Görge K. Hasselhoff , Knut Martin Stünkel (Eds.)

Transcending WordsTh e Language of Religious Contact Between

Buddhists, Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Premodern Times

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Table of Content

IntroductionTh e Emergence of Religious Language in Situations of Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Jörg PlassenTh e Taoist Voice of the Buddhist Commentaries?Some Remarks on the Infl uence of the Chuang-tzu on the Use of Language in Buddhist Commentarial Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Gerhard Endress“Th is is Clear Arabic Speech”God’s Speech and Prophetic Language in Early Islamic Hermeneutics, Th eology and Philosophy . 27

Anna A. AkasoyAre We Speaking the Same Language?Translating Truths across Intellectual Traditions in al-Andalus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Jörn MüllerLessons in CommunicationA New Approach to Peter Abelard’s Collationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Beate Ulrike La SalaAl-Ghazālī and Jehuda HaleviDivine Attributes, Metaphors and Possible Ways to Speak about God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Piero CapelliConversion to Christianity and Anti-Talmudic Criticism from Petrus Alfonsi to Nicolas Donin and Pablo Christiani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Görge K. HasselhoffRashi for Latin Readers: Th e Translations of Paris, 1240With an Edition of the Excerpts from Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Ann GilettiGentiles and JewsCommon Ground and Authorities in the Mission of Ramon Martí’s Pugio fi dei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Knut Martin StünkelTowards the Miracle of LanguageRamon Llull and the Creation of a Christian Religious Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Roberto Hofmeister PichA Confl ict of ReasonScotus’ Appraisal of Christianity and Judgment of Others Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

6 Table of Content

Ulli RothJohn of Segovia and Religious Language / Interreligious Communication . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Günter BaderJohannes 1,1 in den Sermones des Nikolaus von Kues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Knut Martin StünkelTowards a Th eory of Meta-communicative Elements in Medieval Religious DialoguesAbelard’s Collationes and the Topology of “Religion” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Saverio CampaniniDas Hebräische in Reuchlins Werk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Oswald BayerReliable WordLuther’s Understanding of God, Humanity, and the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Wulfert de GreefCalvin: We Learn True Wisdom in the School of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Index   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

IntroductionTh e Emergence of Religious Language in Situations of Contact

ITh e close and almost symbiotic relation of religion and language is a widely acknowledged and intensely examined phenomenon in the study of religion. Religious Studies as an academic disci-pline, takes the conjunction seriously. In most cases the scholarly interest is, on the one hand, fo-cused upon the expression of religious experience for reasons of communication. On the other hand, the possibility of communication with a transcendent sphere is scrutinized. Religious Lan-guage, as defi ned in an encyclopaedia of religion, comprises two interrelated fi elds in particular: the emergence of a cultic language and the formation of a special vocabulary of the prevailing re-ligious group.1 Of course, this defi nition is in need of some additional criteria. Th e “Manual of Basic Notions in Religious Studies” (Handbuch religionswissenschaft licher Grundbegriff e) lists fi ve basic forms of religious language, fi rst the revelational language of the Gods, the teaching and promising language of the Gods, prayer, and expressive language under the heading of “commu-nication” (Kommunikation), second “performativity” (Performanz) which comprises the eff ec-tive word, the creative word, the eff ective word in history, the hypostatic word and the magical word. Th ird, there is “representation” (Vergegenwärtigung), divided into myth as the representa-tion of the world of Gods, and ritual language followed by forth “interplay” (Wechselwirkung) of language describing, reporting, and passing down religious experience which in turn infl uences the use of language itself. Finally, there is the possibility of Entsprachlichung, the “elimination of language (and thought)” as to be found in mysticism to gain the highest level of religious experi-ence which cannot be grasped in language at all.2 As such, the theme of “religion and language” opens a vast spectrum for scholarly research endeavours hardly to be overseen and even less to be accomplished in a manageable time and space. However, an important point is to be made with regard to such an approach: By doing so, the close relation of religion to certain languages is un-doubtedly stressed but, as a consequence, the scholarly examination is concentrated on autoch-thonous areas, i. e. on developments within a single religious tradition.

From its very beginnings, however, Religious Studies were closely connected to philology and its perspectives and methods. As one might learn from (Friedrich) Max Müller as one of the founding fathers of the new science in the 19th century, the only secure way to understand reli-gion is language. Accordingly, there are important parallels between the study of religion and phi-lology, above all the necessity of a comparative perspective in order to arrive at valid results. Mül-ler’s famous Goethean maxim “He who knows one, knows none”3 is the expression of the idea for both religion and language. But despite the attempted abandonment of any preference of re-ligion in the process of research,4 the problem remains if comparison can be performed by the scholar on strictly neutral terms, i. e. by not imposing concepts or notions on one or the other po-sition thus avoiding forms of scientifi c imperialism that have been justifi ably criticized by ana-

1 See Hiroshi Kubota, Art. “Sprache”, in: Christoph Auff arth et al. (eds.), Metzler Lexikon Religion. Gegenwart – All-tag – Medien, Vol. 3: Paganismus – Zombie, Stuttgart 2000, 363 – 366, here 364.

2 See Reinhard Wonneberger, Art. “Sprache”, in: Hubert Cancik et al. (eds.), Handwörterbuch religionswissenschaft li-cher Grundbegriff e, Vol. 5: Säkularisierung – Zwischenwesen, Stuttgart et al. 2001, 89 – 101, here 94 – 101.

3 Friedrich Max Müller, Introduction to the Science of Religion. Four Lectures Delivered at the Royal Institution in February and May, 1870, London 1882, 13.

4 Müller, ibid., 26, himself was positive that his idea was soon to be realized: “A Science of Religion, based on an im-partial and truly scientifi c comparison of all, or at all events, of the most important, religions of mankind is now only a question of time.”

8 Introduction

lysts of Orientialism in the vein of Edward Said. Th us, the main problem for the scholar of reli-gions seems to be how to do comparative work i. e. how to introduce adequate notions and con-cepts without loosing touch with one’s material.

Some leading scholars of Religious Studies, among them Jonathan Z. Smith, claim that current scholarship has not yet met the challenge of Müller’s basic tenet, i. e. his both compara-tive and generalizing approach.5 Our hypothesis is that the problem may be solved by the intro-duction of a contact-related perspective. It is of vital importance to draw the consequence from the comparative perspective as introduced to Religious Studies and examine occasions where the perspective is applied by the religious traditions themselves, i. e. situations of contact and to scru-tinize their refl ections regarding their presuppositions as well as the possibilities of that perspec-tive. By doing so one may witness the emergence of meta-language, of comparative concepts and notions, within object-language itself, and thus, by describing this process and using the concepts and notions evolving here, keeping close contact to the material itself without imposing scientif-ic vocabulary on the phenomena in question.

Accordingly, the question for the role of language in an interreligious context inevitably arises. As it is commonly accepted, religions and religious traditions are not to be described as monolithic entities which are subject only to internal developments, but they rather emerge, ex-pand and stabilize under conditions of interreligious exchange processes. As one may learn from the history of religions, it is the contact of diff erent religious traditions which causes an intensi-fi ed interest for language as a medium of dealing with the prevailing other tradition or traditions. Th is interest manifests itself, for example, in the so-called religious dialogues,6 but also (and, in fact, much more oft en) in projects and concepts of translation. In this regard, anything might be expected from the material. A medieval translator, as it is insistently stated in a recent publica-tion on the subject, “would also know the joy of cross-fertilizing languages, and of fi nding new contexts and audiences for text through their translation.”7 In any case, the other religious tra-dition provides a challenge which has to be answered explicitly – and this is, above all, done via language.

Religious language might be examined in a twofold way. On the one hand, with regard to the ways of talking about the religious (the numinous) respectively how to talk religiously. On the other hand, one might inspect how religious traditions start to introduce a meta-perspective on religion via language, i. e. by introducing certain patterns of language such as, for example, gen-eral notions as the notion of religion itself to be used for comparative purposes. Regarding epis-temology, this way seems to be more promising with regard to both the internal (emic) and the external (scientifi c) perspective. It might even be the case that the fi rst way mentioned, i. e. talk-ing about the religious or talking religiously, may be an expression of the introduction of the me-ta-perspective and, therefore, may be examined in greater depth regarding the meta-perspective. Dealing with religious language does not merely mean enquiring how to speak religiously or how to do it in a proper way, but also to fi nd means to speak about religions and those religious ways of speaking. Th erefore, in the fi rst place “religious language”, as we understand the notion, means

5 See Jonathan Z. Smith, “A Matter of Class: Taxonomies of Religion”, in: Relating Religion. Essays in the Study of Re-ligion, Chicago; London 2004, 160 – 178, here173.

6 See, for example, Görge K. Hasselhoff , “Modelos de diálogos inter-religiosos na história da Igreja”, in: Teocomuni-cação 42 (2012), 144 – 178.

7 Catherine Batt, “Introduction”, in: Karen L. Fresco / Charles D. Wright (eds.), Translating the Middle Ages, Farnham; Burlington 2012, 1 – 10, here 3.

Introduction 9

talking about religion on the object-language level. Examining it means examining something which might be called a meta-communicative perspective,8 which is not the mind-child of the scholarly observer, but rather is introduced by the observed themselves.

So methodologically, the role of the religious other while examining a religious tradition cannot be over-emphasized. For such considerations on the object-language level do not appear out of the blue, but are – and this is the important hypothesis of the editors of the present vol-ume – triggered in situations of contact between religious traditions. Th e formation of Religious Language in this sense is therefore another example for a particular assumption guiding scholar-ly research, which

“[…] consists of the claim that the formation, establishment, spread and further development of the major religious traditions (as well as other religious traditions) have been aff ected by mu-tual infl uences, as well as that the formal unity of the history of religions mainly consists of reli-gious contacts, i. e. of mutual perceptions of religious traditions as religious entities that consti-tute regional religious fi elds and, in the long run, lead to a global religious fi eld.”9

Here, facing the religious other, a religious tradition is forced to contemplate on its own status as well as it is forced to develop certain patterns of language to comprise both itself and the other in order to obtain possibilities to deal with the other in a general way. Of course, one cannot expect this meta-perspective to be balanced in the way the neutral observer wishes it to be (religious di-alogues are therefore not to be primarily considered as documents of tolerance), but some par-amount level of observation and analysis is, nevertheless, established which might be described.

