose

In addition to pure ammunition safety and the safety of weapons and launchers,safety also encompasses the interaction between weapons and ammunition. Ifany of these constituent parts is modified or developed further, or a completelynew weapon system is developed or acquired, the interfaces must be given care-ful consideration. The purpose of this chapter is to:

• identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered and veri-fied when developing and acquiring a weapon system,

• identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered during de-velopment of ammunition,

• make proposals for the specification of such interfaces between weaponsand ammunition.

4.1.2 Structure of chapter

This chapter is subdivided into two main parts. One part deals with commonrequirements that apply independent of the type of weapon, and the second part– called system requirements – also includes a number of other requirements.The system requirements part is subdivided as follows: launchers, pylons anddispensers, weapon platforms, hatches and doors, sighting and laying systems,guidance systems and miscellaneous.

Ammunition specific requirements concerning warheads, propulsion devices,fuzing systems and packagings are not discussed in this chapter but are dealtwith in Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’.

4.1.3 Purpose of the requirements

Where safety to personnel, property and the environment is concerned, the pur-pose throughout of the requirements formulated is to ensure:

• safe handling during transport and deployment,

4 Weapons

58

4

• safety inside and around the weapon during loading or taking onboard, un-loading of the weapon, while the unit is loaded and during firing or weaponrelease,

• safety outside the specified danger area,

• safety during training, exercises, repair and maintenance,

• safety during disposal.

4.1.4 Risks and system safety

Besides freedom from malfunction in the weapon and ammunition, safety isalso dependent on the interface between them and the interfaces between thesystem and the environment and the application (use) for which it is intended.For example, a gun may be part of a battery with other guns that have differentfire missions and thus different natures of ammunition that should preferably notrequire different safety instructions concerning use. There may also be require-ments for several natures of ammunition to be usable in the same launcher with-out any necessity for changes such as barrel replacement. One type of launcherand one nature of ammunition can also be intended for different weapon plat-forms such as vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels. It is therefore crucial thatammunition is developed with due consideration given to all the applicableapplications, and that the characteristics that are decisive for safety in a specificapplication are documented. As more specialized functions are incorporated inammunition – such as proximity fuzes, terminal guidance, and the variousadvanced guidance systems used in guided weapons – increasingly comprehen-sive safety programs and documentation will be needed.

Weapons 4

59

4

Figure 4.1 Overview of weapon phases and risk factors

Tran

spo

rt a

nd

load

ing

saf

ety

Bo

re a

nd

mu

zzle

saf

ety

Exe

mp

el p

åri

skfa

kto

rer

Haz

ard

ove

rvie

w

Arm

ing

ran

ge(

del

ay)

Saf

ety

dis

tan

ce(t

imes

)

In-f

ligh

t sa

fety

rain

saf

ety

resi

stan

ce t

o e

lect

rom

agn

etic

bush

saf

ety

Saf

e se

par

atio

nd

ista

nce

Mas

k sa

fety

Exa

mp

les

of

haz

ard

s fa

cto

rs

Mec

hani

cal a

mm

uniti

on h

andl

ing

Load

ing

Unl

oadi

ngF

lare

-bac

k (p

rope

llant

com

bust

ion)

Abn

orm

al h

andl

ing

Sou

nd p

ress

ure

Pre

ssur

eR

ecoi

lM

ax im

puls

e (

gun

stre

ngth

)W

ear

Coo

k-of

fS

ub-c

alib

re b

arre

lH

azar

dous

initi

atio

nB

ackb

last

Dyn

amic

inte

ract

ion

”Roc

ket f

lare

”

Frag

men

tatio

nS

abot

s/dr

ivin

g ba

nd f

unct

ion

Bas

e bl

eed

cont

aine

rM

ussl

e br

ake

Muz

zle

flash

Frag

men

tatio

n

Fuz

e se

tting

Traj

ecto

ry in

stab

ility

Aim

ing

and

firin

g lim

itatio

n

4 Weapons

60

4

Figure 4.1 shows which risks may need to be evaluated for various types ofweapons and in which phase damage/injury may arise. The figure does notclaim to be exhaustive for all applications.

4.2 Common requirements

Requirements that are independent of weapon type or are similar for severaltypes of weapons are discussed below. For information concerning requirementsthat are common to all materiel refer to Chapter 2, ‘Safety activities and require-ments common to all materiel’.

4.2.1 Requirements of International Law

The weapons related requirements specified below are stated for the purpose ofensuring compliance with the requirements of International Law.

For references refer to Chapter 7, ‘References’.

1.42001 Booby traps that look like civilian utility goods, or are marked with internationally recognized safety emblems, shall not be fabricated.

1.42002 Laser weapons mainly for use against people (anti-personnel laser weapons) shall not be fabricated.

1.42003 Weapons that have deliberately been made toxic in order to harm people shall not be fabricated.

1.42004 Incendiary weapons that have a non-discriminatory effect, or are mainly intended for anti-personnel use, shall not be fabricated.

1.42005 Weapons that are difficult to aim at a specific target shall not be fabricated.Comment: This requirement applies mainly to carpet bombs.

1.42006 Weapons that may cause extensive, long-term, severe damage to the natural environment shall not be fabricated.

4.2.2 General requirements

The handling of an uncocked weapon unit shall be tolerably safe both when theunit is separated from, and is mounted on, the weapon platform. This conditionshall also apply during transport in all operational environments.

Weapons 4

61

4

During an exercise a loaded weapon shall be safe for the personnel operating itand for its surroundings. It shall not be possible for the weapon to be inadvert-ently fired during a simulated attack and thereby cause damage to the weaponplatform or its surroundings including simulated targets (which may be living orartificial targets).

During combat the weapon shall be tolerably safe for personnel operating it.Arming of the ammunition should occur at a safe distance from the weaponplatform, but also sufficiently early to enable effect in target at short ranges. Incertain cases the shell (missile) shall self-destruct.

4.2.2.1 Danger area

When firing or testing involves explosive materiel the danger area must be cal-culated and closed off to prevent damage to property and injury to personnel.Consideration must be given to the type of trials to be performed. Firing withsub-calibre anti-armour projectiles may result in a projectile flying several kilo-metres. Guided ammunition, if a malfunction occurs, may deviate considerablyfrom its intended flight path, etc. Even damage/injury caused by fragmentation,toxic gases, backblast and blast pressure must be taken into consideration. Thedanger area near the weapon, arising from movement of the weapon for exam-ple, must also be considered.

Figure 4.2 shows an example of the danger areas around a weapon and in the fir-ing zone. The size of danger areas is affected inter alia by the characteristics ofthe ammunition.

4 Weapons

62

4

Figure 4.2 Example of danger areas

1.42007 On the basis of analysis and testing an assessment of the danger area for all current combinations of weapons, ammunition, and fir-ing procedures shall be performed.Comment: Refer also to the relevant hazard factor, e.g. blast pressure, fragmen-tation, toxic substances.

4.2.2.2 Safety of friendly forces

Before a Safety Release is issued the weapon system must be evaluated toensure that it can be operated without risk of injury to personnel or damage tomateriel, and without risk to the general public as a result of inadequate safetyinstructions concerning malfunctions when firing. The proficiency required tooperate the weapon, and the methods for stowage of ammunition and other

Firing zone

Danger areaboundary

Weapons 4

63

4

equipment, constitute a vital part of the requirements. In general terms, the riskof a major failure or accident owing to human error can be minimized by goodergonomic design and appropriate training.

For safety in extreme climates refer to Section 4.2.6 ‘Extreme climatic condi-tions’.

1.42008 There shall be an emergency stop for laying and firing when the or-dinary stop function is not sufficient to prevent injury or damage to property.Comment: Cf. standard SS-EN 418 also.

1.42009 The emergency stop for laying and firing should operate in such a way that the energy source is disconnected.

1.42010 The emergency stop for laying and firing should be located as close to the energy source as possible.Comment: When testing the weapon it should be possible for an observer to op-erate the emergency stop manually.

1.42011 It shall be possible to unload a propelling charge that has not func-tioned.

1.42012 It shall be possible to remove empty cartridge cases, missile launch tubes, etc.

1.42013 It should be possible to manually override automatic functions.

1.42014 It shall be possible to mount and remove equipment at the incline angles specified for the weapon platform.

1.42015 It shall be possible for a member of the crew to wear specified equipment while at his operator station.Comment:Such equipment may comprise personal protective clothing such as gloves, helmet, eye protectors (e.g. protective mask, anti-laser gog-gles) and NBC protective clothing.

1.42016 Monitors/VDUs shall be adapted to enable them to be read with ex-isting illumination, even outdoors in direct sunlight or in darkness, if the application so demands.

1.42017 Symbols/texts on switches and other controls shall be legible and unambiguous in accordance with applicable standards.

1.42018 In weapon systems where several operators can fire the weapon it shall be possible for each operator to disarm the weapon indepen-dently.

4 Weapons

64

4

1.42019 Where necessary footholds shall be fitted with appropriate anti-slip surfaces.

1.42020 Locking devices shall be incorporated to secure heavy hatches and doors in open position (see also requirements under the heading ‘Weapon platforms’).

1.42021 A ventilation, heating and air conditioning system should be in-corporated if applicable.

1.42022 The safe separation distance shall be determined for all relevant ammunition in the most unfavourable firing conditions. Any protec-tive features on the weapon shall be taken into consideration, cf. re-quirement 1.51024.Comment:Refer also to other hazard factors and hazards such as blast pressure, fragmentation and toxic substances.

4.2.3 Toxic substances

Substances produced by propelling charges during firing are classified as toxicwhen their concentration in the air exceeds certain levels. These toxic sub-stances include inter alia metals, ammonia, carbon monoxide and oxides ofnitrogen. Propelling charge cases may emit toxic substances even after firing.

Carbon monoxide (CO) commonly occurs and is dangerous since it is odourlessand colourless, and can cause death. Typical symptoms of carbon monoxide poi-soning are headache, nausea, blurred vision, giddiness, extreme lethargy andunconsciousness. Normally, oxygen from the lungs is transported through thebody by the haemoglobin in the blood. Carbon monoxide binds with the haemo-globin and thereby reduces the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. Thebonding capability of carbon monoxide to the blood can be 300 times greaterthan that of oxygen. Carbon monoxide is removed solely through the lungs. Therate at which carbon monoxide is eliminated from the blood declines exponen-tially and relatively slowly. The half-life time of carbon monoxide in the bloodcan be as high as 4 hours for a healthy person in an environment free from con-taminants.

Ammonia (NH3) is generated by the combustion of ammunition propellants.Exposure to ammonia primarily affects the respiratory tract and the eyes. Atconcentrations of 50–100 ppm most people experience a moderate degree ofeye, nose and throat irritation.

Weapons 4

65

4

Nitrogen oxides are also generated during firing. The predominant componentsare nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Nitric oxide has beenreported to cause unconsciousness in laboratory animals exposed to concentra-tions greater than 2 500 ppm. Nitric oxide itself has no irritant properties but isfrequently oxidised in air to form nitrogen dioxide. At concentrations below 50ppm the conversion of nitrogen oxide to nitrogen dioxide is slow.

Nitrogen dioxide is more dangerous than nitrogen oxide, and causes irritation ofthe eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Short exposures to 5 ppm may cause cough-ing and shortness of breath. Exposure to concentrations of 50–100 ppm maycause death or chronic respiratory problems.

Lead (Pb) can be absorbed into the body from inhaling finely divided particles.Propelling charges and small calibre ammunition contain certain quantities oflead. The lead is vaporised as the charge burns. Combustion gases containinglead either escape via the barrel or enter the crew compartment, and also occurwhen small calibre ammunition hits the target. The permissible exposure limit tolead has been set at 0.05 mg per cubic metre of air as a mean average over an 8-hour exposure.

Despite ventilation systems, toxic gases and particles can be a major threat topersonnel working in the enclosed confines of a combat vehicle for example.Neither shall toxic gases be ignored in the case of towed or other materiel. Toxicsubstances, even in small concentrations, can affect or degenerate personnelcapability. A number of factors affect the level of concentration of toxic sub-stances at the crew stations, such as:

• the rate of fire,

• the chemical composition of the propellant,

• the efficiency of the fume extractor if fitted,

• the internal ballistics, nature and weight of the propelling charge. (The fumeextractor, if fitted, is usually less efficient with low charges),

• materials used in the ammunition (e.g. beryllium alloys),

• the efficiency of the ventilation system such as the NBC ventilation system,

• leakage in the breech mechanism,

• the volume of the cartridge case,

• wind velocity and direction,

• whether firing takes place with hatches open or closed,

• which of the weapons is fired,

• overpressure in the crew compartment.

4 Weapons

66

4

Comment: Limit values are specified in AFS 1996:2, ‘Industrial Safety Ordi-nance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occu-pational Safety and Health’.

Ozone depleting substances as specified in the Montreal protocol must not beused. The parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the OzoneLayer shall be mindful of their obligation under that convention to take appro-priate measures to protect human health and the environment against activitiesthat may affect the ozone layer.

1.42023 The concentration of toxic substances shall be less than the per-missible values stated in AFS 1996:2.

1.42024 Requirement 1.42023 shall be verified in the most unfavourable fir-ing conditions and in field conditions.

4.2.4 Electrical and magnetic fields

An electrical firing circuit may be subjected to radiated or conducted electricalinterference generated by the weapon system in which it is incorporated, and toradiated interference generated by external sources, especially radio and radartransmitters. Firing and fuzing systems containing electric igniters may be par-ticularly susceptible to such interference. Communication with the ammunitionis also a sensitive function. Angle sensors, conditions for arming, and control ofstatus are other functions that can be affected and lead to a hazardous event. Ifthe interference level exceeds the specified test level, inadvertent firing mayoccur. Fuzing systems employing percussion caps and a striker actuated by aheavy-duty solenoid are less likely to be adversely affected, and probably do notneed to be tested in this respect. However, if the solenoid is controlled by anyform of electronics or sensitive relays, such a concept may be just as susceptibleas an electrical firing circuit and consequently needs to be analysed and tested.

Electrical switching operations may cause transient interference in the weaponsystem. Onboard radio transmitters and other electrical equipment may consti-tute an internal source of interference, particularly if electromagnetic screeningis inadequate. External interference may emanate from airborne or ground-based radar and radio transmitters operating in the vicinity.

Special measures may need to be taken to protect the weapon system againstelectrostatic discharge (ESD), high-power microwave radiation (HPM), andagainst the electromagnetic pulse that arises in conjunction with lightning(LEMP) or when a nuclear charge detonates (NEMP).

Weapons 4

67

4

1.42025 The susceptibility of electrical circuits to interference shall be analysed with regard to safety.

1.42026 The susceptibility of safety critical electrical circuits to electrical interference shall be determined.

1.42027 The levels of electrical and magnetic fields to which the crew and equipment are subjected shall be determined.

Refer also to Section 4.3.1.2.3 ‘Firing mechanisms’.

4.2.5 Water and moisture resistance

Water and moisture affect mechanical, optical and electrical functions. Drainageof electrical and optical boxes, for example, is often necessary. Changes in tem-perature during storage can cause condensation on surfaces with a subsequentrisk of moisture damage and corrosion, for example.

1.42028 The weapon system should not incorporate undrainable channels.

1.42029 The weapon system should be tested while subjected to water spraying and during fording through water.

4.2.6 Extreme climatic conditions

The safety of the overall system with all its functions shall be verified at theextremes of temperature stated in the specification for the system. It is also nec-essary to verify that the crew can operate the weapon system at these tempera-tures.

It is not sufficient solely to test the system at extreme temperatures. Tests mustbe conducted in the field where extreme temperatures combined with the terrainprovide adverse conditions including combinations of sand, dust, mud, snow,rain, humidity and ice.

To ensure that the crew can fulfil their duties in extreme high and low tempera-tures in field conditions, the following requirements shall be met:

1.42030 The weapon should be designed so that personal protective cloth-ing and other equipment worn by operators does not affect their operation of the weapon.

1.42031 The system should be equipped with facilities that provide a good work environment even in extreme temperature conditions.

4 Weapons

68

4

4.2.7 Fire

All constituent parts of a weapon system and natures of ammunition may besubjected to fire owing to accidents or combat action. For this reason it is essen-tial that the materiel is resistant to fire to a certain degree. Because of the varioustypes of materiel, range of applications, and variations in other circumstances atthe time of fire, it is difficult to standardize a comprehensive fire test.

Any fire of major scale generates temperatures in excess of 800ºC. Fire-resistantmateriel must thus resist such a temperature for a certain prescribed time with-out inadvertent initiation of propelling charges or warheads, and in some casesthe materiel shall still be usable after the specified fire exposure time. Even withfires at lower temperatures, large quantities of toxic gases can be formed.

Fire tests can be subdivided and defined as follows:

• The purpose of material tests is to determine the properties of materialswhen exposed to fire.

• System tests often consist of operational tests in which the weapon systemor ammunition are subjected to a fire scenario determined by the authorities.

• The purpose of safety tests is to determine the characteristics of the weaponand ammunition when exposed to fire or an explosive atmosphere from thepoint of view of the crew and materiel safety. The following characteristicsare pertinent:– resistance to fire with retained function,– the risk for explosion or ignition during fire,– the occurrence of toxic or corrosive gases during fire,– hazards in an explosive atmosphere.

For information concerning fire-fighting refer to Section 4.3.7.3 ‘Fire-fightingequipment’.

Additional requirements concerning the resistance of ammunition to fire arestated in Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’.

The requirements shall ensure the safety of the crew during fire in the weapon orammunition, and during fire in the crew compartments and ammunition stowagecompartment. Testing can be performed as specified in FSD 0165.

1.42032 In the event of fire in a weapon platform or in materiel (ammunition or other materiel) stowed in a confined space the crew should be protected by specific material design measures and/or escape routes.

Weapons 4

69

4

4.2.8 Blast pressure

The impact pressure of the air set in motion by an explosion – called blast pres-sure – that arises when a gun is fired can impair hearing and also injure otherorgans in the body. Very high pressure, such as close to the muzzle of a high-energy weapon, can be immediately fatal. The blast pressure pattern inside andoutside the troop transport compartment can be complex and necessitates trialsunder field conditions. Blast pressure levels should also be measured around thevehicle/materiel to enable an assessment of the hazard to troops operating in theimmediate vicinity of the materiel.

1.42033 The blast pressure level shall be determined for the personnel con-cerned. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Bow-wave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account.Comment:Recoilless systems shall be designed so that there is no harmful in-terference between the blast pressure in the muzzle and venturi. The effect of the terrain (the surroundings) shall also be taken into ac-count.

1.42034 When verifying blast pressure characteristics, the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 should be used.

1.42035 The number of impulse blasts (rounds fired) to which the crew may be exposed during a given period of time shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions for the system. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Bow-wave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account.

1.42036 Any protective devices and the location of the crew relative to the launcher shall be stated in the Safety Restrictions.

4.2.9 Backblast

The backblast is a rearwards directed jet of (hot) propellant gas that exits arecoil weapon via the muzzle brake and from a recoilless weapon via the rearopening during firing. Backblast can contain fragments and particles from theground.

1.43037 The backblast (propellant gases) from the muzzle brake or equiva-lent shall not have such high particle and energy content that it can cause injury to personnel or damage to materiel outside the speci-fied danger area.

1.43038 Requirement 1.43037 shall be verified by calculation and testing.

4 Weapons

70

4

4.2.10 Vibration dose

During firing each individual crew member is subjected to a dose of vibration.By establishing a vibration dose value (VDV) a limit can be set for each individ-ual crew member.

VDV is a measurement of the total vibration to which a crew member may beexposed during a specific period of time. The value gives a general indication ofthe associated discomfort and risk of injury. VDV is calculated from dataobtained from trials. From these results the number of rounds that may be firedbefore the VDV level is reached is calculated for various angles of elevation andtraverse.

1.42039 Crew members shall not be exposed to a harmful vibration dose.Comment: A common requirement for exposure to body vibration is stated in ISO 2631, ISO 5349 and SEN 580110.

4.2.11 Pressure

When projectiles are fired the launcher and projectile are subjected to an inter-nal ballistic gas pressure. If this pressure in any section of the barrel exceeds thestructural strength of the structure, there is a risk that the barrel may rupture andcause serious injury. During the design phase it must also be ensured that othercomponents than the barrel that are subjected to pressure, such as the breechblock and mechanism, can also withstand the loads involved. If the internal bal-listic gas pressure exceeds the structural strength of the projectile there is a riskof barrel rupture, which is why the projectile must also withstand the internalballistic pressure.

1.42040 When determining dimensions and design of the barrel, breech mechanism and other parts exposed to pressure, the pressure defini-tions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 or equivalent stan-dard shall be applied.

4.2.12 Forces

4.2.12.1 General

This section contains general guidelines for ‘forces’ in the form of springs,hydraulic pressure or similar that in the event of a failure/malfunction can bereleased and cause injury (e.g. from impact and/or crushing by moving parts).

Weapons 4

71

4

In many cases it is impossible to determine whether a spring, hydraulic system,etc. contains stored energy. This should be taken into account during service,maintenance and disposal.

4.2.12.2 Requirements

4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical)

Many constructions contain spring forces such as:

• drive springs in loading trays,

• drive springs in ammunition magazines,

• brake parts (like parking brakes, etc.),

• balance springs,

• operating springs in breech mechanisms.

During recoil in a recoil system, drive springs for the ramming motion of theloading tray, for example, can be cocked. The energy stored constitutes a hazardwhich, when inadvertently released, can result in death or serious injury.

When personnel must be present inside a danger area, for unloading or cockingthe breech block before the first round for example, the personnel entering thedanger area shall ensure that the designated safety devices are engaged.

It is important that the analysis gives special consideration to the status ofsprings incorporated with regard to stored energy in the event that firing is inter-rupted.

Springs in a breech mechanism shall be given particular consideration duringthe safety analysis, since failure modes in these design elements can have criti-cal consequences.

When the attachment elements of a spring may constitute a more frequent haz-ard than the spring itself, such attachment elements shall be integrated into thesafety analysis.

1.42041 Spring forces that alone, or in combination with other hazards, can result in an accident shall be analysed.

1.42042 Spring forces that can cause an accident shall either be provided with double locking devices or anti-handling devices that prevent inadvertent release of the spring forces.

4 Weapons

72

4

1.42043 Any spring that constitutes a component in a locking device which, in the event of malfunction, can cause injury shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterized.

1.42044 Fastening elements shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterised together with the spring.

1.42045 The characteristics as specified in requirements 1.42043 and 1.42044 shall not be modified between inspection intervals for pre-ventive maintenance such that safety is degraded.

1.42046 Springs and their attachment elements that can affect safety shall be located in a protected position in such a way that inadvertent con-tact by personnel or the environment around the system does not de-grade their safety.

1.42047 Springs and their attachment elements that can cause a serious in-jury in the event of a malfunction should have a duplicate (redun-dancy) function or have a fail-safe function.

4.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics

Hydraulic pressure (and even pneumatic pressure) during operation, or accumu-lated hydraulic pressure after operation, can result in hazardous events. Hydrau-lic pressure can also constitute a hazard via its consumers (hydraulic cylinders,motors, hoses, etc.).

1.42048 Accumulated pressure shall be monitored and equipped with a de-vice for pressure equalization if inadvertent actuation of any con-sumer in the system can lead to injury during operation, unloading and/or maintenance.

1.42049 Monitoring as specified in requirement 1.42048 should be dupli-cated (instrument and control lamp) or have a fail-safe function.

1.42050 Hydraulic hoses and hydraulic components should be located outside crew compartments in confined spaces.

1.42051 Hydraulic fluid should be prevented from penetrating into crew compartments.

4.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces

Recoil forces exist both in recoilless and recoil systems.

The term ‘recoilless system’ is a qualified truth – there is no absolutely recoil-less system. Instead, the recoil is generally so small that it does not entail anypotential risk for accidents.

Weapons 4

73

4

Recoilless systems exist inter alia as manportable anti-armour weapons (such asthe Carl-Gustaf system) or as anti-armour guns of various types. In recoillesssystems the recoil is neutralised by the gas flow through the open rear end of thebarrel which is equipped with a nozzle/venturi. The recoil forces can be influ-enced by variations in the geometry of the nozzle/venturi.

In manportable recoilless systems the recoil could result in excessive recoilforces on the gunner’s shoulder and/or cause the sight to hit his eye. In caseswhere a recoilless system is fired from the shoulder, the recoil can be experi-enced differently by different gunners even though the recoil is of equal magni-tude (i.e. the same energy).

1.42052 The danger area around the recoil system shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions.Comment:The actions of the gun crew in all situations (emergency firing, un-loading, etc.) shall be taken into account.

1.42053 If it is conceivable that overpressure can arise in the recoil buffer and recuperator and constitute a hazard, they shall be equipped with a device for relieving the pressure before disassembly.

1.42054 The recoil forces in a recoilless system shall be established by cal-culation and testing.

4.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements

Some examples of parts in a weapon system that can cause serious injuries are:

• loading trays during ramming,

• empty cartridge cases that are ejected,

• axles/shafts and other rotating parts.

1.42055 Rotating and other moving parts shall be located so as to minimise the risk of injury.Comment:This requirement can be satisfied by the provision of guards or by preventing the presence of personnel inside the danger area.

1.42056 It shall not be possible for loading devices to be controlled by any-one other than the person performing the loading.

1.42057 Personnel shall be protected against the ejection of empty car-tridge cases.

4 Weapons

74

4

4.2.13 Lasers

Laser beams can cause burns and total or partial blindness. A laser beamdirected at the skin can cause burns and is also considered to be able to causesmall blood clots. Lasers can even cause injuries at long distances from the lasersource depending on the type of laser, power density and the frequency of repe-tition. It is particularly dangerous if binoculars or optical sighting devices etc.are being used.

Occupational activities involving the use of a laser are subject to employer lia-bility in accordance with current legislation and regulations. The overall publi-cation applying to the use of lasers is the Industrial Safety Ordinance andRegulations of the Board for Occupational Safety and Health (AFS).

Lasers are subdivided into a number of classes according to type and outputpower. Regulations governing classification are stated in IEC 60825-1.

1.42058 It should not be possible to activate lasers of range-finder type in an arbitrary direction.Comment:This requirement can be satisfied by linking the laser to the barrel or equivalent.

1.42059 Lasers should be equipped with safety circuits for use in training mode.

1.42060 Lasers should be equipped with safety covers and locking devices.

1.42061 It should not be possible to look into the laser outlet optic when used in the normal way.

1.42062 Lasers shall be equipped with warning signs.

1.42063 Sights, prism windows etc. should either have built-in laser pro-tection filters or be designed in a way that allows the operator to wear anti-laser goggles.

4.2.14 Stability – mechanical

The stability of a weapon system during firing is affected by the following mainfactors:

• trunnion forces and height above the trunnion,

• the angle of elevation,

• the weight and the location of the centre of mass of the weapon system,

Weapons 4

75

4

• the longitudinal axis of the weapon system relative to the direction of fire,

• the incline and type of surface that the system stands on,

• the effectiveness of brakes and suspension,

• whether or not spades are fitted to restrain motion during firing.

Stability during firing shall be verified. The safety of the crew shall also be anal-ysed.

1.42064 Motion of the chassis, platform, controls, eye-piece or launcher shall be so minimal that no danger to personnel nor damage to am-munition or materiel occurs.

1.42065 Open (or closed) doors or hatches shall remain secured.

1.42066 The weapon or weapon platform shall retain ammunition and stowed materiel in their designated places during operational use.

4.2.15 Transport

4.2.15.1 General

Despite comprehensive testing in simulated environments it has long been rec-ognized that it is necessary to transport ammunition stowed in combat vehiclesand self-propelled guns for long distances in a manner specified by regulations,and then subsequently to test fire the ammunition to verify its function.Although simulation methods have been improved the need for practical trialsremains. In the case of a combat vehicle that uses separated ammunition that isrammed into the barrel, vehicle motion may cause a projectile to fall backagainst the propelling charge. If this should happen, damage may be caused tothe barrel when the gun is fired. The risk of projectile fall-back should be evalu-ated through transport resistance testing.

In addition, transport resistance testing should be performed whenever:

• new ammunition is introduced into an existing weapon system,

• ammunition stowage arrangements are altered,

• the vehicle is equipped with newly modified tyres, tracks or suspension sys-tem,

• the vehicle is used in a new environment involving more severe environ-mental stresses for the ammunition.

4 Weapons

76

4


4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back

If the weapon is designed to fire separated ammunition (separate propellingcharges) and is required to be kept loaded during transport mode, requirementsto ensure that the projectile does not fall back from rammed position shall bestated.

1.42067 During driving in terrain in accordance with specified conditions the ammunition should not fall back from the rammed position.Comment:This requirement should be verified by testing with a barrel that has 50% or less of its service life remaining in respect of wear.

1.42068 The system should withstand rounds being fired with ammunition that is not rammed in a correct manner (i.e. in fall-back position).Comment:Gas leakage around the ammunition can damage both the ammuni-tion and the barrel.

4.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects

1.42069 The method for stowing ammunition in racks and bins in various stowage locations shall be dimensioned so that the ammunition after transport and redeployment does not constitute a hazard to the crew.

Weapons 4

77

4

4.3 System requirements

4.3.1 Launchers

Figure 4.3 Examples of launchers

4.3.1.1 Weapon installation

During development it is necessary to verify the structural strength and integrityof the weapon installation.

Verification can be by means of calculation and/or testing. In the case of testingan initial functional inspection shall be performed without firing. Next, straingauges are fitted at critical locations to measure the stresses and inner ballistic

4 Weapons

78

4

pressures during firing. A number of rounds are then fired to produce thestresses and internal ballistic pressures. Finally, the fatigue limits for the instal-lation are estimated through calculations and firings or laboratory trials.

Preparation systems and guidance systems must not render the weapon danger-ous in the event of any malfunction. Incorrect firing data must not occur duringtemporary malfunctions in the weapon system computers, electrical or hydraulicsystems, or guidance systems, that could enable a hazard firing.

1.43001 Launchers controlled by electronics shall have such an interface with safety functions that malfunctions, or bugs in software for ex-ample, do not affect safety in any crucial way.Comment:By differentiating in the design between electronics designed to control safety functions and electronics designed for other func-tions, a better interface is obtained.

1.43002 Clearance between the elevating mass and other parts at maximum recoil within the entire laying range in traverse and elevation shall be sufficient to prevent damage to the system.

1.43003 Safety devices should be fitted to prevent crew members from in-serting limbs into spaces containing moving system parts (range of movement of the recoil system, etc.).Comment:The minimum requirement is that the ‘danger’ zone must be marked out.

4.3.1.2 Recoil systems

4.3.1.2.1 General

Besides the movement of recoil, recoil systems are characterised inter alia byhigh internal ballistic gas pressures and high combustion temperatures. Theoften high rate of fire rapidly results in a high temperature on the inside of thebarrel.

Automatic handling of ammunition and automatic ramming are common. Oftenseveral natures of ammunition shall be fired in one and the same gun system.

Most modern weapons of large calibre have hydro-pneumatic or hydro-mechan-ical mechanisms to assimilate recoil forces and to return the system to initialposition. Rifled guns also generate a torque acting on the gun when spin isimparted to the projectile. Many weapon systems have a muzzle brake fitted tothe barrel to reduce the force of recoil. For any given design of weapon and typeof ammunition, the forces acting on the elevating mass vary according to angle

Weapons 4

79

4

of elevation, the temperature of the propellant, and the temperature of the recoilsystem. Consequently, during trials the recoil system shall be fired at theextremes of temperature and pressure that are expected in the field and at maxi-mum laying angles.

Large calibre weapons that have semi-automatic breech mechanisms can utilizethe recoil energy to open the breech on run-out. Under certain conditions therecoil energy becomes so reduced that it is insufficient to open the breech. Theworst situation with the recoil system often occurs when firing the lowest pro-pelling charge (or when firing the ammunition that produces the lowest trunnionforce) at the lowest firing temperature. Semi-automatic systems must be testedby firing under various combinations of these conditions.

4.3.1.2.2 Breech mechanisms

There are several types of breech mechanism such as screw type with sectoredthreads, a wedge-shaped transverse block or back-piece.

1.43004 It shall be possible to operate the breech mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system to prevent injury to crew members by crushing.

1.43005 When the breech mechanism is fully closed it shall be locked in the closed position.

1.43006 The breech mechanism shall not open as a result of vibration caused by firing or motion/transport.

1.43007 It should not be possible to assemble any component of the breech assembly in an incorrect manner that could cause injury/damage.

