gunawong_gao-2010-challenges of egovernment in developing countries

8/9/2019 Gunawong_gao-2010-Challenges of Egovernment in Developing Countries

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Challenges of eGovernment in Developing Countries:Actor-Network Analysis of Thailand's Smart ID Card Project

Panom Gunawong

Centre for Development InformaticsIDPM, SED, University of Manchester, [email protected]

Ping Gao

Centre for Development InformaticsIDPM, SED, University of Manchester, [email protected]

Abstract:

This study seeks to explain the phenomenon of e-

government initiatives in developing countries through thelens of the actor-network theory. Part of this theory is madeup of the sociology of translation, which was employed as acrucial framework for exploring Thailands Smart ID Card

project. However, this project could not be mobilized, dueto structural flaws in the following three stages:

problematization, interessement and enrolment.

Keywords:Actor-network theory, eGvoernment failure,Smart ID Card, Thailand

1. Introduction

During the 1990s, e-government was introduced to enhanceand support New Public Management (NPM) reform. It wasused initially for information and communication technology(ICT) in order to produce and distribute public informationthrough the Internet. However, the information was static atthat time. Currently, with more than a decade of experience,e-government has developed as a critical tool in a moreadvanced application of ICT, which can develop good andresponsive government that provides value at a lower cost[23]. Perhaps, e-government can be claimed as the secondrevolution in public administration after New PublicManagement[26].

The implementation of eGovernment projects has beenincreasing in developing countries, in the hope they will actas a panacea for enhancing greater public service efficiency.However, 85% of e-government in those regions either

partially or totally fails. This high failure rate is responsible

for serious financial loss; damaged morale, creditability andtrust; and obstacles against the advantages gained from e-government implementation [9]. The question remains: whathappens to e-government projects in developing countries?

Therefore, this paper attempts to explain the phenomenon ofe-government initiatives in a developing country such asThailand. As a selected case study, the Smart ID Cardproject set out to enhance Thailands public services byusing ICT. In order to analyse this initiative, the actor-

network theory has been applied. While the theory possessesmany aspects, this study chose the sociology of translation.

The sociology of translation is used widely in theinformation system and can be employed to investigate thiscase study [16, 25]. Although it is rarely utilised in thegovernment sector, its concept has the strength to explainthoroughly the development of a case study stage by stage.Furthermore, it can extend the understanding of associationbetween human and nonhuman actors in the actor-network.This may contribute to the use of this theory in the field of e-government, and especially focus on the case of adeveloping country.

The following section provides the foundation of the actor-network theory, and focuses mainly on notions of thesociology of translation, which is employed as a maintheoretical tool in this study.

2. Actor-network theory

The actor-network theory supposes everything to be an actor,where elements of any kind hold together such as humans,technological artefacts, organisations, institutions, etc., and itdoes not differentiate between or delegate a priority of anykind [7, 30]. To analyse the actor-network, every actor orelement should be treated with the same analyticalvocabulary [2, 8]. Walsham [30] states that the rigid

separation of humans and nonhumans is a very valuable onein this age of hybrids and blurred and negotiableboundaries. Law [14] also states, sociologies that donot take machines and architecture as seriously as they dopeople will never solve the problem of reproduction insociety, because they are materially heterogeneous inreproducing themselves.

To translate is a verb which implies transformation and thepossibility of equivalence, the possibility that one thing (forexample an actor) may stand for another (for instance anetwork) [14]. The concept of translation focuses on thecontinuity of the displacements and transformation thathappen in the story; for example, displacement of goals andinterests, and also displacement of human devices and

inscriptions. Displacement happens at every stage [3]. Lawand Callon [15] state that in a translation shaped by a set ofcompromises between a somewhat different set of actors translation is the product of continual negotiation. Inconclusion, translation is the mechanism of progressive

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temporary social orders, or the transformation from oneorder to another through changes in the alignment ofinterests in a heterogeneous network[25].