Admittedly, there are many situations of contact imaginable, from direct contact of in-dividuals, by chance or within an institutional framework, to indirect forms such as translating texts from another tradition. It is, however, these very situations which provide the opportunity to describe processes of emergence of meta-language on the object-language level, and accord-ingly prevent oneself from merely imposing one’s notions to the traditions examined.10

IITh e contributions to this volume show the various ways of refl ection on the possibilities and re-straints of communication with the other tradition in Translation, Polemics and Dialogue as per-formed in medieval Islam,11 Judaism12 and Christianity,13 but also from East Asian perspec-tive.14 Of course, these refl ections have a strong infl uence on the religious language as an expres-sion of the prevailing tradition itself. It is our aim to show that certain concepts of religious lan-guage, not at last the notion of religion itself, obtain their meaning rather synchronically with re-

8 See, for example, the contribution by Jörn Müller in this volume. 9 Volkhard Krech, “Religious Contact in Past and Present Times: Aspects of a Research Programme”, in: Religion 42

(2012), 191 – 213, here 192. 10 Cf. ibid., 195: “Metalanguage can best correspond with religious-historical material and avoid a sterile scientism

when it links in with the refl ection abductively identifi ed as religious, in which an object-linguistic awareness of the religious arises and is actively promoted.”

11 See the contributions by Anna A. Akasoy, Günther Endreß, and Beate Ulrike La Sala in this volume. 12 See the contributions by Piero Capelli, Görge K. Hasselhoff , and Beate Ulrike La Sala in this volume. 13 See the contributions by Günter Bader, Piero Capelli, Ann Giletti, Görge K. Hasselhoff , Jörn Müller, Roberto H.

Pich, Ulli Roth, and Knut Martin Stünkel in this volume. 14 See the contribution by Jörg Plassen in this volume.

10 Introduction

gard to situations of real or imagined contact with another tradition, and not diachronically via a genealogy within the own tradition alone.

In two subsequent workshops, the fi rst dating from May 2012 and the second from June 2013, situated at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg (KHK) “Dynamics in the History of Religions Be-tween Asia and Europe” at the Centre for Religious Studies (CERES), Ruhr-University Bochum, such situations of contact have been examined with regard to a certain time and a certain space, concentrating on the European, Near East and East Asian Middle Ages in the fi rst workshop on “Religious Language”. Th e workshop intended to tentatively scrutinize forms of religious lan-guage derived from contact situations in medieval intellectual thought. Th e focus of attention in the second workshop, titled “Convivencia and Religious Language: Dialogue of Religion on the Iberian Peninsular”, then switched spatially to the Western Mediterranean, concentrating on the Iberian Peninsular as a paradigmatic (and, at a certain time ideologically constructed) contact zone of Judaism, Islam and Christianity. While being sceptical about the “golden century” that is supposed to have occurred here, one, nevertheless might regard Iberia as an ideal place to show how the contact of the three monotheistic religions had an impact on religious beliefs, insights, and, above all, languages. Th e papers given on these two workshops and some additional contri-butions, partly from a third workshop titled “Th e Impact of the Reformation on the Establish-ment of Religious Language” (February 2014), provide the content of the present volume.15 Th e reformation period provides the scholar with yet another fi eld of examination guided by the con-tact-related perspective, though it seems to be a mere intra-religious development rather than an interreligious contact situation. One might, however, with regard to the intellectual developments of the time (for example Hebraism and Humanism) try to apply the fi ndings of the contact-cen-tred approach, particularly when examining the various refl ections of the prevailing confessions which, of course, were done vis a vis the challenging other. So a fruitful discussion on religious language is rather likely to be witnessed here as well. Another volume, gathering the other pres-entations from this workshop together with contributions on the impact of the colonization pe-riod on the religious language is in the planning.

Our present volume gathers contributions of experts from diff erent fi elds of expertise, form East Asian, Jewish and Islamic Studies, Church History, Th eology, Religious Studies to Phi-losophy, to a joint venture questing for the emergence of religious language under the guidance of the contact perspective. As broad as the horizon may be, the approach is still in need and explic-itly open for additional case studies of other spaces and times from the whole spectrum of Reli-gious Studies. As such the volume is intended to make a conceptual off er in order to contribute to an interdisciplinary and interreligious perspective in scholarly research on the emergence, for-mation and stabilization of religious tradition, which is inaugurated by the study of phenomena of contact as documented in the material.

IIITh e editors wish to thank a number of persons without whom the volume could not have been made.

Th e past and present boards of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg accepted our workshop programmes that built the basis of this volume. Th e Federal Ministry of Science and Education (Bundes-

15 See the contributions by Oswald Bayer, Saverio Campanini, and Wulfert de Greef in this volume.

Introduction 11

ministerium für Bildung und Forschung) granted the fi nancial aid to conduct these workshops. Special mention is made in this regard to Volkhard Krech, Reinhold Glei, and Nikolas Jaspert (now Heidelberg).

We also have to express our sincerest thanks to the publisher Dr. Dieter Winkler, who not only took the risk of publishing the book, but also showed great patience.

Kristina Göthling helped us with the formal editing; Adam Knobler took the painful lan-guage editing and redactional advice; Alexander Suppa did the type-setting. Th e thanks for all three are immeasurable.

Görge K. Hasselhoff , Knut Martin StünkelDortmund and Bochum, October 2014

Th e Taoist Voice of the Buddhist Commentaries?Some Remarks on the Infl uence of the Chuang-tzu on the Use of Language in Buddhist Commentarial Literature*

Jörg Plassen, Bochum

1 Introduction: Sinifi cation and the Rise of Cataphatic LanguageResearch on Chinese Buddhism still remains informed by persistent models of “sinifi cation”. One of the most infl uential sources of this notion has been Yūki Reimon’s (1902 – 1992) paradigm of a Sui-T’ang “New Buddhism”: Yūki held to the somewhat simplistic model of a three-phased devel-opment of “Chinese Buddhism” entailing an initial reception with Taoist bias before the 5th cen-tury C.E., a turn towards the Indian sources from the arrival of Kumārajīva onwards, and a re-newed begin of sinifi cation during the late 6th and the 7th century. A similar threefold model had been laid down by Paul Demiéville (1894 – 1979) in his ambitious synopsis “La pénétration du Bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique Chinoise” (1956), in which he coined the term sini-sation. According to Demiéville, the fi rst translators resorted to a language familiar to them, i. e. the terminology employed by Kuo Hsiang (? – 314), Wang Pi (226 – 249) and other proponents of the “Learning of the dark” (Hsüan-hsüeh) in their exegeses of the basic texts of Taoism, the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. Building upon these translations, authors such as Chih Tun (314 – 366) developed an understanding of Buddhism which is distorted by Taoist notions. Th e situation changed for the better only with the arrival of the translator Kumarajīva (344 – 413), who togeth-er with his collaborators produced more reliable translations. Based on these translations, Chi-nese monks around Kumarajīva (e. g., Tao-sheng (c. 360 – 424) and Seng Chao (? – 414)) began to develop a more apt understanding of Indian Buddhism. Th is trend was amplifi ed in the 6th and 7th century under the infl uence of Paramartha (499 – 569) und Hsüan-tsang (602 – 664). In the 8th century, however, the previous trend towards sinifi cation regained impetus, which lead to the rise of the Ch’an and Pure land traditions.

Over the last decades, these sinifi cation models have met with severe criticism, not only due to their rather crude nationalistic bias and their similarity to 19th century theological prec-edents, but also due to their very factual basis. Nevertheless, even sophisticated scholars high-ly critical of this model seem to subscribe to the notion of more “Chinese” varieties of Buddhist thought. Th us, Robert Gimello in his still infl uential article “Apophatic and cataphatic discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese way” elaborated on a turn from apophatic to cataphatic speech in the Fa-chieh kuan men, a text usually ascribed to Tu Shun (557 – 640).1

It may be argued whether it is correct to assume such a turn in the use of religious lan-guage occurred in contrast to Indian and Central Asian precedents. Th us, in his introduction to an analysis of the Gandavyūha, David McMahan wrote the following remarks on the relation be-tween Prajñaparamitā literature and the Gandavyūha:

While the emptiness discourses attempt to cut off ordinary thinking through negation of all conceptual constructs, the Gandavyūha attempts to disrupt ordinary thought and perception

* Th e author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr. Grégoire Espesset for a careful reading of the manu-script and a wealth of most helpful suggestions.

1 Cf. Robert Gimello, “Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese view”, Philosophy East and West, 26 / 2 (1976), 117 – 136.

“Th is is Clear Arabic Speech”God’s Speech and Prophetic Language in Early Islamic Hermeneutics, Th eology and Philosophy

Gerhard Endress, Bochum

God spoke to His Prophet in “clear Arabic speech”. Arabic is the language of Islam, of the Islamic revelation and of all precepts concerning belief and action.

Say: Th e holy Spirit hath delivered it from thy Lord with truth, that it may confi rm (the faith of) those who believe, and as guidance and good tidings for those who have surrendered (to Al-lah). And We know well that they say: Only a man teacheth him. Th e speech of him at whom they falsely hint is outlandish, and this is clear Arabic speech.1And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth, they said: Wilt thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Th y praise and sanctify Th ee? He said: Surely I know that which ye know not. – And He taught Adam all the names, then showed them to the angels, saying: Inform Me of the names of these, if ye are truthful. – Th ey said: Be glorifi ed! We have no knowledge saving that which Th ou hast taught us. Lo! Th ou, only Th ou, art the Knower, the Wise. – He said: O Adam! In-form them of their names, and when he had informed them of their names, He said: Did I not tell you that I know the secret of the heavens and the earth? And I know that which ye disclose and which ye hide.2

In the Islamic revelation, set down in the Koran, God communicates with his creation through language, by the intermediary of his Prophet: Arabic language for that matter. Language is God’s gift to humankind. In the fi rst instance, through Adam his prophet, and in fi nal perfection, through Muḥammad the Seal of the Prophets; his message is conveyed in “clear Arabic”, unim-paired by transmission and translation. From these statements, the discussions of early Islamic theology started:

• the origin of language: God’s endowment to humankind providing a means of communica-tion between the divine and the human,

• the question of God’s unity vs. the assumption of divine attributes, or more specifi cally: the co-existence of God’s word with God’s eternal knowledge in God’s essence,

• the discussion about the possibility and the admissibility, and also the limits of interpretation as a way towards the unknown God.

