Epistemology (Western Michigan)BooksLouis Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary ReadingsRichard Fumerton, Epistemology, Laurence BonJourErnest Sosa, Epistemic Justification.Web articlesavailable at homepage: http://homepages.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/episem06.htm

Epistemology (U. Penn)BooksWilliamson, Knowledge and its LimitsReferenced: Nozick, Philosophical ExplanationsArticles”The Analysis of Knowledge” on the SEPE. J. Lowe’s review of Knowledge and its LimitsGilbert Harman’s review of Knowledge and its LimitsPutnam, Selections from “The Meaning of ‘Meaning”’Optional: Putnam, “Brains in a Vat”Burge, Selections from “Individualism and the Mental”Greco and Feldman, “Is Justification Internal?” from Contemporary Debatesin EpistemologyOptional: Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”Cassam, “Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?”Fricker, “Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against”Jackson, “Primeness, Internalism, Explanation”Optional: Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”Conee, “The Comforts of Home”Quine, “On a So-Called Paradox”Selections from Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Chapter 3Optional: Foley’s review of Knowledge and its LimitsBrueckner, “Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson”Weiner, “Must We Know What We Say?”Issues addressedThe Big Picture of Knowledge and its Limits and Semantic ExternalismInternalism vs. Externalism about Content and JustificationCan knowledge be analyzed into component concepts?Is knowledge a relation between an agent and the world, or is it a mental state (orboth)?Does knowledge have distinct internal and external parts? How does knowledgeconnect up to action?Can we tell when we know?What’s going on at the margins of knowledge?The Surprise ParadoxMust knowledge be sensitive? If so, in what sense?Knowledge-firsting SkepticismIs our knowledge the same as our evidence?The Knowledge Norm for Assertion

Epistemology (Harvard, Undergraduate text list only)Sosa et al. Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition. 2008.Optional:Audi, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition.Blackburn, Simon. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edition.

Epistemic Normativity (U. Penn)Introductory ArticlesMiller, Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Ch 1Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, Chapter 2Chignell, "The Ethics of Belief," (SEP) Only Sections 1 and 2Darwall, Gibbard, Railton. "Toward Fin de siecle Ethics"Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Reading Philosophy"Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper"Marušić, "The Ethics of Belief"Kelly, "The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes"Zagzebski, "The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good"The Value of True BeliefSosa, "For the Love of Truth?"Kornblith, "Epistemic Normativity"Lynch, "The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values"Does Belief Have an Aim?Velleman, "On the Aim of Belief"Owens, "Does Belief Have an Aim?"Wedgwood, "The Aim of Belief"Belief's Aim of TruthShah, "How Truth Governs Belief"Shah and Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation"Gibbard, "Truth and Correct Belief"Bykvist & Hattiangadi, "Does Thought Imply Ought?"Steglich-Petersen, "No Norm needed: On the aim of belief"Constructing NormsRailton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action"Enoch, "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Agency"Bagnoli, "Constructivism in Metaethics" (SEP)Constructing Epistemic NormsSinger, "How to Ignore the Schmagency Objection"Nolfi, "Why We Ought to Care About the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs"Ferrero, "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency"Enoch, "Schmagency Revisited"Truth as the Primary Goal (whether constructively or not)David, "Truth as the Epistemic Goal"Maitzen, "Our Errant Epistemic Aim"DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"Kvanvig, "Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal"Elgin, "True Enough"DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"