Callon [3] describes that the sociology of translation iscomposed of four moments, namely problematization,interessement, enrolment and mobilisation.

Problematization is the first moment of translation, whichrelates to the process of a focal actor striving to becomeindispensable to the other actors by defining the problem,motivating them in the network, and suggesting that the

problem would be resolved if the actors negotiated theobligatory passage point (OPP). Problematizationdescribes a product of alliances, or associations betweenactors by identifying what they want [3]. OPP refers to a

process in which a focal actor convinces all other actors toaccept the proposal of a network. OPP also refers to a

process in which a focal actor shows an interest in all theactors who accept the proposed network [3].

Interessement is the second moment of translation, whichrelates to a series of processes where a focal actor attempts

to lock other actors into a position that they have beenoffered in the network. Interessement also means the groupof actions by which the focal actor aims to impose andstabilise the other actors identity. These actions are definedthrough the problematization process. Various devices fordifferent actors are used in these actions. For example, in thescallop case; some devices in the interessement process hada favourable balance of power: the fishermans devices werethe towlines in St. Brieuc Bay and those for their scientificcolleagues were texts and conversation, which attracted theactors concerned to follow the project [3]. If theinteressement succeeded, then enrolment could take place.

Enrolment is the third moment of translation, which refers toa set of strategies in which a focal actor attempts to defineand interrelate the various roles that allow other actors toenrol. The process of enrolment involves group multilateralnegotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany theinteressements and enable them to succeed [3]. When thenegotiation between actors has been achieved, the inscriptionappears. The inscription is a process of artefact creation thatensures the protection of some interests [25]. In brief, anenrolment relates to acceptance from the other actors of theinterests defined by a focal actor through the process of

bargaining and making concessions [18, 25].

Mobilisation is the final moment of translation, which relates

to a set of manners utilised by a focal actor to ensure that allactors have legitimate speakers to represent them in thegroups, and avoid betrayal by various collectives from thelatter [3, 18]. Speakers or representatives are actors whospeak or deputise for other actors [30]. In the scallop case,the researchers, as focal actors, were the legitimatedspeakers for the Scallops at St. Brieuc Bay [3].

3. Research methodology

The actor-network is a unit of analysis in this study. Toexplore the interrelation in it comprehensively, this researchcarried out documentary research for data collection, onwhich this study heavily relies. Formal and informal

documentary material was investigated. In the case offormal or government documentation, its crucial source ofinformation was reviewed, especially official policies and

plans, government publications, minutes from meetings and

memos. For informal documentation, newspaper clippingsand magazines, from 2002 to 2006, were used.

In order to analyse large amounts of qualitative data derivedfrom documentary sources, a coding scheme was developedand applied. This involved putting qualitative data intocategories and labelling them with a theme [4]. The purpose

of this process was to group similar events under acomparable heading or classification [27]. In order to allowthe contents to be verified systematically, the codes wereseparated into different topics and the categories comparedcontinually in order to identify common themes [27].However, the data were triangulated to different datasources, so as to build a coherent justification for thesecommon themes [4]

4. Background of the Smart ID Card

project

The objective of the Smart ID Card project in Thailand wasset to enable Thai citizens the convenience of using allgovernment services with only one card. This would notonly lead to a more efficient and faster service, but alsogreatly reduced paperwork, documentation, filing andcopying. The Ministry of Interior was made responsible forcard issuance, which began with the data collection ofholders birth date, ID number and registration ofname/surname. Other public agencies had the right to recordand amend the data directory in the fields for which theywere responsible, based on the data standard of the card-reading machine, security system, and communicationmethod of the card and reading machine. The planning andimplementation of the system was based on convenience,safety, durability, cost-effectiveness, high quality anduniformed standard across the same database. The

governments cabinet also expected to promote and locallyproduce as much of the necessary hardware and software aspossible, with Thailand becoming a base for card andsoftware production. Initially, data in the ID cards of severalpublic agencies should have been combined[22].

4.1 The 4 stage goal of Smart ID Card utilisation

The 4 stage goal was set to deal with applications and theutilisation of the Smart ID Card, as follows [5].