Th ese discussions, and the methods of hermeneutics arising from such theological premises, were pursued in a close dialogue between the disciplines of “roots,” usūl: principles of law, and principles of grammar, and then, in a diff erent discourse, between the hermeneutics and logic of the Greek philosophical heritage.

1 Grammar: the Hermeneutics of the Arabic KoranIslam was born into the Hellenized world of the Near East – Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Western Iran. It is not surprising that the concepts and structural models of the Arabic gram-

1 Koran, sūra 16: 102 – 3, trans. Pickthall. 2 Koran, sūra 2: 30 – 2.

Are We Speaking the Same Language?Translating Truths across Intellectual Traditions in al-Andalus

Anna A. Akasoy, New York

One of the crucial questions partners in a dialogue, religious or otherwise, have to address is: are we speaking the same language? Furthermore, how is dialogue possible if we speak diff erent lan-guages?

Th e Catalan missionary Ramon Llull (1232 – 1315) found an obvious answer: we need a common ground. According to Llull, adherents of diff erent faiths have to employ a language which transcends the particular and distinctive elements of these beliefs in order to establish truth. Th is language was Llull’s own Ars, a theology with philosophical and geometrical features and universal aspirations, yet deeply marked by Christian thought. Th e author illustrates the ben-efi ts of his approach in his Book of the Gentile and the Th ree Wise Men.1 In this text, the charac-ters mentioned in the title engage in a dialogue in which the “three wise men”, a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim, try to persuade the “gentile” of the truth of their respective religion. Th ey realize that their eff orts will be futile and end in confl ict if they simply insist on the authenticity of their scriptures. Rather, guided by Lady Intelligence, they follow Llull’s generic monotheistic principles manifest on trees in the forest where their gathering takes place.One of the many curious features of this text is Llull’s explanation in the prologue:

Since for a long time we have had dealings with unbelievers and have heard their false opinions and errors; and in order that they may give praise to our Lord God and enter the path of eter-nal salvation, I, who am blameworthy, despicable, poor, sinful, scorned by others, unworthy of having my name affi xed to this book or any other, following the manner of the Arabic Book of the Gentile, wish to exert myself to the utmost – trusting in the help of the Most High – in fi nd-ing a new method and new reasons by which those in error might be shown the path to glory without end and the means of avoiding infi nite suff ering.2

Th e statement locates the literary and intellectual project in a social context. Llull’s exposure to actual unbelievers inspired the text. Th is explanation fi nds ample support in the author’s biogra-phy which began in Majorca and took him to North Africa on the missionary enterprise which was the great ambition of his life. Th e second source of inspiration, the “Arabic Book of the Gen-tile”, is mysterious. No such text is known to modern scholars. Llull may be referring to a text written by someone else, but he could also be referring to an earlier version he may have com-posed in Arabic. Elsewhere too, Llull mentions original versions of his texts which he wrote in Arabic, but none of these have come down to us.3 Th ese uncertainties make it impossible to an-swer the question whether the idea of the Ars as a common language was derived from Arabic sources or Llull’s original creation.

Llull exploited the Arabic philosophical tradition he was familiar with in several ways. Th e Book of the Gentile, for example, betrays knowledge of the Islamic religion and various features

1 Selected Works of Ramón Llull (1232 – 1316), edited and translated by Anthony Bonner, Princeton, 1985, 93 – 304. 2 Ibid., 110. 3 For various connections between Llull’s thought and Arabic learned traditions see Charles Lohr, “Christianus Ar-

abicus, Cuius Nomen Raimundus Lullus”, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Th eologie 31 (1984), 57 – 88; Dominique Urvoy, Penser l’Islam. Les présupposés islamiques de l‘’Art’ de Lull, Paris 1980; Alexander Fidora and Josep E. Rubio (eds.), Raimundus Lullus. An Introduction to his Life, Works and Th ought, Turnhout 2008, 43 – 5 and 128.

Lessons in CommunicationA New Approach to Peter Abelard’s Collationes*

Jörn Müller, Würzburg

IntroductionTh e Collationes1 of Peter Abelard (1079 – 1142) are nowadays counted among the most important dialogues in medieval literature, although their immediate infl uence in the Middle Ages and in early modern times was rather limited. Th e more intense recent reception of this work has cer-tainly been sparked, at least partially, by the general rise in interest in the charismatic personal-ity of Abelard, his intriguing life and his wide-ranging œuvre, which includes infl uential philo-sophical and theological works. But this surge of scholarly attention to the Collationes is also due to the enigmatic character of the work itself, which has given rise to various competing readings of it over the last few decades.

As the former title of this work – Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum2 – already indicates, the Collationes present a disputation between a philosopher, a Jew and a Chris-tian. Th eir meeting takes place in a kind of “dream vision” of the narrator of these events, who can easily be identifi ed as Abelard himself by the cross-reference to his work called Th eologia.3 Of course, such a meeting never took place in this form, and the reported dialogue between the pro-tagonists has to be understood as a fi ctional product. Nevertheless, this intriguing work has cap-tured the imagination of many readers over the centuries, and it has been analysed on diff erent levels. Th e available rival interpretations in the scholarly literature can be categorised in a para-digmatic manner as follows:

(1) Th e “classical” view, which was dominant in the 19th century but is still sometimes to be found in more recent publications, reads the text as an “(inter-)religious dialogue”.4 Th is inter-pretation tends to stress the “enlightened” character of what Abelard presents. According to this reading, Abelard presents religious people of diff erent creeds ultimately worshipping the same God and conversing with one another in an intellectual atmosphere of mutual tolerance instead

* I am grateful to my Würzburg colleague Jon Bornholdt for helping me with my English. 1 Peter Abelard Collationes, edited and translated by John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi, Oxford 2001 [= Maren-

bon / Orlandi 2001]. 2 Th is was the title chosen by the editor of the editio princeps, F.H. Rheinwald, who relied on a Vienna manuscript

containing a later addition: Dialogus Petri Baiolardi. Th e fi rst critical edition by Rudolf Th omas (Stuttgart 1970) fol-lowed this practice. But the Incipit of an Oxford manuscript of the text, cross-references from other works (cf. Expo-sitio in Hexaemeron, Patrologia Latina, vol. 178, 768 B) and passages in the dialogue itself indicate that Collationes is a more appropriate title. For this see Marenbon / Orlandi 2001, xxiii-xxiv.

3 Cf. Collationes, § 4 (see note 1). Here and in the following I refer to the Latin text and its translation by the para-graph numbering off ered by Marenbon / Orlandi 2001. Th e explicit reference here in Abelard’s text is most likely to one of the fi rst two versions of his Th eologia (Th eologia summi boni; Th eologia christiana) since the third one, the Th eologia Scholarium, probably postdates the Collationes. For the time of composition of the Collationes see below, note 27.

4 Julia Gaus, “Das Religionsgespräch von Abaelard”, Th eologische Zeitschrift 27 (1971), 30 – 36; Aryeh Graboïs, “Le dialogue religieux au XIIe siècle. Pierre Abélard et Jehudah Halévi”, in: Bernhard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner (eds.), Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter, Wiesbaden, 1992, 149 – 67; Ursula Niggli, “Abaelards Ideen über die jüdis-che Religion und seine Hermeneutik im Dialogus”, in: ead. (ed.), Peter Abaelard. Leben – Werk –Wirkung, Freiburg 2003, 169 – 91.

Al-Ghazālī and Jehuda HaleviDivine Attributes, Metaphors and Possible Ways to Speak about God*

Beate Ulrike La Sala, Berlin

1 IntroductionIt is usually assumed that Jehuda Halevi’s (1075 – 1141) main philosophical and religious work the Sefer ha-Kuzari (Kitāb al-radd wa-’l-dalīl fī ‘l-dīn al-dhalīl (al-Kitāb al-Khazarī) / Th e book of ref-utation and proof on the despised faith)1, is also infl uenced by the conceptions of medieval Islam-ic thinkers and Sufi terminology.2 Th e thinker, considered to have had the greatest infl uence on Halevi’s thinking, is Al-Ghazālī (1058 – 1111). Th is assumption is based upon the fact that there exist striking similarities between the Sefer ha-Kuzari and Al-Ghazālī’s famous Tahāfut al-falāsifa (Incoherence of the philosophers)3. Above all, Halevi’s presentation of the philosophers is said to rely on Al-Ghazālī’s depiction and criticism of the Falāsifa in Tahāfut al-falāsifa.4 Both accounts have the refutation of three major philosophical assumptions in common, namely the eternity of the world, God’s ignorance of particulars, and the non-existence of reward and punishment. Fur-ther common features of both books are the refutation of the theory of emanation and of dual-ism, the negation of the philosophical doctrine of free will, the refutation of the theory on the rev-olution of the spheres as well as the defense of the doctrines of individual souls and of the resur-rection of the dead and a hereaft er.5 Furthermore, by comparing Halevi’s book with Al-Ghazālī’s

* Th is article also represents my research at the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 980 “Episteme in Motion” at Free University Berlin.

1 Judah Ha-Levi, Kitāb al-radd wa-’l-dalīl fī ‘l-dīn al-dhalīl (al-Kitāb al-Khazarī) / Th e book of refutation and proof on the despised faith, edited by David H. Baneth, Jerusalem 1977; Judah Hallevi, Sefer ha-Kuzari / Book of Kuzari. Translated from the Arabic by Hartwig Hirschfeld, New York 1946.

2 A lot of research has been done on Halevi’s general use of Islamic and even more of Sufi terminology. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, “Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy”, in: Th e Jewish Quarterly Review. New Series, 32 (1942), 345 – 70. Israel Efros, “Some aspects of Yehudah Halevi’s mysticism”, in: Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 11 (1941), 27 – 41. Herbert Davidson, “Th e Active Intellect in the Cuzari and Hallevi’s Th eory of Casuality”, in: Revue des études juives 131 (1972), 351 – 96. Pines, Shlomo, “Shiite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari”, in: Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980), 165 – 251. Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari, Albany, NY 2000. Diana Lobel, “Ittis-al and the Amir Ilahi: Divine Immanence and the World to Come in the Kuzari”, in: Benjamin H. Hary and Haggai Ben Shammai (eds.), Esoteric and Exoteric Aspects in Judeo-Arabic Culture, Leiden 2006, 131 – 73.

