greek and roman military writers - selected readings (edited by brian cambell)

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY WRITERS

From the men who fought hand to hand to defend their communities,to the significant economic impact of organizing a large fighting force,war was a central influence at every level of existence in ancient Greekand Rome. The ancient writers who tell us about technical aspects of military practice and the management of armies shed much light on the murky area of the conduct of war, and convey the importancegiven to the subject in the ancient world.

For this volume Brian Campbell has selected and translated morethan 250 key pieces from the ancient military writers. They cover afascinating range of topics – battle formations and manoeuvres, differ-ent types of troops, the art of generalship, methods for conducting andresisting a siege, the construction of artillery and fortifications, and every kind of ploy and trick used by generals to defeat theiropponents.

Some works are highly technical, while others survey the history ofwarfare and the reasons why past generals had been victorious or cameto grief. The book also includes extracts from other ancient historianswho comment on warfare and society. Each piece is annotated withfurther explanation, making this an essential resource for everyonestudying the army and warfare in the classical age.

Brian Campbell is Professor of Roman History at The Queen’sUniversity of Belfast. He has written several books on the Roman armyincluding The Roman Army 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook (Routledge1994) and War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC–AD 284 (Routledge2002).

Routledge Classical Translations

This series offers translations, usually in selection, of important literaryand historical works from Greece and Rome that provide backgroundand context for the best-known writers. It concentrates on writings in fields that are receiving increased study at present. The books, all of which contain an introduction and annotation, will be useful tostudents at all levels but especially on more advanced courses.

Greek and Roman Military WritersSelected readingsBrian Campbell

Letters from Ancient GreecePatricia Rosenmeyer

The History of ZonarasFrom Alexander Severus to the death of Theodosius the GreatThomas Banchich and Eugene Lane

The Story of AthensSelections from the AtthidographersPhillip Harding

Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of CebesGuides to Stoic livingKeith Seddon

The Roman Book of GardeningJohn Henderson

GREEK AND ROMAN MILITARY

WRITERS

Selected readings

Brian Campbell

First published 2004by Routledge

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© 2004 Brian Campbell

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,

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ISBN 0–415–28546–1 (hbk)ISBN 0–415–28547–x (pbk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

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FOR MY MOTHER AND IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER

CONTENTS

List of readings viiiList of figures xixPreface and acknowledgements xxiAbbreviations and notes xxiii

Introduction: warfare in the Greek and Roman world 1

1 Organization, training, and discipline 21

2 The general’s role 53

3 Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems 88

4 Attacking and defending cities 145

5 Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortifications, siege engines, and siege works 179

Select bibliography 212Index of translated passages 218Index of names and subjects 227

vii

READINGS

1 Organization, training, and discipline

1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting)2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical

fitness)3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry)4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your

position)5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary

cavalry)6 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice)7 Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons)8 Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword)9 Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline)

10 Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour)11 Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the

infantry)12 Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx

and Roman legion)13 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies)14 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line)15 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx)16 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants)17 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands) 18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish

sword)19 Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army)20 Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–7 (Roman discipline)21 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline)22 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules)23 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline)

viii

24 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline)25 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline)26 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline)27 Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry)28 Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals)29 Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command)30 Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training)31 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military

training)32 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of

military training) 33 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable

recruits)34 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military

training)35 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12 (weapons

training)36 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19 (throwing

missiles; other military skills)37 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle

manoeuvres)

2 The general’s role

38 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in ageneral)

39 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalrycommander)

40 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’srelations with his troops)

41 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the rightman for the job)

42 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander)43 Xenophon, Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general)44 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example)45 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general)46 Xenophon, Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline)47 Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology)48 Xenophon, Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas)49 Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a

general)50 Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii)51 Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis)

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52 Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Romancommander)

53 Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing thebattle)

54 Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competentgenerals)

55 Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship)56 Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his

army on the march)57 Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory)58 Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle)59 Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley)60 Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious

observances)61 Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology)62 Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop

dispositions)63 Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology)64 Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best

appearance)65 Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks)66 Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal

combat)67 Onasander, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and

honouring soldiers)68 Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead)69 Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders)70 Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and

conduct in victory)71 Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders

before battle)72 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny)73 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership)74 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men)75 Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems)76 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership)77 Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges)78 Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the

army)79 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership)80 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an

example)

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81 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander)82 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander)83 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander)84 Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders)85 Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle)86 Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of

Alexander)87 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship)88 Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general)89 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1, Preface 1–3 (generals and

stratagems)90 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example)91 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, Preface (a general’s need for military

skill)92 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 11; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates’

skill as a general)93 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander)94 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from

stratagems)95 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle)96 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard

against enemy tricks)97 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership)98 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for

action)99 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his

troops)100 Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship)101 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of

general in securing his army’s welfare)

3 Battle: military formations, tactics, and stratagems

102 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops)

103 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34(Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria)

104 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.70–1 (the drift tothe right in hoplite battles)

105 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill andinspirational leadership of Gylippus)

106 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battleat Syracuse)

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107 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenianretreat at Syracuse)

108 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse inattack)

109 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11 (importance of deception)

110 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa)111 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding

the rearguard)112 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite

marching formation)113 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional

formation)114 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night

marches)115 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites)116 Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan

hoplites)117 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine)118 Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra)119 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation)120 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops)121 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations)122 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres)123 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6 (defending

against elephant attack)124 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31 (battle of

Paraetacene)125 Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae)126 Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites)127 Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed

troops)128 Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations)129 Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation;

counter-attacks)130 Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves)131 Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear)132 Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy)133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations

in war)134 Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order)135 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages)

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136 Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writingabout tactics)

137 Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius)138 Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle)139 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans)140 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans)141 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy)142 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics)143 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position)144 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies)145 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention)146 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight)147 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight)148 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight)149 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight)150 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics)151 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy)152 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush)153 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to

fight to the end)154 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback)155 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy)156 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties)157 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support)158 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry)159 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat)160 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers)161 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion)162 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms

and stratagems)163 Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae)164 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order)165 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against

the Alani)166 Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation)167 Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation)168 Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers)169 Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation)170 Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the

practices of other peoples)171 Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against

carts)

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172 Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics)173 Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill)174 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy)175 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers)176 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms

in the army)177 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the

Spartans)178 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal

operations)179 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush)180 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies)181 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea)182 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity)183 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river)184 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy)185 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split his

forces)186 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush)187 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy)188 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage

valour)189 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour)190 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics)191 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting

information)192 Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation

against cavalry)193 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in

AD 194)194 Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence)195 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an

inexperienced army)196 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms)

4 Attacking and defending cities

197 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4 (Thebanattack on Plataea)

198 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.75–6 (siege of Plataea)

199 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenianblockade of Pylos)

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200 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection)

201 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guardcity gates)

202 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts)203 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on

potential traitors)204 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the

gate)205 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts)206 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at

guard posts)207 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties)208 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable

passwords)209 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols)210 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics)211 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms

smuggling)212 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages)213 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege

engines)214 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack

siege engines)215 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires)216 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing

of siege ladders)217 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with

tunnels)218 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy

incursions)219 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers

are small)220 Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern

gates)221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food)222 Philon, (Siegecraft) B49–50 (preparing ammunition and

supplies)223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege

engines)224 Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches, guards,

passwords, and signals)

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225 Philon, (Siegecraft) D 59–60 (psychology of siege warfare)226 Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town)227 Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply)228 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack)229 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles)230 Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city)231 Josephus, The Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata)232 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack)233 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack)234 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor)235 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged)236 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander)237 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention)238 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river)239 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply)240 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected

quarter)241 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged)242 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire)243 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the

defenders)244 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message)245 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies)246 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about

supplies)247 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie)248 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege)249 Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus)250 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege)251 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’

attention)252 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery)253 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a

mine)254 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city)255 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices used by besiegers and

besieged)256 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel)257 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city)258 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium)

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5 Military engineering: bridges, camps, fortifications, siege engines, and siege works

259 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of firemachine)

260 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river)261 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 43–4

(military value of catapults)262 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 44–7

(construction of a stone-thrower)263 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 65–8

(construction of the mountain belly-bow)264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with

artillery engines) 265 Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–7 (repeating and

air-spring catapults)266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications)267 Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine)268 Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–3 (siege works at Alesia)269 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.12–14.3 (tortoise

and battering ram)270 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s

tortoise)271 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult)272 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams)273 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensive

mechanisms)274 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery

engines)275 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a

torsion catapult)276 Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp)277 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14 (building a

military camp)278 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50; 57–8 (camp

fortifications)279 Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river)280 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1–138.17

(importance of siegecraft)281 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1 (how to set

fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises)282 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the

Danube)

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283 Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of theonager)

284 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a militarycamp)

285 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista)286 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning

ballista)

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FIGURES

1.1 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 36–7) 441.2 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 40.1–7) 453.1 The three phases of the battle of Cannae 1095.1 Biton’s stone-thrower 1825.2 Biton’s mountain belly-bow 1845.3 Hegetor’s tortoise 1935.4 Heron’s torsion catapult 1985.5 Catapult pull-back system 1995.6 Catapult pull-back system with pulleys 1995.7 Roman military camp (Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp

Fortifications 12–14) 2015.8 The onager 207

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My original intention was to offer a selection of readings specificallyfrom Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks and compendiaof stratagems. However, it soon became clear that it would be odd to exclude accomplished historians who wrote about military practicesand battles in the course of their work. Indeed historians likeThucydides and Xenophon and Polybius had held military commandwith varying degrees of success. Similarly, although Caesar’s accountsof his campaigns in Gaul and during the civil war cannot be describedas military textbooks, they are central to our understanding of Romangeneralship and military practice. Other writers were then admittedbecause of particular interest, and here I make no claim for consistencyin my selections. Josephus, for example, who commanded Jewish forces in the Galilee and saw at first hand the violence of a Romanmilitary campaign, offers an incomparable picture of the Roman armyin action. On the other hand, Suetonius, who has little interest inmilitary affairs, happens to preserve the thoughts of the emperorAugustus on what made a good general.

The chapter headings indicate the main themes in the works of themilitary writers and are intended to give some structure to the book,though some passages are potentially relevant to several chapters.Within each chapter passages are cited in chronological order accordingto the author, and there is a short biographical note on the first occasionwhen each author is cited. It is clear that writers on stratagems andother collectors of uplifting anecdotes like Valerius Maximus had a pool of well-known precepts to draw from, which then underwentexpansion and elaboration. While drawing the reader’s attention to this feature of such writings, I have tried to avoid citing repetitiveextracts.

I am very grateful to my colleague Professor David Whitehead forallowing me to see a draft version of his translations of Athenaeus

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Mechanicus and Apollodorus of Damascus in advance of publication.In preparing the text I owe thanks to Dr Richard Stoneman and toRoutledge’s anonymous readers for wise advice.

Figure acknowledgements

Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.4–5.6 and figure 5.8, E.W. Marsden, Greek andRoman Artillery. Technical Treatises (Oxford, 1971), opposite p. 80 figure 1 (a) and (b); p. 102 figure 6 (a) and (c); pp. 49–50, figures 7–9;p. 259, figure 12, reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. Figure 5.3, I.D. Rowland and T.N. Howe, Vitruvius. Ten Bookson Architecture (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 314, figure 137,reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

P R E F A C E A N D A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

AbbreviationsAFLS Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’

Università di Siena (Florence)AJA American Journal of Archaeology (New York)ANRW H. Temporini et al. (eds), Aufstieg und Niedergang

der römischen Welt (Berlin, 1972– )ClasAnt Classical Antiquity (Berkeley)CQ Classical Quarterly (Oxford)CTh Th. Mommsen (ed.), Codex Theodosianus (Berlin,

1905)Digest Th. Mommsen (ed.), Digesta; Corpus Iuris Civilis

vol. I (Berlin, 1872)GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies (Durham,

North Carolina)HSCPh Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (Cambridge,

Mass.)JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies (London)JRS Journal of Roman Studies (London)PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome (London)Pritchett, GSW W.K. Pritchett (1971–91) The Greek State at War

Parts I–V, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California

Notes[ ] enclose letters that no longer exist in the surviving text but

have been restored by modern scholars[- - -] indicate a lacuna where no restoration has been attempted( ) indicate explanatory supplements by this translator. . . indicate words or passages omitted by this translator

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Modern equivalents of ancient units of measurement

Greek

1 dactyl = 19.3 mm (0.76 in)1 palm = 77.1 mm (3.04 in)1 span = 231.2 mm (9.12 in)1 foot = 308.3 mm (12.16 in)1 cubit = 462.4 mm (18.21 in)

Roman

1 foot = 296 mm (11.64 in)1 inch = 24.6 mm (0.97 in)1 palm = 73.9 mm (2.91 in)1 digit = 18.5 mm (0.73 in)

All references to measurements in feet in the translated passages are toGreek or Roman feet.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S A N D N O T E S

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INTRODUCTIONWarfare in the Greek and

Roman world

Greek warfare

In early Greece around 1200 BC battles were probably decided by arelatively small number of aristocratic warriors using heavy thrustingspears. Chariots are also recorded in the Linear B tablets from the palacecentres at Pylos and Cnossus, but seemingly these were normally used for transport to and from battle. The mountainous terrain of main-land Greece with its small plains is unsuitable for large-scale chariotmanoeuvring. The Homeric poems shed further light and perhapsindicate the situation in the ninth to eighth centuries BC. Then aristo-cratic warriors fought individually as infantry, using throwing spearsand swords, supported by groups of the less well off, who were poorlyarmed and equipped. The aristocrats fought for their honour andprestige, but also served their communities, and by doing so confirmedand enhanced their political and economic domination of society, sinceapart from fighting they ran the government, conducted diplomacy,and acted as priests. In this kind of warfare, which was virtually arrangedbetween aristocratic élites, casualties could be kept to a minimum.One significant development in the course of this period was theadoption of iron instead of bronze, certainly no later than the eleventhcentury, especially in the manufacture of swords and spears, thoughbronze was later to reappear.

After c. 750 BC as the Greek world was progressively opened up tooutside influences, new ideas and opportunities in turn influenced thenature of warfare. Communities in Greece developed as independentcity-states, each with its individual system of government, fiercelyloyal to its own identity and traditions. So there was no Greek army as such. However, these communities often fought against one another,and consequently warfare was a constant factor in Greek society. Thecitizens of each city-state were part-time soldiers and therefore armies

1

tended to be small and warfare seasonal since the crops had to beplanted and the harvest brought in. Now, in this period there wereimportant political, social, and economic changes and it is temptingto associate these with significant alterations in the style of fightingadopted eventually by all Greek communities. The increase in tradeand the gradual rise in disposable wealth meant that more people hadaccess to arms and armour of better quality, and therefore more citizenscould potentially contribute to the defence of the city-state. Eventuallythe hoplite became established as the principal instrument of war inthe Greek city-states. He was an infantryman who took his name fromhis arms and armour,1 and when he was fully equipped this consistedof body armour, helmet, sometimes greaves, a large round shield, anda heavy thrusting spear about two or three metres in length. TheGreeks also adopted the phalanx formation, in which hoplites foughtside by side in close array eight to sixteen ranks deep. When the frontlines engaged the ranks behind pushed forward to add weight to thecharge. It was important that the phalanx retained its formation anda flute player helped to keep the hoplites in step. The phalanx con-tinued the Greek tendency to rely on heavy infantry and in a way suited Greek terrain by confining the battle to a small area. When one side gave way the soldiers tended to throw away their shields inorder to retreat more rapidly. It was unusual for the victors to pursuethem for any distance since without cavalry they had little chance ofcatching them. Hoplite battle though bloody, with the possibility of terrible wounds especially to the throat (from a downwards thrustover the opponent’s shield) or to the groin (from a thrust under theshield), restricted the number of casualties and this was importantsince, as the army was simply the citizen population under arms,manpower was limited.2

The exact origins and nature of these military developments aremuch debated. For example, it may be that the hoplite weaponry was adopted piecemeal and that the phalanx emerged subsequentlywhen the full potential of the new weapons had been realized. On theother hand, as more men became available for military service itperhaps made sense to make use of the bigger numbers by establishinga formation that allowed them to fight in a large group. That in turncould have encouraged the development of the large round shield thatmade fighting in formation far more effective.3 It was convex in shapeand rimmed or sometimes entirely covered with bronze. The soldierheld it by means of a strap through which he passed the left arm as faras the elbow, and also grasped a leather thong at the edge of the shield.This made it easier to carry the shield but more difficult to move it

I N T R O D U C T I O N : G R E E K A N D R O M A N W A R F A R E

2

across to protect the right-hand side. Therefore the soldier needed tostand close to the man on his right to ensure protection from his over-lapping shield. And so it could be said that the shield was ‘for the sakeof the entire line’.4 Furthermore, it is also worth considering that inthe longer run possession of a hoplite shield reduced the need for heavybody armour and increased the opportunity for those who could affordonly light armour or none at all to fight in the phalanx.

In general, it is unclear how far these military changes influencedpolitical developments. Since more citizens now could join in the state’smilitary initiatives and there was a greater sense of community involve-ment, it is plausible to suggest that in time the dominating role of thearistocrats would be reduced, and that there might be a correspondingincrease in the role of relatively well-off citizens in government and thedecision-making process, as those with grievances now had a greateropportunity to do something about them. It is also interesting that the Greek city-states made little use of cavalry or light-armed troopsin warfare. Of course the terrain of Greece was not suitable for rearinghorses or for the widespread deployment of cavalry. Furthermore, horseswere expensive to maintain, which meant that they tended to be thepreserve of the rich. On the other hand, the absence of light-armedtroops may reflect social conditions, in that the citizen army was built round relatively well-off farmers who could equip themselves as hoplites. Those who controlled the government might at a pinchaccept them, but be reluctant to make use of men at the margins whocould afford only light equipment.5

Naturally the city-states differed in the organization and training of their military forces, and their skill and application of tactics.6 Infact formal training in weapons drill and unit formations seems to have been limited, and many citizens may have had only some kind ofathletics training.7 The Spartans, however, were famous for their out-standing prowess in hoplite warfare.8 The unique social and politicalconditions in Sparta contributed to this, apart from any predilectionof the Spartans for the military life. A large subject population, thehelots (descendants of the original defeated inhabitants of Laconia)worked the land, leaving Spartan citizens free to devote their time to military training and exercise. The organization of the state alsoprovided for the careful preparation of young men for a future mili-tary role. Other Greeks believed that the skill and discipline andtraining of the Spartan hoplite army were such as to render it virtuallyinvincible in normal conditions. In respect of army command, evenamong the Spartans, generals had no specialist training and were notdedicated military men, at least until the later fourth century with the


3

emergence of mercenary leaders. Indeed, in the case of a traditionalGreek hoplite battle, once the two phalanxes were set on course arguablythe commander could do little to influence the outcome except inspireconfidence by his presence and perhaps engage in combat himself.9

The defeat of the Persian invasion of 480–479 BC, when unusuallya number of city-states co-operated in a common military strategy,seemed to confirm the superiority of Greek methods of heavy infantryfighting. The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) fought betweenAthens and Sparta and their respective groups of allies ended in thecomplete defeat of Athens and apparently demonstrated again the dominance of the Spartan way of war. Nevertheless, the length ofthe war was unprecedented and involved at times virtually year-roundmilitary activity. One reason for the length of the war was that Athenshad built up a strong navy that was able to inflict damage on thePeloponnese and disrupt Spartan interests. Athens, protected by herfortification and the long walls that connected the city to its harbour,the Piraeus, could accept the occupation or ravaging of its territoryand still carry on the war relying on supplies imported by sea.Furthermore, the Athenians developed other forms of fighting on land,using mercenaries and light-armed troops. The shock reverberatedround the Greek world when a force of Spartans surrendered to a mixedforce of Athenian hoplites and light-armed troops on the island ofSphacteria in 424 BC.10

Nevertheless, the predominance of Sparta after 404 meant that forthe moment the emphasis on hoplites continued. Indeed the reputationof the hoplite phalanx was demonstrated by the recruitment of tenthousand Greek hoplites by Cyrus to assist his rebellion against hiselder brother, the Persian king. He was defeated and killed at the battleof Cunaxa in 401 BC, but the Greeks acquitted themselves withdistinction and later successfully marched back to the coast.11 The onestriking development in hoplite tactics emerged when the Thebansunder their leader Epaminondas challenged the Spartan hegemony.The Spartans had previously exploited a tendency of the hoplite battleline, which inclined to drift towards the right as each man tried tomove closer to the protection offered by the shield on the left arm of the man next to him. Accordingly, Spartan commanders used thediscipline and training of their men to outflank the enemy left wing.However, at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC Epaminondas created awedge formation by making the left wing of his phalanx exceptionallydeep and holding back the centre and the right wing. As the Spartanstried their outflanking manoeuvre he attacked through his left wingand won a decisive victory.12


4

This brought the end to Spartan domination of Greek militarypractices and opened the way for further developments. The most notable of these was the increasing use of light-armed troops, inparticular the peltasts, who were equipped with the Thracian shield(pelte) and javelins, and could be used as skirmishers or to seize vantagepoints. They could also keep hoplites at bay by throwing their javelins,and in certain circumstances could even break down a hoplite forma-tion. This famously happened in 390 BC when 600 Spartan hopliteswere caught in an isolated position at Lechaeum (the western port of Corinth) and outmanoeuvred by peltasts under the command of the Athenian Iphicrates, who built up a distinguished reputation as a commander of this kind of force.13 He illustrates another feature ofthis age, in that he served virtually as a mercenary commander.Mercenaries played a more prominent part in the fourth century asmilitary service gradually became separated from the role and dutiesof a citizen.14 This in turn placed greater pressure on states to find thenecessary money. These developments required a more flexible tacticalapproach by commanders, though cavalry still played a minor part incampaigns.

Under Philip II the kingdom of Macedon rose to prominence and at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip defeated the forces of theGreek coalition organized against him by Athens and Thebes, andfrom then on directed Greek affairs as suited him. A major part of hissuccess depended on his reorganization of the Macedonian army. Hemodified the phalanx, discarding the cuirass and equipping the soldierswith a small shield attached to the shoulder by a strap, which left their hands free to hold a pike (the sarisa) up to five metres long. Thephalanx was deeper, containing at least sixteen and as many as thirty-two ranks, and there were élite units of cavalry and infantry known as the ‘Companions’ that attended the king. The phalanx was carefullytrained and drilled in a number of manoeuvres. Philip’s son andsuccessor Alexander the Great exploited this army to confirm hismastery of the Greek world and to overthrow the Persian empire. Hewas adept in making effective use of cavalry, which now assumed a crucial offensive role for the first time in Greek history, and in developing a combined tactical deployment in which slingers, archers,and light-armed troops all had their part to play. From his easternopponents Alexander also adopted the use of elephants.15

After Alexander’s death in 323 BC his empire became the centre of a series of civil wars waged by his generals, and eventually the moresuccessful established personal domains and adopted the royal title.From this emerged the characteristic dynastic monarchies of the


5

Hellenistic period (Seleucid, Ptolemaic, Antigonid, Attalid), whichneeded large and enormously expensive armies including large con-tingents of mercenaries to compete against their rivals for territory.Warfare in the Hellenistic period was not particularly innovative. The kings relied on the heavy infantry phalanx used by Philip andAlexander, and maintained, even if they did not significantly develop,the use of cavalry in an offensive role. However, on occasion Hellenisticgeneralship and tactical skill in the deployment of large compositeforces were impressive.16

In the fifth century Greek communities traditionally defended theirterritory from attack and the destruction of crops and olive trees.Attackers who fought their way through to the city relied on blockadeor betrayal from within. They could build an encircling wall with the aim of reducing the besieged to famine and making better use oftheir own forces. A further refinement was the epiteichismos, a strong-point built in enemy territory from which the attackers could ravagethe land all year round. But Pericles, when he had to defend Athensagainst annual invasions by the Peloponnesians, devised a new strategyof evacuating the territory and concentrating on the defence of the city itself and the long walls. He advised the people to think of them-selves as islanders, who could rely on supplies from the sea. By thefourth century Greek communities tended to resort to a defensivestrategy in which they combined defence of the principal city with anattempt to outmanoeuvre the enemy using their superior knowledgeof the terrain.

These developments meant that the attackers faced the need for anall-out assault on cities. Now, Pericles had allegedly been the first to use siege engines, including rams, at the siege of Samos in 440–439 BC,17 and siege warfare was certainly one area where significantdevelopments occurred in the fourth century. There were now moremercenaries available, which might reduce the losses among the citizenhoplite soldiers, who were a precious commodity and who were in any case not well suited to assaulting walls. The balance was with thedefenders until the second half of the fourth century,18 when there wereimportant developments in the mechanisms of assault. Greeks mayhave borrowed some ideas for siege towers and rams from the east and from Carthage. But the development of the arrow-firing catapultor ‘belly-bow’ was ascribed to Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, whoemployed siege towers and catapults at the siege of Motya in 398 BC.19

The ‘belly-bow’ was a large composite bow equipped with a pipe inwhich the dart was inserted; it was cocked by the artilleryman usinghis stomach to press forward on a groove until the bow was fully


6

extended.20 In his treatise on siege warfare Aeneas Tacticus (mid-fourthcentury BC) mentions an array of siege devices including wheeledtowers, rams protected by screens, drills, tortoises, scaling ladders,mining techniques, and catapults.21 Philip and Alexander deployed a formidable siege capacity in their campaigns and a wide range ofcatapults and devices. Alexander’s bombardment of Halicarnassus in334 used stone-throwing catapults, and it is likely that the inventionof the torsion catapult had taken place in Philip’s reign. Here springsof hair or sinew provided the propulsive power, and they overcame thetechnical limitations of the belly-bow by using a base, which a winchto tighten the firing mechanism. These developments increased thevelocity of missiles and improved range and accuracy.22

The besieged were now under greater threat since walls could bedemolished, even though the design of fortifications had also improved,with the building of flanking towers, the deployment of catapults bythe defenders, and the development of tunnelling techniques to under-mine siegeworks.23 Among the Hellenistic kings who succeededAlexander, Demetrius son of Antigonus (336–283 BC) was famous forhis ingenious conduct of sieges and won his nickname, Poliorcetes (‘TheBesieger’), from the year-long though ultimately unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (305–304 BC).24 Nevertheless, technology did not alwayshave the upper hand. When Aeneas Tacticus offered advice on how to survive under siege he devoted much of his attention to the problemof dealing with internal revolutions and rebellions. It seems Greekdisunity and internal dissension continued to be a potent weapon insieges.25

Roman warfare

In the early period the king, his retainers, and the nobles constitutedRome’s army. As the need for more soldiers grew a levy was conductedamong larger groups of citizens, effectively creating a kind of citizenmilitia, which was probably equipped as heavy infantry and operatedlike the Greek hoplite phalanx. King Servius Tullius (c. 580–530 BC)according to tradition divided Roman citizens into six wealth classesthat determined not only their political rights but also their militaryduties. The lowest group (the capite censi, i.e. ‘registered by a headcount’) had no property and were excluded from military service. Therichest group was that of the equites, who made up the cavalry.Therefore, from early times an obligation was placed upon Romancitizens to serve in the Roman army, but this was also a kind of privilegethat identified a man’s social standing and contribution to the state.


7

Probably by the mid fourth century the phalanx formation had beenmodified with the introduction of maniples, subgroups that could beformed into three battle lines, making a more flexible formation.Soldiers were equipped with a thrusting spear or a throwing spear, thetwo-edged Spanish sword, and a long shield. The word ‘legion’ (fromlegio – a levy) began to be used to describe a division of troops.

The Punic Wars (264–146 BC) had a dramatic impact on Romanmilitary organization, since many more troops were needed and theywere required to serve for longer. However, although the war againstHannibal inflicted serious casualties, the hard-fought campaigns will in the end have made the Romans more resilient and increasedtheir self-confidence in their military establishment. Polybius’ famousdescription of the Roman army probably refers to the army as it wasafter the final defeat of Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC.26 The legionnumbered between 4,200 and 5,000 men and was recruited from those aged 17–46 who met the property qualification. Each man wasexpected to be available for service for sixteen years and might berequired for up to six years’ continuous service. Soldiers received a dailyallowance. The legion continued to operate in a triple battle line, witheach line containing ten maniples drawn up with gaps between them,though these were perhaps closed as the armies engaged. The hastatiand the principes made up the first two ranks and the triarii, the mostexperienced soldiers, the last. The first two ranks were equipped withthe pilum (throwing spear) and Spanish sword, the last rank with thehasta (thrusting spear). All soldiers had an oval shield and, when fullyequipped, helmet, body armour, and greaves. In addition a screen oflight-armed troops (velites) engaged the enemy first before retreatingthrough the ranks. The hastati and principes threw their spears and thenengaged with swords at close quarters. If they were unsuccessful thetriarii came forward for a final assault. Rome required her Italian alliesto provide additional troops as part of their treaty obligations. IndeedRome’s cavalry was largely supplied by these allies and was normallydeployed on the wings. There were also 300 cavalry attached to eachlegion.

In the early period the Romans had engaged in limited, seasonalwarfare, but as they developed a territorial empire the legions came to have virtually a permanent station in certain provinces, and therewas increasing pressure on reserves of manpower. Gaius Marius waselected consul in 107 BC largely through popular support since he hadpromised to end the long war in Africa against Jugurtha. The recenttrend had been to reduce the property qualification for service in thearmy, and Marius took this further by enlisting volunteers from those


8

with no property and had them equipped at the state’s expense. Mariusis usually credited with the introduction of a new tactical deployment,the replacement of the maniple with the cohort. The legion was nowdivided into ten uniformly equipped cohorts of 480 men, though thefirst cohort may have had a larger complement. However this may have been a more gradual development to which Marius added thefinishing touches, and since the maniple did not immediately disappearit is possible that for a time both formations existed as alternatives. Butby the time of Caesar the cohort was clearly the tactical sub-divisionof the legion, although later writers sometimes anachronistically usemanipulares meaning ‘soldiers’. Marius also improved the design of thepilum by introducing wooden pegs to hold the iron tip to the shaft.These broke on impact and made the spear difficult for the enemy to extract from a shield and throw back. The use of the thrusting spearwas now discontinued. It was probably from this time that the eagle(aquila) was adopted as the symbol of each legion, indicating itspermanent identity. The soldiers of the legions were expected to carry in their packs all the gear needed to make them virtually self-sufficient in the field and were nicknamed ‘Marius’ mules’.27 Thelegions equipped in this way and organized tactically in cohorts out-manoeuvred and outfought the Macedonian phalanx at the battles ofCynoscephalae (197 BC) and Pydna (168 BC). The legionary formationcould be adapted quickly to suit circumstances and terrain and alsopermitted the use of reserves. Doubtless the phalanx if combined withcavalry and other troops as Alexander had done could still have been a valuable instrument of war. But the Romans had superior resources,determination, and resilience, and above all a political unity that theGreeks lacked. The rival monarchies that dominated the city-stateswere defeated individually by the Romans.

In the Social War (91–87 BC) Rome fought her recalcitrant Italianallies, and although victorious in the campaign granted Roman citi-zenship to the allied communities in Italy. This confirmed a substantialreservoir of manpower, which became increasingly necessary as Rome’soverseas responsibilities increased, with more provinces requiring apermanent military presence. Furthermore, the army had acquired a political dimension, which accidentally arose from Marius’ changes.Soldiers tended to be loyal to the commander who had recruited them,and since many had few resources, they expected a reward in cash or land when they left military service. Since the senate refused toaccept that the state should be responsible for this, it was often left to individual generals to secure it for their men, who could be expectedto be suitably grateful. So, the personal association between general and


9

soldiers was enhanced, and instead of one Roman army, we find a seriesof armies personally loyal to their commanders. As political instabilityincreased, leading figures exploited popular support to acquire impor-tant army commands, which they then used to enhance their wealthand reputation and to build up military support. Caesar when governorof Gaul increased his original force from four to twelve legions and by a series of wars turned it into a highly experienced army, which hethen led against his rival Pompey in 49 BC after doubling legionary pay. Caesar became dictator, but was murdered in 44 BC and from thelong civil wars that followed his death his grandnephew Octavianemerged as master of the Roman world in 31 BC and four years laterwas granted the name Augustus by the senate and people.28

Augustus reorganized the Roman army, combining traditional practices with substantial innovations. He confirmed the idea of a pro-fessional, standing army with legions permanently stationed in certainprovinces. He also established terms of service, which were finalizedby AD 5. Legionaries, who had to be Roman citizens, served for twentyyears (and probably five in the reserves) on an annual salary of 900sesterces; they also received a gratuity on discharge, in either land or money, to the value of more than thirteen times a year’s salary. Thisformed the basis of the army’s organization for the next 250 years, with length of service eventually being set at twenty-five years. Romehad from time to time used non-Roman troops in specialist roles, and Augustus incorporated into the formal structure of the army such units of auxiliaries (auxilia); they were originally ethnic groups of non-citizens and served in units of cavalry (alae) or infantry (cohorts).In time the ethnic character was diluted and already by the end ofAugustus’ reign they were as numerous as the legions. Augustus alsoestablished the praetorians as a personal bodyguard, nine cohorts strongwith either 500 or 1,000 men in each. The annual cost of the army was in the vicinity of 450 million sesterces and was an enormous drainon the empire’s resources. Such was the cost of Augustus’ desire forsecurity, prestige, and glory. He presented himself to the Roman peopleas a successful military commander and to the army he became anobject of personal loyalty, a model invariably followed by his successors.The army’s size and cost steadily increased and by the third century AD

it numbered around 450,000 men.29

Roman warfare continued to be based on the heavy infantry of thelegions, with the tactical deployment of cavalry, auxiliaries and archerswhere appropriate, and the use of reserves. Yet military practice wasnot static, and the Romans experimented with new formations tocounter the heavy cavalry and mounted archers of the Parthians and


10

Sarmatians. For example, Arrian used an innovative deployment basedon the traditional Greek phalanx formation to repel the invasion ofCappadocia by the Alani.30 By the second century AD the Romans hadestablished their own armoured cavalry units. Roman armies had astrong siege capacity, leaving the enemy nowhere to hide. Nothingthey did was particularly innovative, but from the early third centuryBC the Romans had understood the potential value of artillery, and the imperial period was the time of greatest development. They usedGreek designs and probably Greek artificers and Romans who had been trained in Greek techniques. The legions could deploy arrow-shooting and stone-firing engines, and also carroballistae that were usedin open battlefield conditions. By AD 100 they had the most powerfularrow-shooting engines ever used in the ancient world. The finaladdition to their armoury was the onager, a large, one-armed stone-thrower, probably in use from the third century AD.31

The centurions were central to the command structure of the Romanarmy. They commanded centuries of 80 men, six of these making upa cohort. Since there were only five centurions in the first cohort, which,however, was probably double in size, there were 59 centurions in each legion. Often they were very experienced and presumably anexcellent source of advice. There were also six military tribunes in eachlegion, one of senatorial and five of equestrian rank. The legion wascommanded by a senator of praetorian rank. The provincial governorhad overall command of the army in his province and he was usually a senator of consular rank. Although these men sometimes had onlylimited experience, it is not clear that this significantly inhibitedtactical developments or innovations. Furthermore, there continuedto be a strong interest in Roman society in warfare and militarypractice, as we can see to some extent in the range of writings aboutstratagems and military formations.

What discretion did a commander have? What did he actually haveto do in an ancient battle? In terms of Roman warfare, if we judge fromancient writings on battle tactics, a responsible commander wouldconduct careful scouting and assessment of enemy forces, take properprecautions for fortifying a suitable camp in hostile territory, know howto draw up his battle line, deploy reserves, be aware of relevant strata-gems for particular situations, including ambush, and make speechesof encouragement to his troops. He must also be skilled in battlepsychology and be capable of dealing with the aftermath of battle, thatis conducting a retreat or bringing the campaign to a close by finishingoff the enemy in the most appropriate way. The commander thereforecontrolled the battle, and rarely would become involved in the fighting.


11

From the late third century onwards the Romans had to adapt to a changing balance of power and assaults on the empire from diversequarters by swiftly moving raiding parties. We find in the third centurymoves to increase cavalry provision, and the emperor Gallienus estab-lished an independent cavalry unit that could be sent to repel incursions.In a development that was originally piecemeal, Gallienus began to replace senatorial army commanders with equestrians; these mentended to have more military experience than senators, and oftenindeed had been promoted from experienced centurions and seniorcenturions. Diocletian (AD 284–305) provided a period of stabilityand military regeneration for the empire and greatly increased thenumber of legions; indeed the number of soldiers will have beendoubled if the legions were kept at their normal complement, thoughthis is unclear. He also began to establish the field army, a number of units of infantry and cavalry drawn from the rest of the army, inde-pendent of any provincial location, and capable of moving relativelyspeedily to deal with the empire’s strategic requirements. Diocletianensured all-round defence of imperial territory by continuing thepractice of stationing troops in individual provinces. These reformswere consolidated by Constantine (AD 306–37), who enhanced the size and status of the field army (Comitatenses), though troops continuedto be stationed permanently in the provinces as a static covering force(Limitanei).32

The Romans had no inherent physical superiority over their oppo-nents and no overwhelming numerical superiority. The tribes on the Rhine and Danube had far larger reserves of manpower to draw on. Although the army was large it was never concentrated in one place,and by the second century there were no more than three legions in any one province, and then in only a few cases. Furthermore, whereasthe Romans were well equipped they had no decisive superiority inarmaments. However, the essential qualities of Roman warfare con-tributed to the army’s consistent success through four centuries of warfare. The Romans had a professional standing army, which was well disciplined and competently organized and led, with a soundframework of financial support for most of the imperial period. Theordnance, supplies, and medical treatment in the army were of a highorder. The Romans ruthlessly applied relatively simple battle tacticsand the follow-up was equally aggressive as they inspired terror with their siegecraft and the sacking of cities. Roman soldiers had thepsychological advantage of being on the attack, since that was howtheir generals operated, and the ruling class had no political or moraldoubts about the desirability of preserving the empire.


12

Ancient writers on warfare33

Many of the authors whose work is translated in this book claim thatthey are writing to educate their audience in the skills of army com-mand, with the expectation that their work will be interesting anduseful. Aeneas Tacticus in his work How to Survive under Siege pointedout that defending your polis and everything that you held dear – temples, native land, parents, and children – was not like fightingin a foreign country. ‘Therefore those who are to fight for these belovedthings must not fail in readiness or effort but must work out manydifferent actions so that if they fail it should not seem that they are to blame.’34 The implication is that they should start by reading hiswork. Asclepiodotus sums up the benefits of sound tactical principles:‘They mean safety for those who observe them and danger for those who ignore them.’35 Among writers of the Roman period, Frontinussays specifically of the skilful operations of commanders that he hasrecorded:

For in this way army commanders will be equipped withexamples of good planning and foresight, and this will developtheir own ability to think out and carry into effect similaroperations. An added benefit will be that the commander will not be worried about the outcome of his own stratagemwhen he compares it with innovations already tested inpractice.36

Onasander was confident that generals could learn from his writings:

Finally I may say confidently that my work will be a trainingschool for good generals and a memorial to retired generals in this period of imperial peace . . . I shall make clear whysome generals have suffered mishap, and why others have beensuccessful and become glorious.37

What is more, in seeking the good will or patronage of emperors,authors often claimed to be offering advice that was congenial andhelpful. So, Vitruvius could introduce to Augustus his work onarchitecture by saying that the emperor built on a grand scale and thatguidance was appropriate: ‘I have provided a detailed survey so that byreferring to it you can teach yourself how to evaluate the works thathave been completed and those about to be started.’38 Vitruvius alsoincluded in his work a section on the construction of catapults and he


13

notes his special expertise in this respect, since Augustus had appointedhim to survey the construction and repair of engines of war. Thebuilding of catapults protected against danger and provided security.39

Aelian had taken the trouble of sounding out Frontinus about hisproposal to write about Greek military tactics, and his address to Trajansingled out the emperor’s military prowess and the Romans’ experienceof warfare. The implication is that his work will find a responsiveaudience, and he even inserted headings for each section so that theemperor would not waste time in finding what he wanted.40 Polyaenuswas more direct when he addressed his treatise to Marcus Aurelius andLucius Verus as they prepared to fight the Parthians. He was sure thathis collection of stratagems would help the emperors in their wars, andhe produced an elaborate justification of his Macedonian ancestry and inherited superiority over eastern peoples, almost certainly makingup for his total lack of military experience.41

We have in these examples explicit statements of purpose and claimsof usefulness. Yet many of these works to our eyes seem formulaic andremote from reality. Should we take it at face value when our writersclaim a didactic purpose? Second, even if the works were genuinelyintended to be didactic, were they of value and did generals read them? It was of course conventional for writers to claim relevance fortheir work and attempt to interest their addressee or sponsor. On theother hand, in the context of ancient culture and society there was aninterest in the past among both Greeks and Romans, and often a desireto identify with their cultural heritage, as well as respect for prominentindividuals who had won honour by their actions. Polybius said in the introduction to his history, ‘Man possesses no better corrective toconduct than knowledge of the past’, and went on to point out that all historians claimed that their writing was an education and a trainingfor a political career.42 Similarly, Sallust claimed that among pursuitsof the mind, writing the history of past events was most useful.43 Inthe reign of Tiberius, Valerius Maximus published in nine books the memorable deeds and saying of Romans and non-Romans as anexample to all. As he put it, referring to the emperor: ‘The virtuesabout which I am going to speak are benevolently fostered, while faultsare severely punished.’44 Traditionally Romans claimed to have greatrespect for exempla, that is, guides on how to behave in certain circum-stances. This related not merely to practical experience but couldinvolve reading about the deeds of famous people and trying to emulatethem, or consulting manuals.45 In a farming context we can see this in the advice offered by Columella to the aspiring farmer who wantsto increase his fortune by tilling his fields:


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He should take special care to consult about everything themost knowledgeable farmers of his own day. He should alsocarefully examine manuals written in the past and evaluate theviews and teachings of their authors, to see if all the informa-tion passed down by older writers is relevant to contemporaryagriculture or out of step in some way.46

Now, we can imagine that at least down to the fifth century BC military know-how and experience were traditionally passed on by word of mouth among friends and family. By the end of thePeloponnesian War, the military detail of which was meticulouslyrecorded by Thucydides, the military arts had become a subject for thelecture hall as a branch of technical knowledge. As such it could betaught by academics with little if any experience of battle. Xenophon,who was very experienced in military service and army command,brought a new realism and personal expertise to writing about militaryaffairs, especially in his work The Cavalry Commander. He clearly didnot mean this to be a collection of trivial anecdotes. Aeneas Tacticusshared the same kind of approach and may indeed be seen as one of the pioneers of this kind of writing, since he wrote several otherworks as well as On Siegecraft.47 Aeneas writes like a man who personally knew his subject and, if he can indeed be identified with Aeneas ofStymphalus,48 was a genuine soldier who knew all about the realitiesof warfare and sieges. He presumably aimed to provide a guide for the authorities in a city and for any individual who aspired to be acompetent leader. From the third century BC onwards treatises con-tinued to be written both by experts and by laymen with variedinterests. So, Xenophon was to find his emulator in the experiencedArrian,49 and there was also a tradition of precisely detailed technicalworks on the construction of war engines, which persisted into theRoman period. Yet the mathematical precision and geometric shapesthat accompanied phalanx manoeuvres continued to attract writerslike Asclepiodotus who had no military experience.

Julius Caesar’s Commentaries on the war he fought in Gaul are uniquein ancient literature. They are not just a retrospective justification for his determination to protect his dignitas in political life, but also a demonstration of his skill in the detailed requirements of militaryleadership and battle management that could serve as an example toothers. Indeed many of his exploits were picked up by later writersand incorporated into the tradition of military ingenuity. The themeof the general’s skill and use of stratagems is represented in the sur-viving collections of stratagems compiled by Frontinus and Polyaenus,


15

and in a treatise on the art of generalship by Onasander. Of these authorsonly Frontinus had experience of commanding an army. The descriptionof the manoeuvres of the phalanx was still regarded as a worthwhiletheme by Aelian, and is discussed by Arrian in his Tactica, which alsodealt with cavalry-training exercises. Arrian had held a militarycommand and, as noted above, also wrote a description on his marchingand battle formations against a predicted attack from the Alani. Thisis unique in our military literature, and he presumably expected it to be taken seriously. The complicating factor in the imperial period is that in seeking examples both Greeks and Romans tended to lookbackwards, Greeks because that was when their great deeds had beenaccomplished, and Romans because it was usually safer to review pastmilitary conduct rather than that of the ruling emperor.

In the social and cultural context in the ancient world most armycommanders were not professional soldiers, and in many cases notparticularly experienced in commanding men. In the Roman republicaristocratic generals, who were expected to serve the state in whatevercapacity it asked, thought that entitlement to command came fromwinning the support of the assembly that voted them into office. Theydoubtless expected to take advice passed down by family and friends.But manuals could also play a part, though genuine experience wasalways preferable.50 In the imperial period emperors had direct controlover their appointees to military command and could, if they so chose, impose rules of suitable experience. There is little sign that they did so, and there was no military academy, formal training, or highcommand of senior officers. Much was left to the initiative and con-science of individuals. Naturally a general would be guided by whateverexperience he had, would take advice from others including juniorofficers and centurions, and would learn from actually carrying out hisduties.

What was the value of military handbooks in this? Some survivingworks could have been helpful in preparing a city for a siege, in prac-tising phalanx manoeuvres, in training the cavalry, in building warengines, and we can surmise that lost works on tactics and militarydeployment in the Roman period might have given specific technicaldetails of direct relevance to officers. Indeed, even knowledge of howthe Greek phalanx operated turned out to be useful for Arrian.51 It isalso reasonable to suppose that a textbook on how to build war enginescould be useful in the artillery workshops, even though the artificerswho kept the legion’s catapults in working order probably had acommon understanding of what needed to be done, without readingVitruvius or other writers on catapult design.


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However, what is perhaps more important is that the nature of manyof the surviving works from the Roman imperial period suggests thatthey were concerned with how a man could prepare himself for thetask of commanding men in battle, get into the right frame of mind,and recognize the range of his responsibilities. Frontinus and Polyaenuson stratagems and Onasander on the art of generalship are greatlyinterested in the moral qualities of the commander and the psychologyof warfare. He needed to be alert, full of ingenuity and resourceful-ness, ready to do and prepare for the unexpected, exploit fear andappearances, and use deception where necessary. He must also learnhow to maintain discipline and enthusiasm in the army and, in short,display a range of characteristics that could be used to good effect in other areas of life. Indeed there is something of this theme in AeneasTacticus’ On Siegecraft, where the advice and instructions are to becarried out by a man of talent and resolution, capable of organizing aneffective resistance and controlling his fellow-citizens. If by readingthese works a general could get into the spirit of military command,he could also put some stratagems to practical use. Technological devel-opment in weaponry was slow, the technical demands of controllingand manoeuvring infantry and cavalry did not change much, and ploys used by previous generals could be repeated, not least becausecommanders seemed prone to fall for old tricks.52

To sum up, Greek and Roman writers of military handbooks do notfit easily into a single category. These works were partly historical,offered general guidance of moral value and some potentially usefulpractical and technical information, but also were intended to amuseand delight the upper classes. An enthusiastic readership suggests acontinuing interest in a culture of warfare and violence. Military booksalso provided a platform on which the authors could display literaryskill, erudition, and mastery of a technical subject. These writersranged from accomplished military men to those with a dilettanteinterest in the military arts. Greek writers of the Roman period mayindeed have hoped to demonstrate that the Greeks too had been noinsignificant warriors. The important point is perhaps not that generalsactually read military handbooks just as they went into battle, but that the whole genre is typical of a mindset in society about the role of a commander, his responsibilities in battle, and perhaps also thequalities of character essential for dealing with matters of life anddeath.


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Notes

1 See Lazenby and Whitehead (1996).2 For weapons, see Snodgrass (1964); partial reintroduction of bronze

weapons – ibid., 133–4; early warfare – Greenhalgh (1973); developmentof hoplites – Cartledge (1977); Osborne (1996), 162–4; 170–6; van Wees(2000a); nature of hoplite battle – Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 134–54;Holladay (1982); Krentz (1985a); Hanson (1989); Lazenby, in Hanson(1991); casualties and care of wounded – ibid., 101–2; Krentz (1985b).

3 Hanson, in Hanson (1991) argues that the emergence of hoplite arms andarmour c. 700 BC was a response aimed at improving the combat efficiencyof men who were already fighting in some kind of massed array.

4 In contrast to body armour, which could only protect individuals(Plutarch, Sayings of the Spartans, Moralia 220A).

5 Snodgrass (1965) doubted that the hoplite reform had immediate politicalconsequences, while Salmon (1977) argued that the hoplite reformsupplied the weapon for political reform though not necessarily the willfor it. For the continuing debate, see Raaflaub, in Raaflaub and Rosenstein(1999), 132–41, arguing that the farmer-hoplites were brought intoegalitarian polis structures not primarily because of their contribution tothe phalanx; van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), doubts theconnection between political regimes and citizen militias; however see thecomments of Gabrielsen, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 89–92. Forcavalry in Greek warfare, see Spence (1993); for a useful general survey ofGreek warfare – Ducrey (1985); Sage (1996), xiv–xxviii; van Wees(2000b).

6 See the survey in Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 208–31.7 Argued by van Wees, in Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002), 70–2.8 Cartledge (1977); Lazenby (1985)9 For the role of the hoplite general, see Wheeler, in Hanson (1991),

especially 147–52, who doubts that the general normally stationedhimself in the first rank of battle; the death and wounding of commandersmay often have occurred in the second stage, as the hoplite battle brokeup.

10 See below, no. 103.11 Under Xenophon’s leadership, see below, p. 21.12 The exact nature of the manoeuvre is much debated; see Anderson (1970),

165–220; Buckler (1985); Lazenby (1985), 155–62; Tuplin (1987);Hanson (1988).

13 Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 117–25; Best (1969) argues that peltasts wereoperating before the end of the fifth century. They were of two types:those who carried two javelins and fought at long distance, and those whocarried a long thrusting spear and fought at close range. Iphicrates maynot have made any significant reform of the fighting practices of peltasts;his skill was in deploying them to the best advantage. For the battle atLechaeum, see no. 116.


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14 Parke (1933); Griffith (1935).15 Adcock (1957); Brunt (1963); Anderson (1970); Schullard (1974); Milns,

in Bosworth (1976); Engels (1978); Markle (1978); Bosworth (1988),259–77.

16 See no. 124, battle of Paraetacene; Bar-Kochva (1976); Hamilton, inRaaflaub and Rosenstein (1999).

17 Diodorus Siculus 12.28.2–3.18 See Whitehead (1990), 25.19 Garlan (1974), 164.20 Marsden (1969), 5–12.21 Sections 32–3; 36–7; see also Garlan (1974), 173; Whitehead (1990).22 Marsden, op. cit., 14–41; 56; he believes that torsion artillery was first

introduced between 353 and 341 BC. There was presumably a long seriesof practical experiments down to the mid-third century BC to establishthe best dimensions for the catapult and work out a suitable formula forcalibration; see Marsden, op. cit., 62. Ctesibius worked on air-spring andbronze-spring catapults, though these were not a notable advance onexisting forms of propulsion. Subsequent development work aimed atincreasing the amount of spring-cord that the tightening winches couldtake. See also below, Chapter 5.

23 For fortifications see Winter (1971); Garlan (1974), 244–69; Lawrence(1979). Leriche and Tréziny (1986).

24 Garlan (1974), 202–44 describes Hellenistic techniques, noting thatassault was the norm rather than investiture.

25 For this idea see Garlan (1974), 179; Whitehead (1990), 25–33; alsobelow, pp. 149–52.

26 6.19–26.27 For a general survey of the army of the republic, see Smith (1958);

Harmand (1967); Keppie (1984); Rosenstein, in Raaflaub and Rosenstein(1999).

28 Brunt (1988) is essential for the role of the army in this period.29 Development and history of imperial army – Keppie (1984), 132–98;

Webster (1985); Le Bohec (1989); Campbell (1994), and in Raaflaub andRosenstein (1999); (2002); warfare and tactics – Goldsworthy (1996);Sabin (2000); recruiting and veterans – Mann (1983); the auxilia –Cheesman (1914); Saddington (1975); Holder (1980); M.P. Speidel(1994); praetorians – Durry (1938); Passerini (1939); Kennedy (1978);size of army – MacMullen (1980); Roth (1994); pay and conditions –M.A. Speidel (1992); Alston (1994); logistics – Roth (1999); arms –Bishop and Coulston (1993). For the impact of the army on the societyand culture and life of the eastern part of the empire see the excellentstudy of Isaac (1992); the army in Egypt – Alston (1995).

30 See below, no. 165.31 See Marsden (1969), 174–98; also below, Chapter 5. 32 For the later Roman army see Jones (1964), 607–86; Williams (1985),

91–101; Southern and Dixon (1996).


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33 For descriptions of pitched battles in Greek historians, see Pritchett, GSWIV (1985), 44–93.

34 Preface 3.35 12.11.36 Bk 1, preface.37 Preface 4.38 1, preface 3.39 1, preface 2; 10.10.1.40 Preface 3–4; 7.41 5, preface; see below, nos 89, 91, 94, 96.42 1.1–2; cf. Vegetius (no. 32).43 War with Jugurtha 4.44 1, preface.45 Campbell (1987), 20–1.46 On Agriculture 1.1.3–4.47 See Whitehead (1990), 36 speculating on the possible links between

Xenophon and Aeneas.48 See p. 149. 49 See below, p. 40. Arrian in his writings sometimes identifies himself with

Xenophon.50 Campbell (1987), 21–3.51 See no. 165.52 For the effectiveness of surprise attacks and ambushes and all kinds of

trickery, see Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 156–89; Wheeler (1988); see alsobelow, no. 109.


