growing up without finance - fdic: federal deposit ... · growing up without finance . rawley z....
TRANSCRIPT
Growing Up Without Finance
Rawley Z Heimer (Cleveland Fed) wj James R Brown (Iowa State) amp J Anthony Cookson (Colorado)
FDIC Consumer Research Symposium Fall 2016
These are not necessarily the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Board of Governors
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 1 I 39
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
e Our Paper
~ The role of local financial development amp exposure to financial markets ~ Credible variation in local financial development on Native American
reservations
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
e Our Paper
~ The role of local financial development amp exposure to financial markets ~ Credible variation in local financial development on Native American
reservations
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
e Our Paper
~ The role of local financial development amp exposure to financial markets ~ Credible variation in local financial development on Native American
reservations
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~---------------- 239Brown Cookson Heimer
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
e Our Paper
~ The role of local financial development amp exposure to financial markets ~ Credible variation in local financial development on Native American
reservations
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Motivation
e Household finances affect entrepreneurship (Hurst and Lusardi 2004)
asset prices (Favara and lmbs 2015) consumer welfare (Melzer 2011)
employment (Bernstein 2016) employment credit screening corporate financial policies (Heimer 20)
e Why is poor financial health pervasive even in good times
~ eg 2006Q4 45 unemployment Yet 31 subprime -J15 no credit history
e Literature beh a vi ora I biases fi nancia I education and genetics
~ But effects cannot explain wide variation in financial health
e Our Paper
~ The role of local financial development amp exposure to financial markets ~ Credible variation in local financial development on Native American
reservations
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 2 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-~-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Exposure to financial markets
e Example 13-year old Rawley Mows neighborhood lawns deposits
monthly check builds relationship with local bank Burke and
Herbert in Alexandria VA
e Counterfactual what if brick-and-mortar bank was not there
e Empirical challenge local financial development is not random
- ~QG------riiij~(ii~~ftilsect~-----r-------- 3 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Paper in a nutshell
Consumer credit on Native American reservations
e Long-run Congress-imposed differences in courts across resvns
e Stronger courts = t supply of resvn-area financial development
e t fin dev = t consumer finance through early-life exposure
- ~lt0-----~--~~~~~~~-r~------------- 439Brown Cookson Heimer
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
1953 1953-1980s 1999-20151980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-run differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge ma rket s and managewith a nd without courts by a rtifact credit hist ories as young financial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy A series of historical accidents amp a 1953 law led to sharp differences in local finance
a Large long-run differences in local financial development on Native
American reservations
a Why In 1953 externally-imposed differences in courts across resvns (state courts vs triba I courts)
- debt contract enforcement uncertainty ---+ 20 diff in bank branching 60 diff in Pr(extend small business loan)
Cross-sectional pattern a historical accident (disclaimers in state constitutions see Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
1953 1953-1980s 1999-2015 1980s-1990s PL280 was passed long-ru n differences in Borrowers in our sample Sample Period Assigned some financia l development Borrowers enter credit are born growing up reservat ions to state emerge markets and managewith and without courts by artifact credit hist ories as youngfinancial development
adults
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 5 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Setting and empirical strategy Use long-run differences in local financial devel to study effects on household finances
1953
1950s-1980s
1999-20 ]5
US Congress
State Cou rts
More Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Persistent Externally-imposed Cross-sectional variation
Tribal Courts
Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
State versus tribal affected banking development but not consumer finance directly
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 6 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of U S credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 7 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
What we find using 5 sample of US credit reports from Equifax
0 Less local financial development (tribal versus state courts) leads to
~ Less financial inclusion (10 pp more individuals w o credit reports)
~ Delayed entry into formal credit markets (10-20 lower hazard)
Role for local finance Less after growth of local finance after bank deregulation (IBBEA)
8 These effects are
~ Persistent (consumer credit riskscores take 10+ years to converge) ~ Exp~ lained by delayed entry (controlling for age at first credit)
~ Not explained by differences in economic opportunity but ~ explained by local banking development
- ~QG------riliiiii~[iilmfi~~-~~------- 1 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Contributions