3 Al-Ghazālī, Th e incoherence of the philosophers / Tahāfut al-falāsifa. A parallel English-Arabic text transl., introd., and annotated by Michael E. Marmura, Provo, Utah 2000.

4 Th e fi rst to unfold this reliance of Halevi on Al-Ghazālī was David Kaufmann in a similarly named chapter “Jehu-da Halewi und Gazzali” in his book on the doctrine of attributes in Jewish philosophy. David Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie, Gotha 1877, 119 – 40. Baneth tried to argue against this ap-proach and to prove, which parts of Halevi’s book are genuine products of his own thought in comparison with Al-Ghazālī. See David Hartwig Baneth, “Jehuda Hallewi und Gazali”, in: Korrespondenzblatt der Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums V, Berlin 1924, 27 – 45. Another critic of Kaufmann’s approach was Neumark. See Da-vid Neumark, Jehuda Hallevi’s Philosophy in its Principles, 1908 (Reappeared as: David Neumark, “Jehuda Hallevi’s Philosophy”: in S. Cohon, ed. David Neumark, Essays in Jewish Philosophy, Cincinatti 1929; repr. Amsterdam 1971, 219 – 300). For a recent detailed comparison see Barry S. Kogan, “Al-Ghazali and Halevi on Philosophy and the Phi-losophers”, in: John Inglis (ed.), Medieval Philosophy and the classical tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity, Richmond 2002, 64 – 80. See Norman Solomon, Historical Dictionary of Judaism, Lanham, Md. [u.a.] 2006, 153.

5 See Kaufmann (see note 4), 128 – 34.

Conversion to Christianity and Anti-Talmudic Criticism from Petrus Alfonsi to Nicolas Donin and Pablo Christiani

Piero Capelli, Venezia / Baltimore

1Christian anti-Jewish polemics of the twelft h and thirteenth centuries witnessed the emergence of a new line of argumentation against Judaism and on behalf of conversion to Christianity. Th is line of argumentation was new in two ways: it was inaugurated and prevalently argued by con-verts from Judaism who before converting had been well versed in the Oral Law; and it engaged in critiques of the Talmud and the midrashic aggadot both for their content and for their sta-tus within Judaism. In this essay I will survey some of the best documented polemics, from the twelft h through the fi ft eenth century, in search of the motives for which medieval Jewish intellec-tuals converted to Christianity – fi rst in Iberia, Provence and northern France, then in other areas of what today we call Europe. My hypothesis is, fi rst, that the converts documented in these cas-es shared an inclination towards philosophical rationalism; second, that in some cases they har-bored these rationalistic inclinations before they converted to Christianity; and, fi nally, that their conversion and polemics against Talmudic lore and rabbinic leadership ought to be regarded as evidence of internal dissent within Judaism. Finally, I will argue that all three points are related, that is, that rationalism, criticism of Talmudic tradition, and conversion to Christianity were re-lated phenomena that can be better understood if considered together.

2Petrus Alfonsi’s Dialogi adversus Iudaeos, composed in Aragon around 1109, was one of the most widely read anti-Jewish texts of the Middle Ages. It ran contrary to previous Christian philoso-phy, which had claimed that the Jews were blindly practicing the Old Law, and argued instead that they followed not the Old Law but a new and heretical law, that of the Talmud. In the Dialo-gi Alfonsi defends his mastery of Jewish religious texts: while still a Jew, he had preached in the synagogues on their proper interpretation precisely to prevent Jews from apostatizing; now, start-ing from the Talmudic passage in bBerakhot 3a where God is depicted wearing phylacteries, Al-fonsi argued that this law was full of nonsensical and ridiculous anthropomorphic representa-tions of the deity:1

PETER: [...] I see that they attend to the surface [meaning] and the letter of the law alone, and do not explicate it spiritually but rather carnally, this is why they are especially beguiled by er-ror. [...] Are you not mindful of your teachers who wrote your teaching, on which your entire laws relies, according to you, how they claim that God has a form and a body, and they at-tribute such things to his ineff able majesty as it is wicked to believe and absurd to hear, see-ing that they are not based on reason (nec ulla constant ratione)? And that they advanced such opinions concerning him [God] which appear to be nothing other than the words of little boys making jokes in school, or women telling old wives’ tales in the streets. [...] If you want to know where it is written [that God wears phylacteries]: [it is] in the fi rst part of your teaching, whose name is Benedictions. Th en, if you want to know how: they have said that God has a

1 Sources are quoted in existing English translations, which I have checked against the critical editions or manu-scripts that I quote in the footnotes.

Rashi for Latin Readers: Th e Translations of Paris, 1240With an Edition of the Excerpts from Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy

Görge K. Hasselhoff, Dortmund

When in 1239 the convert Nicholas Donin who around 1225 was excommunicated from his Jew-ish congregation attacked the Talmud,1 that text was rather unfamiliar to Christians. Since the Talmud as a written text was introduced to European Jewry only two centuries earlier this unfa-miliarity is not that surprising.2 In addition, since the Talmud was written in Hebrew and Arama-ic it was not easily accessible to Latin-trained Christian readers as already Jerome in the 5th cen-tury complained when talking about his diffi culties to speak Hebrew.3

Th erefore Donin’s attacks were accompanied by translations of some Jewish texts which in one way or other had been regarded as canonical. Among these translations we fi nd extracts from the Talmud itself, some philosophical texts by Maimonides, and, surprisingly, a list of excerpts from Rashi’s commentaries on the Bible. Rashi – an acronym of Rabenu Shlomo ben Yitzḥaq – was born around 1040 in Troyes. He took studies in the Talmud academies of the Rhineland where he around 1060 started to comment on the whole Hebrew Bible as well as on the whole Babylo-nian Talmud.4 He continued and nearly completed his labours in Troyes until his death in 1105.

Already in the 12th or in the beginning of the 13th century at least the comments on Tal-mudic passages were copied together with the Talmud as can be seen from surviving manuscripts and the Latin translation which included such commentaries.5

Some of the surviving manuscripts that contain the translation of the excerpts from the Talmud also contain a list of some 160 excerpts from Rashi’s huge commentary oeuvre.6 Th ese excerpts are attributed to “Salomon Trecensis”, i. e. Salomon of Troyes, but not to Solomon fi l-ius Isaaci or something comparable. Only later, in Ramon Martí’s writings Rashi is introduced as “Rabbi”.7

I Th e Texts Translated – an OverviewAlthough we cannot state with certainty who the translator of the excerpts was, he – or they – was connected the Dominican convent Saint-Jacques in Paris whose prior Th eobaldus de Saxonia (Th ibaud de Sèzanne) was the author of the Pharetra8 and who seems to have hosted the accuser of the Talmud, Nicholas Donin. It might be that the translator was Th ibaud de Sèzanne himself.

1 See Gilbert Dahan (ed.), Le brûlement du Talmud à Paris 1242 – 1244, Paris 1999; John Friedman et al., Th e Trial of the Talmud: Paris, 1240, Toronto 2012; see also in this volume the article by Piero Capelli.

2 See Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud. Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures, Philadelphia, PA 2011.

3 See G. K. Hasselhoff , “Revising the Vulgate: Jerome and his Jewish Interlocutors”, in: Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 64 (2012), 209 – 221, at 218 with references to Jerome.

4 Avraham Grossman, Rashi, Oxford; Portland, OR 2012. 5 See, e. g., Andreas Lehnardt, “Das Radolfzeller Talmud-Fragment”, in: Hegau. Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Volkskunde

und Naturgeschichte des Gebietes zwischen Rhein, Donau und Bodensee 64 (2007), 29 – 35. 6 See below, II. 7 For examples, see G. K. Hasselhoff , Raimundus Martini, Texte zur Gotteslehre. Pugio fi dei I-III, 1 – 6. Lateinisch – He-

bräisch / Aramäisch – Deutsch; Hrsg., übersetzt und eingeleitet, Freiburg et al. 2014. 8 See Gilbert Dahan, “Les traductions latines de Th ibaud de Sézanne”, in: Id. (ed.), Le brûlement du Talmud (see

note 1), 95 – 120.

Gentiles and JewsCommon Ground and Authorities in the Mission of Ramon Martí’s Pugio fi dei*

Ann Giletti, Rome

Inside the church of Santa Sabina on the Aventine Hill in Rome, high above the entrance, is a blue and gold, fi ft h-century mosaic bearing a dedication recording the patron of the church and its construction. On either side of the text stand two female fi gures, identifi ed in the mosaic as personifi cations of “Ecclesia ex circumcisione” and “Ecclesia ex gentibus”, that is, the two origi-nal peoples from whom the early Church drew its followers: the Jews and the gentiles. It was to these two communities (if we can use this word loosely) that the Apostles preached, Peter fa-mously directing his eff orts to the Jews, and Paul looking also to the gentiles, or pagans, for con-verts.1 In the thirteenth century, St. Dominic and his followers would take up residence at San-ta Sabina, and the church would pass into the care of his newly founded Order. Here, and in cen-tres of study across Europe, the Order of Preachers would promote teaching and preparation for missionary work to carry out their founder’s aims of eff ecting conversions. Th is apostolic work developed and spread over the course of the century, and approaches to it in preaching and de-bating were tested, while expertise in theology and attendant skills, such as languages and phil-osophical reasoning, were promoted through teaching and writing. It was in this atmosphere that a Catalan Dominican expert in Hebrew and Arabic languages, as well as in Jewish and Mus-lim Scripture and Arabic philosophy, produced a large volume called Pugio fi dei.2 Ramon Martí (c. 1220 – c. 1284 / 5) completed this book in Barcelona around 1278, and probably laboured on it for a considerable time before that date. With the Pugio fi dei, we are very fortunate in having ex-tant an autograph manuscript (MS Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève 1405 (13th c.), hereaft er “MS 1405”). It is either in Martí’s own hand, or written out by a scribe under his very close super-vision. Th e work is divided into three books which cover two diverse topics: Book I attacks phi-losophy, while Books II and III put cases for Christian doctrine to Jews. Th e Pugio fi dei is inter-esting for a number of reasons, particularly its astounding collection of quotations from a wide range of sources. It is also distinctive in that it has very close links to the Summa contra gentiles of Th omas Aquinas, Martí’s contemporary and co-frater. While the work’s sources and relationship to the Summa contra gentiles have been well studied in modern scholarship, the pairing of philos-ophy and Judaism in it – or the reasoning behind this – remains unexplained. In what follows, I will consider the nature of the Pugio fi dei as a whole, taking into account its relationship with the Summa contra gentiles, in order to understand how its two apparently unrelated topics belong to-gether, particularly as it is not immediately clear who the intended audience is for the anti-philos-

* I am grateful for the comments of Claudia la Malfa and Janet Chapple, and assistance from Grain d’espoire (Prof. Nicole Bériou) which enabled me to study MS Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève 1405 (13th c.), hereaft er “MS 1405” in Paris.

