gouldner - the norm of reciprocity a preliminary statement.pdf

8/10/2019 Gouldner - The Norm of Reciprocity A Preliminary Statement.pdf

1/19

The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary StatementAuthor(s): Alvin W. GouldnerSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1960), pp. 161-178Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2092623 .Accessed: 19/10/2014 21:19

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 132. 208.246.237 on Sun, 19 Oct 2 014 21:19:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2092623?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2092623?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa


2/19

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

April 1960 Volume 25, Number 2

THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY:A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT *

ALVIN W. GOULDNER

Washington University at St. Louis

The manner in which the concept of reciprocity is implicated in functional theory is explored,enabling a reanalysis of the concepts of "survival" and "exploitation." The need to distinguishbetween the concepts of complementarity and reciprocity is stressed. Distinctions are alsodrawn between (1) reciprocity as a pattern of mutually contingent exchange of gratifications,(2) the existential or folk belief in reciprocity, and (3) the generalized moral norm of reci-procity. Reciprocity as a moral norm is analyzed; it is hypothesized that it is one of theuniversal "principal components" of moral codes. As Westermarck states, "To requite abenefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere, at least undercertain circumstances, regarded as a duty. This is a subject which in the present connectioncalls for special consideration." Ways in which the norm of reciprocity is implicated in themaintenance of stable social systems are examined.

TCClHERE s no duty more indispensablethan that of returning a kindness,"says Cicero, adding that "all men dis-

trust one forgetful of a benefit."-Men havebeen insisting on the importance of reci-procity for a long time. While many sociolo-gists concur in this judgment, there arenonetheless few concepts in sociology whichremain more obscure and ambiguous. Howard

Becker, for example, has found this conceptso important that he has titled one of hisbooks Man in Reciprocity and has evenspoken of man as Homo reciprocus, all with-out venturing to present a straightforwarddefinition of reciprocity. Instead Beckerstates, "I don't propose to furnish any defini-tion of reciprocity; if you produce some, theywill be your own achievements." 1

Becker is not alone in failing to stipulateformally the meaning of reciprocity, whileat the same time affirming its prime im-portance. Indeed, he is in very good company,agreeing with L. T. Hobhouse, who held that"reciprocity . . . is the vital principle of so-ciety," 2 and is a key intervening variablethrough which shared social rules are enabledto yield social stability. Yet Hobhouse pre-

sents no systematic definition of reciprocity.XWhile hardly any clearer than Hobhouse,Richard Thurnwald is equally certain of thecentral importance of the "principle of reci-procity": this principle is almost a primordialimperative which "pervades every relationof primitive life" 3 and is the basis on whichthe entire social and ethical life of primitivecivilizations presumably rests.4 Georg Sim-

* Sections of this paper were read at the annual

meeting of the American Sociological Association,September, 1959. The author is indebted to RobertK. Merton, Howard S. Becker, John W. Bennett,Louis Schneider, and Gregory Stone for reading anearlier draft but knows of no adequate "reciprocity"for their many valuable suggestions.

1 Howard Becker, Man in Reciprocity, New York:Prager, 1956, p. 1.

2 L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution: A Study

in Comparative Ethics, London: Chapman & Hall,1951, First edition, 1906, p. 12.

3 Richard Thurnwald, Economics in PrimitiveCommunities, London: Oxford University Press,1932, p. 106.

4 Ibid., p. 137. See also, Richard Thurnwald,"Banaro Society: Social Organization and KinshipSystem of a Tribe in the Interior of New Guinea,"

161

This content downloaded from 132 .208.246.237 on Sun, 19 Oct 2 014 21:19:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/19

162 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

mel's comments go a step further, emphasiz-ing the importance of reciprocity not onlyfor primitive but for all societies. Simmelremarks that social equilibrium and cohesioncould not exist without "the reciprocity ofservice and return service," and that "allcontacts among men rest on the schema ofgiving and returning the equivalence." 5

Were we confronted with only an obscureconcept, which we had no reason to assumeto be important, we might justifiably con-sign it to the Valhalla of intellectual history,there to consort eternally with the countlessincunabula of sociological ingenuity. How-ever convenient, such a disposition would

be rash, for we can readily note the im-portance attributed to the concept of reci-procity by such scholars as George Homans,Claude Levi-Strauss, and Raymond Firth,")as well as by such earlier writers as Durk-heim, Marx, Mauss, Malinowski, and vonWiese, to name only a few masters.

Accordingly, the aims of this paper are:(1) to indicate the manner in which the con-cept of reciprocity is tacitly involved in butformally neglected by modern functionaltheory; (2) to clarify the concept and dis-play some of its diverse intellectual contents,thus facilitating its theoretical employmentand research utility; and (3) to suggest con-cretely ways in which the clarified conceptprovides new leverage for analysis of thecentral problems of sociological theory,namely, accounting for stability and insta-bility in social systems.

RECIPROCITY AND FUNCTIONAL THEORY

My concern with reciprocity developed ini-tially from a critical reexamination of currentfunctional theory, especially the work of

Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons. Thefullest ramifications of what follows can bestbe seen in this theoretical context. Merton'sfamiliar paradigm of functionalism stressesthat analysis must begin with the identifica-tion of some problematic pattern of humanbehavior, some institution, role, or sharedpattern of belief. Merton stipulates clearlythe basic functionalist assumption, the wayin which the problematic pattern is to beunderstood: he holds that the "central orien-tation of functionalism" is "expressed in thepractice of intepreting data by establishingtheir consequences for larger structures inwhich they are implicated." The function-

alist's emphasis upon studying the existentconsequences, the ongoing functions or dys-functions, of a social pattern may be betterappreciated if it is remembered that thisconcern developed in a polemic against theearlier anthropological notion of a "survival."The survival, of course, was regarded as acustom held to be unexplainable in termsof its existent consequences or utility andwhich, therefore, had to be understood withreference to its consequences for social ar-rangements no longer present.

Merton's posture toward the notion of asocial survival is both pragmatic and scepti-cal. He asserts that the question of survivalsis largely an empirical one; if the evidencedemonstrates that a given social pattern ispresently functionless then it simply has tobe admitted provisionally to be a survival.Contrariwise, f no such evidence can be ad-duced "then the quarrel dwindles of its own

accord." 8 It is in this sense that his positionis pragmatic. It is also a sceptical position inthat he holds that "even when such survivalsare identified in contemporary iterate socie-ties, they seem to add little to our under-standing of human behavior or the dynamicsof social change. . . ." 9 We are told, finally,that "the sociologist of literate societies mayneglect survivals with no apparent loss." 10

This resolution of the problem of survivalsdoes not seem entirely satisfactory, for al-though vital empirical issues are involvedthere are also important questions that can

Memoirs of the American Anthropological Associa-tion, 8, 1916; among other matters of relevance tothe analysis of reciprocity, Thurnwald's discussionhere (p. 275) opens the issue of the "exchange ofwomen," which Levi-Strauss later developed.

6 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel,translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe,Ill.: Free Press, 1950, p. 387.

6 See, respectively, George Homans, "Social Be-havior as Exchange," American Journal of Soci-ology," 63 (May, 1958), pp. 597-606; C. Levi-Strauss, Les Structures 9lmentaires de la parents,Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949; and RaymondFirth, Primitive Polynesian Economy, New York:Humanities Press, 1950.

7 R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc-ture, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957, pp. 46-47.

8 Ibid., p. 33.9 Ibid., p. 34.10 Ibid.



4/19

THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY 163

only be clarified theoretically. Merton's dis-cussion implies that certain patterns ofhuman behavior are already known to be,or may in the future be shown to be, socialsurvivals. How, then, can these be explainedin terms of functional theory? Can functionaltheory ignore them on the grounds that theyare not socially consequential? Consequentialor not, such social survivals would in them-selves entail patterns of behavior or beliefwhich are no less in need of explanation thanany other. More than that, their very exist-ence, which Merton conceives possible, wouldseem to contradict the "central orientation"of functional theory.

Functionalism, to repeat, explains the per-sistence of social patterns in terms of theirongoing consequences for existent social sys-tems. If social survivals, which by definitionhave no such consequences, are conceded toexist or to be possible, then it would seemthat functionalism is by its own admissionincapable of explaining them. To suggestthat survivals do not help us to understandother patterns of social behavior is beside themark. The decisive issue is whether existentversions of functional theory can explainsocial survivals, not whether specific socialsurvivals can explain other social patterns.

