;0591670 3. ~ho A{ pproved for Release CIA Historical

; Zf Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT201 e

Directorateof Intelligence

Ilniteigence MenmorandumOffice of European Analysis27 January 1993

Greterl Seba A Baa

Suvmmary

Belgrade's determination to forge an ethnically pure"Greater Serbia"-even at a high cost to Serbs and their. . opponents-is ironclad, according to a methodologically-basedinteragency analysis. The conciliatory attitude of Milosevicand the Bosnian Serbs during recent negotiatinnei* G

an nic iure eaeer er i o

international community:

' strictly enforces trade sanctions.. o

. arms Bosnia and Croatia 1- conducts air strikes against Serb military targets in

0, inBosniaenforces a no-fly zone in the FRY and

0

This memorandum, based on "Fac

fny me queries are welcome and ma beW 1 j ears Division, EURtA,

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threatens, and perhaps carries out, air strikes againstmilitary targets in Serbia.

' Combining the knowledge of CI[A Saelerte,DI A, an e e ent of Defense s lists on Serbiawith a ill tested polcyforecas n model we conclude thatwithout massive international intervention, the probabili is-ig at a ostile "Greater Serbia" a disrutive forcen urope tou mid-decade. Once Begrade cnlkltepower and territorv we expect it ll fomnt c c amongits neighbors: use low-level force outside its borders;initiate the ethnic clasn f nov:aqirnn-clearweapons of mass destruction; and possibly expand into non-Serbian parts of Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Croatian coast.

The plight of Kosovar Albanians probably willdeteriorate within the next year, according to the study. Thepolitical balance of power in Serbia is shifting in favor ofgroups that want to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. Our analysisfound that Milosevic and Serbian nationalists-with the tacitsupport of the military-drive Serbia's expansion and its ethnicpolicies. Because the military and Serbian nationalists sharemany of Milosevic's policy goals, Serbian expansionist andethnic policies are likely to remain unchanged even if he wereto leave office. The West's ability to shape Serbian behaviorwill be limited unless pressure is ut directly on thenationalists and the military.

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Discussion

Using the "FACTIONS" political analysis and forecasting method to guide its efforts, aninteragency working group met recently to assess four questions stemming from Serb nationalists'efforts to forge a "Greater Serbia." The issues examined were:

At what level of pain imposed by the international community would Serbia stop providingactive support for the creation by force of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia"? I-j What role would a hypothetical "Greater Serbia" play in Balkan politics? \

- What degree of self-rule/ethnic rights will Belgrade permit Kosovar Albanians?

- How bad would conditions in Serbia have to et before the political balance of power inBelgrade favored the ouster of Milosevic?

The "FACTIONS" methodology forced the analysts to focus on policy options associated witheach of the four issues, identify the groups and leaders who will try to influence each policydecision (see box 1), estimate the relative political clout of those players, identify the policyoutcome each player prefers, and estimate the importance of the issue relative to other items onthe player's agenda. The "FACTIONs" method quantifies this information and employs amathematical model of group decisionmaking to forecast the policy outcome. "FACTIONS," whichhas an impressive track record during its 10 years of use at CIA, also can be used to estimate theeffects of events such asacha ge in leadership or the decision of a foreign government tointervene politically.

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Box 1

Leaders and Groups [dentified as Players on Foreign Policy andEthnic Rights Issues in Serbia

Slobodan Milosevic, President of SerbiaDobrica Cosic, President of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"Milan Panic, Prime Minister of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, and Serbian Paramilitary ForcesArmy High CommandMid-level officersArmy ConscriptsDraft-age youthSerbian PoliceDemocratic opposition partiesSocialist Party of Serbia (SPS)Serbian Orthodox ChurchIndependent media, especially newspapersState-controlled mediaBosnian SerbsCroatian SerbsKosovo SerbsPro-Serb MontenegrinsNon-pro-Serb MontenegrinsHardline Kosovar AlbaniansIbrahim Rugova/Moderate Kosovar AlbaniansKosovar Albanian massesHardline Macedonian AlbaniansModerate Macedonian AlbaniansMacedonian nationalistsSandzak MuslimsWorkersEconomic ManagersSerbian MafiaBelgrade StudentsAlbania/President Sali BerishaConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)CroatiaEuropean Community (EC)