1 Galatians 2:7 – 8, and 2:11 – 4 (Paul rebukes Peter for not eating with gentiles); Acts 13:46 – 7 (Paul preaching to gen-tiles); Jews and Gentiles merged in Christ: Galatians 3:27 – 8, and Colossians 3:11. For a discussion of this iconog-raphy and its relation to the Apostles, including at Santa Sabina, see S.J. Frederic W. Schlatter, “Th e Two Women in the Mosaic of Santa Pudenziana”, in: Journal of Early Christian Studies 3 (1995), 1 – 24; and Walter Lowrie, Art in the Early Church, New York 1947, 146.

2 Th is work is extant in 13 manuscripts and two editions of 1651 and 1687, the second of which has been reproduced in facsimile: Ramon Martí, Pugio fi dei adversus mauros et judeos, Leipzig 1687 (reprinted Farnborough 1967). Un-less otherwise indicated, citations are to the 1967 facsimile.

Towards the Miracle of LanguageRamon Llull and the Creation of a Christian Religious Language

Knut Martin Stünkel, Bochum

In studies on religion, from the very origin of Religious Studies in 19th century philology up to re-cent publications, religion and language are closely associated. Th e opinion is held that “religion is constituted, or encompassed, by language. Language, in other words, is a necessary condition for the existence of religion: no language, no religion.”1 As this preeminence of language holds true for every fi eld of human activity, the idea seems to have no further explanatory power. How-ever, at least to my mind, it could gain some further signifi cance, if it could be shown that the re-verse assumption: no religion, no language, can be confi rmed by evidence from the material level.

Th e reason that Ramon Llull (1232 – 1316) had to be subject of a contribution to the pre-sent volume is not only due to personal interests. Llull is not only considered to be a landmark in the history of the so-called religious dialogue. Additionally, the Majorcan is of great geographical or spatial importance with regard to the ideology of convivencia. His relevance is, however, coun-terweighted by his enigmatic persona.2 Th ough Llull for many good reasons can be considered as a freak, i. e. some exciting but marginal fi gure, he is, nevertheless, a freak with central signifi -cance. Th is is the case because of some kind of cumulative idealizing which might happen with regard to the personal existence of this fi gure. In short, the line that culminates in Llull accord-ing to this perspective runs as follows: while the Iberian Peninsula is the birthplace and labora-tory of convivencia, the small trade-based Kingdom of Majorca being oriented towards the wide open sea and far-away coastlines is even more destined to serve as a prime example of this idea. Majorca’s prime port, later to be called Palma, is something of a quintessence of Majorcan mer-its, and here one inhabitant, the philosophically and artistically interested Ramon Llull, off spring of the fi rst generation of settlers aft er the Christian conquest, might serve as a pars pro toto and multiplied, self-refl ective proponent for this spatial privilege. Indeed, one fi nds such descriptions in the literature on Llull quite oft en, especially in those works dealing with religious confl icts and their possible peaceful and tolerant solution in dialogue.3 But – of course – all is not sweet-ness and light in this picture. A “myth of tolerance”4 is likely to be conjured from the geographi-cal circumstances.5 As one learns from historians of this area, for example in this case from Da-

1 Hans Penner, “Holistic Analysis, Conjectures and Refutations”, in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62 (1994), 977 – 96, here 989.

2 Some of his enigmatic features, for example him appearing at the same time as insane and a genius, megaloman-ic and of superior intellectual qualities, are described in: Joachim Lavajo, “Th e Apologetical method of Raymond Marti according to the problematic of Raymond Lull”, in: Islamochristiana 11 (1985), 155 – 176, here 155 – 6.

3 Annemarie Mayer for example speaks enthusiastically about the “kairos” of a situation of religious pluralism not only in Majorca, but also in the whole Mediterranean (Annemarie C. Mayer, Drei Religionen – ein Gott? Ramon Lulls interreligiöse Diskussion der Eigenschaft en Gottes, Freiburg et. al. 2008, 4). And Charles Lohr even praises the “rare spirit of openness and tolerance which emerged between the great Mediterranean cultures from the contact of Islam, Judaism and Christianity.” (Charles Lohr, “Ramon Llull. Philosophische Anstösse zu einem Dialog der Re-ligionen”, in: Anstösse zu einem Dialog der Religionen: Th omas von Aquin – Ramon Llull – Nikolaus von Kues. Ta-gungsberichte der Katholischen Akademie der Erzdiözese Freiburg, Freiburg 1997, 31).

4 Roger Friedlein “Ramon Llull. Der Islam von Mallorca aus gesehen” in: Th omas Bremer et al. (eds.) Romanische In-seln im Mittelmeer. Traumbilder und Wirklichkeiten, Halle an der Saale 2000, 113 – 38, here 131.

5 Even though Anthony Bonner claims for a spirit of buoyancy and optimism to be present in Llull’s lifetime, i. e. in the 13th century Mediterranean, he still pours water into wine by stating: “Th e reader, however, must beware of im-

A Confl ict of ReasonScotus’ Appraisal of Christianity and Judgment of Others Religions*

Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Porto Alegre

IntroductionScotus’ Prologue to the Ordinatio contains several essential refl ections about the nature of theol-ogy. Part I includes discussions on faith and reason of an “anti-Averroistic” sort and off ers a def-inition of the proprium of theology based on the concept of “supernatural”.1 Scotus also defends there the necessity2 of supernatural knowledge (i. e., articles of faith and truths of Scripture), un-derstanding “necessity” in a specifi c sense. In Parts III and IV we fi nd an analysis of the status of theology as scientia; in it, Scotus assesses the defi nition of “scientifi c knowledge” off ered in Aris-totle’s Posterior analytics.3 In Part V Scotus explains in what sense “our theology” (theologia nos-tra) can be understood as a “practical science”. In so doing, he reconsiders Aristotle’s theory of “praxis”, concluding that the adequate object of our necessary theological knowledge is the divine essence, and that practical knowledge consists in knowing the divine essence as an object in con-formity with and prior to the love of God – prior to a “right volition”.4 In his still much neglected Part II, which is found only in the Ordinatio Prologue5 and not in the Prologues to Lectura and Reportatio parisiensis, Scotus defends Scripture against the charge that it does not off er suffi cient information about the supernatural knowledge needed by Christian pilgrims.

In fact, Part II also addresses an epistemic issue connected with theological discourse. In my reading, Part II is indeed an attempt (I) to show the “suffi ciency” of Scripture, and even more to show (II) the credibility of the “necessary” truths found in it. Scotus’ attempt includes apolo-getic arguments on behalf of the truthfulness of Scripture. In the end, this argumentation itself expresses a view about what kind of reasoning can convince unbelievers to believe or accept cer-tain objects – e. g., the articles of faith and/ or doctrines of Scripture – as true.6 (III) Th e fi rst two steps just mentioned are a decisive presupposition to realize how Part II of the Ordinatio Prologue expresses a situation of confl ict with other religions. It may be the case (see below under III) that

* Signifi cant parts of this essay have been already discussed and were published by me in R. H. Pich, “Scotus on the Credibility of the Holy Scripture”, in: José Francisco P. Meirinhos and Olga Weijers (eds.), Florilegium Mediaevale. Études off ertes à Jacqueline Hamesse à l’occasion de son éméritat, Brepols, 2009, 469 – 90; id., “Duns Scotus on the Credibility of Christian Doctrines”, in: Angelo Musco – C. Campagno – S. D’Agostino – G. Musotto (orgs.), Univer-sality of Reason – Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages, vol. II, Palermo, 2012, 999 – 1011. However, Section III of this study is entirely new. New literature has been brought into the text as a whole.

1 Cf. Roberto Hofmeister Pich, “As principais posições de Scotus na Primeira Parte do Prólogo à Ordinatio”, in: João Duns Scotus (ed.), Prólogo da Ordinatio, Porto Alegre 2003, 15 – 218.

2 On this “necessity” cf. Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Oxford 1999, 10 – 2; R. H. Pich, “William E. Mann sobre a dout-rina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: segunda consideração”, in: Dissertatio 21 (2005), 7 – 59.

3 Cf. Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Der Begriff der wissenschaft lichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus, PhD Diss. Bonn 2001.

4 Cf. Henri A. Krop, De status van de theologie volgens Johannes Duns Scotus. De verhouding tussen theologie en metafysica, Amsterdam 1987; Hannes Möhle, Ethik als scientia practica nach Johannes Duns Scotus. Eine philosophis-che Grundlegung, Münster 1995, 13 – 157; Olivier Boulnois, Duns Scot, la rigueur de la charité, Paris 1998, 131 – 42.

5 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Civitas Vaticana, 1950, vol. I, prol. p. 2, q. un., nn. 95 – 123, pp. 59 – 87: “Utrum cognitio supenaturalis necessaria viatori sit suffi cienter tradita in Sacra Scriptura”.

6 Cf. also Josef Finkenzeller, Off enbarung und Th eologie nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Skotus. Eine historische und systematische Untersuchung, Münster 1961, 38.

John of Segovia and Religious Language / Interreligious Communication*

Ulli Roth, Freiburg i. Br.