1.43008 When the breech mechanism is operated automatically the firing mechanism shall automatically become inactive before the breech mechanism is released from its locked position.

1.43009 It shall be possible to indicate or observe the status of the breech mechanism.

1.43010 It shall not be possible to fire the weapon if the breech mechanism is not fully closed.

4.3.1.2.3 Firing mechanisms

The firing mechanism initiates the propelling charge via a cannon primer or car-tridge. This is either an integral part of the cartridge case or a separate cartridge.The firing mechanism is also the means by which the firing of the weapon iscontrolled, and is therefore of crucial importance for the interface between thecrew and the weapon. There are several types of firing mechanism:

4 Weapons

80

4

• Percussion. In this type a metal firing pin strikes the primer of the cannonprimer or cartridge causing it to produce a flash which ignites the propellingcharge. The firing pin is actuated by the release of a spring mechanism, ei-ther manually or by a mechanical or electrical device.

• Electric. In this type the primer is located in the artillery primer. The electro-explosive device (EED) in the artillery primer contains a priming composi-tion.

• Laser. This type uses a laser whose output power is dimensioned to initiatethe propelling charge.

1.43011 It shall be possible to safe the firing mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system.

1.43012 The weapon shall be fired by an active operation from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system

1.43013 If an electromechanical device is used it shall be protected from the effects of radiated or conducted interference that could cause inadvertent initiation.

1.43014 If a firing button, pedal, lever or similar is employed it shall be pro-vided with protection against inadvertent operation such as by a trigger guard.

1.43015 If a firing mechanism is employed to release a firing pin it shall be designed to withstand vibration and shocks.

1.43016 The firing mechanism shall be resistant to shock from other weap-ons mounted in the vicinity.

1.43017 Electrical firing systems shall be resistant to radiated or conduct-ed interference generated by other electrical installations on the weapon, or from moderate external sources of interference (radio, radar, etc.) without resulting in hazard initiation.

1.43018 The electrical connector of the firing mechanism should not come into contact with the base connector of the artillery primer until the breech block/screw is closed and locked.

1.43019 There should be at least two mechanical safety devices (which do not constitute any part of the firing linkage) that directly actuate the striker or the capability of the striker to fire.

1.43020 There shall be a separate manually operated safety interrupter that can break the electrical firing circuit.

1.43021 The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be located outside the zone of operation of the recoil system.

Weapons 4

81

4

1.43022 The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be marked with actual position/mode such as S for unarmed, O for armed, and A for automatic fire.

4.3.1.2.4 Breech ring

The breech ring is one of the parts in a firing system that is subjected to veryhigh stresses. In the same way as the barrel etc. the breech ring can becomefatigued. The safety analysis of the breech ring shall be based on calculation andtesting.

1.43023 For a given load profile the life of the breech ring shall be estab-lished by calculation and material testing.

4.3.1.2.5 Obturation

The breech mechanism shall prevent leakage of propellant gases. The choice ofobturation system is dependent on design requirements such as rate of fire andthe size of ammunition. From the safety aspect the obturation system must func-tion with all types of relevant charges over the entire temperature range. Leak-age of hot propellant gases could severely burn members of the crew. A minorleakage could cause a rise in the concentration of toxic fumes, especially in con-fined spaces. It should be noted that initiation systems employing an igniter alsonecessitate a gas-tight solution. The same requirement should apply to anyfuture initiation system such as laser ignition or an equivalent system.

1.43024 Obturation shall be designed to ensure that the crew is not exposed to either hot gases or harmful concentrations of toxic fumes.

4.3.1.2.6 Backflash

Backflash sometimes occurs in recoil systems when the breech is opened afterfiring. It occurs when combustion has not been completed when the breech isopened, or when combustible propellant gases are released and ignited by thesupply of oxygen. The resultant flash can cause burns to crew members and con-stitutes a hazard for propellant charges and equipment inside the turret of a com-bat vehicle, for example. Backflash may occur when the breech block/screw isopened during run-out. Firing into a head wind also tends to exacerbate back-flash. The efficiency of the fume extractor, if fitted, can be another contributingfactor. Backflash is not always detected during development trials of the propel-ling charge since the breech is not always opened immediately after firing insuch trials. Special trials should be performed to determine whether backflashmight be a problem. If the problem is serious, Safety Restrictions may have tobe placed on the use of certain charges or the fume extractor may need to bemodified.

4 Weapons

82

4

1.43025 Backflash that can cause injury shall not occur during automatic fire into a maximum head wind.

4.3.1.2.7 Barrels and sub-calibre barrels

4.3.1.2.7.1 Barrel wear

Barrel wear is primarily caused by hot propellant gases eroding the inside of thebarrel. Normally barrel wear is defined as the increase in bore diameter at a spe-cific point in the barrel (usually at the commencement of rifling). Wear reducesthe efficiency of obturation since it allows hot gases to pass the projectile. Thisleakage of hot gases can accelerate barrel wear. As wear increases the hot gasesmay begin to erode material from the driving band of the projectile. Eventually alevel of wear is reached that results in insufficient spin being imparted to theprojectile. The resultant instability of the projectile then constitutes a hazard,both in the bore and in trajectory.

In a worn barrel the projectile may accelerate ‘unguided’ until it engages withthe rifling. The resultant load may then cause the driving band to be damagedwhile in the barrel.

1.43026 The barrel shall not constitute any enhanced hazard (such as by im-parting extra stress on ammunition or incorrect trajectory) when the ammunition in question is fired in either a new or worn barrel.Comment: A worn barrel can normally be defined as a barrel that has less than 25% of its total wear life remaining.

1.43027 Requirement 1.43026 shall be verified by testing.

4.3.1.2.7.2 Fatigue

In most modern weapon systems the use of surface coated barrels, wear reduc-ing material (such as titanium dioxide), and non-metallic obturating material hasdecreased the rate of barrel wear and has thus extended barrel life considerably.Consequently, metal fatigue rather than wear can be the determining factorwhen calculating the service life of a barrel as fatigue failure may occur beforewear life has expired. To establish the fatigue life it is necessary to perform the-oretical calculations. On the basis of this data the safe limit for fatigue failurecan subsequently be established.

1.43028 Fatigue, and the inherent risk of barrel rupture, shall not occur during firing within the established barrel life.

1.43029 Requirement 1.43028 shall be verified; theoretical calculations may be employed.

Weapons 4

83

4

4.3.1.2.7.3 Fragmentation

Under extreme conditions, for example when there is soil, sand, a forgotten bar-rel telescope, or snow in the barrel, the barrel may rupture. Ammunition drivingbands, sabots, obturators, jackets, etc. can also cause fragmentation during fir-ing. To ensure the safety of the crew the requirements below shall be satisfied.

1.43030 Attachment of external parts on the outside of the barrel or sub-calibre barrel shall be in a way that precludes detachment during fir-ing.

1.43031 The muzzle brake should prevent rearward ricochets of driving bands, sabots, obturators, etc.

1.43032 During modification in the design or new development of ammuni-tion or weapons relating to driving bands, sabots, obturators, jackets etc., or in the event of a new commencement of rifling in the barrel or a new muzzle brake, testing shall be performed to deter-mine the occurrence of fragmentation.

1.43033 The barrel shall not rupture when firing the highest charge with a specified amount of snow, sand or gravel in the barrel.

1.43034 Practical trials to simulate barrel rupture as per requirement 1.43033 shall be performed.Comment:Testing may be performed by filling the barrel with various quanti-ties of sand and gravel to determine the ruggedness of the weapon.

4.3.1.2.7.4 Cook-off

Where barrel cooling systems are not employed, a sustained high rate of fire willmake the barrel extremely hot. Spontaneous initiation of ammunition (cook-off)can occur in a hot barrel when, for example, firing is interrupted while a round isrammed. Usually it is the propelling charge that is initiated, but initiation of thewarhead can also occur. It is also conceivable that a projectile detaches from thecartridge case during ramming thus enabling propellant to come into direct con-tact with the hot surface of the barrel and result in ignition. When a warheadheated in this way is ‘fired’, melted explosive may be subject to hazard initiationcaused by the acceleration stresses generated during firing.

Testing and calculations are necessary to establish at which temperature cook-off occurs, as well as how many rounds and which rate of fire are necessary toattain this temperature.

4 Weapons

84

4

1.43035 Cook-off shall not occur during the maximum specified fire en-gagement in combination with interrupted fire with rammed am-munition.Comment:Refer also to requirements 1.52011 and 1.53019.

1.43036 To determine the risk of cook-off the temperature and heat flux etc. for a hot barrel shall be established.Comment:The Safety Restrictions shall state the permitted rate of fire, the per-mitted number of rounds per salvo, and/or the permitted duration for fire.

4.3.1.2.8 Fume extractors

A fume extractor is a cylinder attached around the mid-section of the barrel. It ispressure fed by the propellant gases produced during firing and vents them for-wards in the barrel, thereby extracting residual gases out through the muzzle.The fume extractor also helps to prevent the occurrence of backflash. The fumeextractor is subjected to a certain load during firing, and must be dimensioned towithstand such stresses.

Figure 4.4 Example of a fume extractor

1.43037 The fume extractor shall be fitted to the barrel in a way that pre-vents detachment during firing.

1.43038 The fume extractor shall be so dimensioned that it is not subjected to fatigue and inherent risk of rupture during firing.

4.3.1.2.9 Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers

Weapon systems are provided with muzzle brakes to reduce recoil forces. Themuzzle brake is subjected to powerful forces by the high gas velocity, highvelocity particles and high pressure.

Weapons 4

85

4

In some cases it may, however, be necessary to increase recoil forces because offunctional requirements. This can be achieved by mounting an expansion nozzle(venturi) on the muzzle. A flame guard is employed to reduce the signature fromthe weapon when firing.

Figure 4.5 Example of a muzzle brake

1.43039 It shall not be possible for any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil amplifier fitted to detach during firing.

1.43040 Any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil amplifier shall be dimen-sioned so that it does not rupture during firing.

1.43041 Requirements 1.43039 and 1.43040 shall be verified by firing tests using the highest charge.

4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash

Muzzle flash can occur when the projectile passes the muzzle and unburnt pro-pellant gases are combusted. Muzzle flash can also occur when the driving bandor sabot does not obturate properly against the internal surface of the barrel.Besides danger to the crew, muzzle flash may also damage sight equipment (e.g.image amplifier).

1.43042 When fitting external equipment onto the weapon or weapon plat-form consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle flash.

1.43043 Crew stations shall be located such that the crew are not subjected to muzzle flash.

4.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters

A sub-calibre barrel/adapter is often used in large calibre barrels to enable low-cost ammunition to be used, primarily for exercise purposes. By using a sub-cal-ibre barrel the weapon system can largely be used in the same way as with astandard barrel and effective training is thus achieved.

1.43044 Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7 above shall apply.

4 Weapons

86

4

1.43045 It shall not be possible for a correctly fitted sub-calibre barrel or sub-calibre adapter to detach during firing.

1.43046 It shall be possible to inspect a sub-calibre barrel/adapter for cracks and other defects.

1.43047 A sub-calibre barrel/adapter shall not produce higher stresses on the ammunition than a standard barrel.Comment:If, for example, a sub-calibre barrel is longer than a standard bar-rel, other acceleration and spin stresses may arise. It must be deter-mined whether the ammunition is dimensioned for such stresses.

1.43048 Requirements 1.43045 and 1.43047 shall be verified by test firing using the actual propelling charges and natures of ammunition.

1.43049 A system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently fitted in an exercise weapon or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition.

4.3.1.2.12 Ramming

Ammunition can be rammed in the barrel in a number of different ways. When ahigh ramming velocity is used, such as with a high rate of fire, the high explo-sive or fuzing system in the projectile may be damaged. Ammunition containingsubmunitions, electronics, or rocket motors may be particularly vulnerable inthis respect.

1.43050 The rammer shall be provided with safety devices that prevent physical contact by the crew during the ramming operation.

1.43051 The physical ramming environment for the weapon in question shall be verified by testing, which shall be performed at the extreme temperatures specified.

4.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers

Recoil buffers are employed to create forces to enable the cyclical function ofthe recoil system. Recoil forces are usually accumulated in a pressure chamberfor gas/fluid or by springs. The system contains substantial forces which is whycare must be taken during maintenance and repair.

Before and after firing the following requirements shall be satisfied:

1.43052 The system shall be designed so that the static pressure of the re-coil buffer is retained.

1.43053 Leakage of recoil buffer fluid and gas should be minimized.

1.43054 Maximum recoil stresses shall be verified.

Weapons 4

87

4

1.43055 Forced recoil equipment shall withstand recoil forces with a safety margin.

4.3.1.3 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems

4.3.1.3.1 General

Minimal recoil systems and rocket systems are characterised by relatively littlerecoil and gas flow rearwards, among other things.

Ammunition handling is often performed manually. Different types of ammuni-tion can be used in the same weapon system.

Recoilless weapons and rocket systems employ various solutions for ammuni-tion handling:

• weapons for repeated use,

• weapons for limited repeated use,

• disposable weapons (for firing once only),

• fixed launch and aiming unit with replaceable, disposable barrel or launchtube.

Such systems usually have muzzle velocities below sonic speed and relativelyshort ranges. These systems often have large danger areas rearwards comparedwith recoil weapons. Some systems, such as missiles, can be guided while inflight and this affects the danger area.

In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the escape of gas through theopen rear end of the launch tube which has a nozzle or recoil rocket. The forceof recoil can be influenced by the geometry of the nozzle and the design of therecoil rocket.

The mass of gas escaping to the rear can be replaced by solid or liquid sub-stances, known as countermass, which results in a lower blast pressure aroundthe weapon.

In rocket systems the projectile is equipped with a rocket motor in which propel-lant combustion takes place. The pressure in the launch tube is determined bythe static pressure of the escaping gases, which is usually much lower than inrecoil systems.

4 Weapons

88

4

There are variations to both these systems. For recoilless systems there is therocket-assisted projectile (RAP) which maintains or increases velocity in flightby means of a rocket motor, and for rocket systems a gas generator located inthe launch tube provides the initial acceleration for the rocket in the launcher.

During loading there is a risk of inadvertent firing, and during firing muzzleflash and backblast present hazards.

4.3.1.3.2 Requirements

4.3.1.3.2.1 Firing mechanism

1.43056 Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3 above shall ap-ply.

1.43057 The firing mechanism shall have a transport safety device.

1.43058 The firing system shall have a safety device for the operating and system ready-to-fire phases.

1.43059 It shall be possible to deactivate the system to prevent hazard initi-ation during loading/unloading and during transport of the system.

4.3.1.3.2.2 Recoil

1.43060 The direction of recoil for recoilless launch tubes and rocket sys-tems should be to the rear in the event of any resultant recoil.

1.43061 Recoil forces shall be established by testing.

4.3.1.3.2.3 Hazards around the weapon

1.43062 The necessity for using a specific firing stance when firing a weap-on shall be documented in the Safety Restrictions.Comment:For example, fin-stabilized rounds with wide-span fins cannot be fired from the prone position. Safety Restrictions governing opera-tion must be formulated on the basis of the documentation specified above.

4.3.1.3.2.4 Backblast

1.43063 Outside the danger area for materiel and friendly forces the back-blast shall not have a high enough energy content to cause injury.Comment: Energy and particle content shall be determined.

1.43064 Requirement 1.43063 shall be verified by testing.

4.3.1.3.2.5 Muzzle flash

1.43065 When fitting external equipment onto the weapon consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle flash.

Weapons 4

89

4

1.43066 Muzzle flash shall be limited so that personnel are not subjected to higher levels of thermal radiation than the prescribed personal pro-tective equipment can withstand.

1.43067 The weapon should not produce such a muzzle flash that personal protective equipment is required by personnel.

4.3.1.3.2.6 Pressure

1.43068 There shall be a safety margin for structural strength and fatigue. The risk for barrel rupture shall be established for the specified op-erational profile.

1.43069 Requirement 1.43068 shall be verified by theoretical calculations and testing.Comment:For requirements concerning pressure refer to STANAG 4110 or equivalent.

4.3.1.3.2.7 Sub-calibre barrel

1.43070 A recoilless system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this per-manently fitted in an exercise weapon, or in a special exercise car-tridge that is loaded like normal ammunition.

4.3.1.4 Composite and compound barrels

Materials in the form of non-metallic composites, plastics, compounds (mix-tures of metal and composite), etc. are used to an increasing extent in weaponapplications. These materials have different properties compared with metallicmaterials. Elongation and expansion in barrels and rocket/missile launch tubescan be significant factors. Such properties shall be taken into account in thedesign and calculations for weapon systems.

1.43071 In the design of non-metallic and compound barrels, consideration shall be given to dimensioning with regard to expected material properties when these change over time.

1.43072 In the design and fastening of external parts onto non-metallic bar-rels, consideration should be given to the influence of fixtures that are permanently attached by winding for example, so that elon-gation properties are not negatively affected.

4 Weapons

90

4

4.3.1.5 Other weapon systems

4.3.1.5.1 Minelayers for landmines

In some cases landmines can be laid mechanically, which means that hundredsof mines can be laid every hour by each minelayer. Usually the mines are fedinto the minelayer from the towing truck so that only a small number of minesare in the minelayer at any one time. A plough-like device, for example,designed for the type of ground in question prepares space beneath the surfacein which the mines are laid.

Refer also to the requirements stated in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for war-heads and propelling charges’.

Figure 4.6 Example of a minelayer

1.43073 If the minelayer arms the mine via a mechanical device it shall be equipped with an automatic monitoring system.

1.43074 A monitoring system as specified in requirement 1.43073 shall emit both a light and sound signal when a mine becomes jammed in the minelayer. The alarm shall be reset manually.

1.43075 A minelayer that mechanically arms the mine shall enable access to a mine that becomes jammed without the necessity for the use of any tools.

1.43076 It shall be possible to decouple a minelayer that mechanically arms the mine from the towing vehicle to enable personnel and the tow-ing vehicle to be moved outside the danger area of the mine within the duration of the safety delay including a safety margin.Comment:If the above safety delay is 5+1 minutes it should be possible to de-

Weapons 4

91

4

couple the minelayer from the towing vehicle and to move the per-sonnel (with vehicle) outside the mine’s danger area within 2 minutes.

1.43077 The minelayer should be designed so as to minimise the risk of a mine becoming jammed during laying.Comment: The configuration of the mine should also be taken into account.

4.3.1.5.2 Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges

Naval mines are normally laid from a vessel under way (within a certain speedrange). The mines can either be launched by rails over the side of the vesselfrom where they fall freely into the water, or by a minelaying device speciallydesigned for one or more types of mine.

Naval mines are often heavy (several hundred kilograms) and thus require spe-cial lifting devices during handling.

The fuzing system is generally separate from the mine and is installed beforelaying.

Depth charges can be dropped from a launcher (from a vessel or helicopter) toform a ‘carpet’, i.e. with a certain distance between each depth charge to cover aspecific area.

1.43078 The minelayer shall not arm the mine before the mine leaves the minelaying device.

1.43079 The minelayer shall be designed so that the mine cannot become jammed during launch.Comment:The configuration of the mine shall also be taken into account.

4.3.1.5.3 Launch tubes for torpedoes

Torpedoes are used as armament (weapon system) on submarines, surface ves-sels and helicopters.

In a submarine, combat-ready torpedoes are stowed in the launch tubes and/or instowage (standby mode) close to the launch tubes.

Onboard surface vessels the torpedoes are normally stowed only in the launchtubes. Torpedoes are loaded into the launch tubes at the naval base.

4 Weapons

92

4

In peacetime torpedoes are used as exercise torpedoes with the warheadreplaced by a special exercise head. After a practice run the torpedo is recoveredand reused for other practice runs. It can also be reused as a combat torpedoafter being refitted with a warhead. There are two types of energy platforms forpropulsion of torpedoes:

• Thermal system for generating propulsion gas for a thermal motor. Current-ly Swedish torpedoes use high-test peroxide as oxidation agent and alcoholor paraffin is used as fuel.

• Electric energy stored in rechargeable or thermal batteries and an electricmotor for propulsion.

Torpedoes are heavy (250 - 1 800 kg) and require lifting tackle to facilitate han-dling.

The safety, arming and ignition unit (SAI) is normally stored separate from thetorpedo, and the SAI is also provided with a transport safety device. The SAI isinstalled in the torpedo when the latter is loaded into the launch tube.

Two types of system are currently used to launch torpedoes from a submarine:

• Compressed air that actuates a piston located aft of the torpedo that forcesboth the torpedo and the water out of the launch tube (push-out).

• Start of the torpedo motor in a water-filled launch tube whereby the torpedo‘swims’ out of the launch tube under its own power (swim-out).

Torpedo launch from a surface vessel is performed by an overpressure in thelaunch tube aft of the torpedo. This overpressure is generated either by combus-tion of a propelling charge or by compressed air.

The warhead is armed when the barrier lock in the SAI is cancelled.

1.43080 Launch tubes shall be equipped with sensors that indicate that the torpedo has left the tube.

1.43081 Launch tubes shall be so designed that the torpedo cannot become jammed on its way out of the tube or in the forepeak of submarines.Comment:The configuration of the torpedo shall also be taken into account.

1.430821

1) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.

Weapons 4

93

4

1.43083 It shall not be possible for the testing of a launcher to cause hazard initiation.Comment:The test system shall normally be separate from the launch system.

1.43084 For torpedoes incorporating hydrogen peroxide the launch tubes when in standby mode shall be equipped with a draining system connected to the hydrogen peroxide system of the torpedo.

4.3.2 Pylons and dispensers

Pylons and dispensers are attachment elements for weapon systems such asbombs, bomblets (multiple weapons), rockets, missiles and torpedoes. The func-tions that are built into the pylon or ammunition vary according to the applica-tion. A specific function requirement in the following requirements does notmean that the function must be built into the weapon itself.

Figure 4.7 Example of a weapon launcher

1.43085 A pylon/dispenser shall enable a transport safety device in the form of an indicator or equivalent to be clearly visible while the ammunition is in transport safety mode.

1.43086 A pylon/dispenser as specified in requirement 1.43085 should en-able the transport safety device to be carried adjacent to the am-munition.Comment:This enables deactivation if the aircraft lands at a different site from the ammunition preparation site.

4 Weapons

94

4

1.43087 Pylons/dispensers shall enable separation of the weapon system or ammunition in such a way that there is no collision with weapon platforms.Comment:This includes incorrect manoeuvring of the ammunition.

4.3.3 Weapon platforms

This section will be transferred when separate manuals for different platformshave been compiled.

There are numerous types of platform (aircraft, naval vessels, vehicles, etc.) fora weapon system, which means that requirements vary according to the type ofplatform in question.

Generally, each type of platform shall comply with applicable legislation andregulations, although in some cases supplementary requirements may be neces-sary.

For instance, a vehicle that is mainly designed for civil use (such as a construc-tion vehicle), when used in a military application may need additional require-ments to be stipulated depending on the particular military application.

An articulated truck, for example, usually has only a driver (in some cases also a‘passenger’) in the cab. When such a vehicle is modified for military use four tofive persons may be transported in the cab. This means that several persons maybe entering the cab (from different directions) while the driver is seated at hisstation, which could lead to an (inadvertent) movement of the steering wheelresulting in injuries from crushing. Furthermore, several persons are often in thevicinity of the platform while the driver is still at his station, which could entaila risk of injury by crushing around the platform (in the vicinity of the wheels, infront of or behind the platform, or at the articulation pivot point).

Weapons 4

95

4Figure 4.8 Examples of weapon platforms

1.43088 The weapon platform for the system shall satisfy applicable traffic regulations for civil and military use.Comment:Dispensation may be given.

1.43089 Blast pressure during firing shall be acceptable for crew mounted in the platform.Comment:When verifying blast pressure characteristics the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 can be used.

4.3.4 Hatches and doors

Hatches and doors shall meet certain specific requirements. They shall be suffi-ciently stable to withstand shockwaves close to a detonation and subsequentlybe openable. Specific safety requirements concerning manoeuvrability, locking,opening, etc. must be met.

4 Weapons

96

4

1.43090 The locking mechanism shall be dimensioned to withstand the stresses arising during operational use.

1.43091 The locking mechanism should be accessible and manoeuvrable from both inside and outside.

1.43092 Locks on hatches and doors should be manoeuvrable by crew wearing regulation personal protective equipment at all extreme temperatures.Comment:This is not a general requirement. It does not apply, for example, to turret guns.

4.3.5 Sighting and laying systems

4.3.5.1 General

It is obvious that a serious accident may occur if the weapon is fired in thewrong direction. Such an event can be caused by a fault in the sighting system,or a fault in the laying and firing function caused by human error, or a combina-tion of these.

The possibility of user error makes it essential to stipulate requirements toensure that the system is designed according to sound ergonomic principles andthat it is easy to operate. Scales and displays must be unambiguous and legiblein all conceivable situations. Controls must be conveniently located for the crewand facilitate the performance of their tasks. Generally it can be stated that seri-ous accidents can be minimized by good ergonomic design combined with care-fully prepared appropriate training.


4.3.5.2.1 System accuracy

1.43093 The relationship between the axis of bore, and the optical axis in the sight and the values presented on displays/instruments shall co-incide, both when the system stands on a level surface and when it is on a maximum incline during operation.

1.43094 A stabilised weapon shall retain the direction laid until a new di-rection is specified/commanded.

4.3.5.2.2 Sight tests and adjustments

1.43095 The setting of the sight should not change owing to transport etc.

Weapons 4

97

4

4.3.5.2.3 Firing

To ensure that the sighting and laying system can withstand the stresses thatoccur during firing, the following requirement shall be met:

1.43096 When firing with natures of ammunition and charges designed for the weapon the sighting and laying systems shall retain specified settings and attain specified performance.

4.3.5.2.4 Aiming and firing limitations

1.43097 There shall be devices to prevent the armament being aimed or fired in prohibited zones.Comment:In maintenance mode aiming in a prohibited zone is permitted.

4.3.6 Guidance systems

For a guided weapon/ammunition the flight path is determined after separationfrom the weapon platform by the following criteria: the condition of the weaponplatform at separation, the characteristics of the propelling charge/motor, thepre-determined firing data, and the design and characteristics of the guidancesystem. The level of complexity of a guidance system can vary. It generallyincorporates guidance controls, servomotors, and some type of processor to gen-erate guidance signals which can emanate from the weapon platform as well asfrom the missile itself. Signals from the weapon platform can be transmitted viaa link such as electromagnetic waves of suitable frequency such as radar, ther-mal or light, or electrically/optically by wire during part or all of the flight path.

Guided weapons/ammunition often employ search and fire control devices thatregister target data via active sensors based on active target acquisition (e.g.radar, laser) with potentially harmful effects. Furthermore, there is often a turn-table or mobile platform and, for example, even a ground installation that alsoinvolve hazards. Search and fire control devices are dealt with in Section 4.2.4,4.2.13 and 4.3.5 of this manual.

Guidance systems contain sensors, guidance electronics/software, guidancecontrols, and possibly additional functions such as communication links, guid-ance beams or indication equipment (e.g. radar beacon or tracer). All this equip-ment requires power – electric, pneumatic, hydraulic, for example – in additionto the power normally required for an unguided system.

4 Weapons

98

4

Self-destruction and control of the warhead function may be incorporated. Ele-mentary examples of this are arming when there is a specific remaining flighttime to target, or proximity fuze delay, based on approach velocity.

Subsystems in weapons/ammunition affect guidance in one way or another. Forexample, if the propulsion motor stops/expires the guidance performance ischanged dramatically, and the same applies to the energy supply. A true guid-ance system incorporates an automatic guidance function with associated ruddersystem, sensor unit and target seeker. These units, together with computers andgeometry, form a closed guidance system that must be precisely dimensionedfor optimal functioning and performance.

An attack can be subdivided into several stages depending on the general designand functional method of the weapon. Search often precedes an attack. Thereaf-ter comes the approach flight (or equivalent) – possibly involving variations inaltitude and/or changes of course. Target search and the locking of the targetseeker onto the target may occur fairly early in an attack or rather late (terminalguidance) in the case of certain weapons. A successful result in the latter case isentirely dependent on the preceding guidance to the target zone.

Prior to launch and separation of the weapon from the weapon platform, all sub-systems are prepared with initial values while essential functional checks areperformed simultaneously so that the separation conditions are satisfied. Theseparation sequence may involve constraints on guidance signals and rudderdeflection to prevent any risk of the projectile colliding with the weapon plat-form, or any risk of the projectile acquiring excessive angular acceleration withregard to the equipment and subsystems incorporated. Different guidance meth-ods can be applied during the various stages of the flight path such as control ofattitude, proportional navigation with lead bias, inertial navigation and Semi-Active Command by Line Of Sight (SACLOS), depending on the design andperformance requirements for the weapon.

The purpose of the requirements is to ensure:

• safe handling during transport and deployment,

• safety in and around the fire unit during loading, unloading, loaded fire unitand launch,

• safety outside the designated danger areas,

• safety during training, loading exercises, and operation of the fire unit.

1.43098 Sources of radiation (e.g. laser) directed at the fire unit from the guided weapon/ammunition should be so designed that they do not require any danger zones at the fire unit.

Weapons 4

99

4

1.43099 Sources of radiation for guidance that can have a dangerous effect shall be indicated to the operator when radiation transmission is in progress.

1.43100 During exercises the indication specified in requirement 1.43099 should also be visible to anyone anywhere in the vicinity.

1.43101 It shall not be possible for guidance signals to the weapon/ammu-nition to initiate motor or warhead igniters.

1.43102 The guided weapon/ammunition should incorporate a function which, in the event of a target miss or if a malfunction is detected, definitively precludes effect in the target by disarming the weapon. This can be achieved, for example, by self-neutralisation, self-de-struction or disarming.

1.43103 There should be a system for function monitoring and failure de-tection for the guidance system. This may result in self-neutralisa-tion or disarming of the weapon, etc.

1.43104 The guidance system shall be designed and documented in a way that enables a safety analysis to be performed.

1.43105 The safety analysis shall be performed or audited by an instance that is independent of the designer.Comment:Another department or special safety function within the same de-partment may be considered as an independent party.

1.43106 All materials incorporated shall be selected and combined in such a way that effects detrimental to safety do not arise during the life of the guidance system, for example as a result of corrosion, ageing, chemical change or short-circuiting.

1.43107 Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, should conform to standardized communication proto-cols.

1.43108 Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, shall be subject to function monitoring.Comment:Function monitoring can, for example, be by means of parity check-ing or a ‘watch-dog’ function.

4 Weapons

100

4

4.3.7 Miscellaneous requirements

4.3.7.1 Pressure vessels

There are a number of types of pressure vessel for numerous applications. Struc-tural strength calculations and hydrostatic testing shall always be carried out toprovide the basis for type approval.

1.43109 Pressure vessels shall be type approved in accordance with the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health directives.

4.3.7.2 Lifting devices

Lifting devices are used to lift parts of, or complete, systems during productionor in the field. An assurance of compliance with the regulations governing liftingdevices shall be submitted in writing by the manufacturer. This means thatapplicable standards have been adhered to, structural strength calculations havebeen performed, hazard analyses have been performed, an instruction book hasbeen compiled, test certificates have been issued, material certificates are avail-able, and that the lifting device has been CE marked.

1.43110 Lifting devices shall be CE marked.

1.43111 The danger area for a lifting device shall be established and taken into consideration when formulating Safety Restrictions.Comment:The danger area is greater than the area immediately beneath a hanging load, for example.

4.3.7.3 Fire-fighting equipment

Fire, especially in ammunition stowed in confined spaces, can become cata-strophic in a very short time. Even fire in other materiel can quickly lead tomajor health hazards to the crew, especially in a combat vehicle. It is thereforevital that a fire can be extinguished as quickly as possible before the crew isinjured by the fire itself, or by toxic substances released during certain types offire.

Fire-fighting equipment comes in the form of fixed equipment and hand-carriedextinguishers.

Fixed fire-fighting equipment can usually be activated automatically as well asmanually.

Weapons 4

101

4

Fixed sensors that react to smoke and/or temperature, for example, are in gen-eral use.

The primary purpose of the requirements is to ensure the safety of the crew, andsecondarily to preserve weaponry.

1.43112 Fire-fighting systems in crew compartments shall not contain halon.

1.43113 Fire-fighting systems for engine, crew, and ammunition compart-ments shall be automatically activated, but also be possible to ac-tivate manually.