0 Financial inclusion (eg stock mkt participation formal accounts)
~ Celerier and Matray (2015) Kozak and Sosyura (2015) Allen et al (2012) and others
Does local finance still matter
~ Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) Cortes and Strahan (2016) Butler Cornaggia Gurun (2015) and others
Institutions and financial develpoment
~ Much of this is cross-national (eg Levine Djankov Shleifer and many others)
~ Reservation (within-country) setting permits stronger inferences
- ~lt0-----~~~~~~~~----~-------------- 839Brown Cookson Heimer
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Reservation areas PL280 was passed at the state-level but has within-region variation
Leg end
bull State J urisdiction bull Tribal Courts
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 9 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
- ~lt0-----~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- l039Brown Cookson Heimer
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
PL280 What we know
e Similar resvn econjfinancial conditions prior to PL280 _ pre-PL280
e Law intended to improve perceived ~~lawlessness but
~ similar incarceration rates pre-PL280 no effect on criminal outcomes (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al 2015)
~ civil jurisdiction added as an afterthought (Goldberg-Ambrose)
e PL280 ~ more local finance by affecting secured lending (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ but does not apply to most consumer credit contracts
e PL280 ~ higher incomes in finance-dependent industries (Brown
Cookson Heimer 2016)
~ Main alternative economic opportunity affects consumer finance
Show explicit financial mechanism Controls for economic conditions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 10 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Data
Data FRBNY- Consumer Credit Panel
e 5 random sample quarterly credit reports- Equifax (1999 - ongoing)
e Sample on last 2 digits of SSN panel refresh includes new entrants and indicate deaths
e Limitations limited demographic coverage no household assets
e Link census tracts to rsvn areas using Tiger Line GIS shape files
All of the consumers we observe are on reservation lands for first Equifax
record
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 11 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Consumer credit
PL280 and financial inclusion
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 12 1 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Fraction of individuals with a credit history Low-finance regions have lower rates of financial inclusion
Q)-CIJ- -- i enc
0
() -0 C) middot
s t s 0
() (5 c middot-
03 0 4 05 0 6 0 7 08 09
Fraction of residents with a credit record (q uarterly Census tract observations)
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 13 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Consumer age when receive first credit report Consumer age when receive first line of credit
20
21 22
-------shy23 24
--shy25
l) 0
18 19
L()
__ -----shy0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Age at first report Age at first tradeline
--- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction --- Tribal courts ---- bull State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 14 1 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Delayed entry into credit markets
Hazard into formal credit mkts t 10 - 20 pp log-odds
Panel A time to first credit report (1a) (2a) (3a)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -016 [086] -012 [089] -018 [084]
0023) 0023) 0048) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 151394 151394 151394 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
Panel 8 time to first tradeline (1b) (2b) (3b)
t = age shy 18 coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio] coef [odds-ratio]
tribalcourt -0 22 [080] -023 [080] -0 10 [090]
(0023) (0022) (0069) date quarter strata X X X
Census region FE X
state FE X
N (consumer-quarter) 246735 246735 246735 N (consumers) 14 380 14380 14380
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 15 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Is exposure to local finance the channel
e Riegle-Neal interstate bank branching deregulation (1994- 2010) (Rice
and Strahan 2010)
~ = t bank branches in rural areas (Celerier and Matray 2015)
e t bank branching ~
~ if tribal courts have too little finance branching expansion matters
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 16 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Financial mechanism bank branching regulation
Expansion of bank branch supply attenuates hazard rates
A time to first report IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds-ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -022 [081] -015 [086] (0041) (0 026)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 15 267 119870 N (consumers) 1511 11555
8 time to first tradeline IBBEA status not deregu Iated deregulated
coef [odds-ratio ] coef [odds -ratio ]
tri ba lcou rt -037 [069] -015 [086] (0059) (0025)
date quarter strata X X
N (consumer-quarter) 22797 194521 N (consumers) 1511 11555
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 17 1 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Evidence on bank supply frictions
e Bank regulation results are consistent with supply frictions
~ Effects are more pronounced where there is less bank branching
e Can we provide evidence within Equifax
~
~
Focus on lending to subprime borrowers to identify supply restrictions (as in Bhutta and Keys 2014)
supply ratio == new credit lines hard inquiries
- ~lt0---~--~~mm~~~~~--------------- 1839Brown Cookson Heimer
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Evidence of a fi na ncia I mechanism Supply frictions