It would seem that functionalists have butone of two choices: either they must dog-matically deny the existence or possibility offunctionless patterns (survivals), and assertthat all social behavior is explainable parsi-moniously on the basis of the same funcla-mental functionalist assumption, that is, in

terms of its consequences for surroundingsocial structures; or, more reasonably, theymust concede that some social patterns areor may be survivals, admitting that existentfunctional theory fails to account for suchinstances. In the latter case, functionalistsmust develop further their basic assumptionson the generalized level required. I believethat one of the strategic ways in which suchbasic assumptions can be developed is by

recognizing the mannerin

which the conceptof reciprocity is tacitly involved in them,and by explicating the concept's implicationsfor functional theory.

The tacit implication of the concept of rec-iprocity in functional theory can be illus-trated in Merton's analysis of the latentfunctions of the political machine in the

United States. Merton inquires how politicalmachines continue to operate, despite thefact that they frequently run counter to boththe mores and the law. The general form ofhis explanation is to identify the conse-quences of the machine for surrounding truc-tures and to demonstrate that the machineperforms "positive functions which are atthe same time not adequately fulfilled byother existing patterns and structures." 11It seems evident, however, that simply toestablish its consequences for other socialstructures provides no answer to the questionof the persistence of the political machine.The explanation miscarries because no ex-

plicit analysis is made of the feedbackthrough which the social structures or groups,whose needs are satisfied by the politicalmachine, in turn "reciprocate" and repay themachine for the services received from it. Inthis case, the patterns of reciprocity, impliedin the notion of the "corruption" of the ma-chine, are well known and fully documented.

To state the issue generally: the demon-stration that A is functional for B can help toaccount for A's persistence only if the func-tional theorist tacitly assumes some principleof reciprocity. It is in this sense that someconcept of reciprocity apparently has beensmuggled into the basic but unstated postu-lates of functional analysis. The demonstra-tion that A is functional for B helps to ac-count for A's own persistence and stabilityonly on two related assumptions: (1) thatB reciprocates A's services, and (2) that B'sservice to A is contingent upon A's perform-

ance of positive functions for B. The secondassumption, indeed, is one implication ofthe definition of reciprocity as a transaction.Unless B's services to A are contingent uponthe services provided by A, it is pointless toexamine the latter if one wishes to accountfor the perisistence of A.

11 Ibid., p. 73. Among the functions of the politicalmachine to which Merton refers are: the organiza-tion and centralization of power so that it can bemobilized to satisfy the needs of different groups,provision of personalized forms of assistance forlower-class groups, giving political privileges andaid to business groups, and granting protection forillicit rackets.

12 An initial statement of this point is to befound in A. W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Au-tonomy in Functional Theory," in L. Gross, editor,Symposium on Sociological Theory, Evanston, Ill.:Row, Peterson, 1959, pp. 241-270.



5/19


It may be assumed, as a first approxima-tion, that a social unit or group is more likelyto contribute to another which provides itwith benefits than to one which does not;nonetheless, there are certain general condi-tions under which one pattern may providebenefits for the other despite a lack of reci-procity. An important case of this situationis where power arrangements constrain thecontinuance of services. If B is considerablymore powerful than A, B may force A tobenefit it with little or no reciprocity. Thissocial arrangement, to be sure, is less stablethan one in which B's reciprocity motivatesA to continue performing services for B,

but it is hardly for this reason sociologicallyunimportant.The problem can also be approached in

terms of the functional autonomy 13 of twounits relative to each other. For example, Bmay have many alternative sources for sup-plying the services that it normally receivesfrom A. A, however, may be dependent uponB's services and have no, or comparativelyfew, alternatives. Consequently, the con-tinued provision of benefits by one pattern,14A, for another, B, depends not only upon(1) the benefits which A in turn receivesfrom B, but also on (2) the power which Bpossesses relative to A, and (3) the alterna-tive sources of services accessible to each,beyond those provided by the other. In short,an explanation of the stability of a pattern,or of the relationship between A and B, re-quires investigation of mutually contingentbenefits rendered and of the manner in which

this mutual contingency is sustained. Thelatter, in turn, requires utilization of twodifferent theoretical traditions and generalorientations, one stressing the significance ofpower differences and the other emphasizingthe degree of mutual dependence of the pat-terns or parties involved.

Functional theory, then, requires some as-sumption concerning reciprocity. It must,however, avoid the "Pollyanna Fallacy"which optimistcally assumes that structures

securing "satisfactions" from others will in-variably be "grateful" and will always recip-rocate. Therefore it cannot be merely hypos-tatized that reciprocity will operate in everycase; its occurrence must, instead, be docu-mented empirically. Although reciprocal re-lations stabilize patterns, it need not followthat a lack of reciprocity is socially impossi-ble or invariably disruptive of the patternsinvolved. Relations with little or no reci-procity may, for example, occur when powerdisparities allow one party to coerce theother. There may also be special mechanismswhich compensate for or control the tensionswhich arise in the event of a breakdown in

reciprocity. Among such compensatory mech-anisms there may be culturally shared pre-scriptions of one-sided or unconditional gene-rosity, such as the Christian notion of "turn-ing the other cheek" or "walking the secondmile," the feudal notion of "noblesse oblige,"or the Roman notion of "clemency." Theremay also be cultural prohibitions banning theexamination of certain interchanges from thestandpoint of their concrete reciprocity, asexpressed by the cliche, "It's not the giftbut the sentiment that counts." The majorpoint here is that if empirical analysis failsto detect the existence of functional reci-procity, or finds that it has been disrupted,it becomes necessary to search out and ana-lyze the compensatory arrangements thatmay provide means of controlling the re-sultant tensions, thereby enabling the prob-lematic pattern to remain stable.

A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF "SURVIVALS"

Thus far reciprocity has been discussedas a mutually contingent exchange of bene-fits between two or more units, as if it werean "all or none" matter. Once the problemis posed in this way, however, it is apparentthat reciprocity is not merely present or ab-sent but is, instead, quantitatively variable-or may be treated as such. The benefitsexchanged, at one extreme, may be identical

or equal. At the other logical extreme, oneparty may give nothing in return for thebenefits it has received. Both of these ex-tremes are probably rare in social relationsand the intermediary case, in which one partygives something more or less than that re-ceived, is probably more common than eitherof the limiting cases.

18 For fuller discussion of this concept, seeGouldner, ibid.

14 Use of terms such as "pattern" or "unit" isintended to indicate that the present discussiondeliberately collapses distinctions between insti-tutional, interpersonal, group, or role reciprocities,treating them here under a single rubric for reasonsof space.



6/19


Having cast the problem of reciprocity inthese quantitative terms, there emerges animportant implication for the question of so-cial survivals. The quantitative view of reci-procity. These functionalists made the cogentof the earlier notion of a survival. It may nowbe seen that there a survival was tacitlytreated as one of the limiting cases of reci-procity, that is, one in which a pattern pro-vides nothing in exchange for the benefitsgiven it.

The polemical opposition of the earlierfunctionalists to this view of a survival restsimplicitly on an unqualified principle of reci-procity. These functionalists made the cogent

assumption that a social pattern which per-sists must be securing satisfaction of its ownneeds from certain other patterns. What wasfurther and more dubiously assumed, how-ever, was that if this pattern continues to be"serviced" this could only be because it re-ciprocally provided some gratifications to itsbenefactors. In the course of the polemic, thequestion of the degree of such gratification-the relation between its output and input-became obscured. To the early functionalists,the empirical problem became one of un-earthing the hidden contributions made by aseeming survival and, thereby, showing thatit is not in fact functionless. In effect, thisenjoined the functionalist to exert his in-genuity to search out the hidden reciprocitiesfor it was assumed that there must be somereciprocities somewhere. This led, in certaincases, as Audrey Richards states, to "somefar-fetched explanations. . . ." 1'

If, however, it had been better understoodthat compensatory mechanisms might havebeen substituted for reciprocity, or thatpower disparities might have maintained the"survival" despite its lack of reciprocity,then many fruitful problems may well haveemerged. Above all, the early functionalistsneglected the fact that a survival is only thelimiting case of a larger class of social phe-nomena, namely, relations between parties orpatterns in which functional reciprocity s notequal. While the survival, defined as the ex-treme case of a complete lack of reciprocity,may be rare, the larger class of unequal ex-changes, of which survivals are a part, is

frequent. The tacit conception of survivals asentailing no reciprocity led the early func-tionalists to neglect the larger class of un-equal exchanges. It is this problem which thefunctionalist polemic against survivals hasobscured to the present day.