John of Segovia was a diligent and careful reader and an eloquent and exhaustive speaker. Yet, he was not safe from the abyss of language. Th is can best be seen by having a look at an example that shows John of Segovia’s way of thinking about language and more exactly his thinking within and with lan-guage. As John of Segovia liked quoting the Qur’ān in order to interpret it thoroughly, the example is taken from one of his countless quotations of the Qur’ān together with his own interpretation of it in his enormous treatise De gladio divini spiritus, written in about 1453 aft er the fall of Constantinople.

Th e develish men listened and said: We belief that the Alcoran, which is wonderful to listen to, teaches the right way and we do not impose God the sublime to have a winged or a son as par-ticipant. Th erefore, we have the opinion that neither human beings nor devils will impose God anything false.

In these words John of Segovia obviously attacked the Christians saying, that even devilish people who belief in the Alcoran do not want to confess three persons in God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom he denotes fi guratively under the name “winged.”1

Some things sound quite strange and not only for us 500 years aft er John of Segovia. Does the Qur’ān really mention the Holy Spirit, who appears according to the New Testament as a dove, indeed a winged bird? Does the Qur’ān consider devilish or diabolic people to be true Mus-lims believing in the one God? John of Segovia himself has doubts and continues his refl ections with the following restriction: “if it sounds like that in Arabic, as the Latin translation says”2. It

* I want to thank my colleague Michael Fuchs very much for proof-reading my paper. Editions and manuscripts frequently referred to: John of Segovia: De gladio divini spiritus, ed. in: Johannes von Segovia, De gladio divini spiritus in corda mittendo

Sarracenorum. Edition und deutsche Übersetzung mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen von Ulli Roth (= Corpus Islam-ochristianum. Series latina 7), Vol. 2, Wiesbaden 2012;

Johannes von Segovia: Epistula ad Nicolaum de Cusa, ed. in: Davide Scotto, “Via pacis et doctrine”. Le Epistole sull’ Islam di Juan de Segovia, PhD Firenze 2012, 2-81 (partly edited in: Darío Cabanelas Rodríguez, Juan de Segovia y el problama islámico, Madrid 1952, 303-10);

John of Segovia: Praefatio in translationem, ed. in: José Martínez Gázquez, “El prólogo de Juan de Segobia al Corán (Qur’ān) trilingüe (1456)”, in: Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 38 (2003), 389-410;

John of Segovia: Replica magne continencie ad Iohannem Cabilonensem episcopum, ed. in: Scotto, “Via pacis et doc-trine”, loc. cit., 82-281 (partly ed. in: Rodríguez, Juan de Segovia, loc. cit., 331-5);

V: Rom, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vaticanus latinus, 2923. 1 De gladio divini spiritus, Consid. 2,30 – 34. 37 – 40: “[…] homines diabolici auscultando dicebant: Nos Alchoran mi-

rabilem auditu, viam rectam edocentem credimus nec alitem deo sublimi nec fi lium […] participem ponimus [...]. Nos igitur opinati sumus nec homines nec diabolos quodpiam deo falsum imposituros. [Sura 72,1 – 5 (Bibliander 178,8 – 13)]: […] In hiis quidem verbis manifeste invehit contra Christianos dicens, quod homines etiam diaboli-ci Alchoran credentes confi teri nolunt tres personas in deo patrem, fi lium et spiritum sanctum, quem fi gurate des-ignat sub nomine ‘alitis’ […].” Cf. Epistula ad Nicolaum Cusanum (V 7v; Scotto 10). Th e Latin translation of the Qur’ān of Robert of Ketton is quoted according to Th eodor Bibliander (ed.): Machumetis Saracenorum principis, eiusque successorum vitae, doctrina, ac ipse Alcoran, Basel 2nd edition, 1550. For a general survey see my intro-duction to John of Segovia: De gladio divini spiritus, XIX-XCIX.

2 De gladio divini spiritus, Consid. 2,45 – 48: “Quae sola denominatio [sc. homines diabolicos], si ita sonat in Arabico, quomodo Latina interpretatio inquit, testimonium profecto suffi ciens est ad cognoscendum, quales sunt et fi unt li-

Johannes 1,1 in den Sermones des Nikolaus von Kues

Günter Bader, Gomadingen

Michael Wolter zum 12. Juli 2015

EinleitungVEn avrch/| h=n o` lo,goj: Kein Th eologe, der sich nicht gerne mit eben diesen griechischen Voka-beln in humanistischen Kreisen präsentierte; kein Exeget, der nicht durch dieses Tor zu Werke schritte; kein Patristiker, kein Systematiker, der sich nicht dieses Textes zur Bildung von Chris-tologie und Trinitätslehre bediente; kein Prediger und kein Liturg des zweiten Weihnachtstages, der nicht, falls Hörer geblieben sind, diese Perikope zum Anlass nähme zu zeigen, was er kann. Jedermann spürt: Johannes 1,1 gehört den Th eologen.1 Jedoch das Erratische daran ist schwer-lich zu übersehen. Der Satz Johannes 1,1 handelt nicht vom leibhaft en Wort wie Johannes 1,14 und I. Johannes 1,1. Auch handelt er nicht vom Worte Gottes wie Off enbarung 19,13. Er handelt von Wort ohne Attribut und Gott ohne Attribut. Zwei lapidare, absolute Nomina. Zwei Absoluta?

Aber genauer betrachtet schwindet die Pseudovertraulichkeit der Th eologen mit Johannes 1,1 schnell. Sobald man die unabweisbare Frage stellt: Wer spricht hier eigentlich?, kann die Ant-wort nur lauten: Eigentlich niemand. Und schon öff net sich der Abgrund. Beides, eigentlich und niemand, hängt miteinander zusammen. Es ist niemand sichtbar, der solche Worte sprechen soll-te. Sind Worte da, aber niemand sichtbar, der sie spricht, dann sind eben diese Worte nicht eigent-lich gesprochene Worte. Die Sprecherlosigkeit von Johannes 1,1 und die Uneigentlichkeit der dort geführten Rede sind zwei Aspekte von ein und demselben Sachverhalt. Mit gutem Grund wurde von Seiten der Sprachwissenschaft eine „realistisch gewendete Umformulierung“ in Vorschlag ge-bracht; an die Stelle von Am Anfang war das Wort solle treten Am Anfang müssen wir uns in Wor-te fassen, wobei mit wir ein sprechendes Subjekt aufgeboten und mit müssen noch etwas gerettet wird vom einstmaligen theologischen Touch; nur so könne man in Johannes 1,1 „mehr sehen als eine ‚bloß theologische‘ Angelegenheit.“2 Aber was heißt bloß theologisch? Wenn Th eologie, wie die Vokabel sagt, die Zusammenstellung ist von Gott und Wort, Wort und Gott: ist sie nur die opa-ke Vorform dessen, was durch Übersetzung ins Realistische ans Licht gebracht werden soll?

Dass Johannes 1,1 einiges von seiner Erratizität verliert und an Kontextualität gewinnt, hat Tilman Borsche mit sicherem Strich gezeigt, indem er die Aussagen, die dort gemacht werden, dem Bereich der Sprachmetaphern zuordnet, genauer Texten, die über Sprachmetaphern refl ektieren.3 Sprachmetaphern liegen vor, wenn Sprechen den eigentlichen Gebrauch verlässt und metaphori-sche Bedeutung annimmt. Natürlich lässt sich die Grenze zwischen eigentlich / proprie und unei-gentlich / metaphorice nicht ohne willkürliche Setzung ziehen. Ist mit Aristoteles derjenige Begriff der Sprache eigentlich, der von der Stimme ausgeht und dieser mehr als natürliche Bedeutung zu-weist: Bedeutungsfähigkeit,4 und ist demnach Sprechen im eigentlichen Verstand eine Bildung von

1 Albrecht Beutel, In dem Anfang war das Wort. Studien zu Luthers Sprachverständnis (1992), Tübingen, 2. Aufl age 2006. 2 Wolf Peter Klein, Am Anfang war das Wort. Th eorie- und wissenschaft sgeschichtliche Elemente frühneuzeitlichen

Sprachbewußtseins, Berlin 1992, 11. 3 Tilman Borsche, Art. „Sprechen“, in: Ralf Konersmann (Hg.), Wörterbuch der philosophischen Metaphern, Dar-

mstadt 2007, 388 – 401. 4 Aristoteles, De an. II, 8, 420b29 – 33: ouv ga.r pa / õ zw|,ou yo,foõ fwnh,, kaqa,per ei;pomen (e;sti ga.r kai. th|/ glw,tth|

yofei / n kai. w`j oi` bh,ttontej), avlla. dei/ e;myofo,n [v.l. e;myuco,n] te ei=nai to. tu,pton kai. meta. fantasi,,aj tino.j

Towards a Th eory of Meta-communicative Elements in Medieval Religious DialoguesAbelard’s Collationes and the Topology of “Religion”

Knut Martin Stünkel, Bochum

In the following, by scrutinizing forms of language in medieval philosophy I am going to analyze philosophical forms of language that contemplate forms of language in texts which (at least sup-posedly) deal with other religious traditions. By doing so, the form of language in question trans-forms itself to another level of insight.

If one may interpret the so-called “religious dialogues”1 as a philosophical answer to the challenge of some religious contact situations, the answer will mainly consist of some philosophy of language which especially examines the communicative functions of notions or structural con-cepts. Th us, the reaction of someone who writes a religious dialogue is not a refl ection on toler-ance, but rather a refl ection on language. It is done in order to make the contact situation a mat-ter of action-guiding knowledge, dealing with the problem of transfer. Th e results of the refl ection are therefore primarily related to the contact situation, which proves to be of great importance if it comes to the question of notions and their meaning. Th e philosophical dialogue is a refl ection on how language works, how it should work in order to provide both understanding and some balance of positions (which may of course be some act of usurpation). As medieval writers gener-ally considered themselves to be in fact religiously determined (by religious truth), their attempt to refl ect on communication in communication, i. e. meta-communication, is another example of the emergence of meta-language from object language, which may be used as a starting point for a scientifi c examination of religion (Religionswissenschaft / Religious Studies). Meta-communica-tive elements are leading towards a theory on their own account (and not only by means of the generalizing viewpoint of the scientifi c observer). To put it into a theoretical concept: philosoph-ical answers to religious contact situations are above all topologies.2

Let me fi rst spend a few words on the notion of meta-communication used in the following, for it seems that it conveys diff erent traditions in English and in German. Simply speaking, in Ger-many, the notion is related to the psychologist Wolfgang Metzger, a leading fi gure of the Gestaltpsy-chologie, and means communication on communication in order to make communication easier. In the English-speaking world it is associated with the work of Gregory Bateson (whose profession is not so easy to defi ne). Here, meta-communication deals with ordering communication by means of contextualization, re-contextualization or de-contextualization. Th e notion of meta-communi-cation used here, in this paper, may allude to these two usages but it is not to be reduced to them.