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1

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND

DISCIPLINE

1 Xenophon, On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting)

Those who enthusiastically follow the pursuit of hunting will reapgreat advantages, for it makes the body healthy and improves sight andhearing. It also slows down the process of growing old, and is especiallyuseful as training for the art of war. First, men experienced in huntingwill not tire when they are marching over difficult roads under arms.They will endure hardships like this because they are accustomed tocarrying arms in the capture of wild beasts. They will also be capableof sleeping on a hard bed and of effectively guarding the positionassigned to them. In attacks on the enemy they will be able to fall upon him and simultaneously carry out orders passed along the linebecause they do the same things on their own initiative when huntinggame. If positioned in the front line they will not desert the ranks,because they possess endurance. If the enemy flees, they will be able to pursue him directly and safely in any type of terrain because of theirexperience.

Xenophon was born c. 430 BC into a wealthy Athenian family. He probably servedin the Athenian cavalry in his youth, but is likely to have been out of sympathy withthe democratic government of Athens and was an enthusiastic admirer of Spartanpractices. During the rule of the Thirty Tyrants he fought against the democrats inthe civil war (404–403), and although protected by the subsequent amnesty, mayhave thought it wise to leave Athens for a time. He took mercenary service with Cyrus,who was staging a rebellion against the Persian king. Xenophon was one of tenthousand Greek mercenaries who fought in the campaign, which ended in Cyrus’defeat at Cunaxa. After the murder of the Greek generals Xenophon became one of theleaders who guided the army from Mesopotamia to Byzantium. Subsequently hecommanded the survivors of these troops in the interests of Sparta, and after fightingon the Spartan side at the battle of Coronea in 394 was exiled from Athens. There wassome reconciliation with Athens, and his son, Gryllus, was killed fighting with theAthenian cavalry at the battle of Mantinea in 362.

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Xenophon wrote a variety of disparate works, ranging from the a survey of theupbringing and career of the Persian king Cyrus the Great to accounts of Greek history,most notably the Hellenica, in which he took up Thucydides’ narrative, which endedin 411 BC. He also wrote about technical aspects of hunting, and horsemanship, inwhich he offered advice on choosing and looking after horses and explained goodpractice in training and all aspects of riding. His advice seems broadly in line withmodern instruction in horse riding. Two other works reflect Xenophon’s militaryexperience. In the Cavalry Commander he looks at the organization of the Atheniancavalry and concentrates on the duties of the cavalry commander, battle tactics, andthe importance of good leadership. In the Anabasis he describes his role in leading theGreek mercenaries after the defeat of Cyrus. The work is partly historical record, butalso could serve a didactic purpose, as it demonstrates the importance of stratagems,military psychology, good leadership, and discipline. It also shows some aspects of goodpractice in hoplite warfare of the fourth century, though there is much self-justificationof Xenophon’s role (at least one other mercenary leader had written about thecampaign) and the description of the battle of Cunaxa is insufficiently detailed to bereally helpful; see Anderson (1974).

In this extract Xenophon is referring to the hunting of hares and other animals onfoot.

2 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical fitness)

Socrates, noticing that one of his companions, although young, was in poor physical condition, said, ‘Epigenes, you seem to be neglectingyour physical training’. The young man replied, ‘I am merely an ordi-nary citizen, Socrates’. Socrates answered, ‘You need physical trainingjust as much as those intending to compete at Olympia; or does the life and death struggle with their enemies which the Athenians willundertake someday seem of small importance to you? Indeed, manymen die amid the dangers of war or are saved in some disreputablefashion because of their bad physical condition. Many are capturedalive for this very reason, and if this happens to them spend the rest of their lives in the harshest slavery, or are reduced to the mostmiserable condition and pay a ransom beyond their means and spendthe rest of their lives lacking the basic essentials and in desperate straits. Furthermore, many gain a disgraceful reputation because oftheir physical weakness because they seem to be cowards. Do youdespise the penalties of the poor physical condition of these men andthink that you could put up with something similar? I think that the lot of the man who pays proper attention to his physical conditionis much easier and more pleasant.’

The Memorabilia comprise a series of conversations designed to illustrate Socrates’method of debate and incidentally reveal useful details about Athenian life andattitudes.

O R G A N I Z A T I O N , T R A I N I N G , A N D D I S C I P L I N E

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3 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry)

When you have ensured that the horses are in suitable condition thenext task is to train the cavalrymen, firstly so that they can leap up ontotheir horses, since many before now owe their lives to this. Secondly,they must learn to ride over all types of terrain, since wars occur in allsorts of location. As soon as they have obtained a good seat the next task is to make sure that as many as possible can throw their javelinsfrom horseback, and that they become accomplished in all the skills ofhorsemanship.

4 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your position)

If this formation has been adopted it is essential that through word ofmouth passed on by the unit commander every file-leader knows wherehe has to go, just as the unit commanders have their position in theattack explained to them by the commander-in-chief. If commandsare given in this way the army will be better disciplined than if the menget in each other’s way like a crowd leaving the theatre. Furthermore,if there is a frontal attack, the men in the first ranks are much morewilling to fight if they know that this is their position. And those inthe rear ranks, if there is a sudden attack from the rear, understandthat it is disgraceful to leave their position. But if the soldiers aredisorderly, they bring confusion to each other on narrow roads and atriver crossings, and on the battlefield no one willingly takes his positionin the fighting line.

5 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary cavalry)

I believe that the full cavalry complement of one thousand men wouldbe reached far more easily and with less trouble to the citizens if we hiretwo hundred mercenary cavalry. I think that the addition of these menwould make the whole cavalry force more obedient and would fosterrivalry among its members in displays of courage. I know that theLacedaemonian cavalry acquired its reputation when they introducedmercenary cavalry. In other communities everywhere I can see thatmercenary cavalry have an excellent reputation. For need helps toproduce great enthusiasm.


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Xenophon emphasized the importance of cavalry and its proper training, and had beenimpressed with a squadron of mercenary cavalry sent by Dionysius I of Syracuse in369/8 BC to assist the Spartans against the Thebans.

6 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice)

Since it is necessary that the rider should have a firm seat when ridingat top speed over all kinds of country and should be able to use hisweapons properly on horseback, training in horsemanship by huntingis to be commended where the country is suitable and big game is tobe found. When these conditions do not exist, it is a good method of training for two riders to work together in the following way. Onecharges away on his horse over all kinds of ground and retreats, turninghis spear round so that it points backwards. The other pursues, havingbuttons on his javelins and with his spear fixed in the same way, and when he gets within javelin shot, tries to hit the fugitive with theblunt weapon, and if he gets within spear range, strikes his victimwith it.

7 Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons)

Those who are next in seniority (hastati) are ordered to bear the full setof armour and weapons. Roman armour and weapons consist firstly of a shield, whose convex surface is two and a half feet wide and fourfeet long. At the rim it is a quarter of a foot thick. It is made with twoplanks glued together and the outer surface is covered with canvas and then with calf-skin. It has an iron edge on the upper and lower rimsto protect it from downward thrusts from swords and from damagewhen set on the ground. An iron boss is also attached to it and thisdeflects the weighty impact of stones, pikes, and all kinds of heavymissiles. Besides the shield, soldiers also carry a sword, which hangson the right thigh and is called a Spanish sword. This has an excellentpoint and two splendid cutting edges, because its blade is strong anddurable. In addition they have two throwing spears (pila), a bronzehelmet, and greaves. One of these spears is thick, the other slender. Of the thicker ones, some are round and a palm’s length (7.7 cm) indiameter, others a palm square. The slender spears, which they carryalong with the thick ones, resemble moderately sized hunting spears,and for all of them the length of the shaft is three cubits (1.40 m). Abarbed iron head is fitted to each spear and this is the same length asthe shaft. They attach the head very securely to the shaft, letting half


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its length into the shaft and fixing it with many rivets. Consequentlyin battle the iron head will break before it becomes detached, althoughat the bottom where it meets the wood it is only about a finger’s breadthand a half (2.8 cm). This shows how much care they take in attachingit firmly. In addition to this equipment they wear an ornamental circletof feathers consisting of three upright purple or black feathers aboutone and a half feet in height. When the soldier, equipped with theother weaponry, adds this to his head he appears to be twice his height,and is an awesome sight, which strikes terror into the enemy. Thesoldiers also wear a bronze breastplate about a span (nine inches) square,which they place in front of their heart and call the ‘heart-protector’.This completes their equipment. But those who are assessed at morethan ten thousand drachmae wear instead of the breastplate a coat ofchain-mail. The principes and triarii use the same weaponry, except thatthe triarii carry long spears instead of the pila.

Polybius (c. 200–118 BC) came from Megalopolis, part of the Achaean Federation,which had become dominant in the Peloponnese by the second century BC, andprovided a counterweight to Roman influence. In 170/169 Polybius served as cavalrycommander (hipparch) of the Federation. But after 167 tension and hostility arosebetween Rome and the Confederacy and Polybius was among the one thousand leadingAchaeans transported to Italy and detained in Italian towns. However, Polybius wasbefriended by P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and was able to observe many importantevents in Roman history at first hand, including the military campaigns in Spain andAfrica against Carthage. Indeed, Polybius may possibly have been at the siege ofNumantia in 133 BC. His works on military tactics and on the Numantine war havebeen lost, but a significant amount survives of his Histories, in which he explains therise of Rome to supremacy in the Mediterranean area and beyond, her government,customs, and practices. Naturally, in his explanation of how Rome defeated all herenemies the role of the army was of vital importance and Polybius explains in detailRoman military practice. This is particularly important because Polybius had somemilitary expertise, had seen Roman warfare at first hand, and generally exercised clearand sober historical judgement; see Walbank (1972); text and commentary in threevolumes (1957–79).

The description in this extract probably applies at least in part to the end of theSecond Punic War, although there may also be aspects that belong to the time inwhich Polybius was writing in mid-second century. The Spanish cutting and thrustingsword and also the pilum may have been adopted from Spanish mercenaries fightingfor the Carthaginians in the First Punic War. The heavy pilum described by Polybiuswith a shaft 1.40 m long, 7.7 cm wide, and with an iron head of the same length, 2.8 cm wide would weigh 8.5 kg, and be too heavy to throw. But on Walbank’s view(1957), 704–5, it is likely that the pilum was thinner except where the shaft fitted intothe head. Since half the iron head was let into the shaft the total length would be about2.10 m, and the weight about 4.68 kg.


25

8 Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword)

They secure the passing round of the watchword for the night in the following way. From the tenth maniple of each type of cavalry andinfantry, that is the maniple camped at the lower end of the street, aman is chosen and he is relieved of guard duty. Every day at sunset hecomes to the tent of the tribune, and receiving the watchword, whichis written on a wooden board, he goes away again. On returning to hismaniple he passes on in front of witnesses the watchword and thewooden tablet to the commander of the next maniple, and he in turnpasses it on to the commander of the next maniple. All the commandersdo the same until the password arrives at the first maniples, which are encamped next to the tribunes. These must bring the password to the tribunes before dark. Therefore, if all the tablets issued arereturned, the tribune knows that the watchword has been passed to all the maniples and has passed through all of them back to him. But if anyone of them is missing, he enquires at once into what hashappened, and from the record knows from what section the tablet hasnot returned. The person responsible for the delay suffers suitablepunishment.

9 Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline)

If the same thing ever happens to large groups of soldiers, and manipleswhen desperately hard pressed desert their post, the Romans refrainfrom inflicting the fustuarium (beating to death with sticks) or thedeath penalty on all of them, but instead find a resolution that is bothexpedient and also strikes fear. The military tribune assembles thelegion, brings out into the middle all those who deserted their post,and denounces them vigorously. Finally, from all those guilty of cow-ardice he chooses by lot sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimestwenty men, always calculating the proportion in respect of the totalnumber of men in the unit so as far as possible to get one tenth of theguilty. Those selected by lot suffer the fustuarium without mercy in the way described above. To the remainder he gives a ration of barleyinstead of wheat and orders them to encamp outside the safety of therampart. Therefore, the danger and the fear of the lot hang overeveryone equally since it is unclear on whom the lot will fall. And sincethe public humiliation of the allocation of barley rations comes toeveryone equally, this custom is the best directed to inspire terror andcure the fault.


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10 Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour)

They also have a splendid way of inspiring young soldiers to facedanger. After a battle where some of them have distinguished them-selves, the commander summons a meeting of the entire army, andbringing forward those whom he thinks have performed outstandingacts of courage, he first delivers a speech in praise of each man cele-brating his valour and anything else from his past record that is worthyof commendation. He then distributes rewards as follows: to the manwho has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has killed andstripped an enemy, a cup if he is in the infantry, and horse trappings if he is in the cavalry, although the reward here was originally only a spear. . . . (5) To the man who is first to climb the wall during theassault on a city, he gives a gold crown. Similarly, the consul dis-tinguishes with special gifts those who have protected and saved some of their fellow-citizens or allies. And the men they saved crownthem, either willingly, or if not, under the direction of the tribunes whojudge the case. The man who has been saved reveres his rescuer as a father throughout his life and must treat him in every respect as aparent. Through this kind of encouragement they inspire to emulationand rivalry not only those who are present and listen to the ceremonybut also those who stay at home. For the men who receive this kind of gift, apart from their fame in the army and their immediatereputation at home, after their return to Rome have special honours inreligious processions, since no one is allowed to wear decorations exceptthose on whom such honours for valour have been conferred by theconsul. Furthermore, they hang up their war spoils in the most con-spicuous place in their houses, regarding them as signs and evidenceof their courage. When we reflect on the concern and enthusiasm for rewards and punishments in military affairs it is easy to understandhow the Romans bring to a successful and brilliant conclusion the warsin which they fight.

11 Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the infantry)

He himself (Scipio) spent some time at Carthage assiduously trainingthe naval forces and instructed the military tribunes in the followingmethod for training the infantry forces. On the first day he orderedthem to run for thirty stades (about three and a half miles) in armour,and on the second all were to attend to, polish, and inspect all their


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weapons in full view; on the next they were to rest and take their ease,and on the day after some were to fight with wooden swords coveredwith leather and fitted with buttons, while others were to throw spearswith a button on the point; on the fifth day they were to return to therunning exercises and begin the cycle again. He took the greatest care with the workmen so that there should be no deficiency in armsdrill or real combat. He placed suitable men in charge of this essentialtask by rotation, as I explained above. He went out himself every dayand through his own example prepared all the material for each group.

This refers to the siege of New Carthage in 209 BC. Livy (26.51.4), describing the sameevents, assigns the third day to practice with swords and spears, and the fourth day torest. It seems better to have the day spent cleaning weapons between running andfighting, and a transposition of Polybius’ text has been suggested (see Walbank (1967),219).

12 Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx and Roman legion)

There are many reasons that make it easy to understand that as long as the phalanx retains its usual order and strength nothing can meet itface to face or resist its charge. For when the phalanx has closed ranksfor action each soldier with his weapons occupies a space of three feet.The sarisa was originally intended to be sixteen cubits (7.3 m) long butwas changed to fourteen cubits (6.47 m) to fit in with current practice,and from this we must subtract the space of four cubits (1.8 m) betweenthe hands and the counter-weight behind the projecting part. Thereforeit is clear that the sarisa must project ten cubits (4.6 m) in front of thebody of each soldier when he advances towards the enemy holding itwith both hands. It follows from this that while the sarisas of the menin the second, third, and fourth ranks project further (than those ofthe fifth rank), even the sarisas of the fifth rank project three feet in front of the men in the first rank, as long as the phalanx keeps its usualorder and compact formation in respect of depth and breadth . . .

(30) From this it is easy to imagine the appearance and power of theattack of the entire phalanx sixteen ranks deep with levelled sarisas. Ofthe sixteen ranks those stationed further back than the fifth cannot use their pikes to take a fighting role in the battle. Therefore they do not level their sarisas at an opponent, but hold them with the pointstilted upwards over the shoulders of the men in front of them. By doingthis they protect the entire phalanx from above, since the sarisas arepacked so closely together that they intercept any missiles that mightpass over the heads of the first ranks and hit those standing behind


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them. Furthermore, once the attack has begun they use the weight of their bodies to press on those in front and increase the impetus ofthe charge, and also make it impossible for the ranks in front to turnback.

I have explained both the general principles and detailed operationof the phalanx, and now in order to make a comparison I must describethe characteristics of Roman equipment and tactical formation andthe differences between the two. The Roman soldier with his weaponsalso occupies a space of three feet. However, during the battle eachsoldier moves independently, defending his body with a long shield and moving it constantly to meet an anticipated blow; he also uses asword to cut and thrust. Clearly this method of fighting requires anopen order and a gap between the soldiers; indeed each man requiresat least three feet from those beside him and from those behind him if he is to do what is required efficiently. The result of this is that oneRoman soldier has to face two members of the phalanx and so mustencounter and fight against ten pikes. It is impossible for one man to cut through these when the battle is joined, nor is it easy to forcethem aside. Furthermore, the rear ranks do not support those in front,either in forcing aside the spears or in using the sword. Therefore wecan readily understand how nothing can stand up to the frontal assaultof the phalanx, as long as it retains its usual order and strength, as I said before.

(31) What then is the factor that enables the Romans to win andcauses those using the phalanx to lose? The answer is that warfare isconducted as the situation demands without limit on opportunitiesand places. The phalanx, however, has one opportunity and one typeof terrain in which it can bring about its best effect. If the enemy werecompelled to fall in with the opportunities and places that suited thephalanx when a battle was about to take place, then on the argumentI have just put forward those using the phalanx would always win. Butif it is possible or indeed easy to avoid the charge of the phalanx, howcan the formation I have described still be formidable? Furthermore,it is generally agreed that the phalanx needs flat and level ground freeof obstacles like ditches, ravines, depressions, ridges, and watercourses.For all these obstacles are sufficient to disturb or break this kind offormation. People generally agree that it is virtually impossible or atleast very rare to find a location of two or three miles or even more thatdoes not have obstacles of this kind. Then, even if such a location isfound, if the enemy does not come to it but circles round sacking the cities and the territory of our allies, what is the use of the phalanxformation? By remaining in the location that suits it best, it would not


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only be unable to help its friends but even incapable of saving itselfsince the enemy can easily prevent the transport of supplies becausethey have undisputed control of open country. If it leaves the terrainthat suits it and undertakes an action, it will easily be overcome by theenemy. On the other hand, if the enemy does descend to the levelground but does not deploy its entire force at the moment when thephalanx has its one opportunity to charge, but keeps back even a smallpart at the time when the main clash occurs, the outcome can be easilyseen from the tactics that the Romans are employing now.

(32) My viewpoint no longer needs to be justified by argument; I canrefer to what has already happened. The Romans do not make theirbattle line numerically equal or face the phalanx head on with all theirtroops. Instead they keep some of the troops in reserve while the restengage the enemy. Then, when the phalanx drives back those attackingit or is driven back by them, its distinctive formation is broken. Foreither in pursuing troops in retreat or fleeing those attacking it, thephalanx leaves behind the remaining parts of the rest of its army. Whenthis happens the enemy troops held in reserve have the chance to occupythe space previously occupied by the phalanx and no longer have toattack head on, but can fall upon the soldiers of the phalanx from the flank and from the rear. Since it is simple to deny the phalanx itsopportunities and advantages and impossible to prevent action againstit, surely it is reasonable that there is an enormous difference betweenthese two methods (of fighting).

Furthermore, those using the phalanx must march through andencamp in all kinds of terrain; they must occupy favourable positionsin advance, besiege other people and be besieged themselves, and copewith unexpected appearances of the enemy. These are all part of war and have an important or decisive influence in winning a victory. In all these circumstances the Macedonian phalanx is of small value andsometimes of no value at all because the soldier of the phalanx cannotmake a useful contribution either in detachments or individually. By contrast the Roman formation is very flexible. For every Romansoldier, once he is armed and moves into battle, is equally suited forevery type of terrain and eventuality and unexpected attack. He is readyand is equally well prepared if he has to fight with the entire army or with part of it or with his detachment or individually. Therefore,since the Romans are so superior in the effective use of the parts oftheir army, they are far more likely than others to bring their plans to a successful outcome. I thought it essential to treat this subject atsome length because many of the Greeks on those occasions when theMacedonians were defeated thought that it was incredible, and many


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will still be unable to understand why and how the phalanx formationis inferior to the Roman military establishment.

Polybius here explains to his fellow-Greeks how in his view Roman legionaryorganization was superior to the Macedonian phalanx. For the battle of Cynoscephalae,see no. 163. In his description of the Roman legion, Polybius means that the legionaryneeded three feet (a Greek foot = 308.3 mm) between him and the next man in closeformation, and also three feet in which to manoeuvre in sword fighting; see Walbank(1967), 588–90. Polybius is here referring to the manipular formation, which consistedof three ranks, some of which could be held back from immediate engagement (seeabove, p. 8).

13 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies)

The infantry is divided into a corps of hoplites, a corps of peltasts, anda corps of the so-called lightly armed men. The corps of hoplitesbecause it fights at close range uses very heavy equipment, for thesoldiers are protected by enormous shields, body armour, and greaves,and use long spears of the type that I shall call ‘Macedonian’. On theother hand the corps of light infantry uses the lightest equipmentbecause they shoot from a distance and are not equipped with eithergreaves or body armour, but with javelins and slings and missiles thatare generally described as ‘long distance’. The corps of peltasts in away stands between these two, for the pelte is a kind of small, lightshield, and their spears are much smaller than those used by thehoplites.

In the same way there are three subdivisions of the mounted force.The first is cavalry, the second is equipped with chariots, and the thirdwith elephants. However let us postpone until a later time discussionof chariots and elephants since they are not naturally suited for battle.I shall now discuss cavalry since it is widely used and on many occasionshas been more useful in battle. There are three branches of the cavalry,one that fights at close quarters, one that fights at a distance, and onethat is between these two. The cavalry that fights at close quarters justlike the infantry uses the heaviest equipment, entirely protecting both horses and men with defensive armour, and also like the hoplitesusing long spears. Consequently this branch is called spear-bearing orlance-bearing or even shield-bearing, whenever some of them carryexceptionally long shields so as to protect the horse as well as the rider.The branch that fights at long range is called both the archer-cavalryand the Scythian cavalry. The intermediate branch is called theskirmishers. They are stationed on the flanks and some fight with bows


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while others use javelins, the former employing the gear of lightcavalry, the latter that of the heavy cavalry.

Asclepiodotus lived in the first century BC and wrote an account of technical aspectsof the formation and organization of the Greek phalanx and other branches of thearmy. After Aeneas Tacticus, this is the earliest surviving example of a military treatise,though it is much different in character, lacking in historical examples or any kind of personal experience. There is no sign that Asclepiodotus had any military training,but the material he uses must to some extent represent military thinking, preservedin earlier textbooks, of best practice in operating the phalanx. In discussing cavalryfighting, he preserves the information that the Thessalian cavalry first employed therhomboid formation (no. 121); text and translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928).

For peltasts see below, nos 115–16.

14 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line)

We shall not, however, draw up the file in this way, but we shallposition the strongest men in the first rank and behind them the most intelligent. And of the former we shall make the file-leaders themen who stand out in size, strength, and skill. For the line of the file-leaders binds the phalanx together and resembles the cutting edge of a sword, and therefore the ranks that are held together on both flanksby file-leaders are called two-edged.

The second line should also not be significantly inferior to the first, so that if a file-leader falls the man stationed behind can stepforward and hold the line together. The file-closers, both those in thefiles and those in larger units, should surpass everyone else in intel-ligence, the former so as to keep their own files in order, the latter tokeep the regiments in formation and step with one another. They mustalso bring back into line those who abandon their position because offear and compel them to close ranks for fighting in close order.

Asclepiodotus’ version of the Greek phalanx probably was based on late Hellenisticpractice, though the basic structure was similar to the Macedonian unit used by Philipand Alexander. In Asclepiodotus’ description the basic building block of the phalanxis the syntagma, consisting of 16 files of 16 men (256). The ideal phalanx according toAsclepiodotus consisted of 64 syntagmata (16,384 men). The files were drawn up sideby side and the file-leaders were the front-rank men, while the file-closers came at therear.


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15 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx)

The best shield for use in the phalanx is the bronze Macedonian, about eight palms in diameter (61.68 cm), and not excessively concave.The spear is at least ten cubits (4.6 m) long, so that the projecting partshould be at least eight cubits (3.7 m). However, in no circumstancesis it longer than twelve cubits (5.5 m) so that it projects ten cubits.When the Macedonian phalanx used this spear in a close-order forma-tion it seemed irresistible to the enemy. For it is clear that the spearsof the first five ranks project beyond the front. . . . The Macedonians,as people say, not only terrify the enemy with the sight of this row ofspears, but also encourage each of the file-leaders, who is protected by the strength of five men. The men behind the fifth rank, althoughthey cannot extend their spears beyond the first rank, neverthelessshove forward with their bodies and make sure that the soldiers in the front ranks have no hope of flight. Some, however, who want tomake all the spears project equally in front of the line increase thelength of the spears of the rear ranks.

The idea of increasing the length of the spears of the rear ranks seems impracticable.

16 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants)

In respect of elephants, the leader of a single elephant is called an animal-commander (zoarchos), the commander of two a beast-commander(therarchos) and his command a beast-unit. A commander of fourelephants is a senior beast-commander (epitherarchos) and his commanda senior beast-unit. The commander of eight is a troop-commander(ilarches), of sixteen an elephant-commander (elephantarches), of thirty-two a wing-commander (kerarches), and of sixty-four a phalanx-commander (phalangarches). And each unit will receive a correspondingname.

This is the only surviving passage from military writers concerning the organizationof elephant units. The names may owe more to Asclepiodotus’ love of definitions thanto practical reality.

17 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands)

This being the number and nature of the manoeuvres, it would followthat we should discuss the commands used in them, through which we


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can direct and move the soldiers and bring them back to their originalposition. For this was the one aspect that remains to be done.

When, therefore, we want the regiments to perform a quarter turnto the right, we should command the right file to hold its position andeach soldier in the other files to face right, to advance to the right, andthen to face front. Next, we should order the rear ranks to advance, and when in this way a compact formation has been achieved, to quarterturn to the right, and the regiment will be turned round in this fashion.

(10) [We shall train the army to understand clearly the commands],which are given sometimes by the voice, sometimes by visible signals,and sometimes by the trumpet. The clearest commands are those given by the voice, but they may not always be audible because of the clash of arms or strong gusts of wind. Commands given by signalsare more secure against uproar. But sometimes there can be problems even with these, because of the sun’s glare, thick mist and dust, orheavy rain. Therefore it is not easy to find suitable signals, to which the phalanx has been accustomed, for every situation that might arise, and sometimes it is necessary to find a new method to suit thecircumstances. For it is unlikely that all eventualities will happen at once, so that a command will be unclear either by trumpet, voice,or signal.

Commands given by voice must be short and unambiguous. This canbe achieved if we give specific before general commands, since generalcommands are ambiguous. For example we would not say, ‘Face right!’but ‘Right face!’, to ensure that in their eagerness some do not turn to the right and some to the left when the order to turn has been givenfirst, but rather all do the same thing at the same time. Similarly, wedo not say, ‘Face about right!’, but ‘Right about face!’, nor ‘Counter-march Laconian!’, but ‘Laconian counter-march!’, and . . .

In the Laconian counter-march each rank about-faced to the rear and then marchedthrough to the rear taking up position in front of the rank of file-closers, which heldits position (10.15); see also no. 122.

18 Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish sword)

Perhaps what I have said seems incredible to you, as indeed it has tomany others. They claim that it is impossible for plates, once bent andthen straightened by the force of the arm, to return to the bend theyhad before, instead of remaining straight for good. This is of course thenatural quality of horn and some types of wood, and bows are madefrom material like this. Bronze on the other hand is strong by nature


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and has toughness and resilience, just like iron, but when it is bent bysome force it keeps the bend afterwards and cannot straighten itselfback again. Therefore they should be excused for being induced intoholding this view since they have not made detailed enquiries inadvance. For the workmanship needed for the plates I mentioned beforehas been noted in the swords called variously Celtic and Spanish. Whenthey wish to test how good these are, they take the hilt in the right hand and the end of the blade in the left and place it horizontally acrossthe head. They then bend it down from both sides until the ends touchthe shoulders. Next they suddenly let it go, taking both hands away.The blade when released straightens itself out again and returns to itsoriginal shape, so that it has no hint of any bend. Even though theyrepeat this process frequently, the sword remains straight.

Philon of Byzantium lived c. 230 BC and produced a collection of technological worksin nine books, including the construction of artillery (Belopoeica), and the offensiveand defensive conduct of sieges. When he visited Alexandria he met people who hadworked with the great inventor Ctesibius, and it is likely that his account of bronze-spring and air-spring catapults was influenced by Ctesibius’ Commentaries and bycurrent practice in Alexandrian workshops. He also claims to have met personallytechnical experts in Rhodes and to have observed their engineering workshops (Bel. 51.10–14). However, Philon criticizes some aspects of the design of catapults and tells us that the wedge-shaped catapult was his own design (Bel. 56.12–13). BothPhilon and Heron (see p. 196) probably used some common Alexandrian sources sincethere is a close correspondence in their phraseology in some respects; see Marsden(1971), 6–9.

For the use of the Spanish sword see below, no. 35.

19 Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army)

If we examine the rest of their military organization we will see thatthey hold their empire as a prize of courage not as a gift of fortune. (72)For they do not wait until war breaks out before beginning weaponstraining, nor do they go idly through peace time, moving their handsto action only during a crisis. Indeed, as if they had been born fullyarmed they never take a holiday from training and do not wait for crises to appear. (73) Their training manoeuvres lack none of the rigourof genuine warfare and each soldier practises battle drill every day withgreat enthusiasm just as if he were in battle. Therefore they sustain theshock of combat very easily. (74) For their customary well-orderedranks are not disrupted by any confusion, or numbed by fear, orexhausted by toil; so, certain victory inevitably follows since the enemycannot match this. (75) Indeed one would not be wrong in saying that


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their training manoeuvres are battles without bloodshed, and theirbattles manoeuvres with bloodshed. (76) They never leave themselvesvulnerable to surprise enemy attack. Whatever enemy territory theyinvade they do not engage in battle until they have fortified a camp.

(85) Once the camp has been fortified the soldiers take up theirquarters according to unit in a quiet and orderly fashion. All theirduties are carried out with discipline and security; each unit has itsappointed responsibility, for collecting firewood and food-supplies, ifthey are required, and water. (86) They do not take supper and break-fast when it suits individuals, but all at the same time. Trumpet blastsannounce the time for sleep, guard duty, and rising, and nothing isdone without a word of command. (87) At dawn the soldiers report to the appropriate centurion, the centurions go to greet the militarytribunes, with whom the senior officers attend upon the commandingofficer. (88) He customarily gives them the password and other ordersfor distribution to the rank and file. They respond to orders in the sameway on the battlefield and moving as one man they wheel roundquickly as required, either to make an attack or in retreat.

Josephus was a Jewish priest of aristocratic background and one of the political leadersin Jerusalem before the revolt of AD 66. Though devoted to Jewish religious andcultural traditions he was not in full accord with the aims of the leaders of the revoltfrom Rome. Nevertheless, he was put in charge of the defence of the Galilee, directingoperations during the siege of Jotapata conducted by the Roman commander andfuture emperor Vespasian. Josephus was captured after the fall of the city, but ignoringa suicide pact he managed to win the favour of Vespasian and his son Titus. He wrotean account of the war in Aramaic (now lost) and later in Greek. This was based on hisown experiences in the war, eyewitness accounts from others, and the commentariesof Vespasian and Titus. He had encountered the Roman army at first hand and knewhow it had dealt with Jewish fighting methods. This makes his long digression on thestructure of the army and its disciplined organization especially valuable, even thoughit is rather pro-Roman ( Jewish War 3.70–109); for the career and character of Josephus,see Rajak (1983).

20 Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–7 (Roman discipline)

Through their military exercises the Romans give their soldiers notonly strong bodies but also mental courage, and fear also plays a partin training. (103) For they have laws that inflict the death penalty notonly for desertion of the ranks but even for a minor neglect of duty. Thegenerals inspire even greater fear than the laws, since by rewarding the brave they avoid appearing cruel to those whom they punish. (104)So great is the army’s obedience to its leaders that in peacetime it is an


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adornment to Rome and in wartime the whole force acts as a singlebody. (105) This is because the ranks are so well knit together, theirmanoeuvres so well organized, their ears so sharp for orders and their eyesfor signals, and their hands for the task that needs to be done. (106)Therefore they are always prompt in action and correspondingly veryslow to surrender to suffering, and have never been defeated in anysituation by numbers, trickery, unfavourable terrain, or even by badluck. For the Romans, conquering is a stronger force than luck. (107)Since planning precedes action and this effective army carries out theplans, it is no surprise that in the east the Euphrates, in the west theocean, in the south the most fertile parts of Libya, and in the north the Danube and the Rhine form the limits of the empire. It can betruly said that this conquering people are greater than their conquests.

21 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline)

When the Roman army at Numantia had been demoralized by thelaxness of previous commanders, Publius Scipio restored its morale by dismissing a large number of camp followers and conditioning the soldiers to their duties by daily exercise. During the marches thathe frequently instructed them to undertake he ordered them to carryseveral days’ rations. Consequently the soldiers became accustomed toenduring cold and rain and to fording rivers on foot, while the generaldenounced cowardice and indolence and smashed containers that were for mere self-indulgence and not essential for military campaigns. A particularly memorable example of his toughness occurred with thetribune Gaius Memmius, to whom Scipio is said to have commented:‘To me you will be useless for only a short time, but to yourself and thestate for ever!’

Sextus Julius Frontinus was a Roman senator prominent in government and society.He was consul three times (72 or 73, 98, 100) and had a distinguished militaryreputation, taking part in 70 in the suppression of the revolt of Julius Civilis in Gaul,and as governor of Britain (73/4–77) leading campaigns against the Silures in southWales. He served as head of the water supply in Rome (Curator Aquarum) and wrotea book about the responsibilities of this post. He also wrote a guide to aspects of landsurvey, a treatise on the art of war (now lost), and four books of Strategemata, in whichthe collected about 580 examples of military anecdotes, mainly about past Greek andRoman commanders, though he mentions four exploits of the emperor Domitian. Hedrew widely from other writers for his material, including Sallust, Julius Caesar, andValerius Maximus. There is no strong reason for doubting that Frontinus also wrotethe fourth book. The Strategemata are divided by general themes: before battle, duringthe battle itself, the siege and defence of towns, and military science in general,


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especially discipline and military psychology. There are numerous sub-headings underthese themes. He covered the full range of military activities, including how to dealwith defeats. Frontinus writes in the tradition of offering guidance through thesuccessful deeds of others whose ploys could be emulated. In terms of militarycommand he set out to demonstrate and confirm the important principle that part of the skill of commanding lay in the ability to be inventive and alert and think outclever stratagems to deal with the immediate situation. Career and standing – Eck(1982); text and translation – Bennett and McElwain (1925).

This extract refers to the siege of Numantia in 134–133 BC by Publius CorneliusScipio Africanus. A slightly different version of this story appears in Polyaenus 8.16.2;according to Livy, Scipio threw two thousand prostitutes out of the camp (Periochae57); see also Appian, Spanish Wars 85.

22 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules)

Gaius Marius, in order to reduce the number of pack animals withwhich the army’s march was particularly hampered, arranged for thesoldiers’ utensils and food to be wrapped up in bundles and fastenedto forked sticks, so that the troops could readily carry them and easilytake a rest. From this came the famous expression: ‘Marius’ mules’.

For Marius, see pp. 8–9.

23 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline)

The Spartan general Clearchus used to say to his army that they shouldfear their general more than the enemy, meaning that while the deaththey feared in battle was uncertain, they would certainly be executedif they deserted.

Clearchus held various commands as a Spartan officer after 411 BC, but made himselftyrant of Byzantium in 403 and subsequently joined Cyrus as commander of his Greekmercenaries in his attempt to make himself Persian king. Later Clearchus was arrestedwith most of the other senior officers and executed by the Persians. See no. 43 forXenophon’s estimate of his qualities.

24 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline)

When Domitius Corbulo was campaigning in Armenia he ordered twosquadrons and three cohorts, which had given way before the enemyat the fortress of Initia, to camp outside the rampart until they hadredeemed their disgrace with hard work and successful sorties.


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(28) When Domitius Corbulo was campaigning in Armenia, acavalry commander named Aemilius Rufus gave way before the enemyand also kept his cavalry squadron improperly armed. Corbulo had hislictor to cut his clothes off and ordered him to stand in the headquartersas he was in this appalling plight until he should be released.

Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo was appointed by Nero in AD 55 as governor of Cappadociaand Galatia and given the command for the war against Parthia for control overArmenia. Corbulo was a strict disciplinarian and trained the legions assiduously(Tacitus, Annals 13.35–6). A Roman nominee was installed as king of Armenia andCorbulo became governor of Syria. But in 62 war was renewed and after a number ofsetbacks Corbulo assumed command and brought about a lasting settlement withoutfighting any major battles. In 66 the emperor forced him to commit suicide.

25 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline)

Since Gaius Titius, prefect of a cohort, had given way before somefugitive slaves, Lucius Piso ordered him to stand barefoot everyday in the camp headquarters, with the belt of his toga cut and his tunicundone until the night guards came, and to abstain from banquets andbathing.

Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi as consul in 133 BC fought in Sicily against the slaves;cf. Valerius Maximus 2.7.9.

26 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline)

Marcus Antonius, when the enemy set fire to his rampart, decimatedthe soldiers of the two cohorts that had been engaged on the work and punished the centurions of each cohort. In addition he cashieredin disgrace the officer commanding and ordered the rest of the legionto be given barley rations.

This incident occurred during Antony’s invasion of Parthia in 36 BC (cf. Plutarch,Antony 39).

27 Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry)

Infantry and cavalry formations and weaponry are of many differenttypes. First, the weaponry of the infantry, if we look at the most impor-tant categories, is divided into three, namely the hoplite, the light-armed, and the peltast. The hoplites are the most heavily armed, having


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body armour, shields, either round or oblong in shape, swords and spears(as carried by the Greeks) or sarisas (as carried by the Macedonians).Light-armed troops are equipped in a way that is the exact opposite ofthe hoplites, since they do not have body armour, shields, greaves, orhelmets. They always use missile weapons, either bows, or javelins, or slings, or stones thrown by hand. The peltasts are armed more lightlythan the hoplites. For their shield (pelte) is smaller and lighter than thehoplite shield, and their javelins are lighter than the spears and sarisasof the hoplites, though heavier than the javelins of the light-armed.

(4) As regards the weaponry of cavalry, some cavalry is armouredand some without armour. Armoured cavalry has both the horses andriders protected by armour. The cavalrymen have body armour madeof metal plates, or linen, and armour made of horn for the thighs, thehorses have covers for their sides and frontlets. Cavalry without armourhas none of this equipment. Of these cavalrymen some are equippedwith spears, others only with javelins.

Arrian c. AD 86–160 was a Greek from Nicomedia in Bithynia and also a Romansenator. Hadrian appointed him as governor of Cappadocia (131–7). He was a prolificwriter who styled himself as the second Xenophon, and among his works are a historyof Alexander, Periplus of the Black Sea, Tactica, and Order of Battle against the Alani, in which he describes his military dispositions as governor of Cappadocia against anexpected invasion of the Alani c. 135. He therefore had some experience of drawingup a Roman legionary army, yet his Tactica is largely devoted to a study of Greekphalanx formations and manoeuvres. However, arguably there is a contemporaryrelevance in that during the campaign against the Alani, Arrian employed distinctivedefensive tactics by deploying the first ranks of the legionaries with long thrustingspears instead of the usual pila. Furthermore, the second part of the Tactica contains a valuable survey of Roman cavalry tactics and training manoeuvres. For the career ofArrian see Stadter (1980).

In the Tactica Arrian is mainly interested in the Greek armies of the Hellenisticperiod, but here seems to present the usual Greek analysis of the organization ofinfantry troops; cf. no. 13.

28 Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals)

It is essential to accustom the army to receive commands clearly, bothvocal commands, and visible signals, and trumpet calls. Commandsrelayed by the voice are the clearest since in this way your entire inten-tion becomes clear, and not just some symbol of it which is merelyseen or heard. But since there are many circumstances in a battle likely to prevent verbal communication, such as the din of weapons,shouts of mutual encouragement, the screams of the wounded, thegalloping past of a squadron of cavalry, the clash of arms, the neighingof horses, and the noise of the sutlers passing by, all this means that the


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army must be accustomed to visible signals. Nevertheless, even thesesometimes are ineffective because for example there is a mist or a cloudof dust rising up, or because the sun is shining in the soldiers’ faces, orthere is a sudden snow shower or downpour of rain, or because the area is heavily wooded or hilly. In these circumstances the entire armywould not be able to see the signals. Whenever hills interrupt the line of sight, we must improve our visible signals. The trumpet isuseful in dealing with any aerial obstacles (to the line of sight).

29 Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command)

The words of command should be as follows: To arms. Armour-bearersleave the battle line. Quiet, and pay attention to the word of command.Raise spears. Lower spears. The rearguard commander will straightenthe ranks. Watch the gaps. Move to the right (spear side). Move to the left (shield side). Straight ahead. Steady as you go. Move away to the right. Double the depth (of the ranks). As you were. Deploy inthe Laconian manoeuvre. As you were. Wheel to the right. As youwere.

See also above, no. 17.

30 Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training)

After riding into the arena to the left of the tribunal the cavalry haltin close formation. They turn the horses’ heads away and with theirshields cover their own backs and the backs of the horses. This forma-tion is called a tortoise (testudo) just like the equivalent infantryformation using shields. Two cavalrymen come forward a sufficientdistance to allow the main group to charge, and are positioned in frontof the right wing of the tortoise in order to receive the javelin fire of the men riding directly past. Therefore half of the cavalry standready to defend themselves against the charge. When the trumpet givesthe signal half the cavalry take up the attack, keeping up a constantbarrage of javelins, the first being the most courageous trooper, thenthe second, and the rest following in order. The most impressiveperformer is the one who, while effectively controlling his horse, throwsthe most spears most rapidly at the two horsemen standing out in front of the tortoise, and most often hits the target with his weapons.They (the attackers) charge on straight past and then swing to the side


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so as to complete a circle. This movement takes them to the right. Sothere is no obstacle to the attack with spears, and the shields are carriedin front of those throwing the spears during the attack.

(37) They (the targets) must receive all these javelins, since through-out the exercise those riding past are keeping up a barrage. The barrageis continuous and the noise deafening, so that it seems a terrifyingexperience. Between the right wing of the formation and the forwardposition of the two horsemen, the cavalry charge out unexpectedly,riding out in front from their own formation, and throw javelins atthose riding past. But as they wheel round to the left they ride pastshowing their unprotected side. It is here that good horsemanship is especially required, so as to be able simultaneously to throw a javelinat those riding past and to use the shield to protect the right side.When the cavalryman rides parallel to the target he must swivel to theright in order to throw the javelin. And in making a complete about-turn he must perform what is called the petrinos in the Gallic language,which is the most difficult of all. For he must turn right round, as far as the tender nature of his sides will allow, to face the horse’s tail in order to throw backwards as accurately as possible. When he hasdone this he has to turn quickly forward again and bring his shield tocover his back, since if he turns without this protection he will exposehis unprotected back to the enemy.

(40) In addition to this there is a gallop known as the ‘Cantabrian’.In my opinion it gets its name from the Iberian people, the Cantabrii,because the Romans adapted it from them for their own purposes. It is done in the following way. The defensive formation of cavalry, asdescribed before, protected by their armour is stationed on the left of the tribunal, except for the two horsemen who receive the directattack with javelins. They charge from the right, as before, and wheelto the right. While they are making their charge, another charge beginson the left of the tribunal and wheels into a circle. These horsemen nolonger use light javelins, but full-length spears without metal tips,but sufficiently heavy to be awkward for the throwers and not withoutdanger for the men at whom they are aimed. For this reason they areordered not to aim at the helmets of the men riding past, and not tothrow the spear at the horse, but before he wheels and exposes any partof his side or reveals his back as he turns, they are to aim for his shieldand hit it as hard as possible with the spear. The precision of thistraining rests on the point that the man in the Cantabrian circle shouldget as close as possible to those riding past and score a direct hit in themiddle of the shield with his spear, which should thud on it or pierceit right through. The second man gets to grips with the second in the


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other group, the third with the third, and so on through the formationin the same way. The noise is tremendous, and in this exercise the countermovement appears elegant. One group gets practice in accuracy and vehemence in throwing javelins, the other in safe defence againstan attack.

(43) The exercises do not end at this point. They advance holdingtheir spears projecting straight out in front, and then as though theyare pursuing an enemy in flight. Others, as if acting against anotherenemy, wheel their horses round and swing their shields over theirheads so that they are behind them and manoeuvre their spears as though to deal with another enemy’s attack. The Celts call theirmanoeuvre the toloutegon. Furthermore, they draw their swords andmake different kinds of strokes, whatever is best suited to bring down a fleeing enemy, or kill a man already lying on the ground, or todo anything involving attack from the flanks. What is more, theypractise all kinds of ways of jumping onto their horses, all the differentforms and methods by which a man can get on his horse. They end bydemonstrating how a man in full armour can leap on his horse whenit is galloping, a practice that some describe as the ‘traveller’.

(44) All these exercises have been understood by the Roman cavalryand have long been practised. The emperor indeed seeks out foreignpractices with which to train them, for example the manoeuvres of thehorse-archers of the Parthians and Armenians, the wheeling andevolutions practised by the lance-bearing cavalry of the Sarmatians and the Celts as the horses charge in formation, including the many,varied methods of skirmishing that are very useful in battle, and thenative war cries that each race has, namely Celtic war cries for the Celticcavalry, Getic for the Getic cavalry, and Raetian for cavalry from Raetia.Furthermore, their cavalry practises jumping across ditches and leapingover small walls. To sum up, of the ancient exercises there is none thatthe Roman have omitted and not practised from the beginning. Ofthe other exercises that the emperor has discovered, some contributebeauty, some speed, some inspire terror, and some provide whatever is needed for the job in hand. Therefore today in the twentieth year of the reign of the emperor Hadrian, I think that the words that wereapplied to Sparta in ancient times are much more appropriate now:‘There the spear points of the young men flourish and clear melodies,and far-reaching justice, which encourages fine deeds.’

In the Tactica Arrian also includes a description of Roman cavalry training manoeuvresin the second century AD. Arrian’s description is rather allusive since he takes forgranted that the reader knows some of the basic guidelines of horse training. In thetestudo the horses stand side by side in echelon with their head turned slightly to the


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right. The shield of the rider on the right would partly cover the head of the horse onhis left, making a defensive tortoise. In the exercise the cavalrymen were split into twoteams (A and B). From team B two men rode out as targets and then team A wheeledleft and charged past the targets throwing the specially adapted spears at them. At thesame time the rest of team B moved off and aimed to attack team A riders as theywheeled towards the targets. In this manoeuvre the right side of team B riders wouldbe vulnerable and hence each rider had to bring his shield over the horse’s head toprotect his right side before throwing his javelin; he must also be able to throw whilefacing backwards over the horse’s rear. Then he had to face front and immediatelyswing his shield up and over to protect his back (see Figure 1.1). There was also amore complex version of the same exercise.

In the Cantabrian gallop there were also two teams (A and B) lined up as in theprevious manoeuvre. They wheeled right and went on to gallop round in two circleson the right rein with both teams riding clockwise; as the horsemen passed each otherthe attacker aimed to hit the middle of his opponent’s shield with his spears (see Figure1.2 opposite). For discussion, see Hyland (1993), 115–41; Dixon and Southern (1992),126–34; see also Davies (1989), 93–124.

31 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military training)

Philip trained the Macedonians before they encountered danger byhaving them take their weapons and often march for three hundredstades (about 34.5 miles), carrying helmets, shields, greaves, sarisas,and in addition to these weapons the food and equipment needed fordaily life.


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Targets

Team B Team A

y

x

Tribunal

Figure 1.1 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 36–7). Rider x of teamB twists round in his saddle to throw his javelin at rider y ofteam A

Polyaenus was a rhetorician of Macedonian extraction from Bithynia who dedicatedhis collection of military stratagems (Strategemata) in eight books to Marcus Aureliusand Lucius Verus. In AD 161 the governor of Cappadocia M. Sedatius Severianus hadbeen defeated and killed by the Parthians with the loss of a legion. Rome respondedvigorously and Lucius Verus set out to take up command in the war (AD 162–6).Polyaenus says that he is too old to take part in person, but will make a contributionby sending the emperors his stratagems, book by book, so that they can learn from the success of past commanders. There are about 900 stratagems and the content isextremely varied, ranging from the legendary exploits of gods and heroes to the ploysof historical Greek and Roman commanders up to the time of Augustus, althoughRoman examples make up only a small proportion of the work. The material isarranged not by topic as in Frontinus’ Strategemata, but by name of the person con-cerned, loosely based on themes or chronological periods. Polyaenus seems to haveused a wide variety of sources and other collections of stratagems and exempla includingFrontinus, although he does not specifically refer to him. The reliability of Polyaenuswill of course depend on the quality of his sources, but in terms of his own objectiveshe probably did not aim for strict historical accuracy in every detail. He set out to use interesting material to illustrate the importance in military thinking of beingclever, alert, inventive, and willing to take the initiative. Polyaenus may also havewritten a subsequent work called Tactica. Discussion and translation in Krentz andWheeler (1994).


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Team BTeam A

Tribunal

x y

Figure 1.2 Cavalry manoeuvres (Arrian, Tactica 40.1–7). Riders x and yfrom teams A and B act as attacker and defender as they pass

32 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of military training)

In ancient times it was the practice to commit to writing studies in the liberal arts, compile them in the form of books and present themto emperors. For no project is correctly begun unless after God theemperor supports it, and it is not appropriate for anyone to have betteror more extensive knowledge than the emperor, whose learning canbenefit all his subjects. It is clear from many examples that OctavianAugustus and the good emperors that followed him enthusiasticallybelieved this. And so, with the support of rulers, eloquence flourishedand boldness was not criticized. I was moved to emulate this when Iconsidered that Your Clemency was better able than others to pardonboldness in literature, and I scarcely felt my great inferiority to thewriters of ancient times. However, in this little book neither eleganceof expression nor intellectual precision was required, but merely hard work and accuracy, in order to publish for the benefit of Romematerial that was scattered and concealed in the works of differenthistorians and writers on military science. Therefore I am trying to set out by a number of sections and headings the ancient methods oflevying and training recruits. Needless to say, Invincible Emperor,these matters are not unknown to you, but I intend that you shouldsee that the arrangements you make on your own initiative for thesafety of the state were once adhered to by the founders of the Romanempire, and that in this little book you can find whatever you need toknow concerning affairs of state, which are always crucial.

We see that the Roman people conquered the world by no othermeans than training in the military arts, discipline in the camp, andpractice in warfare. How else could small numbers of Romans havesucceeded against hordes of Gauls? How could they with their smallstature have dared to face the tall Germans? It is clear that the Spanish were superior to our men not only in numbers but also inbodily strength. Often we were no match for the Africans in treacheryor money. No one doubts that the Greeks surpass us in the arts andwisdom. But against all of them we triumphed by selecting recruitscarefully, by teaching them the principles, so to speak, of war, bytoughening them by daily exercise, by teaching them in advancethrough manoeuvres in the field everything that can happen on themarch and in battle, and by punishing severely the indolent. Forknowledge of military science fosters courage in battle. No one is afraid to perform what he is confident that he has learned well. Indeeda small force that has been well trained in the clash of battle is more


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likely to be victorious than a large force, which raw and untrained, isexposed to slaughter.

Vegetius was not a soldier, but served in the imperial administration. His Epitome of Military Science was addressed to an emperor, possibly Theodosius the Great (AD

383–95), and is designed to suggest remedies for contemporary failures in militaryorganization. The emperor had instructed him to abridge ancient authors and despite his own military prowess was willing to learn from others. The work haslimited coverage of certain aspects, including cavalry and the Limitanei. He aimed to select suitable passages from earlier writers on warfare such as Cato and Frontinusand supplemented these with his own ideas. He did not intend to write a history of the Roman army and so he does not clearly differentiate chronological periodsprecisely. This does not seriously undermine the value of the work, which set out touse old military practices as a guide for improving the army of Vegetius’ own day. TheEpitome was enormously popular in the Middle Ages. Translation and notes in Milner(1993).

33 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable recruits)

I know that the height of recruits was always kept up to the mark(incomma), so that men of six feet or at least five feet ten inches wererecruited for the cavalry and for the leading cohorts of the legions. Butin earlier times the population was larger and more men pursued a military career, and the civil administration had not taken away the fittest young men. Therefore, if needs must, we should take intoaccount not so much physical size as strength.

(6) The recruiting officer should diligently ensure that through acareful examination of their face, eyes, and general physical constitu-tion, he chooses men who are likely to prove good soldiers. For manyindications reveal the qualities not only of a man but also of horses anddogs. . . . The potential young recruit therefore ought to have alerteyes, should carry his head erect, have a broad chest, muscularshoulders, strong arms, long fingers, a small waist, slim buttocks, andlegs and feet that are not fleshy but sinewy and strong. When you findall these qualities in a recruit you need not pay too much attention tohis height, for brave soldiers are more valuable than tall ones.

Since the Roman foot was 295.7 mm (= 11.64 inches), whereas the modern imperialfoot is 301 mm, six Roman feet amount to 5ft 104⁄5 inches, and Roman 5ft 10 inchesamount to 5ft 85⁄6 inches. In AD 367 the minimum height requirement for the entryof Italians into some units was reduced from 5 ft 10 to 5 ft 7 inches (= 5ft 57⁄8 inches)(CTh. 7.13.3). For the examination of a potential recruit, see Acts of Maximilianus1.1–5 (Musurillo (1972), 17; translation in Campbell (1994), 12).