Phase 1, 2004. The Smart ID Card was aimed to substitutethe free medical treatment card, social security card andATM card. Its holder would be able to access and contact

electronic services in both the public and private sector viaelectronic machines or websites.

Phase 2, 2005. The Smart ID Card substituted the cash card,debit card, credit card and telephone card. It could also beused for recording change of address and votes in areferendum and election.

Phase 3, 2006. The Smart ID Card substituted the passport orborder pass, national and international drivers license, andnational and international cash card, debit card and creditcard.

Phase 4, 2007. The Smart ID Card had alternative uses suchas dual contact.


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4.2 Time line for the Smart ID Card project of Thailand

May 2002 The cabinet set up a committee to integrate andreform the registration system, chaired by thePrime Minister. It was proposed that thiscommittee improve and develop the countrysregistration system as a foundation of e-

government.

January 2003 The cabinet endorsed the year 2003 as theyear of electronic services for citizens.

March 2003 The government allocated a budget of 2 billionbaht (approximately 40 million poundssterling) for the Smart ID Card project. Therewere 5 ministries, 6 organisations and 18subprojects under this project, of which theMinistry of Interior (for card issuance) andMinistry of Information and CommunicationTechnology (ICT) (for production of the IDcard, software and hardware) were leaders.

October 2003 The Ministry of ICT reported problems withcard production to the government. It wasannounced that the card might not be producedin time for the opening ceremony. Thegovernment (i.e. Prime Minister) responded byhiring a private company to do the job insteadof the Ministry.

March 2004 The government aimed to issue the Smart IDCard to all Thai citizens within 3 years (2004-2006). The rate of production would have been12, 26 and 26 million cards in the year 2004,2005 and 2006, respectively, for a total of 64million cards.

March 2004 Conflict arose among the Smart ID Cardcommittee regarding security of the smart cardsystem and card manufacturing. Theseconflicts caused some key persons to resign.

April 2004 The government commenced with a grandopening ceremony called Smart card for Thaisat the international level. The first 10,000smart cards were issued for VIPs such as thePrime Minister, cabinet members and membersof parliament, senators, governors and highranking bureaucrats.

December2004

The goal to issue 12 million Smart ID Cards in2004 was not achieved.

November2005

Planned issuance of the Smart ID Card failedagain. At the same time, the government triedto force relevant organisations to produce thefirst 12 million cards as soon as possible.

July 2006 Tenders for card production in phase twoshowed signs of problems, with the possibilityof corruption in the process.

August 2006 The government notified 1,077 card issuancestations over the country to stop production,due to a shortage of material, and oldfashioned magnetic cards were issued again.

Sources: Department of Provincial Administration and The

committee for the integration and reform registration system[5, 28]

5. Sociology of translation

This section describes the project through the lens of theactor-network theory. Sociology of translation is used as acrucial framework to investigate and explain the Thai SmartID Card phenomenon.

1. Problematization

In defining the nature and problems among actors, the focalactor is necessary in the problematization process. It issuggested that actors negotiate with the focal actor on theobligatory passage point of investigation to rectify this issue.In detail, this process of moments mainly addresses initiationof the project idea, identifies the actors involved, anddescribes the obligatory passage points (OPP) as well as themechanism of alliances or associations among actors [3].These moments are illustrated as follows.

1.1 Identifying Actors

In analysing the actor-network in the construction ordeconstruction of an article (in this case the Smart ID Card),the actor must be followed [3, 12]. In the problematizationprocess of the Smart ID Card project, the main actorsinvolved could be described as follows.