suppl y ratio (1 ) (2) (3) (4)
tribalcourt -0084 -0080 -0084 -0070
(0 015) (0 015 ) (0018) (0018)
riskscore X X X X
quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year - quarter FE X
cen sus reg io n FE X
census regio n - quarter FE X
N 21 726 21 726 21726 21 726 R2 0 040 0060 0059 0 085
sample of borrowers 25 years and you nger riskscore lt 640
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 19 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
-shy
Sup ply frictions and the business cycle Supply ratio looks like financial friction over the business cycle
N
_
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Year
a aTribal courts State jurisdiction
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 20 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Overall financial health
Effects on financial health
~ ~lt0---~~~~~~~~~-------------- 2139Brown Cookson Heimer
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
I) 0
c Q I) N uoctl bull L
LL
I) N
0
ln_0
300 400 500 600 700 800 Equifax rislk score
~ - Tribal courts - State jurisdiction
D t)Qr+
Brown Cookson Heimer Growing Up Without Finance 22 1 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Overall financial health Sample of borrowers who stay on the reservation
18 points lower average credit scores
riskscore (1) (2) (3) (4) tri ba lcourt -186 -185 -182 -178
(099) (100) (101) (100) quarter FE X X
birth year FE X X X
birth year- quarter FE X
census region FE X
census region - quarter FE X
N 66027 66027 66027 66 027 R2 0037 0041 0051 0061
sample 25 years old or younger on resvn entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 23 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Overall financial health
Delayed entry fully explains long-run differences in financial health
riskscore (1) (2) age at first trade line -442 -439
(045) (065) tribalcourt x age at first trade line 056 050
(061) (069) date quarter FE X
first tract FE X
first tract x date FE X
N 11124 11124 R2 033 0 46
sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 24 139
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Overall financial health Economic significance
Economically meaningful differences in financial health
1 Defa uIt rate
e Tribal ---+ State court ~ t 10 pp implied probability of default (at sample means)
2 Suppose 100 28-year-olds demand a $100 000 mortgage
bull Tribal ---+ State court ~ 8 additional people eligible for conventional mortgage
~ $599 monthly savings for 40 borrowers previously eligible for homeownership
- ~QG------riiiiiiiinibli~ml~----r------- 2s 1 39Brown Cookson Heimer
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
So far
r r
State Courts Tniball Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more f inancial frictions
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 26 139
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Are exposure effects persistent
Triba I Courts State Courts
More Local Finance Less Local Finance ~ ~ ~ ~
Young Borrow ers (lt 25 years)
Later entry to credit markets Less financial inclusion Face more financial frictions
Young Borrowers (lt 25 years)
Movers to Off-Reservation Areas Do outcomes converge How persistent a re effects
Benchmark against movers from state court reservations
Brown Cookson Heimer
~QG-
27 139
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
Moving from resvn helps tribal court consumers by 4 credit score points
(convergence)
riskscore (1) (2) (3) tribalcourt x off resvn 407 354 398
(054) (0 61) (061) off resvn 014 0 95 -022
(0 91) (0 92) (088) date quarter FE X X
first tract FE X X
first tract x date FE X
current state FE X
N 340 1385 3401385 3401385 R2 012 015 015
sam ple borrowers w ho start on resvn
~QG-
Brown 1 Cookson 1 Heimer 28 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
e Test assumption borrower quality of movers are equal by jurisdiction
e frac tradelines gt 90 days past due measure of quality
state and tribal court borrowers are similar quality so riskscore effect is unlikely selection
fra c tradelines gt 90 days past due (1) (2) (3) tri ba lcou rt 0 020 0017 -0 10
(016) (016) (016) date FE X X X
first tract FE X X X
birth cohort FE X X
current state FE X
N 31803 31 803 31803 R2 014 014 015
Sample borrowers 28 years or older born on resvn currently off resvn
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 29 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Fi na ncia I health off-reservation
takes more than a decade for growing up without finance (tribal court) borrowers to catch up
riskscoreit == Yt + 31 quarters awayit + 32 birthyeari +fit
------shy
- shy---shy
----~middot---
0 ltD ltD
---
0 lt ltD
0 ()
ltD ~------~------~~------~------~ 0 20 40 60 80
quarters away from reservation
-- Tribal courts State j urisdiction I
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 30 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
Local finance or economic opportunity
- ~QG------rijjiiiii(i~~~~---r-------- 31 I 39Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
state courts and bank branches better long-run financial health even controlling for local opportunities
dep var = riskscore
(1a) (2a) (3a) 4a) (Sa)
tri ba lcou rt -791 -760 -625 (287) (289) (112)
bank branches ( Z) 874 8 94 912
(157) (157) (5 17) median tract income X X X X X
tract employment rate X X X X X
census region - qu arter FE X X X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 32 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
credit demand conditions are similar (consistent with exposure effect not economic opportunities)
dep var = credit inquiries past 12mo
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
tribalcourt 0087 0079 -0011
bank branches (Z)
median tract income