1.43114 Confined spaces that have automatic fire-fighting systems shall be equipped with an evacuation fan to enable rapid ventilation after a fire is extinguished.

1.43115 In addition to automatic fire-fighting systems, manual fire extin-guishers shall be within the reach of the armament crew. This also applies onboard combat vehicles where all compartments shall have a fire extinguisher.

1.43116 The equipment shall have sufficient capacity for the most severe fire possible in a defined application.

1.43117 Confined spaces that are not crew compartments should have auto-matic fire alarm systems.

1.43118 A single failure in fixed fire-fighting equipment should not result in non-function.

1.43119 Fixed fire-fighting equipment shall have duplicate containers con-taining fire-fighting materials.

1.43120 If a rubber hose or equivalent is employed in fixed fire-fighting equipment, its function shall not be exposed to any hazard before or during the actual fire-fighting.

1.43121 If the actuating device in fixed fire-fighting equipment comprises any form of accumulated pressure there should be duplicate pres-sure vessels.

1.43122 The type of fire extinguisher (powder, water, foam, etc.) should be selected so as to preclude any other danger arising during the fire-fighting.

4 Weapons

102

4

4.4 Requirement checklist for weapons


Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons


Requirements of International Law1.42001 SHALL Booby traps

1.42002 SHALL Laser weapons

1.42003 SHALL Toxic weapons

1.42004 SHALL Incendiary weapons

1.42005 SHALL Weapons difficult to aim

1.42006 SHALL Severe damage to environ-ment

General requirements1.42007 SHALL Danger area

1.42008 SHOULD Emergency stop

1.42009 SHOULD Energy stop & energy source disconnection

1.42010 SHALL Emergency stop close to energy source

1.42011 SHALL Unload propelling charge

1.42012 SHALL Empty cartridge cases & expended launch tubes

1.42013 SHOULD Manual override of auto-matic functions

1.42014 SHALL Mount & remove equipment

1.42015 SHALL Specified equipment

1.42016 SHALL Monitors/VDUs

1.42017 SHALL Symbols/texts

1.42018 SHALL Disarm the weapon indepen-dently

1.42019 SHALL Footholds & anti-slip sur-faces

1.42020 SHALL Locking devices on hatches & doors

Weapons 4

103

4

1.42021 SHOULD Ventilation, heating & air conditioning system

1.42022 SHALL Safe separation distance

Toxic substances1.42023 SHALL Concentration of toxic sub-

stances

1.42024 SHALL Verification of requirement 1.42023

Electrical and magnetic fields1.42025 SHALL Susceptibility of electrical

circuits

1.42026 SHALL Safety critical electrical cir-cuits

1.42027 SHALL Electrical & magnetic fields

Water and moisture resistance1.42028 SHOULD Drainability

1.42029 SHOULD Water spraying & fording

Extreme climatic conditions1.42030 SHOULD Protective clothing & equip-

ment

1.42031 SHOULD Good work environment

Fire1.42032 SHOULD Crew protection

Blast pressure1.42033 SHALL Blast pressure level

1.42034 SHOULD Verification of requirement 1.42033

1.42035 SHALL Number of rounds fired

1.42036 SHALL Protection & location of crew

Backblast1.42037 SHALL Backblast


Vibration dose1.42039 SHALL Vibration dose

Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons, continued


4 Weapons

104

4

Pressure1.42040 SHALL Determining dimensions rel-

ative to pressure

Forces1.42041 SHALL Spring forces & hazards

1.42042 SHALL Spring forces & double locking devices

1.42043 SHALL Springs & analysis

1.42044 SHALL Fastening elements

1.42045 SHALL Fastening elements, charac-teristics

1.42046 SHALL Springs to be located in a protected position

1.42047 SHOULD Springs duplicated

1.42048 SHALL Accumulated pressure

1.42049 SHOULD Monitoring duplicated

1.42050 SHOULD Location of hydraulic hoses

1.42051 SHOULD Hydraulic fluid

1.42052 SHALL Danger area

1.42053 SHALL Recoil buffer, recuperator, overpressure

1.42054 SHALL Recoil forces

1.42055 SHOULD Rotating & moving parts

1.42056 SHALL Loading devices

1.42057 SHALL Cartridge case ejection

Lasers1.42058 SHOULD Activation of lasers

1.42059 SHOULD Safety circuits

1.42060 SHOULD Safety covers & locking devices

1.42061 SHOULD Laser outlet optic

1.42062 SHALL Warning signs

1.42063 SHOULD Laser protection filters & goggles

1.42058 SHOULD Activation of lasers

1.42059 SHOULD Safety circuits

1.42060 SHOULD Safety covers & locking devices



Weapons 4

105

4

1.42061 SHOULD Laser outlet optic

1.42062 SHALL Warning signs

1.42063 SHOULD Laser protection filters & goggles

Stability – mechanical1.42064 SHALL Chassis or platform motion

1.42065 SHALL Open (or closed) doors or hatches

1.42066 SHALL Retention of ammunition etc.

Transport1.42067 SHOULD Fall-back

1.42068 SHOULD Firing in fall-back position

1.42069 SHALL Method for stowage

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTSLaunchersWeapon installation1.43001 SHALL Interface with safety func-

tions

1.43002 SHALL Clearance

1.43003 SHOULD Safety devices for moving system parts

Recoil systemsBreech mechanisms1.43004 SHALL Operation of breech mecha-

nism

1.43005 SHALL Locking

1.43006 SHALL Breech mechanism: vibra-tion resistance

1.43007 SHOULD Incorrect assembly

1.43008 SHALL Firing mechanism inactive

1.43009 SHALL Indication of breech mecha-nism status

1.43010 SHALL Firing with breech mecha-nism not fully closed



4 Weapons

106

4

Firing mechanisms1.43011 SHALL Firing mechanism, safing

1.43012 SHALL Firing by active operation

1.43013 SHALL Protection for electrome-chanical device

1.43014 SHALL Firing button guard etc.

1.43015 SHALL Firing mechanism to with-stand vibration & shocks

1.43016 SHALL Firing mechanism, shock resistant

1.43017 SHALL Radiated or conducted inter-ference

1.43018 SHOULD Electrical connector, safing

1.43019 SHOULD Mechanical safety devices

1.43020 SHALL Manually operated safety interrupter

1.43021 SHALL Location of safety inter-rupter

1.43022 SHALL Safety interrupter marking

Breech ring1.43023 SHALL Breech ring life

Obturation1.43024 SHALL Obturation

Backflash1.43025 SHALL Automatic fire into

maximum head wind

Barrels and sub-calibre barrels1.43026 SHALL Firing with new or worn bar-

rel


1.43028 SHALL Fatigue & barrel rupture

1.43029 SHALL Verification & calculation of requirement 1.43028

1.43030 SHALL Attachment of external parts

1.43031 SHOULD Driving bands, sabots, obtu-rators

1.43032 SHALL Testing for fragmentation



Weapons 4

107

4

1.43033 SHALL Snow, sand or gravel in bar-rel

1.43034 SHALL Barrel rupture trials

1.43035 SHALL Cook-off at maximum fire engagement

1.43036 SHALL Determination of tempera-ture & heat flux

Fume extractors1.43037 SHALL Attachment of fume extrac-

tor

1.43038 SHALL Dimensioning of fume extractor

Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers1.43039 SHALL Attachment of muzzle brake

etc.

1.43040 SHALL Dimensioning of muzzle brake etc.

1.43041 SHALL Verification of requirements 1.43039 & 1.43040

Muzzle flash1.43042 SHALL External equipment & effect

of muzzle flash

1.43043 SHALL Crew stations – muzzle flash

Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters1.43044 SHALL Applicable requirements as

stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7

1.43045 SHALL Fitting of sub-calibre barrel etc.

1.43046 SHALL Inspection of sub-calibre barrel etc.

1.43047 SHALL Stresses on ammunition

1.43048 SHALL Verification of requirements 1.43045 & 1.43047

1.43049 SHOULD Permanently fitted sub-cali-bre barrel

Ramming1.43050 SHALL Rammer

1.43051 SHALL Ramming environment



4 Weapons

108

4

Recoil buffers1.43052 SHALL Static pressure of recoil

buffer

1.43053 SHOULD Leakage of recoil buffer fluid & gas

1.43054 SHALL Maximum recoil stresses

1.43055 SHALL Forced recoil equipment

Recoilless weapon and rocket systems1.43056 SHALL Applicable requirements

stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3

1.43057 SHALL Firing mechanism, transport safety

1.43058 SHALL Firing system, safety device

1.43059 SHALL Deactivation, loading/unloading

1.43060 SHALL Direction of recoil

1.43061 SHALL Recoil forces, testing

1.43062 SHALL Firing stance

1.43063 SHALL Backblast, energy content


1.43065 SHALL External equipment & effect of muzzle flash

1.43066 SHALL Limitation of muzzle flash

1.43067 SHOULD Personal protective equip-ment

1.43068 SHALL Structural strength for pres-sure


1.43070 SHOULD Permanently fitted sub-cali-bre barrel

1.43071 SHALL Material properties

1.43072 SHOULD Fixtures permanently attached by winding



Weapons 4

109

4

Other weapon systemsMinelayers for landmines1.43073 SHALL Arming the mine

1.43074 SHALL Monitoring system

1.43075 SHALL Mechanical arming

1.43076 SHALL Decoupling minelayer

1.43077 SHOULD Risk of mine becoming jammed

Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges1.43078 SHALL Arming

1.43079 SHALL Mine cannot become jammed

Launch tubes for torpedoes1.43080 SHALL Sensors

1.43081 SHALL Torpedo cannot become jammed

1.43082 a)

1.43083 SHALL Testing

1.43084 SHALL Draining system

Pylons and dispensers1.43085 SHALL Transport safety device indi-

cator

1.43086 SHOULD Transport safety device to be carried

1.43087 SHALL No collision of ammunition with weapon platform

Weapon platforms1.43088 SHALL Weapon platform

1.43089 SHALL Blast pressure

Hatches and doors1.43090 SHALL Locking mechanism

1.43091 SHOULD Locking mechanism accessi-bility

1.43092 SHOULD Manoeuvrable when wear-ing personal protective equipment



4 Weapons

110

4

Sighting and laying systems1.43093 SHALL Axis of bore & optical axis

1.43094 SHALL Direction laid

1.43095 SHOULD No change of setting during transport

1.43096 SHALL Firing & retention of set-tings etc.

1.43097 SHALL Firing in prohibited zones

Guidance systems1.43098 SHOULD Sources of radiation &

danger zones

1.43099 SHALL Sources of radiation & indication

1.43100 SHOULD Indication during exercises

1.43101 SHALL Guidance signals to warhead system

1.43102 SHOULD Design of self-destruction

1.43103 SHOULD Function monitoring

1.43104 SHALL Safety analysis

1.43105 SHALL Auditing by independent instance

1.43106 SHALL Materials incorporated

1.43107 SHOULD Data transfer

1.43108 SHALL Function monitoring of data transfer

Miscellaneous requirementsPressure vessels1.43109 SHALL Pressure vessels, type

approval

Lifting devices1.43110 SHALL CE marking of lifting

devices

1.43111 SHALL Danger area for lifting devices

Fire-fighting equipment1.43112 SHALL Halon systems

1.43113 SHALL Automatic activation

1.43114 SHALL Evacuation fan



Weapons 4

111

4

1.43115 SHALL Manual fire extinguishers

1.43116 SHALL Capacity of equipment

1.43117 SHOULD Confined spaces

1.43118 SHOULD Single failures

1.43119 SHALL Duplicate containers

1.43120 SHALL Rubber hoses

1.43121 SHALL Actuating device

1.43122 SHOULD Type of fire extinguisher

a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.



Ammunition 5

113

5

5 AMMUNITION

The term ammunition denotes materiel that is designed to achieve damage in thewidest sense (often through explosion), produce smoke, illuminate the battle-field, or achieve electromagnetic jamming. Ammunition also comprises practicemateriel for the above purposes. Packagings can also be included in the ammu-nition concept as they have a unique marking to denote the characteristic of theammunition therein.

This chapter specifies the requirements that are unique for ammunition and itsconstituent parts: warheads, propulsion units, fuzing systems and packagings.Where a weapon part such as a barrel, dispenser, pylon, etc. is a constituent partof the materiel system, Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’ also applies.

Certain materiel specific requirements that are not naturally related to any of theother sections in this chapter are thus stated in this section.

With regard to guidance systems for ammunition that affect the ammunitionafter it has left the launcher, refer to Chapter 4 ‘Weapons’, Section 4.3.

For all ammunition the activity and materiel related requirements stated inChapter 2, ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ shallalways be taken into consideration. Thereafter the requirements specified inSection 5.1 shall apply, after which the materiel specific requirements for thevarious parts of the ammunition shall apply as stated in the respective subsystemsection: 5.2 ‘Warheads’, 5.3 ‘Propulsion systems’, 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for war-heads and propelling charges’, and 5.5 ‘Packaging for ammunition’.

5.1 Joint ammunition requirements

5.1.1 General

This section specifies the requirements that are applicable for complete ammu-nition. These requirements together with the other applicable weapon andammunition safety requirements shall be incorporated in the requirement speci-fications.

5 Ammunition

114

5

5.1.2 Requirements of International Law

These requirements, originating from international agreements, must alwaysbe met and can thus never be disregarded through any other agreement.

1.51001 High explosive shells designed primarily for anti-personnel purpos-es shall have a minimum weight of 400 grams.

1.51002 Mines shall not be designed to be of similar appearance to civil util-ity goods, neither may they be marked with internationally recogn-ised safety emblems.

1.51003 Bullets shall not be easily expanded or flattened in the human body.

1.51004 Bullets shall be fully jacketed and shall not incorporate any notches (cf. dumdum bullets).

5.1.3 Materiel specific requirements

When developing ammunition it is necessary, amongst other needs, to achieve adesign that satisfies the safety requirements in the requirement specifications.During the development phases the safety requirements are verified throughaudits, analyses and testing. The requirements stated herein are largely based onexperience accumulated over the years.

1.51005 Analysis and testing shall be performed to provide data for assess-ment of the danger area for all combinations of launchers and am-munition.Comment:Danger areas for lasers, fragmentation, thermal radiation, blast pres-sure, etc.

1.51006 The projectile and propelling charge should be designed so that the projectile remains in rammed position with the gun at maximum elevation without any special devices for this being needed on the gun. This is particularly important when the projectile and propel-ling charge are separate and an interspace can arise with certain charges.Comment:The above applies for ammunition where ramming is desirable. Re-fer also to Section 4.2.15.2.1.

1.51007 The function stated in requirement 1.51006 shall be tested using a worn barrel.Comment:Refer to the definition of a worn barrel.

Ammunition 5

115

5

1.51008 Ammunition should be designed so that unloading can be per-formed in a safe manner by the weapon crew.Comment:This also applies to unloading after an ammunition misfire.

1.51009 Verification of requirement 1.51008 shall include testing to deter-mine the forces that can be permitted for the unloading tool in ques-tion.Comment:Testing also includes the force required to achieve unloading.

1.51010 Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading as a reverse process of loading.

1.51011 Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading to be per-formed with the aid of tools if the ammunition becomes jammed ei-ther during ramming or in the barrel.

1.51012 To establish the risk of cook-off for the ammunition, the tempera-ture/heat flux etc. for a barrel at its maximum operating temperature and for the shell shall be determined.

1.51013 Driving bands/sabots/obturators/casings etc. should be dimen-sioned and designed so that no fragments are formed that can im-pact with the muzzle brake (if such is fitted) and ricochet rearwards.

1.51014 When modifying or newly developing ammunition, driving bands/ sabots/obturators/casings etc. shall be tested regarding the occur-rence of fragments.

1.51015 Driving bands, casings or equivalent shall be designed so that they do not inadvertently disintegrate outside the barrel when firing with the maximum stress level.

1.51016 Sabots shall be designed to ensure safe separation.Comment:Consideration shall be given to the hazards of sabot fragments and to any change in projectile trajectory.

1.51017 The projectile shall be designed to achieve external ballistic sta-bility in all permitted types of firing provided that the barrel has not reached its maximum permitted wear so that the specified danger area is still valid.Comment:Worn barrels, driving bands, fins, tail units, etc. can affect external ballistics.

5 Ammunition

116

5

1.51018 Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI).Comment:Approval shall be based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Code of Statutes, edition 1986:2 (SÄIFS 1986:2).

1.51019 Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified in ac-cordance with FSD 0214.Comment:Assessments concerning the scope of qualification shall be made by the advisory group for explosives, see Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’, Section 3.6 and 3.8.

1.51020 The ammunition should be resistant to extreme environments such as accidents or the effect of enemy weapons so that the ammunition does not increase the vulnerability of the system to which it is inte-gral.Comment:The above shall be based on the resistance of the ammunition and the protection level of the materiel system. Cf. FSD 0060.

1.51021 Mines shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079.

1.51022 Torpedoes shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in launch tubes. Cf. requirement 1.43081.

1.51023 Underwater mines/depth charges shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079.

1.51024 The safe separation distance/time shall be determined for the se-verest case of operational use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022, 1.52022, 1.53007 and 1.54013.

1.51025 The design and the materials used in the ammunition shall be cho-sen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation.Comment: When dimensioning and designing ammunition the pres-sure definitions and procedures specified in STANAG 4110 shall be applied.

5.1.4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements


Ammunition 5

117

5

Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements


Requirements of International Law1.51001 SHALL Minimum weight of HE

shells

1.51002 SHALL Mines shall not be similar to utility goods

1.51003 SHALL Bullets shall not be easily expanded

1.51004 SHALL Bullets shall be fully jack-eted

Materiel specific requirements1.51005 SHALL Analysis and testing for dan-

ger area

1.51006 SHOULD Projectile in rammed posi-tion

1.51007 SHALL Testing for requirement 1.51006 in worn barrel

1.51008 SHOULD Unloading safely

1.51009 SHALL Verification of unloading tool forces

1.510010 SHOULD Unloading via loading route

1.51011 SHOULD Unloading using tools

1.51012 SHALL Exposure to high tempera-ture

1.51013 SHOULD Fragments from driving bands, sabots, casings, etc.

1.51014 SHALL Testing newly developed driving bands, etc.

1.51015 SHALL Driving bands etc. shall withstand maximum stress

1.51016 SHALL Safe separation of sabot

1.51017 SHALL External ballistic stability

1.51018 SHALL Explosives approved by SÄI

1.51019 SHALL Qualification of explosives

1.51020 SHOULD Resistance to extreme envi-ronments

1.51021 SHALL Mines not become jammed

5 Ammunition

118

5

5.2 Warheads

5.2.1 General

This section is a summary of the joint requirements for warheads. For each typeof warhead there are additional object specific requirements that apply whichare stated in the relevant subsections of this chapter.

5.2.1.1 Description

The term warhead refers to that component of the ammunition which, at a pre-determined time or place (e.g. impact in target, actuation in immediate proxim-ity of target, etc.) is intended to provide effect by, for example, pressure, frag-mentation, or incendiary, or any combination of these, or any other effect oftactical importance to the user. In certain circumstances effect is achieved afterentry or penetration of armour or other protection element, for example. A war-head that is not loaded with explosive is exemplified by an anti-armour projec-tile which penetrates armour by means of high kinetic energy. Furthermore,there are pyrotechnic warheads (illuminating, incendiary, smoke). Most combatwarheads have practice counterparts which – on impact – provide some kind ofvisual signal, such as a flash or smoke, to indicate point of impact and whichhave a lower explosive effect. There is also practice ammunition whose war-heads contain little or no explosive (such as inert ammunition that has no explo-sive content at all).

Several countries are developing more insensitive ammunition designated IM(Insensitive Munition). Technically, the lower sensitivity is achieved by usingplastic as a binding agent and nitramine-based products for the energy produc-ing substance (PBX = plastic bonded high explosive).

1.51022 SHALL Torpedoes not become jammed

1.51023 SHALL Underwater mines not become jammed


1.51025 SHALL Casing to withstand all stresses

Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements, continued


Ammunition 5

119

5

For multiple warheads, each submunition is treated as an individual warhead. Inthe case of guided and trajectory correctable warheads the warheads are dealtwith as described in this chapter, while the guidance and trajectory correctionmotors are dealt with in Section 5.3 with consideration given to the actuallaunch environment. When initiating such motors, the same requirements arespecified as for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, see Section 5.4, if it isnot proven that hazard initiation does not incur injury to personnel nor damageto property or the environment.

5.2.1.2 Materiel environment

Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the mechanical effectsof the environment:

• leakage can occur in joints,

• cracks can occur in warhead casings,

• explosive dust or similar can be created and be moved to a more shock sen-sitive position, e.g. threaded joints and gaps where there may be a risk of ini-tiation due to vibration or shock (e.g. during firing).

Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the physical andchemical effects of the environment:

• high explosives can be heated to a temperature at which they become plas-tically deformed or melt. This can lead to cavities, or the high explosive mi-grating into threaded joints, between separating surfaces, or into crackswhere it can be compressed and thus involve a risk of initiation,

• air may be pumped in and out through leaks in the warhead casing whichcan lead to accumulations of water. The high explosive or equivalent maybe affected and gaseous products may form, for example in the case of highexplosives with an aluminium content,

• brittle fractures can occur in the casing, especially at extremely low temper-atures,

• a significant difference between the coefficients of expansion of the chargeand the casing can occur which may result in the formation of cracks or cav-ities at low temperature, or high internal overpressure can result at high tem-perature,

• reactions between incompatible materials can change the properties of ex-plosives.

5 Ammunition

120

5


1.52001 NBC warheads (nuclear charges, biological weapons, chemical weapons) shall not be fabricated.

1.52002 FAE (Fuel-Air Explosives) warheads, in which a fuel is sprayed into the air and detonates owing to the oxygen in the air and where the main purpose is anti-personnel, shall not be fabricated.

1.52003 Warhead casings whose main effect is fragmentation shall be fabri-cated from material that can be easily detected by X-ray.

1.52004 Multiple weapons and guided weapons shall be treated as having several warheads and propulsion devices. Separation charges and guidance or trajectory correction motors shall be treated as propul-sion devices.

1.52005 The design and the materials used in the body of the warhead shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, in-cluding pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable defor-mation.Comment:Examples of detailed requirements that can be stipulated: safety margin for deformation, freedom from cracks, overlaps, pores or in-correct heat treatment that can lead to hazardous events. Concerning pressure in the barrel, refer to Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’.

1.52006 When tempered steel is used in the casing the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that hydrogen embrittlement or oth-er dangerous corrosion does not occur.

1.52007 The internal surface of the casing shall be smooth and clean.Comment:The warhead shall be protected against moisture until filled with ex-plosive.

1.52008 The design and composition of the HE charge and the pyrotechnic charge shall be such that they can withstand all stresses arising with-out any risk of a hazardous event occurring.Comment:Testing shall be performed in accordance with FSD 0060.

1.52009 The warhead shall be designed to preclude the presence of high ex-plosive or pyrotechnic composition in threads and joints in such a quantity as to create a risk of hazard initiation when screwing com-ponents on or off or during launch or release.

1.52010 Requirements 1.52008 and 1.52009 shall be verified by testing.Comment:The parts in the warhead can be examined prior to testing by using X-ray, radiography, ultrasonic testing or other methods.

Ammunition 5

121

5

1.52011 The warhead shall not be susceptible to cook-off in the event of a misfire or interruption in firing when the barrel is at its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question.Comment:Refer also to requirements 1.43035 and 1.53019.

1.52012 The melting point of the high explosive should be higher than the temperature reached by the ammunition in a barrel heated to its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in ques-tion.

1.52013 The warhead in its application should not detonate in the event of fire.Comment:This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060.

1.52014 Requirement 1.52013 should be verified by testing.

1.52015 The warhead in its application should not detonate from bullet at-tack from small arms ammunition.Comment:This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060.

1.52016 Requirement 1.52015 should be verified by testing.

1.52017 The design of the warhead should facilitate upgrading, in-service surveillance and disposal.

1.52018 The possible destruction of any duds (unexploded ammunition) should be taken into account during the design of the warhead.

1.52019 Toxicity arising from manufacture, use, clearance of duds, recovery of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into account.

1.52020 The blast pressure from a detonating warhead should be deter-mined.Comment:The danger areas for blast pressure and fragmentation shall be de-termined.

1.52021 The environmental aspects of manufacture, use, clearance of duds, recovery of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into ac-count.

1.52022 The safe separation distance shall be determined for all warheads. Refer also to requirement 1.51024.

5 Ammunition

122

5

5.2.2 Warheads containing high explosive (HE)

5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition

This section contains object specific instructions for warheads for tube-launchedammunition. In addition, common instructions as stated in Chapter 2, ‘Safetyactivities and requirements common to all materiel’ shall apply.

HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition for cannons, howitzers, mortars,and recoilless launch tube weapons are dealt with herein.

HE shells primarily consist of a shell body filled with high explosive which maybe compressed or cast. The design is dimensioned to withstand high pressureand high acceleration and, where relevant, spin.

Practice shells with a reduced charge are similar to HE shells but have a greatlyreduced charge or spotting charge. On burst the spotting charge produces a flashand smoke to facilitate observation of the impact point. The quantity of highexplosive is reduced to such an extent that no injury to the gun crew nor damageto the gun shall occur in the event of premature detonation in the barrel. If thiscondition cannot be met in the design, the practice shells shall be treated in thesame way as HE shells from the safety aspect.

Figure 5.1 Example of an HE shell containing a booster and fuze

Fuze

Booster

Auxiliary boostercasing

Auxiliary booster

Auxiliary boostercharge

HE Shell

Auxiliary booster

Main charge

Driving band

Pipe disc

Shell body

Ammunition 5

123

5

A characteristic of tube-launched ammunition is that the projectile is subjectedto high pressure, high temperature and acceleration, and often spin in the barrel,as well as aerodynamic heating while in flight. This means that the safety of thedesign must be examined carefully with regard to material load etc.

Material defects can have a critical effect if leakage occurs allowing hot propel-lant gases to enter and ignite the HE charge. Shell bodies may exhibit leaks inthe base (so-called pipes), which is why the base is usually fitted with a metalbase plate or other sealing device. A coarse inner surface in the shell body mayincrease the risk of a hazardous event owing to increased friction.

The sensitivity of the warhead in question is significantly dependent on the qual-ity of the high explosive, its freedom from foreign particles and its application.Pipes, cavities, and cracks (especially close to the base) may cause settling ofthe high explosive during firing, which in turn can lead to premature ignition byadiabatic compression (detonation in the barrel).

If firing is interrupted, an HE charge in a shell may be initiated if it remains inthe rammed position in a hot barrel (so-called cook-off).

In the case of rocket assisted projectiles it is important to consider the effects ofthermal conductivity and erosion on the wall separating the rocket engine fromthe high explosive charge.

The driving band – usually made of copper, a copper alloy, plastic or sinterediron – can be a safety critical item. Defects in the material or in the manufactureof the driving band may lead to disintegration in the barrel, which in turn maycause a hazardous event.

1.52023 If it is conceivable that the material from which the shell body is fabricated may contain pipes a base plate or equivalent shall be em-ployed and shall be attached in a satisfactory manner.

1.52024 When filling a shell body with high explosive it shall be ensured that unacceptable pipes, cavities or cracks do not occur and that the required adhesion is achieved.

1.52025 Requirement 1.52024 shall be verified by X-ray inspection, sawing in half the shell bodies, or by the use of bisectable shell bodies.

1.52026 Pressed shell bodies shall be free from explosive composition dust.

1.52027 Pressed shell bodies shall meet stipulated requirements concerning freedom from cracks and other defects.

1.52028 Any separations in the shell body shall be satisfactorily sealed to prevent the ingress of high explosive into joints.

5 Ammunition

124

5

1.52029 When installing an auxiliary booster it shall be ensured that no cav-ity occurs that could cause hazard initiation.

1.52030 In shells equipped with an end screw or base fuze, the HE charge in the shell shall be well filled against the base of the shell.

1.52031 It shall be ensured that any uncontrolled base bleed combustion cannot lead to deflagration/detonation of the warhead via gas flow or gas erosion when firing base bleed ammunition.

5.2.2.2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles

This section covers HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles. Such war-heads consist mainly of a casing (sleeve, nose cone) and an HE charge. Designsdiffer to achieve optimum effect in the intended target. The casing is also dimen-sioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. The HE charge may be castor compressed.

Most rockets and guided missiles have practice warheads for training purposes.They have a reduced HE charge, combined with a spotting agent that producessmoke and/or a flash when they burst. There are also practice warheads that pro-duce smoke on impact without employing any high explosive (or fuze), (e.g. anampoule of titanium tetrachloride which is crushed on impact).

Figure 5.2 Rocket with warhead

A characteristic feature of rocket and missile warheads is that they are usuallylocated adjacent to a rocket engine. Consequently, the safety review must takeinto account inter alia the likelihood of initiation of the explosive by heat fromthe burning propellant or by the direct ingress of propellant gases owing to theirerosive effect, or because of material defects. Some projectiles, such as thoseemploying impulse rocket engines, are subjected to high acceleration when allthe propellant has burnt out in the launch tube. In this type of ammunition therequirements concerning absence of pipes etc. in the HE charge and warheadcasing are the same as for tube-launched ammunition as specified inSection 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’, to avoid any pos-sibility of settling of the high explosive that could cause premature initiation.Most rocket and missile warheads, however, are not subjected to such an accel-

Ammunition 5

125

5

eration, which is why the same stringent safety requirements do not need to beapplied in respect of the casing, surface texture, and the freedom from pipes andcracks of the HE charge.

Airborne ammunition can be subjected to aerodynamic heating of the warheadduring normal flight or during the approach phase.

It is important that the quantity of high explosive in practice warheads isreduced to a small enough quantity to ensure that hazard initiation does notentail a risk of injury. If this is not feasible, the practice warhead in questionshall be considered to be an HE warhead from the safety aspect.

1.52032 The warhead casing should not consist of separate parts within the zone adjacent to the rocket engine in order to avoid gas leakage.

1.52033 The HE charge in the warhead should be protected from heat-gen-erating components.

5.2.2.3 HE warheads for bombs

This section addresses HE warheads for bombs which herein refer mainly tothose that are equipped with fins or equivalent, and are dropped from aircraft tosubsequently follow a ballistic trajectory. For bombs that contain devices toguide the bomb to the target or to correct the final phase of the trajectory, theapplicable parts of Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammuni-tion’ and 5.2.2.2 ‘HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles’ apply.

Bomb warheads mainly consist of a casing and an HE charge. The casing issometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing is alsodimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use.

The bomb casing is equipped with a suspension device and fins, and is usuallycompletely filled with high explosive. This may be cast or compressed, or con-sist of liquid high explosive. The casing may also contain the bomb fuzing sys-tem. For this item the requirements specified in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems forwarheads and propelling charges’ apply.

A feature of warheads in HE bombs is that they usually contain large quantitiesof high explosive which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause exten-sive injury and damage.

In the case of practice bombs containing explosive spotting charges it is vitalthat the quantity of explosive contained is small enough so that any hazard initi-ation does not entail a risk of injury or damage.

5 Ammunition

126

5

Bombs are usually not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why lessstringent safety requirements can be stipulated regarding the structural strength,homogeneity, etc. of the explosive charge.

Environmental stress factors such as vibration and aerodynamic heating occur inhigh speed flight.

1.52034 If the casing consists of separate parts, there shall be sufficient sealing to ensure that ingress of moisture or leakage of explosive does not occur.

1.52035 Where separate charges are used the intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate filler material.

5.2.2.4 HE warheads for landmines

This section contains materiel specific requirements for landmine warheads.The joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply.

The text below addresses HE warheads for landmines, which herein mainlydenotes those that are laid manually and those laid by a mechanical minelayer.

For warheads that are ejected or transported to the target zone by some kind ofcarrier, the relevant parts of previous sections of this chapter apply.

In the case of landmines designed for possible deployment in peacetime, thedesign shall take into account the possible risk of hazard initiation – caused bythe weather, radio/light signals, minor earth tremors or equivalent, road works –even after a long period of deployment.

Landmine warheads mainly consist of a casing and HE charge. The casing issometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing also has tobe dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. In some cases thewarhead has no casing, but the HE charge is then reinforced with fiberglass,either homogeneous or surface-reinforced.

The casing is usually completely filled by the HE charge, which may be cast orcompressed. The casing may also contain the mine fuzing system, for which therequirements stated in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propellingcharges’ apply.

