governance, multilevel governance and europeanization european social policy course 4 may 2009 j. r....

Governance, Multilevel Governance and Europeanization

European Social Policy Course4 May 2009J. R. Grote

Governance, MLG and Europeanization 2

Governance

Where does it come from? What does it mean? How has been conceptualized? What are the nain types? Which are the scientific disciplines devoted to its study? Is there something like an overall definition that would be

shared by everybody? What are its pre-requisites and what its obstacles? What is it expected to achieve?


Worldwide governance indicatorsThe most widely diffused notion of the governance term is probably the various governance indices produced by international organizations to measure the performance and development capacity of countries in the first, the second and the third world. The aim is, in most cases, to arrive at something being called “good governance”.Most of these studies make use of compound indices whose number, in principle, is unlimited. For example: Gross Domestic Product Levels of Poverty Levels of Education Government effectiveness Rule of law Political stability and so forth

Whether this really adds up to reflect governance and governance capity is questionable. Yet, at least, it provides for interesting comparative information that has not been available in previous periods


Control of corruption 2007Political stability 2007

Voice and accountability 2007


Government effectiveness 2007 Rule of law 2007

Regulatory quality 2007


Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems or conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and cooperating in the implementation of these decisions.

Governance as institutional cybernetics or governance as an emergent phenomenon that develops behind the backs of the people. Governance as a quasi-natural response to increasing problems of coping with complexity in politics, in technology, in social life, etc. Governance as a self-equlibrating process.

Governance: design or emergence?


John Stuart Mill, 1862. Considerations on Representative Government. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Central question: To what extent are forms of government a matter of choice?

“All speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, more or less exclusive, of two conflicting theories respecting political institutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions of what political institutions are. By some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art, giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention and contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. (…) To find the best form of government, to persuade others that it is the best; and, having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it, is the order of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of political philosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light (difference of scale being allowed for) as they would upon a steam plow or a threshing machine.


To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are so far from assimilating a form of government to a machine that they regard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science of government as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According to them, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must take them, in the main, as we find them. Governments can not be constructed by premeditated design. They “are not made, but grow”. Our business with them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint ourselves with their natural properties, and adapt ourselves to them. The fundamental political institutions of a people are considered by this school as a sort of organic growth from the nature of life of that people; a product of their habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Their will has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities of the moment by the contrivances of the moment (…). It is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the most absurd, if we suppose either of them held as an exclusive theory. But, though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory, out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification to either, the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated difference between two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither of these is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident that neither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get down to what is at the root of each, and avail ourselves of the amount of truth which exists in either.”


Governance in the economy

and in industrial sectors


The variety of mechanisms for the governance of sectorsby P.C. Schmitter

Up to now, scholars have emphasized the importance of simple dichotomies

Charles Lindblom: Market and State Oliver Williamson: Hierarchy and Market Hybrid forms may exist according to these authors, but they

are regarded as intrinsically unstable

Schmitter argues that there are many of such hybrids and that they may be more stable than suggested by the standard literature

Alliances Networks


Figure 1 distinguishes between a vertical axis: two generic types of exchange) and a horizontal axis: three means of enforcing whatever

mechanism comes about)

The figure generates six partially overlapping boxes:

Markets [spontaneously equilibrating (unvisible hand)], Hierarchies [based on enforcement mechanisms

(guarantee of property rights) which can be internalized within a company],

Communities [self-equilibrating (normative consensus among their members)],

States (or public hierarchies) [external units of enforcement par excellence and have a sovreign status]

Alliances Networks.


Fig. 1: The governance of economic sectors


Governance in politics and society


However, the problem can also be addressed from the more encompassing perspective of Overall Modes of Societal Order in modern societies and nation states.Several of such modes have been said to exist and are frequently addressed by different social science disciplines:- The Market- The State- The SocietyWhile state and market are generally accepted as ordering mechanisms by virtually all scholars, it happens that some use the notion of Civil Society (rather than just society) while others insert Networks into the menu of orders. Others again have suggested that the market and the state are complemented by the Community as a third and the Association as a forth mode of societal order.Independently from what is ultimately prefered, the most important thing is that, to speak of governance, these orders need to overlap to some extent thus partly complementing and partly contradicting each other.