A) The Government, which sought to enhance Thai publicmanagement, finally found the Smart ID Card as the answer.As a focal actor, government had the responsibility ofgearing the project as follows. (1.) To encourage governmentagencies to utilise the Smart ID Card in order to improve andrevolutionise public service rendering. (2.) To give fullfinancial support. It could be said that this project was anindicator of the governments efficiency. (3.) To be

responsible for final decision making in case the direction ofthe project was unclear

B) The Ministry of Interior is an organisation that has adatabase of all Thai citizens. Since the 1980s, it has

developed the population registration project. Starting withthe innovation of 13 digits in the identification card, thesedigits represent unique details of each Thai citizen such aswhat type of person they are (native or immigrant), wherethey were born, etc.

C) The Ministry of Information and CommunicationTechnology (ICT) is a new organisation that was establishedin 2000, during the first term of Thaksins administration. Its

objective was to encourage technology use in Thailand. TheSmart ID Card required advanced technology, which wasbeyond the experience of any Thai organisation. Therefore,the Ministry of ICT was asked to create a state-of-the-arttechnology, especially one for a card that contained amemory chip filled with personal data. More importantly,this technology had to be compatible with current

technologies in Thai public agencies.

D) Regarding citizens, the full population of approximately64 million people in Thailand was expected to have a SmartID Card. From a positive point of view, the government

seemed strongly determined to enlighten citizens of publicservices. In the project planning stage, minutes from everymeeting showed that all kinds of citizens were involved. It

can surely be said that no one was left out of this project[29]. However, Thailand does not have an openly democraticsystem, and most policies would likely adopt a top downapproach, from the government down to public agencies andthen citizens [11].


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E) The Smart ID Card technology

It was realised that the Smart ID Card technology couldcomprise a card containing a microchip; card issuingmachines connected online with a central database; andcitizen databases owned by different agencies, e.g. personaldata owned by the Ministry of Interior, healthcare data

owned by the Ministry of Healthcare, educational dataowned by the Ministry of Education, etc. The more theSmart ID Card substituted other cards, the more otheragencies would be involved [5].

1.2 The obligatory passage points (OPP)

The OPP in this project was to revolutionise public servicesby using Smart ID Card technology. The focal actor,government, intended to resolve various public management

problems, possibly those of the whole bureaucratic system,in one swoop. In setting up project objectives from the OPPin the interests of the actors, and overcoming obstacles, theaims revolved around the following. The government aimed

to issue a total of 64 million smart cards to include all Thaicitizens within 3 years (2004 2006). The Smart ID Card

would have substituted more than ten other cards for eachand every Thai citizen, such as the identity card, freemedical treatment card, social security card, tax card, debitcard, credit card, ATM card, passport, etc., and Thailandwould have been the first country in the world to achieve thissystem.

From the project objectives and actor characteristicsdescribed earlier, there are a series of obstacles or problemsthat actors have to overcome before achieving the OPP.However, each actor will produce benefits if the OPP issuccessful. Different actors have to tackle various problemsto produce a variety of benefits. A benefit in achieving OPPis its use as a tool to hold the actors together as allies in the

actornetwork of the project [3]. The Ministry of Interiorcould be a hub of public services, as it is the centre of themain process of the project, such as issuing data, databasemanagement, and software and hardware standardidentification. It has been suggested that the Ministry ofInterior would gain a large short term budget from thegovernment for implementing the project and maintaining it

in the long term. It may not be difficult for the Ministry tomanage this project alone, but unfortunately, it is demandingwork for other public agencies.

The Ministry of ICT was given the purpose of technologydevelopment, and it could not deny that constructing theSmart ID Card created unfamiliar methods. However, thisdisadvantage could be turned into advantage. To produceand make ready 64 million blank Smart ID Cards withmicrochips containing personal data and linking databasecould be claimed, both nationally and internationally, as apioneer project, which is expected in new technology.However, the government did not mention that the card mustbe produced by themselves, as a corporation with a private

company or subcontracted to a private company undersupervision of the Ministry.

At that time, citizens knew little about the project. They hadheard only that the government planned to launch it toimprove public services, and as news of the launch wasspoken by the Prime Minister, the citizens believed it to be agood idea. However, details of the project were not given,and so no objections were raised from the people or media.

