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GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA Center for Chemical Process Safety New York, New York An AlChE Industry Technology Alliance CBWILEY A JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., PUBLICATION

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  • GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    Center for Chemical Process Safety New York, New York

    An AlChE Industry Technology Alliance

    CBWILEY A JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., PUBLICATION

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  • GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

  • This book is one in a series of process safety guideline and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.

    http://www.wiley.com/go/ccps

  • GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    Center for Chemical Process Safety New York, New York

    An AlChE Industry Technology Alliance

    CBWILEY A JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., PUBLICATION

  • It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry. However, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members. their employers. their employers' officers and directors, nor ABS Consulting Inc. and its employees warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between ( I ) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members. their employers, their employers' officers and directors, and ABS Consulting Inc. and its employees and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequcnce of its use or misuse.

    Copyright 0 2009 by American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Inc. All rights resewed.

    A Joint Publication of the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

    Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey Published simultaneously in Canada.

    No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system. or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording. scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 ofthe 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 750-4470, or on the web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 11 1 River Street, Hoboken. NJ 07030, (201) 748-601 1, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http:iiwww.wiley.comigo!permission.

    Limit of LiabilityiDisclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied wananties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages. including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.

    For general infonnation on our other products and services or for technical support, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at (800) 762-2974, outside the United States at (317) 572-3993 or fax (317) 572-4002.

    Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic format. For information about Wiley products, visit our web site at www.wiley.com.

    Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

    Guidelines for developing quantitative safety risk criteria i Center for Chemical Process Safety. p. cm.

    Includes index.

    1. Chemical plants-Accidents--Risk assessment. 2. Chemical industry-Accidents-Prevention. I. American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Center for Chemical Process Safety.

    TP150.A23G85 2009 660'.2804-d~22 2009019922

    ISBN 978-0-470-26140-8 (cloth)

    Printed in the United States of America

    1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

    http://www.copyright.comhttp://iwww.wiley.comigo!permissionhttp://www.wiley.com

  • CONTENTS

    Preface Acknowledgments List of Tables List of Figures Acronyms and Abbreviations Glossavy

    INTRODUCTION

    1.1 What is Risk? 1.1.1 Risk Basics 1.1.2 1.1.3

    Why is Risk Assessment Important? Residual Risk versus “Zero Incidents”

    1.2 Scope of these Guidelines 1.3 Objectives of these Guidelines

    1.3.1 1.3.2

    What these Guidelines Are Intended to Achieve What These Guidelines Do Not Intend

    2 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK CRITERIA 2.1 A Brief History of Risk Assessment

    2.1.1 The Early History 2.1.2

    2.1.3 The Qualitative Approach to Risk Assessment 2.2.1

    The Beginnings of the Modern Consideration of Technological Risk Risk Assessment in the Process Industries

    PHAs as an Example of Qualitative Risk Assessments

    2.2

    xiii

    xix xxi

    xxix

    x V

    X X V

    11 11 11

    12 13 15

    15

    V

  • vi GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    2.2.2 Semi-Quantitative Risk Matrices 2.2.3 2.2.4

    Other Uses for Risk Matrices A Brief Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Assessment

    2.3 Technical Aspects of QRA 2.3.1 Consequence Modeling 2.3.2 Frequency Modeling 2.3.3 Developing a Comprehensive QRA 2.3.4 Standardization of Approach

    2.4.1 Individual Risk 2.4.2 Societal Risk The Role of QRA and Risk Criteria 2.5.1

    Risk Tolerance as a Function of Societal Values 2.6.1 What Is ‘Risk Tolerance’? 2.6.2 2.6.3 Public Perceptions of Risk Definition and Applications of the “As Low as Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) Principle Uncertainty and Its Impact on Risk Decision Making 2.8.1 Sources of Uncertainty 2.8.2 Addressing Uncertainty

    2.4 Quantitative Risk Criteria

    2.5 Impact of Evolving Consensus Standards and Recommended Practices

    2.6

    Public Values as the Basis for Risk Criteria

    2.7

    2.8

    3 LEARNING FROM REGULATORY PRECEDENTS 3.1 Why Study Risk Criteria?

    3.1.1 The Value of Risk Criteria Precedents 3.1.2 How This Chapter Is Organized 3.1.3 Other Precedents The Evolution of Risk Criteria in the UK 3.2.1 3.2.2