Ammunition 5

127

5

Figure 5.3 Example of a landmine warhead

In terms of safety, warheads for HE landmines are usually characterised by con-taining relatively large quantities of high explosive, which means that an inad-vertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage.

Landmines are normally not subjected to high rates of acceleration which iswhy less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning their struc-tural strength, homogeneity, etc.

It is vital that practice landmines containing an explosive spotting charge con-tain a quantity of explosive that is small enough so that any hazard initiationdoes not entail a risk of injury during normal use.

1.52036 If the casing consists of separate parts there shall be sealing to pre-vent the ingress of moisture.

1.52037 The metal casing shall be protected against corrosion.

5.2.2.5 HE warheads for large underwater ammunition

This section contains object specific requirements for warheads used in under-water mines, depth charges and torpedoes. For small underwater weapons, suchas anti-submarine shells, refer to Section 5.2.2.6 ‘HE warheads for other ammu-nition’. In addition, the joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE war-heads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply.

The text below addresses HE warheads for underwater use in such weapons asunderwater mines, depth charges and torpedoes.

Underwater mines that are intended for deployment in peacetime should bedesigned to take into account the possible risk for hazard initiation – owing togas formation in the warhead or collision with a vessel or submarine – even aftera long period of deployment.

5 Ammunition

128

5

Warheads for underwater mines, depth charges, and torpedoes are designed toprovide overpressure effect and consist mainly of an explosive charge, the cas-ing and a location for the fuzing system. The casing is dimensioned for the cal-culated stresses during handling and the actual launch stresses, but greatimportance must also be attached to corrosion resistance and being proofagainst the ingress of water/moisture, both in salt water and in a salt water atmo-sphere.

Figure 5.4 Example of an underwater mine

Figure 5.5 Example of a torpedo

A characteristic feature of HE warheads for underwater mines, depth charges,and torpedoes is that they usually contain extremely large quantities of highexplosive which is why an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury ordamage. The high explosive may contain aluminium powder and ammoniumperchlorate to increase the pressure effect. This generally means that stringentrequirements must be stipulated concerning water-tightness since ingress ofmoisture may cause gas to form. In certain cases ventilation must be enabled.These warheads are subjected to lower rates of acceleration than tube-launchedammunition which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulatedconcerning the structural strength of the high explosive, its adhesion, and itsfreedom from cavities and cracks. However, there is enhanced risk when thereare through-cracks in large charges contained in elastic casings or in casingswith low structural strength.

Ammunition 5

129

5

High explosive should be avoided in practice warheads. If the pedagogicalnature of the training does not enable total exclusion of high explosive, it is vitalthat the quantity of any explosive used shall be small enough so that a hazardinitiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage to materiel. Instead, othertypes of indication should be employed such as buoys or pyrotechnic spottingcharges for smoke or light signals.

1.52038 If there is a risk of overpressure in the warhead it shall be possible to remove plugs or other seals without risk of injury to personnel, such as during in-service surveillance of ammunition.

1.52039 Fuzes shall form a seal with the casing or have a sealed seat/loca-tion.

1.52040 Metal casings shall be protected against corrosion internally and externally.

1.52041 Where separate charges are used, any intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate filler material.

5.2.2.6 HE warheads for other ammunition

This section states materiel specific requirements for natures of ammunitioncontaining HE charges other than those dealt with elsewhere in this chapter. Inaddition, the joint specifications stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads fortube-launched ammunition’ also apply.

This section addresses HE ammunition that is not readily categorised as havingHE warheads designed for tube-launched ammunition, bombs, rockets, guidedmissiles, landmines, underwater mines or torpedoes.

Ammunition denoted by the title to this section is normally used statically withthe exception of hand-grenades and rocket-projected line charges, for example,the former being thrown by hand and the latter being deployed by means of arocket. Initiation is either delayed (e.g. safety fuze with detonator or delay deto-nator) or remotely controlled (e.g. pull-string with percussion cap, rapid orPETN fuze, or electrically).

5 Ammunition

130

5

Examples of such ammunition are hand grenades,mine clearing ammunition, PETN fuzes, cylindrical orprismatic hollow-charges, and demolition charges inthe form of Bangalore torpedoes and linear/hosecharges.

A characteristic feature of such HE ammunition isthat it often incorporates high explosive in containersof elementary design or without a casing, and that if ahazardous event occurs can deflagrate or detonate tocause incendiary, fragmentation and pressure effects.Safety during use is mainly based on directives, regu-lations, and instructions for use.

Figure 5.6 Example of a hand-grenade

1.52042 Ammunition and packaging should be such that co-storage in ac-cordance with IFTEX and joint loading in accordance with the ‘UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be per-mitted.

5.2.3 Pyrotechnic warheads

The section headed ‘General’ is a compilation of general requirements. In addi-tion, the general requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply. Moreover, each type of warhead also hasobject specific requirements that are disclosed in other sections of this chapter.

5.2.3.1 General

This section addresses warheads whose main effect derives from pyrotechniccharges. Other warheads incorporating pyrotechnics (e.g. as tracers or as com-ponents in priming devices) are addressed in the relevant subsection. The sameapplies to warheads with comparable effect achieved by agents other than pyro-technic (e.g. instantaneous smoke by ejection of substances that are themselvesnot explosives). Incendiary warheads containing a charge of high explosiveincendiary composition shall be considered as HE warheads from the safetyaspect.

Ammunition 5

131

5

Pyrotechnic charges contain pyrotechnic compositions that can be in powderform, granulated to a particular shape, or compressed (with or without a bindingagent) to form pellets. They are usually encased in moisture-proof containers.Where appropriate, the warhead casing is resistant and sealed, e.g. warheads fortube-launched ammunition, rockets and bombs.

Pyrotechnic warheads can be incorporated in:

• illuminating ammunition used for illuminating the battlefield,

• smoke ammunition for degrading enemy visibility,

• incendiary ammunition,

• signal ammunition, utilising light and/or smoke,

• spotting agents and practice ammunition simulating real weapon effect.

A characteristic feature of most types of pyrotechnic ammunition is that it oftencontains flammable pyrotechnic composition which, when ignited, emits hotcombustion products that can cause fire. Depending on the confinement, suchpressure may arise that rapid deflagration, or even detonation, occurs in whichcase the casing can burst with subsequent fragmentation effect. Pyrotechniccompositions can be sensitive to shock, especially if composition dust is presentor can occur. There is a risk of friction ignition if such composition dustmigrates to, or during manufacture becomes present in, threads or joint surfaceswhere it may initiate when the fuze is screwed on or off or when subjected toequivalent stress such as bump, shock or vibration. It is vital that pyrotechniccharges are adequately confined to prevent risks of this type. Even cracks incompressed pellets can entail a risk of friction initiation or violent burningsequence if subjected to environmental stress.

Some parts of inadequately mixed compositions may be more sensitive to per-cussion than normal.

Pyrotechnic compositions that are hygroscopic may change their properties as aresult of moisture ingress. Gas may form and create such an increase in pressurethat the casing can burst. Escaping gas (such as hydrogen) can form an explo-sive mixture with air.

Ingress of moisture can also entail a risk of spontaneous combustion (e.g. forsmoke compositions containing zinc).

Generally, smoke compositions contain inert zinc which shall not involve a riskof spontaneous combustion. Smoke ammunition is TS classified with a ‘3’ as thesecond digit, i.e. there is no risk of inadvertent ignition.

5 Ammunition

132

5

Pyrotechnic compositions or their combustion products can be toxic, especiallysmoke compositions. Care must also be taken to ensure compatibility betweenthe various compositions and the other components in a pyrotechnic warhead.The stability of the compositions used when subjected to various environmentalconditions shall also be assured.


1.52043 Pyrotechnic ammunition should be designed and the compositions selected such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and the ‘UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be permitted.

1.52044 The charge shall meet the prescribed moisture content.

1.52045 The charge shall meet the prescribed purity from foreign particles.

1.52046 The pyrotechnic composition used should have good storage sta-bility.

1.52047 Compressed pellets shall meet the prescribed structural strength.

1.52048 Insulation adhesion shall meet the prescribed value.

1.52049 Requirement 1.52048 shall be verified by testing, and if necessary by destructive testing.

1.52050 Insulation shall be free from cracks and cavities.

1.52051 The charge casing shall be sealed.

5.2.3.3 Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition

This section contains object specific requirements for pyrotechnic warheads fortube-launched ammunition. In addition, the applicable parts of the joint require-ments stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’also apply.

This section addresses pyrotechnic warheads for illuminating, smoke or incen-diary effect (or a combination thereof) used in guns (including signal pistols).Such warheads mainly consist of a shell body (cargo shell) which is dimen-sioned to withstand the high pressure and subsequent high acceleration and,where appropriate, spin and spin acceleration for the weapon specified, togetherwith a pyrotechnic charge (or charges). Additionally, in most cases there are oneor more parachutes, spin brakes and support segments. Effect is achieved in theform of illumination, smoke screen, setting the target on fire, or by signal effect.

Ammunition 5

133

5

Figure 5.7 Example of a shell for smoke and illuminating effect

A characteristic feature of pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunitionis that the propelling charge subjects them to high pressure and high temperatureduring the bore phase. In most cases the shell body is provided with an expella-ble base, which is expelled together with the pyrotechnic charge at a pre-deter-mined point in the trajectory. Unsatisfactory sealing of the base or materialdefects that may allow the ingress of hot propellant gas can cause a hazardousevent if the charge is ignited in the barrel.

Furthermore, the structural strength of the charge and the charge casing is vitalfrom the safety aspect, because if the charge disintegrates during acceleration,or if there is loose composition dust present, friction initiation and an uncontrol-lable burning sequence may occur.

1.52052 The base of the shell shall be completely sealed against hot propel-lant gases, moisture etc. and against composition dust.

1.52053 At final assembly the charge shall have the correct moisture con-tent.Comment: If necessary the charge may need to be dried before final assembly.

Smoke shell Illuminating shell

Smoke charges withigniting charge

Spin brake

Shell body

Driving band

Fuze with ignitingdevice

Separation chargein bag or cartridge

Illuminating chargewith igniting charge

Support sleeve

Parachute with centraland shroud lines

Base plate

Spin brake

Ammunition 5

137

5


HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition1.52023 SHALL Base plate against pipes

1.52024 SHALL Unacceptable pipes

1.52025 SHALL X-ray inspection

1.52026 SHALL Explosive composition dust

1.52027 SHALL Freedom from cracks

1.52028 SHALL Separations sealed

1.52029 SHALL Auxiliary booster, no cavity

1.52030 SHALL HE charge well filled

1.52031 SHALL Uncontrolled base bleed combustion

HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles1.52032 SHOULD Mono-casing

1.52033 SHOULD HE charge protected

HE warheads for bombs1.52034 SHALL Casing in separate parts

1.52035 SHALL Separate charges, filler material

HE warheads for landmines1.52036 SHALL Casing in separate parts

1.52037 SHALL Corrosion protection for cas-ing

HE warheads for large underwater ammunition1.52038 SHALL Plugs for overpressure

1.52039 SHALL Fuzes sealed

1.52040 SHALL Corrosion protection for cas-ing

1.52041 SHALL Separate charges, filler material

HE warheads for other ammunition1.52042 SHOULD Co-storage

Pyrotechnic warheads1.52043 SHOULD Co-storage

1.52044 SHALL Moisture content of charge

1.52045 SHALL Purity of charge

Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued


5 Ammunition

138

5

5.3 Propulsion systems

5.3.1 General

This section specifies the joint requirements for propulsion devices. In addition,the materiel specific requirements stated in the relevant subsection for the vari-ous types of propulsion system also apply.

1.52046 SHOULD Storage stability of pyro-technic composition

1.52047 SHALL Structural strength of com-pressed pellets

1.52048 SHALL Insulation adhesion


1.52050 SHALL Insulation free from cracks

1.52051 SHALL Charge casing sealed

Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition1.52052 SHALL Base of shell sealed


1.52054 a)

1.52055 a)

Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs1.52056 SHALL Dividing wall sealed


Other pyrotechnic warheadsThe applicable parts of the requirements specified for pyrotechnic warheads apply to other pyrotechnic warheads

Other warheads1.52058 SHALL Requirements as per Sec-

tion 5.2.3

a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank

Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued


Ammunition 5

139

5

5.3.1.1 Description of function

The purpose of propulsion devices in ammunition is to impart sufficient impulseto the warhead to transport the ammunition to the target. The term propulsiondevices herein denotes charges in gun systems that impart the correct muzzlevelocity to projectiles, and includes reaction motors of various types that pro-vide propulsion in the launch or trajectory phase – such as in a rocket assistedprojectile – or in both phases.

Gas generators are designed to produce gas flow under pressure and are used forvarious purposes in ammunition, such as to pressurise fuel and oxidiser tanks inliquid fuel rocket engines etc., as power sources for subsystems in guided mis-siles and torpedoes, or as devices in projectiles for reducing air resistance – so-called base-bleed units.

Propulsion agents are used in propulsion devices and gas generators, but canalso be taken from the medium through which the projectile travels, i.e. air orwater (torpedo propulsion). Gun systems use propellants only, though in thefuture this may possibly be combined with electricity. Rocket engines use pro-pellant as well as single, double or triple base liquid propulsion agents. Air-breathing engines use low-oxidiser propellants (in ram rocket engines andturbo-rocket engines), solid fuels without oxidizer (ramjets, SFRJ – Solid FuelRamJet), and liquid fuels (ordinary ramjet and turbojet engines). Gas generatorsuse propellants or liquid propulsion agents.

Propellants, like other types of explosives, are characterised by a very rapid gen-eration of energy irrespective of their surroundings. On the other hand, heat gen-eration per unit weight is low, for example only about 10% of the heat generatedby burning the corresponding quantity of petrol (gasoline) in air.

Ignition of propulsion agents is achieved by using various types of primingdevices containing an initiator that is initiated mechanically or electrically, or bysome other type of energy supply. The priming device usually contains a pyro-technic booster charge adjacent to the initiator (e.g. percussion cap, electricprimer) to ensure rapid, reproducible ignition of the propulsion agent. Artilleryprimers, base-bleed initiators, and rocket engine initiators are examples of suchpriming devices.

5.3.1.2 Safety aspects

From a safety point of view it should be noted that propulsion agents can beinflammable, highly reactive, toxic and explosive. The rate of combustion usu-ally increases with pressure, i.e. confinement ratio. If the rise in pressure is

5 Ammunition

140

5

uncontrolled there is a risk of a hazardous event. Inadvertent initiation can occurthrough friction, discharge of static electricity, heating to ignition temperature,or by inadvertent actuation of the priming device (by impact, shock, heat orelectric fields). Additionally, propulsion agents can be susceptible to deteriora-tion through ageing so that the ignition temperature becomes lower or the agentbecomes unstable, for example.

Several countries are developing ammunition that is less sensitive to fire andbullet attack. This ammunition is known as IM (insensitive munition). The des-ignation LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) is also used. Technically, thepropulsion agent is made less sensitive by the use of plastic as a binding agentwhile the energy-producing agent is a nitramine, and/or by confining the propul-sion agent in such a way that sensitivity is reduced.


The following are examples of the consequences of mechanical stress from theenvironment:

• Cracks, debonding, formation of propellant dust, damage to propellant insu-lation or other defects that considerably increase the burning surface, mayoccur in propelling charges causing the pressure during combustion to behigher than that for which the ammunition casing is designed.

The following are examples of the consequences of physical and chemical stressfrom the environment:

• If stored at high temperature and/or in high humidity there is a risk that therate of burn of the propelling charge may be affected so that an excessivepressure arises. This applies particularly to unbonded charges and can, inunfavourable cases for example, result in blockage of the exhaust nozzle inrocket engines or base bleed units by charge particles that have debonded.

• When using a case bonded charge a permanent deformation may be inducedbecause of differences in the coefficients of expansion between the casingand the charge. This can – in some cases after a long duration – result incracks in the charge (relaxation until fracture) or cause debonding betweenthe charge and its insulation. The risks are enhanced when the casing is sub-jected to pressure at ignition. Risks can also arise owing to variations in tem-perature (temperature cycles).

• Reactions in the propulsion agent, or between the agent and other materials,can change the properties of the agent itself (i.e. ageing). An example of thisis a decay in the rheological properties which can lead to the formation ofcracks in the propulsion agent when used at low temperature. Another ex-ample is degraded stability which, in severe cases, can lead to self-ignitionof the propulsion agent. A further example involves changes in internal bal-

Ammunition 5

141

5

listic properties, which can cause the combustion process to differ fromwhat is intended, particularly at high or low temperatures. Furthermore, thepropulsion agent can affect other materials, such as the igniter cup, causingthe material to embrittle and rupture.

• Liquid fuel propulsion agents with a higher thermal cubic expansion ratethan the surrounding fuel tank casing can, when overheated, rupture the cas-ing or the integral bursting discs, whereby the propulsion agent can be ex-pelled into the reaction chamber and/or the surroundings.

• Propellant motors with non-electrically conducting casings, and propellantscontaining metallic powders such as aluminium, can be subject to hazardinitiation caused by electrostatic discharge. Electrical charging of the motorcasing can occur during use. This applies particularly in a dry, cold atmo-sphere. The electric field from the charge can be intensified in the propellantand create a flash-over between the metallic grains thus causing hazard ini-tiation. A number of accidents caused by ESD (electrostatic discharge) haveoccurred in the USA. All have occurred in systems containing large charges(Pershing, Peacekeeper).

5.3.1.4 Joint requirements

1.53001 The design of, and materials in, a propelling charge casing shall be selected so as to ensure that the casing resists all specified loads without exceeding the permissible deformation or stress.

1.53002 Adjacent materials, and materials in the propelling charge, shall be compatible. These materials may comprise internal protective paint, sealing agents, insulation materials, combustion catalysts, wear protectants, etc. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006 and 1.23007.

1.53003 When using hardened steel the material and heat treatment cho-sen shall be such that no hydrogen brittleness nor detrimental corro-sion occurs.

1.53004 The propelling charge shall be of a type, quality, and size to ensure that the required safety margin for permissible maximum pressure in all specified environments is not exceeded.

1.53005 The propulsion force process and pressure–time curves shall be re-producible within the stated requirement specification.

1.53006 The propelling charge should be designed to minimise fragments propelled rearwards from the base plate or nozzle plug, for exam-ple.

1.53007 The safe separation distance/time shall be established for all pro-pulsion systems during the most unfavourable operating conditions. Refer also to requirement 1.51024.

5 Ammunition

142

5

1.53008 Metal additives, if any, shall not be able to block the exhaust noz-zle.

1.53009 The propulsion agent casing shall be sealed as required.

1.53010 The propulsion agent casing shall withstand handling throughout its service life.

1.53011 The composition of the propulsion agent should be such that the agent, its components and its combustion products are of minimal toxicity and have as little environmental impact as possible. This applies to manufacture, use, clearance of duds and disposal.

1.53012 The design should facilitate disassembly (e.g. for upgrading, in-service surveillance and disposal).

1.53013 The propulsion device in its tactical application should not deto-nate when subjected to the specified bullet attack.Comment:This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060.

1.53014 Bullet attack testing of the propulsion device as specified in re-quirement 1.53013 should be performed.

1.53015 The propulsion device in its tactical application should not deto-nate if subjected to fire.Comment:This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060.

1.53016 A fuel fire test should be performed as specified in requirement 1.53015.

5.3.2 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition

5.3.2.1 General

This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion agents in theform of solid propellant for tube-launched ammunition. In addition, the jointrequirements specified in Section 5.1 also apply.

Nitrocellulose-based propellants are normally used as propulsion agents in tube-launched ammunition. The following factors must be taken into account whendimensioning a propelling charge: the size of the combustion chamber, length ofthe barrel, dynamic strength of the barrel (elasticity), mass of the projectile,driving band force, method of ignition, and the temperature. The pressure pro-cess is dependent on these factors as well as on the type of propellant and the

Ammunition 5

143

5

size and shape of the burn surface. Propellant dimensions are usually such thatthe propellant has burnt out before the projectile travels through the muzzle ofthe barrel, since the aim is to achieve low dispersion of velocity and to minimisethe flame.

Propellant is normally encased either in fabric (i.e. bag charge), or in a cartridgecase or separate case to form a propelling charge of designated type and dimen-sions.

Bag charges are used where an incremental/modular charge system is required,such as for howitzers and mortars. Bag charges can then be used in combinationwith separate charge cases, made of metal or plastic, to facilitate simultaneousloading of the shell and propelling charge. Small arms and automatic weapons,for example, use unitary ammunition with a single propelling charge in a metalcartridge case. Combustible cartridge cases are also available, consisting mainlyof nitro-cellulose. The combustible case burns together with the propellant, andis integral to the propelling charge to a greater or lesser extent. Propellants inliquid fuel propellant ammunition employ other suitable mixtures of explosivesrather than nitro-cellulose and nitro-glycerine, to enable a lower sensitivityresulting from a higher ignition temperature for the composition.

Priming devices normally consist of an artillery primer (electrically or mechani-cally actuated), and usually screwed into the base of the cartridge case. Theartillery primer can be short or can extend through a large section of the loadingchamber. Bag charges (modular charges) often have a booster charge of blackpowder or finely granulated porous propellant attached. This enables simulta-neous initiation of the entire propelling charge.

Cannon primers are used as priming devices in howitzers and other gun systemsthat use bag charges. The cannon primer is inserted into the breech mechanismof the weapon.

The propulsion agent for small arms ammunition is ignited by a percussion capor equivalent.

Liquid fuel propellant may be introduced into future weapon systems. The highpressure in the ejection mechanism requires steel with very good mechanicaland chemical properties. Oscillations during combustion can affect the electron-ics in the ammunition, for example.

ETC (electro-thermal-chemical launching) is being studied and developed forpossible introduction into future weapon systems. This technology provides theprerequisites for increased range and higher reproducibility in the weapon.

5 Ammunition

144

5

More stringent requirements will thereby be prescribed for heat resistance andstructural strength in the combustion chamber and barrel. Considerably highercombustion temperatures and pressures will be achieved. The rapid discharge oflarge quantities of stored energy in the capacitor bank of the weapon increasesrisks in the form of high electric and magnetic fields and currents.

Figure 5.9 Examples of propelling charges

5.3.2.1.1 Safety aspects

A characteristic feature of propelling charges is that they combust without anysupply of air, and that their rate of combustion depends inter alia upon the pres-sure, which in turn is dependent on the confinement conditions of the propellant.

Some propellants, under certain circumstances, can be made to detonate. Fac-tors that tend to increase their proneness to detonation are severe confinement,small particle size, high porosity, high nitro-glycerine content and large chargequantities.

In addition to the hazard initiation stated in Section 5.3.1.2, accidents can occurif the incorrect charge (incorrect type of propellant, incorrect dimension orquantity) is used, or if an incorrect or defective projectile is used.

Ammunition 5

145

5


1.53017 Within the permitted temperature range the propelling charge shall produce a pressure (MOP) that is lower than the permitted maxi-mum value for the barrel and shell.Comment:In the dimensioning and design of the ammunition the pressure def-initions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 shall be applied.

1.53018 For recoil barrels the combustion of the propelling charge should be designed not to cause backflash.

1.53019 The propelling charge shall be resistant to cook-off in the event of a misfire or an interruption in firing when the barrel is at maximum temperature for the operational profile in question. Refer also to re-quirement 1.43035.

1.53020 The cartridge case shall seal against the chamber seat so that there is no gas leakage.

1.53021 When using percussion caps in artillery primers etc., the impact surface shall be countersunk so that the risk for inadvertent initia-tion during use is minimal.

1.53022 The propelling charge should be designed such that the propellant is burnt out before the projectile exits the muzzle.

5.3.3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets, guid-ed missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), torpedoes, etc.

5.3.3.1 General

This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion devices andgas generators used in rockets, guided missiles, UAVs, torpedoes, etc. A com-mon factor of these devices is that they all contain propulsion agents that consti-tute hazard factors (fire, explosion or toxic hazards). These devices areincorporated in various types of propulsion systems, and can be subdivided intothe following three groups:

• reaction engines (see Figure 5.10),

• gas generators,

• propulsion devices for torpedoes.

5 Ammunition

146

5

Figure 5.10 Subdivision of reaction engines

5.3.3.2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators

Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators use propellant confinedin a casing (sleeve) incorporating one or more jets (nozzles) and the necessarypriming devices.

As the propellant burns, hot gases are formed that vent out through the exhaustnozzle(s).

Because the rate of combustion is dependent on the temperature of the propel-lant, the pressure is usually higher in a hot engine than in a cold one.

In a propellant gas generator the pressure is regulated by releasing the gas flowthat is not consumed for the designed purpose through one or more valves.

Reaction engines

Hybrid rocketengines

Contain a solid anda liquid propulsionagent

Liquid fuelrocket engines

Contain liquidoxidant and liquidfuel. In certaincases, a singelcomponentpropulsion agent

Ram rocketengines

Turbojetengines

Air taken in fromthe atmosphere iscompressed by aturbine drivencompressor

Ram rocketengines

Air inducated fromthe atmosphere iscompressed by theram effect

Propellantrocket engines

Contain solidpropellant

Rocket engines

Contain oxidants and fuel

Jet rocket engines

Contain a gas generatorthat generates gaseous fuelthat is combusted by airtaken in form the atmosphere

Jet engines

Use fuel (solid or liquid) thatis combusted by air taken inform the atmosphere

Ammunition 5

147

5

Figure 5.11 Example of a propellant gas generator

The charge(s) in a propellant rocket engine is/are usually designed according toone of two main principles:

• unbonded in the engine casing in the form of tubes or rods, for example, seeFigure 5.12,

• case bonded by casting propellant directly into the engine casing which isprovided with an internal layer of cementing and insulating material, seeFigure 5.13.

Sections of the inner walls of the engine casing that are subjected to hot com-bustion gases during combustion are usually protected by insulation.

Figure 5.12 Unbonded tubular propellant. All-round combustion

FilterFilter

Insulation

Casing

Booster charges

Main charge

Electric priming device

Exhaust jets

5 Ammunition

148

5

Figure 5.13 Case bonded charge. Combustion in the propellant channel

The malfunction of a propellant rocket engine or propellant gas generator as aresult of enlargement of the surface, such as by cracks in the propellingcharge(s) and/or debonding between the charge and its insulation, may createsuch high pressure levels that the casing ruptures.

High pressure can also result from the unstable combustion of propellant owingto high frequency pressure oscillations in the engine.

Rupture or leakage at normal operating pressure can also occur owing to degra-dation in the strength of the casing material, or because of corrosion or defectsin the internal heat insulation.

Usually the propellant is extinguished if the casing ruptures, but it can be re-ignited if it comes into contact with hot surfaces.

1.53023 Propulsion devices should be designed such that the pressure ves-sel does not burst or detonate as a result of the impact of shrapnel from fragment-forming ammunition (or equivalent).Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060.

1.53024 Propulsion devices should be designed such that if the pressure vessel bursts a minimum number of dangerous fragments are formed.

1.53025 Propulsion devices should be designed such that fuel fire does not cause uncontrolled flight.

1.53026 Propulsion devices containing propellant with metallic powder shall be analysed with regard to risks in the event of electrostatic charging.

Liner Insulation

Propellant charge

Ammunition 5

149

5

5.3.3.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators

Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators are based on propulsionagents usually in hermetically sealed containers (tanks). Propulsion agents canbe of mono- or multi-component type where each component is stored in a sep-arate tank. The main parts of the system are:

• tank system,

• feed system,

• reaction chamber (combustion usually occurs spontaneously),

• exhaust nozzle.

Figure 5.14 Example of a liquid fuel rocket engine of off-the-shelf, factory-sealed type with double base propulsion agent (spontaneously reacting fuel and oxidis-er) including propellant gas generator

Propulsion agents are often highly reactive and toxic. Liquid fuel rocket enginesusually contain propellant gas generators with relevant priming devices. The fol-lowing hazardous events can occur:

• poisoning or injury to skin upon contact with propulsion agent that hasleaked out during the liquid or gaseous phase,

• fire in the event of contact between propulsion agent that has leaked out andcombustible or catalytic substances,

• spontaneous or delayed reaction in the event of contact between propulsionagents.

1.53027 Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024 and 1.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.

1.53028 The tank system shall be designed such that direct contact between propulsion agents cannot occur inadvertently.

1.53029 Tanks for propulsion agents shall have adequate space for the ex-pansion of the liquids.

1. Fuel pipe2. Fuel tank3. Oxidant tank

4. Piston5. Gas generator6. Priming agent

7. Over-pressure valve8. Combustion chamber9. Exhaust nozzle

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

5 Ammunition

150

5

1.53030 Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the engine to start.

1.53031 Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the pressure vessel to burst.

5.3.3.4 Jet engines

5.3.3.4.1 General

Turbojet and ramjet engines usually use liquid fuel, but ramjet engines can alsouse a solid fuel charge located in the combustion chamber of the engine. Mis-siles that have liquid fuel engines are usually kept in storage with their fueltanks full.

5.3.3.4.1.1 Turbojet engines

Vehicles powered by turbojet engines can be air or ground launched (orlaunched from ships). In the latter case one or more booster rocket engines areused that are discarded after burnout. Turbojet engines are normally started afterthe weapon is released or launched.

5.3.3.4.1.2 Ramjet engines

Vehicles powered by ramjet engines are normally accelerated to approximatelytwice the speed of sound to achieve satisfactory ramjet engine function. This isgenerally achieved by using a propelling charge in the combustion chamber ofthe ramjet engine (i.e. an integrated booster). The rocket engine nozzle locatedin the ramjet engine exhaust nozzle is discarded after burnout, and either thefront end of the combustion chamber is opened or special sealing elements areejected to enable air to enter for the ramjet engine to start. The rocket engineexhaust nozzle can be eliminated in certain cases by designing the propellingcharge in a specific way (a so-called nozzleless booster).

Figure 5.15 Example of a turbojet engine

Priming agentLiquid fuel

Ammunition 5

151

5

Figure 5.16 SFRJ – Solid Fuel RamJet engine

A special safety aspect concerning turbojet engines is that the liquid propulsionagent can cause fuel fire through leakage or inadvertent fuel feed. From thesafety aspect an integrated ramjet engine is characterised – apart from the risk offuel fire – by the same hazards as those inherent in propellant rocket enginesowing to the propelling charge located in the combustion chamber. Other haz-ards that must also be taken into account with both types of engine are those thatarise when engine parts such as intake and exhaust covers, rocket engineexhaust nozzles, and separate burnt-out booster rocket engines are discardedafter launch.

For an SFRJ to function it is necessary for it to reach a high velocity. This veloc-ity can be achieved with the aid of a booster rocket or by firing from a gun. Thefuel for the ramjet phase is a solid fuel propellant, generally with no or very lowoxidiser content. The safety requirements are therefore less stringent thanrequirements stated for booster rockets and propulsion devices in gun barrels.


1.53032 Requirements 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023 and 1.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections for integrated boosters.

1.53033 The quantity and size of discarded parts (debris) at the start of ram-jet function should be minimised.

1.53034 The number of components containing pyrotechnic or explosive compositions should be minimised.

Air intake withcentre cone

Diffuser Combustionchamber

Propellantcharge

Afterburnerchamber

Exhaustnozzle

5 Ammunition

152

5

5.3.3.5 Ram rocket engines

5.3.3.5.1 General

A ram rocket engine consists of a gas generator in which a gaseous fuel is gen-erated, and an afterburner chamber where the fuel is burnt after mixing with airfrom the atmosphere.

The gaseous fuel is generated through combustion or pyrolysis of a solid propul-sion agent.

A ram rocket engine usually has a propellant rocket charge located in the after-burner to achieve the required flight velocity in the same way as an integratedramjet engine. It has a similar system of sealing elements in the front end nearthe air intake, and a propellant rocket nozzle aft that is discarded when the pro-pellant has burnt out. The solid fuel (i.e. propellant with a large excess of fuel)in the gas generator can be ignited and be already burning during the rocketengine phase, thus contributing in a minor way to the mass flow and thereby tothe thrust. However, it is more usual to have the airway between the gas genera-tor and afterburner chamber closed during this phase. At transition (i.e. end ofpropellant phase) the airway is opened while simultaneously the seal closing theair intake is also opened. The gas generator is started by its own igniter andbegins to produce gas in the afterburner chamber where it mixes with incomingair to be subsequently ignited by the afterburner igniter.