I Abelard’s Collationes as a Meta-Communicative DialogueTo explain the notion of meta-communication topologically, I shall start with an analysis of an object language phenomenon, i. e. a medieval religious dialogue from Latin Christendom. Peter

1 On the problematic of this notion cf. Reinhold F. Glei, “Religious Dialogues and Trialogues in the Middle Ages. A Preliminary Essay”, in: Medievalia et Humanistica 38 (2012), 21 – 36, here 22 f.

2 To the notion of topology with regard to the “spatial turn” in the study of medieval religious dialogues cf. Michael Bor-golte, “Christen und Juden im Disput. Mittelalterliche Religionsgespräche im ‘spatial turn’ “, in: Historische Zeitschrift 286 (2008), 359 – 402, here 372 – 374. Borgolte’s account of the topologies has to be completed by the topology of notions.

Das Hebräische in Reuchlins Werk

Saverio Campanini, Paris

Tum Capnion: Sile, cela, occulta, tege, tace, mussa.J. Reuchlin

Es scheint angebracht, kurz etwas über meine Herkunft zu sagen. Ich bin Judaist, das heißt mein Selbstverständnis im Wissenschaft sbetrieb identifi ziert sich mit der Disziplin, die den seltsamen, denkwürdigen Namen Philologie trägt. Sind Th eologie und Philologie nicht etwa Synonyme1? Die Endung (-logie) ist gleich und man könnte meinen, es handle sich um denselben Begriff , wenn man den ersten Teil (Th eos = Gott; Philia = Liebe) mit dem ersten Johannisbrief betrachtet, wo man liest „Gott ist Liebe“ (I. Joh. 4, 16). Aber gerade die Philologie, wie ich sie verstehe, hilft uns, den doppelten Fehler nicht zu begehen. Einerseits ist die Liebe im ersten Johannesbrief nicht philia, sondern agape, und andererseits weist die Struktur des Wortes Philologie eine Anomalie auf. Gewöhnlich ist das Objekt der Disziplin an erster Stelle zu fi nden (Th eologie, Psychologie, Politologie usw.) und die Philologie sollte demnach als „Logophilie“ auft reten, was aber eher eine exzessive Liebe zum Wort zu bezeichnen scheint.

Beide Worte haben aber mit Sicherheit einen anderen, theologisch aufgeladenen Begriff , nämlich Logos gemein. Formuliert man es überspitzt, ist die Philologie eine säkularisierte Ver-sion der Th eologie oder wäre dies zumindest gerne. Aber gerade wenn Gott schweigt, ist nur die Rede von Gott gerechtfertigt. Wenn Gott redet oder geredet hat, scheint die Liebe zu seinem Wort die einzige Möglichkeit, ihm in dieser Welt zu begegnen. Vielleicht könnte es also auch umge-kehrt sein, dann wäre die Th eologie die säkularisierte Form der Philologie. Sicher scheint mir, dass die Philologie ihre eigenen theologischen Prämissen in Klammern zu setzen sucht, um kor-rekt zu funktionieren. Aber gerade wenn sie erfolgreich ist, wird ihr Objekt, das Wort, die Spra-che, völlig irrelevant, weil ohne Subjekt. Dieser erbitterte Kampf zwischen dem „Mah“ (hm, was) und dem „Mi“ (ym, wer) erzeugt meiner Meinung nach die ganze Spannung, die zwischen Philo-logie und Th eologie besteht. Es ist keine simple oder tendenziell überwindbare Diff erenz, es ist ein Kampf um Leben und Tod, und es ist besser, sich keine Illusionen über eine mögliche Versöh-nung zu machen. Nur dann kann die Diskussion fruchtbar werden, wenn alle Beteiligten sich im Klaren über die Ziele und den Spieleinsatz der Auseinandersetzung sind.

Die Th eologie ist viel älter als die Philologie, auch wenn der spätantike heidnische Autor Martianus Capella die Philologie sogar zu einer Göttin erhob, die Mercurius heiratete. Aber es handelte sich um eine andere Sorte von Philologie, die wir heute vielleicht Bildung oder Wissen nennen würden. In mir ist nach und nach die Überzeugung gereift , dass die Philologie und die Th eologie in einen Konfl ikt gerieten, der in der Renaissance in aller Deutlichkeit hervortrat. Die Reformation wäre dann ein Kapitel dieses langwierigen Streites, der immer noch anhält und aus dem bis heute kein Ausweg gefunden wurde.

Ich werde versuchen, das was damit gemeint ist, am Beispiel von Johannes Reuchlin zu ver-deutlichen. Reuchlin (1455 – 1522) war ein Humanist und orientierte seine literarische Laufb ahn an dem italienischen, vor allem fl orentinischen Humanismus. Die Sprache stand im Zentrum sei-nes Interesses und Reuchlin ging gründlich zur Sache: Zuerst beschäft igte er sich mit dem Latei-

1 Vgl. Saverio Campanini, „La traduzione italiana del De arte cabalistica di Johannes Reuchlin“, in: Materia Giudai-ca 1 (1996), 4 – 7.

Reliable WordLuther’s Understanding of God, Humanity, and the World*

Oswald Bayer, Hennef

1 Physical WordTh e philologist Friedrich Nietzsche maintained that Luther’s translation of the Bible was “the best German book”:

Th e preacher was the only one in Germany who knew the weight of a syllable or a word, in what manner a sentence strikes, springs, rushes, fl ows, and comes to a close; he alone had a con-science in his ears [...] Th e masterpiece of German prose is therefore with good reason the mas-terpiece of its greatest preacher: the Bible has hitherto been the best German book.1

In connection to Luther’s work, Goethe designated the Bible a “mirror of the world”2 and thereby saw the world of this one book and the “book of the world” enfolded within each other.

Researchers of the German language to a great extent agreed that Luther, not only with his translation of the Bible but also with his prefaces to the Bible, sermons, Small Catechism, and his songs, pamphlets, and tracts, is “an event [...] in the history of German literature” “ to which no other can be compared.”3 To come to this essay’s thesis most succinctly: the event is of speech that comes out of hearing. Luther is linguistically creative by means of hearing and translating.

To recognize Luther’s signifi cance for the German language, one must not, as has indeed happened, make Luther into the creator of the modern High German literary language. Never-theless, Klopstock wrote that among no nation has a single person shaped the language of a whole people as Luther has done.4 In fact, Luther’s language – above all the language of his translation of the Bible – became the presupposition of understanding and communicating throughout the whole of the German language.

Even Luther’s sharpest opponents recognized the infl uence of his translation of the Bible. Johannes Cochlaeus had to admit that Luther’s New Testament, through its printing, was dissem-inated to such an amazing extent

[...] that even cobblers and women and other simple people, if they had ever learned German at all and in so far as they were Lutherans, read it with greatest desire as the well of all truth. Th ey carried the translation with themselves on their bosoms in order to impress it on their memo-ry by means of frequent reading.5

* Th e following abbreviations are used: LW = Luther’s Works (55 vols.), American Edition, ed. by Jaroslav Pelican and Helmut T. Lehmann; WA = Martin Luthers Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe, Weimar and Köln 1883 – 1993; WA.DB = Weimarer Ausgabe, Deutsche Bibel; WA.TR = Weimarer Ausgabe, Tischreden. 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), #247 in: id. (ed.) Basic Writings, trans. Helen Zimmern, New

York 1947, 560 – 61 (Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin 1968, vol. VI – 2, 199). 2 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Letter to Zelter,” 14 November 1816 (Artemis-Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und

Gespräche, Munich 1949, vol. 21, Letters for the years 1814 – 32; 195 – 98, 196). 3 Heinz Otto Burger, “Luther als Ereignis der Literaturgeschichte”, in: Lutherjahrbuch 24 (1957), 86 – 101, 87. 4 Friedrich G. Kopstock, Die deutsche Gelehrtenrepublic, Part 1 (1774), 170. 5 Johannes Cochlaeus, Commentaria de Actis et Scriptis Martini Lutheri Saxonis (1549), 55 (translated from Latin).

Calvin: We Learn True Wisdom in the School of God*

Wulfert de Greef, Leusden

Th e subject of this article is Calvin’s view of true wisdom and the religious language involved. Ac-cording to Calvin “we learn true wisdom in the school of God.”1 Firstly I will draw attention to the term “wisdom”. Th is term plays an important role in Calvin’s writings, especially in his com-mentaries, and in his sermons as well. Regarding the term “wisdom” I will focus on the fi rst sen-tence of the Institutes from 1539. “Th e whole sum of our wisdom which is worth calling true and certain is practically comprised of two parts: that is, the knowledge of God and of ourselves.”2 In the edition of 1536 the fi rst sentence was diff erent. “Nearly the whole of sacred doctrine con-sists in these two parts: knowledge of God and of ourselves.”3 It is noteworthy that Calvin in 1539 changed the word doctrina to sapientia. We do not know why he did so. Some scholars have of course mentioned this change, but they have not paid much attention to the reason why. Th ey have only made some remarks and suggestions.4 In the mentioned fi rst sentence of the Institutes of 1539 Calvin connected wisdom with the knowledge of God and of ourselves. Th ose words (the knowledge of God and of ourselves) were also written by Calvin in the fi rst sentence of the Insti-tutes of 1536. Th e fact that Calvin speaks about the knowledge of God and the knowledge of our-selves has drawn the attention of all Calvin scholars.