    3.2.3 Royal Society - 1983 3.2.4

    3.2 UK Atomic Energy Authority - 1967 Health and Safety CommissiodAdvisory Committee on Major Hazards - 1976

    Health and Safety Executive - 1988

    17 20

    20 21 21 26 29 30 31 31 35 37

    38 39 39 40 41

    44 46 46 47

    49

    49 49 50 51 51 52

    52 53 54

  • CONTENTS vii

    3.2.5 Health and Safety Executive - 1989 55

    Dangerous Substances - 1991 55 3.2.7 Health and Safety Executive - 1992 57 3.2.8 Health and Safety Executive - 2001 57 3.2.9 Current Guidance to Industry and HSE Inspectors 59

    3.2.6 Health and Safety Committee/Advisory Committee on

    3.2.10 Other HSE Approaches To Addressing Societal Risk 60 3.3 The Evolution of Risk Criteria in the Netherlands 60

    3.3.1 3.3.2

    3.3.3

    3.3.4 3.3.5

    3.3.6

    3.3.7

    Groningen - 1978 60 Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment - 1984 61 Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment - 1988/1989 63 Dutch Parliament - 1993 64 Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management - 1996. 64 Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment - 1999 65 Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment - 2004 65

    3.4 Comparison of Risk Criteria in the UK and the Netherlands 67 3.4.1 3.4.2

    3.4.3 3.4.4

    3.4.5 3.4.6

    3.4.7

    Individual Risk Criteria for Workers 67 Distinction between Individual Risk Criteria for New and Existing Establishments 67 Criteria for Broadly Acceptable (or Negligible) Risk 69 The Distinction between Vulnerable and Less Vulnerable Objects 69 The Issue of F-N Curve Slope 69 A Perspective on the Numerical Disparities between the UK and Dutch Criteria 69 Difficulties in Satisfying the More Stringent Dutch Risk Criteria 71

    3.5 Learning from and Applying the Precedents 73

    3.5.2 Balancing On-site and Off-site Risk Perspectives 75

    3.5.4 Rigid Limits Versus Advisory Goals 75

    3.5.1 Balancing Individual and Societal Risk Perspectives 73

    3.5.3 Experience-based Versus Technology-Driving Criteria 75

  • GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA viii

    4

    3.5.5 3.5.6 Basis for Calculating Risks 3.5.7 Risk Criteria Scaling 3.5.8

    3.5.9

    Application of the ALARP or ALARA Principle

    Application of New Risk Criteria to Old Establishments Risk Criteria for Transportation Risk

    CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING RISK CRITERIA

    4.1 4.2 4.3

    4.4

    4.5

    4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9

    4.10

    4.11 4.12

    Determine the Need to Establish Risk Criteria Determine the Risks to be Addressed Determine/Classify the Population to be Addressed 4.3.1 On-site populations 4.3.2 Off-site populations Determine Which Risk Criteria to Develop 4.4.1

    4.4.2

    Determine Whether Risk Criteria Will Distinguish Between New and Existing Facilities Determine Philosophy for Continuing Risk Reduction Develop Individual Risk Criteria Develop Societal Risk Criteria Qualifymalidate the Risk Criteria 4.9.1

    4.9.2

    Decide on a Philosophy for Apportioning and Scaling the Risk Criteria 4.10.1 Apportioning and Scaling Societal Risk Criteria 4.10.2 Apportioning Risk Criteria to Individual Scenarios 4.10.3 Calibrating the System Over Time Periodically Revalidate the Risk Criteria Matching the Risk Criteria with the System and with the Risk Estimation Methodology

    Will the Risk Criteria Address Both Individual and Societal Risk? Will the Risk Criteria Define a De Minimis Level of Risk?