THE 'EXPLOITATIONS1 PROBLEM

It was, however, not only the functionalistpolemic against the concept of survivals thatobscured the significance and inhibited thestudy of unequal exchanges. A similar resultis also produced by the suspicion with whichmany modern sociologists understandably

regard the concept of"exploitation." This

concept of course is central to the traditionalsocialist critique of modern capitalism. Inthe now nearly-forgotten language of po-litical economy, "exploitation" refers to arelationship in which unearned income re-sults from certain kinds of unequal exchange.

Starting perhaps with Sismondi's notion of"spoliation," and possibly even earlier withthe physiocrat's critique of exchange as in-trinsically unproductive, the concept of ex-

ploitation can be traced from the work of theSaint-Simonians to that of Marx andProudhon.16 It is also present in Veblen'snotion of the Vested Interest which he char-acterizes as "the right to something fornothing" or, in other words, as institution-alized exploitation. Even after the emergenceof sociology as a separate discipline the con-cept of exploitation appears in the works ofE. A. Ross,17 von Wiese, and Howard

Becker.'8 As it passed into sociology, how-

15 Raymond Firth, editor, Man and Culture: AnEvaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malinowski,New York: The Humanities Press, 1957, p. 19.

16 The views of these and other analysts of ex-ploitation are ably summarized in C. Gide andC. Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, translatedby R. Richards, Boston: Heath, revised edition, 1918.

17 See, e.g., E. A. Ross, New-Age Sociology, NewYork: Appleton-Century, 1940, esp. Chapter 9.

18Note von Wiese and Becker's comment: "TheMarxians trace the social process of exploitation tothe 'capitalistic' economic order; their thesis is thatcapitalism creates exploitation. We, on the otherhand, do not deny the existence of capitalistic ex-ploitation, but it is for us only one of the formswhich are found among the phenomena of exploita-tion. The destruction of capitalism will not signalizethe end of exploitation, but will merely prevent theappearance of some of its forms and will open upnew opportunities for others." L. von Wiese andHoward Becker, Systematic Sociology, New York:Wiley, 1932, p. 700. It would seem that 20th centuryhistory amply confirms this view.



7/19


ever, the concept was generalized beyond itsoriginal economic application. Ross andBecker-von Wiese, for example, speak ofvarious types of exploitation: economic, to besure, but also religious, "egotic," and sexual.However, just as the concept of exploitationwas being generalized and made available forsocial analysis, it almost disappeared fromsociological usage.

"Almost disappeared" because there re-mains one area in which unabashed, full-scaleuse of the concept is made by sociologists.This is in the study of sexual relations. AsKanin and Howard remark, "It has been thepractice to speak of exploitation when males

were found to have entered sexual liaisonswith women of comparative lower status." 39Kingsley Davis also uses the notion of ex-ploitation implicitly in his discussion of theincest taboo, remarking that ". . . father-daughter incest would put the daughter in aposition of subordination. While she was stillimmature the father could use his power totake advantage of her." 20 What Davis issaying is that one function of the incest taboois to prevent sexual exploitation. He goes onto add that "legitimate sexual relations ordi-narily involve a certain amount of reciproc-ity. Sex is exchanged for something equallyvaluable." 21 This is an interesting com-mentary, first, because Davis is quite clearabout treating exploitation in the context ofa discussion of reciprocity; and second, be-cause he explicitly uses a notion of reciproc-ity in a strategic way even though it is notsystematically explored elsewhere in his vol-

ume, once again illustrating the tendency touse the concept and to assume its analyticimportance without giving it careful con-ceptualization.22

The continued use of the concept of ex-ploitation in sociological analyses of sexualrelations stems largely from the brilliantwork of Willard Waller on the dynamics ofcourtship. Waller's ambivalent commentsabout the concept suggest why it has falleninto sociological disrepute. "The word ex-ploitation is by no means a desirable one,"explains Waller, "but we have not been ableto find another which will do as well. Thedictionary definition of exploitation as an'unfair or unjust utilization of another' con-tains a value judgment, and this value judg-ment is really a part of the ordinary socio-logical meaning of the term." 23 In short, the

concept of exploitation may have becomedisreputable because its value implicationsconflict with modern sociology's effort toplace itself on a value-free basis, as well asbecause it is a concept commonly and cor-rectly associated with the critique of modernsociety emphasized by the political left. Butthe concept need not be used in such anideological manner; it can be employed sim-ply to refer to certain transactions involvingan exchange of things of unequal value. Itis important to guarantee that the ordinaryvalue implications of a term do not intrudeupon its scientific use. It is also important,however, to prevent our distaste for the ideo-logical implications of exploitation from in-ducing a compulsive and equally ideologicalneglect of its cognitive substance.

The unsavory implications of the conceptof exploitation have not excluded it fromstudies of sexual relations, although almost

all other specializations in sociology eschewit. Why this is so remains a tempting prob-lem for the sociology of knowledge, but can-not be explored here. In the present context,the important implications are the following:If the possible sexual exploitation of daugh-ters by fathers gives rise, as Davis suggests,to mechanisms that serve to prevent this,then it would seem that other types of ex-ploitation may also be controlled by otherkinds of mechanisms. These may be no lessimportant and universal than the incest ta-boo. If the exploitation of women by men(or men by women) is worthy of sociologicalattention, then also worth studying is the

19 E. Kanin and D. H. Howard, "PostmaritalConsequences of Premarital Sex Adjustments,"American Sociological Review, 23 (October, 1958),p. 558. (My italics.)

20 Kingsley Davis, Human Society, New York:Macmillan, 1949, p. 403.

21 Ibid., p. 404.22 Note Davis's tendency to assume that legitimate

sexual relations entail an exchange of equal valueseven though his previous sentence indicates thatthere may be no more than "a certain amount ofreciprocity" involved. The latter is a way of talkingabout unequal exchanges and thus implies that theseoccur in institutionalized and not only in illicitrelations. This is an important problem that cannotbe developed here.

23 Willard Waller, The Family: A Dynamic In-terpretation, revised by Reuben Hill, New York:Dryden, 1951, p. 163.



8/19


exploitation of students by teachers, of work-ers by management or union leaders, of pa-tients by doctors,24 and so on. If the notionof exploitation, in a value-free sense, is usefulfor the analysis of sexual relations then itcan be of similar aid in analyzing many otherkinds of social relations.

Doubtless "exploitation" is by now soheavily charged with misleading ideologicalresonance that the term itself can scarcely besalvaged for purely scientific purposes andwill, quite properly, be resisted by mostAmerican sociologists. This is unimportant.Perhaps a less emotionally freighted-if in-felicitous-term such as "reciprocity imbal-

ance" will suffice to direct attention onceagain to the crucial question of unequal ex-changes.

In any event, the present analysis of reci-procity opens up long-neglected questions,yielding a new perspective on the relationbetween functional theory and the conceptsof "survival" and "exploitation." In the lattercase, moreover, intimations emerge of someof the ways in which two diverse theoreticaltraditions contain surprising convergences.

These two traditions are, first, that whichis commonly if questionably 25 held to beginwith Comte, was developed by Durkheim,and reaches its fullest current expression inthe work of Parsons. The second tradition,while often ideologically distorted neverthe-less retains significant sociological substance,derives from Marx and Engels, was developedby Kautsky, and ended in Bukharin. Thelatent convergence between these two schools

involves the implicit stress that each givesto reciprocity, albeit to polar ends of itscontinuum.

The "Comteian" tradition, of course, ap-proached reciprocity through its emphasis onthe division of labor, viewed as a major

source of social cohesion. Characteristicallyfocusing on the problem of social instabilityand change, rather than stability and co-hesion, the "Marxian" tradition emphasizedthe opposite end of reciprocity namely, ex-ploitation. This, I suspect, is one of the majorbut overlooked convergences n the history ofsociological theory.