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34 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military training)

Right at the start of their training, therefore, recruits should be taughtthe military step. For on the march and in the battle line nothingshould be maintained more carefully than that all the troops shouldkeep in step as they move. This can be achieved only if throughrepeated practice they learn to manoeuvre quickly and in formation.An army that is split up and in disorder is always in grave danger fromthe enemy. So, twenty miles should be completed with the militarystep in five hours, at least in summer. With the fuller step, which isquicker, twenty-four miles should be completed in the same time. Ifyou add anything to this it amounts to running, for which a distancecannot be defined. But recruits should especially be accustomed torunning too, so that they can charge the enemy with greater force,occupy important positions quickly when the need arises, or get therefirst when the enemy aims to do the same, travel fast on scoutingmissions and return even faster, and more easily catch a fleeing enemy.The soldiers should also be trained in jumping so that they can leapover ditches and surmount any height blocking the way, and con-sequently when difficulties of this kind appear, they can cross themwithout trouble. . . .

(10) All recruits without exception should during the summermonths learn how to swim. For rivers cannot always be crossed onbridges, but during a retreat or pursuit armies are frequently forced toswim. Often rivers burst their banks because of sudden storms ormelting snows and through their ignorance (of swimming) the mencome into danger not only from the enemy but even from the water.Therefore in ancient times the Romans, who had been schooled inevery form of military skill by frequent warfare and endless danger,chose the Field of Mars next to the Tiber, in which the young men after arms training cleaned off the sweat and dust and laid aside thefatigue from their running by swimming vigorously. Indeed it is veryuseful to train in swimming not only the infantry but also the cavalryand their horses and grooms, who are called galearii, in case they shouldbe found to be ineffective when an emergency occurs.

One Roman mile amounted to about 1,665 yards. Milner (1993), 10, calculates thatthe soldiers were marching at 2.84 and 3.40 mph respectively on these route marches.


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35 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12(weapons training)

The ancients, as is found in books, trained recruits in the following way. They wove shields from withies in the form of hurdles and roundin shape, so that the hurdle was twice as heavy as the official shieldusually was. They also gave the recruits wooden foils, which were alsodouble weight, instead of swords. Equipped in this way they exercisedagainst posts not only in the morning but also in the afternoon. The use of training posts is of great benefit not only to soldiers but evento gladiators. Neither the arena nor the training area ever made a manunbeatable in battle, unless he was carefully instructed and trained at the post. Each recruit used to plant an individual post in the earthso that it could not move around and projected by six feet. The recruittrained himself against the post as if he was fighting an enemy, usingthe foil and the hurdle just like a sword and shield. Now he attackedthe equivalent of the head and face, now threatened the sides, nowtried to cut the knee-joints and the legs; he would draw back, moveforward, and spring as if he were attacking a real enemy. So, they triedout on the pole every kind of assault and military skill. In this exercisethey took special care that the recruit in leaping forward to inflict awound did not expose any part of his body to a blow.

(12) In particular, recruits learned to strike with the point not withthe edge. For the Romans not only defeated easily those who used theedge but indeed despised them. A cut, with whatever strength it isdelivered, rarely kills since the vital organs are protected by armour andby bones. By contrast, a stab wound driven in only two inches is fatal,since it is inevitable that anything driven in will pierce the vital organs.Furthermore, when a cut is being delivered the right arm and side areexposed. But a stab is delivered with the body protected and the enemyis wounded before he notices. It is accepted that this is why the Romansprincipally use this method of fighting. The recruit was given thehurdles and foils of double weight so that when he lifted real weapons,which were lighter, he fought more confidently and energetically asbeing liberated from the greater weight.

This kind of training was carried out by Scipio Africanus at New Carthage in 209 BC

(Polybius, 10.20; Livy, 26.51.3). The next stage in the training, not mentioned byVegetius, was fencing with a live opponent. Note that Valerius Maximus (2.3.2)thought that P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 BC, was the first to introduce gladiatorialmethods of training to the army, but Cato, writing in the first part of the secondcentury BC, refers to gladiatorial training (De Re Militari fragment 14). For Romanmilitary training grounds, see Davies (1974b). The Spanish sword could be used forcutting and thrusting; see above, no. 18.


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36 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19(throwing missiles; other military skills)

But I return to my subject. The recruit who is training with a foil againstthe post is also instructed to throw spear-shafts that are heavier thanthe real javelins will be at this post as if at a real man. In this exercisethe arms instructor makes sure that the recruit throws the spear-shaftwith great force so that the missile strikes the target or close to it withgood aim. Through this exercise the arms grow stronger and the recruitacquires skill and experience in throwing.

(15) About a third or quarter of recruits who are found to have betteraptitude should be trained constantly by shooting at the post withwooden bows and mock arrows. Experienced instructors should bechosen for this task and they should devote all their skill to ensuringthat the recruits hold the bow properly, string it forcefully, keep theleft hand steady, draw the right back carefully, so that the eye and mindconcentrate on the target that is to be hit, and learn to shoot straightwhether on horseback or on foot. . . .

(16) It is right that recruits should be trained diligently in throwingstones by hand or with slings. The inhabitants of the Balearic Isles aresaid to have invented the use of slings and to have practised with suchskill that mothers would not allow their small sons to touch any food unless they had hit it with a stone fired from a sling. Often, againstsoldiers equipped with helmets, scale-armour, and coats of mail,smooth stones shot with a sling or a sling-stick are more effective thanany arrow, since while leaving the limbs untouched they neverthelessinflict a fatal wound and the enemy dies from the impact of the stonewithout the shedding of blood. No one is unaware that slingers foughtin all ancient battles. This method of fighting should be learned by all recruits through frequent practice, because it is no effort to carry asling. Furthermore, it sometimes happens that battles take place instony places, or some mountain or hill has to be defended, or barbarianshave to be prevented by stones and slings from storming forts or towns.

(18) It has always been a rigorous requirement that both recruitsand also experienced soldiers should vault onto horses. It is clear thatthis practice has survived until the present day, admittedly now with some decline. Wooden horses were set up, indoors in winter, onthe training ground in summer. Recruits were ordered to jump ontothese, at first without weapons, while they gained experience, and thenarmed. Such attention was given to this that they learned to jump on and off both from the right-hand and the left sides, even holdingdrawn swords and spears. They did this too with constant practice,


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and because they had trained so diligently in peacetime, in the tumultof battle they speedily mounted their horses.

(19) Recruits were very frequently compelled to carry a weight of upto sixty pounds and march at the military step, since in difficultcampaigns they must carry their provisions and weapons. This shouldnot be thought difficult once the practice has been established, forthere is nothing that constant practice does not make easier. . . .

Archers – in the imperial period the Romans usually relied on specialist archers often recruited from Syria. There were also horse archers, such as the Ala I AugustaIturaeorum; see Cheesman (1914), 181–2. Slingers – see Griffiths (1989) for use ofslingers in Roman imperial army. Mounting horses – see above, no. 30.

One Roman pound is the equivalent of 0.721 lb. avoirdupois; cf. Milner (1993),17, nn. 6–7. For Marius’ mules, see above, no. 22.

37 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle manoeuvres)

It is accepted that nothing is more helpful in battle than that throughconstant training soldiers keep their assigned positions in the line and do not bunch together or thin out the line inappropriately. For if they are compressed together they lose the space needed for fightingand get in each other’s way, and if they are too widely separated andshowing the light between them, they give the enemy a way of break-ing through. Inevitably everything will be thrown into complete panicif the line is cut and the enemy gets to the rear of the fighting men.Therefore the recruits must constantly be brought out to the exercise-ground and drawn up in the battle line according to the order of theroll, so that at first the line should be single and extended withoutbends or curves, and so that soldier is separated from soldier by anequal and approved interval. Then the command should be given thatthey are immediately to double the length of the line, so that thispattern to which they are accustomed to conform can be maintainedin the actual assault. Thirdly, the command should be given that theyshould suddenly form a square formation, and after that has been donethe line should be changed into a three-sided formation, which theycall a wedge. This formation is usually of great benefit in warfare. Nextthe command is given to form circles, which trained soldiers normallyuse to mount a defence when the enemy has broken through the line,in order to prevent the whole force from being scattered in flight andimminent catastrophe. If recruits have learned these manoeuvresthrough constant practice they will keep to them more easily in theactual battle.


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(27) Furthermore, the ancient practice has remained and the regula-tions of the Divine Augustus and Hadrian laid down that three timesevery month both the cavalry and the infantry should be led out onmanoeuvres (ambulatum). They used this word to designate the follow-ing kind of exercise. The infantry in full armour and equipped with alltheir weapons were ordered to advance for ten miles at the militarypace and then return to camp, performing some part of the march at a quicker pace. The cavalry too, fully armed and divided into troops,covered a similar distance carrying out cavalry exercises, at one momentpursuing, then retreating, and then rallying in some way to renew theattack. Both battle lines had to operate not only in level areas, but alsoto descend and ascend in hilly and steep places, so that nothing, noteven entirely by chance, could happen in the fighting which goodsoldiers had not learned before through constant training.

Milner (1993), 25, n. 2 cites evidence from the Historia Augusta (Life of Avidius Cassius6.3; Life of Maximinus 6.2) that military manoeuvres were to take place every five orseven days. But the evidence of this unreliable source cannot be trusted on points ofdetail. Augustus had the reputation of a strict disciplinarian (Suetonius, Augustus 24,1–2). In his rules of discipline he laid down that soldiers should be removed as littleas possible from normal military duties (Digest 49.16.12.1), a principle that wasendorsed by Trajan (Pliny, Letters 10.20.2). Hadrian too had a formidable reputationbased on his inspection and training of the troops and his preservation of strictdiscipline (Dio, 69.9.4–5). For cavalry exercises, see above no. 30.


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2

THE GENERAL’S ROLE

38 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in a general)

Socrates said: ‘Tell us at what stage he began to teach you aboutgeneralship, so that, if one of us happens to serve as a unit or companycommander, we may have a better grasp of military matters.’ The boyreplied: ‘We started and ended at the same stage. He taught me tacticsand nothing else.’ Socrates said: ‘But this is the smallest part of the art of generalship. For a general must be ready to provide military gearand arrange supplies for his troops and he must be resourceful, hard-working, and vigilant, and also be tough and shrewd. What is more,he must be benevolent and harsh, frank and dissimulating, cautious,but also ready to plunder another’s property, generous and rapacious.Indeed, he must be bountiful and greedy, sound in defence and aggres-sive in attack. The man who is set to become a good general must alsohave many other qualities, both naturally or acquired by training. Butof course tactical skill is a fine thing.’

Here Socrates is advising a friend who intends to stand for public office. It is interestingthat in fourth-century Athens there was some form of instruction in the art ofgeneralship and the use of tactics, though Socrates chooses to emphasize the moralqualities required in a commander.

39 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalry commander)

A cavalry commander must also be able to recognize terrain whereinfantry will be superior to cavalry and where cavalry will be superiorto infantry. He must also be resourceful enough to make a smallnumber of cavalry look large, and by contrast to make a large numberlook small; to seem to be absent when present, and present when

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absent; and to know not only how to steal the enemy’s possessions butalso how to conceal his own cavalry and attack the enemy unexpectedly.

40 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’s relations with his troops)

No one can shape anything as he wishes unless the material he isintending to work with is ready to be moulded by the craftsman’s will.In the same way you can make nothing of soldiers if they are not ready with God’s help to display goodwill towards their commanderand believe that he is better equipped than they are in leading militaryoperations against the enemy.

It is natural that soldiers should have friendly feelings about theircommander when he treats them in a kindly way and clearly takespains to ensure that they have food, are secure during a retreat and wellprotected when resting. In garrisons he must display a concern aboutfodder, tents, water, firewood, and all other supplies, and he must thinkahead and be alert for the sake of his men. Furthermore, when thecommander is successful, it is sound policy for him to give them ashare.

To sum up, a commander is least likely to be despised by his men ifhe shows himself to be better than them at doing whatever tasks heinstructs them to do.

41 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the right man for the job)

It is not difficult to make these dispositions. But it is the mark of acompetent cavalry commander to discover men who display intel-ligence, reliability, enthusiasm, and boldness in wheeling against the enemy. For the commander must be able both in word and actionto convince the men under his command that it is good to obey, followtheir leader, and charge the enemy, and make them eager to hear someword of praise, and enable them to persevere in their undertakings.

42 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander)

It is enough to read these points a few times, but the commander must always work out what the circumstances require and look at the existing situation and carry out whatever is beneficial. It is no morepossible to write out everything that he has to do than to know every-

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thing that is going to happen. I think that the most important part ofall my advice is to make sure that whatever he thinks is advantageousis accomplished.

43 Xenophon, Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general)

Of the generals everyone who could give a knowledgeable opinion ofhim agreed that Clearchus was a real soldier and a man who excep-tionally loved war. . . . This in my opinion is the record of a man wholoved war. He could have lived in peace without shame or injury, buthe chose to make war. He could have taken his ease but he preferredhard work and fighting. He could have been wealthy without any riskto himself, but he chose to reduce his fortune by making war. Indeedhe chose to spend his money on war just as if he were spending it onlove affairs or any other pleasures of this kind. All this indicates howdevoted to war he was. In respect of his soldierly qualities, these are seenin his love of danger as he led attacks on the enemy day and night, andin his ability to keep his head in difficult circumstances, as everyonewho was present with him anywhere agrees. People said that he hadall the qualities of leadership that it was possible for a man of his kindto have. He was exceptionally clever at working out how his armycould get supplies and ensuring that they actually turned up, and hewas very effective in making sure that those around him knew thatClearchus was a man to be obeyed. He achieved this by being tough.For he had a forbidding expression and a rough voice. He imposedtough penalties, and sometimes acted in anger, so that he repented ofwhat he had done. Indeed he inflicted punishment on principle, for hethought that an undisciplined army was useless. People claimed thathe said that a soldier should fear his commander more than the enemy,if he was going to keep a good watch, or avoid doing any damage tohis own side, or advance on the enemy without hesitation. Thereforein difficult circumstances the soldiers had particular confidence in himand did not want anyone else. It was then, so it was said, that hisforbidding expression seemed to shine out and his toughness appearedto be strength in the face of the enemy, so that it seemed not toughnessbut a source of protection. But when they had escaped the danger andthere was an opportunity of going away to take up service underanother leader, many abandoned him. For he was not pleasant, butindeed was always tough and ferocious, so that the soldiers had arelationship with him like pupils and a schoolteacher. Therefore henever bound his followers to him by friendship or good will. However,


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he enforced total obedience among all those who had been placed underhis command by their city or who were forced to serve with himbecause of poverty or some other pressing need. When they started towin victories with him against the enemy it was obvious howimportant were the factors that made his followers good soldiers. Theyhad a confidence in the face of the enemy, and fear of punishment fromhim made them well disciplined. This was the kind of commander hewas. But he was said not to like being under the command of others.He was about fifty years old when he died.

For the Anabasis, see p. 22; for Clearchus see also above, no. 23.

44 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example)

Soteridas, a man from Sicyon, said: ‘We are not equal, Xenophon. Foryou are on horseback while I am struggling with great difficulty tocarry my shield.’ When Xenophon heard this he jumped from hishorse, pushed Soteridas out of the ranks and taking his shield awayfrom him marched on as quickly as he could carrying the shield. Hehappened to be wearing a cavalry breastplate and found the goingdifficult. He kept on urging those in front to keep going and thosebehind to catch up, though he himself could scarcely keep up withthem. But the other soldiers beat Soteridas, threw stones at him andshouted abuse until they forced him to take back his shield and marchon. Xenophon mounted his horse and while the road was passable ledon horseback, but when it was impassable he left his horse behind and hurried forward on foot. And so they reached the summit beforethe enemy.

The context is the retreat of the ten thousand from the pursuit of Tissaphernes, thePersian king’s general and satrap of Sardis. Xenophon’s task was to occupy a strategichill.

45 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general)

While Xenophon was having his breakfast two young men ran up. Foreveryone knew that it was permissible to approach him when he washaving breakfast or dinner and even to wake him if he were asleep andtalk to him if they had any information about the military situation.

For the approachable general, see also no. 55.


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46 Xenophon, Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline)

Xenophon then asked any other soldier to say why he had been beaten.But when no one stood up, he carried on speaking himself: ‘I admit,soldiers, that I have struck men because of indiscipline. These are the kind of men who expected to have their lives preserved by youmarching in good order and fighting wherever you must, while theyabandoned the ranks and charged forward aiming to get more thantheir fair share of plunder. If we had all done this we would all haveperished. Again, if someone began to weaken, refused to stand up, andbegan to give himself up to the enemy, I struck him and forced him to carry on marching. This was because I myself on one occasionduring a period of intense cold sat down for a long time while waitingfor some men who were packing their equipment, and then realizedthat I could hardly stand up and stretch my legs. Therefore as a resultof my personal experience whenever I saw anyone sitting down andbeing lazy I drove him onwards.

The context is a complaint directed at Xenophon by a soldier who claimed to have beenstruck by him and that he had acted in an overbearing manner. Xenophon pointed outthat he had forced the man to carry a wounded comrade and then found him preparingto bury the man, who turned out to be still alive. When the soldier still refused to carryhim Xenophon beat him. The soldiers approved of his action.

47 Xenophon, Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology)

Xenophon eagerly joined in the discussion and spoke as follows:‘Comrades, you know that I have never willingly introduced you to any danger. For I see that you do not want a glorious reputation forbravery but rather to stay alive. But the current situation is as follows.It is not possible for us to get away from here without fighting. For ifwe do not attack the enemy they will follow us and fall upon us as wewithdraw. You should therefore consider whether it is better to advanceagainst the enemy with your weapons at the ready or to turn tail andsee the enemy following us from the rear. You know however thatretreat in the face of the enemy is no honourable move while pursuitbrings confidence even to the cowardly. Indeed I should be happier to conduct a pursuit with half the number of soldiers than to retreatwith double the number.

For the importance of military psychology, see also nos 59; 61; 63.


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48 Xenophon, Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas)

I could not say that his campaign proved a success. Nevertheless, in myopinion Epaminondas did not omit any single action of foresight ordaring. For first of all I praise him because he pitched camp within thewall of Tegea where he was in a safer position than if he had encampedoutside and where it was harder for the enemy to see what he was doing.Second, it was easier for him, being in the city, to prepare whatever heneeded. On the other hand, since the enemy was encamped outside he could see whether they were acting wisely or making mistakes.Finally, while he thought that he was stronger than the enemy he couldnot be persuaded to attack them whenever he saw that they wereholding an advantageous position.

Xenophon is here describing the manoeuvring during the campaign of Mantinea, 362 BC.

49 Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a general)

Unforeseen events that occur during military operations require greatvigilance. But it is possible to achieve success in any of these if a man carries out his plan intelligently. It is easy for anyone who wishesto learn from past events that fewer military operations are accom-plished openly by force than by stealth and exploitation of opportunity.What is more, it is not difficult to work out from experience that in those actions that occur through opportunity there are more failuresthan successes. No one should be ignorant of the fact that most of these failures have occurred because of the ignorance or indifference of the commander.

(14) Of the skills (of generalship) mentioned above, some areacquired by practice, some by enquiry, and some by the meticulousacquisition of experience. It is best for the commander himself to knowthe roads and the locality to which he has to travel and the nature of the topography, and additionally the people through whom andwith whom he is to conduct operations. The second option is for thecommander to make careful enquiries and not to trust chance infor-mants. It is essential that the pledges given by guides should alwaysremain with those whom they are leading. Commanders can learn these and similar points through routine soldierly experience, partlyby practice and partly by enquiry. However those matters concerningscientific matters need an education in the arts and sciences, andespecially in astronomy and geometry. The work involved in this is


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not great, at least for this requirement, and the study itself is importantand can bring significant assistance to the activities mentioned above.

This discussion of generalship does not have a clear context but was probably relatedto a fuller discussion of this theme in Polybius’ lost work on Tactics. We may note theimportance of intellectual qualities in the commander and the value of a soundeducation.

50 Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii)

When Caesar noticed this he led his forces to a nearby hill and sent thecavalry to meet the enemy’s attack. Meanwhile half-way up the hill hedrew up his four veteran legions in a triple battle line and stationed onthe summit of the hill the two legions that he had recently recruitedin Italy and all the auxiliaries, so that the whole hill was filled withtroops. He also ordered the baggage packs to be collected in one placeand defensive works to be constructed round it by the soldiers stationedin the upper line. The Helvetii following with all their carts placedtheir baggage in one place and, after driving back our cavalry with abattle line in very close order, formed themselves in a phalanx andattacked uphill against our front line.

(25) Caesar first sent his own horse away out of sight and then thehorses of everyone else so that all should stand in equal danger andno one should have any chance of running away. Then he roused his

men to action and joined battle. The soldiers, throwing their spearsfrom the higher ground, easily broke the enemy phalanx, and thendrew their swords and charged. The Gauls were greatly impeded infighting because in many cases their overlapping shields were piercedand pinned together by the impact of one spear, which bent and couldnot be pulled out. With their left arm hampered they could not fightproperly, and many having repeatedly tried to jerk their arm about (tofree the shield), preferred to throw the shield down and fight un-protected. Finally, worn out with wounds they retreated and began to move towards a hill situated about a mile away. They occupied the hill and our men were following them when fifteen thousand Boii andTulingi, who guarded the rear of the enemy column, marched up,attacked our men on their right flank and surrounded them. Whenthe Helvetii who had retreated to the hill saw this they pressed forwardagain and renewed the battle. The Romans changed direction andadvanced on two fronts, the first and second line to repulse the Helvetiiwho had already been defeated and driven back, the third to face thetroops who were just arriving.


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(26) This double battle continued for a long time and was fiercelycontested. When they could no longer withstand our troops’ assault,one group as they had begun to do retreated to the hill, the other retiredto the baggage and carts. Now, during this entire battle, which lastedfrom midday to evening, no one saw a single one of the enemy runningaway.

Julius Caesar (100–44 BC) came from a patrician family and followed an ambitiouspolitical career in which he combined political skill, diplomatic dexterity, and a flairfor bribery. After his consulship in 59 BC, he became governor of Transalpine Gauland launched a ten-year military campaign in which he annexed all of Gaul, vastlyincreased his personal wealth, and created an army of battle-hardened legionariesbound in personal loyalty to him. Disagreement with his erstwhile ally Pompey ledto the outbreak of civil war in 49, and in a series of campaigns in Spain, Greece, andAfrica Caesar defeated all his opponents and eventually in 44 BC became perpetualdictator. In the same year he was murdered by disgruntled senators who resented hispersonal domination. He wrote an account of the wars he fought in Gaul (seven books,with an eighth added by Aulus Hirtius) and the civil war campaigns (three books).These are the only extant war commentaries written by an ancient commander. Theyexplain and defend his policies and campaigns and have some vivid descriptions ofbattles and sieges. They combine information on the general sweep of his strategy andthe tactical skill with which he manoeuvred his forces into advantageous positions andlured the enemy away from their strengths. In this way Caesar became a fruitful sourceof military exploits, as we see from Frontinus’ collection of stratagems. I have placedCaesar’s battle descriptions in this chapter rather than in Chapter 3 because they helpto emphasize the role of the commander. For Caesar’s career see Gelzer (1969); textand translation of the Gallic War in Edwards (1917).

Caesar here offers a general’s view of troop dispositions before a battle with nativeforces, and his response to the changing circumstances of the battle. Naturally heaimed to give the best impression of the Roman victory. For some of the problems ofusing ancient accounts of battles, see Campbell (2002), 47–8; see also below nos 51–3.

51 Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis)

In accordance with his usual practice when approaching the enemy,Caesar marched at the head of the column with six legions not bur-dened with any heavy baggage. Next he stationed the baggage trainof the entire army, and then two legions that had been recentlyrecruited formed the rearguard and protected the baggage. Our cavalrywith the slingers and archers crossed the river and joined battle withthe enemy cavalry. The enemy repeatedly withdrew into the woods totheir comrades and then charged out of the wood again to attack ourmen, who did not dare to pursue them further than the end of the openground. Meanwhile the six legions that had first arrived measured outthe ground and began to fortify a camp. As soon as the Gauls who were


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hidden in the wood spotted the head of our army’s baggage train, whichthey had agreed among themselves as the moment to join battle, andsince they had drawn up their battle line under cover of the trees andwere brimming with confidence, they suddenly sprang forward withall their forces and attacked our cavalry. The cavalry was easily routedand driven back, and with incredible speed the enemy charged up to the river so that they seemed in virtually one moment to be at theedge of the trees, in the water, and right on top of us. With equal speedthey charged uphill to attack our camp and the men working on itsfortifications.

(20) Caesar had to do everything at once – hoist the flag, which wasthe usual signal for running to arms, sound the trumpet signal, call thesoldiers back from their work, summon those who had gone furtheraway to get material for the defences, draw up the battle line, encouragethe soldiers, give the signal for battle. Many of these tasks could notbe done because the enemy’s swift attack left no time. Two factorshelped in this crisis; first, the knowledge and experience of the soldiers,since through their training in earlier battles they were able to workout for themselves what needed to be done rather than be told bysomeone else. Second, Caesar had issued an order forbidding thecommanders of individual legions to leave the work until the campfortifications had been completed. Because enemy were so close andcoming on so quickly, these officers did not wait for further commandsfrom Caesar but on their own responsibility carried out whatever theythought best.

(21) After giving only essential orders rushed off to give words ofencouragement to the troops Caesar happened to meet and came uponthe tenth legion. He encouraged the soldiers in a brief address toremember their previous courage, to keep their nerve, and resist theenemy attack bravely. When the enemy was only a spear-cast away hegave the signal for battle. He moved off to another part of the battle-field to encourage the troops there and found them already fighting.Time was so brief and the enemy was so eager for action that they had no time even to don their helmets or remove the covering fromtheir shields, never mind put on their decorations. As each man camedown from his work on the camp he took up position in the first placehe came to under the first standard he saw, in case in searching for hisown unit he wasted time for fighting. The battle line was formedaccording to the nature of the terrain and the sloping hillside and the requirements of the circumstances rather than military theory and procedure. For different legions were fighting on several fronts inseparate actions, and thick hedges impeded the view, as I pointed out


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before. Therefore Caesar could not decide with certainty where to placereserves or foresee what assistance might be needed at what point in thebattlefield, and a unified command was out of the question. In thesevery adverse circumstances there were of course many changes of fortune.

Caesar describes the defeat of the Nervii in 57 BC.

52 Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Roman commander)

As I said above, there was no regular force, no town, and no garrison thatcould put up armed resistance, but instead the bulk of the populationwas dispersed in all directions. Individuals had hidden themselves in any remote valley or wooded glade or impenetrable marsh thatoffered a hope of safety or escape. These places were known to the locals,and the situation required great care, not in safeguarding the entirearmy (for no harm could come to the force from a scattered and terrifiedenemy), but in protecting individual soldiers. Now, what happened to individuals could affect the welfare of the army, for many were lured away over longer distances by a desire for booty, and the woodswith their faint and concealed pathways did not allow advance in close formation. If he wanted to finish the business and exterminate the whole criminal tribe he would have to deploy the troops by send-ing out a large number of individual detachments. But if he wished to keep the troops in regular formation, as established wisdom andRoman military practice required, then the terrain protected thebarbarians. Furthermore, some of them were courageous enough toarrange surprise ambushes and surround scattered soldiers. In thisdifficult situation the most thorough precautions possible were taken,and Caesar decided that it was preferable to let go a chance of damagingthe enemy, even though everyone was ferociously intent on vengeance,rather than damage them severely and risk harming his own troops.Therefore he sent messengers to the neighbouring tribes summoningthem all to him in the expectation of gaining booty by plundering theEburones. He preferred Gallic lives to be at risk in the forests ratherthan the lives of Roman legionaries, and he also intended to surroundthe Eburones with a huge multitude, so that the very existence andname of this tribe, which was guilty of such an outrageous crime,should be exterminated. From all directions an enormous number ofmen rapidly assembled.

In 54 BC the Eburones under Ambiorix had defeated and killed Caesar’s lieutenant,Quintus Titurius Sabinus.


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53 Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing the battle)

Caesar found a suitable spot from which he could observe what wasgoing on in every part of the field and sent help where the soldiers werein trouble. Both sides realized that this was the crucial moment for asuperlative effort. The Gauls knew that unless they broke through thefortifications they had no chance; the Romans knew that if they heldout they could expect the end of all their toils. The greatest danger wasat the fortifications on the hill where Vercassivellaunus had been sent, as I pointed out before. The unfavourable downward slope of theground was very damaging to the Romans. Some of the Gauls hurledspears while others linked their shields over their heads and attackedthe wall; when they tired fresh men replaced them. They all threwearth on the fortifications and this allowed them to climb the wall andalso filled in the traps that the Romans had hidden. Our men wererunning out of weapons and strength.

(86) When Caesar saw this he sent Labienus to help with six cohorts.He gave orders that if the attack could not be repulsed he should with-draw some of the cohorts and make a counter-attack, but that thisshould be done only as a last resort. Caesar himself visited the troopselsewhere in the line and urged them not to succumb to their exhaus-tion, pointing out that all the fruits of their earlier battles dependedon that very day and hour. The besieged Gauls, giving up hope ofstorming the enormous fortifications on the plain, tried an attack on one of the steep ascents and brought there all the implements theyhad collected. They drove the defenders from the towers with showersof missiles, filled in the ditches with earth and faggots, and pulleddown the rampart and breastwork with their hooks.

(87) Caesar first sent young Brutus to help with some cohorts, andthen more under the senior officer Gaius Fabius. Finally, as the battleraged more fiercely he himself led fresh troops to the rescue. He restoredthe situation, drove the enemy back, and then hastened off to the spotto which he had sent Labienus. He took four cohorts from the nearestfort and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him and the rest to circleround the outside of the fortifications and attack the enemy in the rear.Since neither the ramparts nor the ditches had succeeded in breakingthe force of the enemy assault, Labienus collected together elevencohorts, which fortunately he had brought from nearby forts, and sentmessengers to tell Caesar what he thought should be done. Caesar puton speed in order to join in the fighting. (88) Everyone could see himcoming because of the conspicuous colour of his cloak, which he alwayswore in battle to show his identity, and when the enemy saw the cavalry


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squadrons and cohorts that he had ordered to follow him, since fromtheir lofty position they could see the sloping lower ground, they joined battle. Both sides raised a war cry and this was answered by the shouts of the men on the ramparts and all the fortifications. Ourmen put down their spears and used their swords. Suddenly the cavalry was spotted in the rear and other cohorts were approaching. Theenemy fled, but the cavalry caught the fugitives and a great slaughterensued. Sedulius, chieftain and leader of the Lemovici was killed.Vercassivellaunus the Avernian was captured alive as he tried to flee.Seventy-four military standards were brought to Caesar and only a fewmen from the enemy’s large force got back safely to their camp. Whenthe Gauls in the town saw the flight and slaughter of their compan-ions they abandoned hope of rescue and withdrew their forces from the fortifications. When the news got out the Gauls immediately fledfrom their camp, and if the Roman soldiers had not been exhausted by bringing support to their colleagues and an entire day of toil, all theenemy forces could have been destroyed. The cavalry was sent out andcaught up with the rearguard around midnight, capturing or killinga great number of them. The survivors of the rout dispersed to theirhomes.

Caesar is here describing the final defeat of the Gauls at the siege of Alesia in 52 BC.This is a useful account of the role of the commander in assessing the battle andcommitting reserves, the importance of counter-attack, a decisive cavalry attack in therear, and personal leadership and encouragement by the commander; cf. no. 268.

54 Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competent generals)

It remains for me to say confidently that my book will be a guide forgood generals and a memorial to retired generals during this age ofimperial peace. And we shall know, if nothing else, why some generalshave tripped and fallen and why some have been successful and havebecome famous. In particular, we shall examine the valour of theRomans, how neither king, nor city, nor nation ever established abigger empire or even equalled them in setting up secure control forso many years. For in my view it is not merely by chance that they haveoverrun all the land of Italy and extended their dominion to the endsof the earth, but by good generalship. We should pray to Fortune todo her share but not think that she has absolute control over everything.It is stupid people who attribute setbacks to Fortune alone rather thanto the carelessness of generals, and who attribute success to her ratherthan to the skill of commanders.


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Onasander as far as is known had no military experience. In fact traditionally he issupposed to have written a commentary on Plato’s Republic. His treatise on generalshipis dedicated to Quintus Veranius, pretty certainly the consul of AD 49 who wasgovernor of Britain in 57–8, where he conducted military operations in Wales.Although Onasander claims to have studied the exploits and practices of the men‘from whom has come the entire supremacy of the Romans in race and courage rightdown to the present day’ (Proem. 7), he does not cite any illustrative material fromRoman history. In fact, much of his material is rather bland, lacking a specific context,and could refer to most armies in the field, since he is principally interested in generalprinciples of command and the character and demeanour of the commander. The ethical framework blends in with the performance of the general in the field. Theinteresting point is that despite this background Onasander still feels that his workwas not merely of antiquarian interest but would be of direct relevance (see above p. 13). Text and translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928); for the character of the worksee discussion in Ambaglio (1981), Smith (1998).

55 Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship)

We should admire the general who is good, well-born, and rich, butwe should not reject the man who is poor but talented even if he is not from a distinguished family. The chosen general should be honest,approachable, active, calm, not so tolerant as to be despised nor sotough as to be hated, so that he does not undermine the army byindulgence or alienate it through fear.

Onasander here emphasizes the moral qualities of generalship. It is also assumed thata general will normally be from the upper classes; see also no. 70.

56 Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his army on the march)

A marching formation that is compact and rectangular (indeed virtuallysquare-shaped) is secure and easy to handle for every eventuality. . . .

The general should place the medical equipment, draught animals,and all the baggage in the middle of the formation and not outside. Ifhe thinks that the rear (of the army) is not entirely safe and secure, heshould choose the rearguard from the strongest and bravest soldiers,believing that in the light of events the rear is of no less value than thefront of the army.

The general should send cavalry on ahead to scout the roads,especially when he is advancing through wooded country or a desertedlandscape interrupted by ridges. For the enemy frequently set upambushes, which, if they escape detection, can bring complete disasterto the other side. But if they are detected through a little foresight


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they show to the enemy general outstanding competence on the partof his opponent. . . .

(10) When passing through an ally’s land the general should orderhis soldiers not to touch the countryside and not to seize property ordestroy anything. For a large force under arms shows no mercy whenit has the power of exercising control, and the sight of riches nearbyentices the stupid to greed. But small incidents alienate allies or makethem relentlessly hostile. On the other hand, he should destroy, burn,and ravage the enemy’s country. For a loss of resources and a shortageof crops impede warfare, while a surplus encourages it. However firsthe should let the enemy know what he intends to do, for often theexpectation of suffering to come has compelled those in danger, beforethey suffered anything, to come to agreement on terms that they had previously not wanted to accept. But when they have suffered justone setback, thinking that nothing can be worse they despise futuredangers. If the general intends to encamp for a long time in enemyterritory he should destroy only those kinds of things in the countrythat he himself will not need; he should not touch items that ifpreserved will be useful to his friends.

When the army has been brought up to full strength he should notdelay and spend time in his own country, or that of a subject or an ally.For he will use up his own crops and will harm his friends more thanhis enemies. He should lead his army over the border as soon as possibleif affairs are secure at home. For he will obtain generous provisionsfrom the enemy country if it is rich and fertile, but if it is not, at leasthe will not be damaging friendly territory and he will gain great benefitfrom the pain of the hostile country.

This analysis applies particularly to wars between Greek city-states.

57 Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory)

The general, when he is encamping in the territory of the enemy shouldprotect his camp with a stockade and ditch even if he is intending topitch camp for just one day. A fortified camp of this kind will never be regretted, because of sudden and unforeseen attacks. He shouldstation guards as if the enemy are nearby, even if he thinks that theyare far distant. If the enemy are not advancing to attack and the generalintends to encamp for some time, either to ravage the land or wait fora more suitable time for battle, he should chose a location that is notmarshy or damp. For places like this by their effluence and bad air


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bring disease and infection to the soldiers, damage the health of manyand kill many, so that the army is left not only smaller but weaker.

58 Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle)

Therefore it is the role of a good general to prepare whatever is usefulfor warfare at a time when there is no immediate threat of a pitchedbattle, and to assign trivial tasks in order to keep the soldiers in goodphysical condition. For it is good enough relaxation for the soldierseven if they are extremely tired to train without the dangers associatedwith a real conflict. The general should train his men in a way such asfollows.

First he should arm the soldiers and then draw them up in formationso that they become experienced in holding their position in the ranksand become familiar with each other’s faces and names, and so thateach soldier knows beside whom he takes his position and where andafter how many. Therefore on one clear command they all form ranks.

Onasander goes on to describe the need to practise drawing up formations, stagingmock battles, and also training the cavalry.

59 Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley)

If the general, while keeping his troops in the same spot, goes to meetthe enemy commander for a conference, because he wishes to make orhear a proposal, he should choose (as his escort) the most powerful andmost impressive of the younger soldiers, strong, handsome, and tallmen; he should equip them with splendid armour and taking themwith him go to meet the enemy commander. For on many occasionsthe whole of something is judged on the sight of only a part of it, andthe general makes his decision on what he should do not on the basisof what he has heard but because he has been frightened by what hehas seen.

60 Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious observances)

The general should not lead the army out on a journey or draw it upfor battle without first making a sacrifice. Indeed officials responsiblefor sacrifices and diviners should accompany him. It is best if the


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general himself can examine the omens knowledgeably, for it is easyto learn quickly and therefore he can become a good adviser to himself.He should begin every undertaking only when the omens are favour-able and he should call all the officers to inspect the offerings, so that after having seen them they can tell the men under them to be of good heart since the gods are ordering them to fight. For soldiers aremuch more courageous whenever they think that they are goingforward into danger with the support of the gods. . . . But if the omensare unfavourable, he must remain in the same spot, even if he is undersome severe pressure to act quickly, and put up with every discomfort(for he can suffer nothing worse than what the divine Power proph-esies), since if things are going to get better he must have favourableindications in the sacrifice and he must offer sacrifice several times onthe same day.

Onasander is probably thinking more of Greek practice than of the Romans of theimperial period. For sacrifice before battle, see Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 109–26; healso collects evidence for religion and war in Part III (1979); Jameson, in Hanson(1991).

61 Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology)

Whenever despondency and fear have infected an army because theenemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then aboveall the general should show himself to the soldiers as genial, cheerful,and resolute. For the appearance of the commanders brings a reciprocalchange in the minds of the soldiers, and if the general is confident andlooks cheerful the army also takes courage in the belief that there is nodanger. But if the general is downcast and anxious, then the soldiers’spirits drop in the belief that a great disaster is imminent. Thereforethe general must inspire the confidence of the army more by theexpression on his face than by his words. For many people distrustspeeches because they have been put together to suit the occasion, butthinking that a confident appearance is sincere trust in his fearlessness.But it is good to understand both these ideas and to say the appropriatewords and have the appropriate expression.

For military psychology, see also nos 47; 59; 63. For the general’s speech, see Lazenby,in Hanson (1991), 90; in the Roman army – Campbell (1984), 69–88.


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62 Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop dispositions)

A shrewd general, seeing that the enemy has many troops while he isabout to engage in battle with fewer, will choose or get in the habit offinding places where he can prevent the enemy’s encircling movementby drawing up his army beside the bank of a river. Or, by choosing a mountainous district he can use the mountains themselves to blockthose who aim to outflank him, stationing a few men on the summitsto prevent the enemy from climbing above the army. It is not know-ledge of military procedure alone that contributes to this, but alsoluck. For you must have luck to find these localities; you cannot preparethe ground to suit yourself. It is, however, the mark of an intelligentgeneral to choose the best of the localities available and to know theones that will help.

63 Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology)

The general should sometimes ride alongside the battle lines and callout to his solders if he happens to be on the right wing, ‘Our soldierson the left wing are defeating the enemy’s right wing’. If he is on theleft wing he should say that the right wing is victorious whether thisis true or not, for deception is necessary when ‘a great strife has arisen’.For example, when the leader of the enemy is far distant or on the otherwing or holding the centre of the phalanx, he (the general) should callout, ‘The enemy leader has been killed’, or ‘the king’, or whoever it maybe. And the general should shout this out in such a way that the enemyalso hears it. For his own soldiers, hearing that their comrades are moresuccessful, take courage and become doubly keen to fight, while theenemy, learning that their side is being defeated, lose heart and indeedsometimes run away as soon as they hear such a report.

The reference ‘a great strife has arisen’ is to Homer, Iliad 13.122.

64 Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best appearance)

The general should make a point of drawing up his battle line inshining armour. This is an easy matter and needs only an order tosharpen swords and clean helmets and breastplates. For advancinggroups of soldiers have a more fearsome appearance through the gleamfrom their weapons, and the terrible sight immediately strikes fear andconsternation into the hearts of the enemy.


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65 Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks)

I am not entirely able to praise or censure generals who destroy theirown defences or cross rivers or draw up their army with cliffs or deepgulfs behind them so that the soldiers stay and win the victory or bekilled while aiming to escape. For everything involving excessive riskdisplays more daring than common sense and has more in commonwith luck than good judgement. In circumstances where a man musteither conquer and triumph or be defeated and lose everything, howthen can anyone believe that victory came about by deliberate plan or defeat by choice? However I do think that certain soldiers from thearmy should be allowed to run exceptional risks, for if they succeed theywill bring great benefits and if they fail will not do equal damage. ButI do not think that he (the general) should gamble on an uncertainoutcome with the entire army. In my opinion the generals most at faultare those who employ stratagems that will do little damage to theenemy in the event of victory but in defeat will do great harm to theirown soldiers.

Cf. no. 88.

66 Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal combat)

The general should himself fight cautiously rather than daringly, or indeed keep entirely out of a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. Foreven if in battle he shows unsurpassable courage, by fighting he cannotbring a benefit to the army comparable to the loss if he is killed. Forthe knowledge of a general is of greater value than his strength. Evenan ordinary soldier can perform some great deed through his physicalbravery, but no one except the general can through his knowledge plana greater one. If the captain of a ship abandoning the helm himselftook on the duties of ordinary sailors he would endanger the ship.Similarly, if a general should abandon the skilful direction of operationsand descend to the tasks of ordinary soldiers, his aimless neglect of theentire situation will make pointless the routine work of the soldiers.

In Greek phalanx warfare, once the general had made his dispositions and the troopswere on the move, arguably he could best influence the outcome by fighting or leadingby example. In any case, death in battle was held to be honourable. However, a generalmight want to hold himself ready to take charge at some crisis or turning point of the battle; see above, p. 4, n. 9. By the fourth century warfare had become morecomplicated, with the greater use of light-armed troops and cavalry and the oppor-tunity to deploy reserves. The general needed a more detached position, though


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individuals developed their own style, and Alexander was famous for leading theMacedonian cavalry charge that was decisive in so many of his battles. In the developedRoman army the general needed to direct the battle and self-sacrifice could endangerthe army. Yet generals would still enter the battle in a crisis and in a rout the generalmight be unable to avoid the chaos. After Cannae the senate treated Terentius Varrothe surviving consul with respect, thanking him ‘for not despairing of the Republic’.In the imperial period the emperor was commander-in-chief, and when on campaignmade sure to identify with his ‘fellow-soldiers’ and even sometimes share their food.But he did not fight in person, instead directing the battle with the advice of his seniorcommanders; see Campbell (1984), 65–9; also Goldsworthy (1996), 156–63; no. 95.

67 Onasander, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and honouring soldiers)

The general on his return from battle should first offer to the godsthose sacrifices and celebrations that circumstances permit, promisingto make the usual thank-offerings after complete victory in the war.Then he should honour with the customary gifts and rewards thosesoldiers who have distinguished themselves in the face of danger, andpunish those who proved themselves to be cowards.

In Greece special gifts from the booty could be given to soldiers who had distinguishedthemselves in battle (Diodorus Siculus 11.25.1); see in general Pritchett, GSW I(1971), 53–100; V (1991), 68–203; 363–438. In the Roman imperial period there wasa highly developed system of military decorations – Maxfield (1981).

68 Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead)

The general should make provision for the burial of the dead and shouldnot make a pretext for delay either circumstance, or time, or place, orfear, whether he happens to have been victorious or defeated. This isboth a holy act of piety towards the dead and an essential demonstrationfor the living. For each soldier (if the dead are unburied) thinks thathis body will not be cared for if he happens to fall in battle, as he seeswhat happens with his own eyes and imagines the future; he feels thatif he should die he also will be left unburied and becomes very annoyedat this insolent neglect of burial rights.

For the burial of the fallen, see Pritchett, GSW IV (1985), 94–259; Vaughn, in Hanson(1991); Sage (1996), 98–100; Campbell (2002), 69.


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69 Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders)

The general should treat kindly and benevolently any cities that opentheir gates and surrender at the start of the war, for in this way he willpersuade others to do the same. The alluring expectation of similartreatment persuades the majority to surrender voluntarily. But thegeneral who acts in a severe and aggressive manner when he has becomemaster of a city, plundering, killing, and wrecking, makes other citieshostile, with the result that the war becomes burdensome for him andvictory difficult to achieve. Since they realize that the punishment of the vanquished by the vanquisher is pitiless, they will do and sufferanything rather than surrender their cities.

70 Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and conduct in victory)

If the general is hurrying to complete some project in hand, he shouldnot hesitate to be seen to be the first to join in the work. For soldiersare not moved to carry out their duties so much by the threats of theirimmediate officers as by the example of their commanders. For whena soldier sees that his commander is the first to join in the work he not only understands the need for speed but is also ashamed not towork and fears to disobey. Furthermore, the ordinary soldiers no longerthink that they are like slaves receiving orders but are exhorted as ifencouraged by someone on equal footing.

(14) Perhaps someone may ask if the general himself has been madeof adamant or iron so as to stand alone without sleep through everytask. The answer is no, but during the time when he is asleep, and this must be brief and restricted, he should hand over his command toone of his most reliable and courageous officers, from those second onlyto him in military rank.

(24) If it should happen that everything turns out as the generalwishes and the war is brought to a complete end, he should not be over-bearing in his good fortune but even-handed, displaying not stupidityand harshness, but kindly good will. For the former excites envy, thelatter imitation. . . . Therefore a good man will be not only an excellentleader of his fatherland and the army, but also an intelligent strategistfor the permanent safeguarding of his own reputation.


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71 Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders before battle)

Since I alone of those learned in the field of military science haveundertaken to expound it systematically and seem to have succeededin that enterprise as far as my diligence permitted, I think that I should now complete the task I have begun by setting out with shortdescriptions the clever ploys of commanders, which the Greeks sum-marize in one term, strategemata. For through this commanders will beequipped with examples of wisdom and foresight, which will nourishtheir ability to devise and carry out similar actions. There is the addedadvantage that a commander who compares his own stratagem againstproven experiments will not be worried about how it will turn out.

These are the types of stratagems that guide a commander in what-ever that needs to be done before a battle:

I On concealing your plansII On discovering the enemy’s plans

III On establishing the character of the warIV On leading an army through places infested with the enemyV On getting away from a very difficult position

VI On setting up an ambush on the marchVII How to conceal a deficiency in those things that you lack or to

supply substitutes for themVIII On distracting the enemy’s attention

IX On quelling a mutiny of the soldiersX How to restrain an inappropriate demand for battle

XI How to rouse an army to battleXII On dispelling fear that has infected soldiers because of adverse

omens

For the following extracts, which overlap with Chapter 3, I have selected exampleswhere the commander gives a strong personal lead. The lists of headings (see alsobelow nos 75; 77; 78) give a good indication of the military operations with which acommander was expected to be competent to deal.

72 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny)

When some legions of Julius Caesar mutinied to the point that they seemed to threaten even the commander’s life, he concealed hisfear, confronted the soldiers, and with a grim expression voluntarilygranted discharge to those asking for it. But regret for what they had


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done compelled those who had been discharged to apologize to theircommander and to promise greater obedience in future operations.

This incident occurred in 47 BC with Caesar’s famous tenth legion; cf. Suetonius,Caesar 70; Appian, Civil Wars 2.92–4.

73 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership)

When the same Sertorius saw that his troops were incautiouslydemanding the signal for battle and thought that they were going toignore his commands if they did not get to grips with the enemy, heallowed a squadron of cavalry to advance to harass their opponents.When they got into difficulties he sent other troops to rescue themand in this way brought them all back safely. Therefore safely andwithout risk he demonstrated what the result of the battle they haddemanded would have been. From then on he found them mostobedient to his orders.

Cf. Plutarch, Sertorius 16. Quintus Sertorius, an eques with distinguished militaryservice, assisted Cinna in the capture of Rome in 87 BC during the civil war againstSulla. He took command in Spain and after being driven out returned to lead a renegadegroup of those who opposed the government in Rome after the death of Sulla.Eventually he controlled most of Roman Spain, winning numerous victories includinga defeat of Pompey at Lauro in 77. He was assassinated by one of his own supportersin 73.

74 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men)

When Epaminondas, commander of the Thebans, was about to fightagainst the Spartans, to make his soldiers not only physically but alsoemotionally stronger, he announced in a speech that the Spartans hadresolved if victorious to kill all males, lead their wives and childrenaway into slavery, and destroy Thebes utterly. The Thebans were stirredup by this announcement and broke through the Spartans on the firstattack.

Frontinus is presumably referring to the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC (see p. 4).


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75 Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems)

These are the types (of stratagem) that concern the battle itself:

I On choosing the time for battleII On choosing the place for battle

III On drawing up the battle lineIV On disrupting the enemy’s battle lineV On ambushes

VI On letting the enemy escape in case, being penned in, he renewsthe battle in desperation

VII On concealing reversesVIII On restoring morale by fearlessness

I think that these are the types of stratagem that relate to whatmust be done after the battle:

IX On ending the war after a successful battleX On repairing losses after a defeat

XI On keeping the loyalty of untrustworthy elements XII On what must be done for the defence of the camp if you have

insufficient confidence in your existing forces XIII On retreating

76 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership)

When Marcus Furius Camillus met his army in retreat, he said that hewould not take back into the camp anyone who was not victorious,and leading them back into the battle won the victory.

(12) When his legionaries were giving way before the army ofMithridates under the command of Archelaus, Lucius Sulla drew hissword and ran into the front line and addressing his men said that if anyone enquired where they had abandoned their general they should reply: ‘Fighting in Boeotia.’ Shamed by these words all of themfollowed him.

Camillus was fighting the Volscians in 381 BC (Livy, 6.24). Sulla was commandingthe Roman army at the battle of Orchomenus in 85 BC. Cf. Plutarch, Sulla 21; Appian,Mithridatic Wars 49; Polyaenus 8.9.2.


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77 Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges)

Omitting all siegeworks and siege engines, the invention of which haslong since reached its limit and for which I see no further improvementthrough the application of the arts, I have compiled the following typesof stratagem concerning sieges:

I On surprise attacksII On deceiving the besieged

III On encouraging treacheryIV On the means by which the enemy can be reduced to needV How to persuade the enemy that you will persist with the siege

VI On distracting the attention of hostile garrisonsVII On diverting rivers and contaminating water

VIII On instilling panic into the besiegedIX On breaking in from an unexpected quarterX On setting ambushes to lure out the besieged

XI On pretending to retire

On the other hand these are stratagems concerning theprotection of the besieged:

XII On encouraging the vigilance of your own troopsXIII On sending and receiving messagesXIV On bringing in reinforcements and supplying provisionsXV How to make it seem that there is an abundance of what is

lackingXVI How to deal with traitors and deserters

XVII On sortiesXVIII On pertinacity among the besieged

78 Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the army)

(Frontinus turns to stratagems that do not fall under the previousspecific headings.) Naturally this material that has been left over needsto be explained and in doing that I shall try to keep to the followingcategories:

I On disciplineII On the effects of discipline

III On restraint


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IV On justiceV On determination

VI On good will and moderationVII On various maxims

79 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership)

Pyrrhus is said to have commented to his recruiting officer: ‘You choosethe big men. I shall make them brave!’

Pyrrhus (319–272 BC) was king of Epirus and, responding to an appeal from the peopleof Tarentum for help against the Romans, landed in southern Italy with 25,000infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 20 elephants. He won several hard-fought battles butwithdrew in 275 leaving a garrison in Tarentum and having lost more than two-thirdsof his army. He was killed while intervening in Argos in 272 and in that year theRomans captured Tarentum.

80 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an example)

The same general (Hannibal), when serving under Hasdrubal ascommander, usually slept on the bare ground covered only by hismilitary cloak.

(9) It is said that Scipio Aemilianus used to eat bread that had beenhanded to him as he walked along on the march with his friends.

(14) In the war conducted under the auspices of Emperor CaesarDomitian Augustus Germanicus, which Julius Civilis had begun inGaul, the extremely wealthy city of the Lingones, which had defectedto Civilis, feared that the approaching army of the emperor wouldplunder it. But because contrary to expectations the people were leftuntouched and lost none of their property they returned to their loyaltyand handed over to me seventy thousand armed men.

For Hannibal as a commander see Lazenby (1978). For the tradition of the frugalcommander who shared the privations of his men, to which Roman emperors aspired,see Campbell (1984), 32–59. Frontinus was perhaps commanding a legion during therevolt of Civilis in AD 70. Domitian was formally in control because Vespasian andTitus were still absent from Rome.

81 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander)

When Camillus was besieging the Faliscians, a school teacher took thechildren of the Faliscians outside the walls on the pretext of going for


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a walk and then handed them over, saying that if they were kept ashostages the community would be forced to do whatever he com-manded. But Camillus not only disdained the school teacher’s treacherybut tying his hands behind his back he handed him over to his pupilsto be driven back to their parents with sticks. Through his kindnesshe obtained the success that he had declined to win by treachery since the Faliscians voluntarily surrendered to him because of this actof justice.

Camillus secured the surrender of Falerii in 394 BC (cf. Livy, 5.27; Plutarch, Camillus10; Polyaenus, 8.7). Again we see the importance of the moral aspects of generalship.

82 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander)

Lucius Paullus, after losing his army at Cannae, when Lentulus offeredhim a horse on which to escape, refused to survive the disaster althoughhe had not been responsible for it. Instead he remained seated on therock on which he had leaned when he had been wounded, until he was overwhelmed and pierced through by the enemy.

The other consul, Terentius Varro, survived the defeat at Cannae in 216 BC; see aboveno. 66, and also no. 125.