    Relating Risk Criteria to Commonly Tolerated Levels of Risk Relating Risk Criteria to Societal Values Reflected in Regulatory Precedents

    76 76 77

    77 78

    79

    80 82 82 82 83 84

    84

    84

    85 87 87 88 88

    88

    90

    91 93 95 98 98

    100

  • CONTENTS

    4.12.1 Matching the Scope of the Study to the Basis for the Risk Criteria

    4.12.2 Providing Consistency Between the QRA Methodology and the Risk Criteria

    4.12.3 Clearly Defining the Basis for the Risk Criteria 4.13 Risk Criteria in the Multinational Context 4.14 Consideration of Short DuratiodHigher Risk Activities

    5 FUTURE TOPICS

    ix

    5.1 5.2 Enhancing Risk Assessment Technology

    Fostering the Application of Risk-Based Decision Making

    Appendix A: Understanding and Using F-N Diagrams A. 1 Construction of an F-N Curve to Display Data

    A. 1.1 A. 1.2 Presentation of Societal Risk Criteria A.2.1 A.2.2

    The Mathematics of the F-N Curve Calculating and Plotting an Example F-N Curve

    Defining the Risk Criteria F-N Curve The Significance of the Slope of the F-N Curve

    A.2

    A.3 F-N Criteria Slope Selection

    B. 1 Appendix B: Survey of Worldwide Risk Criteria Applications

    Evolution of Land Use Planning Criteria in the UK B. 1.1 Health and Safety Executive (HSE) - 1989 B. 1.2 HSE - 2008

    B.2 Land Use Planning Criteria in the Netherlands B.3 Hong Kong B.4 States of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul,

    Brazil B.5 Singapore B.6 Malaysia B.7 Australia

    B.7.1 Western Australia B.7.2 New South Wales B.7.3 Queensland B.7.4 Victoria B.7.5 Other Australian States

    B.8 Canada

    101

    101 101 102 103

    105

    105 106

    109 109 110 110 113 113 114 116 119 120 120 124 126 127

    130 133 135 135 135 138 141 141 143 143

  • X GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    B.9 France B. 10 Switzerland B. 1 1 Santa Barbara County, California, USA B. 12 United States Federal Government Agencies

    B.12.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) B.12.2 Department of Energy (DOE) B. 12.3 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) B.12.4 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) B. 12.5 Occupational Safety and Health Administration

    (OSHA) B.12.6 Department of Defense (DOD)

    B.13 New Jersey, USA B. 14 International Maritime Organization (IMO) B. 15 Other Nations B.16 Summary

    C. 1 Appendix C: Development of Company Risk Criteria

    Case Study Number 1 C. 1.1 C. 1.2 C. 1.3

    Development of Corporate Criteria Applying the Criteria within the Businesses Validation of the Criteria against Regulatory Precedents

    (2.2.1 Principles C.2.2 General Observations (2.2.3

    (2.2.4

    C.2 Case Study Number 2

    Company Risk Criteria Based upon Regulatory Precedents Basis for Selection of Risk Criteria

    C.3 Case Study Number 3 C.3.1 C.3.2 Applying the Criteria C.3.3

    Development of Company Elevation Criteria

    Use of QRA and Risk Elevation Criteria C.4 Case Study Number 4

    C.4.1 Introduction C.4.2 C.4.3 (2.4.4 Establishing Risk Tolerance Criteria

    Initial Use of Qualitative Tools Initial Use of Quantitative Tools

    144 147 148 151 151 152 153 155

    155 156 158 159 161 161

    171 171 171 173

    175 177 177 178

    178 180 181 181 182 183 184 184 184 185 186

  • CONTENTS

    REFERENCES INDEX

    xi

    191 207

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  • PREFACE

    The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has been involved with process safety and loss prevention in the chemical, petrochemical, hydrocarbon processing, and other process industries since its founding in 1908. As these industries increased in scale and economic importance in the years following World War 11, AIChE’s activities in this area expanded through specific programming activities and publications. AIChE’s symposia, journals, and other publications have been important safety resources for chemical engineers, industrial chemists, and other technical professionals in these industries.

    In 1985, following major chemical disasters in Mexico City, Mexico, and Bhopal, India, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) was established as an AIChE Technology Alliance. The charter of CCPS is to develop and disseminate technical information for use in the prevention of major chemical accidents. CCPS is supported by more than 120 sponsors worldwide, including process industry companies, engineering consulting companies, and government entities. These sponsors provide funding, and, more importantly, technical knowledge, expertise, and professional guidance through participation in various CCPS project subcommittees. One important product of CCPS, in support of its charter, is a series of guidelines books which provide information on implementation of various aspects of a complete process safety management system.