This latent convergence becomes most evi-dent in Durkheim's lectures on "ProfessionalEthics and Civic Morals." 26 Durkheim con-tends that the existence of social classes,characterized by significant inequalities, inprinciple makes it impossible for "just" con-tracts to be negotiated. This system of strati-

fication, Durkheim argues, constrains to anunequal exchange of goods and services,thereby offending the moral expectations ofpeople in industrial societies. The exploita-tion rendered possible by notable disparitiesof power among the contracting parties en-courages a sense of injustice which has so-cially unstabilizing consequences. Thus bothDurkheim and Marx use a concept of "ex-ploitation" for analyzing social instabilities.Durkheim, however, adds an important ele-ment that was systematically neglected byMarx, namely, that unequal exchanges ofgoods and services are socially disruptivebecause they violate certain pervasive values.But the specific nature of this value elementis never fully confronted and explored byDurkheim; we must here take as problematicwhat Durkheim took as given.

COMPLEMENTARITY AND RECIPROCITY

First, however, the question of the mean-ing of the concept of reciprocity should bereexamined. Consideration of some of theways in which the reciprocity problem istreated by Parsons helps to distinguish reci-procity from other cognate concepts. "It isinherent in the nature of social interaction,"writes Parsons, "that the gratification of ego'sneed-dispositions is contingent on alter's re-action and vice versa." 27 Presumably, there-fore, if the gratification of either party'sneeds is not contingent upon the other's re-actions, the stability of their relation is un-

24 The point is not to stress, as Parsons does, theunique exploitability of the patient or the peculiarpower of the physician, but to see this relationshipas but one dramatic case of a larger class of phe-nomena of basic theoretic significance which shouldbe explicitly dealt with in systematic theory ratherthan given only ad hoc treatment in specific empiricalcontexts. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System,Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951, p. 445.

25 The thesis that this is more mythological thanreal is developed in my introduction to EmileDurkheim, Socialism and Saint-Simon, translated byC. Sattler and edited by A. W. Gouldner, YellowSprings: Antioch Press, 1958, esp. p. ix.

26 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and CivicMorals, translated by C. Brookfield, Glencoe, Ill.:Free Press, 1958; see esp. pp. 209-214.

27 Parsons, op. cit., p. 21.



9/19


dermined. This, in turn, implies that if asocial system is to be stable there must al-ways be some "mutuality of gratification." 8Social system stability, then, presumably de-pends in part on the mutually contingentexchange of gratifications, that is, on reci-procity as exchange.

This, however, remains an insight theimplications of which are never systemat-ically explored. For example, the implicationsof differences in the degree of mutuality orin the symmetry of reciprocity are neglected.Again, while the concept of "exploitation" as-sumes central importance in Parsons' com-mentary on the patient-doctor relation, it is

never precisely defined, examined, and lo-cated in his general theory.

One reason for Parsons' neglect of reciproc-ity is that he, like some other sociologists,does not distinguish it from the concept ofcomplementarity. Parsons uses the two con-cepts as if they are synonymous 29 and, forthe most part, centers his analysis on comple-mentarity to the systematic neglect of reci-procity rigorously construed. The term com-plementarity, however, s itself an ambiguousone and is not, in all of its meanings, synony-mous with reciprocity. Complementarity hasat least four distinct meanings: 30

Complementarity, may mean that a right(x) of Ego against Alter implies a duty (-x)of Alter to Ego. Given the often vague use ofthe term "right," it is quite possible thatthis proposition, in one aspect, is only anexpansion of some definition of the concept"right." To that degree, of course, this issimply an analytic proposition. The inter-esting sociological questions, however, ariseonly when issues of empirical substancerather than logical implication are raised.For example, where a group shares a beliefthat some status occupant has a certain right,say the right of a wife to receive supportfrom her husband, does the group in fact

also share a belief that the husband has anobligation to support the wife? Furthermore,even though rights may logically or empiri-cally imply duties, it need not follow that thereverse is true. In other words, it does notfollow that rights and duties are alwaystransitive. This can be seen in a second mean-ing of complementarity.

Complementarity2 may mean that what isa duty (-x) of Alter to Ego implies a right(x) of Ego against Alter. On the empiricallevel, while this is often true, of course, itis also sometimes false. For example, whatmay be regarded as a duty of charity or fore-bearance, say a duty to "turn the othercheek," need not be socially defined as theright of the recipient. While a man may beregarded as having an unconditional obliga-tion to tell the truth to everyone, even to aconfirmed liar, people in his group mightnot claim that the liar has a right to have

the truth told him.The other two meanings of complemen-tarity differ substantially. Complementarity3may mean that a right (x) of Alter againstEgo implies a duty (-y) of Alter to Ego.Similarly, complementarity4 may mean thata duty (-x) of Ego to Alter implies a right(y) of Ego against Alter.

In these four implications of complimen-tarity-sometimes called reciprocal rightsand obligations-there are two distinctivetypes of cases. Properly speaking, comnple-mentarity refers only to the first two mean-ings sketched above, where what is a rightof Ego implies an obligation of Alter, orwhere a duty of Alter to Ego implies a rightof Ego against Alter. Only the other twomeanings, however, involve true instances of

28Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, editors,Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 107.

29 Parsons' tendency to equate complementarityand reciprocity may be illustrated by his commentthat "Role expectations organize . . . the reciproci-ties, expectations, and responses to these expectationsin the specific interaction systems of ego and oneor more alters. This reciprocal aspect must be bornein mind since the expectations of an ego alwaysimply the expectations of one or more alters. Itis in this reciprocity or complementarity that sanc-tions enter. . . ." Ibid., pp. 190-191 (my italics);see also p. 105. The burden of Parsons' analysis at-tends to the conditions and consequences of com-plementarity, by which he means that a role playerrequires of himself what his role partner requiresof him. It is precisely for this reason that Parsonsemphasizes that values must be held in common bythe actors, if their expectations are to be compatible.The equation of reciprocity with complementarity isnot peculiar to Parsons. It is evident in the workof other sociologists who sometimes speak of therights and obligations in a pair of roles as "re-ciprocal" and other times as "complementary." And,like Parsons, others state that rights and duties, orrole expectations, are always complementary.

30 The analysis here closely follows W. D. Ross,The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1950.



10/19


reciprocity, for only in these does what oneparty receives from the other require somereturn, so that giving and receiving are mu-tually contingent.

In short, complementarity connotes thatone's rights are another's obligations, andvice versa. Reciprocity, however, connotesthat each party has rights and duties. Thisis more than an analytic distinction: it is anempirical generalization concerning role sys-tems the importance of which as a datum isso elemental that it is commonly neglectedand rarely made problematic. The Englishphilosopher MacBeath suggests that thisempirical generalization may be accounted

for by the principle of reciprocity.31 Thiswould seem possible in several senses, oneof which is that, were there only rights onthe one side and duties on the other, thereneed be no exchange whatsoever. Stated dif-ferently, it would seem that there can bestable patterns of reciprocity qua exchangeonly insofar as each party has both rightsand duties. In effect, then, reciprocity has itssignificance for role systems in that it tendsto structure each role so as to include bothrights and duties. It is now clear, at any rate,that reciprocity s by no means identical withcomplementarity and that the two are con-fused only at theoretic peril.

MALINOWSKI ON RECIPROCITY

Renewing the effort to clarify the diversemeanings of reciprocity, we turn to Malinow-ski's seminal contribution. This is most fully

elaboratedin

his Crimeand Custom,32

whichopens with the following question: Why isit that rules of conduct in a primitive societyare obeyed, even though they are hard andirksome? Even under normal conditions, thesavage's compliance with his moral code isat best partial, conditional, and evasive.These, says Malinowski, are the elementaryfacts of ethnography, and consequently wecannot assume that the savage's conformity isdue only to his awe and reverence for tradi-tional custom, or that he slavishly and spon-taneously complies with its dictates.

Above all, Malinowski rejects the assump-tion that it is the sacred authority of themoral code, or the "collective conscience,"which accounts for the conformity given it.It is to this anti-Durkheimian point that hedirects the brunt of his polemic. Conformity,says Malinowski, is not sanctioned "by amere psychological force, but by a definitesocial machinery. . . ." 33 Thus Malinowskiexpressly rejects a psychological account ofconformity and seeks instead a distinctivelysociological explanation. This he finds inthe "principle of reciprocity."