83 Frontinus Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander)

When Alexander was marching at the head of his troops during awinter’s day, he sat down beside a fire and began to review the soldiersas they passed by. Since he noticed that one soldier was nearly dead withcold he ordered him to sit in his place, saying: ‘If you had been bornin Persia it would be a capital offence to sit on the king’s chair; but sinceyou were born in Macedonia it is granted to you.’

The incident is described by Curtius Rufus (8.4.15–17), who has Alexander say: ‘Fora Persian, sitting on the king’s throne would have meant death, for you it meant life.’

84 Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders)

He (Alexander) stationed Ptolemy son of Lagus there, giving him three chiliarchies of hypaspists, all the Agrianians, and one companyof archers, and he made clear the place where he expected that the


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tribesman would probably try to break through. He said: ‘When yousee the tribesmen breaking through here you yourself with your armyprevent them from going any further and order the bugler to sound the signal. And you, officers, when this signal is given will each withhis assigned forces go in the direction of the uproar, wherever the buglersummons you. I shall be present personally at the action.’

If the source of this passage is Ptolemy himself, then we have a good indication of howAlexander issued orders.

85 Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle)

Nearchus recounts that he (Alexander) was upset because some of hisfriends had blamed him for taking personal risks in the forefront of his army. They said that this was the duty not of a commander but ofa common soldier. In my view Alexander was annoyed with these com-ments because he knew that they were true and that he had left himselfexposed to this criticism. However, because of his passion in battle andhis love of glory he was not resolute enough to keep away from danger,just like men who are overcome by any other kind of pleasure.

86 Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of Alexander)

At this stage a noble action, as noble as any other carried out byAlexander, should in my opinion not be left in obscurity, whether itwas done in this country or earlier in the land of the Parapamisadae, assome others have written. The army was marching through sand in heatthat was already blazing, since they had to complete their journey byreaching a water supply, which was further along the road. Alexanderhimself was very thirsty but despite great difficulty persisted in leadingthe march on foot, so that the rest of the troops should (as usuallyhappens in these circumstances) endure their tasks more easily whenthe distress was being shared equally. Meanwhile some light-armedsoldiers made a sortie from the army looking for water, and found some collected in a shallow gully, a small and miserable spring. Theyeasily collected the water and hurried to Alexander thinking that theywere bringing something very valuable. When they came near they putthe water in a helmet and offered it to the king. He took it and thankedthem for bringing it, but then poured it out in the full view ofeveryone. The entire army was so inspired by this action that it looked


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as if everyone had drunk the water that Alexander had poured away. I particularly praise this action of Alexander as an indication of hisendurance and also of his generalship.

Quintus Curtius places this incident in Sogdiana (7.5.10).

87 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship)

They (the Macedonians) thought that in appearance and speed andmovement he resembled Alexander, and also observed some shadowand imitation of Alexander in his dashing conduct and violence inbattle. Whereas other kings recalled Alexander by their purple robes,bodyguards, the angle at which they held their head, and a loud voice,Pyrrhus alone did so by weapons and the deeds of his hands. It ispossible to find examples of his skill in military dispositions, general-ship, and shrewdness in the writings that he left concerning thesematters. It is said that Antigonus when asked who was the best generalreplied, ‘Pyrrhus if he grows old’. He was, however, referring only tocommanders in his own age. But Hannibal declared that of all generalsPyrrhus was first in skill and shrewdness, Scipio second, and himselfthird, as I described in my life of Scipio. Indeed Pyrrhus seems to havespent his time practising and thinking about this (generalship), sincehe considered it the most kingly aspect of learning, while the restmerely provided a smooth veneer and were of no account.

Plutarch (c. AD 50–120) was a Greek from Chaeronea and also a Roman citizen. Hewas a philosopher and biographer who was deeply attached to Greek traditions andreligious practices. He served as a priest at Delphi and also had influence among theélite in Rome, believing that Greeks and Romans could profit from one another. Hewas a prolific writer and his most famous work is the Parallel Lives, in which he setout to portray individual virtues or vices through a comparison of the careers of greatmen. His biographies therefore are slanted towards events and actions that reveal aman’s character rather than an examination of historical trends or detailed analysis.Furthermore, he had no military experience. However, occasionally he has usefuldescriptions of battles and the qualities of a general. For Plutarch’s career and workssee Russell (1972).

For Pyrrhus, see above, no. 79.

88 Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general)

He (Augustus) thought nothing less suitable in an accomplishedcommander than haste and rashness. Consequently frequent sayings of


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his were: ‘More haste, less speed’; ‘a cautious general is better than abold one’; and ‘anything is done quickly enough that is done wellenough’. He used to say that a war or a battle should not be undertakenat all unless it was obvious that there was greater expectation of successthan fear of loss. For he said that those who pursued small gains at nosmall risk were like men fishing with a golden hook, the loss of whichif it were broken off could not be compensated by any catch.

Suetonius (born c. AD 70) was of equestrian rank and under Hadrian served as theemperor’s correspondence secretary. However, c. 122 he was dismissed for unknownreasons. He wrote biographies of famous Roman literary men and twelve imperialbiographies from Julius Caesar to Domitian. In his position as secretary he had accessto imperial archives and probably used some of this material in his biographies. He quotes verbatim important documents, which gives his work a unique flavour. Hegenuinely tried to illustrate the personalities of emperors as they attempted to copewith the demands and privileges of absolute power. See in general, Wallace-Hadrill(1983).

89 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1, Preface 1–3 (generals and stratagems)

Most revered Emperors Antoninus (Marcus Aurelius) and Verus(Lucius Verus), you will win victory over the Persians and Parthianswith the help of the gods, your own valour and the courage of theRomans, by means of which both in the past and now you havehabitually triumphed in all wars and battles. I am a Macedonian and have a native ability to defeat Persians in battle and I wish to offeradvice to you at this crucial time. If I were young enough I wouldeagerly serve as a soldier using my Macedonian vigour. But althoughyou see that I am of advanced years I shall not even now be left entirelyoutside military service. Therefore I offer the following material onmilitary knowledge, stratagems of commanders in the past, both to you as a substantial account of past deeds, and to those sent out by you,army commanders, governors, legionary legates, military tribunes,cohort commanders, and all other officers, who can develop their talentsand skills from past successes. For it is an act of courage when someoneuses his strength to overcome an enemy in battle, but it is an act of goodsense to triumph through skill and ingenuity without fighting a battle.It is the highest wisdom of a shrewd commander to bring about a victory without risk.

See also nos 91; 94; 96.


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90 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example)

When Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese the enemy movedforward and encamped at Oneum. A thunderstorm occurred, spreadingfear among the soldiers, and the soothsayer urged him to hold back.But Epaminondas replied: ‘Not at all’, for the enemy camped in sucha place were thunderstruck. The general’s reply instilled courage into the soldiers and they eagerly followed him.

91 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, Preface (a general’s need for military skill)

Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer you this thirdbook of Stratagems. The general’s understanding and skill demonstratedin these can benefit you, both as you wage war and preserve the peace.For all rulers need political generalship and foresight in order to guidecommunities into doing what is necessary. You who exercise imperialrule and are in charge of everything are always using a general’sunderstanding to work out what is best for your subjects. So, in peaceyou must exercise your mind with a general’s considerations, and in war– why do I need to write this? For it is obvious.

92 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 11; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62(Iphicrates’ skill as a general)

After he had routed the enemy Iphicrates used to follow them, leadingthe phalanx carefully and giving orders as follows: ‘You light-armedtroops watch out for ambushes and harass the enemy stragglers. Atriver crossings, narrow places, or ditches you must certainly not encirclethe fugitives, so that they are not compelled to fight in sheer despera-tion. It is not wise to pursue close to city walls, for many have comewithin missile range without noticing and retreated after sufferingserious losses.’

(11) When Iphicrates was about to pitch camp he sent some men to seize a strong point some considerable distance from the camp. The people who were present asked in astonishment, ‘Why are youoccupying that place?’ Iphicrates replied: ‘Who could have expectedthat this would happen?’ By this he showed them that in war it isnecessary to guard against the unexpected.

(14) Iphicrates routed the enemy and drove them into an enclosedspace. Seeing that they had no avenue of retreat except for the absolute


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need to conquer, he said, ‘We must not compel the enemy to be coura-geous’, and gave them the opportunity and space to escape so that hecould keep his victory without risk.

(17) Even when he was in friendly territory Iphicrates used to erecta palisade, saying ‘it is not the mark of a good general to say, “I did notthink”’.

(22) Iphicrates compared the ranks of an army to the human body.He said that the infantry phalanx was the trunk, light-armed troopsthe hands, cavalry the feet, and the general the head. ‘When the otherparts are missing, the army is lame and disabled, but when the generalis killed then the entire army is worthless.’

(46) After marching to Thrace with eight thousand soldiersIphicrates encamped. Learning that the Thracians were intending toattack during the night he led his soldiers during the evening in a retreat of around 3 stades (about 600 yards) to a gully that could hidethem. The Thracians attacked and sacked the empty camp in generaldisorder, laughing at the Greeks for running away. Iphicrates chargingforward from hiding killed many of them and made many captives.

(62) In Thrace Iphicrates took many of the Odrysians captive. TheOdrysians then attacked him vigorously using slings and spears. Buthe placed beside each man in the front ranks a naked prisoner with hishands tied behind his back with thongs. The Odrysians, not wantingto wound their relatives, stopped slinging stones and hurling spears.

For the career of Iphicrates, see p. 5. These excerpts from Polyaenus’ very long entryon Iphicrates give an impression of his style of leadership.

93 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander)

In the first formal battle against the Persians, seeing that theMacedonians were already giving way, Alexander rode past shouting,‘Let us charge once again, Macedonians, let us charge once more nobly’. And when they made a strong attack the Persians were routed.It is said that the victory was achieved by such a narrow margin.

For the sources used by Polyaneus to illustrate Alexander’s leadership and stratagems,see Hammond (1996), who reckons that he was possibly using material from sixauthors including contemporary sources like Cleitarchus and Ptolemy, as well asCurtius Rufus and Arrian. Polyaenus probably chose the most striking version of astratagem.


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94 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from stratagems)

Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer this fifth book of Stratagems to you, believing that I am not so deserving of praise forwriting it as you are for your eagerness to read material of this kindwhen you are in charge of such a large empire. Now especially, whenyou are in charge not only of justice in peacetime but also administerthe business of war, you consider that it is a stratagem for victory if youlearn the ways in which the ancient commanders won their victories.For you realize that emperors waging war should understand greatdeeds. An enthusiasm for literature is useful for those who are at leisure,but for those in charge of armies knowledge of great deeds is the bestteacher of what needs to be done to emulate those who have conqueredin past times. These stratagems will show you how you may emulatethe talent and victories of ancient commanders.

95 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle)

Philopoemen did not think that it was right for a good general to leadthe phalanx. Instead by riding round, now among the front ranks, nowamong the rear, and often in the middle, he oversaw everyone andcorrected any faults.

Philopoemen (c. 253–182 BC) served as a mercenary leader in Crete before becominga general of the Achaean Confederacy; he fought to preserve Achaean independenceagainst the Spartans and subsequently against interference from Rome.

96 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard against enemy tricks)

Most revered Emperors Antoninus and Verus, I offer to you this seventhbook of Stratagems in which you can learn that the barbarians are not entirely incapable of generalship. For they also are interested indevices, deceit, and trickery. Therefore you would do well to encourageyourselves and the commanders whom you send out not to despise thebarbarians as being stupid and without craftiness, but on the contraryto be on guard above all against their deceit, untrustworthiness, andtreachery, in which the barbarian race takes more pleasure thanfighting. Distrust should be the best and impregnable guard againstthem, and along with this we shall have strength in military techniqueand shall practise a sharper skill against them since we have workedout beforehand the thinking behind their stratagems.


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97 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership)

When Scipio saw a soldier carrying a palisade stake he said, ‘You seemto be heavily laden, fellow-soldier’. When the soldier replied that hecertainly was, Scipio said, ‘Probably you place your hope of safety inwood, not in your sword’.


98 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for action)

Julius Caesar ordered his soldiers to be continually at the ready, as ifhe was intending to lead out the army unexpectedly by day or night,during a festival, or in a storm. In this way he did not let slip anopportunity or a single day.

Cf. Suetonius, Caesar 65.

99 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his troops)

When Caesar learnt that several legions of soldiers had been cut down in Gaul he swore that he would not cut his hair before he attackedand took vengeance on those who had killed them. Therefore he wonenormous good will for himself from everyone.

(33) When a victim was found to have no heart Caesar said, ‘Andwhat is odd if a dumb creature has no heart?’ When they heard this thesoldiers took courage.

Cf. Suetonius, Caesar 67; 77. For the defeat in Gaul, see above no. 52.

100 Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship)

On essential and urgent campaigns, however, he (Caracalla) wasunaffected and frugal, and enthusiastically carried out routine taskson equal terms with everyone else. Indeed he used to march and runwith the soldiers, did not wash or change his clothes, joined in everytask, and took the same food as the rest of the soldiers. Often he wouldsend a message to enemy leaders challenging them to single combat.But he made a very poor showing in the skills of a commander, in


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which he should have been extremely well versed, as if he thought thatvictory lay in the performance of menial duties rather than incompetent generalship.

Cassius Dio (c. AD 164 until after 229) was a Greek from Bithynia and Roman senator.He was consul c. 204 and then, among other duties, served as governor of Africa, ofDalmatia, and finally of Upper Pannonia, where he commanded two legions. He wasconsul for the second time, with the emperor Severus Alexander in 229, and had beena friend of Septimius Severus the founder of the Severan dynasty. Dio was thereforewell connected and experienced in holding administrative posts. He wrote a historyof Rome in 80 books from the foundation to AD 229. This is an immensely valuablerecord, especially his account of events in his own lifetime, many of which he hadwitnessed. Despite his time in command of an army Dio had no special militaryexpertise, but, depending on the sources he used, occasionally has valuable battledescriptions and reflections on the conduct of emperors on campaign. For Dio’s careerand history see Millar (1964).

Severus’ elder son Caracalla liked to pose as one of his soldiers and urged them tocall him ‘fellow-soldier’; see Campbell (1984), 52–3. Dio tends to be highly criticalof him.

101 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of general in securing

his army’s welfare)

Now I shall describe a matter that requires the greatest care, namely,the means by which the good health of the army can be safeguarded,that is by site, water supply, climate, medical care, and exercise. Inrespect of site, do not let the soldiers spend time in an unhealthy regionclose to pestilential marshes, or on arid plains or hills without the shade of trees, or without tents in summer. They should not march outtoo late in the day in case they fall ill through sunstroke and theexertion of the march. Instead they should start before dawn and reachtheir objective in the heat of the day. In the depths of winter theyshould not make a night march through snow and frost, or endure a shortage of firewood or have an insufficient supply of clothing. For asoldier who is compelled to be cold will not be healthy or capable ofan expedition. Nor should an army use contaminated or marsh water,for a drink of bad water is similar to poison and produces illness inthose who drink it. Indeed it is the continual responsibility of theofficers and tribunes and the senior commander to ensure that soldierswho fall ill for this reason are nursed back to health by appropriatefoods and receive medical care. It is extremely difficult for those whoare fighting both a war and disease.

(12) The general should find out carefully what the soldiers are thinking on the very day on which they are going to fight. For


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confidence or fear can be recognized from their expression, words,movement, and gestures. Do not be entirely confident if it is therecruits who want battle, for battle is sweet to the inexperienced. Youwill understand that you must postpone battle if experienced soldiersare afraid to fight. However, soldiers’ courage and fighting spirit growthrough the advice and encouragement of their commander, especiallyif they receive such an account of the coming battle that they expectto obtain an easy victory. Then the general should point out thecowardice or blunders of the enemy, and remind the army if they haveever been beaten by us before. He should also say things calculated toinspire hatred of the enemy in the minds of the soldiers by stirring uptheir fury and indignation. . . .

(13) A good commander should know that a good part of winninga victory concerns the place where the battle is to be fought. Makesure, therefore, that when you are about to join battle you first seek helpfrom the place; it is generally held to be more useful, the higher theground occupied. For weapons fall with greater velocity from above on those standing below, and soldiers on higher ground force back withgreater impetus those opposing them. But the soldier who strugglesup a slope has a twofold contest, with the ground and the enemy.However, there is the distinction that if you are hoping to win a victorywith your infantry against the enemy cavalry, you should choose rough,uneven, and mountainous country. But if you are hoping to defeat theenemy infantry with your cavalry, you ought to seek positions that areon rather higher ground, but flat and open, and not blocked by woodsand marshes.

(18) The commander-in-chief normally takes up position betweenthe cavalry and infantry on the right flank. In this place he can controlthe entire battle line and has a clear and uninterrupted advance. Hestands between both groups so that he can control through his adviceand use his authority to encourage to battle both cavalry and infantry.He must arrange for soldiers from the cavalry reserve mixed with light-armed infantry to circle round the enemy’s left wing, which is locatedopposite him, and attack repeatedly from the rear.

Not much is known about the treatment of the wounded in Greek battles, thoughmedical writers discuss how to deal with penetrating wounds; see Anderson, in Hanson(1991), 32–4; Sage (1996), 95. For medical care in Roman army, see Davies (1970);Webster (1985), 248–54. For the position of the general in the battle line, see aboveno. 66.


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3

BATTLEMilitary formations, tactics,

and stratagems

102 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops)

The Aetolians, who had already come as far as Aigitium in support,attacked the Athenians and their allies by charging down from thehills from all directions and throwing their javelins; they retreatedwhenever the Athenian army advanced and attacked again when itretired. The battle went on like this for a long time with alternateadvances and withdrawals in both of which the Athenians came offworse. (98) As long as the archers had arrows and were able to use themthe Athenians held out, since the light-armed Aetolians retreated inthe face of showers of arrows. But the archers scattered on the death oftheir commander, and the soldiers had become worn out throughcarrying out the same exhausting manoeuvre for so long; when theAetolians attacked with volleys of javelins they were routed and fled.Since they blundered into gullies from which there was no way outand into unfamiliar areas they were destroyed, for Chromon, theirMessenian guide, had been killed in the fighting. The Aetolians, whowere fast-moving and lightly equipped, keeping up the barrage ofjavelins, caught and killed many on the spot where the rout occurred.Most of the Athenians, however, lost their way and entered a woodfrom which there was no way out, and which the enemy set on fire sothat it burned all around them.

Thucydides the Athenian was born around 455 BC. He wrote a history of the warbetween Athens and Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies (431–404 BC). But he wasalso active in Athenian life and was elected one of the ten strategoi (chief magistrates).Part of his role involved commanding a fleet in the region of Thrace during the war.This area, and in particular the city of Amphipolis on the river Strymon, were crucialto Athenian interests, as a strategically important centre of communications, a sourceof minerals, and a centre for shipbuilding timber. Thucydides was caught unawares

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by a surprise attack on the city launched by the Spartan commander Brasidas, whichled to its capture. Thucydides led his ships from his base at Thasos and saved Eïon theport of Amphipolis (4.107–8), but nevertheless he was dismissed from his command(5.26.5), subsequently put on trial, and sent into exile. Thucydides seemingly took agenuine pride in Athens’ military strength. Referring to the force that Pericles ledagainst Megara in 431, he says, ‘this was clearly the biggest Athenian force that hadyet taken the field; the city was at the height of its power and had not yet suffered theeffects of the plague; there were no fewer than ten thousand hoplites drawn fromAthenian citizens (apart from the three thousand at Potidaea), and as many as threethousand hoplites from the resident aliens accompanied the invasion, not to mentiona large crowd of light-armed troops’ (2.31.2). He was interested in the military strategyof the war and the tactics of individual campaigns, and could exploit his own experienceof the demands, responsibilities, and vicissitudes of military command; he givesdetailed and thoughtful accounts of warfare, e.g., the siege of Plataea (nos 197–8) andis aware of technical aspects, e.g. the fire machine at Delium (no. 259). It is usefultherefore to include some of these passages from Thucydides’ account of the war thathe himself described as the greatest of all time (1.1). For the most recent commentaryand bibliography, see Hornblower (1991; 1996); general survey (1987).

The campaign described in this extract took place during the Peloponnesian Warin the summer of 426 BC, as the Athenian commander Demosthenes, acting on theadvice of his Messenian allies, attacked the Aetolians, who lived in unfortified villages.However, the Athenian hoplite force was unable to deal effectively with fast-moving,lightly equipped opponents who exploited the terrain. Demosthenes did not wait forhis Locrian allies, who were similarly equipped to the Aetolians.

103 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34 (Spartan hoplites defeated

at Sphacteria)

On the orders of Demosthenes this force was divided into groups ofabout two hundred men, some bigger some smaller, and they occupiedthe higher ground so that the enemy, surrounded on all sides andhaving no one place against which to launch a counter-attack, shouldbe utterly frustrated. For they were exposed to superior numbers on allsides, and if they attacked those in front they would be shot at by thosebehind, if they attacked those on one flank they would be shot at bythose on the other flank. Wherever they went enemy soldiers wouldalways be behind them, lightly armed and very difficult to deal with,since they used arrows, spears, stones, and slings that were effective at long range, and it was impossible to get to grips with them. For inretreat they were faster and when the enemy retired they advancedagain.

(33) This was the original plan devised by Demosthenes for thelanding and he now put it into effect for this operation. . . . But theSpartans were not able to come to close quarters with the (Athenian)hoplites or use their experience, for the light-armed soldiers on both

B A T T L E : F O R M A T I O N S A N D S T R A T A G E M S

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flanks kept them back with volleys of weapons while the Athenians didnot move but remained in their positions. The Spartans drove off thelight-armed troops when they advanced too close to them, but theydefended themselves as they retreated, since they were lightly armedand easily outpaced their pursuers over ground, which, because thearea had been previously uninhabited, was difficult and rough. TheSpartans could not pursue them here because of the weight of theirarmour.

(34) This long-range fighting continued for a short time. But whenthe Spartans were no longer able to counter-attack speedily where they were attacked, the light-armed soldiers gained confidence as theyrealized that they were slower in defending themselves. They couldalso see that they were far more numerous and had got accustomed tothinking that the Spartans no longer seemed so formidable, since theirfirst encounter with them had been not as bad as they expected whenthey first disembarked. They had been bound to the idea that theywere going to attack Spartans. But now they started to despise themand, yelling out, charged them in a massed group, shooting at themwith arrows, spears, and stones, whatever weapons each one had tohand. The Spartans, who were not used to this kind of fighting, werefilled with alarm at the shouts that accompanied the attacks. Anenormous cloud of dust rose from the wood that had recently beenburned and made it difficult for them to see in front, with so manyarrows and stones being fired through the dust cloud. The battle nowstarted to go against the Spartans. For their helmets did not keep outthe arrows, and when they were hit the broken spear-shafts stuck intheir body armour. They had no way of fighting back since they couldnot see what was in front; they could not hear words of commandbecause they were drowned out by the louder shouting of the enemy;danger was all around them and they could see no way of defendingthemselves and escaping.

An Athenian fleet on its way to Sicily in 425 BC under the command of Demostheneshad stopped to fortify the promontory of Pylos in Messenia. Sparta considered this asa threat to her territory and landed soldiers in the adjacent island of Sphacteria. Whenthe Athenian fleet returned the Spartans were cut off on the island. Cleon was sent outas general after complaining about the slowness of the siege operation. Demostheneseperhaps had learnt something from his disastrous experience in Aetolia (no. 102). Thepassage illustrates the effectiveness of light-armed troops against hoplites in the rightconditions, and also the value of using a combination of light-armed troops withhoplites, which was to be important in the fourth century.


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104 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War5.70–1 (the drift to the right in hoplite battles)

After this the armies came together, the Argives and their alliesviolently and angrily, the Spartans slowly to the sound of many flute-players positioned in the ranks. This practice is not because of religiousfeeling, but to enable the soldiers to advance steadily in step withoutbreaking their ranks, as usually happens when large armies are movingforward to join battle. (71) King Agis decided on the followingmanoeuvre as the armies came together. Now, it is true in the case ofall armies joining battle that the right wing tends to extend excessivelyand the right wing of every army outflanks the left wing of the enemy.The reason for this is that through fear each soldier tries his best to findshelter for his unprotected side under the shield of the man drawn upnext to him on the right, and thinks that the denseness of the formationoffers the best protection. The originator of this fault is the soldierstationed on the far right of the front line, who is always eager to keephis unprotected side away from the enemy, and then the others followbecause of the same fear.

Thucydides is here describing the battle of Mantinea in the summer of 418 BC

when the Spartans and their allies defeated an alliance of Argives, Athenians, andMantineans. As both armies edged to the right so the right wing prevailed on eachside, but the Spartans under the command of king Agis broke off the pursuit of the enemy’s defeated left wing and moved across the battlefield to rescue his left wingand win the victory. See also below, no. 128.

105 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5(skill and inspirational leadership of Gylippus)

During this time Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae usingthe stones that the Athenians had earlier put down side by side fortheir own use. At the same time he always led out the Syracusans andtheir allies and drew them up in front of the wall, and the Atheniansdrew up their force opposite. When Gylippus thought the time wasright he led the attack and they fought a hand-to-hand battle betweenthe fortifications where no use could be made of the Syracusan cavalry.The Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up the bodiesunder a truce while the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus called thearmy together and said that it was not their fault but his own, since byconfining the battle line too much between the fortifications he haddeprived them of the assistance of the cavalry and the javelin throwers;but now he would lead them out again. And he told them to remember


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that they were at no disadvantage in terms of equipment, and in termsof morale it would be intolerable if men who were Peloponnesian andDorian did not think that they could beat Ionians, islanders, and theother rabble and drive them from the country.

Thucydides is here describing the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 414 BC. A crucialfactor in their final defeat was the arrival of the Spartan Gylippus, who organized thedefence. Here we see first his ability to adjust his tactics in the light of experience andalso his tact and leadership qualities.

106 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44(night battle at Syracuse)

From this moment the Athenians fell into great confusion and distress.Indeed it was not easy to find out from either side precisely how thingshad happened. For in daylight people involved in the action have aclearer knowledge, but nevertheless they do not know everything andindeed an individual tends to know only what happens round himself.In a night battle, and this was the only such battle involving largeforces in this war, how can anyone know anything clearly? There wasbright moonlight, but as might be expected for visibility in moonlightthey could see the outline of people in front of them but could not besure whose side they were on. For many hoplites from both sides werefighting in a narrow space. And on the Athenian side some had alreadybeen defeated while others were coming up fresh and making theirfirst attack. A large part of the remainder of their army had only justarrived or was still on its way up, so that they did not know where theyhad to go. After the defeat that had taken place everything in front of them was totally confused and it was difficult to recognize who was who because of the uproar. For the Syracusans and their allies werecheering one another on in their victory with loud shouting, which wasthe only way to communicate in the darkness, and at the same timewere meeting attacks on them. The Athenians were trying to find each other and took as enemies all those coming toward them, even ifthey were friends who were in retreat. By repeatedly asking for thewatchword, because there was no other way of recognizing each other,they brought a great deal of confusion on themselves since everyone wasasking for it at once, and they also revealed it to the enemy. It was moredifficult for the Athenians to learn the enemy’s watchword becausethey were victorious and, being in a more coherent formation, recog-nized one another more easily. Therefore, if the Athenians met a weakergroup of the enemy, it got away because it knew their watchword, but if they failed to reply they were massacred.


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Thucydides here describes the decisive Athenian defeat at Syracuse in 413. Nightbattles were comparatively rare in Greek warfare.

107 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80(Athenian retreat at Syracuse)

During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, noting that the army was in a bad way since it was already short of all kinds of supplies andsince many had been wounded in the frequent enemy attacks, decidedto light as many fires as possible and lead the army away. They did not follow the road they had intended, but took the opposite route tothe one watched by the Syracusans, and marched towards the sea. . . .They therefore lit a large number of fires and set out during the night.But the army fell into confusion, as usually happens with all armies,especially very large ones, when fear and panic set in, especially duringthe night if they are marching through enemy territory with the enemynot far away. The force commanded by Nicias, as it was in the lead, kepttogether and advanced a long distance ahead, while that commandedby Demosthenes, which made up more than half the numbers, becamebroken up and marched in a disorderly way.

Thucydides makes an interesting generalization on the difficulty of conducting aretreat with a large army; cf. no. 114. The Syracusans pursued the retreating Atheniansand defeated them in detail; virtually the entire force was killed or captured and Niciasand Demosthenes were executed.

108 Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse in attack)

If there is a cavalry engagement when the enemy camp is situated rightin front, and one side presses the pursuit up to the enemy’s battle lineand then retreats to its own infantry, it is important to understand thatas long as you are with your friends it is right and safe for you to beamong the first to wheel round and attack at full gallop. But when youget close to the enemy you should keep your horse under strict control.For by doing this you have the best chance of inflicting harm on theenemy without being harmed yourself.

109 Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11(importance of deception)

Whenever you intend to make the numbers of your cavalry seem larger,first accept one point of principle – if possible do not attempt to deceive


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the enemy when you are near by; for the deception is safer and moreeffective when practised at a distance. Next, you should know thatwhen grouped together horses seem numerous because of the size of theanimals, but when they are scattered they are easily counted. Anotherway to make your cavalry seem larger is to place the grooms betweenthe horses and if possible arm them with spears, and if not, withimitation spears, whether you display the cavalry at halt or wheel it intoline. For it is inevitable that the size of the force will look bigger anddenser.

(9) For there is nothing more profitable in war than deception. Evenchildren are capable deceivers when they play the game guess the number.They hold up a few counters and make them seem more numerous orhold up a large number and make them seem smaller. If men applytheir mind to deception surely they can achieve something similar.Indeed if you considered successes gained in war you would discoverthat most of them and the greatest had been achieved by deception.

110 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa)

Now the two armies were no more than six or eight hundred yardsapart and the Greeks sang the paean and began to advance towards theenemy. As they moved forward part of the phalanx surged forward inadvance of the rest, and the section left behind began to advance at the run. In unison they all shouted out, like the war cry of ‘Eleleu’ thatsoldiers make to the God of War, and then all ran forward. Some claimthat they clanged their spears against their shields in order to frightenthe horses. Before they got within bow range the Persians turned andfled, and then the Greeks launched a fierce pursuit, but shouted at oneanother not to advance at the run but to pursue the enemy whilekeeping ranks. The chariots charged about, some going through theirown ranks, some with no drivers through the Greek ranks. When theGreeks saw them coming they opened ranks. But one man was rootedto the spot, just as if he was at a horse race, and was knocked over. Buteven this man suffered no injury, so they said. Indeed no other Greeksuffered any injury in this battle except for one man on the left wingwho was said to have been shot by an arrow.

This passage gives a flavour of the start of a battle, the fearsome impression made bythe phalanx, and the Greek war cry. For the context of the battle of Cunaxa, see p. 4.


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111 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding the rearguard)

Hearing this Xenophon said that they were right to blame him andthat what had happened supported their view. ‘But’, he said, ‘I had topursue them since I saw that by staying put we were suffering badlyand unable to retaliate. When we started the pursuit your commentsare true. For we were no more effective in inflicting any harm on theenemy and our own withdrawal was very difficult. We should thereforebe grateful to the gods that they attacked not with a large force but insmall numbers, so that without inflicting great harm they have madeclear what we need. For at the moment the enemy archers can shootfurther than the Cretans in our army can shoot in reply, and the slingershave a better range than our javelin-throwers. Whenever we begin a pursuit we cannot pursue them far from the main army, and over ashort distance an infantryman, however fast he is, cannot catch anotherinfantryman who has had a bow-shot’s start. Therefore if we are to stopthem from harming us on the march we must get slingers and cavalryas quickly as possible.’

The context here is that Xenophon in command of the rearguard had led a counterattack, in which he had been unable to catch a single enemy soldier because the Greekshad no cavalry.

112 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite marching formation)

On this occasion the Greeks realized that the square was an unsuitableformation when the enemy was in pursuit. When the two flanks of thesquare were pushed together because the road became narrower, orbecause of a mountain pass or a bridge, the hoplites inevitably werepushed out of position and found it difficult to march since they wereshoved about and disrupted; consequently in this state of disorder theycould not be used. Then, when the flanks separate again the soldierswho were pushed out of position are scattered and the space betweenthe wings is left empty, and the soldiers experiencing this becomedispirited as the enemy press on from the rear.

In response to these problems the Greek generals formed six companies with onehundred men in each; when the flanks were compressed these companies droppedbehind and when they diverged again the companies came up to offer protection andfilled up any gaps between the flanks; they were always ready for immediate action.See also no. 113.


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113 Xenophon, Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional formation)

Then Xenophon voiced his opinion that they should break up thephalanx formation and advance with the companies in columns. ‘Thephalanx’, he said, ‘will immediately lose its cohesion. For we will findthat parts of the mountain are easy going while other parts are verydifficult. This will at once make the men dispirited when having beendrawn up in a phalanx they see the formation being broken up. But if we advance in a formation many ranks deep the enemy will outflankus and will use their superior numbers in whatever way they wish. But, if we advance in a formation only a few ranks deep, it would notbe surprising if our line was cut by a huge number of missiles and menfalling on us together. And if this occurs at a single spot, things willgo badly with the entire formation. Therefore I suggest that we shouldform up the companies in columns leaving enough space between themso that the furthest companies extend beyond the two wings of theenemy.’

This shows how traditional formations were adapted in the light of experience byXenophon and the other generals. The plan was to outflank the enemy, to have thebravest soldiers at the head of the columns, with each column providing support forits neighbours and preventing infiltration between them.

114 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night marches)

Xenophon said, ‘If we are going to march during the night I thinkthat you should consider if the Greek practice is not better. For duringdaylight marches the part of the army that is best suited to the terraintakes the lead, either the infantry or the light-armed troops or thecavalry. But during the night the Greek practice is for the slowest partof the army to take the lead, since in this way there is least chance thatthe army will be scattered and that they will lose contact as they strayoff from one another. When an army loses cohesion parts of it oftenencounter one another and, not recognizing their comrades, inflict andsuffer damage.’

115 Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites)

Then the Bithynians retreated wherever the Greeks charged forwardand, being peltasts against hoplites, easily got away from them; they


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also threw spears at them from one side and the other and killed manyof them at each attack. In the end the Greeks were shot down like cattleclosed up in a pen.

In this incident about 200 Greek hoplites were guarding the camp of some Odrysianallies of the Spartan commander Dercylidas (operating against the Persians in 399BC), when they were attacked by local Bithynian peltasts. Again we see how peltastsexploited the hoplites’ lack of manoeuvrability; see also nos 102, 103, 116.

116 Xenophon, Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan hoplites)

The garrison commander there (Lechaeum) ordered the garrison troopsof the allies to guard the wall while he with a regiment of hoplites and a regiment of cavalry conducted the Amyclaeans past the city ofCorinth. When they were about three or four miles away from Sicyonthe commander began to return to Lechaeum with the hoplites, whonumbered about six hundred, and ordered the cavalry commander withthe regiment of horse to follow him after escorting the Amyclaeans asfar as they required him to go. Now, they were well aware that therewere many peltasts and hoplites in Corinth, but because of theirprevious success they despised them and thought that no one wouldattack them. But those in Corinth, both Callias, son of Hipponicus,commander of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, commander of thepeltasts, seeing that the Spartans were not numerous and unaccom-panied by peltasts and cavalry, thought that it was safe to attack themwith their peltasts. For if they marched on along the road they couldbe attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and killed. But ifthe Spartans tried to pursue they could easily escape the hoplites withtheir peltasts, the most agile of all troops. When they had worked thisout the commanders led out their troops. Callias drew up his hoplitesnot far from the city while Iphicrates with the peltasts attacked theSpartan regiment. Now, when the Spartans came under attack withjavelins and several had been wounded and several killed, they orderedthe shield-carriers to lift the wounded and bring them back toLechaeum. And these were the only men of the regiment who weretruly saved. The commander ordered the men between the age oftwenty and thirty to drive off the attackers. But when they launcheda pursuit they caught no one since they were hoplites against peltastsat the distance of a javelin-throw. For Iphicrates had ordered his mento withdraw before the hoplites got close to them. Furthermore, whenthe Spartans withdrew they were scattered since each one had pursuedas quickly as possible, and Iphicrates’ troops turned round and while


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some attacked head on with their javelins others ran along the flank toattack their unprotected sides. Indeed in the very first pursuit thepeltasts shot down nine or ten of them with their javelins. Immediatelythis happened they pressed their attacks much more confidently. Whenthe Spartans continued to suffer losses the commander again ordereda pursuit, this time by men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. But when they were withdrawing even more were killed than the first time. After their best men had already been killed the cavalryjoined them and with their help they again launched a pursuit.However, when the peltasts gave way the cavalry did not press hometheir attack effectively. For they did not pursue the enemy until theyhad killed some of them, but kept in line with the hoplites, both whenthey advanced and when they withdrew. Since they were fighting andenduring the same process over and over again they became fewer and feebler while the enemy became bolder and those joining in theattack were more numerous. In desperation they finally rallied togetheron a small hill about a third of a mile from the sea and three miles fromLechaeum. When the men in Lechaeum saw them they embarked insmall boasts and sailed along until they were opposite the hill. Nowthe soldiers on the hill were at a complete loss since they were sufferingbadly and dying but could do nothing in retaliation. On top of all thiswhen they saw the (Athenian) hoplites coming they took to their heels.Indeed some of them charged into the sea while a few got away safelyto Lechaeum with the cavalry. But in all the battles and the flight abouttwo hundred and fifty perished.

Sparta’s war against Corinth and her allies had led to the capture in 391 BC of Corinth’sport of Lechaeum on the Corinthain Gulf. The Amyclaeans were Spartan allies whowere returning to take part in a religious festival. The Spartan commander’s plan wasto use younger hoplites first to try to catch the peltasts. However, this engagementconfirmed the growing belief that a well-led force of peltasts in the right conditionscould resist and wear down hoplites, and did much to enhance the reputation ofpeltasts. For Iphicrates, see p. 5; no. 92.

117 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine)

But, in a fury when he saw what was happening Teleutias seized hisweapons and led the hoplites quickly forwards, ordering the peltastsand the cavalry to pursue and not to stop the pursuit. Of course onmany other occasions those who have carried on a pursuit too close tothe city walls have suffered badly in withdrawing, and on this occasiontoo, when they were bombarded with missiles from the towers they


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were forced to retreat in confusion and protect themselves against themissiles. At this moment the Olynthians sent the cavalry to attackwith peltasts in support. Finally the hoplites charged out and fell onthe Spartan phalanx, which was already in confusion. Here Teleutiasfell fighting, and when this happened the soldiers with him turnedtail, no one stood his ground, but they all fled. . . . As a result ofdisasters like this I believe that men are taught a lesson, especially that. . . in fighting your enemies it is a complete mistake to attack in arage and not through sound judgement. For anger takes no thoughtbeforehand while judgement is just as much concerned with escapingharm as with inflicting damage on the enemy.

The context here is an attack on Olynthus by the Spartan commander Teleutias in 381BC. The leader of the peltasts with the Spartans had been killed in an injudiciouspursuit of the Olynthian cavalry.

118 Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra)

In the battle everything went against the Spartans while for theBoeotians everything went well, including even good luck. Afterbreakfast Cleombrotus held his last council about the battle, and atmidday the Spartans drank a little saying that wine acted as a stimulantto them. When both sides were arming themselves and it was clear thatthere was going to be a battle, those who had provided the market,some baggage-carriers, and those who did not wish to fight set out toleave the Boeotian camp. The (Spartan) mercenaries under Hieron, thePhocian peltasts, and the Heracleots and Phliasians from the cavalry,circled round and attacked them as they were leaving, turned themround and pursued them back to the Boeotian camp. Because of thisthey made the Boeotian army much bigger and more densely packedthan before. Furthermore, since there was a plain between the armiesthe Spartans drew up their cavalry in front of their phalanx and theThebans drew theirs up opposite them. Now, the Theban cavalry was well trained because of the wars against the Orchomenians andthe Thespians, while the Spartan cavalry at that time was very poor. Forthe richest men kept the horses, but it was only when call-up tookplace that the appointed cavalryman appeared. Then, getting his horseand whatever weapons were given to him, he would take the fieldimmediately. Among the soldiers, men who were least physically fitand least ambitious served in the cavalry. This was the condition of thecavalry on either side. In respect of the infantry, the Spartans, so it wassaid, drew up their companies three abreast so that they were no more


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than twelve ranks deep. But the Thebans were drawn up not less thanfifty shields deep, since they reckoned that if they defeated the troopsround the king all the rest would be easy.

When Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, at firsteven before his own soldiers realized that he was on the move, thecavalry had indeed already joined battle and the Spartans had beenspeedily defeated. In their flight they became mixed up with their own infantry and then the Theban companies attacked. Nevertheless,Cleombrotus and the soldiers around him were at first victorious, as canbe seen from one unambiguous piece of evidence. They would not havebeen able to pick him up and carry him back still alive if those fightingin front of him had not been victorious at that time. But then Deinonthe polemarch, and Sphodrias, one of those who attended on the king’stent, and his son Cleonymus were killed, while the knights, the so-called companions of the polemarch, and the others were forced tofall back under the pressure of numbers. When those on the Spartanleft wing saw that the right wing was being pushed back, they gaveway. However, although they had been defeated with the loss of manymen, when they crossed the ditch that happened to be round theircamp, they grounded their arms at the place from which they had set out. Now, the camp was not on a level surface but on a slight slope.Some of the Spartans, thinking that the defeat was unendurable, saidthat they must prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy and that theyshould take up the bodies, not under truce, but by fighting. But whenthe polemarchs saw that of the whole Lacedaemonian force nearly onethousand men had been killed, and of the seven hundred Spartanspresent nearly four hundred had been killed, and perceived that all the allies had no spirit for fighting and that indeed some were notdispleased by what had happened, they collected together the mostimportant people to discuss what they should do. Since they allthought it best to recover the bodies under truce they sent a herald toarrange a truce. After this the Thebans set up a trophy and returnedthe bodies under truce.

In 371 BC the Spartans and their allies invaded Boeotia to force Epaminondas and theThebans to accept the terms of the peace treaty agreed with the other Greek states (seeSage (1996), 137–9). Xenophon’s account of the battle is the only contemporary one,but although he mentions the unusual depth of the Theban line he does not mentionEpaminondas or his tactics. In fact Epaminondas developed the Theban practice ofusing a deep phalanx formation and aimed his attack at a particular point of the Spartanline (see above, p. 4). Again we see the importance of recovering the bodies and settingup a trophy in the symbolism of victory. See Pritchett, GSW II (1974), 246–75; III(1979), 240–76; also Jackson, in Hanson (1991).


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119 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation)

It is necessary first to all to split the phalanx, that is, divide it intofiles. A file is a number of men dividing the phalanx into symmetricalunits. ‘Symmetrical’ means that these units do not impede the pha-lanx’s readiness for battle. Therefore some have made the file numbereight men, some ten, and some twelve and other sixteen. This is toallow the phalanx to be symmetrical both for doubling its numbers to thirty-two men to meet requirements that I shall describe later, andalso for reducing it by one-half to eight men. Therefore it will not getin the way of the light-armed troops fighting in the rear with javelins,slings, or bows. For they will be able to fire their missiles over a phalanxof this depth.

The file was the smallest unit of the phalanx and dictated its depth (Asclepiodotusbelieved that sixteen was the ideal depth for the phalanx). There was a file-leader(lochagos) and a file-closer (ouragos); for the discipline exercised by these soldiers inmaintaining the formation, see above, no. 14.

120 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops)

The light infantry and the peltasts will be positioned by the generalas the circumstances demand, sometimes in front of the phalanx,sometimes behind it, and sometimes on the right or left flank. Thefirst is called front-station (protaxis), the second rear-station (hypotaxis),and the third flank-station (prosentaxis). On occasion they are entwinedwith the phalanx and positioned one beside each man. This is calledinsert-station (parentaxis) because there is an insertion of different typesof soldier, light-armed and hoplites.

This passage shows the increasing importance of light-armed soldiers; no longer mereskirmishers, they could become part of an integrated battle plan.

121 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations)

The cavalry, just like the light infantry, take up their position accordingto the circumstances of the battle, especially the cavalry skirmishers.For these are the most useful at inflicting the first wounds, provokingbattle, breaking up their ranks, driving away the cavalry, being first toseize good positions or capturing positions already occupied by theenemy, scouting suspicious areas, preparing ambushes, and in general


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opening and sustaining the battle. For because of their speed they canachieve great things in battle.

Some draw up the ranks of the cavalry in a square, other in arectangle, others in a rhomboid, and still others in a wedge or pointedformation. Nevertheless, everyone agrees in describing the entireformation as a squadron. Apparently the Thessalians, who were verystrong in cavalry, were the first to use the rhomboid formation in theirsquadrons both for retreating and attacking, ensuring, through theirability to wheel in every direction, that they were not thrown intodisorder. For they placed the best cavalrymen on the flanks and themost outstanding of these at the angles.

122 Asclepiodotus, Tactics 10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres)

It is a quarter-turn when we close up the entire unit by file and rankin a tight formation and move it like the body of a single man so thatthe entire force turns on the first file-leader like a pivot, if to the righton the right file-leader and if to the left on the left file-leader. At thesame time it takes a position in front and faces ‘by spear’ if moving rightand ‘by shield’ if moving left.

This is an extract from the complicated rules for manoeuvring the phalanx; see Oldfather (Loeb, 1928), 300–1. For the commands used by the officers, see above,no. 17.

123 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6(defending against elephant attack)

On the next day Polyperchon cleared the breach and made it passablefor the elephants with the intention of using their strength to capturethe city. The people of Megalopolis were under the command of Damis,who had been in Asia with Alexander and knew all about the characterand military value of elephants, and they were outstandingly success-ful. For Damis pitted his natural intelligence against the power of the beasts and made the strength of their bodies useless. He first hada large number of huge doors studded with sharp nails and then laidthem in shallow trenches with the sharp points covered over. He leftclear a passage through these to the city and placed no soldiers in frontof them, but on the flanks positioned a force of javelin-men, archers,and catapults.

When Polyperchon had entirely cleared the area of the breach theelephants made an attack in force by this route. But something strange


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happened to the elephants. Since there was no opposition in front ofthem the Indian mahouts forced the elephants to attack the citydirectly and, charging on with their usual vigour, they fell onto thenail-studded doors. Their feet were wounded by the nails on whichthey were impaled by their own weight and they could not movefurther forwards or turn round because of the pain whenever theymoved. Simultaneously they were pelted from the flanks with all kindsof missiles and some of the mahouts were killed and others werewounded and lost any control they had. Because of the showers ofmissiles and the peculiar nature of the pain inflicted by the nails, theelephants turned round through their own troops and trampled manyof them. At last the bravest of the elephants, which inspired thegreatest terror, collapsed. Of the remainder most were made entirelyuseless while many brought death to their own side.

Diodorus Siculus from Agyrium in Sicily probably settled in Rome around 56 BC

and completed there his universal history dating from earliest times down to 60 BC.Diodorus devoted much attention to Greek history and particularly that of Sicily, and is particularly important for the reign of Philip II, Alexander, and the wars of the Successors down to 306. He had no military experience but his description of thebattle of Paraetacene in 317 is justly celebrated for its vigour and accuracy (no. 124).Text and translation in C.H. Oldfather (1933–67).

Polyperchon was one of Alexander’s commanders and after the king’s death wasinvolved in a war against Cassander, his rival for power in Greece. In 317 BC he triedto capture Megalopolis, which had declared for Cassander. Although elephants areused here to attack a city, the ploy to defeat them takes place in open ground.

124 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31(battle of Paraetacene)

Antigonus had more than 28,000 infantry including the reinforce-ments brought by Pithon and Seleucus, 8,500 cavalry, and 65elephants. The generals on either side employed different troop forma-tions and also vied with each other in their tactical skill in using these.On the left wing Eumenes stationed Eudaemon, who had brought theelephants back from India and commanded a squadron of 150 cavalry,and an advance guard of two ilae of picked lancers, numbering fiftymen. He placed them next to the high ground and next to them thegeneral Stasander with his personal cavalry force of 950 men. Next hestationed Amphimachus the satrap of Mesopotamia with 600 cavalry,and then 600 men from Arachosia who had previously been under thecommand of Sibyrtius, but who after his flight were commanded byCephalon. Immediately after them were 500 men from Paropanisadaeand the same number of Thracians from colonies in the upper satrapies.


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In front of all these he drew up forty-five elephants at an angle, andfilled up the spaces between them with a sufficient number of archersand slingers. When he had strengthened the left wing in this way hestationed the phalanx next to it. The mercenaries, more than 6,000 intotal, occupied the extreme left of the phalanx, and next to them 5,000men from all ethnic groups, armed in the Macedonian way. (28) Nextto these he placed the Macedonian Silver Shields, numbering morethan 3,000, who were undefeated and inspired great fear among theenemy because of their courage. Finally he drew up his hypaspists whonumbered more than 3,000. Antigenes and Teutamus commandedboth these units. He stationed forty elephants in front of the entirephalanx and filled up the spaces between them with light-armedsoldiers. On the right wing he drew up the cavalry. Next to the phalanxwere 800 Carmenians under the command of their satrap Tlepolemus,the 900 so-called companions and the squadron (agema) of Peucestesand Antigenes, comprising 300 cavalry in one ila. On the far rightcame the squadron of Eumenes’ own guards, also with 300 cavalry, andtheir advance guard of two ilae of Eumenes’ own slaves, each unithaving fifty cavalry, and a flank guard of four ilae with 200 pickedcavalry. In a separate formation he stationed behind his guards 300cavalry chosen from all the units for their speed and strength. In frontof the entire right wing he stationed forty elephants. His entire armyamounted to 35,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 114 elephants.

(29) After Antigonus had looked down from a vantage point on theenemy formation, he drew up his own army in a way that matchedtheirs. Since he noticed that the enemy right wing had been strength-ened by elephants and the strongest cavalry, he therefore positionedopposite them his light cavalry, which was drawn up in open order,with orders to avoid close combat. Instead, they were to fight bywheeling and in this way to disrupt that part of the enemy force inwhich they placed greatest trust. Antigonus also stationed on this winghorse-archers and lancers from Media and Parthia, numbering 1,000and well suited to combat involving manoeuvring. Next to them hestationed 2,200 Tarentines, who had come up by sea to assist and werespecially picked for their skill in ambush and loyalty to him, and then1,000 cavalry from Phrygia and Lydia, 1,500 under the command of Pithon and 400 lancers with Lysander. On the far left he drew upthe so-called two-horse men and 800 cavalry from the upper (Thracian)colonies. This made up the complement of cavalry on the left wing, andthe whole group was under the command of Pithon.

The first of the infantry formation were the mercenaries, numberingmore than 6,000, then 3,000 Lycians and Pamphylians. After these


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came more than 8,000 soldiers of differing ethnic origins armed in theMacedonian style, and on the far right of the phalanx he stationedalmost 8,000 Macedonians whom Antipater had given to him whenhe became regent of the kingdom. On the right wing the first of the cavalry consisted of a mixed group of 500 mercenaries next to thephalanx, and then 1,000 Thracians, and next 500 allies, then the so-called Companions, numbering about 1,000, under the command of his son Demetrius, who was then for the first time to go into battlealongside his father. On the far right of the wing was the Royalsquadron (agema), numbering 300 cavalry with whom he himselfwould share the danger. As an advance guard for these forces hestationed three ilae of his own slaves and parallel to them an equalnumber of units supported by 100 Tarentines. In front of the entirebattle line he placed the thirty strongest elephants at an angle andfilled up the gaps between them with picked light-armed men. Of theremaining elephants most were stationed in front of the phalanx anda few with the cavalry on the left. With his army drawn up in this way Antigonus descended to meet the enemy, advancing in obliqueformation with his right wing, in which he placed the greatest trust,pushed forward. He held back the left wing since he had resolved toavoid battle with one wing while fighting with the other.

(30) When the armies were close to one another and the signals forbattle had been given, each army uttered its war cry alternately withthe other many times, and the trumpeters blew the signal for battle.The cavalry of Pithon advanced first, and although it was not in firmorder and lacked an advance guard worthy of the name, it was superiorto the force opposing them in numbers and speed, and they tried toexploit their advantages. They did not think that it would be safe toattack the elephants directly, but rode round their flanks, pelted theirsides with showers of missiles, and so began to inflict wounds on them.They suffered no harm because they were fast, but severely damagedthe elephants, which because of their weight could neither pursue norretreat whenever an opportunity offered. When Eumenes saw that thewing was suffering from the mass of horse-archers, he sent for Eudamuswho was in command of the lightest of the cavalry on the left wing.He led out his entire force on this wing and attacked the enemy withhis light-armed men and the light cavalry. The elephants followed onbehind him and he easily routed the force under Pithon and pursuedthem to the high ground. While this was going on the infantry onboth sides had been engaged in battle and finally after many had fallenon both sides Eumenes’ troops were victorious because of the courageof the Macedonian Silver Shields. For although these men were fairly


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old, because of their experience of battle they excelled in daring andskill so that no one could stand up to them face to face. Therefore,although they numbered only three thousand they were the sharp edgeof the entire army.

Although Antigonus saw that his left wing was in flight and theentire phalanx had been thrown into disarray, he paid no attention tothose advising him to retreat towards the high ground, round up thosewho had escaped the rout, and keep intact the section of the armystationed round him. Instead he cleverly seized an opportunity for-tuitously given to him, rescued his own men who had fled and grabbedthe victory. For as soon as the Silver Shields of Eumenes and the rest of the infantry had routed their opponents, they pursued them up tothe high ground close by. But a gap opened up in their ranks andAntigonus, riding through it with part of his cavalry, attacked in theflank the troops drawn up with Eudamus on the left wing. Taking the enemy by surprise he routed them and killed many. He then sentforward the lightest cavalry to round up his own routed forces andformed them up again in ranks on the high ground. His reasoning wasthat Eumenes and his commanders, when they realized that their ownforces had been routed, summoned the pursuing troops back withtrumpet calls in their eagerness to help those with Eudamus.