    Process hazard analysis, risk analysis, and risk management have been recognized as critical features of a process safety management program by CCPS from its inception in 1985. The first product of CCPS was the first edition of Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, published in 1985, and now in its third edition (published in 2008). The second and third editions of this book include discussion of qualitative risk evaluation tools, which can be incorporated into process hazard studies. CCPS has also published several important books related to process risk analysis, including:

    xiii

  • xiv GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (1 989, 2nd Edition published in 2000) provides a complete methodology for quantitative process risk analysis. Evaluating Process Safety in the Chemical Industry: A User's Guide to Quantitative Risk Analysis (2000) is an overview of the use of quantitative risk analysis techniques in the process industries for engineers and managers. Tools for Making Acute Risk Decisions with Chemical Process Safety Applications (1 995) describes how various decision analysis techniques can be applied to management decision making incorporating the results of risk analysis studies. Layer of Protection Analysis: SimpliJed Process Risk Assessment (2001) provides a description of a simplified technique for evaluating process safety risks.

    This book, Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria, provides additional guidance on the use of risk analysis studies for process risk management decisions. Over the last several decades, as quantitative risk analysis has been applied increasingly in the process industries, many government and industry organizations have begun to develop and apply risk criteria as tools for making process risk management decisions. This book surveys experience with the development and application of these criteria, and provides guidance on how an organization might use this experience to establish its own risk criteria. The book does not recommend criteria, or endorse specific criteria that have been used by various organizations. The focus is on understanding the meaning of the various criteria that have been used, their bases, how they are applied, and how this experience can be used by an organization that is considering similar approaches as a part of its own process risk management system. We hope that this book will help engineers and managers in the process industries better understand risk criteria, how they can be applied, how they can become one element of a comprehensive process risk management system, as well as understand the limitations and potential problems that might be associated with the use of risk criteria.

  • CCPS wishes to thank the Risk Criteria Subcommittee for their efforts to prepare Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria:

    Wayne Chastain Don Connolley Mike Considine Les Cunningham Tom Dileo Ken Harrington Dennis Hendershot Dave Jones Shakeel Kadri Greg Keeports Kevin Klein Sam Mannan Bill Marshall Jack McCavit Chee Ong Scott Ostrowski Tim Overton Bayan M. Saab Mike Schmidt Angela Summers Karen Tancredi John Wincek Brent Woodland Mike Yurconic

    Eastman Chemical Company BP BP Merck A lbemarle Chevron Phillips Chemical CCPS Staff Consultant Chevron Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Rohm and Haas Company, retired Solutia, Celanese Texas A&M University Eli Lilly and Company CCPS Emeritus Shell ExxonMobil Dow LyondellBasell Industries Emerson Process Management

    DuPont Croda, Inc. Conoco/Phillips Intel

    SIS- TECH

    xv

  • xvi GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    Walt Frank of Frank Risk Solutions, Inc. (formerly of ABS Consulting) and John Farquharson of ABS Consulting were the authors of the book. Steve Arendt, Myron Casada, and Henrique Paula of ABS Consulting provided valuable contributions to its outline and content. Dr. Paula’s past extensive research to identify relevant resources on the development of safety risk criteria throughout the world was of great value in developing the book. Karen Taylor edited the manuscript, Susan Hagemeyer prepared the manuscript for the printer, and Paul Olsen provided graphics support.