According to ID card technology, the Smart ID Card, whencombined with others, would be a powerful tool for citizensusing public services. However, it faced difficulty inintegrating because separate organisations are responsiblefor different parts of the system.


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Figure 1The system of association among actors, which illustrates the problems encountered and overcome by achieving the OPP,as well as the benefits awarded.

Source: Adapted from Colon 1986 [3]

The government Ministry of Interior Ministry of ICT Citizens

OPPProblem: need to workwith many agencies

Problem: lack ofexperience with new

technology

Problem: insufficientinformation about the

project

Thai public services

revolutionised by theSmart ID Card project

The hub of citizen data

management

Improved public

services

The pioneer in a new

technology

Entities

Goals of

entities

Problem: difficultyin integrating itself

ID card technology

A powerful card

for citizens inpublic services


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2. Interessement

In the problematization process, the actors involvedcan agree to being incorporated into the primaryplan. However, this process could not guarantee thatall actors want to continue in the actor-networksystem. Some may think that it is not worth joining

because of their identity, motivation or goal, or theyhave interests in other projects or assignments.Therefore, the problematization phase is never thatclear cut [3].

The following details show how the governmentcreated a device ensuring and confirming that allactors agreed to be incorporated into the primaryplan in the actor-network of the Smart ID Cardproject. To explain clearly, each actor was separatedinto individual sections as follows.

2.1 Negotiation with the Ministry of ICT

The government had locked the Ministry of ICT tothe obligatory passage point (OPP) by using thefollowing tools. Firstly, the Ministry of ICT wasrequired to join this project to design and producethe blank card as the main part of its responsibilityfor technology development. However, as a public

agency, it was difficult to set up a new factory toproduce the card. Therefore, it had to negotiate withgovernment as to whether an IT vender was neededto tender for card production. However, thecompany to be awarded a contract had to workunder supervision of the Ministry of ICT and alsoaccept the TOR (Term of reference). The Ministryof ICT was asked by the government to set the TOR

up with the Ministry of Interior. The reason for thiswas to make sure that the card technology wascompatible with present databases and the currenttechnology used in the Ministry of Interior.

2.2 Negotiation with the Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior took charge of citizendatabases, issued the card and, as a duty, acceptedthe obligatory passage point (OPP) inproblematization without question: the OPP moveddirectly into the heart of organisational vision toenhance the citizen database to a higher level. TheMinistry felt confident about the project procedure,due to its successful record in demographic citizen

databases by winning the Smithsonian award in1990.

The government approved a large budget for theMinistry of Interior to buy software and hardwarefor online connection with central citizen databases,and expand the number of issuing ID card stationsfrom 904 to 1,044 nationwide. In addition, the TORfor the ID card technology was set up with theMinistry of ICT and other corporate public agencies,who needed to integrate their services with theSmart ID Card system [29].

2.3 The communication with citizens

The government did not negotiate with citizens, butonly communicated with them. It could be said that

there was no bargaining between them. The waythat government lured citizens into the actor-network was interesting. There were many channels,

starting with the Prime Minister, ThaksinShinawatra, who announced by broadcastingnationwide that Thailand would have this project.He said that it would be good for all Thai citizens,

and the country would become the world leader inthis technological field [17]. Also, the governmentdeclared that 2004 was the year of electronic servicefor Thai citizens [29]. Furthermore, the Ministry ofInterior instructed all ID card issuing stations to stopdistributing magnetic ID cards to citizens, and it toldcitizens to wait for the new Smart ID Card, whichwas more attractive, had more utilities and was freeof charge.

Government and public agencies communicatedmore with citizens via newspapers, television andradio on how wonderful and useful the Smart IDCard was. There was no negative response from

citizens or even the media. Just a few articles in thenewspapers suggested that the government be moreconcerned about card security. A representative ofthe public agency responded by stating that planshad been already made regarding security.