Truth and Degreed BeliefWeisberg and Easwaran on PhilosTV on Full and Partial Belief (Video)Joyce, "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism"Gibbard, "Rational Credence and the Value of Truth"Joyce, "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief"Joyce, "Why Evidentialists Need not Worry About the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism"Against Epistemic TeleologyGoldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Ch 5 (For an example real epistemic teleology) (Or Thagard's Quick Review)Kelly, "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique"Grimm, "Epistemic Normativity"Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Ch 2Supposed Problems with Epistemic ConsequentialismBerker, "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism"Greaves, "Epistemic Decision Theory"Goldman, Intro to Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (Selection)Berker, "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions"Easwaran and Fitelson, "An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism"The Normativity of Coherence RequirementsKolodny, "Why Be Rational?"Broome, "Is Rationality Normative?"Sylvan, "Rationality and Justification: Reasons to Divorce?"Sylvan, "The Objective Significance of the Subjective"How to be an Epistemic Consequentalist"Rule Consequentialism" (SEP) (Sections 4 - 6)Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality""Moral Responsibility" (SEP) (Read intro and Section 2, Skim 1)Singer, "How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist"Epistemic ReasonsSchroeder, "Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason"Lord, "Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters"Additional Readings (Optional)Epistemic ExpressivismChrisman, "Epistemic Expressivism"Yalcin, "Epistemic Modals"Gibbard, "Meaning and Probability" on YouTubeMoss, "Epistemology Formalized"Field, "Epistemology without metaphysics"

Seminar in Metaphysics: Realism and Truth (NYU)ArticlesKit Fine’s paper, ‘The Question of Realism’. Realism Michael Devitt, ‘What is Realism?’, from his Realism and TruthDrew Khlentzos, ‘Naturalistic Realism and Antirealism’, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge Gideon Rosen, ‘Objectivity and Modern Idealism’, in Philosophy in MindMark Johnston, ‘Objectivity Refigured’, in Reality, Representation, and Projection Michael Devitt, ‘What has Truth to do with Realism?’, from his Realism and Truth

Drew Khlentzos, ‘Contenting Realism’, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge Existence Colin McGinn, ‘Existence’, from his Logical Properties Terence Parsons‘Are There Non-existent Objects?’, in the American Philosophical Quarterly Nathan Salmon, ‘Nonexistence’, in NoûsAlexis Burgess ‘Negative Existentials Again’, in nothing at the moment Stephen Yablo, ‘A Paradox of Existence’, on his website Stephen Yablo, ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’, on his website Deflationism Paul Horwich, ‘Reference’, from his MeaningPaul Horwich, ‘Truth’, from his Meaning Paul Boghossian, ‘The Status of Content’, in The Philosophical ReviewHartry Field, ‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse’, in The Philosophical Review Huw Price, ‘The Place of Truth’, from his Facts and the Function of TruthMichael Smith, ‘Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude, and Belief’, in Analysis Fictionalism Gideon Rosen, ‘Problems in the History of Fictionalism’, in Fictionalism in MetaphysicsMichael Frede, ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs’, in The Original Sceptics: A Controversy Stephen Yablo, ‘Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism’, on his website Hartry Field, ‘Introduction’, from his Realism, Mathematics and Modality Paul Teller, ‘What is a Stance?’, in Philosophical StudiesBas van Fraassen, ‘Lecture Two’, from his The Empirical Stance

Philosophy of Mind (NYU)BooksDavid Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996ArticlesSubstance DualismRené Descartes, Meditations II and VI (NM 1)Property Dualism and MaterialismDaniel Dennett, 'True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works' (NM 36)Hilary Putnam, 'Brains and Behavior' (NM 16)Optional: Alex Byrne, 'Behaviourism' (in Guttenplan).The 'Identity Theory'J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' (NM 17)David Lewis, 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications' (NM 22)Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, excerpts (NM 25)Optional: David Armstrong, 'The Causal Theory of Mind' (NM 19)FunctionalismHilary Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States' (NM 21)David Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' (NM 24)Ned Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism' (NM 23)John R. Searle, 'Minds, Brains and Programs' (NM 55)Optional: Ned Block, 'The Mind as Software of the Brain' (online only); 'Functionalism' (in Guttenplan); the debate between Searle and Fodor (NM 55); Sydney Shoemaker, 'Functionalism and Qualia' (NM 43)EliminativismPaul Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' (NM 61)