    CCPS also thanks the following peer reviewers for taking the time to review the final manuscript of the book, and providing extensive and valuable input and comments:

    Ben Ale Lee Alford Nasir Ali Arnold Allemang Marco Amaral Wim Blom Sergio D. M. Castro Mohan Chahal Phil Crossthwaite Brian Dunbobbin Leopoldine Montiel Frioni Martin Goose Richard C. Griffin Koos Ham Randy Hawkins Jean-Paul Lacoursiere Steve Leigh John R. Lockwood Donald K. Lorenzo John Marshall Georges A. Melhem Jose Luiz Mendes Thia Cheong Meng Lisa Morrison Art Mundt Lou Nathanson Robert Ormsby Bill Ostrowski Robin Pitblado Ana Flavia Sampaio

    Technical University Devt European Process Safety Centre Conoco/Phillips Dow, retired ABS Consulting Chevron ABS Group Services do Brasil, Ltda. ConocoPhillips DNV Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. CETESB IChemE Safety & Loss Prevention Subject Group Chevron Phillips Chemical TNO Built Environment and Geosciences RRS Schirmer University of Sherbrooke Croda International plc Independent risk consultant ABS Consulting Dow, retired ioMosaic Corporation INEA International Rejnery Services Singapore BP International Limited Dow, retired ConocoPhillips CCPS ConocoPhillips DNV ABS Consulting

  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii

    Gregg SaPP Conoco/Phillips Marcos Tadeu Seriacopi CETESB Irfan Shaikh Diogo Singulani INE.4 Emery Thomas ConocoPhilIips Hal Thomas

    Lloyd’s Register North America, Inc.

    Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.

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  • LIST OF TABLES

    TABLE 1.1. TABLE 2.1.

    TABLE 2.2. TABLE 2.3.

    TABLE 2.4. TABLE 2.5.

    TABLE 2.6.

    TABLE 2.7.

    TABLE 2.8.

    TABLE 3.1.

    TABLE 4.1.

    TABLE 4.2.

    TABLE A.l .

    TABLE A.2.

    TABLE A.3.

    TABLE A.4.

    Risk Based Process Safety Elements Example Consequence Categories - Qualitative Risk Matrix Example Frequency Categories - Qualitative Risk Matrix Example Risk RankingiResponse Categories - Qualitative Risk Matrix Example Semi-Quantitative Risk Matrix Suggested Mishap Severity Categories for Semi- Quantitative Risk Matrix Suggested Mishap Probability Levels for Semi- Quantitative Risk Matrix Example Mishap Risk Categories and Mishap Risk Acceptance Levels Attributes of Qualitative Versus Quantitative Studies Comparison of UK and Dutch Individual Risk Criteria Individual Risk of Accidental Work-Related Death in US, 2006, Fatalityiyear Individual Risk of Accidental Death in US, 2003, Fatalityiy ear

    8

    16 16

    17 18

    18

    19

    20

    23

    68

    89

    90

    F-N Calculations 111

    Sample QRA Results 111

    QRA Results Sorted By Decreasing N

    F-N Presentation of QRA Results

    112

    112

    xix

  • xx GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    TABLE B.1.

    TABLE B.2.

    TABLE B.3.

    TABLE B.4.

    TABLE B.5.

    TABLE B.6.

    TABLE B.7.

    TABLE B.8.

    TABLE B.9.

    TABLE B.lO.

    TABLE B. l l .

    TABLE B.12.

    TABLE B.13.

    TABLE B.14.

    TABLE B.15.

    TABLE B.16.

    TABLE B.17.

    TABLE B.18.

    TABLE B.19.

    TABLE C.l .

    TABLE C.2.

    HSE’s PAHDI Decision Matrix

    Hong Kong Individual Risk Criteria

    Individual Risk Criteria for Three States in Brazil

    Singapore Individual Risk Criteria

    Western Australia Individual Risk Criteria

    MIACC Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning

    Matrix for Determining Severity of Consequences

    Risk Assessment Frequency Ranges

    Decision Matrix for Permitting New or Modified Facilities

    Determination of Global Hazard Levels for PPRT

    Guidance for Proposed Land Use Decisions Based Upon Hazard Rating

    Guidance for Existing Land Use Decisions Based Upon Hazard Rating

    Various Risk Criteria Used by EPA (as of 1996)