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GreeceMacedonian governmentMontenegroOrganization of Islamic Countries (OIC)RussiaTurkeyUN Security Council (UNSC)UN Mediators Cyrus Vance and David OwenUS CongressUS Administration

In the following sections we explore in detail Serbia's likely course of action on the ethnic andforeign policy questions under examination. In some cases, the FACTIONS analysis projected moreviolent results than did traditional DI analysis (see box 2). The working group's assessment of theclout wielded by hardline Serbs heavily conditioned the projected policy outcomes in the fourareas For, example, hardline Serb groups wishing to reduce the rights of Kosovar Albanians--including those wishing to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians--are almost twice as powerful as groupsthtwatto protect or expand theaihso ooa lain sefgr ) h sr groupshave even more clout on foreign policy issues. In addition only o the issue of thes SerboKosovar Albanians were Western nations and international organizations considered to be players.Even so, the combined clout of the US, the UN, the EC, CSCE, and Russia on the "Albanianrights" issue was estimated at less than 30 percent of that of Milosevic and the FRY army.

For each issue we have provided a diagram that depicts the range of possible policy outcomes.These options, including the status quo policy in force in late January 1993, are spaced in such away as to capture the "political distance" between them in the Serbian context. In the diagrams,policy options are placed below the line. The policy eachcooe--nt te formsindicated above the line. For eac poiia e nu rlyrwudhose--not settle for--isindiate abve te lne.Foreach political decision under analysis, FACTIONS predicts a policyoutcome (identified as the "Forecast") based on experts assessments of the players' policy goals,relative strength, and degree of interest in the issue. Lfp

1There was general agreement among the workingthe policies each player preferred for each issue. When d agreementsoccurred, they were noted, and alternative scenarios weredevised. I]

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Box 2

Traditional DI Analytic Views ofIssues Addressed by Factions

The strong showing by followers of ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav SeseUin the December elections and recent reporting moved the conclusions of traditional DI analysesmuch closer to conclusions of the FAC TONS exercise.

-- Serb acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia is a tactical maneuver to staveoff outside military intervention and to make the Bosnians appear uncooperative. Serbnationalists and the Belgrade government have not quit the road to a "Greater Serbia"; theyhave only made a tactical detour in Bosnia.

f b fThe radicals will definitely make Serbia a disruptive force in the Balkans for theforeseeable future.

-- Efforts by Serbian President Milosevic and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to keep thelid on there will be hampered by increased ultranationalist activity in Kosovo and Macedonia.

On several points, however, DI analysts believe that elasticity in the Serbian politicalsystem allows the possibility of less violent results than FACTIONs forecasts:

-- Fearing military intervention, Milosevic may suspend active support for Serbs inBosnia before Serbia proper became the target of airstrikes.Ansuhusnioowvrwould be temporary and only in effect while pressure was applied.

-- Both Belgrade and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are unprepared for a majorconfrontation and are still williig to avoid major bloodletting. The presence of ultranationalistsin Kosovo, however, and increased international activity in the Balkans--by givingencouragement to the Albanians-- probably will lead to conflict eventually.

h In addition, although partition of Kosovo is possible, it is unlikely until fightinghas occurred and both sides see such an outcome as in their interest.

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Figure tClout of Players on Policy toward Kosovar Albanians

Index ofRelative

Clout

I Milosevic

90-

80

70 --

60- FRYArmy

50 ugova

Kosovar &Macedonian Ksv

40 Albanian KosovarG ps Cosic Serbs'

30 SP Iesel K

20- US Croatia-Albania Administration20 USoito

10 Congress GreMontenegro?IC Macedonian

Government hurch0

TurkeyVance/Turkey Owen CSCE Russia Independent Macedonian

Media Oe p Maeona MacedonianMuslims EC Media Nationalists Serbs

of Albanian rights Least tolerant ofAlbanian rights

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A Greater Serbia at Any Price?