Is Governance able of solving the problems resulting from the incompatibility or complementarity of different types of orders? (from Streeck/Schmitter‘s essay on PIGs)Modern societies, polities and economies can only be analyzed

in terms of a specific mix of these institutions and principles. Each of them can in principle undermine but also strengthen the existence of adjacent institutions and principles.

Communities can undermine markets (informal collusion, clientelist arrangments) but can also encourage mutual confidence and good faith necessary for stable economic exchange.

Markets can decompose community bonds and erode common values but can also provide for opportunities for extended reproduction.


State intervention can distort markets but can also provide for a legal framework that guides and makes economic exchange viable.

Free contracts and competition may contradict state policies but even the most etatist state requires markets as a supplementary mechanism of allocation.

State growth and government intervention may lead to a disintegration of communities but, at the same time, communities without a state would always be in danger of losing their identity and independence.

Communitarian tribalism can frustrate the development of a stable nation state while, at the same time, a state without some degree of spontaneous solidarity among its citizens is no more than a bureacratic or military conspiracy.


While until this point, hardly anybody would have a problem with the description of virtues and vices of these three modes of societal order, Streeck and Schmiiter are convinced that there is a forth mode which has so far been largely neglected

Streeck and Schmitter introduce an additional and distinct institution (including these institutions‘ guiding principles) which they call „Association“.

„Association“ is more than a transient amalgam of the three other orders and is capable of making a lasting and autonomous contribution to rendering the behaviour of social actors reciprocally adjustive and predictable. The guiding principle of interaction and allocation of this mode of societal governance is „organizational concertation“.

But let us have a look at the other principles as well:


Three or four modes of societal order: Communities, Markets, States – and Associations?

Communities Markets States Associative order (PIG)

Coordination Spontaneous solidarity

Dispersed competition

Hierarchical control

Intra/ inter-organizational Concertation

Main actors Families Firms/ parties Bureaucratic agencies

Associations, movements

Entry conditions Ascriptive member status

Abiltiy to pay, eligibility to vote

Legal authorization

Capacity to disrupt and compromise

Exchange medium

Esteem Money/ votes Coercion Mutual recognition

Exchange product

Compacts Contracts/ political positions

Regulation Pacts

Resources Trust, respect Pol. and econ. entrepreneurship

Legitimate control

Guaranteed access

Motives of actors

Esteem of followers

Profit/ electoral victory

Careers, bureaucratic stability

Organizational development

Cleavages Natives vs. foreigners

Sellers vs. buyers, parties vs. voters

Rulers vs. ruled

Members vs. leaders vs. state interlocutors

Pay-offs Mutual affection, collective identity

Material prosperity, citizen accountability

(External) security

Social peace


Both in practice (empirical manifestations of it) and in theory (analytical reflection on it), governance needs to be/ can be:

- approached from (at least) three analytical angles in a simultaneous fashion.- understood in terms of an emergent phenomenon that tends to develop everywhere within a given political system and tends to achieve equilibrium points which reflect highly specific situations in political, societal and in economic terms- understood in terms of deliberate design. i.e. as a program or strategy elaborated by political practitioners and political analysts

State

CommunityMarket

(Association)


S

M

A C

The number of potential hybrids and of their concrete overlap areas is in principle unlimited

Communitarian markets, New Public Management, social economy, associative democracy, public-private partnerships, etc.


Scientific „order and disorder“

Political Science

SociologyEconomics

Organization theory

In a situation where everything overlaps and depends on each other, theestablished disciplines dealing with these systems might run into problems.It is today hardly imaginable that any single of these disciplines will be ableto dealing with the complexity characterizing any single of their analytical targets.Hence the need for inter-disciplinary research!