    Individual and Societal Risk Criteria for DOD Test Range Operations

    Individual and Societal Risk Criteria for DOD Explosives Handling Operations

    Proposed IMO Individual Risk Criteria

    Proposed IMO Societal Risk Criteria

    Summary: Individual Risk to the Public

    Summary: Individual Risk to Workers

    Company B’s Individual Risk Criteria

    Company D’s Public Risk Criteria

    126

    129

    132

    134

    137

    143

    145

    145

    146

    146

    147

    147

    154

    157

    158

    159

    160

    162

    167

    179

    188

  • LIST OF FIGURES

    FIGURE 2.1. FIGURE 2.2. FIGURE 2.3. FIGURE 2.4. FIGURE 2.5. FIGURE 2.6. FIGURE 2.7. FIGURE 2.8. FIGURE 2.9. FIGURE 2.10. FIGURE 2.11. FIGURE 3.1. FIGURE 3.2. FIGURE 3.3. FIGURE 3.4. FIGURE 4.1. FIGURE 4.2. FIGURE 4.3. FIGURE 4.4. FIGURE 4.5.

    FIGURE 4.6.

    FIGURE A.l .

    Example Qualitative Risk Matrix Levels of Risk Analysis Scale of Risk Assessment Efforts QRA Process Consequence Analysis Flowchart Sample Event Tree Example Individual Risk Contour Example Individual Risk Profile Example F-N Curve Current Dutch Societal Risk F-N Risk Criteria HSE Tolerability of Risk Diagram Farmer Curve Groningen Societal Risk Criteria Comparison of UK and Dutch Societal Risk Criteria A Risk Performance Convergence Risk Criteria Development Flowchart TOR Diagram with De Minimis Level TOR Diagram without De Minimis Level Levels at which Risk Must be Managed Levels over Which Risk Criteria May Be Apportioned

    Societal Risk Curves from the WASH- 1400 Study F-N Curve for Hypothetical QRA Results

    16 22 22 25 27 28 32 33 36 42 44 52 62 68 74 81 86 86 92

    93

    102 113

    xxi

  • xxii

    FIGURE A.2.

    FIGURE A.3.

    GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING QUANTITATIVE SAFETY RISK CRITERIA

    Hypothetical QRA Results with UK HSE Societal Risk Criterion 115

    Comparison of f-N and F-N Curves for a ‘Risk Neutral’ Slope 115

    FIGURE A.4. Historical F-N Curve with -1 Slope 117

    FIGURES B.la. and B.lb.

    FIGURE B.2

    FIGURE B.3

    FIGURE B.4.

    FIGURE B.5.

    FIGURE B.6.

    FIGURE B.7.

    FIGURE B.8.

    FIGURE B.9.

    Illustration of HSE’s Consultation Distance around Fixed Facilities and Pipelines

    Hong Kong Societal Risk Criteria

    Societal Risk Criteria for Three States in Brazil

    New South Wales Proposed Societal Risk Criteria

    Queensland Individual Risk Criteria

    Victoria Societal Risk Criteria

    MIACC Land Use Planning Risk Criteria

    Swiss Societal Risk Criteria

    Santa Barbara County Risk Criteria

    FIGURE B.10. DOD Test Range Societal Risk Criteria

    FIGURE B. l l .

    FIGURE C.l.

    FIGURE C.2.

    FIGURE C.3.

    FIGURE C.4.

    FIGURE C.5.

    FIGURE C.6.

    Summary of Relevant Maximum Tolerable Societal Risk Criteria

    Company A’s Perspective on Unsustainable Risk

    Company A’s Societal Risk Criteria for a

    Business Division

    Company A’s Societal Risk Criteria for a Large Site Company A’s Societal Risk Criteria for a Small Site Regulatory Criteria for Public Societal Risk Relevant to Company A’s Business Portfolio Comparison of Company A’s and Regulatory Criteria for Public Societal Risk for a Major Facility

    125

    128

    131

    140

    141

    142

    144

    149

    151

    157

    169

    172

    173

    174

    175

    176

    177

  • LIST OF FIGURES xxiii

    FIGURE C.7. Comparison of Company A’s and Regulatory Criteria for Public Societal Risk for a Small Facility 178

    Company B’s Societal Risk Criteria for the Public 179

    Company B’s Societal Risk Criteria for

    Employees and Contractors 180

    182

    FIGURE C.8.

    FIGURE C.9.

    FIGURE C.10. Company C’s Elevation Criteria

    FIGURE C. l l . Company D’s Individual Risk Criteria, Illustrating Application of ALARP 190