(0057)
X
(0 057)
X
016
(0 12)
X
016
(012)
X
(0 15)
016
(012)
X
tract employment rate
census region - quarter FE X X
X
X X
X
X
X
N 12285
Sample 28 years old and older on resvn the entire sample
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 33 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity
PL280 does not affect financial health of individuals born before law
dep var = riskscore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tri ba I court -1446 -1139 -1390 3379
( 495) ( 476) (396) (381)
date quarter FE
tract employment rate (Z)
X X
X
X
X
X
X
median tract income (Z)
Census region FE X X
X
N 175 970 175949 175949 175949 R2 0069 0079 010 012
Sample consumers born between 1930 and 1953
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 34 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 35 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~ Robust to including region FE ~ Attenuated by bank branching expansion ~ Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~ Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE ~ Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) ~ Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample) ~ Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE ~ Robust and stable upon including median tract income ~ Not robust to controlling for branches population
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Local finance or economic opportunity Summary of evidence on the effects of growing up without finance
e Slower credit market entry ~
~
~
Robust to including region FE Attenuated by bank branching expansion Lower supply ratio conditional on demand
e Persistent effects on movers ~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including first Census tract FE Similar borrower qualities (delinquencies in the long run) Long-run effects eventually converge
e Worse long-run financial health (on res entire sample)
~
~
~
Robust and stable upon including region x quarter FE Robust and stable upon including median tract income Not robust to controlling for branches population
e No effect on population born before PL280
- ~lt0------~~~~~~~~-~---------------- 3539Brown Cookson Heimer
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Conclusion
e Credible evidence on exposure to local finance using financial
development arising from historical accidents
~ financial development improves financial health
e Broader implications
~ local finance still has considerable value
~ policies to bring finance to underserved populations can be effective
~ supply frictions are also important
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 36 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
Are state jurisdiction and tribal court rsvns similar pre-PL280
e 1950 US Census
e 1952 edition of Polks Bank Directory
~ hand transcribe build area-specific measures of banking activity 2rmiddot~ott nmiddotttLmiddot 1ib
ltt M0 r a11bull -POPbull
Thnrnnaon lrta amput Fllanovlta v p
etb Luuton Oaill Cnbulll Chatloa Ptaroa
1407 00 11 1 ~0 ~middotl ~~tfll ~a~g~
J sa~tk at D lf~~8n_~ Otfleers 2~()21- Total 2-~2tfr~
~ns ABA OblfiA ~ bull bull 985 2 -
THE ONAL BANK
OF DOVER 101 W Till~ St
Telellllbullbullbull 4bullIICM
Tuscarawas c oun ty-FRO 4 Cleveonci-Map M 4
CORRESPOIH)EtSSTATEMENT OF CONDITION JUliE 30 19~3 MEW VORIIASSETS LIABILITIES Haft_nr ampu-~aeh amp Due rom Banlla$ 140145$ Demand Deoobullll 45t1t99
Si S Socurltl 2512180 Time Deonlh bull bull 5~~middot1~~ CLEVEVoiiO C1tnn d truampt Coate amp Mua Bonds 1382218 Ot~bullbull Labllltl middot SlllOOO
0 1tlSIIUIIGIL~~r lD~~u~ bullmmiddotm ~~~~~1 middotmiddot middot soolllo 11olon llat B lo Tr Co Bnk Building etc 75488 Un4 vlded Profits middot 1~~~~ COLUMSUS Other Aneta bull 1830 Caaltal Rlmbull _---- Oblo llalonal 6u
OIREClOIIampTotal $ 10874342 TOtal bull to87434l 1111 ~4aa ) f tllbull
OFFICERS II P Llft A V LlbullbullR H Adklbullbullmiddotvmiddotit Ayj w~i~~middotc-bull1gt middot S RuCD lrA Y Ll yp E E middotabullrlloYmiddot AC
A J 8roadllbullnt A bull bull bull bull ND COtlPOtlATONSshyAmNTION-IANKS as for fost ttfcent Servce
Send Collections anncldlteCmsple Banking Facilities Modern a om
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 37 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Cou rts T ribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$) per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011 6142
263 2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967 648
2678
581
00601
Findin g
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
county
county
BIA area
reservation
county
county
Level
indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns wI state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns wI state courts county
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 38 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39
Reservation econom1es prior to PL280
state and tribal court rsvn were similar prior to PL280
Conditions prior the passage of PL280 State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value Level
bank branches per capita ( x 1000)
bank loans per capita
bank assets per capita
credit per capita from customary lenders (2008$)
per capita income (2008$)
fam ily incomes (decile rank)
unemployment rate
Banking development present-day Outcome measure
00248
2011
6142
263
2640
585
00596
00313
1918
5967
648
2678
581
00601
Finding
-00065
929
1751
-385
-38
004
-000053
0579
0909
0942
0865
0887
0948
coun ty
coun ty
coun ty
BIA area
reservation
county
coun ty
Level indicator for any lending banks significantly more likely to originate loans to bank-county
resvns w state courts
log(l+ bank branches per capita) banking density 20 greater on resvns w state courts coun ty
iZGt
~QG-
Brown Cookson Heimer 39 I 39