Governance as network


There is of course also a network component involved in discussions of governance. Imagine the people represented below were political institutions, organizations and different organizational layers that are formally divided by specific tasks and duties (e.g. the president, ministerial offices, and public and private organizations attached to these offices).


Rectangular matrix of advise relations (14 x 14)

director

head of division

book-keeper

secretaries

“To whom do you turn with questions relevant to your work?”

or:

“To whom do you turn for information of strategic importance?”


Simple network graph


Status analysis


Status indices

head of division

secretaryhead of divisiondirectorhead of divisionhead of divisionsecretarysecretarybook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keepersecretary


Governanceby Anne Mette Kjaer

On paradigm shifts and the meanings of governance:

GOV in Public Administration/ Public Policy GOV in International Relations European GOV (and MLG) GOV in Comparative Politics and economic development GOV in Processes of Democratization and Transition GOV and the World Bank


I. Paradigm shift in public policies

From hierarchy, sub-ordination and top-down control

towards

Policy networks network management, self-organizing networks

Meta-governance Managing the rules (of formulation, decision-making

and implementation) and coordinating them across policy domains

Coordinating the plurality of hierarchies, markets and networks across domains


II. Paradigm shift in international relations

From the neo-realist assumption of states as the most important actors in world politics

versus

a growing importance of multinational actors and transnational networks

a growing importance of international regimes


III. Paradigm shift in European integration studies

From a focus on European integration and institutions (as the explanandum)

towards

a focus on EU policy-making, its effects on domestic policies and on the management of complex inter-relationships in

policy-making across all levels (subnational, domestic, supranational)


IV. Paradigm shift in political economy

From the neo-liberal position (the state should have no role at all and leave development to the market)

towards

a heterarchic conception of governance as the management of self-organizing networks that involve a plurality of organizational forms such as the state, the market or networks


V. Paradigm shift in democratization/ transition research

From modernization and early transition theories (determinism and presumption of the existence

of only one single path-way of development towards democracy)

towards

institutional & governance approaches that allow for a more open-ended vision and argue that institutions circumscribe political agency

in as much as agents themselves are capable of altering institutions


VI. Paradigm shift in the international economy

From a selective policy followed by the World Bank (granting help to those that already have „good

governance“)

towards

a critique of the WB‘s dependency on its largest shareholder (the US)

a focus on accountability versus a global public


Governance and political design


“Attributive” requisites of governance arrangements (from PC

Schmitter, 2002) a. List of potential “pro-governance”

policies supported and implemented by public authorities

b. List of necessary attributes on the part

of (organized) civil society

c. List of principles for the chartering, composition and decision-rules of governance arrangements


I. “Pro-governance” policies

1. freedom of association, petition and assembly2. legal recognition3. special fiscal treatment4. arenas for functional representation5. guarantees of access to decision-making6. protection from non-intromission in internal affairs7. subsidization with public funds8. obligatory membership and/ or member

contributions9. legal extension of contracts10. devolved responsibility for policy

implementation


II. Attributes of (organized) civil society

1. class, sectoral, professional or corporate consciousness

2. voluntarism3. “moral sentiments”4. sociability5. trust6. altruism or “other-regardingness”7. universalism8. sense of personal efficacy9. organizational skills


1. mandated authority (clearly circumscribed mandate [by the EU] establishing its composition and rules)

2. sunset principle (not for an indefinite period; pre-established date of expiry with possibility of renewal)

3. functional separability (no overlap in tasks with existing [EU] institutions)

4. non-supplementarity (no displacement of existing [EU] institutions)

5. request variety ([E]GA can narrow or widen the range of participants and modify internal rules as long as it does not violate the general charter)

6. anti-spill-over (no [E]GA should exceed the tasks for whose solution it has originally been designed)