One of Malinowski's central theses holdsthat people owe obligations to each other

and that, therefore, conformity with norms issomething they give to each other. He notes,for example, that almost every religious orceremonial act is regarded as an obligationbetween groups and living individuals, andnot only to the immortal gods. For Malinow-ski, therefore, one meaning of reciprocityrefers to the interlocking status duties whichpeople owe one another. Thus he speaks ofreciprocity as taking place "within a stand-ing partnership, or as associated with definitesocial ties or coupled with mutuality in non-economic matters." 35

Reciprocity also entails a "mutual de-pendence and [is] realized in the equivalentarrangement of reciprocal services. . . .2236Here reciprocity is conceived as the comple-ment to and fulfillment of the division oflabor. It is the pattern of exchange throughwhich the mutual dependence of people,brought about by the division of labor, is

31 Alexander MacBeath, Experiments in Living,London: Macmillan, 1952; see esp. pp. 127 ff.

32 Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom inSavage Society, London: Paul, Trench, Trubner,1932.

3B Ibid., p. 55.34This, by the way, is why I cannot concur in

Parsons' judgment that Malinowski never disen-tangled a social system level of analysis from anencyclopedic concept of culture. See Talcott Parsons,"Malinowski and the Theory of Social Systems," inMan and Culture . . ., op. cit., pp. 53-70. Malinow-ski's Crime and Custom transcends a clinical caseanalysis of specific primitive societies and presentsa generalized and basic contribution to the theoryof social systems when it addresses itself to theproblem of reciprocity. Parsons, however, does notmention the significance of reciprocity in Malinow-ski's work and is able to support his claim that itignores social system analysis only by this note-worthy omission. Parsons' neglect of the principleof reciprocity in Malinowski's work, it would seem,is consistent with his own neglect of the distinctionbetween reciprocity and complementarity.

35 Malinowski, op. cit., p. 39.36 Ibid., p. 55.



11/19


realized. Reciprocity, therefore, s a mutuallygratifying pattern of exchanging goods andservices.

As noted above, Malinowski speaks ofreciprocity as involving an exchange ofequivalent services; he further stresses thisby insisting that "most if not all economicacts are found to belong to some chain ofreciprocal gifts and counter-gifts, which inthe long run balance, benefiting both sidesequally." 37 For Malinowski, then, the ex-change of goods and services is not onlymutually gratifying but is equally so, "inthe long run."

Speaking of the reciprocal exchange of

vegetables and fish between inland commu-nities and fishing villages, Malinowski re-marks that there is a "system of mutualobligations which forces the fisherman torepay whenever he has received a gift fromhis inland partner, and vice versa. Neitherpartner can refuse, neither may stint, neithershould delay." 38 This is seen to be relatedto the group's existential beliefs about rec-iprocity. That is, men are not regarded asblindly involving themselves in reciprocaltransactions; they are viewed as having somepresentiment of the consequences of reciproc-ity and of its breakdown. In this vein, Mal-inowski writes: "Though no native, howeverintelligent, can formulate this state of affairsin a general abstract manner, or present it asa sociological theory, yet everyone is wellaware of its existence and in each concretecase he can foresee the consequences."More specifically, it seems to be implied that

people believe that (a) in the long run themutual exchange of goods and services willbalance out; or (b) if people do not aidthose who helped them certain penalties willbe imposed upon them; or (c) those whomthey have helped can be expected to helpthem; or (d) some or all of these.

It is clear that two basically different ele-ments were caught up in Malinowski's "prin-ciple of reciprocity." One of these is a setof sentiments or existential folk beliefs about

reciprocity. The other is a mutually con-tingent exchange of benefits or gratifications.(The latter conception converges, though itis not completely identical, with the ecologi-cal concept of symbiosis.) There is, however,a third analytically distinct element which, ifimplicit in Malinowski, remained murky.This is a value element, the same value thatDurkheim, as mentioned earlier, invoked butdid not clarify. Like Durkheim, Malinowskinever fully disentangles it from the other ele-ments.

In the exchanges between the fishing andthe inland villages, cited above, we may sug-gest that each side lives up to its obligations,

not simply because of constraints imposedby the division of labor with its attendantmutual dependency, but also because thepartners share the higher level moral norm:"You should give benefits to those who giveyou benefits." Note that this norm doesnot simply make it unconditionally impera-tive, say, for the fisherman o give the inlandgardeners fish. I refer here not to the specificobligation to give fish but rather to a generalobligation to repay benefits.

In sum, beyond reciprocity as a pattern ofexchange and beyond folk beliefs about reci-procity as a fact of life, there is another ele-ment: a generalized moral norm of reciproc-ity which defines certain actions and obliga-tions as repayments for benefits received.

Malinowski frequently seems to confusethis general norm with the existence of com-plementary and concrete status rights andduties. It is theoretically necessary, however,

to distinguish specific status duties from thegeneral norm. Specific and complementaryduties are owed by role partners to oneanother by virtue of the socially standardizedroles they play. These may require an almostunconditional compliance in the sense thatthey are incumbent on all those in a givenstatus simply by virtue of its occupancy.In contrast, the generalized norm of reci-procity evokes obligations toward others onthe basis of their past behavior. In the firstcase, Ego's obligations to Alter depend uponEgo's status vis-a-vis Alter; in the secondcase, Ego's obligation toward Alter dependupon what Alter has done for Ego. There arecertain duties that people owe one another,not as human beings, or as fellow membersof a group, or even as occupants of social

37 Ibid., p. 39.38 Ibid., p. 22.39 Ibid., p. 40. This is not to say, however, that

Malinowski regards reciprocity qua transaction asalways intended by all the actors or as something ofwhich they are always aware. In brief-and I agree-there are both latent and manifest reciprocities.



12/19


statuses within the group but, rather, becauseof their prior actions. We owe others certainthings because of what they have previouslydone for us, because of the history of previousinteraction we have had with them. It is thiskind of obligation which is entailed by thegeneralized norm of reciprocity.

THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY

Contrary to some cultural relativists, itcan be hypothesized that a norm of reciproc-ity is universal. As Westermarck stated, "Torequite a benefit, or to be grateful to him whobestows it, is probably everywhere, at leastunder certain circumstances, regarded as aduty." 40 A norm of reciprocity is, I suspect,no less universal and important an elementof culture than the incest taboo, although,similarly, its concrete formulations may varywith time and place.

Specifically, I suggest that a norm of reci-procity, in its universal form, makes twointerrelated, minimal demands: (1) peopleshould help those who have helped them, and(2) people should not injure those who have

helped them. Generically, the norm of reci-procity may be conceived of as a dimensionto be found in all value systems and, in par-ticular, as one among a number of "PrincipalComponents" universally present in moralcodes. (The task of the sociologist, in thisregard, parallels that of the physicist whoseeks to identify the basic particles of matter,the conditions under which they vary, andtheir relations to one another.)

To suggest that a norm of reciprocity isuniversal is not, of course, to assert that itis unconditional. Unconditionality would, in-deed, be at variance with the basic characterof the reciprocity norm which imposes obli-gations only contingently, that is, in responseto the benefits conferred by others. Moreover,such obligations of repayment are contingentupon the imputed value of the benefit re-ceived. The value of the benefit and hence thedebt is in proportion to and varies with-

among other things-the intensity of therecipient's need at the time the benefit wasbestowed ("a friend in need . . ."), the re-sources of the donor ("he gave although

he could ill afford it"), the motives imputedto the donor ("without thought of gain"),and the nature of the constraints which areperceived to exist or to be absent ("he gaveof his own free will . . ."). Thus the obliga-tions imposed by the norm of reciprocity mayvary with the status of the participantswithin a society.

Similarly, this norm functions differentlyin some degree in different cultures. In thePhilippines, for example, the compadre sys-tem cuts across and pervades the political,economic, and other institutional spheres.Compadres are bound by a norm of reci-procity. If one man pays his compadre'sdoctor's bill in time of need, for example,the latter may be obligated to help theformer's son to get a government job. Herethe tendency to govern all relations by thenorm of reciprocity, thereby underminingbureaucratic impersonality, is relatively le-gitimate, hence overt and powerful. In theUnited States, however, such tendencies areweaker, in part because friendship relationsare less institutionalized. Nonetheless, even

in bureaucracies n this country such tenden-cies are endemic, albeit less legitimate andovert. Except in friendship, kinship, andneighborly relations, a norm of reciprocityis not imposed on Americans by the "domi-nant cultural profile," although it is com-monly found in the latent or "substitute"culture structure in all institutional sectors,even the most rationalized, in the UnitedStates.