2.4 Negotiation with Smart ID Card technology

In the beginning, the smart card technology wassuccessful in convincing the focal actor;government, that it could help initially to integratemany public services by using its full capacity.Public services might then be changed radically anddramatically in a positive way. After that, all Thaicitizens might have gained the full benefit of publicservices, with more satisfaction, which would havebecome very meaningful for government in the longterm. Definitely, the smart card technology (ifsuccessful) would have been very good as acampaign supporter for the next general election,with many voters feeling guaranteed and secure. Itshould be noted; however, that implementation ofthis technology was later seen as a tool for

government corruption.

The government offered a large budget to separateand lock each part of the smart card technology intoorganisations. How the network of Smart ID Cardtechnology could blend together might have been

difficult to imagine at a later stage.

3. Enrolment

Two moments, problematization and interessement,could not guarantee success, but they did achieveenrolment. Enrolment is the third moment oftranslation, which refers to a set of strategies inwhich a focal actor attempts to define and interrelatethe various roles that allow other actors to enrol.The process of enrolment involves groupmultilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricksthat accompany the interessement and enable them

to succeed [3]. When the negotiation betweenactors has been achieved, the inscription appears.The inscription is a process of artefact creation that


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ensures the protection of some interests. In brief, anenrolment relates to the other actors acceptance ofthe interests defined by a focal actor through theprocess of bargaining and making concessions [18,25].

In this case, many strategies and tricks were created

by negotiating with the Smart ID Card technologyand other actors as well. All details are laid down asfollows.

3.1 Ministry of ICT movement in producing the

Smart ID Card

In June 2004, the CST Company was awardedproduction of the first batch of 12 million cards atthe price of 888 million baht, which was lower thanthe average 1,300 million baht set by thegovernment. CST planned to send 3 million cards tothe Ministry of ICT in October, 2004 and after thatall cards would be sent to the Ministry of Interior

for putting into the security system. By January2005, 1,077 issuing stations were ready to distribute

the card nationwide[20].

Interestingly, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry ofICT said that there was no officially signed contractbetween the Ministry of ICT and CST Companybefore producing the card, because only one officialprocess was needed initially to hurry production andkeep within the timeframe. Therefore, production ofthe card came before signing the contract. At thismoment, swift translation occurred [19]. TheMinistry of ICT translated the CST Company asproducers of the card, but with no guarantee of howthe Ministry translated what the Smart ID Cardwanted in the way of production from the CSTCompany. There was definitely no officially signedcontract; only a draft TOR of just 18 pages at thismoment, and CST may not have understood fullyhow to produce the cards. However, no space fornegotiation was offered; and things just kept going[1].

3.2 Stuck in the middle because of the swift

translation effect

Two months later (August 2004), after the CSTCompany was allowed to start producing the cardwithout a signed contract, the finished document

was signed officially by the Ministry of ICT andsent to the company. However, the CST Companycould not accept certain issues in the contract andneeded the Ministry to revise it; e.g. they wanted thefinal process of producing the 12 million cards to beapproved by the Ministry of ICT alone, and not theMinistry of ICT and Ministry of Interior together,and the card operating system patent must belong tothe CST Company, not the Ministry of ICT. In aninterview, the Minister of the Ministry of ICT saidthat some issues could be reviewed, but inspectionof the card and summit meetings must be carried outby the Ministry of ICT and Ministry of Interior [21].

The story above shows that because of the swifttranslation between the CST Company and Ministryof ICT, all details were not covered. In addition,

insufficient understanding of the smart cardtechnology caused the Ministry of ICT to losetranslation with the CST Company. Swift translation

creates vagueness or misconceptions in the project[19].

3.3 A repeated mess in the second batch of e-

Auction

In 2006, the second tender bids to make another 13million cards started. Unfortunately, andinterestingly, the auction was chaotic again. Whenreferring to the process of project design in makingthe Smart ID Card, the government secured it withlarge budgets. This hinted that the Smart ID Cardwas not only a card, but also a card with financialconnotations; a combination of card and moneyworking together. This gave more power to actorsthat looked at this combination in various ways.Additionally, the Smart ID Card could induce actorinterest by attempts to use big money as a tool.