(31) Although it was already growing dark, both sides rallied theirfleeing soldiers and once again drew up their full armies, such was thedesire for victory that filled not only the commanders but also the rankand file soldiers. Since the night was clear with a full moon, and thearmies were marching parallel with one another about a quarter of a mile apart, the noise of the weapons and the snorting of the horsesseemed very close to the opposing soldiers. When they were deployingfrom column into line about three and a half a miles’ march from thefallen, the midnight hour came on them. Since both sides were in badway because of the difficulties of the march and the damage they hadsuffered in battle and lack of food, they were forced to break off thebattle and encamp. Eumenes wanted to march back to the dead, beingeager to get control of the recovery of these and thus claim an un-disputed victory. But his soldiers did not agree and shouted out thatthey wanted to march to their baggage, which was a long distanceaway. He was forced to give way to them because he was unable to treathis soldiers harshly, since there were many contenders for the leadershipand he did not think that it was a suitable moment to punish them fordisobedience. Antigonus was in the opposite position, in that he hadfirm control without the need to court popular support, and made hissoldiers encamp beside the bodies. Being in control of the burial of the


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bodies he claimed the victory, making it clear that the person who hadcontrol of the disposal of the fallen was victor. In the battle Antigonussuffered the following casualties: 3,700 infantry and 54 cavalry killed,with more than 4,000 wounded. Eumenes suffered 5,400 infantrykilled and a small number of cavalry, with more than 900 wounded.

This battle between two of Alexander’s successors and most competent generals tookplace in 317 at Paraetacene in Susiana in southwest Iran. The account in Diodorus is thought to be based on a good contemporary source that accurately described the dispositions and manoeuvres. The large forces involved contained a tacticalcombination of all the elements of Hellenistic armies – heavy infantry, light troops,archers, cavalry, and elephants; see Devine (1985).

125 Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae)

When the battle cry was raised the auxiliaries charged and the light-armed troops began the battle. Then the Gallic and Spanish cavalry on the left wing closed with the Roman right wing. This did not at allresemble a cavalry battle. They had to meet directly head on becausethere was no room to make an outflanking manoeuvre, since the riveron one side and the lines of infantry on the other hemmed them in.Therefore both sides went straight ahead but the horses were finallyforced to stop, being pressed together in a crowd, and the cavalrymentried to wrestle the enemy out of the saddle. To a large extent it turnedinto an infantry battle, which was fiercer than long lasting, and theRomans were defeated and fled. Towards the end of the cavalry engage-ment the infantry battle began. At first both sides in this struggle were well matched in strength and spirit, as long as the Gauls and theSpanish maintained good order. In the end the Romans perseveredwith their forward thrusts in close formation across a broad front andbroke through the enemy, who were in wedge formation projectingfrom the rest of the battle line, and too thin and weak to resist thecharge. They were defeated and hastily withdrew. The Romans chargedstraight through the line of soldiers who were in panic-stricken retreatuntil they came to the Carthaginian centre, and finally with littleresistance they reached the position of the African auxiliaries, who heldboth wings, which had been drawn back a little. When the projectingwedge (of Gallic and Spanish troops) was forced back it first levelledthe Carthaginian front and then as the troops were forced to retreat stillfurther, the centre assumed a concave shape and the Africans formedtwo outer wings (in a crescent shape). As the Romans charged rashlyinto the middle of this the Africans closed in around them; then by


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extending the wings they closed the trap behind the Romans. At thispoint the Romans having completed one battle fruitlessly left theGauls and Spanish whom they had cut down as they fled and began afresh struggle against the Africans. This was an unequal fight not onlybecause they were completely surrounded but also because they weretired men fighting a fresh and energetic enemy.

(48) Meanwhile on the Roman left wing where the allied cavalryfaced the Numidians battle had been joined. This went slowly at firstand began with some Punic trickery. Nearly five hundred Numidians,who besides their regular weapons had swords concealed under theirtunics, pretended to desert by riding away from their own side withtheir shields behind their backs. Suddenly dismounting, they threwdown their shields and spears at the feet of the Romans, were broughtinto the line and then taken to the rear where they were instructed toremain. When the general engagement began they remained quiet,but when the struggle occupied everyone’s attention, snatching upshields that lay everywhere among the heaps of bodies, they attackedthe Roman line; by striking the soldiers in the back and hamstringingthem, they caused havoc and created an enormous panic and uproar.At this moment when in one part of the battlefield the Romans werein panic-stricken flight while in another they fought tenaciouslyalthough hope was almost gone, Hasdrubal, who was in command inthat part of the line, withdrew the Numidians from the centre. Theywere not actively involved in the battle and he sent them to pursue thescattered fugitives, while also bringing up the Spanish and Gallicinfantry to support the Africans, who were exhausted by what was aslaughter rather than a battle.

Livy (probably 59 BC–AD 17) came from Patavium in northern Italy and wrote ahistory of Rome from the foundation to 9 BC in 142 books. He set out to describe howRome from small beginnings conquered Italy and then the entire Mediterranean world.The virtues of the early Romans could serve as a model for the present. Naturally hishistory has a strong military theme. But Livy had to rely on earlier written accounts,and his ignorance of military practice means that his battle descriptions can be ratherstereotyped, with no clear picture of topography or the direction of the battle. He did,however, aim for clarity and often a dramatic recreation of the psychology of thoseinvolved. He offers a good view of what a non-specialist audience thought of battles.For Livy’s historical methods, see Walsh (1961).

Livy’s description of the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BC

does seem to give a clear picture of his tactics; see Keppie (1984), 26–8; see also Figure3.1. It is important to understand why the Romans thought that this defeat cameabout; it was not just Hannibal’s clever tactics, and the superiority of his cavalry, butthe careless and uncontrolled pursuit of a retreating enemy by the Romans, and ofcourse Punic treachery.


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109

Cavalry Cavalry

CelticCavalry

NumidianCavalry

Africans Africans

Celts

Legions

Africans

Celts

Africans

Cavalry

Cavalry

Cavalry

Cavalry

Legions

LegionsAfricans

Africans

Cavalry

Cavalry

Celts

Figure 3.1 The three phases of the battle of Cannae

1

2

3

126 Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites)

At last they found a way to make up in guile for what they lacked instrength. From the entire legionary force they chose young men whowere outstandingly vigorous, lightly built, and nimble-footed. Theyequipped them with smaller shields than the cavalrymen and sevenjavelins for each man, four feet long with iron tips like the spears ofthe light infantry. Every cavalryman took one of them on his horse andtrained them to ride behind him and leap down rapidly when the signalwas given. After daily practice demonstrated that this could be donepromptly, the Romans advanced into the plain that lay between thecamp and the city wall against the Campanian cavalry drawn up there. When they were within javelin range the velites jumped downat a signal. Then the cavalry suddenly became an infantry battle lineand it advanced against the enemy cavalry, throwing volley after volleyof javelins with great force. By throwing such large numbers of theseat both horses and men all along the line they wounded many of them.But they spread greater panic by the unusual and unexpected meansof attack, and when the enemy was in disarray the cavalry attacked androuted them, driving them to the city gates with enormous slaughter.From that point the Romans were superior in cavalry as well, and thepractice began of including light-armed soldiers with the legions. The story is that the centurion Quintus Navius suggested includinginfantry with the cavalry and was honoured for that reason by thecommander-in-chief.

The context is the Roman siege of Capua in 211 BC during the war with Hannibal.The local Campanian forces had proved superior to the Romans in cavalryengagements. Velites had no defensive armour. Subsequently there were 1,200 veliteswith each legion, and they remained until the changes introduced by Marius.

127 Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed troops)

The general should position his light-armed troops, javelin-throwers,archers, and slingers, in front of the phalanx. For if they are positionedin the rear they will do more harm to their own side than to the enemy,and if in the middle of the phalanx they will find it impossible to display their particular expertise, since they will be unable to takea step backwards to throw their spears or to throw them at the run,since other soldiers are in front of and behind them. Similarly theslingers cannot whirl their slings in a circle when their fellow soldiers


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are standing beside them, and they also stumble as they try to avoidthe whirling motion. If the archers are positioned in front of the armythey shoot their arrows straight at the bodies of the enemy just like ata target. But if they are positioned behind the other ranks or in themiddle, they will shoot upwards, so that the arrows have impetus onlyfor their flight upwards, and afterwards have spent their force so thateven if they fall directly in the heads of the enemy they cause littledamage.

For slingers in Greek warfare see Pritchett, GSW V (1991), 1–67.

128 Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations)

The general who wishes to guard against an encircling manoeuvreshould not extend his line lengthways so as to make his entire phalanxweak and lacking in depth. For it could happen that the enemy quicklyforces a way through, and no longer trying an encircling manoeuvreon the flanks, breaks through the centre and attacks in their opponents’rear. Indeed the general should not only take precautions to avoid thismanoeuvre but also try to execute it, if he sees that the enemy phalanxis feeble and thin. Furthermore, he should not contract his phalanx toomuch by extending it to the rear in order to produce great depth, withthe result that the enemy could easily outflank and surround it.

129 Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation; counter-attacks)

Generals in command of a powerful and numerous force are often inthe habit of advancing to battle in a crescent formation, thinking thatthe enemy also wish to engage at close quarters and that they willprovoke them to battle. Then at the edges of the semicircle the enemywill be forced back into the road and cut off by the enveloping folds as he joins together his two wings to make a complete circle. Againsttroops in a crescent formation a general should not adopt a similarformation. Instead, he should divide his army into three parts, andsend two of them against the enemy, one against each of the wings,while the third, drawn up opposite the hollow in the centre of thecrescent formation, should stand still and not engage. For while theenemy remains in a crescent formation the troops drawn up in thecentre will stand with nothing to do and will be useless. But if theywish to advance in a group and move forwards, as they change from a


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crescent shape to a straight line, they will be crushed together and lose their formation. For while the wings remain in the same positionand carry on fighting, it is impossible for a crescent formation to moveto a straight line. Then, when they are in confusion and have brokenranks, the general should send the third part of his army posted insupport against the troops who are advancing in disorder from thecentre of the curve. But if the enemy maintain their crescent formation,the general should draw up his light-armed troops and archers oppositethem, since by shooting at them they will cause a lot of harm. However,if the general attacks obliquely with his entire force against one wingof the enemy, he will be right in using this offensive manoeuvre againstthe encircling movement of the crescent formation. For he will for along time prevent the enemy from coming to close quarters with hisentire force, and little by little will throw him into turmoil since onlythe troops on one wing will be in action, namely the first ones forcedto join battle by the oblique attack.

From time to time it is a valuable stratagem for an army facing theenemy to retreat gradually, as if in terror, or to turn in its tracks andretreat as if in flight, but in good order, and then to turn suddenly and attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delightedly think-ing that their opponents are in retreat, break ranks and charge forward,rushing ahead of one another. It is safe to turn and attack these men,for those who have been pursuing for some time are terrified by theunexpectedly bold stand and run away in turn.

For the crescent battle formation in action at Cannae, see above, no. 125.

130 Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves)

Somewhere the general should have picked soldiers positionedseparately from the phalanx as a military reserve, so that he can keepthem ready to assist parts of the army that are weary. Indeed freshtroops are a great advantage in attacking tired men. For first they bringrelief to their exhausted comrades, but also being full of energy theyattack a now weary enemy.

131 Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear)

The sudden attack against the rear of the enemy is the most terrifyingand indeed effective of all manoeuvres. If it is at all possible the general


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should send a detachment of soldiers ahead by night with orders tomarch round the enemy and approach their rear. Next morning, there-fore, they can move out from their ambush after the battle has begun,and appear suddenly in the enemy’s rear. For the enemy would have no hope of escaping by running away, and would be unable to turnback because of the force ranged against him, or to advance because ofthose attacking his rear.

132 Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy)

The general should lead his troops into battle with war cries, andsometimes at the run, because their appearance, and yelling and clangof arms, can destroy the spirit of the enemy. Closely packed groups of soldiers should spread out in the attack before they engage at closequarters, holding their swords aloft above their heads inclined towardsthe sun. For the polished spear points and flashing swords, glitteringin close formation and reflecting the light of the sun, send out anawesome lightning bolt of war.

133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations in war)

In battle the Romans do not act without thinking and leave nothingto chance. On the contrary, deliberation precedes every action andaction follows the decision reached. (99) Therefore they rarely makemistakes, and if they do they can easily correct what has gone wrong.(100) They think that a well-discussed plan, even if it ends in failure,is better than a fortuitous success, because accidental success enticesmen into acting without proper consideration, whereas forethought,though sometimes followed by misfortune, is a good instructor of how to avoid the same mistake. (101) They also believe that the manwho profits by accidental good fortune cannot take the credit for it,while setbacks that occur contrary to all deliberation at least bring theconsolation that proper procedures were followed.

134 Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order)

But eager to invade the Galilee himself, Vespasian marched out fromPtolemais after drawing up his army in the usual Roman marchingorder. (116) He ordered the auxiliary light-armed troops and the


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archers to go on ahead to cut off any sudden attacks by the enemy andto investigate woodland which was suspicious because of its suitabilityfor ambushes. Next followed a detachment of heavily armed Romansoldiers, both infantry and cavalry. (117) After them marched ten menfrom each century carrying their own equipment and implements formeasuring out the camp. (118) Next came the engineers, whose taskwas to straighten bends in the road, level rough areas, and cut downwoodland that was blocking the way, so that the army should not beexhausted by a difficult march. (119) Behind these men Vespasianplaced his personal equipment and that belonging to his subordinatecommanders with a strong cavalry guard to protect it. (120) He himselfrode behind these with picked infantry and cavalry and his personalbodyguards. Next followed the legionary cavalry, for one hundred andtwenty cavalry are attached to each legion. (121) After these came themules carrying the siege towers and the remaining siege engines. (122)After them came the legionary commanders, the commanders of thecohorts, and the military tribunes, surrounded by picked soldiers. (123)Next came the standards surrounding the eagle, which goes at the headof every Roman legion, since it is the king and the most courageous ofall birds. The Romans think of it as the symbol of empire and a portentof victory no matter who their opponents may be. (124) The trumpetersfollowed these holy objects, and behind them the packed marchingcolumn, six abreast. According to the usual procedure a centurionaccompanied them to supervise the marching ranks. (125) Behind theinfantry the servants attached to each legion followed in a group,bringing the soldiers’ equipment on mules and other beasts. (126)Behind all the legionaries came a mixed group of auxiliaries, and finallyfor security a rearguard consisting of light and heavy infantry and alarge force of cavalry.

For the Roman marching order see also below, no. 164.

135 Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages)

The bark of the beech, lime, fir, and spruce is of great use in thecountryside. . . . Military scouts write to their commander by cuttingthe letters on a piece of fresh bark still full of sap.

Pliny the Elder (AD 23/4–79) had a distinguished equestrian career including acavalry command in Germany with the future emperor Titus. After holding a numberof important procuratorships he became Prefect of the Fleet at Misenum, in commandof which he met his death while investigating the eruption of Vesuvius in 79. He


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wrote a treatise on the use of the throwing spear by cavalrymen and a history of thewars fought by Rome against the Germans, both of which have been lost. His mainwork is the Natural History, an encyclopaedia of contemporary information on thenatural world, which contains a vast assortment of material, animal, vegetable, andmineral, into which readers have dipped throughout the ages. For a survey of Pliny’swriting, see Beagon (1992).

Austin and Rankov (1995), 65, argue that as the bark dried out the incisions wouldhave opened up and perhaps darkened through oxidization and so become legible.

136 Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writing about tactics)

Emperor Caesar Trajan Augustus, son of a God, analysis of militarytactics among the Greeks dates from the time of Homer, but manyearlier writers on the topic did not have the skill that I believe I haveacquired in my studies. I persuaded myself that I wanted to prepare thisanalysis so that those who come after me may take note of my writingsrather than those of earlier authors. Since I am not acquainted with the strength and skill of the Romans in this area – I have to admit thetruth – I hesitated about writing and publishing this account, becauseit might be obscure and perhaps of no use in practical terms after youhad developed instruction in military training. But in the reign of yourdivine father, Nerva, I spent a few days at Formiae with Frontinus, thedistinguished consular, who has acquired a glorious reputation for skill in military matters. In meeting with him I found that he wasequally enthusiastic about Greek learning and speculation (on militaryscience). Therefore I set aside my doubts about writing on (Greek)military tactics, believing that Frontinus would not be enthusiastic ifhe thought that it had less to offer than Roman practice.

Aelian Tacticus in the preface of his Tactica addresses Trajan directly as someonewho has surpassed all previous commanders in military expertise, and pays homage tothe power and experience of the Romans in military affairs. His description of a visitto Frontinus at his villa at Formiae to discuss military science provides an interestingglimpse of social and intellectual life in Rome. Aelian was apparently encouraged topublish his work in which he explained the technicalities of the tactics of theHellenistic phalanx. He describes the different types and roles of soldiers, the valueand nature of organized formations and the technical terms relevant to them, cavalryformations, battlefield manoeuvres, the size of units, and the role of officers. It is ofcourse reasonable to hold that this kind of information had little relevance in thesecond century AD except as part of the history of warfare; see above, pp. 13–17. Textin Köchly and Rüstow (1853–5).


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137 Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius)

The battle began with an exchange of missiles, and the Britonsdisplayed both valour and skill in parrying our soldiers’ javelins withtheir enormous swords or deflecting them with their little shields,while they themselves poured volleys on us. Then Agricola orderedthe four cohorts of Batavians and the two of Tungrians to come to closequarters and fight it out at sword point. This was a well-practisedmanoeuvre for those veteran soldiers, but very difficult for the enemy,who were armed with their small shields and large swords. Britishswords lack a thrusting point, and are therefore unsuited to swordplayin fighting at close quarters. The Batavians began to rain blow afterblow, shove with the bosses of their shields, and stab at the faces of theirenemies. They annihilated the soldiers on the plain and began toadvance up the hill. This provoked the rest of our units to smash intotheir nearest opponents and massacre them. Many Britons were leftbehind half-dead or even unwounded, because of the speed of ourvictorious advance. Meanwhile our cavalry squadrons, after the rout ofthe war chariots, now plunged right into the infantry battle. By theirattack they brought new terror, but the closely packed enemy ranks andthe uneven ground soon brought them to a halt. The battle now lookedanything but a cavalry engagement, while our infantry struggling fora foothold on the slope was jostled by the flanks of the horses. Andstray chariots, with their horses panic-stricken without a driver, oftenwent plunging into the flanks or front.

(37) The Britons who had taken up position on the hilltops had sofar taken no part in the battle, and being unengaged, contemptuouslynoted the smallness of our numbers. They now began to descend slowlyand surround the rear of our victorious troops. But Agricola had been concerned about precisely this move, and placed in the path oftheir advance the four alae of cavalry, which he was keeping back foremergencies. He therefore crushed and scattered them in a rout assevere as their assault had been spirited. So, the tactics of the Britonswere turned against themselves. The Roman cavalry squadrons, on theorders of the general, rode round from the front of the battle and fellon the enemy in the rear. Then followed an awe-inspiring and terriblespectacle over the open country. Our troops pursued, took prisoners andthen killed them when more of the enemy appeared. Among the enemyeach man now followed his own inclination. Some groups, though fullyarmed, fled before smaller numbers, while some men, though unarmed,charged forward and met their deaths. Weapons, bodies, and severedlimbs were scattered everywhere and the earth was stained with blood.


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Cornelius Tacitus (born c. AD 56) was a Roman senator, becoming consul in 97 andgovernor of Asia in 112–13. He probably held a number of other government posts,though it is not clear if he exercised any military responsibilities. His major works werethe Histories, originally intended to cover the period AD 69–96, and the Annales,dealing with AD 14–68. Among his shorter works is the Agricola, a biography of hisfather-in-law, Julius Agricola, who as governor of Britain (77 or 78–84) led a seriesof campaigns in northern Scotland, winning the battle of Mons Graupius. Tacitus hasincurred criticism for his indifference to detailed analysis of the overall setting,direction, and logistics of battles. However, his skill is rather in depicting the rapidpassage of events, the reaction of important men to them, and the emotions andpsychology of military campaigns. In any case his description of the battle of MonsGraupius is not only exceptionally vivid but clearly explains Agricola’s tactics and thedisposition of his troops. For the career and writings of Tacitus, see Syme (1958);Mellor (1993).

The exact location in the Scottish Highlands of the battle of Mons Graupius cannotbe identified.

138 Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle)

Antonius strengthened the wavering battle line by bringing up thepraetorians, and when they entered the battle they drove back the enemy, only to be driven back themselves. This was because theVitellians had concentrated their artillery on the raised embankmentof the road so that they had an uninterrupted field of fire over the open ground. At first their fire had been sporadic and hit the vine poles without harming their opponents. The Fifteenth Legion had anexceptionally large catapult, which pounded the enemy line withenormous stones. It would have inflicted carnage far and wide if twosoldiers had not carried out an act of conspicuous heroism. They con-cealed their true identity by taking shields from fallen soldiers and cut the ropes and gear by which the catapult was operated. They wereimmediately killed and so their names have perished, but there is nodoubt about what they did.

This incident occurred in the second battle of Bedriacum in AD 69, as Antonius Primuscommanding the army of Vespasian attacked the forces of the emperor Vitellius. Forthe (rare) use of artillery in open battle, see Campbell (2002), 53–4.

139 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans)

When the emperor Caesar Domitian Augustus Conqueror of theGermans wished to suppress the Germans, who were under arms, herealized that they would make even greater preparations for war if


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they had any inkling of the arrival of so distinguished a commander.Therefore, he concealed his own departure under the pretext of takinga census in Gaul. In this way by an unexpected attack he smashed theseferociously savage tribes and looked after the interests of the provinces.

This episode may belong to Domitian’s campaign against the Chatti on the middleRhine in AD 82/83.

140 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans)

Scipio Africanus, seizing the opportunity of sending envoys to Syphax,ordered specially selected tribunes and centurions disguised as slavesto go with Laelius, with the job of spying out the king’s resources.These men, so that they could inspect more freely the layout of thecamp, deliberately let loose a horse and then pretending that it wasrunning away pursued it round most of the fortifications. When theyhad reported their findings, the camp was set ablaze and the war wasbrought to an end.

This refers to Scipio’s campaign in Africa in 203 BC against the Carthaginians and theirally Syphax.

141 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy)

Fabius Maximus, when fighting Hannibal, who was arrogant becauseof his success in battle, decided to stay clear of any dangerous venturesand concentrate entirely on protecting Italy. By this policy he earnedthe nickname ‘Delayer’ (Cunctator) and the reputation of an outstandingcommander.

(10) When the Germans were as usual making repeated attacksagainst our soldiers from woods and hidden lairs and retreating safelyinto the depths of the forests, the emperor Caesar Domitian Augustusmoved the zone of Roman control forward over a stretch of one hundredand twenty miles (about 113.5 miles in imperial measures). Thereforehe not only changed the character of the war but also brought theenemy under his control by uncovering their hiding places.

Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, while holding the office of dictator after theRoman defeat at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC (see no. 152), pursued a policy of attritionagainst Hannibal by avoiding battle and trying to contain him in the Campanianplain. After the Romans returned to the policy of offering battle and suffered defeatat Cannae (see no. 125), Fabius’ policy was followed with some success.

Domitian brought the Taunus area under Roman control in AD 83.


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142 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics)

The same Alexander because he was prevented by the enemy fromcrossing the river Indus, arranged to send horsemen into the river atdifferent points and threaten to cross. Then, when he had the Indianson edge with expectation he occupied an island a little further away,first with a small force and then with a larger one, and from there got his troops across to the opposite bank. When all the enemy forcecharged off to destroy this band, he made a safe crossing by anunguarded ford and united all his forces.

This must refer to the crossing of the river Hydaspes against king Porus in 326 BC.However at 1.4.9 Frontinus describes a much simpler ploy for that event. It seems thathe was confused by several different versions of the story; see Polyaenus 4.3.9; Plutarch,Alexander 60; Quintus Curtius 8.13.

143 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position)

The same Spartacus, when hemmed in by the commander PubliusVarinius, set up stakes at regular intervals outside the gate of the camp. He then tied dead bodies upright to the stakes, dressed inclothing and armed with weapons, so that they looked like sentries toanyone viewing from a distance. He also lit fires throughout the entirecamp. Deceiving the enemy with this misleading show he silently ledhis forces out by night.

Spartacus was a Thracian gladiator who led a revolt in the gladiatorial school at Capuain 73 BC. He raised an army of some 70,000 from slaves and the destitute and had somesuccess against the Roman forces sent against him. He was eventually defeated andkilled by Marcus Crassus in 71.

144 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies)

Lucius Caecilius Metellus because of a shortage of ships in which totransport his elephants fastened together large earthenware jars,covered them with planking, and loading the elephants on thesetransported them across the Sicilian straits.

This refers to a campaign in which the Carthaginians were defeated at Panormus in250 BC.


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145 Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention)

Julius Caesar on one occasion captured a soldier who was collectingwater, and learned from him that Afranius and Petreius were planningto strike camp during the night. In order to block the enemy planswithout disturbing his own men he ordered that in the early eveningthe signal for striking camp should be given and that mules should bedriven past the enemy camp with a great deal of noise and shouting.His opponents, thinking that Caesar was striking camp, remainedwhere they were, just as Caesar wanted.

This refers to Caesar’s civil war campaign in Spain in 49 BC against the Pompeiangenerals (cf. Caesar, Civil War 1.66).

146 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight)

In the war against the Pannonians, when the enemy in savage moodformed up for battle as soon as day broke, Tiberius Nero kept his menback and allowed the enemy to be afflicted with the fog and showers,which happened to be frequent on that day. Finally when he observedthat they were exhausted from standing and were losing heart bothfrom exposure to the rain and from tiredness, he gave the signal,attacked, and routed them.

Tiberius Nero is the future emperor Tiberius (AD 14–37). The battle probably tookplace during the Pannonian revolt of AD 6–9.

147 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight)

The divine Vespasian Augustus attacked the Jews on their Sabbath, aday on which it is sinful for them to carry on any serious business, andconsequently defeated them.

The context is the suppression of the Jewish revolt in AD 66–70.

148 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight)

When Lucullus was going to do battle against Mithridates andTigranes in Greater Armenia at Tigranocerta, he suddenly seized thelevel summit of the nearest hill with part of his forces, charged down


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on the enemy spread out below, and attacked their cavalry from theflank. When the cavalry fled and immediately spread panic among theinfantry, Lucullus followed them and won a distinguished victory.

Lucius Licinius Lucullus (consul 74 BC) used this brilliant tactical ploy duringcampaigns against Rome’s dangerous enemy Mithridates VI of Pontus and his allyTigranes of Armenia in 69 BC; see Plutarch, Lucullus 28; Appian, Mithridatic Wars 85.

149 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight)

Ventidius, when at war with the Parthians, did not lead his men outuntil the Parthians were less than half a mile away. Then he made asudden advance and came so close to them that by meeting them faceto face he avoided the arrows, which they usually fired from a distance.Therefore by this stratagem, because he made some show of confidence,he rapidly defeated the barbarians.

Publius Ventidius (consul 43 BC) had served with Caesar and later supported M. Antonius. He was sent to recover Asia and Syria from the Parthians and in 39 and38 BC won three distinguished victories.

150 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics)

When Marcus Antonius was fighting the Parthians, who were bom-barding his army with an enormous number of arrows, he ordered hismen to crouch down and form a tortoise (testudo). The arrows passedover this without harming the soldiers and the enemy was soonexhausted.

(23) When the Chatti repeatedly interrupted a cavalry battle byretreating into woodland, the emperor Caesar Augustus Conqueror ofthe Germans (Domitian) ordered his cavalrymen, as soon as theyreached impassable ground, to jump from their horses and fight onfoot; by this ploy he ensured that his victory should not be denied bydifficulties of terrain.

Antony’s campaign against the Parthians was in 36 BC (Dio 49.29–30; Plutarch,Antonius 45). Domitian’s ploy against the Chatti probably belongs to AD 83.


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151 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy)

Since Marius at Aquae Sextiae intended to fight a battle on the nextday against the Teutones, he sent Marcellus during the night with asmall force of cavalry and infantry to the enemy’s rear. In order to givethe impression of a large force he ordered armed grooms and campfollowers to go with them and also most of the pack animals equippedwith saddle blankets to make them look like cavalry. He ordered thesemen to attack the enemy in the rear as soon as they saw that the battlehad begun. This stratagem inspired such terror in the enemy thatdespite their savage nature they turned tail and fled.

This battle occurred in 102 BC; see Plutarch, Marius 20; Polyaenus 8.10.2.

152 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush)

At Trasimenus, where a narrow road between the lake and the foothillsof the mountains led out to the open plains, Hannibal while pretendingto flee made his way through the narrow defile and pitched camp in the open ground. During the night he stationed soldiers on the highground of the neighbouring hill and along the sides of the defile. At dawn, under cover of a mist, he drew up his battle line. Flaminius,pursuing what he thought was a retreating enemy, entered the defileand did not see the ambush until he was surrounded to the front, thesides, and the rear, and was cut down along with his army.

(33) Pompey when fighting in Armenia against Mithridates, whosecavalry was superior in number and quality, during the night stationedthree thousand light-armed soldiers and five hundred cavalry concealedin the undergrowth in the valley that lay between the two camps. Thenat dawn he sent his cavalry against the enemy position with the planthat, when all the enemy cavalry forces and their entire army had joinedbattle, they should, while keeping their formation, give groundgradually so as to provide an opportunity for an attack in the rear bythose stationed for this purpose. When this turned out as planned, andsoldiers who were apparently in flight turned about, Pompey cut downthe panic-stricken enemy who were now caught between two lines. TheRoman infantry also joined in hand-to-hand battle and stabbed thehorses of the enemy. This battle destroyed the king’s faith in his cavalry.

The battle of Lake Trasimene took place in 217 BC (Livy 22.4; Polybius 3.83–5). Theexact site of the battle is disputed (Walbank (1957), 415–18). Pompey defeatedMithridates in 66 BC (Appian, Mithridatic Wars 98; Dio, 36.47.3–4; see also above,no. 148).


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153 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to fight to the end)

Julius Caesar, when some Germans whom he had hemmed in foughtmore fiercely in their desperation, ordered them to be let through andattacked them as they fled.

154 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback)

When one of Lucius Sulla’s officers deserted to the enemy taking a substantial force of cavalry with him just as battle was being joined,Sulla announced that this had been done on his orders. By this ploy henot only prevented his soldiers from being reduced to panic but also encouraged them in the expectation that some good would comefrom the plan.

155 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy)

When Domitius Corbulo was besieging Tigranocerta and theArmenians seemed likely to resist the siege obstinately, he executedVadandus, one of the nobles he had captured, and fired his head from a catapult, sending it flying inside the enemy fortifications. Bychance the head fell in the middle of a council meeting which thebarbarians were holding just at that moment; the sight of it, just likea portent, filled them with panic and hastened their surrender.

Domitius Corbulo was appointed by Nero to take command of the war (which beganin AD 58) against the Parthians for the control of Armenia.

156 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties)

Titus Didius fought a ferocious battle in Spain that was ended bynightfall with a large number slain on both sides. He ordered thatduring the night many of the bodies of his own men should be buried.On the next day the Spanish came out to perform a similar function,and because they found that many more of their men had been killedthan those of the Romans, reckoned on that calculation that they hadbeen defeated and agreed to the terms of the Roman commander.

Titus Didius had won a triumph for campaigns in Thrace. After holding the consulshipin 98 BC he took command in Spain and won a second triumph in 93 BC.


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157 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support)

When Scipio Africanus was fighting in Spain, there was brought to himamong the captive women a noble young girl of exceptional beautywho attracted the attention of everyone. Scipio kept her under closeprotection and returned her to her betrothed, who was called Alicius,and also handed over to him as a wedding gift the amount of gold that her parents had brought to Scipio to ransom her. The entire tribe,overwhelmed by this extensive generosity, linked itself with the Romanpeople.

This occurred in 210 BC during Scipio’s campaign to capture New Carthage; for otherversions of the anecdote see Livy 26.50.1–12; Polybius 10.19; Aulus Gellius, AtticNights 7.8.5; Valerius Maximus, 4.3.1.

158 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry)

Quintus Sertorius in Spain was entirely outclassed by the enemy’scavalry, which arrogantly rode right up to the fortifications. There-fore during the night he dug trenches and drew up his forces in frontof them. When the cavalry squadrons arrived as usual he withdrew hisline of battle. The cavalry pursued him closely, fell into the ditches, andin this way were defeated.

For Sertorius, see above, no. 73.

159 Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat)

When M. Antonius was retreating with the Parthians hard on his heels,every time he broke camp at daybreak his retreating line wasbombarded with showers of arrows from the barbarians. Therefore hekept his men in camp until close to noon and gave the impression thatit was a permanent camp. As soon as the Parthians were convinced bythis and withdrew, he completed his regular march during the rest ofthe day without interference.

For methods of retreating safely, see Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.22.


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160 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers)

Hirtius kept pigeons shut up in the dark and starved them. He thenattached letters to their neck with a hair and released them from as closeto the city walls as he could. The pigeons, longing for light and food,made for the highest buildings and were caught by Brutus, who by thismeans was informed about everything, especially after he left out foodin different places and trained the pigeons to alight there.

During the civil wars after the murder of Caesar in 44 BC, Decimus Brutus wasbesieged in Mutina by M. Antonius. The siege was raised by the consul of 43, AulusHirtius.

161 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion)

Hamilcar the Carthaginian commander, since his Gallic allies werehabitually deserting to the Romans and were regularly welcomed bythem as allies, instructed his most loyal soldiers to pretend to desert.They then killed the Romans who came out to welcome them. Thisploy not only brought immediate success to Hamilcar, but also meantthat in the future genuine deserters came to be suspected by theRomans.

162 Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms and stratagems)

Julius Caesar used to say that he followed the same policy against theenemy as doctors did against bodily ailments, namely that they shouldbe conquered by hunger rather than steel.

(2) Domitius Corbulo used to say that the enemy should beconquered by the pick.

(16) Scipio Africanus used to say that not only should a road be madeavailable to the enemy for their flight, but that indeed it ought to bepaved.

(20) When Ptolemy, who had a weak force, was fighting againstPerdiccas’ mighty army he arranged for a few cavalrymen to drive alongall kinds of animals which had brush attached to their backs so that it was dragged along behind them. Ptolemy himself went on aheadwith the troops he had, so that the dust the animals produced gave theimpression of a large army following, and he then defeated the enemy,who were terrified by the prospect.


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(42) When Quintus Metellus was about to strike camp in Spain andwanted to keep his soldiers in line, he announced that he had discoveredthat an ambush had been set up by the enemy, and that therefore theyshould not stray from the standards or break ranks. Although he haddone this to preserve discipline, he happened to encounter a real ambush,and because he had predicted it found that his soldiers were undeterred.

For Corbulo’s reputation as a cautious commander and strong disciplinarian, seeTacitus, Annals 13.35–6.

Scipio’s view was obviously a well-known maxim; see above no. 153; Vegetiusexpands this idea (Epitome of Military Science 3.21) – ‘When a way out is revealed, theyall agree in turning their backs and are slaughtered like sheep without danger ofreprisal.’

Perdiccas was the senior Macedonian commander after the death of Alexander in323 BC who tried to hold the empire together. In 321 he invaded Egypt suspectingthat Ptolemy was intending to establish an independent kingdom.

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus had held a triumph when only ofpraetorian rank for his success in Macedonia. Consul in 143 BC he was sent to Spainto suppress a revolt of the Celtiberians.

163 Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae)

Philip was victorious on the right wing. From high ground he launchedhis entire phalanx against the Romans, who could not stand up to the weight of the locked shields and the sharp points of the sarisae. However, on his left wing the phalanx was dispersed over the hillyterrain and was pulled out of formation. Therefore Flamininus,abandoning hope for his defeated wing quickly rode to the other and attacked the Macedonians, who were prevented by the uneven andrough terrain from forming the phalanx and establishing the depth of ranks that is the strength of their formation. Furthermore, in indi-vidual fighting the soldiers’ weaponry was heavy and difficult to use.For the phalanx resembles an invincible animal in its strength as longas it preserves its unity and keeps its single locked-shields formation. But when this unity has been broken, then each individual soldier loses his strength because of the type of weapons he uses and becausehis strength comes from the mutual support of the parts of the phalanxrather than from his individual ability. This wing was routed and someof the Romans pursued them while the others, attacking from theflank, slaughtered the Macedonians who were still fighting. This meantthat the victorious Macedonians on the right wing swung round andfled, throwing away their weapons. No fewer than 8,000 men fell inthe battle, with 5,000 captured.


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Plutarch here refers to the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC when the Romans underTitus Quinctius Flamininus defeated the Macedonian army of king Philip V. Plutarchprovides a good summary of the possible weakness of the phalanx formation, especiallyin unfavourable, hilly terrain. See above, no. 12 for Polybius’ comparison of thequalities of the phalanx and the Roman legions.

164 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order)

At the head of the entire army are to be stationed the mounted scoutsdivided into two sections with their own commander. After theseshould come the Petraean mounted archers also divided into two sec-tions, and under the command of their decurions. After these shouldbe stationed the men drawn from the ala of the Aurianians. Drawn upwith them should be the men of the fourth cohort of Raetians underthe command of Daphne the Corinthian. Next to them should comethe men from the ala of Colonists. Drawn up with them should be the Ituraeans and Cyrenaicans and then men from the first cohort ofRaetians. Demetrius should be commander of all these men. (2) Afterthese should come the German cavalry, also divided into two sections,under the command of the centurion in charge of the camp.

(3) After these the infantry should be drawn up, holding theirstandards in front of them, the Italians, and the Cyrenaicans who arepresent. Pulcher, who commands the Italians, should be in commandof them all. After these should come the Bosporan infantry under theircommander Lamprocles, and after these the Numidians under theircommander Verus. (4) They should be drawn up with four infantrymenabreast. The attached archers should be at the head of this group. Theirown cavalry should protect both flanks of the marching column. Afterthese should come the mounted guards (of the legionary legate) and after these the legionary cavalry, and then the catapults. (5) Nextshould come the standard of the fifteenth legion (Apollinaris) withValens the commander of the legion, the second in command, themilitary tribunes who have been assigned to the expedition, and cen-turions of the first cohort. In front of the standard of the infantrymenshould be drawn up the spearmen; the infantrymen should marchdrawn up four abreast. (6) After the fifteenth legion the standard of thetwelfth legion (Fulminata) should be positioned, with the militarytribunes and centurions around it; this phalanx (the legion) should alsomarch drawn up four abreast.

(7) After the heavy infantry the allied force should be drawn up,heavy infantry from Lesser Armenia and Trapezus, and spearmen fromColchis and Rhizion. After them should be drawn up the infantry of


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the [Apulians]. Secundinus, commander of the [Apulians] should becommander of the allied force. (8) After this should come the baggagetrain. The ala of the Dacians and its prefect should form the rearguard.(9) Centurions who have been appointed for this purpose should keep the flanks of the infantry in order; to provide protection the alaof Gauls should ride along both flanks in a single column, and also theItalian cavalry. Their commander should patrol along the flanks. (10)The commander of the entire force, Xenophon (i.e. Arrian), shouldgenerally take up position in advance of the infantry standards, butshould also make the rounds of the whole army; he should ensure thatthey march according to their formation, bring to order those whohave got into disorder, and praise those who are in proper formation.(11) This should be the marching formation.

Arrian’s Ectaxis is an account of the military dispositions and tactical preparation hemade during his governorship of Cappadocia for repelling the invasion c. AD 135 ofthe Alani, a nomadic people living north of the Caucasus. It is interesting that herefers to himself as Xenophon, the famous Greek commander (see p. 40). ‘Apulians’(known from another source) have been substituted in the translation for ‘Aplanoi’ in the original manuscript, since the Aplanoi are not known as a military unit inCappadocia. This is the only detailed record we have of a Roman marching orderwritten by a commander. See also above, no. 134.

165 Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against the Alani)

When the army has arrived at the appointed place, all the cavalry bywheeling in a circular movement is to adopt a square formation; scoutsshould be sent to high ground to watch for the enemy. Next, at a signalthe men will prepare their arms in silence and when this has been done take their place in formation. (12) Battle formation should be as follows. Each wing of the infantry (auxiliary) should hold the highground, since that will be its formation in terrain like this. TheArmenians under the command of Vasakes and Arbelos should bedrawn up on the right wing, holding the highest point on that wing,because they are all archers. (13) The men of the Italian cohort shouldbe drawn up in front of them, and they will all be under the commandof Pulcher who commands the Italian cohort. And Vasakes and Arbelosand their cavalry and infantry should be positioned in support of him.

(14) The allied force from Lesser Armenia, the light-armed troopsfrom Trapezus, and the Rhizionian spearmen should be drawn up onthe left wing and hold the highest ground on this wing. The twohundred [Apulians] should be drawn up in front of them and onehundred of the Cyrenaicans so that their heavily armed men can be a


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protection for the spearmen, who can shoot over their heads from thehigh ground. (15) The heavy infantry of the fifteenth legion shouldoccupy all the central area of the right, beyond the mid-point of theentire area, because these troops are by far the most numerous. Theinfantry of the twelfth legion should occupy the remaining area on the left side, right up to the outer limit of the left wing. The infantryshould be drawn up eight ranks deep, in a closely packed formation.(16) The first four ranks shall consist of pike-bearers, whose pikes will end in long, slender iron points. The men in the first rank shouldhold their pikes at the ready, so that if the enemy comes near, they canthrust the iron tip of their pike especially at the breasts of the horses.(17) The men of the second, third, and fourth ranks should hold theirpikes forward to jab and wound the horses where they can, and kill theriders. When the pike has been lodged into the heavy body armour,because of the softness of the metal it will bend and make the horse-man ineffective. (18) The remaining ranks behind them should be of spearmen. Behind them should be a ninth rank of infantry archersfrom the Numidians, Cyrenaicans, Bosporans, and Ituraeans. (19) Theartillery should be positioned on each wing so that it can fire its missilesat the advancing enemy from the longest possible range, and behindthe whole infantry formation.

(20) All the cavalry drawn up in alae and squadrons, which will beeight in number, should be positioned beside the infantry on bothwings, with the infantry and archers in front of them as a defensivescreen, two companies of them, while in the middle of the infantryformation, six companies [- - -]. (21) The mounted archers amongthese troops should be stationed close to the infantry formation, in order to shoot over it. Spearmen, pikemen, knifemen, and battleaxe-men should keep watch over both flanks and wait for the signal. (22)The mounted bodyguards should be stationed around Xenophonhimself (i.e. Arrian), and also up to two hundred bodyguards from theinfantry phalanx, and the centurions assigned to the mounted guards,and the commanders of the bodyguards, and the decurions of themounted guards. (23) They should take up position round him [- - -]one hundred light-armed spearmen, so that as he tours the entireformation, where he sees anything lacking, he should take note of itand correct it. (24) Valens, commander of the fifteenth legion, shouldtake command of the entire right wing along with the cavalry. Thetribunes of the twelfth legion should take command of the left wing.

(25) When the troops have been drawn up like this there should besilence until the enemy come within weapon range. When they havecome within range, everyone should utter a huge and ferocious warcry;


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missiles and stones should be discharged from catapults, arrows frombows, and the spearmen should throw their spears, both the light-armed troops and those carrying shields. Stones should be thrown at the enemy by the allied forces on the high ground; there should bea general bombardment from all sides, so concentrated as to throw thehorses into confusion and bring destruction to the enemy cavalry. (26)Because of the incredible weight of missiles we may hope that theadvancing Scythians (i.e. Alani) will not get very close to our infantryformation. But if they do get close, then the first three ranks shouldlock their shields together, and, standing shoulder to shoulder, with-stand the charge with all possible strength in the most concentratedformation, joined together in the strongest possible way. The fourthrank [shall hold up their pikes, so that they can kill any enemy horse-men, but not hold them straight up, so that the spearmen overshootwith their spears], while the first rank should wound and stab thehorses and their riders ceaselessly with their pikes. (27) When theenemy has been repulsed, if there is an obvious rout, the infantryformation should open up and the cavalry should advance, though notall the squadrons, only half of them. The vanguard of this formationshould consist of those who are first to advance. (28) The other halfshould follow those who have advanced first, but in good order and notin full-blooded pursuit, so that if the rout becomes complete, the firstpursuit can be sustained by fresh horses, and if there is a sudden enemycounter-attack, they can be attacked as they turn. (29) Simultaneouslythe Armenian archers should advance and shoot, to prevent theretreating forces from turning, and the light-armed spearmen shouldattack at the run. The infantry formation should not remain in thesame spot but should advance more quickly than a walking pace, sothat if any stronger resistance is encountered from the enemy it canagain provide a protective screen in front of the cavalry.

(30) This is what should happen if the enemy is routed at the firstattack. But if they wheel about and aim at an encirclement of ourwings, the wings of our light-armed archers should extend theirposition onto the higher ground. I do not think that the enemy, notingthat our wings were weaker as a result of this extension, would thrusttheir way through them and break up the infantry. (31) But if theenemy should overcome one wing or both of them, it is absolutelyinevitable that their cavalry will expose their flank to us and their pikeswill be at right angles to us. Then our cavalry should attack them notwith a bombardment of missiles, but with swords and battleaxes. TheScythians (Alani) being unprotected and with their horses unprotected(the text breaks off here).


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The brackets at section 26 indicate the restoration of Bosworth (1977), 240, for adamaged part of the text. Arrian’s tactics were designed to deal with the expectedmassed cavalry attack from the Alani. The legions adopted a defensive formation,which owed something to the model of the classical Greek phalanx, and were to besupported by a barrage of missiles and strong cavalry action.

166 Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation)

The foremost and most important task of the general is to take adisorderly crowd of men and establish them in orderly ranks. I meanthat he should assemble and arrange the men in proper ranks and givethe multitude a balanced order suitable for battle. For a well-organizedarmy is easier to handle on the march, more secure in camps, and more useful in battle. Indeed we know that in times past, large well-armed armies have been destroyed through lack of order by smallerand less well-equipped forces. For the weaker and less well-armed forceconquered the larger by superior discipline.

167 Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation)

The phalanx is sometimes drawn up on a wide front with shallowdepth, or sometimes in a deeper formation if the terrain permits andit is more advantageous, if it is necessary to crush the enemy with thedepth and the impetus of the charge. For example, Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra drew up the Thebans and at Mantineia all theBoeotians in a wedge formation and led it against the Spartans. On the other hand, it might be necessary to repel attackers, as in theformations adopted against the Sarmatians and Scythians. A deepeningof the phalanx occurs when there is a contraction of the ranks from a shallower to a deeper formation, through the movement of the menstanding beside and behind one another, which takes place in respectof the length and depth of the formation. When in this way youproduce a deeper formation of the phalanx the shields are held closetogether, so that because of the unbroken line of shields there is noscope for the ranks to wheel to one side or the other. By bringing theirshields together in this way the Romans make the tortoise (testudo),usually in the shape of a square, though it can be round or rectangularor however it turns out.

For the Theban battle order at Leuctra, see p. 4. The Roman legionaries formed atortoise (testudo) by linking their shields over their heads; this formation could be used


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to approach the wall of a city or in open battle as a defence against arrows. In this casethe first rank of soldiers would kneel down.

168 Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers)

Archers and javelin-throwers and slingers and all those who employdifferent types of missiles are useful in battle. For they are capable of breaking up the enemy, especially those who fire stones over longdistances and inflict wounds at long range; indeed a severe wound canbe fatal. They are also useful for luring the enemy from strong points,because by shooting at them from long range they cause them to hopethat they could not withstand their charge. Again, they are useful forbreaking up the formation of a phalanx or repulsing a cavalry attackor seizing high ground because of their speed since they are lightlyequipped. But if the enemy comes to grips with them they keep up acontinuous bombardment and do not allow them to get near withoutsuffering many wounds. They are also useful in dislodging from astrong point the men who seized it, since they are unable to stand thewounds they inflict. They are ideal for scouting suspicious places andcan in addition be used to set up an ambush.

For the use of light-armed soldiers, see also nos 102, 103, 116, 120, 127.

169 Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation)

We hear that the Scythians in particular used the wedge formation, and also the Thracians, who learned it from the Scythians. Philip ofMacedon trained the Macedonians to use this formation, which isespecially effective because the leaders are drawn up in a circle and thefront of the wedge tapers away to a point. This makes it easy for it tocut its way through any enemy formation and allows it to wheel swiftlyround or back.

170 Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the practices of other peoples)

And yet I am not unaware that it will be difficult to make clear everytechnical term since even the Romans do not have an expression forthem in their native tongue. Instead there are terms in the languageof the Spanish and the Celts, since the Romans took over practices thathad originated with the Celts because the Celtic cavalry distinguished


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itself on their behalf in battle. The Romans deserve praise above all inthis respect, namely that the pleasure they take in their own nativepractices does not prevent them from choosing the best practices fromeverywhere and making them into their own.

171 Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against carts)

Alexander considered the safest way in which to cross the ridge. Now,since he decided that he would have to take the risk as there was noother way round, he issued orders to the hoplites that when the cartsrolled down the slope those on the level ground who were able to breakranks should move away to both sides so that the carts could runbetween them. Those who were hemmed in should push close togetherand some should even lie on the ground and join their shields closelytogether, so that when the carts ran at them they were likely to bounceover them by their own impetus and leave them unharmed. Eventsturned out as Alexander had indicated and guessed. For part of thephalanx divided, while the carts rolled over the shields of the othersoldiers but did little harm. Not a single man died beneath the carts.

Alexander had succeeded his father as king of Macedon in 336 BC and in 335 led anexpedition against the Triballi and the Illyrians in Thrace. He planned to invade thePersian empire and wished to secure his Macedonian base by humbling these tribes.See also below, nos 172–3.

172 Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics)

When he heard about their move Alexander himself turned back tolead the attack on the Triballians and caught them when they were inthe act of making camp. Since they were caught they drew up their line in a grove beside the river. Alexander drew up his phalanx in a deep formation and led it forward in person, ordering the archers andslingers to run ahead and fire their arrows and stones at the barbarians,to see if they could lure them out of the grove into the open. When theenemy came into range and began to be hit, they charged the archersin order to get to grips with them, since archers are unarmed. ButAlexander, when he had lured them out of the glen, ordered Philotasto take the cavalry of upper Macedonia and charge their right wing,where their charge had taken them the farthest. He also orderedHeracleides and Sopolis to lead the cavalry from Bottiaea andAmphipolis against the left wing. He led the infantry phalanx and the


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remaining cavalry, which he stationed in front of the phalanx, againstthe centre.

173 Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill)

When the hides had been prepared for the crossing and the army wasin position fully armed on the bank of the river, the catapults on asignal bombarded the Scythians riding past on the opposite bank. Somewere wounded by the missiles and one man was pierced right throughhis shield and body armour and fell from his horse. The Scythians wereshocked by the long-range missiles and the death of a brave comrade,and retreated a little from the bank. Alexander, seeing that they were in disarray because of the missiles, sounded the trumpets andtook personal leadership of the crossing of the river. The rest of thearmy followed him. He disembarked the archers and slingers first ofall, ordering them to fire their arrows and stones at the Scythians so thatthey could not approach the infantry phalanx as it was disembarking,before all his cavalry had crossed. When they were all collected on the bank he first sent against the Scythians a hipparchy of mercenariesand four squadrons of lancers. The Scythians received this attack byriding round in circles and shooting at them. Since they were manyfighting a smaller force they evaded the attack without difficulty.However, Alexander positioned his archers, the Agrianians, and theother light-armed troops commanded by Balacrus, among the cavalryand led them against the Scythians. When they came close he orderedthree hipparchies of the Companions and all the mounted javelin-mento charge them. Alexander himself led the remainder of the cavalry attop speed and attacked with the squadrons in column formation.Consequently the Scythian cavalrymen were no longer able to wheelround in circles, as they had done up to this point. For the cavalry wasnow on top of them and simultaneously the light-armed men mixedwith the cavalry prevented them from wheeling round safely. Fromthis moment the Scythians were in open flight.

This engagement in 329 BC shows Alexander’s tactical acumen and ability to adaptto changing circumstances. Originally there were eight squadrons (ilai) of Companioncavalry, numbering probably 1,800 men in total and including the Royal Squadron.After 330 the cavalry was reorganized into hipparchies, possibly eight in total. For theorganization of the Macedonian army under Alexander, see Bosworth (1988), 259–77.


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174 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy)

Cleomenes, king of the Spartans, when engaging in war with theArgives, encamped opposite them. Now, the Argives kept a close watchon what their enemy was doing, and since Cleomenes issued orders to the army through a herald for everything he wanted done, theyhastened to do exactly the same. When the Spartans armed, theyarmed, when they marched out, they marched out against them, andwhen they withdrew, they withdrew. Cleomenes issued a secretcommand that when the herald announced that they were to preparebreakfast they were in fact to arm. The herald made the announcementand the Argives prepared their breakfast. But Cleomenes led his fullyarmed troops to the attack and easily slaughtered the Argives, whowere defenceless without their weapons.

Herodotus relates this incident to the battle of Sepeia c. 494 BC. The following selectionof passages from Polyaenus illustrates some of the themes common in collections ofstratagems, such as the importance of alertness, knowing the enemy and the terrain,deceiving the opposition, and concealing your own strengths and weaknesses.

175 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers)

Thrasyllus, wishing to make the enemy think that he had few ships,ordered the helmsmen to draw the triremes up side by side and raise thesails of one while securing the other with ropes to the middle bank ofoars. This allowed it to move side by side with the first ship and its sailscould not be seen out at sea. In this way he concealed half his ships.

During the oligarchic coup in Athens in 411 BC Thrasyllus organized the democratsin the fleet stationed in Samos and was elected general. He contributed to the Atheniannaval victory at Cynossema (411) and carried on other successful military operationsfor Athens. He was executed after the Athenian victory over the Spartans at Arginusae(406) for failure to pick up survivors and the dead.

176 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms in the army)

When Clearchus was in Thrace his army was gripped by night-timepanics. He therefore ordered that if an alarm occurred during the nightno one should stand up. Anyone who stood up was to be killed as anenemy. This order taught the soldiers to despise night-time panics andthey stopped jumping up and becoming disturbed.