In otherwise contrasting discussions of thenorm of reciprocity one emphasis is notable.Some scholars, especially Homans, Thurwald,Simmel, and Malinowski, assert or implythat the reciprocity norm stipulates that theamount of the return to be made is "roughlyequivalent" to what had been received. Theproblem of equivalence is a difficult but im-portant one. Whether in fact there is a reci-procity norm specifically requiring that re-turns for benefits received be equivalent isan empirical question. So, too, is the prob-lem of whether such a norm is part of ordistinct from a more general norm whichsimply requires that one return some (un-specified) benefits to benefactors. Logicallyprior to such empirical problems, however,is the question of what the meaning of

40 Edward Westermarck, The Origin and De-velopmtent of the Moral Ideas, London: Macmillan,1908, Vol. 2, p. 154.



13/19


equivalence would be in the former normof equivalent reciprocity.

Equivalence may have at least two forms,the sociological and psychodynamic signifi-cance of which are apt to be quite distinct.In the first case, heteromorphic reciprocity,equivalence may mean that the things ex-changed may be concretely different butshould be equal in value, as defined by theactors in the situation. In the second case,homeomorphic reciprocity, equivalence maymean that exchanges should be concretelyalike, or identical in form, either with re-spect to the things exchanged or to the cir-cumstances under which they are exchanged.

In the former, equivalence calls for "tit fortat"; in the latter, equivalence calls for"tat for tat." Historically, the most importantexpression of homeomorphic reciprocity isfound in the negative norms of reciprocity,that is, in sentiments of retaliation wherethe emphasis is placed not on the return ofbenefits but on the return of injuries, and isbest exemplified by the lex talionis.4'

Finally, it should be stressed that equiva-lence in the above cases refers to a definitionof the exchangeables made by actors in thesituation. This differs of course, from holdingthat the things exchanged by people, in thelong run, will be objectively equal in value,as measured by economists or other socialscientists. Here, again, the adequacy of theseconceptual distinctions will be determinedultimately by empirical test. For example,can we find reciprocity norms which, in fact,require that returns be equivalent in value

and are these empirically distinguishablefrom norms requiring that returns be con-cretely alike? Are these uni-dimensional ormulti-dimensional? Similarly, only researchcan resolve the question whether a norm ofretaliation exists in any given group, is thepolar side of the norm of reciprocity, or isa distinctive norm which may vary inde-pendently of the reciprocity norm. Theseconceptual distinctions only suggest a set

of research possibilities and have value pri-marily as guides to investigation.42

RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS

As mentioned above, sociologists havesometimes confused the notion of comple-mentarity with that of reciprocity and haverecently tended to focus on the former. Pre-sumably, the reason for this is because ofthe importance of complementarity n main-taining the stability of social systems.Clearly, if what one party deems his right isaccepted by the other as his obligation, theirrelation will be more stable than if the latter

fails to so define it. But if the group stabiliz-ing consequences of complementarity are thebasis of its theoretical significance, then thesame consideration underwrites with equalpotency the significance of reciprocity. Forreciprocity has no less a role in maintainingthe stability of social systems.

Note that there are at least two ways,not merely one, in which complementarity assuch can break down. In the one case, Altercan refuse to acknowledge Ego's rights as hisown duties. In the other case, however, Egomay not regard as rights that which Alteracknowledges as duties. The former is com-monly viewed as the empirically more fre-quent and as the theoretically more sig-nificant case. That this often seems to be

41 It is further indicative of our terminologicaldifficulties in this area that this is often what Piagetspoke of as "reciprocity." For example, ". . . reci-procity stands so high in the eyes of the child thathe will apply it even where to us it seems to borderon crude vengeance." J. Piaget, The Moral Judg-ment of the Child, New York: Harcourt, Brace,1932, p. 216.

42 A further point that fuller discussion shoulddevelop concerns the terms "roughly" equivalent.Use of the term "roughly," in one part, indicatesthat a certain range of concrete behavior will beviewed by the actors as compliance with this reci-procity norm and that more than one specific returnwill be acceptable and defined as equivalent. Thenorm of reciprocity qua equivalence is thus likemost other norms which also tolerate a range ofvariability. The demand for exact equality wouldplace an impossible burden even on actors highlymotivated to comply with the reciprocity norm andwould yield endemic tensions. Conversely, a notionof "rough" equivalence held by the actors allowsfor easier compliance with the norm and can beregarded as one of the mechanisms sustaining it.Recognition that the requirement is for "rough"equivalence, however, should not be allowed toobscure the fact that there may be a specific reci-procity norm which does in fact call for equiv-alence. This would be a distinguishing featureof the hypothesized norm and should no more beconcealed by reference to a "rough" equivalent thanshould the distinctive content of any other normbe obscured by the fact that a variable range ofbehaviors will be acceptable to those holding it.



14/19


taken as a matter of course suggests thepresence of certain tacit assumptions aboutbasic human dispositions. It seems to assume,as Aristotle put it, that people are moreready to receive than to give benefits. Inshort, it premises a common tendency towardwhat used to be called "egoism," a salient(but not exclusive) concern with the satis-faction of one's own needs.

This or some cognate assumption appearsto be eminently reasonable and empiricallyjustified. There can be no adequate system-atic sociological theory which boggles at theissue; indeed, it is one of the many virtuesof Parsons' work that it confronts the egoism

problem. His solution seems to be side-tracked, however, because his overwhelmingfocus on the problem of complementarityleads to the neglect of reciprocity. If assump-tions about egoistic dispositions are valid,however, a complementarity of rights andobligations should be exposed to a persistentstrain, in which each party is somewhat moreactively concerned to defend or extend hisown rights than those of others. There isnothing in complementarity as such whichwould seem able to control egoism.

One way out may be obtained by premis-ing that socialization internalizes comple-mentary rights and obligations in persons,before they fully assume responsible partici-pation in a social system. Even if socializa-tion were to work perfectly and so internalizesuch rights and obligations, there still re-mains the question as to what mechanismcan sustain and reinforce these during full

participation in the social system. The con-cept of complementarity takes mutuallycompatible expectations as given; it doesnot and cannot explain how they are main-tained once established. For this we need toturn to the reciprocities processes becausethese, unlike pure complementarity, actuallymobilize egoistic motivations and channelthem into the maintenance of the social sys-tem. Benthamite utilitarianism has long un-derstood that egoism can motivate one partyto satisfy the expectations of the other, sinceby doing so he induces the latter to recipro-cate and to satisfy his own. As Max Gluck-man might put it with his penchant forHegelian paradox, there is an altruism inegoism, made possible through reciprocity.

Furthermore, the existential belief in reci-

procity says something like this, "People willusually help those who help them." Similarly,the norm of reciprocity holds that peopleshould help those who help them and, there-fore, those whom you have helped have anobligation to help you. The conclusion isclear: if you want to be helped by others youmust help them; hence it is not only properbut also expedient to conform with the spe-cific status rights of others and with thegeneral norm. Both the existential belief inand the norm of reciprocity enlist egoisticmotivations in the service of social systemstability.43

A full analysis of the ways in which the

whole reciprocities complex is involved inthe maintenance of social systems wouldrequire consideration of the linkages betweeneach of its various elements, and their rela-tion to other general properties of social sys-tems. There is no space for such considera-tion here. Instead, I examine only one partof the complex, namely, the generalized normof reciprocity, and suggest some of the waysin which it contributes to social system sta-bility.

If, following Parsons, we suppose thatsocial systems are stable to the extent thatEgo and Alter conform with one another'sexpectations, we are confronted with theproblem of why men reciprocate gratifica-tions. Parsons holds that once a stable rela-tion of mutual gratification has been es-tablished the system is self-perpetuating;presumably, no special mechanisms are nec-essary to maintain it. Insofar as this is not

simply postulated in analogy with the prin-ciple of inertia in physics, apparently reci-procity is accounted for by Parsons, and alsoby Homans, as a result of the developmentof a beneficent cycle of mutual reinforce-ment. That is, Ego's conformity with Alter's

43 I suppose that one can take two different atti-tudes toward this transmutation of the base metalof egoism. One can deplore the situation and say

with Eliot:"The last temptation is the greatest treason;To do the right thing for the wrong reason."