Ammunition 5

153

5

Figure 5.17 Ram rocket engine phases

From the safety aspect, ram rocket engines are equivalent to propellant rocketengines and propellant gas generators, as well as ramjet engines (see relevantsubsections).

1.53035 Requirements 1.53005, 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53025, 1.53033 and 1.53034 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.

5.3.3.6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes

Propulsion devices for torpedoes are based on piston engines that are driven byhigh-pressure steam from a steam generator. A propellant gas generator can beused to start the engine. Battery-driven electric motors are also used.

The steam generator is in principle a combustion chamber in which fuel and anoxidiser react while heat is generated. At the same time an appropriate quantityof water is injected so that the propellant gas for the engine consists of dry high-pressure steam mixed with combustion products, usually carbon dioxide, as wellas nitrogen in the case of air propulsion.

Booster phase Solid fuel Propellant Propellant igniter

Transition phase Priming agent

Ram rocket phase Priming agent

5 Ammunition

154

5

The following combinations of fuel and oxidiser are used: ethyl alcohol and air,paraffin (kerosene) and air, ethyl alcohol and hydrogen peroxide (HP), and par-affin (kerosene) and high test peroxide (HTP).

Propulsion agents are stored in separate tanks. Compressed air is used as an oxi-diser as well as for pressurising the other propulsion agent tanks.

The hazard factors that apply to propulsion devices with the propulsion agentcombinations of ethyl alcohol/air and paraffin (kerosene)/air are the same asthose that apply to liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators (seeabove in this section). The instability and powerful oxidising effect of hydrogenperoxide constitutes the most significant hazard factor in systems where HP isused as propulsion agent.

HP that accidentally leaks out and comes into contact with combustible or catal-ysing substances can cause spontaneous combustion.


1.53036 Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024, 1.53028 and 1.53029 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL re-quirements as specified in previous subsections.

1.53037 HP shall be provided with a stabilizer.

1.53038 HP tanks shall be provided with adequate load relieving and drain-ing devices.

5.3.4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices


Ammunition 5

155

5

Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices


Propulsion devices and gas generators in ammunition1.53001 SHALL Deformation of casing

1.53002 SHALL Compatibility

1.53003 SHALL Heat treatment

1.53004 SHALL Permissible maximum pres-sure of propelling charge

1.53005 SHALL Reproducibility of propul-sion force process

1.53006 SHOULD Fragments propelled rear-wards


1.53008 SHALL Locking of exhaust nozzle

1.53009 SHALL Propulsion agent casing sealed

1.53010 SHALL Propulsion agent casing, handling throughout service life

1.53011 SHOULD Toxicity of propulsion agent

1.53012 SHOULD Disassembly

1.53013 SHOULD Bullet attack of propulsion device

1.53014 SHOULD Bullet attack test

1.53015 SHOULD Propulsion device resistant to fire

1.53016 SHOULD Fuel fire test for propulsion devices

Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition1.53017 SHALL MOP of propelling charge

1.53018 SHOULD Backflash

1.53019 SHALL Cook-off

1.53020 SHALL Cartridge case sealed

1.53021 SHALL Percussion caps countersunk

1.53022 SHOULD Propelling charge burnt out

Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets etc.1.53023 SHOULD Pressure vessel burst caused

by shrapnel

1.53024 SHOULD Fragments from pressure vessel burst

5 Ammunition

156

5

1.53025 SHALL Uncontrolled flight

1.53026 SHALL Electrostatic charging

Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators1.53027 SHALL Requirements 1.53005,

1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024 and 1.53025 apply

1.53028 SHALL Direct contact between pro-pulsion agents

1.53029 SHALL Propulsion agent tanks, space for expansion

1.53030 SHALL Motor not started by leakage of propulsion agents

1.53031 SHALL Pressure vessel not to burst by leakage of propulsion agents

Jet engines1.53032 SHALL Requirements 1.53013,

1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023 and 1.53025 apply

1.53033 SHOULD Discarded parts to be mini-mised

1.53034 SHOULD Explosive compositions to be minimised

Ram rocket engines1.53035 SHALL Requirements 1.53005,

1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53025, 1.53033 and 1.53034 apply

Propulsion devices for torpedoes1.53036 SHALL Requirements 1.53005,

1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024, 1.53028 and 1.53029 apply

1.53037 SHALL Stabiliser for HP

1.53038 SHALL Draining devices for HP tanks

Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices, continued


Ammunition 5

157

5

5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges

5.4.1 Introduction

5.4.1.1 General

The following sections apply to all fuzing systems that are designed to initiatewarheads or propelling charges.

The requirements specified in Section 5.4.2 through 5.4.5 shall as far as possiblebe met, even by fuzing systems with non-conforming functions (e.g. fuzing sys-tems that do not use environmental forces for arming) in Section 5.4.6.

Warheads and propulsion devices must be initiated by a fuzing system if theyare to function as intended. It thus follows that the safety of the fuzing system isa decisive factor in the safety of the entire weapon system. The fuzing systemtherefore has its own safety system whose task is to prevent hazard initiationthroughout all phases in the life of the ammunition with the necessary degree ofsafety.

The integral safety system of a fuze may contain one or more mutually indepen-dent safety devices. Each safety device is subject to one or more arming condi-tions, each of which must be satisfied for the safety device to arm.

It is necessary for all the safety devices to be armed to enable the warhead to beinitiated.

The more safety devices that prevent initiation or transmission in an explosivetrain at any given stage, the greater is the degree of safety against hazard initia-tion at that stage.

On the other hand, a large number of safety devices can degrade the reliabilityof the fuzing system with regard to its intended function.

The principal element of a fuzing system consists of one or more transmissionsafety devices, the design and location of which are dependent on the method ofinitiation.

5 Ammunition

158

5

There are two groups of transmission safety devices (see Figure 5.18 and 5.19):1. Transmission safety devices for systems with an out-of-line explosive train

(safety device). The explosive components in the explosive train are sepa-rated by a mechanical interrupter.

2. Transmission safety devices for systems with an in-line explosive train. There is no mechanical interrupter between the explosive components of the explosive train.

The transmission safety device can be electrical (circuit breaker) or optical, forexample.

The explosive train is initiated by an initiator when the initiator receives the sig-nal to initiate.

Figure 5.18 A fuzing system with out-of-line explosive train

Sensor(-s)

Signal processor

Initiator

Interrupter Armingconditions

Warhead charge

Transmissionsafety device

Exp

losi

ve tr

ain

Booster

Saf

ety

feat

ures

InitiatorInterrupterBooster

Ammunition 5

159

5

Figure 5.19 A fuzing system with in-line explosive train

When all requirements for the arming process cannot be met, such as whenenvironmental conditions dependent on use are lacking, the safety level can beaccepted in certain cases by enabling the fuzing system – or an essential partthereof – to be assembled/installed immediately before use.

The most sensitive part of the initiator can be a primary explosive, an explosiveor a priming composition. Of these the primary explosive is most easily initi-ated, and therefore demands the most stringent requirements for the safety sys-tem.

The use of electric SAI units has become increasingly common in pace with theuse of electronics for sensors and signal processing. These initiators are gener-ally more sensitive to initiation (by radiated interference, for example, that cancause hazard initiation) than mechanical initiators. However, there are excep-tions such as EFI systems. Moreover, it is often difficult to predict the presenceand extent of electric energy.

Initiator

Circuit breaker Armingconditions

Warhead charge

Exp

losi

ve tr

ain

Saf

ety

feat

ures

Sensor(-s)

Signal processor

Transmissionsafety device

Booster

InitiatorBoosterCircuit breaker

5 Ammunition

160

5

Total safety when using a fuzing system is based on two factors – firstly, verycarefully considered technical solutions and, secondly, instructions on how touse the system. Together these two factors shall enable a tolerable safety level.

As many as possible of the safety features shall be designed into the technicalsolution, and shall rely on operating instructions no more than is necessary.

Requirements governing the need for safety devices in a fuzing system must, toa large extent, be related to the consequences of a hazardous event. A thoroughconsideration of this interrelationship is vital to system safety.

Ammunition 5

161

5

Figure 5.20 Safety concepts

Tran

spo

rt a

nd

load

ing

saf

ety

Bo

re a

nd

mu

zzle

saf

ety

Exe

mp

el p

åri

skfa

kto

rer

Haz

ard

ove

rvie

w

Arm

ing

ran

ge(

del

ay)

Saf

ety

dis

tan

ce(t

imes

)

In-f

ligh

t sa

fety

rain

saf

ety

resi

stan

ce t

o e

lect

rom

agn

etic

bush

saf

ety

Saf

e se

par

atio

nd

ista

nce

Mas

k sa

fety

5 Ammunition

162

5


Certain typical defects can be detected by subjecting the fuzing system to spe-cial testing during development. Such testing shall simulate the predicted envi-ronment to which the fuze will be exposed during its life. Defects discovered atthis stage can often be remedied by relatively elementary actions.

Examples of defects and events that can result from environmental stress andthat can adversely affect safety are listed in the subsections below. The listshould not be considered as comprehensive.

New designs and materials may entail new hazard factors.

Additional information may lead to the discovery of further hazard factors.

5.4.1.2.1 Mechanical stress

Examples of the effects of mechanical stress:

• Leakage.

• Cracks in materials

• Pulverization of explosives that can subsequently migrate to a positionwhere initiation can occur through shock or vibration.

• Localized heating caused by friction between moving parts.

• Mechanical parts of fuzing systems can be damaged or broken so that initi-ation occurs during transportation, or prematurely during loading or firing.

• Electric power cuts or short-circuits can occur through damage to leads orconnections. Extraneous circuits can also be created by the ingress of for-eign bodies. The risk of complex short-circuits on printed circuit boards andin connectors, for example, should be particularly considered.

• Cracks in micro-electronic circuits can result in failure effects that are diffi-cult to evaluate.

• Batteries and electrolytic capacitors can be damaged causing leakage ofelectrolyte that may cause spontaneous ignition of explosives or make themmore sensitive.

• During transportation, loading and firing, warheads are subjected to accel-eration levels that can disable safety features temporarily or permanently.

Ammunition 5

163

5

5.4.1.2.2 Physical and chemical stress

Examples of the effects of physical and chemical stress:

• Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they melt or flowplastically. This can result in explosives fastening in screw threads or cavi-ties where they may later be actuated leading to hazard initiation.

• Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they are initiated(cook-off).

• Air can be pumped in and out through leaks whereby water vapour entersthe fuzing system. Most explosives are adversely affected by water and be-come either more sensitive or more inert. Gaseous products can be formedfrom the reaction that can cause damage to constituent parts, and sometimesmay also react with them to form more sensitive compounds (such as copperazide).

• The structural strength, elasticity, and dimensions of the materials fromwhich the fuze is fabricated are affected by temperature so that damage fromshocks and vibrations at low temperature, for example, is more likely to oc-cur.

• Extreme variations in pressure can occur that can damage confined parts andthereby affect their function.

• Where there are great differences between the coefficients of linear expan-sion of explosives and their encasing material, leaks and ruptures can becaused in the casing or cracks may be formed in the explosive. Materialscontaining moisture may swell or shrink when the moisture content chang-es.

• Gases or fluids (desirable or undesirable) in the construction can cause cor-rosion or other physical changes to constituent materials in the fuzing sys-tem.

• Reactions between incompatible materials.

• Condensation and coating on electrical components and leads can result inextraneous lead-over current and changed electrical characteristics. Corro-sion can occur where there is galvanic contact between different metals.

• An inadvertent flow of energy to electric or laser initiators, possibly causedby some environmental factor, can cause initiation.

• An inadvertent supply of electric energy, such as discharge of static electric-ity, can result in electronic components being damaged in such a way thatsafety is affected.

• Electrostatic discharge can, in unfavourable cases (in inappropriate de-signs), directly or indirectly initiate the initiator in the fuzing system.

5 Ammunition

164

5

• An electric potential difference can occur between the ammunition andnearby objects or earth/ground. The risks are greatest when the potential dif-ference is equalized in conjunction with a connection – mechanical or elec-trical – to the weapon platform or test equipment.

• When connecting and disconnecting electrical equipment, high transientcurrents can occur inadvertently such as when disconnecting the powersource after testing.

5.4.1.3 Technical solutions

5.4.1.3.1 Electrical subsystems

5.4.1.3.1.1 General

Consideration shall be given to the following factors inter alia when designingfuzing systems to achieve protection against inadvertent function:

• Selection of components:The relay for the armed and unarmed modes shall be selected such that anelectric current maintains the relay in armed mode, and any break in voltageresults in the relay returning to unarmed mode. Mechanical initiators forthermal batteries shall be selected such that they do not activate the batteriesin the event of a defect. When selecting components all the environmentalfactors to which the system can be subjected shall be taken into account.

• Static electricity:Any uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can cause hazard initiationof the fuzing system. The design shall ensure that the electrostatic dischargecan occur via a resistor or in some other way.

• Electromagnetic energy:The design must provide the best possible protection from electromagneticinfluences including lightning, EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and HPM(high power microwaves). Protection can be achieved in the followingways:– Metallic shielding of sensitive components. Storage containers can

give considerable protection against electromagnetic energy.– HF shielding of openings where there are controls and connectors.– ‘Filtration’.– Circuit insulating relays and connectors that are insensitive to HF en-

ergy shall be located as close as possible to protected elements to pre-clude use of long cables that assimilate energy.

– Shield connections shall be of low resistance and shall be fullysheathed at all connection points.

Ammunition 5

165

5

• Earth/ground currents:The design shall not incorporate earth/ground loops. Each design shall en-sure that earth/ground currents are restricted to a safe level during operation,loading and testing.

• Connectors and cables:Connectors and cables shall be designed and located to achieve maximumprotection against short-circuiting resulting from ingress of moisture andforeign matter, e.g. lead connections can have insulating combs betweenconnection points. Connectors shall be designed such that they cannot be as-sembled incorrectly nor be incorrectly identified.

5.4.1.3.1.2 Electronics

Experience has shown that our present fuzing systems are very safe. Whendeveloping new products the aim must be to maintain, or even improve, on thisstandard of safety.

Current developments involve the replacement of mechanical and electromag-netic designs with electronic circuits. This trend is driven by the major advan-tages afforded by electronics such as high performance, low weight, greatflexibility and low price.

The application of electronics in fuzing systems is, however, far from self-evi-dent. Often any defect in the electronics will affect not only function but alsosafety. Consequently, there are excellent reasons for exercising great caution.

In fuzing systems with an out-of-line explosive train transmission in the explo-sive train is certainly prevented, but if the interrupting function as such is con-trolled by electronics the system should be considered as an electronic fuzingsystem from the safety aspect.

5.4.1.3.1.3 Subsystems with wave-borne signals

If an arming system uses a signal transmitted via a carrier wave the system willbe open to all signals – intentional and inadvertent – that reach its input port. Itmust thus be ensured that only the correct signal can result in arming, and thatthe probability of an unauthorized signal reaching the arming object is madesufficiently low.

This can be achieved, for example, by:

• Using a sufficient number of combinations and a sufficiently narrow band-width.

5 Ammunition

166

5

• Limiting the strength of the signal in range and dispersion to that which isnecessary for the specific application.

• Selecting codes so that only a limited number of objects can be armed by thesame code.

• Changing the signal before the next operating occasion.

• Varying the signal when repeating commands to the same object.

• Being able to vary codes or data for signal configuration when deploying theobject.

• Ensuring the code cannot be deciphered despite wide knowledge of the safe-ty system.

• Incorporating a time-dependent parameter in the signal in cases where arm-ing will take place at a later occasion after deployment.

5.4.1.3.1.4 Programmable subsystems

The increasing use of software in safety critical applications creates a need forrules and guidelines concerning the development of such systems. Those usedfor the design of electronics are not directly applicable. Conventional safetyanalysis studies the consequences when various components malfunction or aremissing. The behavior of the system in various failure modes can be predicted.Component defects do not usually occur in software after the system has beendeveloped. Instead, the risk is that the system does not behave as intended in allrespects. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove subsequently that an existingsoftware program is free from bugs in all respects. ‘Manufacturing defects’ canalso arise during coding, for example. Instead, safety must be designed into theapplication. This is achieved by systematic procedure throughout design, devel-opment, testing, configuration management and documentation. Software canbe a good aid for enhancing test efficiency but should be avoided as a circuitsafety feature in fuzing systems.

5.4.1.3.1.5 Laser fuzing systems

A laser fuzing system in its most elementary form consists of a laser, opticalfibre, and a detonator (primer). It is also possible to transmit laser energydirectly to the detonator without any optical fibre.

For a system without an interrupter in the explosive train, the laser must be pre-vented from releasing initiation energy to the detonator before the safe separa-tion distance has been reached.

This can be prevented by:

Ammunition 5

167

5

• Separating the laser from the detonator by a barrier introduced into the partof the beam, or by blocking the laser cavity. The requirements for the barri-er/blocking then become the same as for an interrupter.

• Safety features to prevent the electronics from activating the laser.

For laser systems with an interrupter in the explosive train, the standard require-ments for an interrupter apply.

5.4.1.4 Other fuzing systems

5.4.1.4.1 Fuzing systems for explosives etc.

Fuzing systems with an in-line explosive train have been traditionally acceptedfor use in demolition devices, signal and spotting agents, hand-grenades, andminesweeping ammunition such as mine counter-blasting charges, explosivecutters and acoustic explosive sweeps, even though sensitivity requirements arenot met for such fuzing systems. The initiator usually consists of a primer ordetonator that is initiated by electrical or mechanical energy. Safety is mainlybased on the observance of regulations governing use. For newly developedammunition, however, the requirements in this section should also be applied.

5.4.1.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives, demolition sticks, Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges)

Demolition devices are initiated by fuzing systems consisting of, for example, asafety fuze, PETN fuze, non-electric fuze, or solely a detonator with electricalor mechanical initiation. It is vital that fault-free materiel and only the pre-scribed initiation device are used to prevent hazard initiation.

5.4.1.4.3 Signal and spotting agents

Signal and spotting agents are ignited by igniting devices such as a primer incombination with a safety fuze, or percussion primer with wire actuation.

Signal rounds for underwater use can have explosives which, in the event ofhazard initiation in air, can cause great damage. For this reason they should havea safety system to which the requirements in this section are applied to thegreatest possible extent.

5 Ammunition

168

5

5.4.1.4.4 Hand-grenades

There are different kinds of hand-grenades such as smoke or HE grenades ofwhich the latter are the most dangerous, having on many occasions causedinjury during practice throwing.

The most common type of hand-grenade has a fuzing system containing a prim-ing device (i.e. hand-grenade fuze). The fuzing system is armed by the release ofa lever on throwing. The hand-grenade fuze is stored separately and is installedonly when the grenade is to be used.

For newly developed hand-grenades, however, the requirements in this sectionshould be applied to the greatest possible extent.

5.4.1.4.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters

Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters are initiated by a fuzingsystem consisting of a mechanically initiated detonator. In addition to a trans-port safety device they incorporate a safety device that requires them to be sub-merged in water (water pressure).

An acoustic explosive sweep consists of detonator clusters and TNT bodies thatare initiated by electric detonators. The detonators are fired by an electric initia-tion device with the charges located in special launch tubes.

5.4.1.4.6 Self-destruction

If the fuzing system contains an integrated self-destruction or anti-handlingdevice etc., this function shall have the same degree of safety against hazard ini-tiation as the remainder of the system.

5.4.1.4.7 Submunitions

Fuzing systems in submunitions are subject to the same basic requirements asother fuzing systems. Submunitions can have special functions and characteris-tics for which it is important to observe the following:

• That the safety features are disabled in the proper sequence. This can be cru-cial, for example, for a submunition in an artillery shell in which the firstsafety feature is disabled when the shell is fired, the second safety feature isdisabled when the submunition is ejected.

• That the safety features are disabled as late as possible with regard to avail-able environmental requirements. For an airborne pod system it could, forexample, be inappropriate to disable the first safety feature when the pod is

Ammunition 5

169

5

released from the aircraft since the aircraft is often close to the pod for a longtime after separation. Instead, the separation of submunitions from the podand the drag force from the parachute etc. should be used as conditions fordisabling. Separation from the aircraft may, however, be used as an ‘extra’safety condition and as a prerequisite for disabling the other safety features.

• For submunitions containing high explosive it is often important to incorpo-rate a self-destruction facility owing to the risk of difficulty in detecting un-exploded ammunition.

5.4.1.4.8 Multi-purpose ammunition

Multi-purpose ammunition is a special type of tube-launched ammunition thatexists mainly in the 12.7 - 40 mm calibre range. A characteristic feature of thistype of ammunition is that it lacks a conventional fuzing system, and that theexplosive reaction consists rather of deflagration instead of detonation. Theexplosive in the warhead is initiated solely by the transfer of energy that occurswhen the shell hits the target.

Safety against inadvertent initiation can thus only be regulated to a certainextent by applicable requirements in this section. Instead, safety must be veri-fied by testing dedicated to the operational environment of the object.

A safety margin can be achieved by increasing the level of severity during test-ing contra the operational environment. In addition, FMEA testing should beperformed with regard to the conceivable malfunctions that can cause safetyhazards.

5.4.1.4.9 Tandem systems

The requirements stated in this section shall apply to the initiation of each war-head in systems containing several warheads (i.e. tandem systems).

The warheads can have separate or common fuzing systems.

5.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices

Existing fuzing systems for propulsion devices often lack a transmission safetydevice despite the fact that the fuzing system contains explosives that are notapproved for use after interrupters, and that the propulsion device itself in theevent of a hazard initiation can cause great damage, and even in some cases canactivate the fuzing system for the warhead.

For newly designed fuzing systems for propulsion devices, however, it is desir-able that the requirements stated in this section be applied.

5 Ammunition

170

5

5.4.2 General requirements

5.4.2.1 Common requirements

1.54001 Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable safety analysis to be performed.

1.54002 The safety analysis shall be performed by at least one independent party.Comment:In some cases the special system safety function in the same com-pany that designed the system can be considered to be an indepen-dent party.

1.54003 The safety level of the fuzing system should be specified numeri-cally as a probability and should be verified by analysis.

1.54004 Single failures that can lead to inadvertent arming or initiation of explosives after the interrupter or circuit safety device within the safe separation distance/time shall not occur.Consequences to the system of single failures shall be verified by theoretical analysis and/or FMEA testing throughout the environ-mental/applicational range.Comment:This requirement does not apply to the failure mode ‘self-initiation of explosive’.For some applications the requirement for redundancy to prevent in-advertent arming can be resolved by, for example, a fail-safe func-tion or by an interrupter between the energy source and the initiator so that activation of the sensor does not lead to initiation.

1.54005 Explosive trains containing sensitive explosives (not approved for use after an interrupter as specified in FSD 0214) shall have at least one mechanical interrupter. No sensitive explosive is permitted after that interrupter.Comment:Refer also to requirements1.54113, 1.54114 and 1.54115.

1.54006 The interrupter in an explosive train should, before arming, seg-regate the sensitive explosive (out-of-line) from the explosive train.

1.54007 Explosives approved for use after the interrupter or for use in sys-tems without an interrupter shall be qualified for such use as spec-ified in FSD 0214.

1.54008 The probability of inadvertent initiation of an explosive after the interrupter or circuit safety device shall not be higher than the prob-ability against inadvertent arming.

Ammunition 5

171

5

Comment:A failure must thus not lead to initiation unless all the steps normal-ly required for arming have been completed.

1.54009 Fuzing systems shall be designed and documented in such a man-ner as to facilitate an effective production control and quality in-spection.

1.54010 All constituent materials shall be selected and combined such that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system, e.g. as a result of corrosion, mechanical fatigue, mutual in-terference, or insufficient chemical stability resulting in the forma-tion of copper azide for example.

1.54011 All explosives shall be confined and/or be fixed so that they remain intact when subjected to specified environmental severities.

1.54012 It shall not be possible for external environmental stress – such as electromagnetic, electrostatic or laser – to be able to inadvertently initiate the initiator in a fuzing system.

1.54013 The safe separation distance/time shall always be established with regard to warhead effect and intended tactical use. Refer also to re-quirements 1.42022 and 1.51024.Comment:Three different cases can be distinguished:

1. The safe separation distance is so great that there is no risk to friendly forces in the event of a burst when that distance has been reached. No evasive action is assumed.

2. The safe separation distance is shorter than in item 1 above ow-ing to tactical reasons. Evasive action or taking cover is as-sumed.

3. The safe separation time enables friendly forces to exit the dan-ger area.

1.54014 Fuzing systems should be designed so that a failure in the system results in a fail-safe state.Comment:This requirement can lead to a degradation of any deactivation or self-destruction function.

1.54015 Fuzing systems should not be capable of accumulating sufficient energy to initiate the warhead within the safe separation distance/time.

1.54016 Fuzing systems should be designed such that incorrect assembly of safety critical parts is not possible.

5 Ammunition

172

5

1.54017 It shall not be possible to install an armed SAI/SAU in the ammu-nition if signals to the target sensor can be expected to occur during transport and storage, or during firing before the safe separation dis-tance has been reached.Comment:Arming may have occurred without being detected as a result of in-correct assembly during manufacture or maintenance, or because the SAI/SAU was not deactivated after final testing.

1.54018 Fuzing systems should be equipped with indication for vital safety devices/functions such as arming.Comment:This requirement applies to all phases including manufacture.

1.54019 If there is a requirement for system testing after manufacture (AUR testing), functions for a reliable test shall be built into the fuzing system from the beginning.

1.54020 Fuzing systems should be designed to enable maintenance, upgrad-ing, in-service surveillance, disposal, destruction and destruction of duds, to be carried out safely.

1.54021 The composition and integration of the booster should be such that it does not detonate or deflagrate before the main charge is subject-ed to heating (e.g. by fire).

1.54022 Integrated circuits should be avoided in safety critical applica-tions.

1.54023 Well proven components should be used.

5.4.2.2 Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs)

1.54024 Connector pins in external connectors connected by an EED should be semi-enclosed.

1.54025 The sleeve of an external connector should make contact and pro-vide electromagnetic shielding before the pins engage.

1.54026 The shielding of ignition cables should be connected to the casing of the connector around the complete circumference of the cable.Comment:This is particularly important with the casing of an EED to obtain good high frequency protection. The connection pins in a connector should not be used to connect shields.

1.54027 The switch that finally connects an EED to the electric supply should be located as close to the initiator as possible.

1.54028 The lead/leads between the switch and the EED shall be shielded from external electromagnetic fields and be protected against static electricity.

Ammunition 5

173

5

1.54029 The capacitance across the switch should be kept sufficiently low to prevent initiation by electrostatic discharge.

1.54030 Twin conductors should be twined.

1.54031 If one pole is earthed/grounded to an EED the earthing/grounding should take the shortest route to a shield surrounding the igniter.

1.54032 Ignition cables shall not be located in the same shield as other con-ductors.

1.54033 An EED shall have documented electrical characteristics as spec-ified in FSD 0112 or equivalent.

1.54034 Fuzing systems containing EEDs shall be system tested in accor-dance with FSD 0212 or equivalent.

5.4.2.3 The arming process

1.54035 The arming process should be as elementary as possible.

1.54036 The arming process should be functionally and physically sepa-rated from other processes in the system.

1.54037 If a fuzing system requires human intervention to start the arming process, there shall be a device that provides unambiguous indica-tion of whether the system is unarmed.

1.54038 Arming shall not occur until the safe separation distance/time has been reached at the earliest.

1.54039 When two electric signals are used for arming at least one of them shall be dependent on a continuous current supply.

1.54040 If the current supply ceases before arming is completed the fuzing system shall be neutralized or deactivated.

1.54041 In a system where the arming process is controlled by electrical safety features, at least two of them shall be in the form of an inter-rupter from the current supply.

1.54042 Fuzing systems in which arming is performed by connecting the circuit to earth/ground (single conductor system) should be avoid-ed.

1.54043 Arming shall not be enabled as a result of plausible short-circuits such as short-circuits between adjacent leads in harnesses, in con-nectors, on PC assemblies and in integrated circuits.

1.54044 Arming shall not be enabled as a result of a plausible power cut caused by, for example, soldering defects, oxidised connector sur-faces, or cracks in PCBs or substrates.

5 Ammunition

174

5

1.54045 In systems with wave-borne signals the probability of unautho-rized arming/actuation shall be sufficiently low with regard to the field of application.

1.54046 If a signal outside the ammunition is used for arming, the fuzing system shall verify the signal before arming takes place.

5.4.2.4 Arming safety features including semiconductor switches

1.54047 Hazard arming shall be prevented by at least two mutually inde-pendent safety features.Comment:The safety features can be:

– mechanical safety features in an interrupter,

– mechanically operated electric switches,

– relays,

– semiconductor switches.

1.54048 If a system with only two safety features is used, both shall be me-chanical.

1.54049 There shall be at least one mechanical safety feature before the point of launch/deployment.

1.54050 For systems with only semiconductors as safety features, at least three independent ‘closings’ shall be required at system blocking level for arming.Comment:The closings are best actuated by different signal levels.

1.54051 A system containing only semiconductors shall not be able to arm as a result of static failures in the safety features (failure mode either closed or open), which can mean that at least one of the safety fea-tures requires a dynamic signal.Comment:The dynamic signal must be of such a nature that it cannot reason-ably occur inadvertently.

1.54052 The safety analysis of system solutions containing only semicon-ductors as safety features should be performed by at least two inde-pendent parties.

5.4.2.5 Application specific requirements

1.54053 Fuzing systems should be designed so that safety is not dependent upon operating procedures.

Ammunition 5

175

5

1.54054 Arming shall only be enabled during use.Comment:The lower limit for arming shall exceed by a good margin the max-imum stress level experienced during operation, transport and other relevant environmental conditions.

1.54055 Arming shall only be enabled if two mutually independent, appli-cation specific, environmental conditions are satisfied, provided that reasonable such conditions are available.Comment:Examples are stated below of environmental factors that can be used to activate arming and/or as sources for arming energy. All of them shall be considered before the most suitable is selected:

– acceleration,

– angular acceleration,

– spin,

– launch/deployment device. Sensing of these devices (such as a barrel) is not considered to be a particularly good method but can be accepted,

– dynamic pressure,

– drag (via a turbine or parachute for example),

– hydrodynamic and hydrostatic pressure,

– arming wires,

– back pressure.

1.54056 If only one realistic environmental condition is available, or two de-pendent conditions, there shall be at least one manual operation (such as removal of a safety pin) required for arming prior to load-ing/deployment.Comment:When safety relies entirely on one environmental condition after the manual operation has been performed, a major effort must be made to verify practically and theoretically that this condition cannot oc-cur inadvertently after the manual operation, such as if a shell is dropped during loading.

1.54057 A manual operation or safety pin shall also block the function pro-duced by the only available environmental condition

1.54058 During mechanical deployment of ammunition (such as when lay-ing mines with a minelayer) the arming shall take place at the ear-liest when the mine leaves the laying device.

5 Ammunition

176

5

5.4.2.6 Testing

1.54059 Constituent components and subsystems that are vital to the safety of the fuzing system shall undergo separate safety qualification (type testing).

1.54060 Fuzing systems shall undergo complete safety qualification as specified in FSD 0213 or equivalent. Safety critical functions should be monitored during testing and be inspected after testing.

1.54061 Testing shall be performed at a safety limit at which arming is not permitted.Comment:Safety limit in this case denotes the stress level which exceeds by an acceptable margin the most severe level reached during transport, operation, ramming or the firing/launch process. Testing is de-signed to verify requirement 1.54054. Refer also to the comment af-ter requirement 1.54056.

1.54062 The choice of materials in a fuzing system shall – if it is considered necessary – be verified by testing that demonstrates with acceptable probability that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006 and 1.23007.

1.54063 Testing shall be performed to demonstrate whether the design used for confinement of the explosives meets the stipulated require-ments.Comment:For this testing, dimensions, compacting pressure and other proper-ties shall be selected within their respective tolerance range such that the probability for failures is considered to be greatest. Testing shall be performed in the environment (within the operating range of the fuzing system) that is considered to be the most unfavourable from the safety aspect.

1.54064 Testing shall be performed to establish the distance or time from launch or equivalent at which the transmission safety device arms. If there are other safety devices in the explosive train, they shall be neutralised prior to testing.

1.54065 Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate within the safe separation distance/time owing to passage through mask, impact with the ground, contact with the seabed, somersault, or collision with obstacles.Comment:The concept of ‘inherent safety’ is used for torpedoes.

Ammunition 5

177

5

1.54066 Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate in flight or after deployment after the arming process is com-pleted as a result of the environmental stress stipulated in the re-quirement specification for the object.Comment:This requirement applies in the first instance to ammunition for which there is a continuous (undivided) danger area.