For Clearchus, see no. 43.


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177 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the Spartans)

Epaminondas wanted to attack the Spartans, but since there was aSpartan guard at mount Oneion he pretended that he was going tomarch through the pass during the night. In fact he allowed his armyto sleep at the foot of the mountain. The Spartans guarding the passwere exhausted after staying awake all night under arms. When dawnbroke Epaminondas roused his army, attacked the guards, who hadgone to sleep, and routing them easily made his way through the pass.

This refers to events in 369 BC during the invasion of the Peloponnese by Thebes andher allies.

178 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal operations)

When Epaminondas was confronted by the Thessalians at the bridgeover the river Sperchius, he saw that an extensive, thick mist rose fromthe river at dawn. Therefore he ordered each unit to collect two pilesof wood, one green, the other dry, and to place the dry wood below andthe green wood on top and light them in the middle of the night. Thedarkness and mist and smoke mingled together. The enemy could notsee through this atmosphere and Epaminondas got his soldiers acrossthe bridge. They were in the middle of the plain when the smoke andthe mist cleared and the Thessalians realized that their opponents hadcrossed the bridge.

179 Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush)

Tisamenus while leading his army saw a large number of birds flyingover a particular spot but not settling on the ground. He suspected thatthey were reluctant to settle because they feared men who had takenup position there. When he had scouted the place he attacked anddestroyed the Ionians who were lying in ambush.

In mythology Tisamenus was the son of Orestes; the same story is in Frontinus,Stratagems 1.2.8.


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180 Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies)

Chares, suspecting that there were spies in his camp, placed guardsoutside the palisade and ordered each soldier to seize the man standingnext to him and not to let him go until he said who he was and namedhis unit. Consequently the spies were captured since they could notidentify their unit, file, mess, or the password.

Chares was a distinguished Athenian soldier and often held the position of general inthe fourth century BC. At times he operated virtually as a mercenary commander; seePritchett, GSW II (1974), 77–85.

181 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea)

Philip when facing the Athenians at Chaeronea gave way and movedback a little. Stratocles, the Athenian general, shouted out, ‘We mustnot stop the pursuit until we have shut the enemy up in Macedonia’,and did not desist from the pursuit. Philip said, ‘The Athenians donot know how to win.’ He continued the gradual withdrawal, keepinghis phalanx in good order and well protected behind their shields. Ashort time later he seized high ground on the right wing, and spurringon his soldiers turned about and launched a strong attack on theAthenians. Fighting splendidly he routed them.

The battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC fought by Philip against Thebes, Athens and theirallies confirmed Macedonian dominance in Greece.

182 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity)

Since the Thessalians were holding the pass of Tempe, Alexander dug out regularly shaped rocks on Mount Ossa and formed them into small steps, and climbing up by means of these both he and theMacedonians scaled the crests. Once they had crossed Mount Ossa they were in possession of Thessaly. For the Thessalians were guardingthe narrow pass of Tempe. People travelling through the pass even nowcan see the rocks of Ossa built up like a stepladder. Indeed they callthem ‘Alexander’s ladder’.


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183 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river)

Demetrius was trying to get across the swift-flowing river Lycus, whichwas fordable for horses but not for infantry. Taking the biggest horseswith the strongest chests he placed them upstream in a formation offour columns. These horses broke the force of the current and made iteasier for the infantry to cross.

Demetrius I Poliorcetes (‘City-Besieger’) supported his father Antigonus, who hadbeen Alexander’s governor of Phrygia, in his attempts to establish himself as anindependent ruler. Demetrius eventually became king of Macedonia (294–287). Seeabove p. 7.

184 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy)

When Demetrius had pitched camp in the foothills of Taurus, Seleucus,fearing that he would slip away secretly into Syria, sent Lysias with alarge contingent of Macedonians to the hills dominating the AmanusGates, which was the route Demetrius was intending to take, withorders to light many fires. When Demetrius saw that these places hadbeen seized in advance he stopped his march.

After Alexander’s death Seleucus became governor of Babylonia and eventuallysucceeded in establishing an independent kingship and dynasty.

185 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split his forces)

When the Carthaginians invaded with 300,000 men, Dionysius setup many forts and guard posts scattered throughout the country withorders that they were to make terms with the Carthaginians and accepttheir garrisons. The Carthaginians gladly seized these places withouta fight and left many of their soldiers as guards and garrisons in eachof them. When most of their army had been split up and scattered as guards and garrisons Dionysius then attacked the remainder anddefeated them.

Dionysius of Syracuse, born c. 430 BC, eventually obtained domination over most ofSicily and attempted to drive the Carthaginians out of the island.


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186 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush)

Diotimus, after sailing during the night to enemy territory, dis-embarked a few men from each ship and hid them in an ambush. Atdaybreak he kept the ships at anchor near the men who lay in ambush,and ordered those on deck to prepare for battle and the rowers to taketurns with the thalaminian, zeugite, and thranite oars. He then triedto bring some of the ships to the shore. The enemy ran forward toprevent them from landing, but when he hoisted the prearrangedsignal the men lying in ambush suddenly appeared and butcheredmany of the enemy and routed the rest. Diotimus made his landingsafely.

Of the three banks of oars in an Athenian trireme the thranite was top, the thalaminianat the bottom, and the zeugite in between.

187 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy)

Since the enemy occupied a fortified position and did not come downto offer battle, Memnon withdrew some distance away from the strongpoint and drew up his army in two parts in opposition to one anotheras if one part had mutinied against him. He also sent a deserter to theenemy with orders to say that there was a mutiny and that they wereabout to fight one another, and this was the reason he had movedfurther away, fearing that you would attack from above, since you werealready armed and ready for a full-scale battle. When the men in thecity saw that the deserter’s words fitted in with what was happening,they came down from the fortified position against them. Memnon’sforces, when they saw the enemy on the level ground, did not attackone another but combined to attack the enemy and made them allcaptives.

Memnon of Rhodes was a military commander who took service under the Persiansand fought against the Macedonian invasion force. His advice that the Persians shouldfollow a scorched-earth policy and avoid pitched battles was rejected with disastrousconsequences at the river Granicus. Memnon subsequently co-ordinated Persianresistance in the Aegean, but was killed at the siege of Mytilene in 333 BC.

188 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice toencourage valour)

The Taurians, a Scythian people, when they are about to engage in battle, always dig up the roads behind them and make them


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impassable. They fight in this fashion so that, not being able to escape,they will either conquer or die.

189 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour)

When M. Atilius Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians he swore an oath to them that if set free he would persuade the senate toput an end to the war, and if he failed to persuade it he would returnto them. But when he arrived in Rome he put to the senate the contraryview that now was the time to intensify the war with the Carthaginianssince their strength was failing. He also announced in public theirsecret weaknesses and how they would be defeated. Although thesenate urged him to remain and to consider that an oath sworn underduress was invalid, and his children, wife, friends, and relatives huggedhim, he refused to break his oath, and sailing to the Carthaginians hetold them his own ploy and the decision of the Romans. They shuthim in a cage, and after humiliating and torturing him for a long timethey killed him.

Regulus was consul in 267 and 256 BC. He fought several successful battles againstthe Carthaginians and took the war into Africa. He was defeated in 255 and probablydied in captivity. The story of his honourable return (Appian, Punic Wars 4; Dio,11.15) seems to be later elaboration, but helps to illustrate the theme that the art ofcommand has a moral dimension.

190 Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics)

During the war with Hannibal Fabius was criticized in the senate fornot deploying his troops for battle. When his son called on him todefend this slander, he showed him each part of the legion. Since someparts were not strong, he said, ‘You see that it is not wise for these mento join battle and run the risk of a decisive engagement. For on manyoccasions the entire legion has not been involved in the hazards ofbattle, and the experienced commander does not fail to recognize thathe can be defeated in one part. Therefore my advice is not to engage inbattle but to pursue, following the high ground and encouraging citiesto revolt.’ For recommending and carrying out this policy he was at thetime regarded as a coward. But later, when other commanders had lostmany armies, the Romans turned back to Fabius and his strategy, sothat he was declared Dictator and was given the name Maximus. Thismeans ‘the Greatest’.

For Quintus Fabius Maximus, see no. 141.


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191 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting information)

When Trajan was campaigning in Dacia and was drawing close toTapae, where the barbarians were encamped, a large mushroom wasbrought to him inscribed with Latin letters saying that the Buri andother allies of Trajan urged him to turn back and maintain the peace.

This was apparently a well-known incident and was represented on Trajan’s column(see Austin and Rankov (1995), 65, and plate 3).

192 Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation against cavalry)

Round this time the Romans defeated the Iazyges on land and later on the river. I do not mean that a naval battle took place but that theRomans chased them as they fled across the frozen river Danube andfought them there as if on dry land. When the Iazyges realized that they were being pursued they waited the Romans’ charge, thinkingthat they would defeat them easily since they were not used to the ice.Therefore some of the Iazyges charged straight at the Romans whileothers rode round the flanks, for their horses had been trained to gallopsafely over a surface like this. The Romans did not panic when they saw this but formed into a compact mass so that they faced all theenemy at once, and most of them placed their shields on the groundand put one foot on them so that they did not slip so much. Supportingthemselves like this they received the enemy charge, and some grabbedthe bridles, others the shields and spears of the attackers, dragging the men towards them. Locked in close combat they pulled down both men and horses, since carried on by their momentum the bar-barians could no longer stop themselves slipping. Of course theRomans also slipped, but if one of them fell on his back he pulled hisopponent down on top of him and then threw him backward with his feet, just as in wrestling, and so got on top of him. If one fell on hisfront he would grab his enemy, who had fallen first, with his teeth. Thebarbarians were not used to battle of this kind and were more lightlyequipped, with the result that only few escaped out of a large force.

This battle occurred during the campaigns conducted on the Danube by MarcusAurelius, in the winter of AD 173 or 174.


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193 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in AD 194)

In this battle (Issus) Valerianus and Anullinus commanded the armyof Septimius Severus, while Pescennius Niger himself was present withhis forces and drew them up for battle. This pass, the ‘Cilician Gates’,has this name because of its narrowness. On one side steep mountainsloom above, while on the other high cliffs sweep down to the sea. Now,Niger pitched his camp on a strongly fortified hill and stationed theheavy infantry in the front of the line, then the spear-men and slingers,then behind all the rest the archers. The intention was that the frontranks should hold off their opponents while the archers at a distanceused their strength to fire over the heads of those in front. He was protected on the left and right flank respectively by the cliffs onthe side of the sea and by an impenetrable forest. He drew up his armylike this and placed the baggage-carriers behind it so that none of hissoldiers would be able to flee even if they wanted. When Anullinus sawthis he drew up his heavily armed soldiers in front, and behind themall his light troops, so that they could fire at long range over the headsof the other soldiers and hold back the enemy, while the soldiers in frontcould make the advance up the slope safe for them. He sent the cavalrywith Valerianus, ordering them to find some way round the forest andsuddenly attack Niger’s soldiers in the rear. When they came to closequarters some of Severus’ soldiers raised their shields in front of themwhile others put them over their heads to form a tortoise (testudo), andin this way advanced on the enemy.

Septimius Severus, governor of Upper Pannonia, seized power in Rome in AD 193. Hisimmediate rival was the governor of Syria, Pescennius Niger, and Issus was the decisivebattle in a campaign fought largely in the eastern provinces. Niger’s forces were at firstvictorious but a sudden rainstorm blowing in their faces disconcerted them, and theywere caught in a trap when Valerianus’ cavalry appeared in their rear. Niger’s armywas destroyed with the loss of 20,000 men.

194 Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence)

I discovered something that is disbelieved by many and about whichI am doubtful, but because it is unusual I have put it forward. Somepeople claim that the Mauretanians, having dug a small hole and lain down in it, place their neck against a piece of wood pressed to theground, and with their ears pick up sound unhindered. The story is thatbandits among the Gallic peoples do the same thing. There is a similar,improvised way of picking up information. If someone with a largearmy wants to discover the intentions of his own soldiers or those of


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the enemy, he should dig a deep hole as if he intends to get down intoit. Then he should cover it over with his cloak in case anyone happensto come by. Nothing will escape the notice of the man who ispositioned there, and he will reveal to you like a prophet what is saidand what sounds are made.

Julius Africanus was a Christian philosopher from Aelia Capitolina (Jerusalem) whowas active in the early third century. He wrote the Chronographies, a combination ofreligious and profane history, and also the Cesti, a compilation of miscellaneousinformation including material on tactics, some of it rather fanciful. Text in Migne(ed. Hopfner, 1928–36).

195 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an inexperienced army)

The general should arrange ambushes in total secrecy at river crossings,mountain passes, forest defiles, marshes, or other difficult routes. Heshould organize his march so that while being fully prepared himselfhe can attack the enemy while they are eating or sleeping or at leasttaking their rest, when they are relaxed, unarmed and without theirboots, with their horse unsaddled. In an attack of this kind his soldierscan build up their confidence. For men who have not for a long time,or indeed who have never, seen men being wounded or killed arehorrified and confused by terror when they first set eyes on it, and beginto think more about fleeing than fighting. What is more, if the enemyare on the march, the general should attack when they are worn outafter a long journey; he should attack the rearguard and he certainlymust launch surprise attacks. He should also attack with picked troopsany who have wandered far from their army in search of fodder or booty.These should be the first operations he undertakes, which if they turnout badly will do less damage, and if they are successful will bringmaximum benefit.

Vegetius discusses various ways to engage in a pitched battle (3.20).

196 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms)

A soldier should never be led into battle unless you have tried him outfirst.

It is better to overcome the enemy by famine, raids, and terror tacticsthan by battle, in which luck has more influence than courage.

It is better to keep extra reserves behind the battle line than to spreadthe soldiers out too widely.


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Courage is of greater value than numbers.Terrain is often of greater value than courage.The unexpected terrifies the enemy, while the familiar generates

contempt.The general who carries out a pursuit carelessly with scattered forces

is prepared to offer his opponent the victory that he has won.Good generals never engage in a set battle unless an opportunity

offers or under great pressure.

These are extracts from a long section on the principles of war, which was very popularin the Middle Ages.


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4

ATTACKING ANDDEFENDING CITIES

197 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4(Theban attack on Plataea)

When the Plataeans realized that the Thebans were inside and that thecity had been captured by surprise, because they were in a panic andbelieved that far more had entered than was the case (they could notsee what had happened in the dark), they came to terms. They acceptedthe proposals and remained inactive, especially since the Thebans tookno offensive action against anyone. But while they were negotiatingthey realized that there were not many Thebans and thought that ifthey attacked they would defeat them easily. For a majority of thepeople of Plataea did not wish to leave their alliance with Athens.Therefore they decided that they should make the attempt and theyassembled together by digging through the party walls of their housesin order to avoid being seen going about in the streets. They alsodragged wagons without their draught animals into the streets to actas barricades and got other things ready in the way that seemed mostlikely to help in their current predicament. When they had goteverything ready as best they could they waited until the time justbefore dawn when it was still dark and then came out of their housesand attacked the Thebans. They thought that if they attacked indaylight the Thebans would be more confident and could meet themon equal terms, while during the night they would be less certain ofthemselves and would also suffer from not knowing the city as well asthe Plataeans did. They attacked at once and speedily engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. (4) When the Thebans realized that they had beentricked they closed up their ranks and resisted the attacks whereverthey occurred. They forced them back two or three times, and all thewhile there was a tremendous uproar from the men who launchedattacks on them and also from the women and slaves, who werescreaming and shouting and hurling down stones and tiles from the

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rooftops; at the same time there was a severe rain storm during thenight. In the end the Thebans, overcome by fear, turned round andfled through the city. But in the darkness and mud most of them didnot know the route they needed to take to escape, and since these eventsoccurred at the end of the month there was no moon. Their pursuers,however, knew how to prevent their escape, with the result that mostof them perished. The gate by which they had entered was the only onestill open, but one of the Plataeans closed it by using a spear spikeinstead of a pin and driving it into the bar, so that there was no longerany way out even by this route. As they were pursued though the citysome of them climbed onto the wall and threw themselves down onthe other side; most were killed in doing so. Some found an unguardedgate and since a woman gave them an axe they cut through the boltwithout being seen. But then they were quickly spotted and only afew got away. Others were killed here and there in different parts of thecity. The largest group, which had kept itself in a tighter formation,rushed into a large building, which was part of the wall and had itsdoors lying open. They thought that the doors were city gates andwould lead through to the outside. When the Plataeans saw that theywere trapped they debated whether to set fire to the building and burnthem as they were or try some other plan. Finally these men and all the other Theban survivors wandering about in the city came to anagreement with the Plataeans to hand over their weapons and surrenderunconditionally.

This surprise attack on Plataea occurred in 431 BC at the start of the PeloponnesianWar; see also below, no. 198.

198 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War2.75–6 (siege of Plataea)

When he had made this appeal to the gods Archidamas brought thearmy into action, and first using the trees that they had cut down theybuilt a palisade round the city (Plataea) to prevent anyone breaking out.Then they built a mound up against the wall of the city, expecting to take it quickly since such a large force was working on the task.They cut down trees from Mount Cithaeron and built a framework on both sides of the mound, laying the logs in a criss-cross formationinstead of walls to prevent the mound from coming apart. They madethe mound out of wood, and stones, and earth, and anything else thatcould be added to accomplish the task. They worked on the moundcontinuously for seventy (?) days and nights, being divided in relays

A T T A C K I N G A N D D E F E N D I N G C I T I E S

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so that while one group was carrying material the other was sleepingand eating. The Spartan officers who were in command of the con-tingents from each allied city stood over them and made sure that theygot on with the work. The Plataeans, however, seeing the moundgrowing bigger, built a wooden wall and attached it to the top of theirown wall where the mound was being erected. Inside this frame-work they built a wall of bricks, which they took from neighbouringhouses. The wood bound the construction together and prevented itfrom weakening as it was built higher. They also used skins and hidesas protective coverings so that both the men working on it and thewoodwork would be protected from attack by fire arrows. Therefore the wall soon rose to a great height and the mound opposite did notlag behind it. The Plataeans also had the idea of dismantling their wall against which the mound was being built and carrying away theearth. (76) When the Peloponnesians realized this they packed clayclosely into reed baskets and placed these into the gap to prevent thestructure from breaking up and stop them from being removed as the earth had been removed. The Plataeans, finding themselves frus-trated in this direction, stopped the work. But they then dug a tunnelfrom the city, having calculated the distance underneath the mound,and then dragged the earth from which the mound was built back withthem. For along time the besiegers did not notice this, and despitetheir piling more earth on top the work made less progress becausethe earth was being taken out from underneath the mound and it wasalways settling down into the empty space. Despite this the Plataeanswere worried in case their small numbers could not hold out against a larger force. They therefore tried another defensive ploy. They stoppedworking on the enormous construction opposite the mound, andstarting from either side of this building, at the ends of the low citywall, they built an inner wall in the shape of a crescent curving backtowards the city. So, if the high wall were captured they could still usethe second wall for protection and the enemy would have to start againbuilding another mound against it, and as they moved inside to haveall the labour for a second time and in a much more dangerous position.Now, while they were building the mound the Peloponnesians broughtup siege engines against the city. One of these was directed at the hugeconstruction opposite the mound and knocked down a large part of it,spreading consternation among the Plataeans. Other siege engineswere deployed against other parts of the wall, and the Plataeans loopedropes over them and fended them off. They also lowered large beamson long iron chains attached to the ends of two poles that projected atright angles from the top of the wall. Whenever a siege engine was


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being brought into position, they hauled the beam up at an obliqueangle and then dropped it by slackening the chains, so that it camecrashing down and broke off the head of the battering ram.

The Peloponnesian army began the siege of Plataea in the summer 429 BC. Thebesiegers next tried to burn the city down, but this failed because the wind did notblow in the right direction. Part of the besieging army then settled down to starve outthe Plataeans. The engines here are battering rams. The figure of seventy days forbuilding the mound seems too great in the context of other siege operations. Some wishto emend the text, suggesting seventeen days, but no certainty is possible.

199 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26(Athenian blockade of Pylos)

Meanwhile at Pylos the Athenians were still carrying on the siege ofthe Spartans on the island while the Spartan army on the mainlandremained in its position. The Athenians were finding the blockadetroublesome because of shortage of food and water. For there was nospring except one on the acropolis of Pylos, and that was not large.Most had to dig about in the shingle on the beach to find what waterthey could to drink. Furthermore there was a shortage of room sincethey were encamped close together, and since the ships had noanchorage the crews took it in turns to have their meals on land whilethe rest anchored at sea. But the greatest despondency was caused bythe unexpectedly long time spent on the siege, since they had expectedthat they would take only a few days to overcome an enemy who wereon a desolate island with only brackish water to drink. The reason wasthat the Spartans had appealed for volunteers to bring to the islandground corn, wine, cheese, and any other type of food that could helpin a siege. They promised large cash rewards, and freedom for any helot who actually brought in food. Many men took the risk andbrought in food, and especially helots, who set out from wherever theycould on the coast of the Peloponnese, and sailing during the night putin at the part of the island facing the open sea. Most of all they waitedfor a wind to bring them in. For it was easy for them to evade the guardkept by the triremes when the wind blew from the sea since it wasimpossible for them to anchor all round the island. The helots madetheir approach to the shore recklessly since the boats that they ranaground had been insured and the Spartan hoplites were on the lookoutat the landing places. But all those who made the attempt in calmweather were captured. Underwater swimmers also made their way infrom the harbour dragging behind them by a rope skins filled withhoneyed poppy seed and crushed linseed. At first the swimmers avoided


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detection, but later guards were posted. Therefore both sides used everykind of device, one to get food in, the other to detect and interceptthem.

For the battle on Sphacteria, see above, no. 103.

200 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protectingthose parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection)

So that you do not need soldiers to guard them, it is best to block offunused open spaces in the city, by digging ditches and making themas inaccessible as possible for those wishing to start a revolt who might seize them as a first move. For example, when the Thebans werebreaking into Sparta, the Spartans in different places throughout thecity ripped apart the houses closest to them and filled baskets withearth and stones taken from them and also from fences and walls. Thestory has it that they even used many enormous bronze tripods fromthe temples and with these managed to block the city’s entrances,thoroughfares, and open spaces before the Thebans arrived, and stoppedtheir attempts to break into the city proper.

Aeneas Tacticus was probably Aeneas of Stymphalus, general of the Arcadian Leaguein 367 BC, who helped to depose Euphron, the tyrant of Sicyon. Aeneas is the earliestof the ancient technical military writers any of whose work has survived. On the basisof the examples he cites his treatise on Siegecraft was probably written in the mid-fourth century. In it he is mainly concerned with the methods to be used in preparingand defending a city against a siege. Several other of his works on military science arenow lost and among them he may have treated the role of the besieger. He gives aparticularly vivid picture of the resourceful and skilful defence of relatively smallGreek cities, especially when some of the citizens were subversive. The work falls intothree general headings: dealing with preparations under threat of siege before an enemypresence is clearly established, preparations when the arrival of the enemy army isimminent, and measures to deal with an actual siege. Of course a Greek city wouldhave considered its sovereignty violated as soon as its territory was invaded, and Aeneasbelieved that as well as securing the city the authorities must also try to prevent theenemy from invading the city’s territory or at least from advancing on the city. Textand translation in W.A. Oldfather (1928); translation and commentary in Whitehead(1990). Aeneas’ identity has been much debated. I here follow Whitehead’s assessment,op. cit., 12.

In this extract Aeneas refers to the Theban attack on Sparta in the summer of 362BC.


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201 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guard city gates)

Next, the appointment of men to watch over the gates must not bedone casually. You should choose sensible and shrewd men who arealways capable of feeling suspicious about anything brought into the city. They should also be prosperous men with an interest in thecity, by which I mean a wife and children, but not men who, becauseof poverty or the pressure of some contract or some other need, couldbe persuaded by someone to revolt, or could themselves instigate revolt. Leucon, tyrant of the Bosporus, used to discharge even from hisown guard men who owed money because of dice games or some otherexcess.

Leucon of the Spartokid dynasty ruled the Cimmerian Bosporus in the eastern Crimeac. 389/8–349/8 BC. For Aeneas the gatekeepers are very important figures because ofhis concern about treachery within the city. To Aeneas this is part of the same defensiveoperation because the internal malcontents are likely to be in collusion with thebesiegers; see Whitehead (1990), 20–1; 25–33.

202 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts)

It is essential to station day scouts in front of the city in a lofty position,visible over as long a distance as possible. At least three scouts shouldbe stationed at each location, and they should not be chosen casually.They should be men experienced in warfare in order to prevent a singlescout, having formed an opinion in ignorance, from signalling orannouncing it to the city and needlessly disturbing the citizens. Thishappens to men who are inexperienced in military formations and thepractice of warfare, since they do not understand whether enemymovements and activities are deliberate or merely accidental. But theexperienced man, knowing enemy preparations, numbers, anddirection of march, and other movements made by the army, willconvey the truth.

For scouting in Greek warfare, see Pritchett, GSW I (1971), 127–34.

203 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keepingwatch on potential traitors)

You must keep under observation those citizens who are antagonisticand not naïvely accept their advice.


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(3) Just before Chios was betrayed, one of the officials who wasinvolved in the treason deceitfully persuaded his colleagues that, sinceit was a time of peace, they should raise the harbour barrier up onto the land for drying and caulking, sell the ships’ old rigging, andrepair the leaking roofs of the ship sheds, the adjoining stoa, and thetower next to it, in which the magistrates took their meals. This was a pretext to ensure that ladders would be in place for those whointended to seize the ship sheds, the stoa, and the tower. He also advisedthat the majority of men who were on guard duty throughout the cityshould be paid off so that, as he claimed, the expense incurred by the city should be as low as possible. By this and similar arguments hepersuaded his colleagues to accept everything that would assist thetraitors when they made their attempt to seize the city. So, you mustalways watch out for men who are enthusiastic to bring about thingslike this. At the same time he fastened to the wall and hung out, as ifhe was trying to dry them, nets for deer and boars, and in another placesails with ropes attached. It was by these that soldiers climbed upduring the night.

This incident at Chios cannot be firmly dated. The stoa was perhaps used as a store orarsenal. Again we see Aeneas’ concern with the possibility of betrayal from within thecity and the need to take precautionary measures well in advance of any threat.

204 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the gate)

To prevent mischief of this kind, the general’s first duty before he takeshis dinner must be to supervise personally the locking of the gate andnot carelessly entrust the task to someone else. In precarious situationshe must give his full attention to this matter.

This is part of Aeneas’ long set of instructions about securing the gates and againreflects his concern about betrayal of the besieged from within; see also below, no. 205.

205 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts)

Furthermore, the guards stationed on the wall, in the market place, atthe civic buildings, at the approaches to the market place, at thetheatre, and other occupied locations should keep watch for short spells.The guards should be changed frequently and there should be manymen involved in each shift. For if a man is on duty for a short spell he


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will not have enough time to have any contact with the enemy and toget ahead with starting a revolution. What is more, if men keep guardfor short spells they are less likely to be overcome by sleep. And if manymen keep guard together it is more probable that some word of anytreachery will leak out.

206 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at guard posts)

In a city where there is unanimity and no one holds any suspicions,lights should be kept burning in lanterns throughout the night at theguard posts on the wall, so that if any hostile activity is directed againstthem they can raise the lantern as a signal to the general. If the natureof the terrain prevents the lantern from being seen by the general,another guard acting as relay should signal the general with his lantern.The general, using a bugler or dispatch-bearers, as seems best, shouldpass on to the other guards the signal he has received. On theseoccasions when the guards are on duty in the way described, the restof the population should be informed that no one is to go out after asignal has been given. And if someone goes out on some essential taskhe should carry a lantern with him so that he is visible from a distanceto the patrols. No workman or craftsman is to carry on his work in casenoises made by any of them reach the guards.

‘Unanimity’ is a translation of the Greek word homonoia, which refers to politicalharmony. Other possible translations are ‘concord’ or ‘of one mind’; see Whitehead(1990), 27.

207 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties)

Whoever is making secret sorties during the night against a besiegingenemy should take the following precautions. First he should ensurethat no one deserts, and then that no light is burning outside, in casethe air above the city, being brighter than the rest, reveals the plan. Hemust also prevent dogs from barking and cocks from crowing bymaking them mute for the moment by cauterising a part of theirmouth. For the noise made by these animals before daybreak will revealthe plan. Some have used the following ploy in making sorties. Theystaged a pretended internal revolt on a plausible pretext, waited fortheir chance and then making a sortie unexpectedly attacked the enemywith great success. Others who were besieged have made a secret sortie


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in the following way. They walled up the gates in full view of theenemy, but where the enemy were most vulnerable to attack they letdown a small sail and raised it again after a time. At first the enemywere astonished by this, but after it had happened several times theypaid no attention. Then the people in the city pulled down as much of the wall as they wanted during the night, built a false wall in itsplace, and let down the sail over it. Next, watching for their chancethey made a sudden sortie and attacked the enemy. When they weredoing this they took care that no one deserted. Therefore it is essentialnot to overlook any of these matters.

For the textual problem in respect of cauterising part of the mouth (or body), seeWhitehead (1990), 163.

208 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable passwords)

Iphicrates indeed issued orders that men on patrol and men on guardduty should not have the same password, but that a different one shouldbe given to each group. Therefore the one questioned first might reply,‘Zeus the Saviour’, if he happened to have this password, while anotherwould reply, ‘Poseidon’. By doing this they were least likely to bedeceived by the enemy and the password betrayed by deserters. If theguards should become separated from one another, they must com-municate using a whistle that has been agreed beforehand. Apart fromthe person who knows it, this will not be recognized by anyone whetherthey are Greeks or barbarians. However, you must make sure that thewhistling does not make the dogs cause trouble. They used this methodat Thebes during the capture of the Cadmeia, when the (attacking)forces were scattered in the darkness and could not recognize oneanother but were gathered together by whistling. The men on patroland the guards in the outposts must ask each other for the password.There is no point in only one person asking, since an enemy pretendingto be a patrol could do that.

For Iphicrates see p. 5. The Cadmeia was the Acropolis at Thebes and this passage referseither to its capture by Sparta in 382 BC or (more likely) to its subsequent liberationin 379; see Whitehead (1990), 171. If the patrol alone gave the password the systemcould be undermined by a courageous enemy who bluffed his way and got the passwordfrom the sentries. This problem could be overcome if both patrol and sentries haddifferent passwords or had an additional sign of recognition (On Siegecraft 25).


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209 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols)

In times of crisis the first thing to do is to arrange for two of the com-panies assembled in the market place to take their turn in patrollingthe base of the city wall. They must be supplied with the availableweapons and tokens of recognition so that they can clearly recognizeeach other from a substantial distance. The men who take the firstwatch must make their patrol before they have had their dinner. Formen on the first watch who have already eaten tend to be more indolentand undisciplined. Furthermore, they should patrol without a light,unless it is very dark and stormy. But if they have a light it must not shine upwards, but must be covered with something, and shouldshine only on the ground in front of their feet. In a city that keepshorses and if the ground is suitable for horses, mounted patrols cantake place in the winter, for in the cold and mud and the long nightsthe patrol can be accomplished more speedily in this way.

210 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics)

The terrors and fears that suddenly strike a city or military camp bynight or day are called ‘panics’ by some. This is a Peloponnesian word,found particularly in Arcadia. Therefore, in dealing with these panicssome wishing to prevent them say that signals should be arranged inadvance for people in the city, which they will recognize when they see. They will then realize that there is a panic since they will observethe previously arranged fire-signal at a place easily visible as far aspossible to everyone in the city. It is best to announce in advance thatwhenever a feeling of fear comes over the soldiers they must remain in their places and sing the paean, or say that it is only a panic andeveryone who hears it should pass the word along the line to hisneighbour. If part of the army does not respond to the singing of thepaean you can tell that the really frightened men are here.

This passage refers to an irrational fear and takes its name from the god Pan (seeBorgeaud (1988), 88–116). The paean was originally a ritual cry in honour of Paen,an ancient god of healing, often identified with Apollo and Asclepius. Later the paeandescribed a song sung in certain situations, such as before entering battle; see Pritchett,GSW I (1971), 105–8.


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211 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms smuggling)

I shall now discuss the question of smuggling into a city jars andbundles, in which something may be hidden by means of which thecity and the acropolis have in past examples been captured. It isessential to pay attention to this issue and not treat it carelessly, andthis applies particularly to the gatekeeper during times when there is a threat from outside or within the city. He must carefully give hisattention to everything brought in.

212 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages)

In respect of secret messages, there are all kinds of ways of sendingthem, but it is essential that the sender and the recipient have made a private arrangement in advance. The following methods are the most likely to avoid detection. In one case a message was sent as follows.A book or other document of any size and age was placed in with a load or other baggage. The message was written on it by marking the first, second and third lines with tiny dots, which were visible onlyto the recipient. When the book arrived with the intended recipient,he wrote out and placed in order the marked letters from the first and second line and similarly from all the others, and worked out themessage.

For the importance of cryptography in Aeneas, see Whitehead (1990), 183. For secretmessages in Roman times, see above, no. 135.

213 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege engines)

Against the assaults of the enemy using either engines or troops youcan offer resistance in the following way. First of all, sails can protectagainst anything raised higher than the wall from towers, or masts, orsimilar things; they should be stretched tight by ropes and coveredwith an impenetrable material, and the missiles will have to overshootthem. It is especially important to produce a great deal of smoke andlight fires to create the biggest blaze possible, and build as a defencelarge wooden towers made from baskets filled with sand, or from stonesor bricks. Indeed even wickerwork woven from reeds in a criss-crosspattern can stop missiles. You should prepare a defence against enginesused to attack the battlements, such as rams or similar things, by


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hanging in front of them sacks of chaff, bags of wool, or fresh hides thathave been inflated or stuffed with something, and other devices likethis.

For towers and masts see Garlan (1974) 171; 225–34. Masts would support a leatheror wicker cradle that could hold one or more men. See also Whitehead (1990), 194–5.

214 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack siege engines)

You must pour pitch and throw tow and sulphur on the shelters thathave been brought up, and then throw down on them a blazing bundleof sticks attached to a rope. Devices of this type, suspended out fromthe walls, can be fired at the engines as they are being moved intoposition. You can destroy these machines by fire in the following way.Wooden sticks should be prepared shaped like pestles, though muchlarger. Then sharp pieces of iron, both long and short, should be driveninto the end of the sticks, and strong combustible material should beattached to the rest of the stick, both top and bottom. It shouldresemble an artist’s depiction of a thunderbolt. This should be droppedonto the engine as it is being moved into position, and its design willensure that it sticks to the engine and while it remains in position thefire will last.

The iron spikes were driven into both ends of the sticks. For the appearance of thethunderbolt on coins, see Jenkins (1972), nos 81, 175, 180, 240, 451, 516, 631.

215 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires)

If the enemy try to set fire to anything with powerful incendiarymaterial, you must put it out with vinegar, since that makes it difficultto start again. It is preferable, though, to smear it first with [birdlime]since this is not combustible. The men who extinguish fires from aheight should have protection for their faces so that they will be lesstroubled if the flames jump up at them.

Polyaenus 6.3 (below, no. 255), in a passage that has some echoes of Aeneas, notes thatvinegar is not combustible. In the second sentence a word is missing from Aeneas’ textand Oldfather (1928), 183, argues that birdlime was meant, partly because vinegarhas already been mentioned, and Aeneas talks of ‘smearing’ it on, and also because ittoo was well known for its non-combustible qualities.


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216 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing of siege ladders)

The placing of siege ladders can be prevented in the following way. Ifthe ladder when set against the wall overtops it, then when the manclimbing up is at the top push him or his ladder away with a forkedpole, if you are not able to stop him in any other way because arrowsare being fired from below. If, however, the ladder is level with the topof the wall, you will not be able to push the ladder away and insteadyou must push off the man climbing over the wall. However, if this is apparently impossible you should use a kind of door-frame made of wooden planks, and when the ladder is being brought forward theframe should be inserted first underneath it. When the ladder beginsto touch the frame, which has had a roller fitted underneath, the framemoves away from underneath and the ladder is unable to get a firmposition and inevitably falls.

For the device with the roller, see Garlan (1974), 173–6, and figure 2. The panel wascontrolled by ropes attached to both sides; when pulled it moved laterally along thewall on its rollers in the required direction and by this movement dislodged the siegeladder.

217 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with tunnels)

Those who are building tunnels should be prevented in the followingway. If you think that a tunnel is being constructed you should dig a ditch as deep as possible outside the wall, so that the tunnel opensinto the ditch and those digging it are exposed to view. If you have the opportunity you should build a wall in the trench made from thetoughest and biggest stones. If you cannot build it from stones, bringup wood shavings. . . . And if at any point the tunnel comes into theditch, throw the wood and the shavings there and set fire to them.Then cover the rest of the ditch so that the smoke penetrates the tunneland injures those inside. Indeed it is possible that the smoke will killmany. Some have even released wasps and bees into the opening andcaused distress to those in the tunnel.

(6) There is an old story . . . about Amasis besieging Barca, when hewas trying to dig a tunnel. The people of Barca, who knew that Amasiswas making the attempt, were worried in case he avoided detection orbeat them to it. But then a coppersmith worked out a ploy. He carrieda bronze shield round inside the wall and in several places held itagainst the ground. Normally there was no sound at most places where


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the shield was set down. But where the digging was going on the shieldproduced a resonance. Therefore the people of Barca dug a counter-tunnel at this point and killed many of the enemy who were diggingthe tunnel. As a result of this up to this very day men use this deviceto discover where a tunnel is being dug.

For tunnelling see Garlan (1974) 143–5; 176–7; 235–6. Use of smoke – Polybius21.28.11–17. Wasps and bees – Appian, Mithridatic Wars 78. The Persian generalAmasis besieged Barca in north Africa in 512 BC (Herodotus, 4.200).

218 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy incursions)

It is essential that those who are under siege should employ devicessuch as the following. At the city gates and just inside them they shoulddig a ditch, leaving a passage on either side of it. Then some of themshould make a sortie and skirmish with the enemy, luring them on sothat they charge into the city with them. Naturally as the men from thecity retreat into it they must run in along the passages left on either side.But it is reasonable that the enemy who run in with them, because theydo not know about the ditch, especially since it is also concealed, willfall in and be immediately killed by those inside the city. Some of thesemen should be stationed in the passageways and at the ditch near thegate. Furthermore, if larger numbers of the enemy infiltrate the cityafter the first group and you wish to contain them, you must prepareabove the centre of the gate a portcullis made of very heavy timber andsheathed in iron. Then, when you want to cut off the enemy who haverushed in, drop this straight down. Now, the portcullis as it falls willkill some of the enemy and will prevent the rest from entering, whilesimultaneously men on the walls are bombarding the enemy at thegates. It is essential that you arrange things in advance with your own men, in case the enemy charges in with them, so that they knowwhere to rendezvous in the city and the friendly forces can therefore bedistinguished by their location. For it is not easy to distinguish betweenfriends and enemies in the uproar of a confused mass of armed men allcharging in together. In some cases when the enemy were over-confidentand came closer than was wise to the city wall either by night or by day, the besieged prepared nooses (brochoi), secretly during the day, butquite openly at night. They then lured the enemy on by skirmishingand hauled up those caught in the nooses.

For the portcullis, see Garlan (1974), 197–8. Brochoi elsewhere in Aeneas refer to loopsor nooses rather than nets – 18.5, 9, 16, 32.4; see Whitehead (1990), 203.


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219 Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers are small)

If the city is large and the men in it are insufficiently numerous todefend the walls all the way round, but you wish to guard it securelywith the forces available, it is essential, using material to hand, to buildup high all the parts of the city wall that can be attacked. Therefore ifsome of the enemy climb the walls by stealth or by force they will beunable to jump down from these heights, being unused to this, and willhave no way at all of getting down. On either side of the areas that havebeen built up men from the available forces should keep guard andkill those who do leap down from the high points.

(4) Indeed the people of Sinope, during their war against Datamaswhen they were under threat and needed men, disguised the mostphysically imposing of their women and armed them as far as possibleto look like men. Instead of shields and helmets they gave them jarsand similar bronze objects and led them round the walls where theenemy was particularly likely to see them. But they forbade them tothrow missiles, for even from far off a woman can be recognized whenshe tries to throw. While they were engaged on this they made sure thatdeserters did not reveal the ploy.

Datamas was Persian governor of Cappodocia who launched a rebellion against kingArtaxerxes in the 360s BC. The war against Sinope, a colony of Miletus on the southernBlack Sea, should probably be dated c. 370 BC.

220 Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern gates)

At the bottom of the walls and the outworks batteries are set up con-sisting of the biggest and most numerous catapults. Some are situatedon level ground, others underground in order to have plenty of roomand to avoid wounding the operators. Without being seen themselvesthey can inflict damage on the enemy, and when the enemy come closethe catapult operators will not become ineffective through inability to lower the angle of fire.

(33) Furthermore, numerous postern gates should be left on theflanks so that sorties can be made easily, and the soldiers whenreturning and making an about turn on the shield side do not leavethemselves exposed. So, the detachment that leaves through onepostern gate will be able to return through a second, and similarly forall the others who are making a withdrawal.

For Philon of Byzantium see above, p. 35. The untitled text here described as (Siegecraft)has a heterogeneous character, though it is generally concerned with aspects of siege


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warfare. Text, translation and commentary in Garlan (1974), 279–404. Garlan, incommon with earlier editors has divided the text into four sections.

Well-positioned postern gates would allow the troops on the sortie to retreatwithout exposing their right sides to the enemy.

221 Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food)

It is right to keep in reserve in public keeping and in private housesother foodstuffs that will not decay, such as pearl barley, wheat insheaves, chick peas, lupines, hippace, lentils, sesame, poppy seeds for the preparation of medicines, and also millet; in addition to this thereshould be bread made from dates. (2) The rich citizens should keepmeat that has been dried or conserved in wine sediment, or other salted meat. For they make no small contribution to nourishment and strength, and are entirely sufficient by themselves and do not needdressing or salt. And there should also be legumes, thoroughly grilled,but if not, in their natural state; others should be marinated in olivelees, for in this way they do not decay.

Pliny (Natural History 25.83) attributed to the plant hippace the same properties as acheese made from mares’ milk by the Scythians.

222 Philon, (Siegecraft) B 49–50 (preparing ammunition and supplies)

It is essential in dealing with sieges to prepare weapons, iron, bronze,bricks, and stones suitable for building, ammunition for catapults,stone-throwers, dart-firing catapults, an engineer to build catapults,men to look after the machines, baskets, mattocks, shovels, carts, axes, and digging tools. (50) All things should be tested during timeof peace when there is no emergency, so that you do not discover duringwartime in a sudden emergency that they are worn out and ineffective.

223 Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege engines)

Then, to deal with catapults, it is right to suspend in front of the wallcovers made from palm leaves that have been tied together; for they aretough and difficult to set on fire. Next, cushioning material should be put in front of them at the point where they overlap so that theirjoints are not cut apart by the missiles, (4) and nets woven from cordsand filled with seaweed should be dropped down. (5) Up above, chains


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are fastened from projecting pieces of wood to carry the covers and the cushions. But it is essential to suspend hides in front of them sothat the chains are not cut by the missiles.


224 Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches,guards, passwords, and signals)

It is right to dig defensive ditches in some places inside the walls and conceal them, so that if a breach is made in the wall the enemy will charge in and many will perish because they do not know aboutthe ditches. (33) But it is also essential, where it is expected that abreach will be made in the wall, to set up a palisade as quickly aspossible and also baskets packed with earth to serve as an advance-wall.

(34) It is right to change the night watches and guard duties of thosesoldiers and citizens whom you distrust and not allow them to knowwhat part of the wall they will be guarding, so that they cannot betraythe city to the enemy. (35) It is sometimes necessary to change thepasswords, so that if some traitor inside the city betrays the passwordto the enemy, or if the enemy creeps up the wall during the night and finds it out, it is of no use to him because it has been changed. (36)In addition to the password secret signals are given, so that even if theenemy hears the password, those who have climbed stealthily onto thewall can easily be recognized.

For ditches, see above, no. 218. Note again the concern about betrayal from within.

225 Philon, (Siegecraft) D59–60 (psychology of siege warfare)

If you are intending to besiege a city for a considerable period of time,you should give the impression to the enemy that you are planning ashort siege so that they carelessly consume all their provisions, makeno preparations for the coming assault, and do not send for help. (60)However, if you are planning a direct assault you should threaten thatyou will persist with a long siege, so that the enemy fearing what mayhappen quickly agrees to the terms that you want.


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226 Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town)

During the capture of a city it is absolutely essential to get possessionof the walls and the acropolis and the market place and the militaryheadquarters and any other strong point. If your army is not strongenough for this, occupy the towers and the strategically most importantplace, in case you are driven from the city again.

(72) If you are unable to carry on the siege so as to storm the city byforce because it is strongly defended on all sides, then you should tryto capture it by stealth or treachery or hunger.

The wisdom of Philon’s advice is borne out by events, e.g., at Plataea in 431 BC theThebans who broke into the city grounded their weapons in the market place(Thucydides 2.2.4); in 223 BC king Cleomenes of Sparta in his assault on Megalopolishad ‘seized the commanding positions beforehand’ (Polybius 2.55.6). Aeneas Tacticusstates that the general in command of the defence forces should take up position atthe government offices and market place if they are defensible; but if not, at thestrongest and most conspicuous places (22.2.)

227 Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply)

Then all the multitude of the townspeople converged on a single watersource at a spot right underneath the city wall, where an abundantspring gushed out in the area where for a distance of three hundred feetthere was a gap in the circuit of the river. Everyone wanted to find away to keep the townspeople away from this spring, but only Caesarsaw how it could be done. Opposite the spring he began to erectmantlets up the hillside and to construct a terrace. This involved a lotof work and constant fighting. For the townspeople charged down fromtheir lofty position and threw missiles from a distance without incur-ring any risk, and by tenaciously keeping up the attack wounded manysoldiers. However, our men were not prevented from pushing on withthe mantlets and overcame the difficulties of terrain by hard work andeffort. Simultaneously they dug hidden mines towards the watercoursesand the source of the spring. They carried on this kind of work withoutany danger to themselves since they could work without the enemy’ssuspecting it. They constructed a terrace sixty feet high and placed onit a ten-storey tower. This was not intended to reach the height of the walls (no amount of work could achieve that), but to allow themto dominate the spring. When engines fired missiles from the towerat the approaches to the spring, the townspeople could not collect water


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without risk, and not only cattle and pack animals but also a greatcrowd of the enemy were tormented by thirst.

This refers to the siege of Uxellodunum, a town of the Cadurci, in 51 BC. This was thelast serious resistance to the Roman conquest of Gaul. Its exact location is disputed.

228 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack)

At Chios also, when the enemy had built storming ladders (sambucae)on board their ships, the Chians during the night threw earth, sand,and stones into the sea in front of the wall. So, on the following daywhen the enemy wanted to approach the wall the ships grounded onthe material that had been heaped up under the surface. They couldneither approach the wall nor make their way back, but were piercedby fire-missiles and burned up on the spot.

Vitruvius was an architect and military engineer who wrote a treatise De Architecturain ten books, addressed to Augustus in 27 BC. Book 10 deals with the construction ofmachines for both civil and military purposes. At 10.11.2 he tells us that in respectof the calibrations for stone-throwers he had personal experience of what worked inpractice and had also received guidance from his instructors. It seems also that alongwith his contemporary, Athenaeus Mechanicus, he was greatly indebted to the workof Agesistratus (see below, p. 191), and his work on catapults certainly seems to be upto date, incorporating modifications and improvements in the design of catapults afterPhilon. Translation and commentary – Rowland and Howe (1999).

For the sambuca, see Polybius 8.6. It was a kind of scaling ladder attached to themast of a ship, and its name came from the stringed harp, which it resembled. Thechronological context of the siege is not clear. See Rowland and Howe, op. cit., 315,figure 138.

229 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles)

Again, when Marseilles (Massilia) was under siege and the attackersbuilt more than thirty tunnels, the people of Marseilles becomingsuspicious deepened the entire ditch that ran round the city wall byexcavating it more deeply. So, all the tunnels came out into this ditch.In those places where a ditch could not be constructed, they dug insidethe wall a pit of enormous length and depth, just like a swimmingpool, opposite the spot where the tunnel was being built, and filled itfrom wells and the water in the harbour. Therefore, when the tunnel’spassage was suddenly opened up, a huge rush of water surged in andflattened the props. The troops who were inside were killed by thehuge quantity of water and the collapse of the tunnel.


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Furthermore, when a mound was heaped up against the walls andthe site was raised higher still by cutting down trees and piling themthere, the besieged made the entire construction catch fire by firing red-hot iron bars into it from their catapults. Then when the ram-tortoisehad been brought up to pound the wall, they let down a rope andlooped it round the head of the ram. Next they used a capstan to wind the rope round a drum and by keeping the head of the ramsuspended they did not allow it to touch the wall. Finally theydestroyed the machine with fire-missiles and shots from the catapult.So, these victorious cities were liberated not by military engines, butby the skill of architects working against the deployment of engines.

The siege of Marseilles in 49 BC was conducted by D. Brutus and C. Trebonius onCaesar’s behalf during the civil war against Pompey (see Caesar, Civil Wars 2.1–2).

230 Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city)

If the general is setting out by day to lead his army to capture at anagreed time cities that are to be betrayed, he should send cavalrymenon ahead to arrest everyone they meet on the road, in case one of thelocal inhabitants runs on ahead and gives warning of their opponents’advance. The army ought to appear suddenly while the enemy is off his guard. The general must arrive unexpectedly on an unsuspectingenemy even if he is not intending to capture the city by treachery butby force of arms after declaration of war. He must not hesitate but musttry in every way to attack outpost, camp, or city before his advancebecomes known, especially if he is aware that his army is small andinferior to the enemy’s.

(40) A siege requires valour on the part of the soldiers, militaryscience on the part of the general, and armament consisting of warengines. The general must be careful and just as wary as the besieged.For when an army comes under attack, it is especially watchful of theattacking force when it knows exactly what the danger is. The armythat thinks it is not in danger carries out its tasks when it pleases, whilethe army that is in danger tries to anticipate the enemy in its actionswhenever it gets the chance. Therefore it is essential for the besieginggeneral to secure his own camp with ditch, rampart, and guards. Forwhatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls, whilethe besieged have the wall as a shield and often without being seenburst out through the gates and set fire to the engines or butcher thesoldiers or do whatever mischief they can manage.


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231 Josephus, The Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata)

Vespasian placed his artillery engines, which all together numbered onehundred and sixty, in a circular formation and ordered them to fire atthe defenders on the walls. (167) In one great barrage the catapultsfired bolts, the stone-throwers hurled stones weighing nearly a talent(26 kg), there were fire-brands and showers of arrows, making itimpossible for the Jews to man the ramparts or the interior area, whichwas within range of the missiles. (168) For a throng of Arab archers and all the javelin men and slingers joined in the bombardment withthe artillery. (169) Nevertheless the Jews despite being prevented from defending the ramparts did not remain inactive. They madesorties in small groups in guerrilla style, pulled away the shelters fromthe men working, and when they were exposed attacked them.Wherever the Romans retired, the Jews demolished the earthworksand set fire to the palisade and wicker screens. (170) Finally Vespasian,realizing that the reason for the damage was a gap between the earth-works, as the space allowed the Jews a place to attack, brought togetherthe shelters and at the same time concentrated his troops, preventingany more incursions by the Jews.

(171) The siege mound was now getting higher and was almost levelwith the battlements when Josephus, thinking that it would beoutrageous if he could not work out some counter-stratagem to savethe city, summoned the stonemasons and ordered them to make thewall higher. (172) But they said that it was impossible to build the wallwhen they were being bombarded with missiles. So, he devised thefollowing protection for them. (173) He ordered that a wooden railingshould be attached to the wall and hides of recently flayed oxen hungover it, in order to catch in their folds the stones hurled by the engines;other missiles would glance off the hides and their moisture would putout fire-missiles. (174) This screen was placed before the masons andworking under it in safety day and night they raised the wall to a heightof thirty feet, built many towers, and completed the work with strongbattlements. (175) This made the Romans very disheartened since theythought that they were already inside the town, and they were amazedby Josephus’ cleverness and the courage of the inhabitants.

(271) In this crisis Josephus, taking necessity as his guide (for whenshe is provoked by despair she is very ingenious), ordered that boilingoil should be poured over the formation of interlocking shields. (272)The Jews had it ready and immediately poured enormous quantitiesover the Romans on all sides and threw down after it the jars, which


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were still scalding hot. (273) This broke the Romans’ formation asthey were burned and rolled off the wall in appalling agony. (274) Forthe oil easily flowed over their entire bodies from their head to theirfeet under their armour, and consumed their flesh no less fiercely thana flame; oil because of its fatty properties is naturally quick to heat andslow to cool. (275) For the Romans burdened with their helmets and body armour there was no escape from the burning liquid, andjumping and twisting in agony they fell off the scaling ladders. Thosewho turned to flee encountered their own men forcing their wayforward and were an easy target for the Jews attacking from the rear.

These extracts describe the siege of Jotapata in the Jewish revolt of AD 66.

232 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack)

Marcus Cato in Spain saw that he could capture a certain town if hecould attack the enemy unexpectedly. Therefore he completed in twodays a four-day march through a rough and infertile area and destroyedthe enemy, who were not expecting anything like this. When his menenquired about the reason for such an easy success, he replied that theyhad won the victory at the moment when they had completed the four-day march in two.

Marcus Cato commanded in Spain after his consulship of 195 BC and suppressed arebellion. See above, no. 77 for a general list of the general’s responsibilities duringsieges.

233 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack)

When Domitius Calvinus was besieging Lueria, a town of theLigurians, which was protected not only by its site and fortifications,but also by the excellence of the defenders, he established the practiceof frequently marching round the town with all his forces and thenleading them back to camp. This routine lured the people in the towninto thinking that the Romans were doing this as part of their drill andtherefore they took no precautions against his action. But he switchedfrom this parade into a sudden attack and when he had seized the wallshe forced the townspeople to surrender.