Or one can adopt the older and perhaps sociologicallywiser view that here, once more, "private vicesmake public benefits," and provide an indispensablebasis for the spontaneous self-regulation of socialsystems.



15/19


expectations reinforces Alter's conformitywith Ego's expectations, and so on.

This explanation of reciprocity qua trans-action is particularly strange in Parsons'case since he often stresses, but here neglects,the significance of shared values as a sourceof stability in social systems. So far as thequestion here is not simply the general oneof why men conform with the expectationsof others but, rather, the more specific prob-lem of why they reciprocate benefits, partof the answer would seem to be that theyhave commonly internalized some generalmoral norm. In short, the suggestion is thatthe motivation for reciprocity stems not only

from the sheer gratification which Alter re-ceives from Ego but also from Alter's in-ternalization of a specific norm of reciprocitywhich morally obliges him to give benefitsto those from whom he has received them.In this respect, the norm of reciprocity is aconcrete and special mechanism involved inthe maintenance of any stable social system.

Why should such a norm be necessary?Why is it that expedient considerations donot suffice to mobilize motivations to complywith other's expectations, thereby inducingthem to provide reciprocal compliances? Onemajor line of analysis here would certainlyindicate the disruptive potentialities of powerdifferences. Given significant power differ-ences, egoistic motivations may seek to getbenefits without returning them. (It isnotable that Parsons fails to define the powersituation in his basic model of Ego-Alterequilibrium.) The situation is then ripe for

the breakdown of reciprocity and for thedevelopment of system-disrupting exploita-tion. The norm of reciprocity, however, en-genders motives for returning benefits evenwhen power differences might invite exploita-tion. The norm thus safeguards powerfulpeople against the temptations of their ownstatus; it motivates and regulates reciprocityas an exchange pattern, serving to inhibit theemergence of exploitative relations whichwould undermine the social system and thevery power arrangements which had madeexploitation possible.44

As we have seen, Parsons stresses thatthe stability of social systems largely de-rives from the conformity of role partnersto each other's expectations, particularlywhen they do their duty to one another.This formulation induces a focus on con-formity and deviance, and the degrees andtypes of each. Presumably, the more thatpeople pay their social debts the more stablethe social system. But much more than con-formity and deviance are involved here.

The idea of the reciprocities complex leadsus to the historical or genetic dimension of so-cial interaction. For example, Malinowski, inhis discussion of the Kula Ring, carefully

notes that the gifts given are not immediatelyreturned and repayment may take as long asa year. What is the significance of this inter-vening time period? It is a period governedby the norm of reciprocity in a double sense.First, the actor is accumulating, mobilizing,liquidating, or earmarking resources so thathe can make a suitable repayment. Second,it is a period governed by the rule that youshould not do harm to those who have doneyou a benefit. This is a time, then, when menare morally constrained to manifest theirgratitude toward, or at least to maintainpeace with, their benefactors.

Insofar as men live under such a rule ofreciprocity, when one party benefits another,an obligation is generated. The recipient isnow indebted to the donor, and he remainsso until he repays. Once interaction is seenas taking place over time, we may note thatthe norm of reciprocity so structures social

relations that, between the time of Ego'sprovision of a gratification and the time ofAlter's repayment, falls the shadow of in-debtedness. An adequate analysis of the

44This line of analysis is further strengthened fwe consider the possibility that Ego's continuedconformity with Alter's expectations may eventuallylead Alter to take Ego's conformity for "granted"and thus lead Alter to reciprocate ess for later acts

of conformity by Ego. In short, the value of Ego'sconformity may undergo an inflationary spiral inwhich his later conforming actions are worth lessthan earlier ones, in terms of the reciprocities theyyield. As reciprocities tend to decline, the socialsystem may experience mounting strain, either col-lapsing in apathy or being disrupted by conflict.In this connection, the general norm of reciprocitymay serve as a brake, slowing the rate at whichreciprocities decline or preventing them from de-clining beyond a certain (unknown) level, and thuscontributing to the stability of the system. This ismore fully developed in A. W. Gouldner, "Organiza-tional Analysis," in R. K. Merton et al., editors,Sociology Today, New York: Basic Books, 1959,esp. pp. 423 ff.



16/19


dynamics of social interaction is thus re-quired to go beyond the question of deviancefrom or conformity with the parties' obliga-tions to one another. A second basic dimen-sion needs to be examined systematically,namely, the time period when there is anobligation still to be performed, when com-mitments which have been made are yet tobe fulfilled.

These outstanding obligations, no less thanthose already given compliance, contributesubstantially to the stability of social sys-tems. It is obviously inexpedient for creditorsto break off relationships with those who haveoutstanding obligations to them. It may also

be inexpedient for debtors to do so becausetheir creditors may not again allow them torun up a bill of social indebtedness. In addi-tion, it is morally improper, under the normof reciprocity, to break off relations or tolaunch hostilities against those to whom youare still indebted.

If this conclusion s correct, then we shouldnot only look for mechanisms which constrainor motivate men to do their duty and to pay

off their debts. We should also expect tofind mechanisms which induce people toremain socially indebted to each other andwhich inhibit their complete repayment. Thissuggests another function performed by therequirement of only rough equivalence ofrepayment that may be involved in one ofthe norms of reciprocity. For it induces acertain amount of ambiguity as to whetherindebtedness has been repaid and, over time,

generates uncertainty about who is in whosedebt.45 This all hinges, however, on a shared

conception of the moral propriety of repay-ment, engendered by the norm of reciprocity.

Still another way in which the generalnorm of reciprocity is implicated in themaintenance of social system stability is re-lated to an important attribute of the norm,namely, its comparative ndeterminancy. Un-like specific status duties and like other gen-eral norms, this norm does not require highlyspecific and uniform performances frompeople whose behavior it regulates. For ex-ample, unlike the status duties of Americanwives, it does not call upon them to cook andto take care of the children. Instead, the con-crete demands it makes change substantially

from situation to situation and vary with thebenefits which one party receives fromanother.

This indeterminancy enables the norm ofreciprocity to perform some of its most im-portant system-stabilizing functions. Beingindeterminate, the norm can be applied tocountless ad hoc transactions, thus provid-ing a flexible moral sanction for transactionswhich might not otherwise be regulated byspecific status obligations. The norm, in thisrespect, is a kind of plastic filler, capableof being poured into the shifting crevices ofsocial structures, and serving as a kind ofall-purpose moral cement.

Not only does the norm of reciprocity playa stabilizing role in human relations in theabsence of a well developed system of spe-cific status duties, but it contributes to socialstability even when these are present andwell established. Status duties shape behavior

because the status occupant believes thembinding in their own right; they possess akind of prima facie legitimacy for properlysocialized group members. The general normof reciprocity, however, is a second-orderdefense of stability; it provides a furthersource of motivation and an additional moralsanction for conforming with specific status

45 An interesting case of a mechanism serving tocreate and maintain outstanding obligations is partof the Vartan Bhanji, a form of ritual gift exchangein Pakistan and other parts of India. Eglar's studyof this pattern makes it clear that a fundamentalrule of Vartan Bhanji is reciprocity, that a giftshould be returned for a gift, and a favor for afavor. It is also notable that the system pains-takingly prevents the total elimination of outstand-ing obligations. Thus, on the occasion of a marriage,departing guests are given gifts of sweets. Inweighing them out, the hostess may say, "These fiveare yours," meaning "these are a repayment forwhat you formerly gave me," and she then addsan extra measure, saying, "These are mine." On thenext occasion, she will receive these back alongwith an additional measure which she later returns,and so on. See Z. E. Eglar, Vartan Bhanji: Institu-

tionalized Reciprocity in a Changing Punjab Village,Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1958.

Other mechanisms for maintaining outstandingobligations may be found in cultural prescriptionswhich require men not to be overly eager to repaytheir social obligations. It still seems to be under-stood that there is a certain impropriety in this,even if we do not go as far as Seneca in holdingthat "a person who wants to repay a gift tooquickly with a gift in return is an unwilling debtorand an ungrateful person."



17/19


obligations. For example, the employer maypay his workers not merely because he hascontracted to do so; he may also feel thatthe workman has earned his wages. Thehousewife may take pains with her husband'smeals not merely because cooking may beincumbent on her as a wife; she may alsohave a particularly considerate husband. Ineach case, the specific status duties are com-plied with not only because they are inherentin the status and are believed to be right inthemselves, but also because each is furtherdefined as a "repayment." In sum, the normof reciprocity requires that if others havebeen fulfilling their status duties to you,

you in turn have an additional or second-order obligation (repayment) to fulfill yourstatus duties to them. In this manner, thesentiment of gratitude joins forces with thesentiment of rectitude and adds a safety-margin in the motivation to conformity.