1.54067 Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable the required functional testing to be performed safely.

5.4.2.7 Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal

1.54068 Ignition capacitors shall be equipped with duplicate discharge circuits. At least one of these circuits shall be physically located as close to the capacitor as possible.

1.54069 The leakage resistance of ignition capacitors, or for earthing/grounding in twin conductor systems, shall have as low earth/ground resistance as the system permits.

1.54070 If the fuzing system contains an integrated anti-handling or anti-clearance device or a booby trap charge, the same safety require-ments shall apply as for a normal fuzing system.

1.54071 Fuzing systems incorporating a deactivating function shall contain a device that indicates in an unambiguous way whether the system is deactivated.

1.54072 Deactivation shall provide at least the same level of safety as when the system was initially in unarmed mode.

1.54073 Deactivation should not require special tools.

1.54074 Deactivation should remove all initiation energy.

1.54075 The fuzing system should be designed such that deactivation/neu-tralisation is not prevented by a malfunction in any part of the fuzing system that is not used for deactivation/neutralisation.

1.54076 If it is intended to enable clearance or disposal or recycling the fuz-ing system shall be designed for subsequent safe handling.

5.4.2.8 Requirements of International Law

1.54077 Landmines shall have a self-destruction, neutralisation or deac-tivation facility that renders the mine harmless after a certain time. This facility can be automatically or remotely controlled.

1.54078 Drift mines shall have a fuzing system that ensures that the mine is harmless one hour after deployment at the latest.

5 Ammunition

178

5

1.54079 Anchored mines shall be neutralised as soon as the mine has slipped its mooring.

1.54080 Torpedoes shall be neutralised if they do not hit the target.

5.4.3 Requirements for systems with interrupters

5.4.3.1 Design requirements

1.54081 The interrupter shall prevent the booster charge in the fuzing sys-tem from initiating in the event of a hazard initiation in the explo-sive train before the interrupter.

1.54082 Each of the safety features shall individually retain the interrupter in unarmed mode.

1.54083 Safety features in an interrupter should lock directly into the inter-rupter, not via any linkage or similar device.

1.54084 In systems where unique, application specific, environmental fac-tors are available, at least one of the safety features shall lock the interrupter during the arming phase until the ammunition has left the launcher/release device.

1.54085 Fuzing systems should not contain stored energy – such as me-chanical, pyrotechnical or electrical – for removing the interrupter in an explosive train.Comment:Energy for removing an interrupter can best be provided by some unique environmental factor after launch/release.

1.54086 Stored energy shall not be used for both disabling safety features and removing interrupters.

1.54087 Confinement of the explosive train shall be designed such that haz-ard initiation of the explosive train before the interrupter while the interrupter is in unarmed mode does not provide ejection of frag-ments that can cause injury or damage to property or the environ-ment.

5.4.3.2 Testing interrupters

1.54088 Testing shall be performed to establish that an interrupter remains locked in unarmed mode with sufficient margin when subjected to the most severe load (cf. the environmental specification) when only one safety feature is installed. The function of each safety fea-ture shall be tested individually.

Ammunition 5

179

5

1.54089 Testing shall be performed to establish that explosives located after the interrupter are not initiated by the detonator while the safety de-vice is in unarmed mode.Comment:The following shall be taken into consideration:

– the critical thickness of a mechanical barrier,

– the critical charge quantity and compacting pressure of a detona-tor located before the interrupter,

– the critical play and dimensions etc. of gas passages through or around the interrupter. The term ‘critical’ denotes the value when transmission in some form takes place. Testing can be sup-plemented by calculations.

1.54090 Testing shall be performed to determine at which point transmission is achieved when the interrupter is gradually moved from unarmed to armed position. Dimensions shall be chosen within each toler-ance range so as to facilitate transmission. Between unarmed posi-tion and the boundary limit for transmission, any ejection of fragments, deformation or fragmentation shall not entail a risk of in-jury.Comment: For interrupters with an instantaneous arming motion, testing can be performed in fewer positions (at least one) between unarmed and armed position.

5.4.4 Requirements for systems without interrupters

1.54091 A fuzing system with an in-line explosive train shall be initiated only by a signal that is unique and which cannot be emulated by any undesired internal or external signal.Comment:Usually only high power systems (such as EFI) are used in systems containing only circuit fuzes.

1.54092 Charging of an ignition capacitor or equivalent should only be started after the safe separation distance/time has been reached.

1.54093 The voltage in an ignition capacitor or equivalent shall be below the lower ignition voltage (maximum-no-fire) until the safe separation distance/time is reached.Comment:This is analogous to the conventional case with one interrupter that moves slowly and enables transmission in the explosive train at

5 Ammunition

180

5

some point before final position. Full arming is achieved when the voltage of the ignition capacitor reaches the minimum-all-fire level of the electric igniter.

1.54094 In systems where unique, application specific, environmental fac-tors are available, at least one of the safety features shall be disabled by an environmental factor after the ammunition has left the launcher.

5.4.5 Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions

5.4.5.1 Fuzing systems where unique, application specific, environ-mental factors are not available

1.54095 Fuzing systems shall be designed such that the packaged ammuni-tion and fuzing systems remain safe during storage, transport, han-dling and use. This applies until the point in time when the ammunition is issued, or when the fuzing system or initiator is in-stalled and arming or priming is performed in accordance with the specified operating instructions.

1.54096 Fuzing systems should be set/installed as late as is permissible by the requirements of the tactical application.

1.54097 Incorrect installation of a fuzing system should not be possible.

1.54098 At least two different and almost simultaneous manual operations shall be required for arming to take place.Comment:These manual operations should be sequential, i.e. a specific se-quence is required.

1.54099 Electric ignition energy shall not be enabled in the firing circuit un-til after the specified arming delay or safe separation time has elapsed.

1.54100 Fuzing systems shall be equipped with a device which – after arm-ing – provides sufficient safety time for the operator to leave the danger zone.

5.4.5.2 Signal and spotting agents

1.54101 The risk of incorrect connection of fuzing systems to explosives, signal and spotting agents owing to a mistake, clumsiness or care-lessness shall be taken into account.

1.54102 In cases where safety is based on operation, operating instructions shall accompany the packaging or the ammunition.

Ammunition 5

181

5

1.54103 The fuzing system and components for the fuzing system shall be designed such that assembly of the priming device can be per-formed as the final operation in the readiness procedure.

1.54104 An intentional manual operation, such as removing a safety pin, shall be necessary before initiation of the warhead can take place.Comment: The safety pin shall be designed so that it is not inadvert-ently removed during normal handling of the ammunition.

5.4.5.3 Initiation devices and demolition charges

1.54105 Fuzing systems for demolition charges shall be designed to enable them to be disassembled safely after connection so that they can be re-used if so stipulated.

1.54106 When the application permits, fuzing systems for demolition charg-es should incorporate an interrupter that is remotely controlled from the initiation device.

1.54107 Time fuzes should incorporate an interrupter that arms after the fuze is set and after personnel have taken cover. The initiation de-vice is armed when the interrupter is removed from the explosive train.Comment:Where application specific environmental factors are available (such as hydrostatic pressure for underwater time fuzes) they shall be used. For other time fuzes manual time-delayed arming, for ex-ample, can be used.

1.54108 Ignition leads shall be long enough to enable connection of the ini-tiation device without it being necessary for personnel to be inside the danger area of the warhead.

1.54109 If requirement 1.54108 cannot be met, the initiation device shall in-corporate a time function that provides a delay in arming of suffi-cient duration to enable the operator to leave the danger area or take cover.

1.54110 Initiation devices should be designed so that the risk of ignition failure is minimised.Comment:Consequently, it should be equipped with a conductor tester and an indicator to show that it can deliver sufficient ignition energy.

1.54111 To minimise the risk of inadvertent initiation, initiation devices shall be designed so that at least two manual operations are re-quired to enable firing.

5 Ammunition

182

5

1.54112 There shall be at least one mechanical/galvanic interrupter in the firing circuits of initiation devices.Comment:The output on the initiation device can also be short-circuited up to the moment of firing (e.g. by one or more electromechanical inter-rupters).

5.4.5.4 Propulsion devices

1.54113 There shall be a transmission safety device in the explosive train of propulsion devices if hazard initiation of the propelling charge leads to activation of the fuzing system in the warhead.Comment:This requirement also applies if the propelling charge itself can cause major damage.

1.54114 Electric igniters in propulsion devices that do not contain a trans-mission safety device shall be as insensitive as possible.Comment: The aim shall be that an electric igniter can be subjected to a current intensity of 1 A and an output of 1 W for a minimum duration of 5 minutes.

1.54115 The explosive in an igniter composition after an interrupter, or in an igniter in a system without an interrupter, should not be more sen-sitive than the explosive in the propelling charge.

1.54116 It should be possible to install the fuzing system into a propulsion device as late as possible before operation.

1.54117 It should be possible to check easily whether the fuzing system is installed in a propulsion device.

1.54118 The fuzing system should be easily accessible for replacement.

1.54119 The fuzing system shall be designed so that normal firing takes place within the specified timeframe (i.e. abnormal delay, so-called hangfire, is prevented).

5.4.6 Requirement checklist for fuzing systems


Ammunition 5

183

5

Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems


General requirements1.54001 SHALL Fuzing system design

1.54002 SHALL Safety analysis

1.54003 SHOULD Specification of safety level

1.54004 SHALL Single failures, safety analy-sis

1.54005 SHALL Mechanical interrupter in explosive trains

1.54006 SHOULD Interrupter in an explosive train

1.54007 SHALL Qualification of explosives

1.54008 SHALL Probability of inadvertent initiation

1.54009 SHALL Quality inspection of fuzing systems

1.54010 SHALL Selection of constituent materials

1.54011 SHALL Confinement and/or fixing

1.54012 SHALL No initiation by environ-mental stress


1.54014 SHOULD Fuzing system design

1.54015 SHOULD Accumulated energy in fuz-ing systems

1.54016 SHOULD Incorrect assembly of fuzing systems

1.54017 SHALL Assembly of SAI/SAU

1.54018 SHOULD Indication in fuzing systems

1.54019 SHALL Integral test in fuzing sys-tems

1.54020 SHOULD Upgrading

1.54021 SHOULD Booster design

1.54022 SHOULD Integrated circuits

1.54023 SHOULD Proven components

5 Ammunition

184

5

EEDs1.54024 SHOULD Connector pins semi-

enclosed

1.54025 SHOULD Shielding of connector sleeve

1.54026 SHOULD Shielding of ignition cables

1.54027 SHOULD Location of switch

1.54028 SHALL Shielding of leads

1.54029 SHOULD Capacitance across switch

1.54030 SHOULD Twin conductors twined

1.54031 SHOULD Earthing/grounding

1.54032 SHALL Location of ignition cables

1.54033 SHALL Documented characteristics of EEDs

1.54034 SHALL System testing

Arming process1.54035 SHOULD Elementary arming process

1.54036 SHOULD Separated arming process

1.54037 SHALL Unarmed indication

1.54038 SHALL Point in time for arming

1.54039 SHALL Electric signals for arming

1.54040 SHALL Neutralisation/deactivation

1.54041 SHALL Interrupter for current sup-ply

1.54042 SHOULD Arming by earthing/ground-ing

1.54043 SHALL Arming by short-circuiting

1.54044 SHALL Arming by power cut

1.54045 SHALL Probability of unauthorized arming

1.54046 SHALL Verification of arming signal

Arming safety features including semi-conductor switches1.54047 SHALL Hazard arming

1.54048 SHALL Mechanical safety features

1.54049 SHALL Mechanical safety feature

1.54050 SHALL Independent ‘closings’

Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems, continued


Ammunition 5

185

5

1.54051 SHALL Arming by semiconductors only

1.54052 SHOULD Safety analysis

Application specific requirements1.54053 SHOULD Safety

1.54054 SHALL Arming

1.54055 SHALL Arming, environmental con-ditions

1.54056 SHALL Manual operation

1.54057 SHALL Manual operation, block

1.54058 SHALL Point in time for arming

Testing1.54059 SHALL Type testing of components

1.54060 SHALL Complete safety qualifica-tion

1.54061 SHALL Testing at safety limit

1.54062 SHALL Verification of choice of materials

1.54063 SHALL Testing for confinement

1.54064 SHALL Testing for distance/time

1.54065 SHALL Testing for safe separation distance/time

1.54066 SHALL Testing for environmental stress

1.54067 SHALL Design to enable functional testing

Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal1.54068 SHALL Discharge of ignition capac-

itors

1.54069 SHALL Low leakage resistance of capacitors

1.54070 SHALL Anti-handling or anti-clear-ance device

1.54071 SHALL Indication of deactivation

1.54072 SHALL Safety level of deactivation

1.54073 SHOULD No special tools for deacti-vation



5 Ammunition

186

5

1.54074 SHOULD Deactivation to remove initi-ation energy

1.54075 SHOULD Design and deactivation

1.54076 SHALL Clearance or disposal, etc.

Requirements of International Law1.54077 SHALL Self-destruction/neutralisa-

tion of landmines

1.54078 SHALL Fuzing system for drift mines

1.54079 SHALL Neutralisation of anchored mines

1.54080 SHALL Neutralisation of torpedoes

Requirements for systems with interruptersDesign requirements1.54081 SHALL Interrupters, basic require-

ment

1.54082 SHALL Individual safety features

1.54083 SHOULD No linkage in safety features

1.54084 SHALL Safety feature before separa-tion

1.54085 SHOULD Stored energy for interrupter

1.54086 SHALL Stored energy for interrupter or safety feature

1.54087 SHALL Ejection of fragments

Testing interrupters1.54088 SHALL Test of locking

1.54089 SHALL Initiation in unarmed mode

1.54090 SHALL Interrupter transmission sta-tus

Requirements for systems without interrupters1.54091 SHALL Initiation

1.54092 SHOULD Charging and ignition capacitor

1.54093 SHALL Maximum-no-fire

1.54094 SHALL Safety feature disabled by environmental factor after launch



Ammunition 5

187

5

Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functionsFuzing systems where unique, application specific, environmentalfactors are not available1.54095 SHALL Fuzing system design

1.54096 SHOULD Setting/installing fuzing sys-tem

1.54097 SHOULD Incorrect installation

1.54098 SHALL Manual operations

1.54099 SHALL Ignition energy

1.54100 SHALL Safety time

Signal and spotting agents1.54101 SHALL Incorrect connection

1.54102 SHALL Operating instructions

1.54103 SHALL Assembly of priming device

1.54104 SHALL Intentional manual operation

Initiation devices and demolition charges1.54105 SHALL Fuzing system design

1.54106 SHOULD Remotely controlled inter-rupter

1.54107 SHOULD Interrupter in time fuzes

1.54108 SHALL Length of ignition leads

1.54109 SHALL Time function

1.54110 SHOULD Initiation device design

1.54111 SHALL Manual operations for initia-tion devices

1.54112 SHALL Mechanical interrupter

Propulsion devices1.54113 SHALL Transmission safety device

1.54114 SHOULD Electric igniters to be insensitive

1.54115 SHOULD Sensitivity of explosive in igniter composition

1.54116 SHOULD Point in time for installation of fuzing system

1.54117 SHOULD Check of installation

1.54118 SHOULD Fuzing system accessible for replacement

1.54119 SHALL Abnormal delay



5 Ammunition

188

5

5.5 Packaging for ammunition

5.5.1 General

To ensure that the safety characteristics of ammunition are maintained duringhandling and storage it is essential that ammunition be protected by appropri-ately designed packaging whose task is:

• to protect its contents against the adverse effects of the relevant environ-mental factors,

• to protect the surrounding environment.

There are two distinct environmental concepts for packaged goods: the externalenvironment where environmental factors affect the goods from the outside, andthe internal environment (sometimes called the micro-environment) whichdenotes the environmental factors present inside the packaging.

It is essential that packages be clearly marked to enable rapid and safe identifi-cation (even under stressful conditions) to prevent dangerous mix-ups duringhandling.

It is important to consider the question of packaging at the earliest possiblestage during development of ammunition to enable the specified safety level tobe achieved in the most appropriate way. Comprehensive data must be preparedfor the study of environmental factors, properties of materials, and resistance tovarious environments etc. The required safety level can be achieved by choosingthe packaging design and materials to enable the critical environmental factorsin the internal environment to be constrained to a low level of severity.

Packagings consist of a collective part that surrounds one or more units as pro-tection against prevalent environmental stresses. Components like shock absorb-ers, barriers (against humidity, gases, etc.), and protection against electricalinterference etc. are included herein.

There are various types of packaging for once-only (i.e. disposable) or repeateduse. In some cases the packaging is designed to have a secondary function suchas a launcher or other type of launch device.

In the case of IM and LSM the packaging can contribute to reducing the sensi-tivity of the packaged ammunition.

Ammunition 5

189

5

5.5.2 Environmental factors

The risks of damage to packaged ammunition are determined by mechanical,electrical, chemical, climatic and biological environmental factors. The risksmay exist during all phases of the life of the ammunition. If the packaging isdamaged it may result in unpredictable impact on the environment.

Mechanical environmental factors comprise, for example, dynamic stressesfrom shock or vibration, or stresses caused by static load (such as when stack-ing).

Electrical environmental factors comprise, for example, electromagnetic radia-tion (e.g. from radio or radar transmitters), static electricity (e.g. thunderstormsor hovering helicopters), or electromagnetic pulse in conjunction with a nuclearweapon engagement, and high power pulsed microwave radiation.

Chemical environmental factors such as the effect of gases, vapours, fluids orparticles in the external or internal environment can cause damage or hazardousevents.

Climatic environmental factors such as extreme high or low temperatures,changes in barometric pressure, thermal shock, relative humidity, rain, hail, etc.can cause damage or hazardous events.

Biological environmental factors such as other life forms (such as rodents,insects, fungi and bacteria) can cause damage or hazardous events.

5.5.3 Consequences of environmental stress

5.5.3.1 Mechanical environmental stress

Examples of the consequences of mechanical stress:

• Leaks in joints can occur through fatigue, shock or other mechanical stress.

• Cracks, debonding, explosive dust, damage to surface treatment, indicationsof ruptures or other degradation of material strength can occur as a result ofmechanical stress or fatigue.

• Initiation of initiators containing impact-sensitive pyrotechnic compositionscan occur through inadvertent impacts.

5 Ammunition

190

5

5.5.3.2 Electrical environmental stress

Examples of the consequences of electrical environmental stress:

• Electric igniters can be initiated inadvertently if the electrical and electro-magnetic environment is more severe than the test level. This also applies inthe case of electrostatic discharge.

5.5.3.3 Chemical environmental stress

Examples of the consequences of chemical environmental stress:

• Corrosion can occur through the effect of incompatible substances in com-bination with moisture, either by direct contact or through any gases or flu-ids generated.

5.5.3.4 Climatic environmental stress

Examples of the consequences of climatic environmental stress:

• Variations in temperature during storage can cause condensation on the sur-faces of materials with high thermal capacity incurring a risk of moisturedamage and corrosion, for example.

• Variations in temperature of high amplitude can cause such high stresses inmaterials or joints that ruptures occur.

• Air can be pumped in or out through leaks in packaging enabling moistureto be transported into the internal environment where it causes damage tothe ammunition such as corrosion.

5.5.3.5 Other environmental stress

Example of the consequences of other environmental stress:

• Explosives can be initiated by inadvertent heating (e.g. in the event of afire).

5.5.4 Requirements

1.55001 Provided no special reason for non-compliance exists, the packag-ing shall withstand the testing specified in the UN recommenda-tions for the explosive goods in question.

1.55002 The packaging shall protect the ammunition against the environ-ments to which it is predicted that the system will be subjected throughout its life. These environments are stated in the environ-mental specification.

Ammunition 5

191

5

Comment: Requirements governing the protective properties of the packaging can be related to the inherent resistance of the ammuni-tion. Furthermore, the packaging must not create an environment that the ammunition cannot withstand.

1.55003 Constituent materials in the packaging shall be selected and com-bined so that effects detrimental to safety do not occur.Comment:Such effects can, for example, be caused by corrosion, incompati-bility or instability. Further, there are certain constraints regarding materials in international regulations (e.g. ADR, RID, IMDG code and the UN Recommendation for the Packaging of Dangerous Goods).

1.55004 Packagings should be designed to prevent mass detonation.Comment:This requirement can be achieved by adequate separation between the units.

1.55005 Packagings should be designed such that the consequences of a haz-ard initiation of the constituent explosive is limited.Comment:In the event of a fire a propulsion device, for example, can give a ‘gun effect’ if the packaging is in the form of a metallic tube.

1.55006 The design of, and materials for, packagings shall be selected to pre-vent detrimental effects from handling and storage environments.

1.55007 Packagings and their contents shall be TS classified in accordance with IFTEX.

1.55008 Packagings and their contents shall be classified in accordance with UN coding.

1.55009 Packagings and their ammunition shall be provided with distinct and durable marking in accordance with applicable regulations governing transport and storage to enable rapid and safe identifica-tion of the contents.

1.55010 Re-usable packagings shall be checked to ensure that they are equivalent to new ones from the safety aspect.

1.55011 When selecting materials for packagings, consideration shall be given to the applicable regulations for recycling.

1.55012 The prescribed material recycling symbols shall be marked on constituent components.

5 Ammunition

192

5

5.5.5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings


Table 5:5 Checklist of requirements for ammunition packagings


General requirements1.55001 SHALL UN recommendations

1.55002 SHALL Protection of ammunition

1.55003 SHALL Constituent materials

1.55004 SHOULD Mass detonation

1.55005 SHOULD Hazard initiation

1.55006 SHALL Storage environment

1.55007 SHALL TS coding

1.55008 SHALL UN coding

1.55009 SHALL Marking

1.55010 SHALL Re-usable

1.55011 SHALL Selection of materials for recycling

1.55012 SHALL Material recycling symbols

Definitions 6

193

6

6 DEFINITIONS

This section lists the nomenclature and abbreviations used in this manual.

6.1 Terminology

AblationEvaporation of surface material by the action of (hot) gases (flowing over it).

Comment: Ablation is a method for protecting objects against aerodynamic heating (e.g. space vehicles on re-entry into the atmosphere).

AccidentAn undesired event, or series of events, that causes unacceptable injury or dam-age to property or the environment.

Acquisition program for off-the-shelf (OTS) materielThis program relating to system safety shall be applied when acquiring OTSmateriel systems.

AgeingThe ageing of materials involves a continuous change through time of properties(chemical and physical such as sensitivity, rate of combustion and mechanicalstrength).

Aiming and firing limitationAiming and firing limitation is a system integrated into the weapon to preventaiming in certain sectors (so as not to collide with nearby obstacles for exam-ple), and to prevent firing in other specific sectors (to prevent hitting weaponplatforms or friendly forces for example).

AmmunitionMateriel designed for inflicting damage, producing smoke or illumination, blast-ing, mining, mine clearance, and certain types of signalling, as well as exercisemateriel used to replace the above during training. The materiel may containexplosives or other chemicals.

The term also comprises packaging for ammunition and manufactured parts forammunition.

6 Definitions

194

6

Ammunition safetyAmmunition safety is the property of ammunition that enables the ammunition– under specified conditions – to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, anddisposed of without a hazardous event taking place, and without constituentparts in the ammunition being affected in such a way that a hazardous eventoccurs.

ArmTo remove safety constraints in safety device(s) to enable initiation to takeplace.

Comment: In a system with an out-of-line explosive train arming occurs when the interrupter has been removed and an initiation can result in fuz-ing system function. In an in-line system arming occurs when the minimum level for ignition energy has been reached and only the initiation signal remains for initiation to take place.

Arming deviceRefer also to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.

Arming range/distance/timeThe range (distance/time) from the launcher (or release device) until the point(in time) where/when the fuzing system is armed.

Artillery primerAn igniting device of the same design and function as a cannon primer. An artil-lery primer is usually threaded and is used to ignite a propulsion agent confinedin a cartridge case or separate case, in the rear plane of which there is a seat forthe artillery primer.

Comment: In cases where the priming device is fixed by means of compress-ing it is often incorrectly referred to as a cannon primer.

Assemble, install (a fuze)To assemble/install individually manufactured ammunition components con-taining explosive, including assembly/installation of fuzes in ammunition.

AUR (All Up Round) testingTesting of a complete weapon or ammunition while in storage.

Auxiliary boosterA booster affixed to a main charge (e.g. by cementing, casting or screw attach-ment). The auxiliary booster consists of compressed high explosive designed toensure initiation of the main charge.

Definitions 6

195

6

BackblastThe rearward blast of (hot) propulsion gases which, when a weapon is fired,escape from the muzzle brake of recoil weapons and from the aft opening (ven-turi) of recoilless weapons. The blast may contain fragments and particles sweptup from the ground.

Barrel fatigue lifeThis is the number of rounds a barrel can be fired with an acceptable risk offatigue rupture. The barrel fatigue life is calculated using mechanical rupturemethods based on crack propagation data for the material of the barrel. The cal-culation shall be made for a pressure level corresponding to an upper opera-tional temperature for the ammunition, and an established safety factor forbarrel life shall be applied.

Base bleedAn auxiliary device in a shell consisting of propellant in a combustion chamber.The propellant gases flow out into the wake behind the shell, enhancing thepressure and thereby reducing drag.

Black powderRefer to the entry for ‘Propellant’.

Blast pressureAir shock waves created around the weapon as a result of firing. The shockwaves normally emanate from the muzzle in recoil systems, and in recoillesssystems from the aft end of the launcher as well as the muzzle.

Comment: Severe blast pressure may cause impairment of hearing. High lev-els may cause injury to the larynx. Extreme levels may even cause fatal injury (collapse of the lungs, etc.).

Booster (1)A launch rocket engine. Refer also to the entries for ‘Booster (2)’ and ‘Boostercharge or booster’.

Booster (2)1. An amplifying charge in a fuze usually comprised of compressed explosive.

2. A charge, usually comprised of compressed explosive, in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the HE charge.

Comment: The booster is normally also used as a connector device for combi-nations of certain fuzes and shells.

6 Definitions

196

6

Booster charge or boosterA link in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the priming device. Thebooster charge may also be referred to in various contexts as booster, auxiliarybooster or auxiliary charge.

Booster motor or boosterA motor that accelerates a vehicle in the launch phase.

Bore safetyThe property that enables ammunition and its constituent parts to withstand theenvironment during the bore phase of firing with the required level of safety.

Bridge primer, bridge wire igniterAn electric initiator in which the initiation current passes through a wire or thinlayer of metal that becomes heated, thereby initiating a priming composition orprimary explosive.

Bullet attack safetyThe capability of the ammunition to withstand bullet attack without initiating/igniting.

BurstThe explosion phenomenon of a detonating warhead and its corresponding prac-tice ammunition.

Cannon primerAn igniting device in the form of a cartridge containing an initiator such as apercussion primer and booster charge. A cannon primer is mainly used in gunswhere the propulsion agent is not confined in a cartridge case, such as in certainhowitzers. A cannon primer is inserted (fed into) the breech mechanism.

Cartridge caseA case, usually made of metal or plastic, incorporating an igniting device andcontaining propellant.

Comment: Cartridge cases are used in:

– fixed rounds (permanently attached to the projectile)

– semi-fixed rounds (attached to the projectile, such as by a bayo-net coupling, so as to be separable)

– separated rounds (separated from the projectile but united beforeloading).Cf. the entry for ‘Separate case’.

Definitions 6

197

6

Case bonded chargeRefer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’.

Circuit interrupterRefer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.

Combustion catalystAn additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to increase therate of combustion.

Combustion chamberThe space in which propulsion agents burn, in some cases after mixing.

Composite propellantRefer to the entry for ‘Propellant’.

CompatibilityA property of materials used in a product which means that they do not affectone another chemically when subjected to the specified environmental condi-tions.

Comment: TNT, for example, is affected by polyamides but not by olefin plas-tics.Polycarbonate resin is embrittled by double-base propellant.Lead azide forms highly sensitive copper azide on contact with copper.Certain combinations of metals may cause galvanic corrosion that may involve a safety hazard.

Control system, guidance systemFunctions and related subsystems that can change the path of a guided missile,torpedo or other guided ammunition.

Cook-offInadvertent initiation of an explosive as a result of abnormal heating.

Comment: Cook-off can occur, for example, after a misfire in a hot barrel.

Danger areaThe area around a proving/firing site inside which there is a risk of injury.

DeactivateTo return an armed fuzing system to unarmed mode. No special action is nor-mally required before the fuzing system can be used again.

6 Definitions

198

6

Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarizationDisassembly of ammunition for an in-service surveillance inspection, for exam-ple, or to render harmless components of ammunition that can/will no longer beused (e.g. defective, exceeded the established service life, etc.).

DelayA device that provides the desired delay in a fuzing system. The delay may beachieved pyrotechnically, electrically, mechanically or chemically.

DeflagrationDeflagration is characterised by a combustion wave, sustained by the generationof heat in the decomposition zone, that spreads through the explosive or explo-sive mixture at subsonic velocity.

Comment: During normal use of propellants in rockets, barrels, gas genera-tors, etc., the combustion rate (deflagration rate) – which is depen-dent on the pressure – is much lower than sonic velocity (in the magnitude of cm/s at l0 MPa). In the event of incorrect operation or malfunctions of various types, such as a blockage in the exhaust nozzle of a rocket engine or excessive charge density in guns, the combustion rate may increase uncontrollably so that the combus-tion chamber ruptures. This may even progress to detonation.

Design criteria and test planThe part of an item specification that contains requirements specifying resis-tance to environmental conditions and the environmental factor list for testing.

Desired (SHOULD) requirementsRefer to the entry for ‘Requirements’.

DestructionRefer to entry for ‘Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarization’.

DetonationDetonation is characterised by a shock wave, sustained by a chemical reaction inthe shock wave zone, that propagates at supersonic velocity.

Comment: Detonation gives maximum blast effect in explosives, and is nor-mally started by a primary explosive which, even in small quanti-ties, can transmit a sufficiently powerful shock wave impulse to initiate a detonation process.

Definitions 6

199

6

DetonatorAn initiator that is initiated by a stab, percussion, friction, flame or break sensi-tive primary explosive designed to initiate the detonation in an explosive.

DudHigh explosive ammunition that has not burst despite expected function.

Dynamic analysisVerification of test of the flow in a computer program to discover how the pro-gram behaves in different situations. The following items inter alia are of partic-ular interest:

• determination of which segments of the program are executed most fre-quently,

• time studies for certain operations,

• tracing of variable values,

• inspection of invariant conditions,

• code that is not executed,

• inspection to verify that the test comprises all elements of the program.

Dynamic interactionThe interaction between projectile and barrel during the launch process.

Comment: Incorrect interaction can cause damage to the bore and/or greater dispersion and/or ammunition malfunction (e.g. failure to initiate).

EBW (exploding bridge wire) igniterAn electric initiator without priming composition or primary explosive. Initia-tion is achieved by an exploding wire in contact with a low-density explosive,usually PETN.

Comment: The wire is made to ‘explode’ by a very high power input (MW).

EED (electro-explosive device)A priming device that is initiated electrically. Electric igniters, electric primers,electric artillery primers, electric detonators, electric blasting caps and electricpriming detonators are examples of EEDs.

6 Definitions

200

6

EFI (exploding foil initiator) igniterAn electric initiator without a priming composition or primary explosive. Initia-tion is achieved by an exploding metal foil accelerating a plastic disc against thehigh density explosive.

Comment: The metal foil is made to ‘explode’ by very high power input (MW). The term ‘Slapper’ is also used for EFIs.

Electric primerAn electrically initiated igniting device containing an initiator and booster, allconfined in a casing.

Electric detonatorAn initiator that is electrically initiated and which contains primary explosivefor a detonating explosive train.

Electro-explosive cartridgeRefer to the entry for ‘Electric detonator’.

Electric gap detonatorAn electric initiator that is very fast and easily initiated.

There are three main types of gap detonator:

• Electrically conducting composition, consisting of primary explosive andgraphite or metallic powder.

• Graphite bridge, in contact with primary explosive.

• Spark gap, adjacent to primary explosive.

Thus there is no hot wire, and the initiating function in all three types is basedon energy concentration in hot spots.

Electric igniter, EEDAn initiator that is initiated electrically.

Electric primerAn initiator that is initiated electrically and which contains priming compositionfor a deflagrating explosive train.

Electric primer-detonatorAn electric initiator used for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes andexplosive cutters. Cf. the entry for ‘Electric detonator’.