Optional: Stephen P. Stich, 'Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis' (NM 60)Content and ConsciousnessBertrand Russell, Principles of Philosophy, excerptsTyler Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental' (NM 57)Optional: W.V. Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' (NM 33); Brian Loar, 'Social Content and Psychological Content' (NM 58); Robert Stalnaker, 'On What's in the Head' (NM 59)Content: What determines it?Jerry Fodor, 'Why There Still Has to Be a Language Of Thought' (in his Psychosemantics (MIT Press, 1987) and in Lycan)Daniel Dennett, 'Brain Writing and Mind Reading' (NM 54)Optional: Fred Dretske, 'The Intentionality of Cognitive States' (NM 37); Tim Van Gelder, 'What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?' (Journal of Philosophy 112, 1995; in Lycan)Consciousness: the Knowledge ArgumentFrank Jackson, 'What Mary Didn't Know' (NM 42)Brian Loar, 'Phenomenal States' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990)David Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches' (in Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge, 1999; in Lycan)Optional: Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' (NM 46)Consciousness: ZombiesDavid Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (excerpts)Daniel Dennett, 'Quining Qualia'Consciousness and Content: RepresentationalismGilbert Harman, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)Ned Block, 'Inverted Earth' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)ResourcesOptional textsJim Pryor's Philosophical Terms and Methods.A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, by Samuel Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994).Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward Craig)Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Ted Honderich)Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Robert Audi)Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Westview Press, 1998)David Armstrong, The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Westview Press, 1999).William Lycan's Mind and Cognition (2nd edition, Blackwell, 1999)

Disagreement and Testimony (Tufts)ArticlesDisagreementAdam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement”Optional: David Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence”David Christensen, “Epistemology and Disagreement: The Good News”Thomas Kelly, “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment”Optional: Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”The etiology of beliefRoger White, “You Just Believe that Because…”Ekaterina Vavova, “Irrelevant Influences”Background reading: David Papineau, “The Evolution of Knowledge" http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/evoknow.htmlEpistemic akrasia and disgreement

Michael Titelbaum, “Rationality’s Fixed Point”Daniel Greco, “A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia”Sophie Horowitz, “Epistemic Akrasia” Aesthetic testimonyRobert Hopkins, “Beauty and Testimony”Optional: Tyler Burge, “Content Preservation”Aaron Meskin, “Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?”Aaron Meskin, “Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony”Moral testimonySarah McGrath, “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism”Paulina Sliwa, “In Defense of Moral Testimony”David Enoch, “A Defense of Moral Deference”Epistemic permissivenessRoger White, “Epistemic Permissiveness”Optional: Thomas Kelly, “How to be an Epistemic Permissivist”

The Self (Tufts)ArticlesDe se thought, Fregean aspects:Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (pp.296-298)Optional: Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”Evans vs. Perry on Frege on demonstrativesEvans, “Understanding Demonstratives” Perry, “Postscript to ‘Frege on Demonstratives’” Kripke on Frege on demonstrativesKripke, “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”Optional: Burge, “Sinning against Frege”; Kripke, “The First Person”Self-knowledgePryor, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”Optional: Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Sections: 6.6, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self”Personal identitySider, selections from Four-DimensionalismParfit, “Personal Identity” Lewis, “Survival and Identity”Parfit, “Lewis, Perry, and What Matters” The problem of too many thinkersNoonan: “Animalism vs. Lockeanism: A Current Controversy”Olson: “Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’”De se thought, formal aspects:Lewis, “Attitudes, De Dicto and De Se”Optional: Lewis, “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”Stalnaker on de se thoughtStalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Ch. 3Optional: Stalnaker, “Indexical Thought”; Stalnaker, pp. 1-21 of the Introduction to Context and Content

Philosophy of Language (Tufts)