The matter can be put differently from thestandpoint of potential deviance or non-con-formity. All status obligations are vulnerableto challenge and, at times, may have to bejustified. If, for any reason, people refuseto do their duty, those demanding compliancemay be required to justify their claims. Obvi-ously, there are many standardized ways inwhich this might be done. Invoking the gen-eral norm of reciprocity s one way of justify-ing the more concrete demands of statusobligations. Forced to the wall, the man de-manding his "rights," may say, in effect,"Very well, if you won't do this simply be-cause it is your duty, then remember all thatI have done for you in the past and do itto repay your debt to me." The norm of reci-procity thus provides a second-order defenseof the stability of social systems in that itcan be used to overcome incipient devianceand to mobilize auxiliary motivations forconformity with existent status demands.46

STARTING MECHANISMS

Two distinct points have been made aboutthe social functions of the norm of reciproc-ity. One is that this norm serves a group

stabilizing function and thus is quite familiarin functional theory. The second point, how-ever, is the view that the norm is not onlyin some sense a defense or stabilizing mecha-nism but is also what may be called a "start-ing mechanism." That is, it helps to initiatesocial interaction and is functional in theearly phases of certain groups before theyhave developed a differentiated and custo-mary set of status duties.

In speaking of the norm of reciprocity asa "starting mechanism," ndeed in conceivingof starting mechanisms, we find ourselvesoutside the usual perspective of functionaltheory. Functional theory commonly focuseson already-established, on-going systems,and on the mechanisms by means of whichan established social system is enabled tomaintain itself. Although functional theoryis concerned with the problems of how indi-

vidual actors are prepared by socializationto play a role in social systems, its generaltheoretical models rarely, if ever, includesystematic treatment of the beginnings ofa social system as such and, consequently,do not formally raise the question of thenature of the mechanisms needed to startsuch a system.47

46 A cogent illustration of this is provided byWilliam F. Whyte: "When life in the group runs

smoothly, the obligations binding members are notexplicitly recognized. . . . It is only when the rela-tionship breaks down that the underlying obliga-tions are brought to light. While Alec and Frankwere friends I never heard either one of them dis-cuss the services he was performing for the other,but when they had a falling out . . . each mancomplained to Doc that the other was not actingas he should in view of the services which had been

done for him." Street Corner Society, Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1945, p. 256.47Modern functionalism emerged in a world in

which Newtonian mechanics was the overshadowingscientific achievement and a basic model for thedevelopment of social science. The Newtonianstandpoint was not, of course, a cosmology con-cerned with the question of planetary origins buttook the existent relations among planets as given.Today, however, two developments of global sig-nificance encourage and perhaps require a shift insocial perspectives. In one, rocket engineering, thequestion is raised as to how new, man-made,planets may be "shot" into stable orbits. Secondly,

international politics require us to help "under-developed" countries to begin a beneficent cycle ofcapital accumulation which will be self-sustaining.In both instances, practical "engineering" problemsforcefully direct attention to the question of "start-ing mechanisms" and would seem likely to heightendissatisfaction with general sociological models thatlargely confine themselves to already establishedsystems.



18/19


Every social system of course has a his-tory, which means that it has had its be-ginnings even if these are shrouded in antiq-uity. Granted that the question of originscan readily bog down in a metaphysicalmorass, the fact is that many concrete socialsystems do have determinate beginnings.Marriages are not made in heaven, andwhether they end in divorce or continue inbliss, they have some identifiable origins.Similarly, corporations, political parties, andall manner of groups have their beginnings.(Recent studies of friendship and other in-terpersonal relations in housing projects havebegun to explore this problem.)

People are continually brought together innew juxtapositions and combinations, bring-ing with them the possibilities of new socialsystems. How are these possibilities realized?Is such realization entirely a random matter?These are the kinds of questions that werefamiliar to the earlier students of "collectivebehavior," who, in focusing on crowds, riots,and rumors, were often primarily concernedwith investigating the development of groupsin status nascendi.48 Although this perspectivemay at first seem somewhat alien to the func-tionalist, once it is put to him, he may sus-pect that certain kinds of mechanisms, con-ducive to the crystallization of social systemsout of ephemeral contacts, will in some meas-ure be institutionalized or otherwise pat-terned in any society. At this point he wouldbe considering "starting mechanisms." Inthis way, I suggest, the norm of reciprocityprovides one among many starting mech-anisms.

From the standpoint of a purely economicor utilitarian model,49 there are certain dif-ficulties in accounting for the manner inwhich social interaction begins. Let us sup-pose two people or groups, Ego and Alter,each possesses valuables sought by the other.Suppose further that each feels that theonly motive the other has to conduct an ex-

change is the anticipated gratification it willbring. Each may then feel that it would beadvantageous to lay hold of the other's valua-bles without relinquishing his own. Further-more, suppose that each party suspects theother of precisely such an intention, perhapsbecause of the operation of projective orempathic mechanisms. At least since Hobbes,it has been recognized that under such cir-cumstances, each is likely to regard the im-pending exchange as dangerous and to viewthe other with some suspicion.50 Each maythen hesitate to part with his valuables be-fore the other has first turned his over. Likeparticipants in a disarmament conference,

each may say to other, "You first " Thusthe exchange may be delayed or altogetherflounder and the relationship may be pre-vented from developing.

The norm of reciprocity may serve as astarting mechanism in such circumstances bypreventing or enabling the parties to breakout of this impasse. When internalized inboth parties, the norm obliges the one whohas first received a benefit to repay it at sometime; it thus provides some realistic groundsfor confidence, in the one who first partswith his valuables, that he will be repaid.Consequently, there may be less hesitancy inbeing the first and a greater facility withwhich the exchange and the social relationcan get underway.

CONCLUSION

I have limited this discussion of the norm

of reciprocity to its functions and its contri-bution to the stability of social systems,omitting examination of its dysfunctions andof the manner in which it induces tensionsand changes in social systems. That the normcommonly imposes obligations of reciprocityonly "when the individual is able" to recip-rocate does not guarantee agreement con-cerning the individual's "ability." Futher-more there may be occasions when questions

as to whether the individual's return is ap-propriate or sufficient (apart from whether itis equivalent) that arise by virtue of the ab-sence of common yardsticks in terms of which

48I am indebted to Howard S. Becker for thisand many other insights into what seemed to bethe guiding impulses of the "Chicago School" ofcollective behavior.

49 Some indications of the utilitarian approach tothis problem may be derived from the stimulatingpaper by T. C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining,"American Economic Review, 46 (June, 1956), pp.281-306.

50 Cf. M. Deutsch, "A Study of Conditions Affect-ing Cooperation," New York: Research Center forHuman Relations, 1955, p. 25, dittoed.



19/19


giving and returning may be compared.Moreover, the norm may lead individualsto establish relations only or primarily withthose who can reciprocate, thus inducingneglect of the needs of those unable to do so.Clearly, the norm of reciprocity cannot applywith full force in relations with children, old

people, or with those who are mentally orphysically handicapped, and it is theoreti-cally inferable that other, fundamentallydifferent kinds of normative orientations willdevelop in moral codes. I hope to explorethese and related problems in subsequentdiscussions.

STRUCTURAL EFFECTS

PETER M. BLAUUniversity of Chicago

In empirical research, social structures are usually characterized, explicitly or implicitly, byfrequency distributions of behavior of individuals or relationships among them. Thus, thecommon culture refers to prevailing values, and group cohesiveness, to pervasive interpersonalbonds. To isolate the external constraints of social values from the influences of the individual'sinternalized values, that the prevalence of a value in a group is associated with social conductwhen this value is held constant for individuals must be demonstrated. Data from a publicassistance agency show that the prevailing values in a work group had such structural effects.In some cases, the group value and the individual's orientation had similar, but independent,effects on his conduct; in other cases, they had opposite effects; in still others, the effects ofthe individual's orientation were contingent on the prevalence of this orientation in the group,a pattern whi

gouldner - the norm of reciprocity a preliminary statement.pdf

Documents