The interagency group concluded that Serbia's democratic parties and its independentmedia have little influence in Belgrade despite their vocal opposition. Milosevic, the SocialistParty of Serbia (SPS), and Serb nationalists in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo-with the tacitsupport of the military-drive the Serbian government's active support for the creation of anethnically pure "Greater Serbia." They appear willing to endure great pain before they abandonthis polcy. Ind ed, the "FA TION " m tho olo y i dic testhat bef re elg ade eve te porarilyretreats from actively supporting the creation of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia," (ee fure2ythe international community will have to: ( figure 2)

- enforce economic sanctions vigorously

- isolate Serbia politically

' create protected safe zones in Bosnia for Bosnians

- restrict the arms embargo to the FRY

' pull UNPROFOR out

- arm Bosnia and Croatia

- initiate air strikes against military targets in Bosnia

- enforce a no-fly zone in the FRY

- and perhaps threaten and undertake airstrikes against military targets in Serbia.A Hostile "Greater Serbia"

To assess the role of a "Greater Serbia" in Balkan politics, the working group consideredthe freign policy goals of players likely to shape Belgrade's relations with its neighbors in themid l990s. Our analysis suggests that a "Greater Serbia is likely to be a continual source oftrouble in the Balkans well into this decade. The interagency FACTIONS exercise concludes that a"Greater Serbia" will eschew the Danish model of a peaceful, cooperative, CSCE-abiding stateand opt to follow Iraq's hostile, expansionist example instead. "Greater Serbia" probably will stirup trouble among its neighbors, begin the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and acquire weapons ofmass destruction, such as chemical weapons and delivery systems. Our analysis also indicates thata "Greater Serbia" would not hesitate to use low-level force outside its borders and could possiblytry to dominate the government of Macedonia and take land not occ ied by Serbs in Bosnia orCroatia, particularly near the Adriatic coast (see figure 3).

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Figure 2

WHAT WOULD THE IINTERNATffONAL (COMMUNJITY HAVE TO PRVDNDOIESU1OTFO RAINO NER TO STOP THE SERBIANGOEN NTFMHPROVIDINGACTIVE SUPPOT TFORCREATIONOFANETHNCAY PURE GREATER SERIARBY MFORCE?OM

Forecast

ChurchPreventive Economic Milosevicpeacekeepers managers Policein Macedonia Military Military

draftees high command

Democratic Mid-levelopposition mtary Pro-SerbNon-pro-Serb Workers officers Montenegrins

Montenegrins Independent Students Bosnian SPS Croatian SeseljeaSerbs Serbs

PartialTihArEase easing of sanctions; Croatia Enforce Airstrikes Commitsanctions sanctions overland Supply no-fly against round Full-scale

Status Quo: enforce- arms, . zone in military es to ground warPorous ment; training, the FRY targets in offensive in Serbiasanctions, total intelligence Serbia versus thediplomatic isolation to Bosnia no internationalsemi-isolation, Restrict Airstrikes commumtyinternational arms againstmonitors embargo military Airstrikes

Enforce to FRY; targets in against Enforcedno-fly UNPROFOR Bosnia industrial protectivezone in out targets zone for

Note: Policies are cumulative Bosnia Internationally in Serbia Kosovofrom "enforce no-fly zone" to protectedthe right. safe zones

in Bosnia S ETfor Bosnians

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Figure 3

WHAT ACTIONS WOULD TYPIFY THE REGIONAL ROLE PLAYED BY A "GREATER SERBIA"

Forecast

Independentmedia

Democratic Armyopposition Pro-Serb

NbKosovar MontenegrinsMontenegrins managersSeb KrjnSrs

- Workers PlcStudents -Church Police M0ilosevicCosic MfaSpS Seselj

Denmark": Negotiates Makes selected Imposes Begins Takes territoryA model, partition of openings to partition ethnic outside borders "Iraq":CSCE-abiding Kosovo, and international of Kosovo 'cleansing (Macedonia, expansionist state-state; seeks institutes community; -in Kosovo; Bosnia, Coast of seeks to dominatecooperative relative willing to meet Status quo acquires CW Croatia) Balkans; regionalrelations; ethnic criteria to join IGOs; in Kosovo, capability hegemondesires to tolerance economic openings neutral,promote harmony isolationist,