I want to start with giving my view on why Calvin changed doctrina into sapientia. It is re-lated to Calvin’s aim in writing the Institutes. In the fi rst edition of the Institutes he aimed to espe-cially equip those who had little knowledge of faith and to give them instruction of the Christian

* Th e following abbreviations are used: CO = Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Wilhelm Baum et al., 59 vols., Corpus Reformatorum 29 – 87

(Brunswick 1863 – 1900). 1 See for example Calvin’s commentary on Eph. 5:15. “[...] comme gens: c’est-à-dire, comme gens que le Seigneur

a instruits en l’escole de vraye sagesse.” Cf. the prayer at the end of Calvin’s sermon on Is. 57:5 – 9: “Et cognoissant qu’il nous a suffi semment enseignez par sa Parole, que nous luy soions vraiement disciples desirans de profi ter en son escolle et n’estimant autre sagesse, sinon celle que nous avons apprinse de luy seul” (Sermons sur Esaïe, ed. Max Engamamare (Supplementa Calviniana IV / 1 – 2), Neukirchen-Vluyn 2012, 331).

2 Latin: “Tota fere sapientiae nostrae summa, quae vera demum ac solida sapientia censeri debeat, duabus partibus constat: cognitione Dei, et nostri” (CO 1,279).

3 Latin: “Summa fere sacrae doctrinae duabus his partibus constat: Cognitione Dei ac nostri” (CO 1,27). 4 See for example T.H. L. Parker, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, Edinburgh 1969. Parker thinks that the

change from doctrina to sapientia is signifi cant (p. 15). He suggests that this change is connected with the emer-gence of the many neo-philosophies in the sixteenth century. Calvin would not be content with the term doctrina because he found it too limiting. “Calvin therefore changes the term to the comprehensive sapientia, and so cuts the ground from under the feet of the many neo-philosophies of his day” (p. 16). Paul C. Bötger notes that sapientia refers to the knowledge we acquire through the Holy Spirit. He gives the next explanation for Calvin’s use of sapi-entia in 1539: “Aus literarischen Gründen wurde die speziell christliche Terminologie vorerst zurückgehalten.” See Paul C. Bötger, Calvins Institutio als Erbauungsbuch. Versuch einer literarischen Analyse, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1992, 34. Christoph Strohm gives the next elucidation: “With the replacement of the term ‘doctrina’ with that of ‘sapien-tia’ connectedness to life and the existential dimension are more heavily stressed as characteristics of true theolo-gy.” See Christoph Strohm, “Methodology in discussion of ‘Calvin and Calvinis’ “, in: Herman J. Selderhuis (ed.), Calvinus Praeceptor Ecclesiae. Papers of the International Congress on Calvin Research, Princeton, August 20 – 24, 2002, Genève 2004, 73. Olivier Millet mentions that there are diff erent views on the change from doctrina to sapien-tia. “Le débat est ouvert.” See Olivier Millet, Calvin et la dynamique de la parole. Étude de rhétorique réformée, Par-is 1992, 558; see also Jean Calvin, Institution de la religion chrétienne (1541), édition critique par Olivier Millet, Ge-nève 2008, tome I, 187, note 1 and the mentioned literature.

a) Hebrew BibleGenesis 49:10 161Exodus 9:24 96– 20:2 221– 22:5 96– 23:19 91Leviticus 10:1 96– 18:19 108– 26:14 108– 26:46 108Numbers 6:27 109– 13:33 109– 23:8 109– 24:19 109– 27:11 109– 28:15 109– 30:2 109– 32:14 96Deuteronomy 4:14 105, 109– 4:32 105, 109– 7:2 105, 109– 11:22 105 – 6, 109– 14:21 91– 17:11 106, 110– 19:19 106, 110– 22:10 91– 24:7 106 – 7, 110– 28:30 107, 110II Kings 2:11 102Isaiah 9:2 186– 9:6 187Jeremiah 31:19 97Jonah 4:6 117Micah 6:5 109Psalm 2:7 186– 19 234 – 5– 33:4 221– 119 238– 119:2 237Job 6:3 97– 13:26 96Proverbs 18:23 96Lamentations 2:14 96Daniel 9:24 161I Chronicles 11:2 96

b) New TestamentMatthews 5:43 107

– 16:19 221– 26:26 221– 26:28 221Mark 16:16 221Luke 22:32 166John 1:1 181 – 191– 1:4 185– 1:12 185– 1:14 181 – 3Acts 5:38 – 9 166– 13:46 – 7 111Romans 1:19 233I Corinthians 1:21 233– 3:18 233Galatians 2:7 – 8 111– 2:11 – 4 111– 3:27 – 8 111Ephesians 6:17 173Colossians 1:28 228– 3:11 111Titus 1:9 125Hebrews 9:1 – 28 161– 11:3 235I Peter 3:15 125I John 1:1 181– 4:16 207Revelation 19:13 181, 188

c) Rabbinical Writingsc1) Mishnah

Avot 1:1 95, 101

c2) Babylonian TalmudBerakhot 3a 89Rosh ha-Shanah 16b 101Ketubbot 77b 100 – 1Baba Meṣiʾa 86a 95Baba Batra 25a 101

d) Quran2:30 – 2 272:31 342:221 1752:223 1755:110 1775:112 176 – 79:29 179

Index

Egrög Tunk, Bochum

242 Index

16:102 – 3 2724:35 4229:46 17836:78 – 82 3955:5 – 6 39

e) NamesA

ʿAbbād ibn Sulaymān 35ʿAbdallah ibn Kullāb 33Abelard, Peter 55 – 68, 193 – 202, 205Abner of Burgos 98, 100Abraham 237Abraham ben Shmuʾel of Rouen 95Abū Hāšim 35Abū ʿĪsā v. Al-WarrāqAbulafi a, David 127 – 8Adam 27, 34, 35, 44Agamben, Giorgio 205Aḥmad ibn Fāris 35Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal 33Akasoy, Anna A. 43 – 54Al-Ašʿarī 31, 32 – 3, 35Al-Bāqillānī 33 – 5Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) 107, 125, 230Alexander of Lycopolis 228Al-Fārābī 37, 39 – 42, 49, 53, 70, 85, 114, 123Alfonsi, Petrus 89 – 91, 92, 93, 100, 101Alfonso of Valladolid 98Al-Ghazālī 44, 69 – 87, 114, 122 – 4Al-Ǧubbāʾī, Abū ʿAlī 32, 35Al-Kaʿbī, Abū l-Qāsim 35Al-Kindī 38 – 9Al-Maʾmūn 31Al-Mutawakkil 31Al-Shushtarī 50Al-Suyūṭī 35 – 6Al-Warrāq, Abū ʿĪsā 34 – 5Anselm of Canterbury 57, 62 – 3, 67, 90Anshelm, Th omas 210Aquinas, Th omas v. Th omas AquinasAristotle 30, 36 – 41, 45, 49, 53, 94, 120, 123, 164 – 5,

181, 230Ashi, Rav 95Augustine 64, 117, 153 – 4, 158, 162 – 3, 165 – 6, 212,

220, 228 – 30, 231(Ps.-)Augustine 167Averroes 45, 48 – 9, 50, 51, 52, 53, 114, 123 – 4Avicenna 40, 41, 70, 76 – 7, 78, 85, 114, 123 – 4, 160ʿAzaryah ben Yosef ibn Abba Mari of Perpignan 98

BBader, Günter 181 – 91Badr al-Dīn ibn Hūd 49 – 50Baer, Yitzhak 98Balić, Charles 145 – 6Bar-Ilan, Meir 90Bartholomew of Bologna 155Bateson, Gregory 193Bayer, Oswald 217 – 25Benedict XVI 53 – 4Benjamin, Walter 210Ben-Sasson, Haim Hillel 98Bibago, Abraham 99Blacketer, Raymond 231Blumenberg, Hans 25Boethius 98 – 9Bonaventure 155Bonner, Anthony 130Borsche, Tilman 181 – 2Buber, Martin 214Buddha 16Budé, Guillaume 229, 235 – 6Büchmann, Georg 218Burman, Th omas 178

CCalvin, Jean 213, 227 – 39Campanini, Saverio 207 – 15Capelli, Piero 89 – 102Cesarini, Giuliano 172Chenu, Marie-Dominique 120Chih Tun 13, 24Chi-tsang 14, 18 – 21, 23, 24 – 6Christianson, Gerald 172Cicero 164, 229, 235Cochlaeus, Johannes 217Cohen, Jeremy 97Colet, John 230Contzen, Adam 223Cook, Guy 24Cooke, Maeve 52 – 3Cop, Nicolas 229Crispin, Gilbert 67, 202, 204, 205Cross, Richard 146Cusanus, Nicolas 131, 173, 181 – 91, 194, 202 – 3, 205,

208

DDaiber, Hans 136Démieville, Paul 13, 23Dionysius Areopagita 187

Index 243

Domínguez, Fernando 128 – 9Dominic 111Donin, Nicolas 92 – 4, 97 – 8, 100, 102, 103Dürer, Albrecht 223Duns Scotus, John v. Scotus, John Duns

EEckhart, Meister 183Egbert of Münster 91Eliʾezer ben ʿImmanuʾel of Tarascon 95Endreß, Gerhard 27 – 42Epicurus 64

FFa-lang 14, 18, 23, 25Ficino, Marsilio 208Fierro, Maribel 45Fishman, Talya 94Fletcher, Madeleine 50Frederick II 49Friederici, Jeremias 213Friedlein, Roger 139Friedman, Yvonne 92

GGauthier, René-Antoine 120Gerson, Jean 135Giletti, Ann 111 – 26Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 217, 218Gorce, Matthieu-Maxime 120Greef, Wulfert de 227 – 39Gregory the Great 63Gregory IX, pope 92 – 3Gutwirth, Eleazar 98

HHabermas, Jürgen 53Halevi, Jehuda 69, 80 – 7, 194Hamann, Johann Georg 139Hasselhoff , Görge K. 7 – 11, 103 – 10Henry I (of England) 90Henry of Ghent 166Herman of Cologne 91, 97Hillgarth, Jocelyn 135Homer 218Hsüan-tsang 13

IIbn al-Rēwandī 34 – 5

Ibn ʿArabī 52Ibn Gabirol 51Ibn Ḥazm 45, 46, 90Ibn Rushd v. AverroesIbn Sabʿīn 45, 49 – 50, 52Ibn Sīnā v. AvicennaIbn Ṭufayl 45 – 7, 49, 51, 52Iça (Yça) Gidelli 171, 176, 180Innocent III 146Innocent IV 94 – 5Isaac Israeli 51

JJaume (Jame