Having the best actor to make the Smart ID Cardwas logical, and in line with the wishes of the focal

actor (government). This moment showed that theSmart ID Card was a good actor in the actor-network, but unfortunately, the process needed otheractors, which involved human ones.

Surprisingly, the e-auction produced the same storyas in the previous year (2005). The vote from the e-auction committee resulted in a split decision of 3 to2. An external academic, the committee Chair andhis direct subordinate wanted to buy the moreexpensive Franco-Japanese cards, while thetreasurer and senior director of the Affairs Bureausaid that they should buy the cheaper Sino-Koreanones. This split decision prevented a formalannouncement or letter about who had won thebidding. The newspapers reported that thecommittee had rejected at least two direct tendersfrom the highest bidders to formally conclude the e-auction process and name the winner. Franco-Japanese complained to the police that inclusion ofIRCHST in the final bidding was unfair, as this

company was eliminated in the first round. Sino-Korean prepared to sue the Ministry of ICT in theadministrative court to force them to honour theircontract, and the Ministry of ICT reported that theyhad less than one months supply of the cards left[24].

3.4 The actor-network malfunctioned

In August, 2006, the Ministry of Interior sent aformal letter to all 1,044 issuing stations to stopissuance of the Smart ID Card. The letter stated thatcause of the stoppage was due to a shortage ofSmart ID Cards and the Ministry of ICT could notsupply more of them at the time. It was alsosuggested that issuing station officers inform thepeople that the old fashioned magnetic card was stillvalid until its expiry date, and new ones would beissued for those lost or invalid[31].

In the meantime, there was no sign of the focalactor: the government that should solve theproblem. This situation was exacerbated by mass


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demonstrations against the Prime Minister, ThaksinShinawatra, for his alleged involvement incorruption and abuse of authority in order to servehis self-interests. Such were the protests that onSeptember 16, 2006, a military coup overthrew thegovernment while Thaksin was out of the country.The country found itself in disarray and so too did

the Smart ID Card project.

4. Mobilization

Mobilization includes a set of methods used by thefocal actor to ensure that all actors have theirrepresentatives or spokespersons act according tothe agreement and not betray the interest of theinitiator. In the actor-network, the focal actor isneeded to secure continued support for underlyingideas from the other actors enrolled. With alliesmobilized, an actor-network achieves stability. Thisstability enables the actor-network to institutionalise

underlying ideas so they are no longer seen ascontroversial[3].

According to the term, mobilization, it could be saidthat there is no completed mobilization because ifthe actor-network is mobilized, it may have stability

as an actor-network, but not in the project, as in thisone. The Smart ID Card project seems to have failedpartly because the OPP could not be achieved in thetime line, and the projects future becameunpredictable.

6. Conclusion

Heeks and Bialur [10], and Gronlound [6] state thatthe theory used in the area of e-government, as afield of study, is a weak point. Therefore, this studyattempts to apply the actor-network theory to extend

the usage of theory in the e-government context, andespecially focus on the case of a developingcountry. This study shows that when the actor-network theory is applied in a wider context, itexplains, for example, e-government at not only theorganisational, but also national level; and it is stilla powerful theory that can explain the interactionbetween human and nonhuman actors, and also thesocial construction of technology.

In terms of failure analysis, the sociology oftranslation can be an excellent framework forinvestigating the root of failure stage by stage. Thisstudy exposes that the case of failure could haveoccurred in every moment of translation. It canconfirm the statement of Latour [13] that we are

sitting on leaky black boxes, which refers to theassociation of an unstable actor-network across timeand space and its possible collapse at anytime.

Regarding lessons learned for the practitioner, it can

be said that a skilful focal actor, who can determinethe success or failure of an e-government project, isvery important. Furthermore, the balance of

interests, equality among human and nonhumanactors and the actors exclusion from and/or

inclusion into the actor-network are also cruciallyimportant in maintaining and balancing the actor-network in order to achieve its goal.

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