III. Principles for the chartering, the composition and the decision-rules of Governance Arrangements

a) Chartering


1. rights (membership in a national political community)2. spatial location (all those living on a regular basis within

a demarcated territory)3. knowledge (person or organization possessing

indispensible knowledge for solution of problem)4. share (holders of property rights in those assets being

affected by [E]GA)5. stake (all those that could materially or spiritually be

affected by operation of [E]GA)6. interest (anybody representing a constituency who

demonstrates sufficient awareness about the issue at stake)

7. status (each organization having an official status in the representation of social, economic or political categories)

b) Composition


“primary” citizens:

1. rights holders = citizens/voters

“secondary” citizens:

2. space holders = residents3. knowledge holders = experts4. share holders = owners5. stake holders = beneficiaries AND victims6. interest holders = spokespersons7. status holders = representatives

Composition … continued (different types of “holders”)


1. “putative” equality (irrespective of size, each participant should be considered as equal – no first, second, third class participants)

2. horizontal interaction (avoidance of hierarchy such as stable delegation of tasks, formalized leadership, etc.)

3. consensus principle (no majority voting, no imposition but deliberation, persuasion and regular interaction)

4. open-door (possibility of exit-option without subsequent retaliation)

5. proportionality (outcomes are roughly proportional to the specific assets of each participant)

6. shifting alliances (avoidance of rigid cleavages; permanent re-composition of groups and actors)

7. checks and balances (no decision on matters concerning outside organizations)

8. reversibility (no decisions that cannot be annulled by “right” holders, i.e. citizen/ voters

c) Decision rules


Multilevel Governance (MLG)

1. MLG visualized

2. MLG and jurisdictions


A simple circuit of functional political exchange

State authoritiesRepresentatives of labor unionsRepresentatives of business associations


A simple circuit of territorial political exchange

Government at level A




A more complex representation of Multilevel Governance and of the positioning of different

actor categories

Sub-national(regional, local)

National

International

suprantional

government

NGOsassociations


Type I GovernanceThe intellectual foundation for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels. Federalism is concerned chiefly with the relationship between central government and a tier of non-intersecting sub-national governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government, rather than the individual policy. In the words of Wallace Oates (1999, 1121), dean of fiscal federalism, "The traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a "general normative framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions." The framework is system-wide, the functions are bundled, and the levels of government are multiple but limited in number.

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governanceby Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks


Type II GovernanceAn alternative form of multi-level governance is one in which the number of jurisdictions is potentially vast rather than limited, in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few levels but operate at numerous territorial scales, in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general-purpose, and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political economists and public choice theorists, but it also summarizes the ideas of several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and Europeanstudies.


Type I governance constrains the number of jurisdictions according to the following design principles:

Nonintersecting memberships. Jurisdictional memberships at the same territorial level do not overlap. Nonintersecting membership limits the need for jurisdictional coordination horizontally at any level and, vertically, across levels.

Cascading jurisdictional scale. The territorial scale of jurisdiction decreases sharply across levels. European Union countries have between two and five subnational levels, described by the European Commission in terms of a common rubric, the Nomenclature des unitis territoriales statistiques (NUTS) (Eurostat 1999, 27). The median population represented in the first level, NUTS 1 jurisdictions, is 3.89 million; that in the second level, NUTS 2 jurisdictions, is 1.42 million; NUTS 3 jurisdictions have a median population of 369,000; the median population in NUTS 4 is 48,000; and at the lowest level, NUTS 5, it is 5,100. In the United States, the corresponding median population is 3.76 million for states, 69,600 for counties, and 8,800 for subcounties. A cascading jurisdictional scale spreads governance across vastly different scales but limits the total number of sub-national levels to three, four, or, at most, five tiers.


General-purpose jurisdictions. A logical corollary is that authoritative competencies are bundled into a small number of extensive packages at each level. Type I governance disperses authority across widely different levels and constrains the number of levels by making the jurisdictions at each level multipurpose.

Systemwide architecture. The pyramidal structure of Type I governance lends itself to hierarchical direction. Most Type I governance systems are bound together by a single court system with ultimate authority to adjudicate among contending jurisdictions.