BooksThe Philosophy of Language (edited by A. P. Martinich)Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (William G. Lycan)suggested: Philosophy of Language, Scott Soames, Princeton University Press, 2012Articles/readings-in-textLycan, pp. 108-119 of Ch. 9: “Truth-Condition Theories: Davidson’s program”, Ch. 2, pp. 31-44 of Ch. 3: “Proper names: the Description Theory”, Ch. 4: “Proper names: Direct Reference and the Causal-Historical Theory”, Lycan, Ch. 13: “Implicative relations”, Optional: Ch. 1; Lycan, Ch. 10.Portner, pp. 12-22 of What is Meaning?Russell, “On Denoting” (in Martinich)Strawson, “On Referring” (in Martinich)Frege, “On Sense and Nominatum” (in Martinich)Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures 1-3Lycan, Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names” (in Martinich)Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief” (in Martinich)Frege, pp. 366-367-41 of “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (in Martinich)Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” (in Martinich)Kaplan, “Demonstratives”“Semantic pragmatics”DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”Putnam, “Meaning and Reference” (in Martinich)Grice, pp. 1-13 and all of Ch. 2 of Studies in the Way of WordsGrice, Ch. 4 of Studies in the Way of WordsBennett, Ch. 2 of A Philosophical Guide to ConditionalsKripke on Wittgenstein on rule-followingKripke, “On Rules and Private Language” (in Martinich)Optional: Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”

Ethical Theory (Tufts)BooksDavid Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, Hackett.Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett.John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Hackett.Articles:Peter Singer, ‘Affluence, Famine, and Morality’.Michael Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’.Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’.Catherine Wilson, ‘On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor’.John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’.

Logic (Tufts)BooksJeffrey, Richard. Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits. 4th edition. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006). Quine, Willard. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). suggested: Quine, Willard. Elementary Logic. Revised edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

Semantics and Cognition (Tufts)

Books:Jackendoff, Semantics and CognitionJackendoff, A User’s Guide to Thought and MeaningMisc:Various readings by Lakoff, Talmy, and Fillmore

Computation Theory (Tufts) [notes used in course, but unavailable]Books:Boolos, Burgess, Jeffrey, Computability and LogicMarvin Minsky, Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines (Automatic Computation)

Philosophy of Law (Tufts)Books:Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986). H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law Third Ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012). Articles:Philosophy of Criminal Justice:Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Chs. 1, 4, 13, 17 (§1))Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution” Murphy, “Marxism and Retribution” Furman v. Georgia Alexander. “The Color of Justice”McClesky v. Kemp Farrell, “The Justification of General Deterrence” Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment” Tadros, “Punishment and Duty” Tadros, “Protection Against Punishment” Wasserstrom, “Strict Liability in the Criminal Law” Tison v. ArizonaPinkerton v. U.S.Private Law - Corrective Justice:Posner, “Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry” Whitman v. American Trucking Association Coleman, “A Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” Goldberg and Zipursky, “Tort Law and Responsibility” Goldberg and Zipursky, “In Defense of Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law” Lauer v. City of New YorkNatural Law Theory and Bentham’s Challenge:Aquinas, Summa Thoelogiae, selections Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, selections Bentham, “A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights,” selections Legal Positivism - Austin and Hart:Austin, “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence,” (pp. 1-33, 191-200, 228-233, 253-264) Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. I (pp.1-13), Ch. II (pp.18-25), Ch. III (pp.38-44), Ch. IV (pp. 50-61, 66-78), Ch. V (pp. 79-99), VI (100-117), Ch. VII (124-147) Coleman, “Inclusive Legal Positivism” Griswold v. ConnecticutDworkin and Law as Integrity

Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Ch. 1 (pp. 15-30), Ch. 4 (pp. 114-124, 130-150), Ch. 4 (130-150), Ch. 5 (pp. 151-168), Ch. 6 (pp. 176-216) Plessy v. Ferguson Brown v. Board of Education Rawls A Theory of Justice (pp. 93-101, 293-308)