Arrests and inward-prosecutes looking;war criminals unable to Uses low-level Acquiresproject force outside nuclearpower Intimidates borders; acquires capability

Macedonia; missilery forstirs up trouble CW capabilityamongneighbors;runs embargoes

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Albanian "Reservations" in Kosovo

According to our analysis, the political balance of power in Belgrade has shifted to groupsthat favor herding the Albanians-who comprise 90 percent of Kosovo's population--into lessdesirable parts of Kosovo that can be administratively separated from areas reserved for Serbs (seefigure 4). Although both Kosovar Serbs and Albanians now want to avoid violence, a concertedSerb effort to create a Belgrade-dominated, impoverishen Albanian rump a te robably wouldgenerate a violent Kosova Albanian reato Voannrup state probably wouldgrac .Ts a ctiont o d layniant eaction. Violence could also be sparked by Albanianradicals. This action would play into the hands of Serb extremists--such as Vojislav Seselj, headof the Serbian Radical P his followers--who want to pursue an even more radical ethniccleansing of Kosovo.

M~lesevic Is Only Part of the Problem

Economic and political conditions in Serbia would have to deteriorate well beyond theircurrent levels before Milosevic's supporters would turn against him and drive him out of office,according to the "FACTIONS" analysis. The working group estimates that the nationalists, themilitary, and the police will support Milosevic despite an effective embargo, labor unrest, andsevere hyper-inflation. Only if all those things occur and Serbs suffer si a r esin Croatia and Bosnia, we conclude would the nationalists and mility gnificant terrtoil lossesgovernment (see figure 5). bring downthe ilosevic

Even if Miosevic were to leave the scene, however, military and nationalist groups wouldstill be the dominant players in Belgrade. A "Greater Serbia" without Milosevic would fomenttrouble among its neighbors and probably take, or threaten to take, some non-Serb territory inCroatia, Bosnia, or Macedonia. Similarly, the "FACTIONS model indicates that Serbia withoutMilosevic would be as determined to support the creation of an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia"by or ieig Srbia. Kosovar Albanians, however, might be sparedexpulsion or ethnic cleansing if Milosevic's replacement were much weaker than he.

net

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Figure 4

SEERET

WHAT DEGREE OF SELF RULJE/ETHNIC RIGHTS WILL SERBIA PERMIT ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO?

Hardline KosovarAlbanians PolicyMacedonian Hardline ForecastAlbanians

Kosovar Albanianmasses EC MacedonianRugova Vance & Owen Government

US Administration Independent Media -

UNSC Democratic MilosevicMacedonian CSCE Opposition Montenegro FRY Armymoderate Macedonian acedonian

anians Turkey Panic Nationalists SerbsUS Conmss Kosovo

Greece Croatia Church Seselj

1988 autonomy Belgrade makes Partition Kosovo Kosovoden education and Belgrade- Annihilate

Independent human rights dominated KosovarKosovo in Limited republic for Albanians

a consensual autonomy Status uo: in the mountainsConfederation government" Mono-ethnic

(ethnically cleansed)Serbia;

minimize violence

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Figure 5

AT WHAT POINT WILL GROUPS IN SERBIA MOVE TO FORCE MIILOSEVIC OUT?

ForecastBelgrade StudentsIndependent mediaSandzak Moslems

Albanians SeChurch Seselj==

Democratic Bosnian SerbsOpposition Pro-Serb Montenegrins

Panic Croatia State-controlledNot-pro-Serb Mid-level Army officers mediaMontenegrins Kosovar Serbs

Army conscriMts PoliceCosic SPS Army High iWorkers Command

Student -infcn

Conditions unrest Massive, but Significantin late Jan. 93 .peaceful, nubaklitar Anarchy increases;

Slabor unrest sebc ih loss of control;.};;Greater loss of .rise of warlordshyper-inflation Croatia and Full-fledged

TtladBosnia civil war-

-effective Serbembargo, forces War entersincluding suffer serbianfood and heavy territorymedicine casualties