Definitions 6

201

6

EMP (electromagnetic pulse)An electromagnetic pulse that can arise, for example, when a nuclear chargedetonates.

EnvironmentThe cumulative effect of all the natural and induced environmental factors towhich an item is subjected at a specific moment.

Environmental factorA factor or group of factors that alone affects certain failure mechanisms andcan thus usually be isolated when testing.

Environmental severityThe value of the physical and chemical magnitudes that is characterised by theenvironment or an environmental factor.

ErosionThe removal of material from a surface by the action of another medium flowingover the surface.

Exhaust nozzleThat part of a reaction engine through which the combustion gases of the pro-pulsion agent escape at high velocity. An exhaust nozzle consists of an inlet, aconstricting section, and in most cases an expansion section. The thermal energyreleased is converted into kinetic energy in the exhaust nozzle.

ExplosiveExplosives are defined in the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goodsas solid or liquid substances or mixtures thereof that can undergo a rapid chemi-cal reaction whereby energy is released in the form of pressure-volume work orheat.

Explosive plungerAn explosive charge used in explosive cutters.

Explosive trainA combination of various elements (explosives, channels, etc.) designed to ini-tiate a charge. The explosive train may contain conditional interrupters or barrierlocks (safety devices).

Extreme environmentEnvironmental factors of such a severity that arise in conjunction with accidentsor enemy attack (e.g. fire, bullet attack).

6 Definitions

202

6

FAE (fuel air explosives)A warhead based on fuel that is dispersed in the air in an appropriate ratio priorto initiation.

Flame safety deviceAn interrupter in an explosive train that prevents the transmission of ignition toa deflagrating main charge. Cf. the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.

FuelThe propulsion agent that is combusted (oxidated) to generate energy.

Full form gaugingAn inspection method for the loadability of ammunition.

FuzeA fuze is a type of initiation system in which the sensors, safety system, initiatorand booster are integrated into the same assembly unit – generally for artilleryammunition.

Comment: Fuzes are classified according to:

– mode of initiation, e.g. impact, time or proximity,

– location, e.g. in nose, mid-section or base,

– sensitivity, e.g. sensitive or supersensitive,

– time of action, e.g. instantaneous or delay,

– safety devices in fuze categories,

– connection dimensions in fuzing systems.

Fuzing systemA generic term for a device designed to initiate charges in ammunition at a spe-cific time or location.

Comment: A fuzing system also contains a safety system that shall prevent inadvertent initiation that can cause injury or damage to equipment or serious malfunctions. A fuzing system consists of (a) sensor(s), a safety system (often referred to as an SAD/SAU) and a priming device.

The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks controlledby arming conditions.

There are two different principles for the design of a fuzing system:

– an out-of-line explosive train in which the SAD/SAU contains amechanical interrupter which, in unarmed mode, prevents trans-mission in the explosive train,

Definitions 6

203

6

– an in-line explosive train containing no interrupter. In this casethe safety and arming functions are allocated to the electric cir-cuits preceding the explosive train. The explosive train containsno primary explosive.

In out-of-line systems the interrupter often incorporates a detonatoror primer which, when in unarmed mode, is geometrically locatedin such a way that its detonation or deflagration cannot be transmit-ted to subsequent charges. This arrangement is the reason for theterm ‘out-of-line’.

The interrupter may consist of a rotor, slide or equivalent.

Fuzing systems are often named according to the method of func-tioning of their sensor(s), such as impact or proximity sensing, ordelay systems.

Gas generatorA device for producing a gas flow under pressure by combustion of a propulsionagent.

Comment: There are two types of gas generator: propellant and liquid gas.

Guided missileAn unmanned object that is launched, projected or dropped/released, and whichis designed to move in a flight path totally or partially above the surface of theearth guided by external signals or by integrated devices.

Gun PMP (permissible individual maximum pressure)The pressure which, for reasons of safety, must not be exceeded at any point inthe weapon by more than 13 rounds in every 10,000 statistically.

HandlingIn the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goods handling denotes allhandling from manufacture to final use and destruction. This comprises interalia storage, transport, handling, use and disposal/demilitarization.

HazardSomething that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment.

Hazardous eventAn event that occurs by accident, i.e. unintentionally, and which may result inan accident/mishap or damage/injury.

6 Definitions

204

6

Hazard initiationInadvertent initiation of a propelling charge or warhead.

High explosive (HE)An explosive whose decomposition normally occurs through detonation.

Comment: To start a detonation in a high explosive usually requires initiation with high energy and shock wave effect provided by, for example, a primary explosive.

HPM (high power microwaves)High-energy pulsed microwave radiation.

Hybrid rocket engineRefer to the entry for ‘Rocket engine’.

Hypergolic propulsion agent combinationA combination of propulsion agents (fuel–oxidizer) that react spontaneouslywith one another.

Igniferous burstThe explosion phenomenon of a deflagrating warhead. Cf. the entry for ‘Burst’.

IgniteTo make an explosive deflagrate.

Igniting deviceA device whose purpose is to ignite deflagrating explosive charges. It consists ofan initiator and a booster charge.

Comment: An igniting device in its most elementary form may consist of only the initiator (e.g. a primer in small arms ammunition).

IM (insensitive munition)Ammunition with a lower sensitivity than current ‘normal’ ammunition. This isachieved by using a lower sensitivity propellant and explosive, or by enclosingthe propulsion agent in such a way that its sensitivity is reduced.

Impulse (rocket) motorA motor of very short burning duration used to provide guidance impulses etc.

Independent safety deviceA safety device is independent if its status is not affected by the status of anyother safety device in the system.

Definitions 6

205

6

In-flight safetyThe property of ammunition and parts thereof not to detonate or burst in flightfrom the point at which the fuzing system is armed until the point at which it isdesignated to function.

Inherent safetyThe safety property of a torpedo and its constituent parts that enables it to makecontact with the seabed, or to somersault, or collide with objects in the water,without detonation of the main charge within the safe separation distance.

InitiateTo ignite or initiate an explosive.

InitiateTo cause an explosive to detonate.

Initiating deviceA device designed to initiate detonating explosive charges. It comprises an initi-ator (mechanical or electric) and a booster.

InitiatorA device, such as a primer or detonator, that receives initiation signal(s) andsubsequently initiates an explosive train

In-line explosive trainAn explosive train whitout interrupter, i.e. if one element in the explosive trainis initiated then the booster in the fuzing system will also be initiated.

In-service surveillance inspectionAn activity designed to establish whether the status of ammunition has changedso as to jeopardise safety during storage, transport, operation or other handling.

Integrated fuzing system (or initiator)A fuzing system that is built into the ammunition in such a way that it is not pos-sible to remove it completely or partially.

Intelligent ammunitionAmmunition with built-in logics, target seeker, target sensor or equivalent toenhance hit probability.

InterrupterA mechanical component that effects a designated interruption in an explosivetrain. It may consist of a rotor, slide or similar device.

6 Definitions

206

6

Item or specimenAny piece of defence materiel or software being dealt with at a specific moment.An item may, for example, be a complete guided missile, an electronic compo-nent or a computer program. Cf. the entry for ‘Test item or test specimen’.

Launch phaseThe period from when the ammunition has irrevocably started to move in thelauncher until it has left the launcher.LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition)Propellant with low sensitivity properties.

LinerA binding layer between the propelling charge and the cartridge case, usuallyconsisting of the same material as the fuel polymer in the propellant.

Loading safetyThe property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables the ammuni-tion to be loaded into a weapon with the required level of safety.

LSM (less sensitive munition)Ammunition for which action has been taken to reduce sensitivity to extremeenvironments such as fire.

Main chargeThe largest charge in a high explosive warhead or propulsion device.

Mask safetyThe property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enable firing throughvegetation (mask) close to the weapon without a burst or igniferous burst result-ing.

Mission profileA part of the operational profile that defines conditions to which an item can besubjected when used in a specific way, such as an airborne missile suspendedfrom an aircraft and carried on a mission, which in turn is defined in the form offlight velocities, altitudes and durations. Cf. the entry for ‘Operational profile’.

MonopropellantA propulsion agent that decomposes in a reaction chamber to form propellantgas. Decomposition can be by catalysis or be started by the application of heat.

Definitions 6

207

6

MOP (maximum operating pressure)The pressure that a specific charge provides under the most extreme conditions,such as in terms of propellant temperature, and which purely statistically mustnot be exceeded by more than 13 cases out of 10,000.

Multiple warheadA warhead which in turn consists of several warheads.

Muzzle safetyThe property of the ammunition and its constituent parts that enables it to passthrough a fixed obstacle close to the muzzle of the weapon with the requiredlevel of safety.

NeutralizationPrevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated, for example by dis-charging ignition capacitors or by interrupters returning to unarmed state.

ObturatorA sealing element attached to the projectile used to achieve a satisfactory sealduring the launch phase.

Out-of-line (interrupted) explosive trainThe explosive train that contains an interrupter that in unarmed position pre-vents transmission in the explosive train.

Operational profileThe part of the life cycle comprising use of the product. The operational profileis defined in terms of various methods of application and their respective dura-tions.

OxidizerA propulsion agent that oxidizes fuel while generating energy.

PBX (plastic-bonded explosive)Plastic-bonded explosive.

Pendulum pressurePressure perturbation in barrels and rocket engines.

Barrels Pressure oscillations that can occur in long chambers not completely filled by the propelling charge. Pressure in the chamber may thus increase locally to such an extent that de-formation occurs.

6 Definitions

208

6

Rocket engines Pressure oscillations that can occur in propellant-driven as well as liquid fuel rocket engines as a result of resonance be-tween acoustic perturbation and pressure-dependent combus-tion. The geometry of the engine and the charge, together with other factors, contribute to this. The pressure oscilla-tions may be of such an amplitude that the engine ruptures.

PolymerA chemical compound formed by the interlinking of small units to large mole-cules. Polymers can be subdivided into plastics (such as polyethylene, PVC andphenolic plastics) and elastomers or rubber materials (such as natural rubber,polybutadiene rubber and styrene-butadiene rubber).

Premature burstA burst that occurs inadvertently in the trajectory before the designated point ortime.

Primary explosiveAn explosive that decomposes through detonation and which requires little initi-ation energy, for example in the form of heat (friction, percussion, flame or hotwire), and is used to initiate detonation in high explosives (such as TNT). A pri-mary explosive detonates even in very small quantities when there is little or noconfinement.

PrimerAn initiator consisting of a case (capsule) containing a stab, percussion, flame orother heat sensitive priming composition designed to initiate deflagration in anexplosive train.

Priming compositionA pyrotechnic composition that is initiated by heat (friction, percussion, flame,spark, hot wire).

Priming detonatorAn initiator for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and explosive cut-ters. Cf. the entry for ‘Detonator’.

Priming deviceA device containing an initiator (mechanical or electrical) and a booster whosepurpose is to initiate or ignite an explosive charge. In its most elementary form apriming device may comprise only an initiator (such as a primer as an ignitingdevice in small arms ammunition).

Definitions 6

209

6

Projectile

General A body projected (launched) by an external force and which subsequently continues in motion under its own inertia.

Applied to ammunition A warhead without an integral propelling force, and which does not contain explosive with the exception of illuminating compositions in tracers and incendiary substances in small incendiary compositions (spotting charges), fired from tube-launched weapons.

Comment: The term projectile is also used as a generic name for all types of warheads in tube-launched ammunition.

PropellantAn explosive in solid form that normally decomposes by deflagration.

The most common types of propellant are:

• Nitro-cellulose based propellant such as single-base propellant, the mainconstituent of which is nitro-cellulose, double-base propellant containingnitro-cellulose gelatinized with nitro-glycerine, triple-base propellant con-taining nitro-cellulose, nitro-glycerine and a nitro compound such as ni-troguanadine, and nitramine propellant with a binding agent of plastic.

• Mechanically mixed propellants in which the various components in fine-grained powder form are granulated or compressed to the desired shape andsize. An example of such a propellant is black powder which, however, canalso be denoted as a pyrotechnic composition.

• Composite propellant consisting of a finely distributed oxidiser, usually am-monium perchlorate dispersed in a fuel binding agent – usually a polymersuch as polybutadiene. Energy enhancing additives, such as metallic pow-der, are sometimes used. The mixture can be cast into the desired shape.Composite propellant usually contains softeners and combustion catalysts.

• Anew type of propellant known as LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition)where reduced sensitivity is achieved by using a binding agent consisting ofa polymer and where the energizer is a nitramine (such as RDX or HNX).

Propulsion deviceThe part of the ammunition that provides the necessary impulse to transport thewarhead from its launcher to the target.

6 Definitions

210

6

Propulsion agentA substance that functions as a fuel or oxidiser or both, and which contains theenergy necessary for propulsion. Propulsion agents can be in solid, liquid or gasform. They can be mixed with each other like propellants, or be separated as inliquid-fuel rocket engines and air-breathing engines.

Propulsion cartridgeA cartridge containing a propelling charge and igniting device, used in mortarammunition and rifle grenades for example.

PyrolysisThe decomposition of solid or liquid substances caused by the effect of heat intosmaller, usually gaseous, molecules.

Pyrotechnic compositionAn explosive that consists of a mixture of fuel and oxidiser, usually in solidform, which normally are not themselves explosives.

The components can react with each other in the form of deflagration involvingheat generation.

Pyrotechnic compositions are usually used for:

• functions in explosive trains in the form of ignition, delay, initiation

• effect in warheads in the form of light, fire, smoke, noise.

RAP (rocket assisted projectile)A shell with a (propellant) rocket engine that provides thrust in flight, therebyincreasing range.

Reaction chamberA chamber into which propulsion agents are injected and made to react in orderto generate propelling gas.

Reaction motor or jet engineA motor in which the thrust is generated by the momentum of an escapingworking medium (combustion gases, reaction products, air, etc.).

RecoilRecoil is the phenomenon that occurs when a weapon reacts to the effect of thepropellant gases and acceleration of the projectile. There are different ways ofmeasuring recoil such as impulse, force and energy.

Definitions 6

211

6

Relaxation to ruptureThe delayed forming of cracks in a deformed material.

RequirementsMandatory requirements (often expressed by SHALL in tables) are require-ments that are of decisive significance to the achievement of the necessarysafety level in a system.

Desired requirements (often expressed by SHOULD in tables) are requirementsthat are important to system safety and shall thus be satisfied whenever possible.

Requirement specificationA specification issued by the purchaser to provide a basis for tendering prior to aprocurement, or issued as a requirement document when placing an order.

Resistance to environmental conditionsThe capability of an item to withstand a specific severity for a specific duration.

Rheological propertiesThe deformation properties of a material subjected to external forces. In vis-coelastic materials the properties are time-dependent.

RiskA combination of frequency or probability and the consequence of a specifiedhazardous event or accident.

RocketAn unmanned, unguided self-propelled object incorporating a warhead androcket engine(s).

Rocket engineA type of reaction engine that carries its own fuel and oxidiser, and is thus inde-pendent of the surrounding atmosphere for combustion.

There are three types of rocket engines:

• Propellant rocket engines. The propulsion agent is a solid propellant.

• Liquid fuel rocket engines. The propulsion agents are liquid – mono-propel-lant or bi-propellant – in the latter case an oxidiser and fuel. Tri-propellantmay also be used.

• Hybrid rocket engines. The propulsion agents consist of a solid and a liquidpropulsion agent.

6 Definitions

212

6

Rocket engine igniterThe igniting device for a rocket engine.

Rocket propellant chargeA solid propulsion agent charge for propellant rocket engines. The propellantcharge is determined inter alia by the type of propellant, charge geometry, andthe method of fixing it inside the rocket casing. An unbonded charge is free fromthe rocket casing but is supported against it or against special support. A casebonded charge is wholly or partially bonded to the rocket casing by means of anintermediate layer (liner). The charge may also be bonded to an internal supporttube.

SAD (safety and arming device), SAU (safety and arming unit)A device that arms a fuzing system at the correct time, and which also preventsinadvertent initiation of the explosive train.

Safe separation distanceThe minimum distance between the launcher (or drop/release device) and theammunition beyond which a burst is judged to give an acceptable level of safetyfor personnel and equipment located at the launcher or drop/release device. Rea-sonable evasive action by the weapon platform is assumed.

Safety assessment of existing materielA system safety program that shall be applied during overhaul of existingdefence materiel systems in storage that have not been examined previouslywith regard to modern system safety requirements.

Safety deviceRefer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.

Safety analysisA generic term describing the parts of the safety program that involve a system-atic analysis of hazardous events and their causes, as well as the qualitative orquantitative evaluation of the safety level achieved.

Safety deviceA part or combination of parts designed to prevent inadvertent initiation of themain charge in ammunition.

Definitions 6

213

6

Safety distanceThe distance from the launcher (drop/release device) to the point in the trajec-tory or flight path at which a safety device is cancelled.

Comment: Each individual safety device has its safety distance.

Safety systemThe generic term used to denote the combination of all the safety devices in afuzing system. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks that arecontrolled by arming conditions.

Sealing ringRefer to the entry for ‘Obturator’.

Service lifeThe period during which the ammunition can be transported and stored in theprescribed packaging under the stipulated storage conditions (temperature andrelative humidity) without changes occurring that can result in hazardous eventsor an unacceptable degradation of performance.

Safety featureA device that locks a transmission safety device. A mechanical component thatlocks the interrupter in unarmed or armed mode or a component/function thatbreaks an electric circuit.

SAI (safety, arming and ignition) unitAn SAD/SAU with ignition function.

Secondary armamentThis term refers to additional weaponry that can be mounted on a combat vehi-cle to provide secondary or supporting functions. The following types ofweapon are considered to belong to this category:

• machine gun or cannon for covering fire,

• parallel machine gun for use together with the main armament,

• mortars,

• flare launchers.

Secondary chargeRefer to the entry for ‘Booster charge or booster’.

6 Definitions

214

6

Self-destructionAutomatic initiation of an HE charge in ammunition that has missed the target,for example, or was not initiated within the designated time after arming.

SensorThe part of a fuzing system that senses the target and emits initiation signal(s) tothe initiator when function is expected.

Separate caseA case, normally made of metal (e.g. brass) with an igniting device and contain-ing a propelling charge. It is kept separate from the projectile during transportand loading.

Comment: A separate case requires two operations when loading the weapon. Cf. the entry for ‘Cartridge case’.

Set a fuzeThe act of setting the fuze to the desired initiation mode (e.g. impact or proxim-ity mode) or time.

SHALL requirementRefer to entry for ‘Requirements’.

Shelf life testingTesting to verify the performance, reliability, and safety of a product after simu-lated depot storage.

ShellA projectile with a cavity filled with explosive, smoke or illuminating composi-tion, submunitions or equivalent.

Similar to operational conditionsThe realization of hardware, software (in co-ordinating functional parts outsidethe tested software) or environment in the system, being as close to the finaldesign or system environment as possible with regard to function and behavior. Example: If the requirement is that the software shall be verified using an elec-tricity supply similar to that used in operational conditions, the power unit of theseries design shall be used.

SquibAn initiator that is initiated electrically and which comprises electricity supplyleads with a heating hot wire between them surrounded by priming composition.

Definitions 6

215

6

ST fuzeA shock-tube fuze consists of a plastic tube coated on the inside with a thinlayer of high explosive or filled with a combustible gas mixture.

The initiation impulse is transmitted through the tube as a shock wave.

StabilizerAn additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to keep decom-position at a low level and thereby safeguard storage capability.

StabilityThe property that enables a material not to change in the environment in whichit exists.

SterilizationThe prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated by permanentlydamaging some part of the safety system (Cf. the entries for ‘Neutralisation’ and‘Deactivate’.)

Storage, logisticalThe long-term storage of items in depots, usually under controlled relativehumidity conditions.

Storage, tacticalThe storage of an item for a limited period of time under field conditions. Itdenotes storage in ammunition depots or at readying sites located adjacent tobases, naval vessels, or deployment areas, usually without any kind of con-trolled environment.

Sub-calibre barrelA small calibre barrel inserted inside the standard barrel, and used either foraligning the standard barrel or for practice firing. Also known as sub-calibreadapter.

Sustainer, sustainer motorA motor designed to provide thrust in flight.

Terminally corrected projectileA shell that is corrected in the final path of its trajectory by intermittent lateralforces triggered by guidance signals.

6 Definitions

216

6

Terminally guided projectileA shell that is guided in the final part of its trajectory by continuous lateralforces controlled by guidance signals.

Terminal guidance deviceA device that by its influence makes a projectile, for example, fly in a specificdirection.

TestAn investigation to determine one or more properties of an item/specimen.

Test item or test specimenAn object, such as a component or subsystem, that is to be tested.

Transmission safety device

• This denotes an interrupter in an explosive train including associate safetycomponents. The synonyms for this concept are detonator safety device,arming device, and flame safety device (out-of-line explosive train).

• A switch in the electric circuit(s) of a fuzing system including associatesafety components. Also known as a circuit breaker (in-line explosive train).

Transport, logisticalTransport of items to and between storage depots, and from storage depots toand from maintenance workshops.

Transport, tacticalTransport of items in field conditions from depot storage to bases, naval vessels,deployment areas, etc. The concept includes short transport of items within andbetween these sites.

Transport safetyThe property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables transport,operation and storage with the required level of safety.

Unbonded chargeRefer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’.

Unguided weaponA weapon whose flight path is determined at launch.

Definitions 6

217

6

ValidationThis is a method of verifying that requirements are correct, i.e. that the productfunctions as intended in its operational environment.

WadA flat or cupped unit, often made of cardboard, that is inserted into the cartridgecase to secure the propelling charge in position and to reduce the risk of cook-off.

WakeThe area immediately behind a projectile in motion. Cf. the entry for ‘Basebleed’.

WarheadThe part of ammunition which at a predetermined time or place provides theintended effect by means of pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary effect, or anycombination of these effects; other forms may be smoke or illuminating effectsor sensor jamming.

WeaponA device for firing, launching, dropping or deploying ammunition.

Weapon safetyWeapon safety is the property of the weapon that enables the weapon underspecified conditions to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, maintainedand demilitarized without any hazardous event occurring, or any constituentparts of the weapon being affected in such a way that a hazardous event couldoccur.

Wear (in barrel)The mechanical, thermal, and chemical influences on the internal surface of thebarrel. There are two wear effects: barrel wear through the mechanical effect ofthe round, and erosion of the barrel caused by the mechanical and chemicalinfluences of hot, fast flowing propellant gases. As a rule, the commencement ofrifling is most exposed to wear.

Worn barrelA worn barrel has less than 25% of its total barrel life left. The wear life is usu-ally established with reference to decreased muzzle velocity, dispersion, andwear at commencement of the rifling.

Comment: A worn barrel is a prerequisite for some compatibility tests.

6 Definitions

218

6

6.2 Key to abbreviations

AFS Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Swedish Boardfor Occupational Safety and Health

ASWG Ammunition Safety Working Group

BVKF Swedish Armed Forces’ joint regulations for the prevention of fireand explosion hazards, water contamination, chemical health haz-ards from flammable goods etc.

Cf. Compare

CE EC mark of conformity

DTTFO Draft version of TTFO

EED Electro-Explosive Device

EFI Exploding Foil Initiator

EMP ElectroMagnetic Pulse

ESD ElectroStatic Discharge

FAE Fuel-Air Explosives

FM Swedish Armed Forces

FMEA Fault Modes and Effects Analysis

FMV Swedish Defence Materiel Administration

FOA Swedish Defence Research Establishment

FSD Swedish Defence Standard

HF High frequency

HQ Headquarters

HP Hydrogen peroxide

Definitions 6

219

6

HPM High power microwaves

HTP High test peroxide

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IFTEX Instruction governing storage and transport of Swedish ArmedForces’ explosive goods

IM Insensitive Munition

IR Infrared

LEMP Lightning ElectroMagnetic Pulse

LSM Less Sensitive Munition

MIL-STD Military Standard (USA)

MOP Maximum Operating Pressure

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPa MegaPascal

NA Not applicable

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NEMP Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse

P1 Development

P2 Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems

P3 Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems

PBX Plastic-bonded Explosives

PCB Printed circuit board

PETN Pentaerythritol tetranitrate

6 Definitions

220

6

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PHL Preliminary Hazard List

PHST Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations

PMP Permissible Individual Maximum Pressure

ppm Parts per million

PTTFO Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives

RFP Request for Proposal

Rg Advisory Group (at FMV)

RSV Hollow charge

SAI Safety, Arming and Ignition unit

SACLOS Semi-Active Command by Line-Of-Sight

SFS Swedish Code of Statutes

SFRJ Solid Fuel Ram Jet

SRP Safety Requirement Proposed

SSPP System Safety Program Plan

SV Safety Verification

SÄI Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables

SäkI Safety Instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces

TS Transport and storage

TTFO Tactical Technical Financial Objectives

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

Definitions 6

221

6

PTTFO Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives

VDU Video Display Unit

VDV Vibration Dose Value

References 7

223

7

7 REFERENCES

Owing to constraints on the space available in this manual it has been necessaryto severely restrict the number of references.

To find complete information in MIL-STD and STANAG documents, for exam-ple, the reader is referred to the special search systems that are available on themarket.

At FMV there is a subscription system so that MIL-STD is available on CD-ROM.

The documents referenced are grouped as follows:

7.1 Documents governing safety

7.2 Standards relating to design and testing (e.g. MIL-STD, STANAG)

7.3 Design principles and experience (e.g. manuals, magazine articles, studies)

7.4 Textbooks

7.5 Documents relating to the environment(fundamental studies, measurement methods, etc.)

7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition

7.7 Accident investigations.

The following acronyms and abbreviations have been used for the standards ref-erenced herein:

AOC Proc. Australian Ordnance Council, Proceeding, AUS

AOP Allied Ordnance Publication, NATO

DEF (AUST) Australian Defence Standard, AUS

DEF STAN Defence Standard, UK

DOE Department of Explosives, USA

7 References

224

7

DOD-STD Department of Defense Standard, USA

FSD Swedish Defence Standard

GAM Delegation General Pour l´Armement, FR

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

ITOP International Test Operation Procedure, USA, BRD

MIL-HDBK Military Handbook, USA

MIL-STD Military Standard, USA

NAVORD US Naval Ordnance Laboratory, USA

OB Proc. Ordnance Board Proceeding, UK

SFS Swedish Code of Statutes

SS Swedish Standard

SSI FS National Swedish Institute of Radiation Protection Code of Stat-utes

STANAG Standardization Agreement, NATO

SÄI FS National Swedish Inspectorate of Explosives and FlammablesCode of Statutes

TDv Technische Dienstvorschrift, BRD

TECOM Test and Evaluation Command, USA

TOP Test Operation Procedure, USA

References 7

225

7

7.1 Documents governing safety

Table 7:1 Documents governing safety

Designation Title

AFS 1996:2 Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupa-tional Safety and Health

AFS 1994:8 Lasers

AOP-15 Guidance for the Assessment of the Safety and Suitabil-ity for Service of Munitions for NATO Armed Forces

DEF STAN 13-131 Ordnance Board Safety Guidelines for Weapons and Munitions

DGA/AQ 4112 Guide pour la construction de la securité

H SystSäkM7740-784851

System Safety Manual

IEC 60825-1 Laser Classification and Safety

MIL-STD 882 System Safety Program, Requirements

TjF-FMV 97:12 Regulations governing weapon and ammunition safety activities within FMV

SFS 1977:1160–1171 Work Environment Act (AML) and directives

SFS 1982:821 Transport of Dangerous Goods Act

SFS 1988:220 Radiation Protection Act

SFS 1988:868 Explosive and Flammable Goods Act

SFS 1988:1145 Directive on Explosive and Flammable Goods

SFS 1994:536 Directive on International Supervision of Weapon Projects

SSI FS 1980:2 Classification of lasers

SSI FS 1993:1 Directives on lasers

SÄIFS 1986:2 General advisory statements concerning SÄI directives on sensitivity testing of explosives

SÄIFS 1999:2 Directive on the handling of hydrogen peroxide

7 References

226

7

7.2 Standards relating to design and testing

Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing

Designation Title

ADA-086259 Vol. 4 Joint Services Safety and Performance Manual for Qualification of Explosives for Military Use

AOC 218.93 The Qualification of Explosives for Service Use

AOC 223.93 Assessment of Munition Related Safety Critical Com-puting Systems

AOC 236.94 Guidelines for the Preclusion of Electro-Explosive Haz-ards in the Electromagnetic Environment

AOP-22 Design Criteria for and Test Methods for Inductive Set-ting of Electromagnetic fuzes

DEF (AUST) 5168 The Climatic Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Military Materiel

DEF (AUST) 5247 Environmental Testing of Service Materiel

DEF STAN 00 35 Environmental Handbook for Defence Material

DEF STAN 00 36 Test Methods (draft)

DEF STAN 00 55 Requirements for the Procurement of Safety Critical Software in Defence Equipment

DEF STAN 00 56 Requirements for the Analysis of Safety Critical Haz-ards

DEF STAN 59-41/1 Electromagnetic Compatibility

DEF STAN 59-41/2 Electromagnetic Compatibility Management and Plan-ning Procedures

DEF STAN 59-41/3 Electromagnetic Compatibility Technical Requirements Test Methods and Limits

DOD-STD-2168 Software Quality Evaluation

DOE/EV/06194-3- REV2 DF 86 OV1154

DOE Explosives Safety Manual

GAM-EG-13 Essais Generaux en Environment des Materiels

ITOP 3-2-829 Cannon Safety Test

ITOP 4-2-504/1 Safety Testing of Field Artillery Ammunition

ITOP 4-2-504/2 Safety Testing of Tank Ammunition

ITOP 5-2-619 Safety Testing of Missile and Rocket Systems Employ-ing Manual Launch Stations

IFTEX Part 1 M7762-000082IFTEXPart 2 M7762-000220

Instruction governing the storage and transport of Armed Forces’ explosive goods

References 7

227

7

M7762-000220 FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveil-lance of Ammunition

MIL-STD-210 Climatic Information to Determine Design and Test Requirements for Military Systems and Equipment

MIL-HDBK-217 Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment

MIL-STD-322 Explosive Components, Electrically Initiated, Basic Qualification Tests for

MIL-STD-331 Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and Perfor-mance Tests for

MIL-HDBK-338-1 Electronic Reliability Design Handbook

MIL-STD-461 Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Require-ments for Equipment

MIL-STD-462 Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Measure-ment of

MIL-STD-498 Software Development and Documentation

MIL-STD-810 Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guide-lines

MIL-STD-1316 Fuze Design, Safety Criteria for

MIL-STD-1385 Preclusion of Ordnance Hazards in Electromagnetic Fields, General Requirements for

MIL-STD-1455 Dispenser and Sub-munition, Air Delivered, Safety Design and Safety Qualification, Criteria for

MIL-STD-1466 Safety Criteria and Qualification Requirements for Pyrotechnic Initiated Explosive (PIE) ammunition

MIL-STD-1472 Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Sys-tems Equipment and Facilities

MIL-STD-1474 Noise Limits for Army Materiel

MIL-STD-1512 Electroexplosive Subsystems, Electrically Initiated, Design Requirements and Test Methods

MIL-STD-1521 Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments and Computer Software

MIL-STD-1629 Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analyses

MIL-STD-1670 Environmental Criteria and Guidelines for Air-launched Weapons

MIL-STD 1901 Munition Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition System Design, Safety Criteria for

MIL-STD 1911 Hand-Emplaced Ordnance Design, Safety Criteria For

Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing, continued

Designation Title

7 References

228

7

MIL-STD-2105 Hazard Assessment Tests for Navy Non-Nuclear Muni-tion

OB Proc 41 849 Climatic Environmental Conditions

OB Proc 42 202 Safety of Fuzing Systems

OB Proc 42 240 Safety of Fuzing Systems, Mines

OB Proc 42 242 Environmental Testing of Armament Stores

OB Proc 42 351 Assessment of Gun Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above

OB Proc 42 413 Principles of Design and Use for Electrical Circuits Incorporating Explosive Components

OB Proc 42 491 Solid Propellants for Rocket Motors

OB Proc 42 496 Life Assessment of Munitions

OB Proc 42 610 Assessment of Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above

OB Proc P114(1) Assessment of Land Service Weapons Installations excluding Rocket Systems and GW, Pillar Proceeding

SS 49 90 701 Electric detonators, general requirements and testing

SS-EN 418 Machine safety – emergency stopping, functional aspects – design principles