Type II governance is alternative to Type I.

It limits coordination costs by constraining interaction across jurisdictions. Type II governance sets no ceiling on the number of jurisdictions but spawns new ones along functionally differentiated lines. As a result, externalities across jurisdictions are minimized. This is an exact corollary to Herbert Simon's (1996,178) notion of "nearly decomposable“ structures. Simon argues that tasks within an organization should be distributed so that the share of internal interactions within constituent units is maximized and the share of external interactions minimized. The idea, applied to jurisdictional design, is to distribute tasks so that the short-run behavior of actors across different jurisdictions is more or less independent from that of others, while their long-run behavior is connected only in the aggregate.'‘ How can decomposability be attained in policy provision? How, in other words, can one break up policymaking into discrete pieces with minimal external spillover?


The following design principles characterize Type II governance.

Functional specificity. Specific, functionally distinct competencies are hived off and insulated. In this way, externalities-and therefore interdependence-among jurisdictions are minimized. The assumption that all significant costs and benefits are internalized within the jurisdiction is a foundation of Type I1 governance theory, including Tiebout's (1956) theory of jurisdictional competition, Buchanan's (1965) theory of clubs, and Oates‘ analysis of metropolitan competition (Oates and Schwab 1988).

Flexible, policy-specific, architecture. Type I1 governance is designed with respect to particular policy problems-not particular communities or constituencies. Institutional design-the scope of a jurisdiction, its mode of decision making, adjudication, and implementation-can thus be adapted to particular policy problems.


The two types of governance share one vital feature: They are both radical departures from the centralized state. However, they diffuse authority in contrasting ways. Type I governance bundles competencies in jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions form part of a system-wide plan: They are mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested within those at the next higher level. Jurisdictional design generally corresponds to communal identities: Each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group or territorial community. These jurisdictions are oriented to voice rather than to exit. Type I governance reflects a simple design principle: Maximize the fit between the scale of a jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good provision while minimizing inter-jurisdictional coordination by (a) creating inclusive jurisdictions that internalize most relevant externalities and (b) limiting the number of jurisdictional levels.


Type II governance also limits the transaction costs of inter-jurisdictional coordination, but it does so in a fundamentally different way, by splicing public good provision into a large number of functionally discrete jurisdictions. But these jurisdictions do not conform to an overarching blueprint. Rather, each is designed to address a limited set of related problems. Type II jurisdictions are task-driven. Hence, the same individual may be part of several overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions. Membership in Type II jurisdictions tends to be conditional and extrinsic. Type II jurisdictions are often designed to have low barriers to entry and exit so as to engender competition among them.


3. Europeanization

1.Conceptualizing and measuring it

2. Europeanization in comparative perspective


3.1 The domestic effect of Europeanization


3.2 Two logics of domestic change


3.3 Degrees of domestic change


Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Policy

Makingby Vivian A.Schmidt

1. Policies


3. Patterns of policy formulation and implementation

Member states along a continuum from statist to corporatist processes


Corporatist countries


Statist/ etatist countries


Pluralist countries


National patterns of policy-making and the impact of the EU


Conclusions Policies


2. Politics


Representative politics of simple and compound polities


Simple and compound polities along a continuum betweenmajoritarian and proportional electoral systems


Percentage of people who said they were “very“ or “fairly satisfied“ with their domestic political system


Percentage of people who said they trusted the European Union


Percentage of people who feel their country‘s membership in the European Union is a “good thing“


Percentage of people who see themselves as both their nationality and European


Percentage of people who feel their country benefits from EU membership


Conclusions Politics


2. Polities


Simple and compound polities along a continuum betweenunitary, regionalized and federal structures


Institutional structures of simple and compound polities


The differential effect of the EU on national executives‘ powers, projection of preferences and compliance patterns related to institutional structure


Conclusions polity

governance, multilevel governance and europeanization european social policy course 4 may 2009 j. r....

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