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234 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor)

Marcus Marcellus had lured a Syracusan named Sosistratus to turntraitor, and learned from him that the guard would be less strict on afestival day when Epicydes was going to make a distribution of wineand food. Therefore Marcellus, taking advantage of the festive spiritand the lack of discipline that went with it, scaled the walls, killed theguards, and opened up to the Roman army a city already famous as the location of splendid victories.

This occurred in 212 BC during the war with Hannibal; there were variations in thestory, and Livy (25.23), Plutarch (Marcellus 18), and Polyaenus (8.11) mention theinformant as Damippus from Sparta.

235 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged)

When Alexander was preparing to besiege Leucadia, which had anabundance of supplies, he first captured the forts on the borders andallowed all the people from these to flee to Leucadia so that theirsupplies would be used up more quickly because of the increasednumbers.

This refers to Alexander, son of king Pyrrhus of Epirus.

236 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander)

When the Lusitanians told Tiberius Gracchus that they had suppliesfor ten years and therefore did not fear a siege, he said, ‘I shall captureyou in the eleventh year’. The Lusitanians were terrified by what hesaid, and although well provisioned immediately surrendered.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, father of the tribune, served as praetor and proconsulin Spain (180–178 BC) and defeated the Celtiberians.

237 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention)

King Pyrrhus of Epirus during his war against the Illyrians wanted tocapture the town that was their capital, but giving up hope of achievingthis began to attack other towns. Therefore he brought it about thatthe enemy, trusting that the defences of the capital were sufficient,


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slipped away to defend the other towns. Then he immediately recalledall his troops and captured the town, which had been denuded ofdefenders.

For Pyrrhus, see above no. 79.

238 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river)

Lucius Metellus, when operating in Nearer Spain, diverted the courseof a river and directed it from high ground against the enemy camp,which was situated on lower ground. The enemy were terrified by thesudden flood and he massacred them by men placed in ambush for thisvery purpose.

For Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus in Spain, see above no. 162.

239 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply)

Cleisthenes of Sicyon cut the water-pipes leading into the town ofKirra, and when the inhabitants were affected with thirst he restoredthe supply contaminated with hellebore. When they used the waterthey were so enfeebled by diarrhoea that Cleisthenes captured them.

This occurred c. 595 BC. Polyaenus (6.13) attributed the stratagem to Eurylochus,Pausanias (10.37.5) to Solon.

240 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected quarter)

Fabius Maximus, son of the ‘Delayer’, on coming to Arpi, which wasgarrisoned by Hannibal’s troops, first inspected the site of the city andthen sent six hundred troops on a dark night to climb the walls withscaling ladders at the part of the city that was fortified and thereforehad fewest defenders, and break down the gates. These soldiers werehelped by the noise of falling rain, which muffled the sounds of theiractivities, and carried out their orders. Fabius himself on a given signalattacked from another direction and captured Arpi.

This occurred in 213 BC; cf. Livy 24.46–7.


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241 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged)

Himilco the Carthaginian, when campaigning at Agrigentum, stationedpart of his army in ambush near the town with instructions to set fireto some damp wood when the townspeople marched out. Then movingforward at dawn with the rest of his army in order to lure the enemyout, he pretended to flee and by continuing his retreat he made theenemy follow him further and further away. The soldiers in ambushclose to the walls followed their orders and lit a fire with torches. Whenthe Agrigentines saw the smoke rising up they thought that their citywas on fire and charged back in a panic to defend it. Caught betweenthe men in ambush near the walls who waylaid them and the troopspressing on from behind whom they had recently been pursuing, theywere butchered.

Himilco commanded the Carthaginian forces in Sicily in the war against Dionysius Iof Syracuse in 406 BC; cf. Polyaenus 5.10.4.

242 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire)

The Spartan leader Agesilaus, when he was besieging the Phocaeansand realized that the allies acting as a garrison were already worn down with the toils of war, withdrew a short distance as though onother business, and gave them an easy opportunity to leave the city.Soon after, he led his troops back and conquered the Phocaeans, whohad been left on their own.

The Spartan king Agesilaus II (c. 445–359 BC) campaigned in 395–394 against acoalition of Sparta’s enemies in Greece; cf. Polyaenus 2.1.16.

243 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilanceamong the defenders)

Alcibiades the Athenian leader, when his own city was under siege bythe Spartans, fearing that the guards might be careless, told those onduty to watch out for a light that he would show from the citadelduring the night, and to raise their own lights when they saw it.Anyone who failed in this duty would be punished. While they wereanxiously waiting their leader’s signal everyone remained vigilant andthe danger of this hazardous night was averted.


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Alcibiades (451/0–404/3 BC) was an Athenian politician and general. Elected generalby the Athenian fleet at Samos he fought a successful naval campaign against theSpartans. He was appointed to a special command, but after a minor defeat sufferedby his subordinate at Notium in 406 he left Athens; cf. Polyaenus 1.40.3.

244 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message)

When the people of Cyzicus were besieged by Mithridrates, LuciusLucullus wanted to let them know that he had arrived. There was asingle, narrow entrance to the city, linking the island to the main-land by a small bridge, and this was in the hands of enemy soldiers.Therefore Lucullus sewed letters inside two inflated skins and orderedone of his soldiers who was a competent swimmer and boatman to lieon the skins, which he had tied together at the bottom with two stripssome distance apart, and make the crossing of seven miles. The soldierdid this so skilfully, by angling his legs like a rudder to control direc-tion, that he deceived the guards on duty, who were watching from adistance, into thinking that he was some kind of marine animal.

For the campaigns of Lucullus, see above no. 148; cf. Florus 1.40.15–16.

245 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies)

When Hannibal was besieging Casilinum, the Romans sent jars of wheat downstream on the river Volturnus to be picked up by thebesieged. When Hannibal stopped this by stretching a chain acrossthe river they scattered nuts on the water. These floated down to thetown on the current and this food sustained the allies in their time of need.

This is part of Hannibal’s campaign in Italy in 216 BC. Cf. Livy 23.19; the garrisoneventually surrendered on terms.

246 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about supplies)

Thrasybulus the leader of the Milesians, when his soldiers were sufferingin a long siege conducted by Alyattes, who was hoping to starve theminto surrender, ordered that all the grain should be collected in themarket place in preparation for the arrival of envoys from Alyattes. Healso arranged banquets at the same time and provided luxurious feasts


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throughout the city. In this way he convinced the enemy that they had an abundance of supplies with which to hold out against a longsiege.

Thrasybulus was ruler of Miletus, which was involved in a long struggle with theLydians under king Alyattes c. 610 BC; cf. Herodotus 1.21–2; Polyaenus 6.47.

247 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie)

When the people of Numantia were besieged they did not even draw up their battle line in front of the rampart but kept themselvesso carefully inside the town that Popillius Laenas became confidentenough to attack it with scaling ladders. Laenas, suspecting an ambushbecause they did not offer any resistance even then, recalled his forces.But at this point the Numantines made a sortie and attacked theRomans in the rear as they were climbing down.

Marcus Popillius Laenas (consul 139 BC) continued the long-running siege ofNumantia in Spain.

248 Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege)

When the Romans were besieged by Hannibal and were themselvesbesieging Capua, they issued a decree that they would not recall theirarmy from there until it had been captured.

This occurred in 211 BC; cf. Livy 26.1.2–4.

249 Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus)

First he began to fill in the ditch they had dug in front of the city,about forty-five feet broad and twenty-two deep, to make the approachof the siege towers easier, from which he intended to bombard thedefenders on the city walls, and the other engines, with which heplanned to batter down the wall. Alexander filled in the ditch with nodifficulty and soon the towers were brought up. However, the defendersof Halicarnassus made a sortie during the night intending to set fireto the towers and any other engines that had been brought up or werealmost in position. But they were easily shut up again inside the walls


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by the Macedonian guards and others who were alerted by the actionand charged up to help.

(21) Once again the troops making the sortie were driven back inside the walls by the Macedonians and the city came close to beingcaptured. For the walls at that time were not vigilantly guarded andtwo towers and the curtain wall had collapsed to their foundations.The approach to the wall would not have been difficult for the army if they had all joined in the task. Furthermore, the third tower hadbeen badly shaken and if it had been undermined it could easily havebeen brought down. But the defenders anticipated this by building onthe inner side a crescent-shaped brick wall in place of the one that hadcollapsed. Since there were many engaged in the work, it was easilyaccomplished.

Next day Alexander moved up the engines against this wall, andagain the defenders launched a sortie in order to burn them. Part of theline of mantlets near the wall and part of one of the wooden towers wereburnt down. Philotas and Hellanicus and their men, who had beenentrusted with guarding them, saved the rest. But when Alexanderhimself appeared in the sortie, they dropped the torches they hadbrought with them when they charged out to attack, and many threwaway their weapons as they fled inside the walls. And yet at first thedefenders from their advantageous position came off the better, as theywere firing at those defending the engines not only from the front butalso from the towers which had remained standing on either side of thebreach in the wall and allowed fire from the flanks and indeed virtuallyat the rear of those attacking the replacement wall.

(22) A few days later Alexander again brought up the engines againstthe inner brick wall and took charge of the work himself. There was asortie from the city in full force, and some of the enemy attacked nearthe breach in the wall where Alexander himself was positioned, othersnear the triple gate where the Macedonians least expected it. Somethrew torches on the engines and anything else that could start a fireand make a conflagration. But the men with Alexander launched astrong counter-attack, and the engines on the towers hurled enormousstones while volleys of missiles rained down. The besieged were easilyrouted and fled to the city. Here there was a massacre, in proportion tothe number in the sortie and their greater boldness. For some perishedin hand-to-hand fighting with the Macedonians, others at the collapsedwall, where the space was too small for the mass of men and the fallensections of the wall made it difficult to get over them.

Ptolemaeus, the royal bodyguard, met those making a sortie by thetriple gate, bringing up the units commanded by Adaeus and Timander


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and some of the light-armed troops. These forces easily routed thetroops from the city, who indeed also suffered during the retreat incrossing the narrow bridge constructed over the ditch. This gave way under their weight and many of them fell into the ditch and were trampled to death by their own side while others were shot by the Macedonians above. The greatest carnage occurred round the gatesthemselves because in the panic they were closed too early, as thebesieged feared that the Macedonians would get into the city followingon the heels of the fugitives. Consequently many friends were shutoutside the city and massacred by the Macedonians under the walls.Indeed the city came close to being captured if Alexander had notcalled his army back, since he still wanted to save Halicarnassus if thecitizens would surrender peacefully.

Arrian here describes Alexander’s siege of Halicarnassus in 334 BC during his campaignagainst the Persians in Asia Minor.

250 Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege)

Cleon handed Sestos over to the people of Abydos not by means of openwarfare but by underhand cunning. Theodorus, who commanded theguard at Sestos and was a friend of Cleon, was having sex with a womanin the suburbs. He went out at night by taking one stone out of anarrow watercourse that led out through the wall and putting it backwhen he returned. This was how he avoided detection, and he toldCleon about what he was doing as if it were a kind of game. But Cleontold the secret to the people of Abydos, and watching by the water-course for a moonless night, when Theodotus had removed the stoneand was busy having sex, he led in the soldiers. They killed the guards,opened the gates from the inside for the entire force, and easily tookcontrol of Sestos.

Cleon was an Athenian politician who had contributed to the Spartan defeat atSphacteria (see above, no. 103). Subsequently as general in 422 BC he led a campaignto defend Athenian interests in Thrace. He was defeated and killed at the battle ofAmphipolis in 421.

251 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’ attention)

Philip was besieging Pharcedon, a Thessalian city. The inhabitantssurrendered the city, but when Philip’s mercenaries were entering they


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fell into an ambush, for many pelted them with stones and javelinsfrom the roofs and the towers. Philip quickly thought up a ploy to deal with the ambush. The rear part of the city was deserted since the citizens had assembled for the ambush, and Philip ordered theMacedonians to attack this part and put up scaling ladders. When theyclimbed up on top of the wall the Pharcedonians stopped bombardingthe mercenaries and hurried off to deal with the soldiers who had seizedthe city wall. But the Macedonians had already taken control of the citybefore it came to hand-to-hand fighting.

By 352 BC Philip had virtually annexed Thessaly and was appointed to its traditionalheadship (archon).

252 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery)

When Corinth was being betrayed to Demetrius, he arrived duringthe night, before the traitors had opened the gates in the citadel.Fearing that the inhabitants might attack him when they found outwhat was happening, Demetrius encircled them with a large force andattacked the Lechaeum gate. These soldiers raised a tremendous shout,and all the Corinthians ran together towards the uproar. Meanwhile the traitors opened the gates at the citadel and welcomed the enemy.And so Demetrius captured Corinth while the Corinthians guardedthe Lechaeum gate.

For Demetrius Poliorcetes, see above, nos 183–4; cf. Diodorus Siculus 20.103.1.

253 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a mine)

Philip was besieging Prinassus, a Rhodian city in Peraea. Since it hadstrong walls he tried to undermine them. But in the dig theyencountered hard rock that would not yield to their digging tools.Philip ordered his men to go into the mine during the day as if theywere going to work and to erect screens as if he wanted to avoid detec-tion. This activity was visible to the enemy, who were watching fromthe walls. He ordered the soldiers during the night to bring earth froma deep pit about a mile away and pile it in front of the mouth of themine. When a large amount of earth had been piled up in heaps andevery day the men on the wall saw this, they came to believe that thecity was being undermined. This fear induced them to surrender the


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city to Philip. Later, when they realized how they had been deceived,they deplored their own stupidity.

This refers to the campaigns of Philip V of Macedon in 201 BC against the Rhodiansand their allies; cf. Polybius 16.11; Frontinus, Stratagems 3.8.1.

254 Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city)

When Aenetus, general of Demetrius, was in control of Ephesus andwas using pirates to attack his neighbours, Lycus, general of Lysimachus,captured Ephesus by bribing Andron, the pirate leader. Andronbrought into the city soldiers of Lycus, unarmed, in cloaks and oldclothes, and with their hands bound, as if he had taken them prisoner.When he came near the acropolis he ordered them to use their daggers, which they carried concealed under their arms. When thegatekeepers and guards on the acropolis had been butchered, a signalwas raised to the soldiers with Lycus. They attacked, captured Aenetus,and occupied Ephesus. They gave the pirates their reward but imme-diately expelled them from the city, thinking that those who betrayedtheir first friends were not reliable.

See also Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.7. Lysimachus had been one of Alexander’sbodyguards, and after becoming governor of Thrace established himself for a time asking of Macedon.

255 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices uses by besiegers and besieged)

When Athenocles was besieged, to protect against attack by rams andborers he constructed lead bars and stretched them lengthways alongthe battlements with the result that the enemy’s engines broke whenthey hit them. But the enemy devised and brought up another engine,which struck the end of the lead bar and forced it to fall straight downfrom the battlements so that it injured none of those standing on theground below. Then the enemy brought up ‘tortoises’ and started tobatter the walls. The defenders thrust out from the walls bronzecontainers full of molten lead and poured it down, thereby destroyingthe ‘tortoise’. But the enemy brought up siege towers and pouredvinegar down from them onto the ‘tortoise’ and quenched the lead andall the other firebrands thrown from the walls. For vinegar is apparentlyexcellent at putting out fire. Indeed the best protection against fire isto rub on vinegar (for vinegar will not catch fire at all) and to attach a


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sponge soaked in water. As a defence against the pouring down of lead,some men placed caps on the engines, consisting of an application ofearth and clay mixed with hair.

For putting out fires, see also above, no. 215.

256 Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel)

After many Romans had been wounded or killed during the siege ofthe Ambracians, they built a narrow tunnel underneath the city in thehope of bringing the siege to an end. For a long time they avoideddetection by the enemy, but when a large amount of earth had beenheaped up the Ambracians realized what the Romans were up to andbuilt a counter-tunnel from inside the city. At the end of the tunnelthey dug a ditch at right angles and set up thin bronze sheets in a rowso that when the Romans came upon these there would be a noise.Indeed when the noise came they met the Romans underground anddrove them back with sarisas. But in the narrow, dark tunnel they didnot have much success, and they therefore got ready a jar, which fittedexactly into the tunnel. They bored holes in the bottom, fitted a metalpipe, filled it with fine feathers and then lit a small fire. Then theyplaced a lid full of holes on it and angled it towards the enemy tunnel.They then fixed blacksmith’s bellows to the rear of the jar, blew intothe tube which had been fitted, and kindled the fire. The result was thatthe tunnel was filled with a lot of acrid smoke and since the Romanscould not bear it they abandoned their underground siege works.

Ambracia was besieged in 189 BC by Marcus Fulvius Nobilior during campaignsagainst the Aetolian Confederacy (Livy 38.7).

257 Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city)

Although Darius had been besieging Babylon for a long time he wasunable to take the city. Zopyrus, Darius’ satrap, mutilated his face and came as a deserter saying that he had suffered this at the hands of Darius. The Babylonians put their faith in the sight of what hadbeen inflicted on him and entrusted the city to Zopyrus. But he opened the gates during the night, and Darius after taking possession ofBabylon made that famous statement: ‘I would not want to capturetwenty Babylons in return for seeing Zopyrus suffering mutilation likethis.’


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518 BC; cf. Herodotus 3.153–60; Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.4 makes Cyrus the Persianking and claims that he mutilated Zopyrus.

258 Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium)

Their city (Byzantium) is very favourably located both in respect of the two continents and the sea that lies between them and has strongdefences because of the topography of the site and the character of theBosporus. For the city is built on high ground and sticks out into the sea, which surges down from the Euxine just like a mountaintorrent and crashes against the headland, where part of it is deflectedto the right and makes the bay and the harbours. But the greater partgoes towards the Propontis, rushing past the city at tremendous speed.In addition Byzantium had very strong fortifications. For the breast-work of the walls was constructed using enormous squared stones,bound together with bronze plates, and inside they were reinforcedwith mounds and buildings, so that the whole construction resembledone very thick wall with a covered walkway on top that could be easilydefended. There were many huge towers built on the outside (of thewall) and they had windows positioned close together on all sides, sothat anyone attacking the wall would be entrapped between them.Since they were constructed at short intervals, not following a straightline but with some here and some there on a rather crooked circuit, theyoffered a line of fire at any group making an assault. The walls on thelandside were built to a great height so as to repel any chance attackfrom that side, while those facing the sea are of a lesser height. For the rocks on which the walls were built and the perilous nature of theBosporus were splendid allies for the Byzantines. The harbours insidethe walls were both closed with chains, and their breakwaters hadtowers that jutted out a long way on both sides so that it was impossiblefor an enemy to make an approach by sea. To sum up, the Bosporus isa tremendous help to the Byzantines. For it is entirely inevitable thatas soon as anyone is swept into the current, then willing or not he isbound to be washed up on the land. This situation is welcome for thecitizens but disastrous for enemies.

(11) These were the fortifications of Byzantium and in addition manydifferent types of engine were positioned along the entire wall. Now,some threw stones and beams against the enemy at short range, othersfired stones, missiles, and darts at long range so that no one could safely come near over a substantial area. Others had hooks and they letthese down suddenly and snatched up ships or engines over the short


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intervening distance. A fellow citizen of mine called Priscus designedmost of them and was consequently both condemned to death andreprieved. For Septimius Severus, hearing about his skill, forbade hisexecution and from then on used his services for various operations,particularly in the siege of Hatra, where engines built by Priscus werethe only ones not burnt by the barbarians.

(12) The achievements and sufferings of the Byzantines were on alarge scale since they were under siege for three whole years by theweaponry of virtually the entire world. I shall mention a few incidentsthat were particularly noteworthy. They used to capture ships thatwere sailing past by making well-judged attacks, but they also seizedtriremes in the enemy anchorage. For they used divers to cut theanchors and hammer into the sides of the ships nails that were attachedby ropes to the friendly shore. Then they pulled on the ropes so that itlooked as if the ships were sailing by themselves with no impetus fromoarsmen or wind. Indeed, some traders deliberately allowed themselvesto be captured by the Byzantines while pretending that this was againsttheir will, sold their merchandise for a huge profit, and escaped by sea.

Dio here describes the siege of Byzantium, AD 193–5 during the civil war betweenSeptimius Severus and Pescennius Niger, governor of Syria.


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5

MILITARY ENGINEERINGBridges, camps, fortifications, siege

engines, and siege works

259 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100(use of fire machine)

The Boeotians . . . marched on Delium and attacked the fortifications.They used various means of attack and in the end captured it by bring-ing up an engine that had been constructed as follows. They sawed anenormous wooden beam into two parts, hollowed out both of them, andthen carefully fitted them back together, just like a pipe. They attacheda cauldron to one end with chains, and an iron tube was inclinedthrough the hollowed-out beam down into the cauldron. They alsocovered most of the rest of the wooden beam with iron plates. Usingcarts they brought the engine from a considerable distance up to thepart of the wall that was built mainly of vines and wood. When it wasclose to the wall they attached large bellows to their end of the beamand blew through them. The draught of air, confined inside the tube,went into the cauldron, which contained lighted coals, sulphur, andpitch. It created an enormous fire that caught hold of the wall, so thatno one could remain on it. The defenders leaving their positions tookto their heels and the wall was captured in this way.

Athenian forces were besieged in Delium in 424/3 BC by the Boeotian forces. TheSpartans had used a primitive fire machine against Plataea (Thucydides 2.77.3–6),and later Brasidas was preparing a fire machine against the defenders at Lecythus(4.115.2–3). These machines were of some value, at least in small-scale operationsagainst wooden walls; see Garlan (1974), 140–1.

260 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river)

When the generals were at a loss what to do a man from Rhodes cameup to them and said: ‘I am ready to bring you across in groups of four

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thousand hoplites at a time if you supply me with what I need andgive me one talent in payment. When they asked what he needed, hereplied: ‘I will need two thousand bags made from skin. I see that thereare many sheep, goats, cattle, and asses here. Once they have beenskinned and the skins inflated they will make the crossing easy. I shallalso need the ropes that you use for the baggage animals. With theseI shall bind the bags to one another and fix each bag in place by tyingstones to it and letting them down into the water like anchors. ThenI shall stretch the bags across the river and attach them to each bank,and finally place a layer of wood and spread earth on top of it. You caneasily appreciate that there is no danger that they will sink. For one bagwill prevent two men from sinking and the wood and the earth willprevent them from slipping off the skin.’ When the generals heardthis they thought that it was a good idea, but impossible in practice.For there were large numbers of cavalry on the other bank to preventthe crossing, and they would not allow the first across to accomplishany of this.

The Greeks were trying to cross the Tigris, which was so deep that even spears did notstand out above the water.

261 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults43–4 (military value of catapults)

I have undertaken, King Attalus, to explain the construction of a stone-throwing engine, and please do not mock me if some engines happento belong to a different category from this. (44) It is my firm opinionthat with the help of these you will easily overcome the enginesemployed in the assaults of your enemies, if you counter-attack usingthe methods that I describe below. You should try to use technicalknowledge, for it is essential to use both the measurements and indeedthe proportions of the engines set out here. You should also try, in respect of all wooden parts, to prepare them for hard wear and inparticular (to use) the wood of the ash tree. For these parts would beespecially suitable.

Biton’s treatise on siege engines is addressed to a king Attalus. This is probably AttalusI of Pergamum (269–197 BC), rather than one of the later Attalid kings, because Bitondiscusses only non-torsion engines (see above, p. 7), which were probably no longerin common use from c. 250 BC onwards. A technical work discussing such enginesmight conceivably have some relevance around 240 BC but not in the second century.On the other hand, it is the case that among military writers there is sometimes aliking for an antiquarian theme, and a willingness to discuss tactics and practices no

B R I D G E S , C A M P S , S I E G E E N G I N E S A N D W O R K S

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longer in use. The only datable person to whom Biton refers is one Posidonius, whoconstructed a siege tower for Alexander the Great. Text, translation, and commentaryin Marsden (1971), 5–6; 61–103; for the character of his work see also Cuomo (2001),86–8.

262 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults44–7 (construction of a stone-thrower)

I shall therefore begin by setting out first the construction of the stone-thrower described below. (45) I request you to look carefully at the list of measurements. Charon of Magnesia designed this stone-throwerin Rhodes. Now, it has straight beams AB. These should have a lengthof six feet, and a breadth and height of half a foot. Next, two moreparallel beams ΓΓ, three and one half feet long and one foot broad,should be fastened to the first (beams). The ends of the beams shouldbe fitted with iron or bronze for not less that two feet of their lengthso that they do not break under the strain. Next the beams ΓΓ shouldhave iron serrated teeth of not less than two dactyls (38.6 mm). Thestrips of toothed metal should have appropriate thickness and breadth.(46) Then there should be two more beams, ∆E, similar to the firstones, ΓΓ, and of similar thickness. These should not stand in a fixedposition but should run in small grooves so that during operationsthey can run backwards and forwards. And these beams should haveteeth similar to the first in thickness, shape, and size. They should be parallel, so that when the engine is tightened during the pull-backoperation, the teeth on the beams intermesh and a conjunction isachieved between the two upper beams and between the two lowerbeams. For the beams should rest evenly against one another, and thesize of the gap between the grooves should be the same for the frontand rear ends of the beams. (47) On the upper beam ∆ there should be a sling, which is half a foot distant from the beams AB on either side.The sling should be made of hair, capable of supporting the stoneplaced on it. Its perimeter should be ten dactyls (193 mm). Then, atone corner of the sling there should be an iron ring plaited into thesling. Next, one and a half feet away from A, a bow should be fittedthat is stretched towards the beam Γ, if the man intending to fire thestone pulls it back using the beams ZH on the stanchions KΘ. The endof beam Γ should have iron crossbars so that it is sufficiently strong to withstand the firing process.

In this construction the serrated teeth operate as a ratchet. The beams ∆E make theslider and the upper part (∆) contained the channel in which the projectile was placed.Marsden (1971), 79 calculates that the weight of the projectile was about 5.164 lb.


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The beams ZH on Marsden’s interpretation constitute a windlass for pulling back theslider. Note also Landels (1978), 100–6. See Figure 5.1. For measurement equivalents,see p. xxiv.

263 Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults65–8 (construction of the mountain belly-bow)

After this I shall describe for you the mountain belly-bow. Theconstruction of this is as follows. I shall expound for you the one builtby Zopyrus of Tarentum at Cumae in Italy. There is a base, A, whichis five feet in length, three and a half feet in breadth, and one foot inheight. Above it are trestles, XX, of which one is smaller while the


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Θ

Γ Γ

KZ

∆

x y

B B

A A

(a) Plan

Θ

Z

B

∆

A Γ

(b) Side-elevation

H

E

Figure 5.1 Biton’s stone-thrower

other is larger. The smaller is I, the larger Θ. The smaller one is threefeet in height, the larger five feet. Then, on top there is a beam, M, likethe one described for the belly-bow, which is five feet in length, onefoot in height, three feet broad, and hollow inside. The trestles shouldbe fitted to the beam, which should be well balanced in every direction.Next, measure out four feet from the front and provide a space for abracket at M. Then, put through the aperture a bow seven feet in lengthwith a perimeter of nine dactyls (173.7 mm); a bowstring should beattached with a perimeter of three dactyls (57.9 mm). (66) Next,measure out three feet from the front and attach to the underside at Θa bracket like a cup extending in length to the curvature of the bow.Then, set up a pole three and a half feet away from the bow, which hasthe role of an axle, and when it is in position it will check everythingon top of it. Let this column be designated Φ. After this, two feet away,there should be a beam four feet in length, [four dactyls] (7.2 mm)broad, and one foot in height. At the rear end, opposite the smallertrestle, I, there should be a wheel fitted to an axle, as is the normalpractice with other catapults. Next, a cord should be extended betweenthis and the beam T, both above and below, as is shown in the diagram,. . . (67) so that the missile can be fired more violently and over a longerdistance. The nature of the design is illustrated below.

I have now explained the engines that I considered especially suitablefor you. I am sure that by means of these you will discover similartypes. Do not be disturbed by the idea that because I have used definitemeasurements it will be necessary for you to use the same measure-ments. If you wish to build a bigger or smaller model, go ahead; justtry to keep the proportions. (68) The designs and the measurementshave been set out above.

Zopyrus, if he can be identified with the Pythagorean of that name, probably livedaround the middle of the fourth century BC. The construction of the mountain bowwas supposed to enable the crew to dismantle it and carry the components over difficultground to a new firing position. The ‘cup-bracket’ refers to a component resemblinga universal joint. The column Φ is the central pillar of the trestle, and T is the slider.Biton does not describe the trigger mechanism of his engines. See Figure 5.2.

264 Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with artillery engines)

The purpose of artillery construction is to fire a missile at long rangeand strike the target powerfully. It is for this objective that mostexperiments and enquiries have taken place. I shall therefore explainto you exactly what I discovered in Alexandria, through substantial


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dealings with the craftsmen engaged in such matters, and throughmeetings with many master craftsmen in Rhodes. I learnt from thesemen that the most effective engines to a large extent conformed to themethod (of construction) that I am going to describe.

(56) You will recognize during the description of their constructionand the demonstrations put on in relation to them not only the excel-lence of the engines but also many of the features that are most useful.First then, the engine stretched by a wedge performs well in the aspect that men appreciate most and for which they would exchange anything. I mean that it has a long range. Second, it remains strong and vigorous during operations. Furthermore, it is easy to construct and does not need much careful adjustment. Then, it is easily strung


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3´

4´

2´

M

X1

A

φ

XΘ

231´

(a) Side-elevation

T

M

0 20 40 dactyls

(b) Plan from above

Figure 5.2 Biton’s mountain belly-bow

and put together, but equally easy to dismantle when necessary. Finally,in appearance it is no less imposing than the others, and in all respectsis less expensive. These are the main points. But I think that it isessential, since I am about to give an account of the nature and con-struction of individual engines, to begin by pointing out weaknessesand problems in old engines. These cause particular trouble in thebuilding process and great difficulty in stringing, and consequentlyconstruction of the engines becomes troublesome and expensive.Furthermore, with repeated use the engines seem to be of little valuebecause they cannot sustain the constant movement of the spring. Inmy view this does not happen without a reason.

(57) If you want to fire over long range you must try to add as muchspring-cord as possible; of course I am not alone in thinking that the power lies in this aspect; everyone else does too. However, since thespring passes through the holes of the hole-carrier the man who intends to add more spring-cord must make the holes in the hole-carrier bigger (otherwise the greater amount of spring-cord will not fit).Consequently the surrounding edges are left very thin and naturallybecome weak. It is not possible to make the hole-carrier broader, for itwill then exceed the scale of the dimensions (of the engine). Thereforethey try to place small metal plates underneath. But since these smallplates are thin and weak because of their position, when the springs aretightened by being continually pulled back, they bend and rub hardup against the section of the hole-carrier above them. . . .

(58) There follows another aspect that is entirely inconvenient,unprofessional, and harmful to the range of shooting. For in the firingand frequent pulling back the spring becomes slack and needs to betightened again. The range of fire deteriorates because of the slack-ening. Now, it generally happens that those wanting to tighten the spring cannot do so vertically and in a straight line, but do it byresorting to extra twisting, giving an additional twist unnaturallygreater than is proper. They think that they are improving the spring,but I argue that they are doing great harm to the tension and arereducing the firing velocity and the force of impact. The engine loses the force of the spring because the strands are twisted into a thickplait, and the spring, because it is out of alignment, is robbed of itsnatural force and vibrancy due to the excessive additional twisting. Aspring in this state is hard to move and stiff when it is being pulledback, but is weak and lacking vigour in shooting, since the excessivetwisting reverts to a similar loose position. . . .

This is a brief summary of the faults that one could ascribe to existingengines. The best way to demonstrate them is visually, bit by bit.


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However, we should praise the men who in the first place invented the construction of these engines. They were the originators of thisinvention and its established form. They discovered something thatexcelled all other weapons in range of fire and force of impact, I meanweapons like the bow, or spear, or sling. For to devise an original ideaand to give it practical application is a work of greater genius. It seemsmuch easier to improve or correct an existing idea. Although manyyears have passed since the blueprint (of catapults) was invented, andthere have of course been many makers of machines and artillery, noone has dared to move on from the established procedure.

For a text and translation and commentary of the Construction of War Engines, seeMarsden (1971), 106–84; also above, no. 18. Philon is here referring to torsioncatapults. The propulsion was provided by a bundle of strands of sinew or hair, whichwere stretched by a lever inserted in the middle and turned in a plane perpendicularto them. When the lever was released the strands contracted and the lever returnedrapidly to its original position. Most torsion catapults had two vertically mountedsprings, with the levers moving out in a horizontal direction; the bowstring wasattached to the tips of the arms; see Landels (1978), 106–23. Marsden (1971), 163thinks that some of Philon’s criticisms of the weakness of the hole-carrier areexaggerated. He also points out (op. cit., 164) that in the problem of tightening thespring Philon had not grasped the properties of elasticity. Extra twisting should at leastrestore the power of the spring until the hair or sinews lost their resilience with use;at this point there would be no point in removing it for restringing. So the wedge-sprung engine would not be any more durable because it avoided twisting the sinews;see also Landels (1978), 126, for the wedge catapult.

265 Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–7 (repeating and air-spring catapults)

Therefore this is the design for the repeating catapult, comprising atechnically accomplished and complicated scheme. However, it hasnot found a worthwhile use. As I have often pointed out, we must turnmost of our research towards the achievement of long range and thediscovery of the factors in engines that create power. In the procedurethat I have just described I think that nothing has been achieved in thisrespect; it is merely that a lot of missiles are loaded simultaneouslyand then fired individually in rapid succession. This is more likely to lead to inefficiency than efficiency and I do not need to make a longcriticism. First, the target does not stand still but is capable of movingaround. Who then would want to fire a series of missiles purposelessly?Perhaps the claim that it is valuable for firing at a crowd would per-suade many people. But this too clearly has no weight. For the missileswill not fan out since the sights have been set on one target and producea line of fire virtually along one segment of a circle. Furthermore, the


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fall of the missiles will not be spread out over a long distance. (77) Inthe case of engines that fire single missiles, we shall pull the trigger atthe moment when we think that we have got the target accurately inour sights, and we shall therefore make efficient use of most missiles.If, however, we fire many missiles pointlessly and to no effect, weourselves will be providing the enemy with them. Of course someonemay say that they will be useless to the enemy because they are withoutnotches; to put notches on them is I suppose a large job needing a lotof work.

I shall now describe summarily in a few words the air-spring catapult,which is in fact a stone-thrower, and then go on to another aspect of mechanics. Now, this engine was invented by Ctesibius, and had avery clever and scientific design. He noted in what have been called thepneumatic demonstrations (and which I shall treat later on) that air isexceptionally strong, vigorous, and compressible. In particular, whenit is enclosed inside a strong jar it can be compressed, and by contrastwill expand rapidly again to fill the entire space of the jar. Because hewas experienced in engineering he well understood that this movementcould produce tremendous power and extreme velocity for the arms (of a catapult). He therefore constructed cylinders similar in shape toa doctor’s pill-boxes, with no lids. He made them from beaten bronzeto maintain strength and durability; but they had previously beenmade pliable and smelted to obtain thickness. The inside of them had been bored out by a machine with a surface made level, straight(measured by a ruler), and smooth. And so, when the bronze piston wasinserted it could run through and press against the circumference sincethat was also constructed to be level and smooth. Consequently the join between them was such that air could not force its way past evenwhen under maximum pressure.

The repeater catapult had a number of missiles loaded into the magazine; when theslider was pulled back holding the bowstring one of the missiles fell into the firingslot and was fired automatically as the slider was pulled further back. This wouldcontinue until all the missiles were fired in rapid succession; for detailed discussion,see Marsden (1971), 177–83; Landels (1978), 123–6. Philon gives no measurementsfor the air-spring catapult. As the arms of the catapult were drawn back projectionson their ends pushed the pistons into the cylinders and compressed the air. When thebowstring was released the pistons were shot forward by the expanding air and movedthe arms forward, so firing the missile (Landels (1978), 129–30). Modern investigationsuggests that the compressed air cylinders and pistons were unlikely to work efficientlywithout an air pump (Marsden, op. cit., 184).


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266 Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications)

In the same way we shall also build the towers with the kind of stonesthat I have described, fitting them together upright in lime and givingthe wall a width of not less than fifteen feet. In the flanking walls we should also keep windows with embrasures, which are narrow on the outside and wide on the inside, or narrow in the middle and witha sloping sill underneath. In this way those inside will not be wounded,and in setting up their war engines can fire catapults and stone-throwers where they choose. (21) It is also essential that there areembrasures in the walls of the towers for the firing of catapults andstone-throwers, where the batteries can be established on a firingplatform. Therefore if the enemy brings up engines directly against any of the curtain walls or if they attack any of the projecting walls,the towers can work together in defending one another, since the stone-throwers can launch a bombardment from the flanking towers, intowhich the embrasures have been built as I described.

For Greek practices in fortification, see Garlan (1974), 148–53; 348–50; Philon refersto windows with an interior embrasure and those with a double embrasure; Lawrence(1979); for the placing of artillery on fortifications, see Marsden (1969), 116–17; seealso above, no. 220.

267 Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine)

For the reasons that I have mentioned, Caesar decided to cross theRhine but thought that it was too risky to cross by ship and also notin keeping with his own dignity or that of the Roman people. There-fore, although the building of a bridge presented enormous difficultiesbecause of the breadth, speed, and depth of the river, nevertheless hethought that he should attempt it or not take the army across. He adopted the following method of building the bridge. He took two wooden piles, each one and a half feet thick and sharpened closeto its end and with a length measured to suit the river depth, andjoined them at intervals of two feet. He used machinery to lower theseinto the river and then fixed them in position with pile-drivers; these supports were not set upright but angled so as to provide asloping surface to fit in with the direction of the current. Oppositethese, forty feet lower down the river he then set up two piles con-structed in the same way, but this time set against the direction of the


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current. The two pairs were then kept apart by the insertion into theirtops of beams two feet thick, which were the same length as the gapsbetween the two piles, and they were secured by two iron braces at the outer side (of each pile). Since the pairs of piles were both keptapart and secured together, the construction was so sturdy and such was its nature that the greater the force of the current the more tightlythe bridge supports were held fastened together. These piles wereconnected with cross-beams and these were then covered over withpoles and bundles of sticks. None the less, more wooden supports were added obliquely on the downstream side, which jutted out like a buttress and joined with the whole structure in resisting the force of the water. Other supports were positioned a short distance above the bridge, so that if tree trunks or ships were floated down by thebarbarians to break down the bridge, their force would be reduced bythese defences and the bridge protected from harm.

Ten days after the collection of timber had begun, all the work wascompleted and the army was brought across.

This was Caesar’s first crossing of the Rhine in 55 BC. For Roman bridge-building,see also below, no. 282.

268 Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–3 (siege works at Alesia)

When Caesar heard about this from deserters and prisoners he set aboutbuilding the following type of siege work. He dug a ditch twenty feetwide with perpendicular sides, so that the width at the bottom equalledthat at the top. He kept all the remaining siege works 400 paces (c. 591m) behind this ditch, in order to protect them from surprise attacks,for a huge amount of space had to be enclosed and only with difficultycould the entire construction be manned by soldiers. There was there-fore a danger that a crowd of the enemy could descend suddenly bynight or throw missiles during the day at our soldiers when they were engaged on their work. And so at this distance Caesar dug twoditches fifteen feet wide and of equal depth, and filled the inner one,where it crossed a low-lying plain, with water diverted from a stream.Behind these ditches he constructed a rampart and palisade twelve feet high. To this he added a breastwork and battlements with largeforked stakes projecting from the juncture of the breastwork and therampart in order to impede enemy soldiers who tried to climb over. Healso constructed towers eighty feet apart from one another round theentire line of fortifications.


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(73) At the same time, since men had to be sent out to collect timberand corn and they were going further away from the camp, this reducedthe forces available for the construction of the enormous fortifications.Furthermore the Gauls made frequent attempts to attack our works bylaunching sorties in full force simultaneously from many gates of thetown. Therefore Caesar thought that these works should be strength-ened even more so that they could be defended by a smaller number of soldiers. Consequently, tree trunks or at least very strong brancheswere cut down, their tops were stripped of bark and sharpened intopoints, and they were set in long ditches five feet deep. When thesestakes had been set in the ditches they were tied together at the bottomso that they could not be pulled up, projecting from the branches.There were five rows, connected and intertwined with each other, so that anyone who came on them would impale himself on the sharppoints. The soldiers used to call them boundary posts. In front of thesein diagonal rows in a quincunx formation he dug pits three feet deep,which gradually became narrower towards the bottom. Into these werelowered rounded logs as thick as a man’s thigh, sharpened and charredat the top, so that they projected no more than three inches aboveground. In order to keep the logs firmly in position, earth was thrownin and trampled down to a depth of one foot. The rest of the pit wascamouflaged with branches and scrub to conceal the trap. In this systemeight rows were laid out, three feet apart, and they were called liliesbecause of their similarity to that flower. In front of them logs one footlong with iron spikes embedded in them were completely buried in theground and spread round all over the place with only short gapsbetween them. The soldiers called them goads.

For the conclusion of the siege of Alesia in 52 BC see above, no. 53; see also Keppie(1984), 89–94.

269 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines12.12–14.3 (tortoise and battering ram)

The tortoise that bears the battering ram was constructed in the sameway whether it was small or large. (13) The biggest had a breadth of30 cubits (13.87 m), a length of 40 cubits (18.50 m), and a height of13 cubits (6.01 m), apart from the gable, which was added later. Theheight of the gable itself from the base to the ridge was 16 cubits (7.40m). But the gable exceeded the middle part of the roof by at least two cubits (0. 92 m), and sloped down the roofing to the beams on it,so that there was a circular walkway. He constructed a three-storey


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tower from the centre of the roof and placed catapults on the top twostoreys and a reservoir of water on the lower. Upright pillars wereattached to the tortoise so that it also had a circular walkway. Then, inthe tortoise he built the framework for the ram (14) and fitted a rolleron it. The ram is pulled forward by ropes along this and so does its job.They placed ox skins over this construction, as with the towers.

Athenaeus Mechanicus dedicated his treatise on siege engines to ‘most reveredMarcellus’, and it is possible that this is Augustus’ nephew Marcellus, son of his sisterOctavia and married to his daughter Julia. This would place Athenaeus firmly in theorbit of the imperial court. It is interesting that Vitruvius dedicated his work OnArchitecture to Augustus and also mentioned that whereas Augustus had appointedhim to supervise the construction and repair of war engines, he had retained thatposition ‘through the recommendation of your sister’ (1, preface, 2). Now, it isgenerally agreed that there is a close similarity between Vitruvius, De Architectura10.13–15 and parts of Athenaeus’ work (9–26), to the extent that one might be atranslation of the other. In fact, it is possible that both authors were using the samesource, Agesistratus, who wrote a treatise on artillery probably towards the middle ofthe first century BC, and who is specifically mentioned by Athenaeus as a source.Marsden (1971), 5 speculates that Octavia was a patroness of both Vitruvius andAthenaeus. For text, commentary and translation into German see Schneider (1912).See now Whitehead and Blyth (2004).

The tortoise was designed to protect the men working the battering ram bydeflecting off its steeply sloping roof weapons, rocks, and liquids dropped by thedefenders. Oxhides would also reduce the risk of fire spreading. Cf. Vitruvius 10.13.6;Whitehead and Blyth (2004), 48–50. See also below, no. 270.

270 Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s tortoise)

In the tortoise invented by Hegetor of Byzantium the platform is 42cubits (19.42 m) long and 28 cubits (12.95 m) wide. Four legs areattached to the platform, each one made from two wooden beamsfastened together, with a length of 24 cubits (11.09 m), a thickness offive palms (38.55 cm), and a breadth of one cubit (46.24 cm).

It has eight wheels on which the entire construction moves. Thewheels are four and a half cubits (2.08 m) in height, and two cubits(92.48 cm) thick. They are built <in three layers joined by dowels>by breadth (22) and depth alternately, and are bound together withcold-hammered plates; they revolve in axle-sockets.

They fix posts on the platform, each 12 cubits (5.55 m) high, threepalms (23.13 cm) wide, and 10 dactyls (19.3 cm) thick. Each post is seven palms (53.97 cm) distant from the next one, and architravesjoin them together at the top all round, with a breadth of four palms(30.84 cm) and a thickness of three palms (23.13 cm). They attach


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rafters to the architraves, each eight cubits (3.70 m) high, and to them a transverse beam is fitted, to which all the tops of the rafters are attached; therefore there are two sloping sides. Finally, the entirestructure is covered with planks and protected rather like fillertortoises.

It also has a middle storey sitting on the architraves and this is toserve as a platform for weapons. Behind the framework for the batteringram two composite legs (23) stand upright in the middle of thetortoise, 30 cubits (13.87 m) long. They are one cubit (46.24 cm) thick,and three palms (22.13 cm) broad. A <dovetailed> headpiece joinsthe legs at the top and another crossbeam in the middle between thelegs <bound with iron plates>. And between the middle of theheadpiece and the crossbeam is fitted an upright beam. Then, ontoeither side of the wooden beam, when it has been fitted, and the legsgo lathe-turned windlasses. To these they attach ropes, from which the battering ram is suspended. A parapet is built onto the headpieceand the framework for the ram, so that <two soldiers> can stand incomplete safely on it to watch for missiles being fired from the enemyagainst the ram.

In total the battering ram is 120 cubits (55.49 m) long, two feetthick (61.66 cm) at the butt-end, and five palms (38.55 cm) broad.Towards the point (24) it narrows to one foot (30.83 cm) thick andthree palms (22.13 cm) broad. It has an iron mouth resembling a ship’sram, a body shaped like a tube, and four iron hoops extend from it,which are nailed to the ram, over a distance of ten cubits (4.62 m). Theentire battering ram is secured underneath <in the same way as shipsare secured from stern to prow> with three ropes, each eight dactyls(15.44 cm) thick, and it is fastened at the middle by three windingswith thick chains. The binding that holds the battering ram in themiddle is wound round the ram for five palms (38.55 cm). When it hasbeen closed up it is covered in leather all round, with raw hide. Theropes, which are made taut by the windlasses on the frame of thebattering ram and hold up the ram, are spliced at their front-ends (25)to four iron chains. Also, the chains are covered all over with hides sothat they cannot be seen.

There is an assault-bridge made of planks nailed onto the front ofthe battering ram, and to this is fixed a net made from strong ropes<whose roughness prevents the feet from slipping> with a mesh onepalm (7.71 cm) wide to allow easy ascent of the wall. The battering ramhas in addition extensions from each side, since. . . .

The engine performs (26) six movements: forwards, backwards,sideways in both directions, upwards, and downwards. It brings


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destruction from a height of 70 cubits (32.37 m), and it swings to thesides for a distance of 70 cubits. It is operated by 100 men and has atotal weight of four thousand talents (c. 157 tonnes).

Words marked < > are taken from the parallel passage of Vitruvius 10.15.2. Nothingis known of Hegetor. For discussion and diagrams, see Schneider (1912), 61–6 and tafelV; Irby-Massie and Keyser (2002), 164–6; Whitehead and Blyth (2004), 53–6; see alsoFigure 5.3. It is doubtful if this enormous machine was a practical proposition in asiege.

271 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult)

You should take very long beams and on top of them fix brackets, inwhich windlasses are positioned. In the middle section of the beamsforms are cut and hollowed out, and in these hollows are fitted theuprights of the catapults. These are held apart by wedges to preventtheir moving around when tensioning takes place. Then bronze washersare inserted into the uprights and in them are positioned small ironrods, which the Greeks call epizygides.

Next the ends of the ropes are passed through the holes in theuprights and brought across to the other side. Then they are attachedto the windlasses and wound round them, so that when the ropes arestretched over them by levers and are struck by hand they give off


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Figure 5.3 Hegetor’s tortoise

a matching tone on each side. Next they are secured by wedges at thespring holes so that they cannot work themselves loose. So, the ropes,carried across to the other side of the upright, are extended in the sameway by levers round the windlasses until they give off an equal tone.Therefore, by using wedges catapults are tuned to the appropriate noteby a musical ear.

See Rowland and Howe (1999), 310, figure 133.

272 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams)

First of all, the battering ram for assaults is said to have been inventedin the following manner. The Carthaginians pitched their camp forthe siege of Cadiz and tried to demolish a fort that they had previouslycaptured. Because they did not have the iron tools for demolishing it,they took a wooden beam and supporting it with their handscontinually battered one end of it against the top of the city wall andknocked down the top layers of stones. In this way they graduallysmashed down the entire wall, course by course.

Later, a Tyrian engineer called Pephrasmenos, inspired by theprinciple of this invention, set up a pole and from it suspended another cross-beam, just like the beam in a balance, and by pushingand pulling it backwards and forwards he demolished the walls ofCadiz with violent blows. Ceras the Carthaginian first constructed awooden base, with wheels underneath, and on this he built a frame ofuprights and cross-beams from which he suspended a ram. He coveredthe frame with oxhides to give greater protection to the men stationedin the machine to batter down the wall. Because its movements wereslow, he began to call it ‘tortoise for a ram’.

Chapter 13 is closely similar to Athenaeus Mechanicus 9.4–10.3 (see above, p. 191).The Carthaginians developed siege warfare during their conquest of Sicily in the fifthcentury BC.

273 Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensive mechanisms)

In the case of scorpions, catapults, and ballistae, and also tortoises andtowers, I have explained the ones that seemed to me most valuable, and also by whom they were invented and how they ought to be con-structed. However I did not think it necessary to write about ladders,cranes, and similar things whose principles (of construction) are easier.


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Indeed soldiers normally construct these by themselves. Furthermore,these devices cannot be effective in all places or use the same methods,since fortifications are different from other fortifications and also thefighting spirit of peoples. And so military engines should be preparedin a different way depending on whether you are fighting a courageousand bold enemy, or a careful enemy, or a cowardly one.

Consequently if anyone wishes to follow these instructions andchoose from their varied types to make one construction, he will notlack assistance. He will be able to set out without hesitation what-ever material the situation or topography requires. On the other handdefensive measures cannot be set out in writing. For an enemy does notprepare siege materials in line with our writings, and their siegeengines are more often destroyed by speed and clever tactics devisedon the spur of the moment without engines. Indeed it is recorded thatthis actually happened to the Rhodians.

Diognetus was an architect of Rhodes and he received an honoraryfixed annual wage from the state because of his professional expertise.At this time an architect from Aradus called Callias came to Rhodesand gave a public lecture, in which he showed a model of a defensivewall; he placed a machine above it with a revolving derrick by whichhe snatched up a siege engine approaching the wall and moved it insidethe city. When the Rhodians saw this model, in their admiration theydeprived Diognetus of his annual salary and transferred the distinctionto Callias.

(7) (In desperation during a siege the Rhodians implore Diognetusto resume his duties). At first he declined. Later, girls and young menof noble birth came along with the priests to beg him, and he promisedto help on the condition that if he captured the war engine it shouldbe his. When this had been agreed he made a breach in the wall wherethe engine was to approach, and ordered everyone by proclamation and private appeal to pour whatever water, sewage, and mud they hadthrough this opening along channels running in front of the wall. Afterthey had poured down a great quantity of water, mud, and sewageduring the night, on the next day the siege engine came up, but beforeit came close to the wall it stuck in the mass of mud that it had churnedup and could not move forwards or back. Therefore when Demetriussaw that he had been outmanoeuvred by the skill of Diognetus, heretreated with his fleet.

Demetrius Poliorcetes besieged Rhodes in 305–304 BC. His engineer Epimachusdevised an enormous siege engine and Callias realized that his proposed crane wouldbe unable to lift it.


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274 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery engines)

Now, men before me have written a great number of works on artillery,covering measurements and designs, but not one of them has expoundedthe building of the engines in proper sequence nor what they are usedfor, but apparently write only for an audience of experts. Therefore I think that it is appropriate for me to extend these works and to givea clear description of artillery engines, including those now out of date,so that everyone can easily follow my treatise. Therefore I shall describe(74) the building of entire engines and their individual components,their names, their assembly, the fitting of cord, and in addition the use and measurements of each engine. But first I shall speak about thedifferences between the engines and how each one of them developedfrom the beginning.

Of the engines described, some are straight springs (euthytones),others are called V-springs (palintones). Some refer to straight springsas scorpions, because of the similarity in shape. Engines with straightsprings fire only arrows. Some engines with V-springs are called stone-throwers because they fire stones. But they fire either arrows or stonesor both.

The purpose of artillery construction is to fire a missile at a giventarget over a long distance with powerful impact. For the enginesdescribed it is essential to direct all your attention to this objective.

Heron of Alexandria lived probably in the second half of the first century AD. He wasknown as ‘the engineer’ and wrote a series of treatises on various aspects of mensuration,mathematics, and mechanics. He also wrote the Belopoeica (On the Construction ofArtillery). Although his works contain a theoretical element he was interested inbuilding machines that worked, and his discussion of the earliest non-torsion, arrow-firing engine and the subsequent development of torsion catapults was intended to bea clear and readable account of how they were constructed. In the Belopoeica he reliedheavily on the earlier writings of Ctesibius, and it must be said that in technical termsthe work is rather out of date and does not incorporate the improvements in catapulttechnology introduced after Ctesibius. But it would have been useful for conveyingthe basic principles of construction. In the Cheiroballistra he gives a detailed technicaldescription of a new catapult with measurements. Text, translation and commentaryin Marsden (1971), 18–60.

Marsden, op. cit., 44 argues that the construction of war engines involved at leastfive processes: (1) calculating the size of the components; (2) shaping and aligningthese components; (3) assembling the components; (4) arming with spring-cord; (5)imparting an additional twist to the spring-cord. Euthytone catapults and palintonestone-throwers are both torsion engines; the palintone was the more powerful becauseof the construction of the spring (Marsden, op. cit., 45); for a general assessment ofthe range and effect of artillery, see Marsden (1969), 86–98.