STANAG 3441 Design of Aircraft Stores for Fixed Wing Aircraft and Helicopters

STANAG 3525 Design Safety Principles and General Design Criteria for Weapon Fuzing and Safety and Arming Systems

STANAG 4110 Definition of pressure terms and their interrelationship for use in the design and proof of cannons and ammuni-tion

STANAG 4157 Development Safety Test Methods and Procedures for Fuzes for Unguided Tube-launched Projectiles

STANAG 4170 Principles and Methodology for the Qualification of Explosive Materials for Military Use

STANAG 4187 Fuzing Systems – Safety Design Requirement

STANAG 4224 Safety and Suitability Testing of Artillery and Naval Gun Ammunition 76 mm and Greater

STANAG 4225 Safety Evaluation of Mortar Bombs

STANAG 4226 Assessment of Safety and Suitability for Services of Underwater Naval Mines

STANAG 4227 Safety Testing of Airborne Dispenser Weapons

STANAG 4228 Gun Munition of Caliber 20 to 40 mm, Safety Evalua-tion


Designation Title

References 7

229

7

STANAG 4234 Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) 200kHz to 40 GHz Environment - Affecting the Design of Mate-rial for Use by NATO Forces

STANAG 4235 Electrostatic Environment Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces

STANAG 4236 Lightning Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces

STANAG 4238 Design Principles for Safety Circuits Containing EED

STANAG 4239 Electrostatic Discharge Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems Munitions and Weapon Systems

STANAG 4240 Liquid Fuel Fire Test for Munition

STANAG 4241 Bullet Attack Test for Munition

STANAG 4297 Implementing Document for AOP-15

STANAG 4324 Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) Test Information to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of Electro-Explosive Devices and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems

STANAG 4325 Air-launched Munitions, Safety Evaluation

STANAG 4326 Implementing STANAG for AOP-8

STANAG 4327 Lightning Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Elec-tronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems

STANAG 4337 Surface Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation

STANAG 4338 Underwater-Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation

STANAG 4370 Environmental Test Planning for NATO Material

STANAG 4404 Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines for Muni-tion-Related Safety Critical Computing Systems

STANAG 4423 Aircraft Guns & Ammunition, Safety Evaluation

STANAG 4452 Safety Assessment of Munition-Related Computing Systems

TECOM Pam 310-4AD No A204333

Index of Test Operations Procedures and International Test Operations Procedures

TDv 018 Bewerten von Waffenrohren kal 5,6 mm bis 20,3 cm

TOP 2-2-614 Toxic Hazard Tests for Vehicles and Other Equipment

UN ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.11 Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations


Designation Title

7 References

230

7

7.3 Design principles and experience

UN ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.2 Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Test and Criteria

Table 7:3 Design principles and experience

Designation Title

R N GottronNational DefenceMay/June l975,464-466

The Army and Fluidics

Kurt Nygaard ABBofors FKP-2 l978

Characterizing of Electric Ignitors

Reynolds Industries Inc,San Ramon, Ca

Electronic Firing Systems

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-l29

Engineering Design Handbook, Electromagnetic Com-patibility

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet No 706-114,115, 116, 117, 118, 119

Engineering Design Handbook, Environmental Series

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-177,1971

Engineering Design Handbook, Explosive Series – Properties of Explosives of Military Interest

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-l79January l974

Engineering Design Handbook,Explosive Trains

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-2l0

Engineering Design Handbook,Fuzes

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-235

Engineering Design Handbook, Hardening Weapon Systems against RF Energy

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-l86

Engineering Design Handbook, Military Pyrotechnics, Part Two, Safety Procedures and Glossary


Designation Title

References 7

231

7

US Army MaterialCommandPamphlet 706-l80,April 1972

Engineering Design Handbook, Principles of Explosive Behavior

US Army Material Command

Engineering Design Handbook, Part Four, Design of Ammunition for Pyrotechnic Effects

EMA-89-RR-22 ESD. Solid Full Propellant Hazards with Special Appli-cation to Manufacture and Handling Operation in Swe-den


Exploding Bridgewire Ordnance


Exploding Foil Initiator Ordnance

SÄIFS 1989:15 List of directives and general advisory statements within SÄI’s field of operations

K O BrauerChemical Publishing Co Inc,New York l974

Handbook of Pyrotechnics

NAVWEPS OP 3199 Vol 1 0609 319 9100,l965

The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants

Ove BringUD 1989:5

Humanitarian rights and weapons control

W C Schumb, C N Satterfield,R L WentworthReinhold PublishingCorporation, New York,N Y, 1955

Hydrogen Peroxide

FFV FT 102-04:79 Long-term storage ZP81

M GunnerhedFOA 3 C 30420-E

Microelectronics in safety critical applications

M A BarronNational DefenceSeptember/October l974, l46-l48

Multi-Option Fuzing

G Hall, S Jahnberg,M Ohlin, B Spiridon FOA C 20649-2.7

Software in safety critical applications

FMV-Vapen A 761:62/85

Risks involved in the use of glass fibre reinforced plas-tic as reinforcement material for explosives

Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued

Designation Title

7 References

232

7

M E AndersonOrdnance,July/August l972, 59-62

Safety/Arming Devices

NAVWEPS OP 2943(First Revision) l965

Safety Precautions for Prepackaged Liquid Propellants

Report FFV MT 225/72 l972 Safety inspection of 105 mm light HE shell m/34 60 units, 105 mm HE shell m/60Z 120 units, 105 mm HE shell m/61A 25 units

Olof NordzellFMV-A:VAB2Order no. 28-3600-0lFMV, Stockholm l97l

Safety field trials with ammunition l960–l965

Radio TechnicalCommission forAeronauticsRTCA/DO-178

Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification

FMV-A:A A761: 3/82 1982

Final report of cavity group

H AlmströmFOA Report

Study of risks associated with cavities in high explosive shells

Franklin Institute, l969 Summary of Test Data for 75 Hot-Wire Bridge or EBW Initiators Tested at the FIRL

S LamnevikFOA C 20302-D1

Explosive trains for detonation transmission

FMV-Vapen A761:342 83/86

UK Qualification Programme for Introduction of PBX into Service

TRC 829/l03 Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma metric analysis

TRC 829/072 Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma radiography

with Co60

Ola ListhFOA report C 20457-Dl(D4)Part l:

Investigation of electric igniters for ammunition.Data for igniters in Swedish ammunition and knowl-edge status concerning testing

Ola ListhFOA report C 20228-D1 (D4)March 1978

Instantaneous point detonation supersensitive m/484D – investigation of certain risks for inadvertent arming and initiation of composition dust

Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued

Designation Title

References 7

233

7

7.4 Textbooks

Table 7:4 Textbooks

Designation Title

Roy L GrantBureau of Mines, Dept of the Interior, Washington D.C., l967

A Combination Statistical Design for Sensitivity Test-ing IC-8324

FMV-A M77:21/79 Ammunition doctrine for the Army

AB BoforsWezäta, Göteborg, l960

Analytical Methods for Powders and Explosives

W Ficket & W C DavisUniv California PressBerkeley, l979

Detonation

Johansson C H and Persson P AAcademic Press, London(l970)

Detonics of High Explosives

B T Fedoroff m flPicatinny Arsenal, DoverNew Jersey, USA

Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items

S Lamnevikl983

Explosive processes – Fundamentals for consequence and risk analysis.Compendium FOA Inst 24

Rudolf MeyerVerlag Chemie, GmbHD-6940 Weinheim, l993ISBN 3-527-28506-7

Explosives

G BlomqvistFOA report A l577-Dll973

Explosives and their sensitivity properties.Fundamentals for future sensitivity research

S Lamnevik m fll983

Chemistry of explosives.Revised extract from MHS compendium in chemistry l972-ll-06

Ingvar SeilitzNobelkoncernservice

Knowledge of explosives

A A ShidlovskyReport FTD II-63-758(trans DDC AD 602 687) Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson AFB, l964

Foundations of Pyrotechnics (translation from the Rus-sian original Osnovy Pirotekhniki)

7 References

234

7

D W Culbertson,V F De VostU S Navy

Instrumentation Techniques and the Application of Spectral Analysis and Laboratory Simulation to Gun Shock Problems, The Shock and Vibration Bulletin, Jan l972, Bulletin 42

NAVORD OD448llNaval Weapons Center,China Lake Ca (l97l)

Joint Services Evaluation Plan for Preferred and Alter-native Explosive Fills for Principal Munitions Vol IV

Military Office of the Swedish Ministry of DefenceISBN 91-38-31004-X(M 7740-804001)

International rules of warfare, conventions of interna-tional law applicable during wartime, neutrality and occupation

B M DobratzLawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory report UCRL-52997, l98l

LLNL Explosives Handbook Properties of Chemical Explosives and Explosives and Explosive Simulants

NASA-AP-8076 NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Pro-pulsion): Solid Propellant Grain Design and Internal Ballistics. March l972

NASA-SP-8039 NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Pro-pulsion): Solid Rocket Motor Performance Analysis and Prediction. May l97l

C L MaderUniv of California PressBerkeley, l979

Numerical Modeling of Detonations

J M Mc LainThe Franklin Institute PressPhiladelphia, l980

Pyrotechnics

RARDE, Fort Halstead,Kent, GB (l988)

Sensitiveness Collaboration Committee, Manual of Tests

E Lidén, L HolmbergI Mellgard, L WesterlingFOA-R-94-00035-2.3-SEOctober 1994ISSN 1104-9154

Warheads, interaction protection

P F Mohrbach, R F Wood Franklin Institute Monograph APL-69-l, 1968

Systems and Techniques Employed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories to Determine the Responses of Electro-explosive Devices to Radio Fre-quency Energy

M7742-108001 Weapons doctrine for the Army

US NavyNAVORD OD 44 492

Weapon System Safety Guidelines Handbook

Table 7:4 Textbooks, continued

Designation Title

References 7

235

7

7.5 Documents relating to the environment

Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment

Designation Title

Saab-Scania ABTCP-37-7.76:R2,June 1979

30 mm automatic cannon m/75Fuze accelerations with forced driving band

SAABSAAB TCP-0-72.33:Rl

Acceleration measurement in fuze.Analysis of measuring methodology

René RenströmFOA report C 2525-D3,1972

Acceleration stresses in projectile-borne rocket propel-lant

ITT Research Institute(For Defense NuclearAgency, Washington)

DNA EMP Awareness Course Notes, August l973

TeleplanE3-MPA-0236, Dec l978

Electric interference

ITT Research Institute(For Naval Surface Weapon Center USA)Report NSWC/WOL/TR 75-l93

EMP Design Guidelines for Naval Ship Systems, l975

FOA 2Reg. no. 2l330-Xl6August l977

Fourier analysis of water shock waves from underwater charges

S AlmrothFOA C 23204-41 1969

Casting properties and sensitivity for octol

S LamnevikFOA 1 reportA146l143 (40, 4l)January l969

Copper acid corrosion

Bofors KL-R6775 Sensitivity of octol NSV10 and octonal NSB 9030

Anders SchwartzFOA report A 200l5-DlMarch l976

Methods for testing rocket propellant.I Double-base propellant

Anders SchwartzFOA report A 2003l-DlFebruary l979

Methods for testing rocket propellant.II Composite propellant

S LamnevikFOA A-1510-41(40) 1970

HMX. Basic data for technical specifications

Küller, N-EFMV A:A m/4/l4:85/75

Plan for analysis of ammunition environment

7 References

236

7

A MagnussonFOA 2 report A 2l48-242October l96l

Rheological properties of viscoelastic materials

AB BoforsKL-R-5696, Dec l976

Risk for self-initiation of round rammed in a hot barrel

Institute for water & air purifi-cation researchIVL no. 02:0464, June l977

Collocation of the presence, content levels, and proper-ties of gaseous air pollutants

H J PasmanDREV Report 707/75DREV Québec, Canada,1975

Shell Prematures by Compression Ignition and their Laboratory Simulation

J Hansson, G ÅqvistFOA report A 20027-DlMay l978

Study of organic substances present in ammunition sur-roundings that have a harmful effect on ammunition and packaging

A D Randolph and K O Sim-psson, Univ. Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 1974

Study of Accidental Ignition of Encased High Explo-sive Charges by Gas Compression Mechanisms

AB BoforsKL-R 7742, Nov l982

Safety testing of ammunition with regard to resistance to cook-off

US ArmyTECOM Pamphlet No 3l0-4

Test Operations Procedures

AB BoforsKL-R-5776, Dec l976

Pressure and temperature in the air cushion in front of a projectile in a barrel

S LamnevikFOA report C 20l68-Dl(D4) April l977

Investigations concerning composition dust in fuzes

FOA 2Reg. no. 2l840-Xl6October l976

Investigation concerning water shock wave severity at various distances from a detonating underwater mine

FOA 2Reg. no. 2278-Xl5

Some shock wave parameters for warheads detonating above ground

Anders SchwartzFOA report A 200l6-Dl(D3) 1976

The influence of age on the adhesion of insulation on gas generator charges

T LiljegrenFOA 2 report A 2234-242October l963

Ageing testing of rocket propellant

Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment, continued

Designation Title

References 7

237

7

7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition

7.6.1 System specific specifications

7.6.2 Environment specific specifications

7.6.2.1 Mechanical testing

Table 7:6 System specific specifications

Designation Title

FSD 0060 Safety testing of ammunitionFSD 0112 Testing of electric igniters with regard to electrical

propertiesFSD 0168 Environment typesFSD 0212 Testing of systems containing electric ignitersFSD 0213 Testing of fuze systemsFSD 0214 Qualification of explosives for military useFSD 0223 Shelf-life engineering

Table 7:7 Mechanical testing

Designation Title

FSD 0098 Constant acceleration

FSD 0099 Shock firing

FSD 0102 Sinusoidal vibration

FSD 0103 Jumbling

FSD 0104 Broadband random vibration

FSD 0105 Free-fall drop from maximum 12 m

FSD 0107 Free-fall drop from high altitude or equivalent

FSD 0113 Bump

FSD 0114 Shock

FSD 0115 Shock with high peak value and short duration

FSD 0116 High-frequency transient vibration

FSD 0117 Small arms bullet attack

FSD 0118 Loose cargo

FSD 0120 Static load

FSD 0121 Fragment attack

FSD 0122 Shock waves in water

7 References

238

7

7.6.2.2 Climatic testing

7.6.2.3 Chemical testing

7.6.2.4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing

FSD 0123 Acoustic noise

FSD 0234 Sand and dust

FSD 0124 Recommended severity of mechanical testing

Table 7:8 Climatic testing

Designation Title

FSD 0044 Low barometric pressure and during change of air pres-sure

FSD 0045 Humidity, methods A and B

FSD 0059 Thermal shock and temperature change

FSD 0072 Low temperature, methods A, B and C

FSD 0073 High temperature, methods A, B and C

FSD 0125 Salt mist

FSD 0126 Water spraying

FSD 0127 Simulated solar radiation

FSD 0128 High water pressure

FSD 0129 Recommended severity of climatic testing

Table 7:9 Chemical testing

Designation Title

FSD 0130 Gaseous air pollutants and ozone

FSD 0224 Testing with contaminants

Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing

Designation Title

FSD 0046 Lightning

FSD 0047 Static electricity, methods A and B

FSD 0058 Transient over voltages when current is interrupted

FSD 0100 Electromagnetic fields relevant to radar and radio radia-tion

FSD 0101 Inductive interference of wiring

Table 7:7 Mechanical testing, continued

Designation Title

References 7

239

7

7.6.2.5 Fire and explosion testing

7.6.2.6 Combined testing

7.7 Accident investigations

FSD 0106 Electromagnetic pulse, EMP

FSD 0112 Electric igniter tests: electrical properties (excluding EBW and EFI)

FSD 0225 Testing of semiconductor components with regard to ionizing radiation

FSD 0235 High Power Microwaves

FSD 0119 Recommended severity of electrical and electromag-netic testing

Table 7:11 Fire and explosion testing

Designation Title

FSD 0159 Gas pressure shock (explosive atmosphere)

FSD 0165 Fire

FSD 0166 Cook-off

FSD 0167 Recommended severity of fire and explosion testing

Table 7:12 Combined testing

Designation Title

FSD 0160 High temperature – vibrationFSD 0161 Low temperature – vibrationFSD 0162 High temperature – low barometric pressureFSD 0163 Low temperature – low barometric pressureFSD 0164 Recommended severity of combined testing

Table 7:13 Accident investigations

Designation Title

A:VA 036577:9l/70 Expert group for Ravlunda accident 1969. Final report

FOA-report A l520-40,l970

Analysis of m/5l fuze clockwork as a result of the firing accident at Ravlunda

A:VA A684/24/7ll97l-l0-ll

Expert group for the Grytan accident l969

Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing, continued

Designation Title

7 References

240

7

A:V A684:75/74l974-l0–02

Expert group for the Väddö accident l970

A:VA A684:80/73l973-l0–09

Expert group for the Kungsängen accident l97l

A:A M4808/4:6/78 Final report regarding accident when firing with 84 mm Carl Gustaf at InfSS in January l978

The committee (KN 1981:02)for investigation of serious accidents.Investigation report no. 2:1985

Firing accident at Stockholm coastal artillery defence force on 17 May 1984

S D Stein, S J LowellPicatinny Arsenall957, PB l28 979

Initiation of Explosive in Shell Threads

Ordnance Corps (USA)Report No. DPS-220

Report on Investigation of Premature Occurrence with Cavitated Composition B Shell, HE, l20-MM, Tl5 E3

R L HuddlestonAberdeen Proving GroundADA 026 046

Diagnostic Significance of Macro- and Microscopic Features of Catastrophic Gun-tube Failures

Table 7:13 Accident investigations, continued

Designation Title

Checklists 8

241

8

8 CHECKLISTS

This chapter provides some examples of how checklists can be designed. Toprovide a clear overview of the requirements that apply to a weapon and/orammunition system some form of checklist is advisable. Chapter 2, 4 and 5,which define requirements, contain basic checklists of all requirements. Theselists provide a good overview but have limited use for monitoring purposes inthe various advisory groups, for example. More detailed information is oftenrequired for the advisory groups and when monitoring projects which is whymore specific checklists are necessary. A number of examples of specific check-lists have been compiled in this chapter.

Some advisory groups require specific checklists to be submitted. Refer also toChapter 3, Section 3.6.

8.1 Checklist example 1

CHECKLIST FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SAFETY MANUAL

Compiled by: Date Page 2 (30)N.N. 2000-02-07

Item: Flame thrower

Project phase: Product definition phase

Requirement no.: 1.22003 Requirement type: Desired (SHOULD)

Content: Supplement to supplier’s SRP in accordance with Section 3.4

Requirement met: YesNoNot applicable

Comment: A technical requirement specification was established (Ref. No. 08 222 221) in which all requirements from the RFP have been formulated with regard to the concept in question. In addition, the requirements from the RFP have been broken down into the rele-vant subsystems.

8 Checklists

242

8

8.2 Checklist example 2


Yes No NA a)

a) NA = Not applicable

Description/ repor

Activities1.22001 SHALL Supplement to safety

requirements in TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as per Section 3.2

× A list of weapon related safety requirements are stated in report FMV:Armament Directorate: 123/00

Index

243

INDEX

AAbnormal delay 182Accident 23Accumulated pressure 72Advisory Group 43–44Advisory Group for Environmental

Engineering 44Advisory Group for Explosives

(Rg Expl) 32, 44, 46Advisory Group for explosives

(Rg Expl) 116Advisory Group for Fuzing systems

(Rg T) 44–45Advisory Group for System Safety 44Advisory Group for Warheads and

Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) 44, 48Ageing 140Aiming and firing limitations 97Air conditioning system 64Air-breathing engines 139Alcohol 92, 154Ammonia 64Ammunition 113Anti-laser goggles 74Anti-slip surfaces 64Arming

carrier wave 165conditions 157delay 180enabled 175failure 171full 180hazard 174inadvertent 170indication 172mechanical deployment 175phase 178power cut 173process 159, 173, 177safe separation 173safety features 174safety limit 176short-circuits 173signal outside 174single conductor 173time-dependent 166

unauthorized 174Artillery primers 139, 145Axis of bore 96

BBackblast 69, 88Backflash 81–82, 145Bag charge 143Bangalore torpedoes 130, 167Barrel 82

rupture 82, 89Barrier 188Base of the shell 124, 133Base plate 123, 141Base-bleed 139

initiator 139Blast pressure 62, 69, 121Body vibration 70Bomb 93Bomblets 93Booby traps 60Booster 158–159

charge 143Breech mechanism 79Breech ring 81Bullet attack 121, 142Bullet attack test 142Bump 131Burst simulators 135Bursting discs 141

CCannon primers 143Carbon monoxide 64Carrier wave 165Cartridge case 143, 145Casing 115, 120, 125Casting propellant directly 147Cavity 124CE marking 100Changes in barometric pressure 189Charge casing 132Chassis 75Checklist for safety activities and

requirements 34Circuit breaker 158–159Classification 51

Index

244

Clearance 78Clearly marked 188Climatic conditions 67Combustible cartridge case 143Combustion catalysts 141Commencement of rifling 82Compatibility 33Composite barrels 89Compound barrels 89Compressed pellets 132Conducted interference 80Confined spaces 101Consequence 42Constituent materials 191Contact with the seabed 176Cook-off 83, 121, 145, 163Copper azide 41, 163, 171Copper content 47Corrosion 67, 99, 127, 129, 141, 148,

163, 171, 190–191resistance 128

Co-storage 130, 132Countersunk 145Cracks 123, 162

DDanger

area 61–62, 73zones 98

Data transfer 99Deactivation 93, 171, 177Debris 151Deflagration 124, 172Deformation 120, 141Delegation for International Supervision

of Weapon Project 33Demolition charge 130Description of function 139Desired requirement 18Destruction 121Detonation 124Direction of recoil 88Disassembly 142Dispensers 93Dividing wall (partition) 134Doors 64, 95Draining

devices 154

system 93Driving bands 83, 115Drop test 50DTTFO 36

EEED 172EFI systems 159Ejection of empty cartridge cases 73Electric primer 139Electrical

fields 66subsystems 164

Electromagneticpulse 189radiation 189

Electromechanical device 80Electron incendiary bomb 135Electronics 165Electrostatic charging 148Emergency stop 63EMP 164Empty cartridge cases 63Environment

extreme 116severe damage 60

Environmentalaspects 121factors 178, 189

ESD 66Ethyl alcohol 154Evacuation fan 101Explosive 33, 46

composition dust 123cutters 167–168train 170

External ballistic stability 115External environment 188Extraneous circuits 162

FFAE 120Fall-back 76Fastening element 72Fatigue 82, 89Fault mode 42Filler material 126, 129Fire 68

Index

245

Fire extinguisher 101Fire-fighting

equipment 100systems 101

Firing 97button 80circuit 182mechanism 79, 88stance 88

Flame guard 84Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act 21FMEA testing 170FMV Manual of Regulations for In-

Service Surveillance of Ammunition 53Footholds 64Forced recoil 87Forces 70Fording 67Fragmentation 62, 83Fragments 115Friction initiation 131FSD

0060 37, 48–49, 51, 116, 120–121, 142, 148

0112 46, 51, 1730113 480114 480117 480121 480165 680166 480212 46, 51, 1730213 46, 51, 1760214 46–47, 51, 116, 170

FSD 0214 47, 170Fume extractor 84Fuzing system 45, 113, 119, 125–126,

128, 157–160, 162–174, 176–182Fuzing systems for warheads and

propelling charges 157

GGas pressure 70Guidance signals 99Guidance systems 97Guided weapons 120

HHail 189Hand-grenades 168Hatches 64, 95Hazard firing 78Hazard initiation 93, 119–120, 124–

127, 129, 141, 144, 157, 159, 163–164, 167–169, 178, 182, 191

Hazardous event 23Hazards 28HE charge 120Heat

flux 84, 115treatment 141

Heating 64High test peroxide 154Hollow-charges 130Hose charges 130HPM 66, 164Hydraulic

systems 71, 78Hydraulics 72Hydrogen peroxide 93, 154

IIEC 60825-1 74IFTEX 130, 132, 191Igniter cup 141Ignition

cables 172–173capacitor 177, 179composition 134energy 180friction 131inadvertent 131leads 181of propulsion agents 139premature 123pyrotechnic composition 134self 140spontaneous 162spontaneous contact 135temperature 140voltage 179

Illuminating ammunition 131IM 118Impact

of shrapnel 148

Index

246

with the ground 176Impulse 139

blasts 69Inadvertent initiation 140, 170Incendiary

ammunition 131weapon 60

Incorrect assembly 171Inherent safety 176Initiate 157Initiation

designed 181devices 181

Initiator 158–159In-line explosive train 158, 179Insensitive munition 37Inspection

X-ray 123Installation 76Insulation

adhesion 132material 141

Internal protective paint 141Interrupted fire 84Interrupter 158, 178–179, 181ISO

2631 705349 70

JJackets 83Jet engines 150Joint surface 131

LLaser 74

fuzing systems 166protection filters 74weapons 60

Launch tubes 92torpedoes 91

Launchers 77Laying systems 96Lead 65

azide 41, 47Leakage 162

of propulsion agents 150LEMP 66

Lifting devices 100Linear charges 130, 167Liquid

fuel rocket engines 149gas generators 149

Loading devices 73Locking

devices 64, 74mechanism 96

LOVA 140

MMagnetic fields 66Mandatory requirements 18Marking 191Mass detonation 191Material

recycling symbols 191Materiel

environment 119, 140, 162publications 55

Mechanicalbarrier 179interrupter 182

Melting point 121Memorandum of Understanding 28Micro-electronic circuits 162Micro-environment 188MIL-STD-1474 69, 95Mine counter-blasting charge 168Minelayers

depth charges 91landmines 90naval mines 91

Mines 116Missile launch tubes 63Missiles 93Moisture

content 132–134resistance 67

Monitor 63Monitoring system 90Montreal protocol 66MOU 28Moving

parts 73system parts 78

Multiple weapons 120

Index

247

Multi-purpose ammunition 169Muzzle

brake 84flash 85, 88

NNational Inspectorate of Explosives and

Flammables (SÄI) 21NBC 120NEMP 66Neutralized 173Nitric oxide 65Nitrogen

dioxide 65oxide 65

Non-discriminatory effect 32Nozzle plug 141

OObturation 81Obturators 83, 115Optical axis 96Out-of-line explosive train 158Overpressure 73

PP1 Development 27P2 Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon

and Ammunition Systems 27P3 Review of Existing Weapon and Am-

munition Systems 27Packaging 113, 188Paraffin

kerosene 92, 154PBX 118Peacetime 25Percussion caps 129, 139, 143, 145Peroxide 92PHL 41PHST 53Pipe 123Plugs 129Pneumatics 72Potential difference 164Preliminary Hazard List 32, 41Pressure 70, 89

MOP 145time curves 141vessels 100

Pressure vessels 100Production control 171Programmable subsystems 166Propellant

gas generators 146, 153rocket engines 146

Propellingcharge 141charge casing 141

Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) 32, 53

Propulsionagents 149device 139, 169devices for torpedoes 153force process 141systems 138unit 113

Protective clothing 63, 67PTTFO 36Publications from Armed Forces head-

quarters 55Pulverization 162Purity 132Push-out 92Pylon 93Pyrotechnic warheads 130

QQuality inspection 171

RRadiated interference 80Radiography 120Rain 189Ram rocket engines 139, 152Ramjet engines 150Rammer 86Ramming 86Reading instructions 2Recoil 88

amplifiers 84buffer 73, 86forces 73, 88systems 78

Recoilless weapon systems 87Recuperator 73Recycling 191

Index

248

REQDOC Technical Specification Manu-al 38

Request for Proposal 37Requirements of International Law 60,

114RFP 31, 37Rocket

assisted projectile 139engine initiators 139systems 87

Rotating parts 73Rupture 83

SSabots 83, 115SACLOS 98Safe

separation distance 64, 121, 171separation time 171

Safetycircuits 74covers 74devices 78, 158interrupter 80–81surveillance 52system 157testing 50

Safety Requirements Proposed 39SAI units 159Sealed 123Sealing 126

agents 141Self-destruction 99, 168, 177Semiconductor switches 174SEN 580110 70Separate

case 143charges 126, 129

Separating surface 119Separation 98, 115, 123Service life 33Shock 131

absorbers 188Sighting systems 96Signal

agents 167, 180ammunition 131

Single conductor system 173

Single failure 101, 170Smoke

ammunition 131candles 135hand-grenades 135

Smoke ammunition 131Soldering defects 173Solid Fuel RamJet engine (SFRJ) 151Somersault 176Sources of radiation 98–99Spotting

agents 131, 167, 180rounds 135

Spring 71–72forces 71

SRP 39Stability 74Stabilizer 154STANAG 4110 70, 89, 116, 145Static

electricity 189load 189

Steam generator 153Storage stability 132Stowage 76Stress

chemical 163chemical environmental 190climatic environmental 190dynamic 189electrical environmental 190mechanical 162mechanical environmental 189physical 163

Structural strength 89, 100, 132Sub-calibre

adapters 85barrel 85–86, 89

Sub-calibre barrel 86Submunitions 168Supplier’s Safety Requirements

Proposed 32Swim-out 92Symbols 63System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) 19,

22, 27

Index

249

TTactical Technical Financial

Objectives 22, 31Tandem systems 169Temperature cycles 140Terminal guidance 98Thermal shock 189Threads 120, 131, 134Thunder flashes 135Time fuzes 181Tolerable level of safety 21Tolerance range 179Torpedo propulsion 139Torpedoes 116, 178Toxic

substances 62toxicity 121weapons 60

Transient currents 164Transmission safety device

electrical 158optical 158

Transport 75safety device 88, 93

Transport and storage classification 26Transport of Dangerous Goods Act 21TS classified 191TTFO 21, 31, 35–36Tube-launched ammunition 142Turbojet engines 150Turbo-rocket engines 139Type testing 176

UUAV 145Ultrasonic testing 120UN

coding 191recommendations 190

Uncontrolled base bleed combustion 124Underwater

ammunition 127mines 116, 128

Unloading 115Unloading tool 115

VVariations in temperature 140

VDU 63VDV 70Ventilation 64, 101Verification 40, 50Verify other safety requirements 50Vibration 131, 189Vibration dose 70

WWarheads 113, 118Warning signs 74Wartime 25Water

resistance 67spraying 67

Weapon platforms 94Weapons difficult to aim 60Wear protectants 141Work environment 67Work Environment Act 21

XX-ray 120, 123

Notes

9 NOTES

Abbreviated list of contents

0 To our Foreign Reader .............................. 15

0.1 Purpose of this chapter ..................... 15

0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ..................................... 15

0.3 About the manual ............................. 15

1 Introduction ................................................ 17

1.1 General ............................................. 17

1.2 Instructions for use .......................... 20

1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety ..... 21

1.4 Objectives for safety activities ......... 25

1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV ............................. 25

1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities ... 26

1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ............... 26

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ............................................. 27

2.1 General ............................................. 27

2.2 Safety activity requirements ............ 28

2.3 Requirements common to all materiel ....................................... 32

2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ....................................... 34

3 Methodology .............................................. 35

3.1 General ............................................. 35

3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO .................................... 35

3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ............. 37

3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ........ 39

3.5 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ........................... 41

3.6 Obtaining advice from advisory groups .............................................. 43

3.7 Safety testing ................................... 50

3.8 Test directives for safety surveillance ...................................... 52

3.9 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) ........ 53

4 Weapons .....................................................57

4.1 General .............................................57

4.2 Common requirements .....................60

4.3 System requirements ........................77

4.4 Requirement checklist for weapons 102

5 Ammunition ..............................................113

5.1 Joint ammunition requirements ......113

5.2 Warheads ........................................118

5.3 Propulsion systems .........................138

5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ..........................157

5.5 Packaging for ammunition .............188

6 Definitions ................................................193

6.1 Terminology ...................................193

6.2 Key to abbreviations .......................218

7 References ................................................223

7.1 Documents governing safety ..........225

7.2 Standards relating to design and testing .............................................226

7.3 Design principles and experience ...230

7.4 Textbooks .......................................233

7.5 Documents relating to the environment ....................................235

7.6 Description of methods for environ-mental testing of ammunition .........237

7.7 Accident investigations ..................239

8 Checklists ..................................................241

8.1 Checklist example 1 .......................241

8.2 Checklist example 2 .......................242

Index .........................................................243

guns, weapons & ammunition safety manual (2000)

Documents

inter alia

defence research

smallest detectable

industrial

intentionally

high power

ram rocket

advisory group