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275 Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a torsion catapult)

By using the engine described above it is possible to fire a larger missileover a longer distance. But they wished to increase both the size of themissile and the power of projection, but they were unable to realizetheir intention of making the arms of the bow more powerful throughthe use of composite bows. Therefore, they constructed everything elseas described before, but made the arms of more resilient wood and ona larger scale than in an ordinary bow. The constructed a frame (let itbe ABΓ∆) from four strong wooden beams, with sockets on the uprightbeams AB and Γ∆. Around the horizontal beams A∆, BΓ they woundcord, which was plaited on a machine for twisting cords, making asufficient coil. (82) Next they wound on the first turn, forcing it tostretch very tightly. Then they wound on another turn next to the first,and beat the layers of cord with a small wedge so that they fitted closelytogether. They continued to make other turns until they had used upthe entire coil, and then tucked its end in under all the layers. Nextthey slid one of the arms through the middle of the cords, and placediron bars under the cords on top of the cross-beams A∆ and BΓ.Twisting these by force they stretched the cords, and when the twistingoccurred the arm was gripped forcefully by the cords. Let the arm thathas been described be EZ, the cord HΘ, and the bars KΛ and MN.They built another similar frame and fastened the two together underone casing by using boards, so that the arms recoiled and expendedtheir force outwards. They then fastened a bowstring to the ends (83)by making loops and secured these to the arms using the pins �O andΠP, so that the bowstring did not slip off. They constructed the restof it in the way I have described previously. The cords holding the arms they called the spring; but some call it single-spring, others, half-spring. The bars for twisting the spring they call the levers; they made them of iron. During the method of construction described ithappened that the twisting and stretching of the cords could not movevery far because the cross-pieces A∆ and BΓ were not capable of takingthe spring-cord. Therefore they placed the levers over the holes, but inother respects built everything as I have already described. Howeverthe twisting of the lever was difficult because it could not be turnedbecause it was resting on the cross-piece and touched it everywhere. For this reason they were compelled to fit what are called washers, asI shall describe in due course.

(84) Since the strength of the arms has now become so powerful, it is essential that the pull-back mechanism must also be made power-


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ful since it must have an equal strength for pulling back the arms.Therefore, instead of what was called the withdrawal-rest in themethod outlined earlier, they added a horizontal, freely turning axleto the rear end of the case, and they turned it by attaching squarehandles to its ends. When this was turned the slider, which held thebowstring, was pulled back in the following way. They fastened ropesto the end of the slider by the frame and attached them to the axlementioned above. When these were wound up the pulling back tookplace. But on the larger engines the pulling back of the arms was stilltroublesome. Therefore they pulled them back using pulleys. Theyattached one pulley of the system to the frame, and the other to the endof the casing at the axle or windlass; they then fastened the end of thepulley system, after it had been fed through, to the axle and turned it.(85) In this way the pulling back was accomplished more easily, thoughmore slowly because the pulling back involved several parts of thepulley system over the one operation and was therefore slowed down.The pulley system can be set up differently, as for example when severalpulleys are located in one pulley-block in the frame, and several in theother pulley-block in the casing at the back, near the axle.

See Marsden (1971), 47–50; also Figures 5.4 to 5.6.


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A

E

O

B

Z

M N

P

KH

Γ

∆

ΠΞ

Θ

Λ

(a) Rear-elevation

E

Ξ

Z

Π

(b) Plan from above

Figure 5.4 Heron’s torsion catapult

276 Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp)

The Romans are never subject to surprise attack from their enemies.For whenever they invade any hostile territory, before they join battlethey fortify a camp. (77) Now, they do not build the camp at randomor in an irregular way, and they do not work all at once or in a disorderlyfashion. If the ground happens to be uneven, they level it; then theymeasure out the camp in the shape of a square. (78) The army has a largenumber of workmen with it and also tools for building.

(79) They divide the inside of the camp into rows of tents, while the exterior circuit has the appearance of a wall, decked out with towersat equal intervals. (80) In the spaces between the towers they set up‘quick-firers’, catapults, stone-throwers, and every kind of artilleryengine, all ready to fire. (81) They build four gates, one in each wall of the circuit, and they are large enough to allow draught animals toenter easily and wide enough to allow the solders to make a sortie


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(a) Side-elevation

(b) Plan

Figure 5.5 Catapult pull-back system

(a) Side-elevation

(b) Plan

Figure 5.6 Catapult pull-back system with pulleys

in an emergency. (82) The camp is intersected by streets laid out in aregimented way, and the officers’ tents are located in the centre, andright in the middle of these is the general’s headquarters, like a smalltemple. (83) It is as if a town has appeared on the spur of the moment,with a market place, a quarter for workmen, areas where the tribunesand centurions can hold court, if there are differences to be settled.(84) The circuit of the walls and the buildings inside are completedquicker than thought because of the number and skill of the men whowork on them. In case there is an attack an outer ditch is built roundthe camp, six feet deep and of equal breadth.

Polybius also admired the Roman practice of entrenching and camp building(6.27–32); cf. Keppie (1984), 36; see also below, nos 277–8.

277 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14(building a military camp)

At the entrance to the general’s headquarters, and in the middle of itnear the via principalis, is the place called groma, because the soldiersassemble here, or because when the measurements were being fixedthe metal base was set up here, on which the groma was placed. Theresult was that the gates of the camp observed directly from this spotmake a star. And the exponents of that skill, for the reason mentionedabove, are called gromatici.

(13) They build lesser roads close to the via sagularis that run throughthe camp, to allow the soldiers to move out quickly on a sortie.

(14) I shall now explain the layout of the front part of the camp(praetentura). The via principalis, which lies between the right-handgate and the left-hand gate, takes its name from the headquarters(principia) and should be sixty feet wide, which is the same distance asthat between the rampart (vallum) and the quarters of the legions. Forthis reason some people have called it the intervallum. Similarly, theroad that leads to the praetorian gate is called the via praetoria, withoutdoubt after the general’s quarters (praetorium). It should be sixty feetwide, as in the case above.

Pseudo-Hyginus is so called because a text on the laying out of military camps, themeasurement of quarters for hypothetical army units, and the building of fortificationswas mistakenly attributed to Hyginus Gromaticus who wrote on land surveyingprobably in the second century AD. The text, named On Camp Fortifications in thesixteenth century, may have been written in the second or third century, though somehave argued more specifically for the reign of Trajan. See Grillone (1977); text,translation into French, and commentary – Lenoir (1979); for the basic camp layout,see Figure 5.7; also below, no. 284.


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The groma or ferramentum was a surveying implement for sighting and plottingstraight lines and right angles, and was used in dividing up land for new settlements.This process involved a regimented layout of lines intersecting at right anglesproducing units of regular dimensions. Land division had similarities to the layout ofmilitary camps, and the two probably influenced one another. Military surveyors wereresponsible for laying out the camp, with its orderly blocks of accommodation and aregulated amount of space for each unit; see Sherk (1974).

278 Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50;57–8 (camp fortifications)

A ditch, located in a secure position, [is] associated with discipline, andits shape is either ‘sloping’ or ‘punic’. ‘Sloping’ is the name given to aditch where the sides slope inwards, starting out wide apart at the topand meeting together at the bottom. ‘Punic’ is the name given to a ditch when the outer bank is perpendicular; the opposite bank isinclined, as in the sloping ditch. These ditches should have a minimumwidth of five feet and a height of three feet. At a distance of sixty feet in front of the gates a ditch should be constructed of similardimensions to the width of the gates, which because of its shortness iscalled titulum.

(50) It is essential to erect in any vulnerable position a rampart madefrom turf, stones, rocks, or rubble. It should be eight feet wide, six feet


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Intervallum

Intervallum

PortaPraetoriana

PortaDecumana

Via Praetoria

Praetentura

Praetentura

Praetorium Quaestorium

= groma

= via principalis

= via sagularis

Figure 5.7 Roman military camp (Pseudo-Hyginus, On CampFortifications 12–14)

high, and have a small breastwork. Similarly it is necessary to erect arampart in front of the gates along the titulum, just as along the ditch.It is called ‘sacred’ in order to inspire discipline among the soldiers.

(57) It is particularly necessary to watch out for the road that runsalong the sides of the camp. Furthermore, whatever position the camphas, it will need a river or a source of water on one side or other.Unsuitable locations, which earlier writers called ‘stepmothers’, shouldentirely be avoided. So, a mountain should not loom over the camp,by which the enemy might get into a superior position or spy from adistance on what is going on in the camp. A wood that might concealthe enemy should not be close, or a ditch or a valley by means of whichthey might secretly creep up on the camp. Also, it is essential that the camp should not be flooded and destroyed by a neighbouring river,in flood because of a sudden storm.

(58) In hostile territory it is essential to take care to arrange accessto the ramparts that is double and linked, and to construct platformsfor the catapults at the gates, in the angles (of the rampart), and at the towers. It is of paramount importance to protect the rampart withcatapults on that side where there are ‘stepmothers’, if they cannot beavoided.

The ‘punic’ ditch, which was considered to be more difficult for an attacker to cross,may have been so named from Carthaginian use of it. The dimensions suggested areprobably the minimum desirable in a secure location; cf. Vegetius, Epitome of MilitaryScience 3.8. The titulum was intended to break up an enemy rush at the gates. The fortgates were sometimes protected by a clavicula, which was a curving stretch of rampart,which either projected outwards from the left-hand side of the gateway as seen by theattacker or inwards from the right-hand side. The intention was to force the attackingforces to move to the left as they passed through the gate and so expose his unprotectedright side to the defenders (Lepper and Frere (1988), 263; Lenoir (1979), figure 9).Lenoir, op. cit., 84 argues that the rampart (described as sanctum) was of particularsignificance in the camp community; indeed soldiers who crossed it without permissioncould be subject to the death penalty. It was part of the soldiers’ training and disciplineto respect it. ‘Stepmothers’ here probably refers to drainage channels that might concealan enemy approach. The double, linked access presumably refers to a circular walkwayrunning round the inside of the rampart.

279 Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river)

The quickest way to bridge a river that I know is the Roman methodof using ships, and I shall explain it now, for it is worth describing. On a signal their ships are floated downstream, not with bows forward,but as if backing. The current naturally carries them down, but arowing boat holds them back until it manoeuvres them into the


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arranged place. Then wickerwork boxes shaped like pyramids, full ofuncut stones, are let down from the prow of each ship, to hold it in placeagainst the current. As soon as one ship has been secured, another is moored, at a distance sufficient to support the superstructure, with the prow facing the current. Next, from both ships timbers arespeedily and carefully laid, with transverse planks to secure themtogether. The work goes on for all the ships required to bridge theriver. On either side of the bridge gangways are set down and securedto make the passage safer for horses and draught animals, and also toact as a fastening for the bridge. In a short time the task is finished amidgreat commotion, though good planning is present in the work. Thecheers that might be raised on each ship and censure of those who shirktheir duty do not stop the men from hearing their orders or carryingon the work quickly.

Cassius Dio (71.3) describes a similar method for bridging rivers by boats mooredside by side.

280 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft137.1–138.17 (importance of siegecraft)

My lord, I read your letter about siege engines and was delighted that you thought me worthy to share your thoughts on this. ThereforeI have collected and written down some designs that would be usefulfor a siege and sent them to you. I have discussed them all, and I havereleased an assistant, having first demonstrated everything to him and worked it out in his presence, so that he too, if required, can workto the designs. Since I do not know the topography (where siegeengines might be deployed), I have recorded many different types andhave explained their purpose. In the case of each I have added informa-tion in respect of its effectiveness, protection, and safety, aiming as faras possible that everything is easily procured, light, easy to work, andspeedily completed by whatever workforce is available. (138) My lord,I have furnished you with this material to demonstrate that you andyour officers can not only study these matters theoretically, but also givethem a practical application following my instructions. It is an entirelydifferent situation when a man is besieging a town with full militaryequipment, an abundance of wood, and plenty of time, and when he is dealing with peoples and lands where revolution is easily broughtabout by setbacks. Therefore, because I was examining and analysingthese matters, I have taken my time in replying to you, since I have not been able to get any help from previous writers due to the noveltyof the subject matter and because of the shortage of time. I have also


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sent you some local technicians and men who can work and labour inother ways. For I know from being with you on campaign, when I wasfortunate to have a good supply of soldiers well prepared throughexperience and skill for excellent workmanship, how unexpected crises in warfare need both soldiers and engines that are versatile.Forgive me, my lord, if my account is a little unclear in the descriptionof each construction. The technical terms will be unfamiliar in commonparlance and the subject matter has a complicated theoretical aspect,and I myself am a rather feeble exponent of it. But perhaps your noblespirit will set it right and your goodwill grant it pardon.

Apollodorus of Damascus was an outstanding architect and engineer who is said tohave designed Trajan’s forum and baths in Rome; he also built the emperor’s bridgeacross the Danube (below, no. 282). He quarrelled with Hadrian on a matter ofarchitectural design and was banished and later executed. Apollodorus’ chief interestperhaps lay in military engineering and his treatise on the tactics of conducting a siege(Poliorcetica) deals with the protection of the attackers from missiles, the underminingof walls, battering rams, assault towers, and the construction and use of assault ladders.His work has a practical ring to it, though it is not clear what sources he used. Textand commentary with translation into German – Schneider (1908). The addressee ofthis extract is presumably Trajan.

281 Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1(how to set fire to a wall; construction

of ram-bearing tortoises)

If the wall is made of stone blocks the usual practice is to pile woodround it, and when this is set on fire it will crack the wall. But this task is difficult during a war, and water poured from above puts the fireout; the sideways impact on a wall is feeble as the fire drifts upwards,and the men involved in this cannot take shelter under a tortoise, forit also will be set on fire. Therefore pottery jars are prepared bound iniron plates, which open at the (153) bottom in a hole of about onedactyl (1.9 cm) in width. The jars are filled with fine charcoal and havean iron pipe, into which another pipe is fitted equipped with bellows.When fire is applied to it, the charcoal catches fire, and as it is blownon by the bellows it spreads a strong flame that engulfs the stone andsmashes it, when vinegar or some other kind of piercing liquid ispoured on. The design of this construction is as illustrated. Leadworkers use it all the time.

If we wish to batter a tower, or a gate, or a wall, we must constructtall ram-bearing tortoises, with wheels underneath. They bear theframework on which the ram hangs so that it has a forceful impact.Because this suspension framework is high the ram swings over a longer


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distance and when moved further (154) its long travel has a morejarring impact. Therefore in design the tortoise should just be tall butnot large, so that it can be moved easily. It should be twice as high as it is broad so that it has a sharply defined ridge and very steeplysloping roofs, with the result that any heavy object thrown onto it will not only slide off but also be sharply deflected. Furthermore, the tortoise has a protective covering sloping towards the wall to catchheavy objects thrown down on the ram and deflect them to either side. For the defenders throw down stones pierced through likecylinders or horizontal beams dropped together like a yoke, so thatthey can deal with every eventuality and anticipate the attack on thewall by breaking the ram. Either the ram is broken in pieces or thesoldiers operating it are scattered and killed.

The construction of the tortoise is as follows. You place two woodenbeams not less that twelve feet (3.7 m) apart from one another on theground, and between these beams you place four wooden beams, twelvedactyls (23 cm) thick, and one foot broad, and not less than twenty-four feet (7.3 m) high. These (155) meet each other at a ridge, wherethey are connected to a piece of wood, which is the ridge of the tortoise;this should be longer than the original beams on the part where we wish to incline the tortoise forward. When the main beams havebeen placed upright, other supporting beams should be attached tothe middle of them, and on the inside additional beams are pushed upsupporting the central beams and the ridge. On the outside the tortoiseshould be covered with wooden boards four dactyls (7.7 cm) thick,which are attached to the upright beams. This completes the con-struction of the casing. Then, from the base of the inner beams you should support the outer ones with beams arranged vertically. Thespace between the lower beams should have small wheels to supportthe tortoise. So that the beams underneath do not spring apart cross-ties will be fitted. The beams should not be cut on the outside, but they(the cross-ties) will be attached to the tortoise by brackets; they serveas the flooring of the tortoise. Now, the tortoise as described carries the ram. A second one behind for the soldiers operating it is of lesserheight, and two smaller ones behind this are essential to protect theapproach. I recommend that the tortoises should be many and small,for ease of movement and construction, and that they should always bebuilt from shorter pieces of wood, and not one large piece, because thatwill bring (156) disadvantages in contrast to the advantages mentionedabove.

For construction of the tortoise see also above, no. 269. It must be doubtful if theinstructions given by Apollodorus would have been sufficient for the construction of


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a tortoise by inexperienced engineers. However the passage is good evidence for Romanmethods of building with timber.

282 Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the Danube)

Trajan built a stone bridge over the Danube for which I cannotsufficiently praise him. For although his other achievements wereoutstanding this surpasses them. For it has twenty piers of squaredstone, one hundred and fifty feet (44.4 m) high above the foundations,and sixty feet (17.76 m) broad. The piers are one hundred and seventyfeet (50.3 m) apart from one another and are joined by arches. Howcould anyone avoid being amazed at the money spent in building them,or the method by which each of them was built in a mighty river with swirling eddies and a muddy bed? For it was indeed impossibleto divert the river anywhere. What I said about the width of the river should not be taken to imply that it is uniformly of this width,and indeed in some locations it is twice as broad and floods to threetimes that distance. I merely meant that this was the narrowest andmost suitable place in the area for building a bridge. However, the factthat in its descent the river is here forced into a narrow channel froma broad expanse, after which it spreads out again in a broader expanse,makes it correspondingly stronger and deeper. So this too added to thedifficulty of building the bridge. Therefore we can judge the grandeurof Trajan’s ideas from this construction. However, the bridge is of nouse to us, since only the piers remain standing and do not offer a wayof crossing, as if they had been constructed solely to demonstrate thatthere is nothing that human ingenuity cannot accomplish.

Hadrian dismantled the superstructure to prevent hostile tribes from crossing into theprovince of Moesia. Apollodorus’ bridge was between Pontes on the south bank andDrobeta on the north, where the width of the river is about 1,097 metres; the date wasprobably AD 105/6; see Lepper and Frere (1988), 147–51.

283 Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of the onager)

The scorpion, which is now called the wild ass (onager), is designed inthe following way. Two posts of oak or holm-oak are hewn into shape,with a slight curve, so that they seem to project like humps. Theseposts are connected to one another like a frame-saw, and have a fairlylarge hole drilled through them on either side. Strong ropes, passing


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through the holes, are bound between them and hold the structuretogether so that it does not disintegrate. From the middle of theseropes a wooden arm is raised at an angle, pointing upwards, like thepole of a chariot (unhitched). It is bound up with the twists of the ropeso that it can be raised higher or depressed. Iron hooks are fitted to the top of the pole and from these hangs a sling made from hemp oriron. Then in front of the pole is fitted a large goat-hair cushion, stuffedwith fine chaff, and tied on with strong cords. The engine is placed onheaps of turf or a platform of bricks. For if a heavy machine of this kindis placed on a stone wall it smashes everything underneath, not by


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Side-elevation, left handspike – drum removed

Drum winch

Pawl

Trigger-mechanism

Arm

Trigger

Ratchet

Handspike

Drum

Spring – diameters

Rear-elevation, rear cross-beam removed

0 3

0 3

Ratchet

Drum

Handspike

Trigger-mechanism

Arm

Pawl

Spring – diameters

LeverSpring washer

Figure 5.8 The onager: firing arm, winch, and trigger mechanism

its weight but by its violent recoil. Now, in combat a round stone isplaced in the sling, and four young men on each side pull back thebars (of the windlass), to which the ropes are attached, and bend backthe pole until it is almost horizontal. Finally, the artillery officer,standing close by, with a strong blow of a hammer knocks out the boltthat keeps the whole rope mechanism in position. This swift blow freesthe arm, which strikes the soft cushion and flings the stone, which willsmash whatever it hits. The machine is called a tormentum because therelease of power is created by twisting (torquere), and a scorpion becauseit has an upright stinger. Recent times have given it the name of wildass because when wild asses (onagri) are attacked by hunters they kickstones behind them over a long distance, so that they can penetrate thechest of those following or break and crush the bones of their skulls.

Ammianus Marcellinus (c. AD 330–95) during the reign of Constantius II wasattached to the staff of the imperial general Ursicinus, under whom he saw extensivemilitary service. After the capture of Amida by the Persians in 359 Ursicinus wasdismissed from office. Ammianus subsequently accompanied the unsuccessful militarycampaign of Julian against the Persians and travelled widely in the empire. He wrotea history of Rome from AD 96, with particular emphasis on the invasion of the Goths(376–8) and the battle of Adrianople in 378, in which the emperor Valens was killed.He produces a very vivid and detailed narrative especially for events in which he himselfparticipated, and wrote as someone active and experienced in the imperial service. SeeMatthews (1989).

Ammianus does not explain that the ropes holding the arm are twisted to providethe tension necessary for firing, or how the firing mechanism works. The one-armedstone-throwing engine is mentioned briefly by Philon c. 200 BC and then byApollodorus of Damascus, who describes a device similar to the one-armed catapult,which was attached to the front of a battering ram (188.2–9). It is not clear how widelythis kind of engine was used before Ammianus’ description in the fourth century AD;see Marsden (1971), 249–65, and plate 14; also Figure 5.8. It was easier to constructthan the two-armed engines, but would have been hard to aim and very difficult totransport because of its weight. Text and translation – Marsden (1971), 250–4.

284 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a military camp)

Camps should always be pitched in a secure spot, especially when theenemy is nearby, with a ready supply of wood, fodder, and water. If thecamp is to be long term, a healthy spot should be chosen. Care mustbe taken that no mountain or lofty hill is close to the camp in case itis captured by the enemy and becomes a threat. It should be a concernthat the site is not subject to flooding from rivers and that the armydoes not come to grief for this reason. The camp should be built pre-cisely to accommodate the number of soldiers and equipment, in case


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a large number is crushed together in inadequate space, or a small forceis compelled to spread itself more thinly than is right because the spaceis too large.

(23) Camps should be made sometimes quadrangular, sometimestriangular, or sometimes semicircular, depending on the nature andrequirements of the site. The gate that is called praetorian should face east, or that area that faces the enemy. But if the army is on themarch it should face in the direction in which the army is about tomove. Within this space the first centuries, that is, the cohorts, pitchtheir tents and set up the dragons and standards. The gate calleddecumana is behind the general’s headquarters, and through it soldierswho have committed an offence are led out for punishment.

(24) There are three different types of fortification of a camp. If thereis no immediate danger, pieces of turf are cut from the earth and heapedup to serve as a wall, three feet high; there should be a ditch in front,from which the turf was taken. Then there is a makeshift ditch, ninefeet wide and seven feet deep. However, when a strong force of theenemy is threatening, then it is right to fortify the circuit of the campwith a proper ditch, twelve feet broad and nine feet deep below the line(ground level), as it is called. Above it is heaped (i.e. on the inner sideof the ditch) the earth that was removed from the ditch, rising even-tually to a height of four feet, and revetments are constructed on bothsides. The outcome is that the ditch is thirteen feet deep and twelvefeet broad, and on top of it are fixed stakes made from very strongwood, which the soldiers normally carry with them. For this task it isimportant to have at the ready mattocks, rakes, baskets, and otherkinds of tools.

See also above, nos 277–8. For Vegetius’ summary of siege methodologies, see 4.1–30.

285 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista)

Let us look at the design of a ballista, whose construction, set out beforeyour eyes, is illustrated by a detailed diagram. Its smoothly runningframe set on four wheels, to which two armoured horses are harnessed,drags it to its military tasks. Its usefulness, which matches its cleverdesign, is so great that it fires missiles at the enemy from all sides,copying the manual freedom of movement of the archer. It has holesin four locations, by means of which it is moved and turned round tosuit the circumstances, and is very easily got ready to meet all attacks.


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By using a roller mechanism at the front it can be depressed morequickly and also raised and elevated. Its stock can be speedily and easilytraversed and raised in whatever direction is required. It should berecognized, however, that this type of ballista, operated by two men,fires bolts, not after being wound up with ropes like other engines,but with rods.

De Rebus Bellicis is an anonymous treatise which suggests various reforms in theimperial administration and military affairs and is addressed to unknown emperors,probably Valentinian I and Valens (AD 364–75/8). The author describes several inven-tions of military machines, including a catapult, designed to improve the efficiencyof the army and reduce manpower. Some of his inventions are bizarrely impractical,and it is possible that the treatise was mainly a plea for reduced expenditure on thearmy. Text – Hassall (1979); Ireland (1984); text translation and commentary –Marsden (1971), 240–3, who thinks that the author’s chief claim to originality was anew firing device, which used a winch connected to the slider not by ropes but by rods.The stock is the central block of the catapult with the slider as its upper part; natureand background of the work – Thompson (1952); Astin (1983).

286 De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning ballista)

It has been discovered by practical experience that this type of ballista,which is necessary for the defence of city walls, is superior to others inpower and range. When an iron arch has been attached above thegroove from which the bolt is fired, a powerful sinew-rope (bowstring)is drawn back by an iron hook and when released fires the bolt withtremendous force at the enemy. The engine is too big to allow this ropeto be pulled back manually by the strength of soldiers. Instead twomen, one at each of two wheels, pull the rope backwards by pushingagainst the spokes of the wheels in a rearward direction; mechanicalpower has therefore been obtained to match the difficulty of the task. A roller mechanism now raises and now depresses the engine asrequired so as to fire the missiles with a higher or lower trajectory. Thisexceptionally clever design, which combines many different elements,is controlled calmly by one man, if I can describe it this way; his onlytask is to load the missile ready to be fired. The point is presumablythat if many men were involved on this task the cleverness of theinvention would be reduced. Therefore a missile fired from this engine,enhanced by so many great and ingenious devices, has such a longrange that it could reach across the Danube, a river famous for its width.It is called the lightning ballista, and by its name indicates the effectof its power.


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See Thompson (1952), 63–4; Marsden (1971), 244–6. It is unlikely that this machinecould have offered any significant improvements on existing catapults. Since the widthof the Danube varies so much, the indication of the catapult’s range is unclear.


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INDEX OF TRANSLATEDPASSAGES

Passage number

Aelian Tacticus, Tactica Preface 1–7 (importance of writing about tactics) 136

Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 2.1–2 (protecting those parts of a city vulnerable to insurrection) 200

Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 5.1–2 (choosing men to guard citygates) 201

Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 6.1–3 (choosing day scouts) 202Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.1; 3 (keeping watch on potential

traitors) 203Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 20.1 (importance of locking the

gate) 204Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.4–5 (organizing guard shifts) 205Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 22.21–3 (setting up lanterns at

guard posts) 206Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 23.1–5 (organizing sorties) 207Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 24.16–19 (arranging suitable

passwords) 208Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 26.1–5 (organizing patrols) 209Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 27.1–3 (dealing with panics) 210Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 29.1–2 (dealing with arms

smuggling) 211Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 31.1–2 (sending secret messages) 212Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 32.1–2 (protection against siege

engines) 213Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 33.1–2 (how to counter-attack siege

engines) 214Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 34.1–2 (how to put out fires) 215Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 36.1–2 (preventing the placing of

siege ladders) 216Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 37.1–3; 6–7 (dealing with tunnels) 217

218

Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 39.1–6 (how to deal with enemy incursions) 218

Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 40.1; 4 (improvising if numbers are small) 219

Africanus, Cesti 2.12 (gathering intelligence) 194

Ammianus Marcellinus, History 23.4.4–7 (construction of the onager) 283

Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 137.1–138.17 (importance of siegecraft) 280

Apollodorus of Damascus, Siegecraft 152.7–156.1 (how to set fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises) 281

Arrian, Tactica 3.1–4; 4.1–2 (infantry and cavalry weaponry) 27Arrian, Tactica 5.2–3 (importance of orderly formation) 166Arrian, Tactica 11 (deepening the phalanx formation) 167Arrian, Tactica 15 (value of archers and slingers) 168Arrian, Tactica 16.6–7 (Scythian cavalry formation) 169Arrian, Tactica 27 (use of signals) 28Arrian, Tactica 32 (words of command) 29Arrian, Tactica 33.1–2 (Roman willingness to adopt the practices

of other peoples) 170Arrian, Tactica 36; 37; 40.1–7; 43.2–4; 44 (cavalry training) 30Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 1–11 (Roman marching order) 164Arrian, Ectaxis contra Alanos 11–31 (battle formation against the

Alani) 165Arrian, Anabasis 1.1.8–10 (Alexander’s stratagem against carts) 171Arrian, Anabasis 1.2.4–5 (Alexander uses combined tactics) 172Arrian, Anabasis 1.20.8–9; 21.3–22 (siege of Halicarnassus) 249Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.4–5 (Alexander’s tactical skill) 173Arrian, Anabasis 5.7.3–5 (Roman method of bridging a river) 279Arrian, Anabasis 5.23.7 (Alexander’s way of giving orders) 84Arrian, Anabasis 6.13.4 (commander’s role in battle) 85Arrian, Anabasis 6.26.1–3 (endurance and example of Alexander) 86

Asclepiodotus, Tactics 1.2 (usual branches of Greek armies) 13Asclepiodotus, Tactics 2.1 (phalanx formation) 119Asclepiodotus, Tactics 3.5–6 (drawing up the battle line) 14Asclepiodotus, Tactics 5.1–2 (weaponry of phalanx) 15Asclepiodotus, Tactics 6.1 (position of light-armed troops) 120Asclepiodotus, Tactics 7.1–2 (cavalry formations) 121Asclepiodotus, Tactics 9 (use of elephants) 16Asclepiodotus, Tactics10.4 (phalanx manoeuvres) 122Asclepiodotus, Tactics 12.1–2; 10–11 (commands) 17

I N D E X O F T R A N S L A T E D P A S S A G E S

219

Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 12.12–14.3 (tortoise and battering ram) 269

Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Siege Engines 21.2–26.5 (Hegetor’s tortoise) 270

Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 43–4 (military value of catapults) 261

Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 44–7 (construction of a stone-thrower) 262

Biton, Construction of War Engines and Catapults 65–8 (construction of the mountain belly-bow) 263

Caesar, Gallic War 1.24–6 (battle against the Helvetii) 50Caesar, Gallic War 2.19–21 (Caesar’s role in a battlefield crisis) 51Caesar, Gallic War 4.17 (bridge across the Rhine) 267Caesar, Gallic War 6.34 (responsibilities of a Roman commander) 52Caesar, Gallic War 7.72–73 (siege works at Alesia) 268Caesar, Gallic War 7.85–8 (role of general in directing the battle) 53Caesar, Gallic War 8.41 (cutting off the water supply) 227

Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.8.1 (method of transmitting information) 191

Cassius Dio, Roman History 68.13 (stone bridge over the Danube) 282Cassius Dio, Roman History 71.7 (Roman defensive formation

against cavalry) 192Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.7 (tactics at battle of Issus in

AD 194) 193Cassius Dio, Roman History 75.10–12 (siege of Byzantium) 258Cassius Dio, Roman History 77.13,1 (qualities of generalship) 100

De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 7 (the mobile ballista) 285De Rebus Bellicis (On Military Matters) 18 (the lightning ballista) 286

Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 18.71.2–6 (defending against elephant attack) 123

Diodorus Siculus, Universal History 19.27–31 (battle of Paraetacene) 124

Frontinus, Stratagems 1, Preface (guidance for commanders before battle) 71

Frontinus, Stratagems 1.1.8 (concealing plans) 139Frontinus, Stratagems 1.2.1 (discovering the enemy’s plans) 140Frontinus, Stratagems 1.3.3; 10 (choice of strategy) 141Frontinus, Stratagems 1.4.9a (devising tactics) 142Frontinus, Stratagems 1.5.22 (escaping from a difficult position) 143Frontinus, Stratagems 1.7.1 (making up deficiencies) 144Frontinus, Stratagems 1.8.9 (distracting the enemy’s attention) 145


220

Frontinus, Stratagems 1.9.4 (Caesar deals with a mutiny) 72Frontinus, Stratagems 1.10.2 (Sertorius’ leadership) 73Frontinus, Stratagems 1.11.6 (Epaminondas inspires his men) 74Frontinus, Stratagems 2, Preface (battle stratagems) 75Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.15 (choosing the right time to fight) 146Frontinus, Stratagems 2.1.17 (choosing the right time to fight) 147Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.4 (choosing the place to fight) 148Frontinus, Stratagems 2.2.5 (choosing the place to fight) 149Frontinus, Stratagems 2.3.15; 23 (adapting battle tactics) 150Frontinus, Stratagems 2.4.6 (inspiring panic in the enemy) 151Frontinus, Stratagems 2.5.24; 33 (ambush) 152Frontinus, Stratagems 2.6.3 (avoiding forcing the enemy to fight to

the end) 153Frontinus, Stratagems 2.7.2 (concealing a setback) 154Frontinus, Stratagems 2.8.6; 12 (personal leadership) 76Frontinus, Stratagems 2.9.5 (intimidating the enemy) 155Frontinus, Stratagems 2.10.1 (concealing casualties) 156Frontinus, Stratagems 2.11.5 (winning support) 157Frontinus, Stratagems 2.12.2 (setting a trap for cavalry) 158Frontinus, Stratagems 2.13.7 (covering a retreat) 159Frontinus, Stratagems 3, Preface (stratagems for sieges) 77Frontinus, Stratagems 3.1.2 (value of surprise attack) 232Frontinus, Stratagems 3.2.1 (use of surprise attack) 233Frontinus, Stratagems 3.3.2 (use of a traitor) 234Frontinus, Stratagems 3.4.5 (reducing supplies of the besieged) 235Frontinus, Stratagems 3.5.2 (a resolute commander) 236Frontinus, Stratagems 3.6.3 (distracting the enemy’s attention) 237Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.3 (diverting a river) 238Frontinus, Stratagems 3.7.6 (contaminating the water supply) 239Frontinus, Stratagems 3.9.2 (attacking from an unexpected

quarter) 240Frontinus, Stratagems 3.10.5 (luring out the besieged) 241Frontinus, Stratagems 3.11.2 (pretending to retire) 242Frontinus, Stratagems 3.12.1 (keeping vigilance among the

defenders) 243Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.6 (sending a secret message) 244Frontinus, Stratagems 3.13.8 (using pigeons as messengers) 160Frontinus, Stratagems 3.14.2 (sending in supplies) 245Frontinus, Stratagems 3.15.6 (deceiving the enemy about supplies) 246Frontinus, Stratagems 3.16.2 (dealing with desertion) 161Frontinus, Stratagems 3.17.9 (a sudden sortie) 247Frontinus, Stratagems 3.18.3 (determination under siege) 248Frontinus, Stratagems 4, Preface (keeping good order in the army) 78Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.1 (Scipio’s discipline) 21Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.3 (Pyrrhus’ leadership) 79Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.7 (Marius’ mules) 22


221

Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.17 (Clearchus’ discipline) 23Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.21; 28 (Corbulo’s discipline) 24Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.26 (Piso’s discipline) 25Frontinus, Stratagems 4.1.37 (M. Antonius’ discipline) 26Frontinus, Stratagems 4.3.8; 9; 14 (commanders set an example) 80Frontinus, Stratagems 4.4.1 (kindness of a commander) 81Frontinus, Stratagems 4.5.5 (personal courage of a commander) 82Frontinus, Stratagems 4.6.3 (generosity of Alexander) 83Frontinus, Stratagems 4.7.1; 2; 16; 20; 42 (military aphorisms and

stratagems) 162

Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 73–4 (nature of artillery engines) 274

Heron, On the Construction of Artillery 81–5 (construction of a torsion catapult) 275

Josephus, Jewish War 3.71–6; 85–8 (training the Roman army) 19Josephus, Jewish War 3.76–84 (the Roman military camp) 276Josephus, Jewish War 3.98–101 (value of careful preparations in

war) 133Josephus, Jewish War 3.102–9 (Roman discipline) 20Josephus, Jewish War 3.115–26 (Roman marching order) 134Josephus, Jewish War 3.166–75; 271–5 (siege of Jotapata) 231

Livy, History of Rome 22.47–8 (battle of Cannae) 125Livy, History of Rome 26.4.4–10 (creation of the velites) 126

Onasander, The General Preface 4–6 (importance of competent generals) 54

Onasander, The General 2.1–3 (moral qualities of generalship) 55Onasander, The General 6.5–7; 10–13 (the general and his army

on the march) 56Onasander, The General 8.1 (encamping in hostile territory) 57Onasander, The General 10.1–2 (preparing an army for battle) 58Onasander, The General 10.14 (choosing an escort for a parley) 59Onasander, The General 10.25–6 (making religious observances) 60Onasander, The General 13.1–3 (military psychology) 61Onasander, The General 17.1 (positioning of light-armed troops) 127Onasander, The General 21.1 (battle formations) 128Onasander, The General 21.3 (making effective troop dispositions) 62Onasander, The General 21.5–9 (crescent formation; counter-attacks) 129Onasander, The General 22.1 (use of reserves) 130Onasander, The General 22.4 (attacks in the rear) 131Onasander, The General 23.1 (more military psychology) 63Onasander, The General 28 (ensuring that the army has its best

appearance) 64


222

Onasander, The General 29.1–2 (intimidating the enemy) 132Onasander, The General 32 (taking risks) 65Onasander, The General 33.1–2 (the general and personal combat) 66Onasnader, The General 34.1 (making thank-offerings and

honouring soldiers) 67Onasander, The General 36 (burying the dead) 68Onasander, The General 38.1–2 (dealing with surrenders) 69Onasander, The General 39.4–5; 40 (how to capture a city) 230Onasander, The General 42.2; 14; 24 (personal example, and

conduct in victory) 70

Philon, (Siegecraft) A20–1 (construction of fortifications) 266Philon, (Siegecraft) A32–3 (positioning of catapults and postern

gates) 220Philon, (Siegecraft) B1–2 (keeping reserve stocks of food) 221Philon, (Siegecraft) B49–50 (preparing ammunition and supplies) 222Philon, (Siegecraft) C3–5 (defensive precautions against siege engines) 223Philon, (Siegecraft) C32–6 (defensive ditches, guards, passwords,

and signals) 224Philon, (Siegecraft) D 59–60 (psychology of siege warfare) 225Philon, (Siegecraft) D71–2 (capturing the vital parts of a town) 226Philon, Construction of War Engines 51; 56–8 (problems with

artillery engines) 264Philon, Construction of War Engines 71 (properties of the Spanish

sword) 18Philon, Construction of War Engines 76–77 (repeating and air-spring

catapults) 265

Pliny, Natural History 16.35 (sending secret messages) 135

Plutarch, Flamininus 8.2–4 (battle of Cynoscephalae) 163Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8.2–6 (qualities of generalship) 87

Polyaenus, Stratagems 1 Preface 1–3 (generals and stratagems) 89Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.14 (Cleomenes deceives the enemy) 174Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.37 (treachery and cunning in a siege) 250Polyaenus, Stratagems 1.47.1 (concealing numbers) 175Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.2.10 (avoiding unnecessary alarms in an

army) 176Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.4 (a general sets an example) 90Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.9 (Epaminondas deceives the Spartans) 177Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.3.13 (use of a smokescreen to conceal

operations) 178Polyaenus, Stratagems 2.37 (spotting an ambush) 179Polyaenus, Stratagems 3, preface (a general’s need for military skill) 91Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.9.2; 14; 17; 22; 46; 62 (Iphicrates’ skill as a

general) 92


223

Polyaenus, Stratagems 3.13.1 (identifying spies) 180Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.1.2 (tactics of Philip at Chaeronea) 181Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.10 (Philip and Macedonian military

training) 31Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.18 (diverting the defenders’ attention) 251Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.8 (personal leadership of Alexander) 93Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.3.23 (Alexander’s ingenuity) 182Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.8 (capture of Corinth by treachery) 252Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.7.12 (crossing a river) 183Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.9.5 (deceiving the enemy) 184Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.18 (17).1 (pretending to construct a mine) 253Polyaenus, Stratagems 5, Preface (generals should learn from

stratagems) 94Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.2.9 (causing the enemy to split up his

forces) 185Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.19 (smuggling soldiers into a city) 254Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.22.4 (setting an ambush) 186Polyaenus, Stratagems 5.44.2 (deceiving the enemy) 187Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.3 (devices used by besiegers and besieged) 255Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.4.1 (role of general in battle) 95Polyaenus, Stratagems 6.17 (dealing with a siege tunnel) 256Polyaenus, Stratagems 7, Preface (how the general should guard against

enemy tricks) 96Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.13 (extreme measures to capture a city) 257Polyaenus, Stratagems 7.46 (Scythian practice to encourage valour) 188Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.12 (Roman honour) 189Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.14.1 (value of delaying tactics) 190Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.16.3 (Scipio’s tough leadership) 97Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.17 (Caesar keeps his army ready for

action) 98Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.23.23; 33 (Caesar’s rapport with his troops) 99

Polybius, Histories 6.23 (Roman weapons) 7Polybius, Histories 6.34.7–12 (passing round the watchword) 8Polybius, Histories 6.38 (Roman discipline) 9Polybius, Histories 6.39.1–3; 5–11 (rewards for valour) 10Polybius, Histories 9.12.1–4; 14.1–5 (varied skills of a general) 49Polybius, Histories 10.20.1–5 (Scipio Africanus trains the infantry) 11Polybius, Histories 18.29–32 (comparison of Greek phalanx and

Roman legion) 12

Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 12–14 (building a military camp) 277

Pseudo-Hyginus, On Camp Fortifications 49–50; 57–8 (camp fortifications) 278


224

Suetonius, Augustus 25.4 (the qualities of a good general) 88

Tacitus, Agricola 36–7 (battle of Mons Graupius) 137Tacitus, Histories 3.23 (use of artillery in open battle) 138

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.3–4 (Theban attack on Plataea) 197

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.75–6 (siege of Plataea) 198

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 3.97.3–98.2 (skill of light-armed troops) 102

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.26 (Athenian blockade of Pylos) 199

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.32.3–4; 33.2; 34 (Spartan hoplites defeated at Sphacteria) 103

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 4.100 (use of fire machine) 259

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 5.70–1 (the drift to the right in hoplite battles) 104

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.5 (skill and inspirational leadership of Gylippus) 105

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.44 (night battle at Syracuse) 106

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 7.80 (Athenian retreat at Syracuse) 107

Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1, Preface 1 (value of military training) 32

Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.5–6 (choosing suitable recruits) 33

Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.9–10 (Roman military training) 34

Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.11–12 (weapons training) 35Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.14–16; 18–19 (throwing

missiles; other military skills) 36Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.22–4 (building a military

camp) 284Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.26–7 (training in battle

manoeuvres) 37Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.2; 12–13; 18 (role of general

in securing his army’s welfare) 101Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.10 (tactics with an

inexperienced army) 195Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 3.26 (military aphorisms) 196

Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.12.1–2 (tensioning a catapult) 271Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.13.1–2 (history of battering rams) 272


225

Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.1–3; 7 (offensive and defensivemechanisms) 273

Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.9 (stratagem to impede attack) 228Vitruvius, On Architecture 10.16.11–12 (defence of Marseilles) 229

Xenophon On Hunting 12.1–4 (value of hunting) 1Xenophon Memorabilia 3.1.5–6 (qualities required in a general) 38Xenophon Memorabilia 3.12.1–4 (importance of physical fitness) 2Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 1.5–6 (training the cavalry) 3Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 2.7–9 (knowing your position) 4Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 5.1–2 (skills of a cavalry

commander) 39Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 5.5–6; 9–11 (importance of

deception) 109Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 6.1–4 (the commander’s

relations with his troops) 40Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 8.21–2 (choosing the right

man for the job) 41Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 9.1–2 (role of commander) 42Xenophon The Cavalry Commander 9.3–4 (use of mercenary cavalry) 5Xenophon, On Horsemanship 8.10–11 (cavalry practice) 6Xenophon On Horsemanship 8.12 (controlling your horse in attack) 108

Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.17–21 (start of the battle of Cunaxa) 110Xenophon Anabasis 2.6.1–15 (qualities of a Greek general) 43Xenophon Anabasis 3.3.12–16 (difficulties of commanding the

rearguard) 111Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.19–20 (difficulties of the hoplite marching

formation) 112Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.47–9 (leading by personal example) 44Xenophon Anabasis 3.5.8–12 (method of crossing a river) 260Xenophon Anabasis 4.3.10–11 (the approachable general) 45Xenophon Anabasis 4.8.10–12 (changes to the traditional

formation) 113Xenophon Anabasis 5.8.12–15 (the general and discipline) 46Xenophon Anabasis 6.5.14–17 (military psychology) 47Xenophon Anabasis 7.3.37–9 (Greek practice in night marches) 114Xenophon Hellenica 3.2.4 (peltasts against hoplites) 115Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.11–18 (peltasts defeat Spartan hoplites) 116Xenophon Hellenica 5.3.5–7 (peltasts and cavalry combine) 117Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.8–15 (battle of Leuctra) 118Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.8 (skill of Epaminondas) 48


226

Aelian Tacticus, addresses work toTrajan 14

Aemilius Paullus, L., defeated atCannae 78

Aeneas Tacticus, career andwritings of 149

Africanus, Julius, writings of 143Agesilaus (Spartan king), stratagem

of 169Alcibiades, stratagem of 169Alexander the Great, army of 5;

besieges Halicarnassus 171;crosses the Hydaspes 119;personal leadership of 78–9, 83;stratagems of 133, 137; tacticsof 78, 133–4

ambushes, setting of 65, 112, 122,136, 139, 143

Ammianus Marcellinus, career andwritings of 208

Antigonus directs his army at battleof Paraetacene 103

Antonius M., discipline of 39;tactics of in Parthia 121, 124

Apollodorus of Damascus, careerand writings of 204

Aquae Sextiae, battle of 122archers, role of 51, 60, 78, 88, 95,

102, 104ff., 110, 114, 127,128–30, 132, 133, 142, 165;training of 50

army (in Greece), development androle of 1–7; see also hoplites;

light-armed troops; peltasts;phalanx

army (in Rome), development of7–12; discipline of 36; marchingorder of 113, 127; politicalimportance of 9–10; tactics of8–11; training of 35, 46–52;weapons of 8–9, 24

Arrian (Flavius Arrianus), career of40; prepares to fight Alani 128

artillery, Greek 6–7; Roman 11Asclepiodotus, writings of 32Athenaeus Mechanicus, career and

writings of 191Atilius Regulus, M., noble

behaviour of 140Augustus (emperor 31 BC–AD 14),

advice of to generals 80; militaryregulations of 52; reorganizesthe Roman army 10

auxilia, development of 10

Barca, siege of 157Bedriacum, battle of 117belly-bow, design of 6Biton, writings of 180bridging a river, Roman methods of

188, 202, 206burial, of battle dead 71Byzantium, siege of 177

Caecilius Metellus, L., fights theCarthaginians 119

227

INDEX OF NAMES ANDSUBJECTS

Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus,Q., stratagems of 126, 168

Calpurnius Piso Frugi, L.,discipline of 39

camps, design of 199–202Cannae, battle of 78, 107Cantabrian gallop, cavalry

manoeuvre 42Caracalla (emperor AD 198–217),

failings of as general 85Casilinum, siege of 170Cassius Dio, career and writings

of 86cavalry (Greek), deployment and

role of 3, 5, 103ff.; role ofcommander of 53–5; training of 23–4

cavalry (Roman), deployment and role of 8, 10, 116, 129;training of 41–4, 50; weapons of 40

centurions, in Roman army 11Chaeronea, battle of 137Chares, stratagem of 137Claudius Marcellus, M., and siege

of Syracuse 167Clearchus, qualities of as a general

55, 135; discipline of 38Cleombrotus (Spartan king),

defeated at Leuctra 99Cleomenes (Spartan king), deceives

the Argives 135Cleon, employs treachery 173cohort, development of in Roman

army 9command, words of 34commander, skills and role of 3–4,

11Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P.,

befriends Polybius 25; disciplineof 37

Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P.,generous conduct of 124; spieson the enemy 118; stratagems of125; trains the army in Spain 27

Cornelius Sulla, L., defeats

Mithridates 75; stratagem of123

Cunaxa, battle of 94Cynoscephalae, battle of 126

Darius (Persian king), and the siegeof Babylon 176

deception, importance of in war 93,138, 139, 170

decorations, in Roman army 71Delium, siege of 179Demetrius Poliorcetes, besieges

Corinth 174; crosses river Lycus138; military career of 7;stratagem of 174

Demosthenes, defeated by Aetolians88; defeats Spartans atSphacteria 89; killed at Syracuse93

De Rebus Bellicis, nature of 210Didius, T., stratagem of 123Diodorus Siculus, writings of 103Diognetus, stratagem of 195Dionysius, stratagem of 138Diotimus, stratagem of 139discipline, maintenance of 26, 36,

37–9Domitian (emperor AD 81–96),

strategy of 118; tactics of inGermany 117, 121

Domitius Calvinus, uses surpriseattack 166

Domitius Corbulo, C., intimidatesthe enemy 123; tough disciplineof 38, 125

elephants, in battle 5; repulsed atMegalopolis 102

Epaminondas, stratagems of 58, 74,82, 136; tactics of 99, 131

Eumenes, directs his army at battleof Paraetacene 103

Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, Q.,strategy of against Hannibal118, 140

I N D E X O F N A M E S A N D S U B J E C T S

228

Fabius Maximus, Q., attacks Arpi168

Fulvius Nobilior, M., besieges theAmbracians 176

Furius Camillus, M., stratagem of75

Gylippus, defeats Athenians atSyracuse 91–2

Hadrian (emperor AD 117–38),military regulations of 52

Halicarnassus, siege of 171Hamilcar, stratagem of 125Hannibal, leadership of 77;

stratagem of 122Heron, career and writings of 196Himilco, captures Agrigentum

169Hirtius, A., uses pigeons as

messengers 125hoplites, arms of 2–3; problems of

against peltasts 88–9, 97; see alsophalanx

hunting, value of 21

Iphicrates, skill of as general andstratagems of 82, 97

Issus (AD 194), battle of 142

Josephus, career and writings of 36;defends Jotapata 165

Jotapata, siege of 165Julius Agricola, Cn., campaigns of

in Scotland 116Julius Caesar, C. career and writings

of 60; conducts siege of Alesia63, 189; crosses the Rhine 188;cuts off water supply atUxellodunum 162; deals withmutiny 73; distracts the enemy120; fights the Eburones 62, theHelvetii 59, the Nervii 60;rapport of with troops 85;stratagems of 123, 125; trainsarmy 85

Julius Frontinus, Sextus, career andwritings of 37, 115

ladders, use of in siege 157, 166,168, 171, 174

Lechaeum, battle of 97legion, see army (in Rome)Leuctra, battle of 99Licinius Lucullus, L., fights

Mithridates 120; sends secretmessage 170

light-armed troops, role of 5; valueof 88–90; see also peltasts

Lucius Verus (emperor AD 161–69),campaigns of 45, 81

Lysimachus, captures Ephesus bytreachery 175

maniple, role of 8Mantinea, battle of 91Marcus Aurelius (emperor AD

161–80), campaigns of 141Marius, C., reforms of in Roman

army 8–9; tactics of at AquaeSextiae 122

Massilia, siege of 163Memnon, deceives the enemy

139mercenaries, use of 5messages, sending of in secret 114,

141, 155military psychology, importance of

57, 68, 69Mons Graupius, battle of 116mountain belly-bow, construction

of 182

Numantia, siege of 171

onager, construction of 206Onasander, career and writings of

65

Paraetacene, battle of 103peltasts, equipment and role of 5,

96–9


229

Pescennius Niger, C., at battle ofIssus 142

petrinos, cavalry manoeuvre 41–2phalanx, comparison of with

Roman legions 28; organizationand deployment of 2–5, 32, 33,91, 96

Philip II (of Macedon), career of 5;stratagems and tactics of 132,137, 173

Philip V (of Macedon), besiegesPrinassus, 174; defeated atCynoscephalae, 126

Philon, career and writings of 35Philopoemen, general of Achaean

Confederacy 84Plataea, attack on 145; siege of 146Pliny the Elder, career and writings

of 114Plutarch, career and writings of 80Polyaenus, career and writings of 45Polybius, career and writings of 25Pompeius Magnus, Cn., fights

Mithridates 122Popillius Laenas, M., and the siege

of Numantia 171Porcius Cato, M., campaigns in

Spain 166Pseudo-Hyginus, on building a

camp 200–2Ptolemy (ruler of Egypt), stratagem

of 125Pyrrhus (of Epirus), generalship of

77, 80

Quinctius Flamininus, T., winsbattle of Cynoscephalae 126

ram, construction of 190

Scythians, cavalry formation of 132Sempronius Gracchus, T., defeats

the Lusitanians 167Septimius Severus (Roman emperor

AD 193–211), and battle of Issus142; and siege of Byzantium 177

Sertorius, Quintus, career andleadership of 74; stratagem of124

siege warfare, 6–7, 145–211signals, use of 34, 40slingers, use of in battle 50, 95,

110, 132Socrates, comments of on physical

training 22; on the qualities of ageneral 53

soldiers, see armySparta, defeats Argives 135; defeat

of at Lechaeum 97, at Leuctra99, at Sphacteria 89; militaryreputation of 3–4

Spartacus, stratagem of 119Sphacteria, battle of 89speeches, by commanders 68stone-thrower, construction of 181Suetonius, career and writings of 81

Tacitus, career and writings of 117Teleutias, defeated at Olynthus 98Terentius Varro, C., defeated at

Cannae 71Thrasybulus (tyrant of Miletus),

stratagem of 170Thrasyllus, stratagem of 135Thucydides, career and writings of

88Tiberius (emperor AD 14–37),

fights the Pannonians 120tortoise, in cavalry formations 41;

in infantry formations 121, 131,142; in siege engines 190–3

training, see armyTrajan (emperor AD 98–117),

builds bridge over the Danube206

Trasimene (lake), battle of 122tunnels, use of in sieges 147, 157,

163, 176

Valerius Maximus, writings of, 14Vegetius, career and writings of 47velites, role of 110


230

Ventidius, P., fights the Parthians121

Vespasian (emperor AD 69–79),campaigns of in Judaea 36, 113,120, 165

Vitruvius, career and writings of163

watchword, use of 26, 153writers on art of war, nature and

purpose of 13–17

Xenophon, career and writings of21; role of as general 56–7, 95–6


231

greek and roman military writers - selected readings (edited by brian cambell)

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