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From Simonides to Isocrates: The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century PanhellenismAuthor(s): Michael A. FlowerSource: Classical Antiquity, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Apr., 2000), pp. 65-101Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25011112

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MICHAEL A. FLOWER

From Simonides to Isocrates:The Fifth-Century Origins ofFourth. Century Panhellenism

If someone is not merely making a rhetorical display but also wishesto accomplish something, it is necessary for him to seek out thosearguments which shall persuade these two cities [Athens and Sparta]to share equallywith each other and todivide the hegemony and to exactfrom the barbarians those advantages which they now desire to obtainfor themselves from theGreeks. (Panegyricus 17)

So wrote Isocrates in 380 BC about the dual hegemony of Athens and Spartaand the great panhellenic crusade against Persia. Isocrates, however, never usesthe word "panhellenism." What do we mean by it? It is a modem term and,like somany modem creations, it isvariously used by scholars tomean differentthings.' The ancientGreek word "panhellenes" or "all theGreeks" did not haveany particular ideological connotation.2 Inmodem usage "panhellenism" has twodistinct, but related,meanings. In one sense, it refers to the notion of Hellenicethnic identity and the concomitant polarization ofGreek andbarbarianas genericopposites which rapidly developed as a resultof thePersian invasions.3 In its othersense, panhellenism is the idea that the various Greek city-states could solve theirpolitical disputes and simultaneously enrich themselves by uniting in commonIwould like to thankKaren Bassi, JoelFarber,Harriet Flower, Christopher Pelling, andan anonymousreader for Classical Antiquity for their criticisms and suggestions. A much abbreviated version ofthis paperwas delivered at Bryn Mawr College inMarch, 1997.

1. As Green 1996: 6 and 28 n. 7 points out, the term seems to have been coined by Grotein hisHistory of Greece.

2. See Perlman 1976: 4 andDillery 1995: 42 and 260 n. 3.3. See especially E. Hall 1989: esp. 3-13; E. Hall 1993; J.Hall 1997: 44-48.

Classical Antiquity. Volume 19,Number 1, pages 65-101. ISSN 0278-6656(p); 1067-8344 (e).Copyright ? 2000 by The Regents of theUniversity of California. All rights reserved.Send requests for permission to reprint to:Rights andPermissions.University of California Press, 2000 Center Street, Ste 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.


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66 CLASSICALNTIQUITY Volume 19/No. 1/April 2000

cause and conquering all or part of the Persian empire. The justification for suchan enterprisewas revenge for thePersian invasions of Greece in490 and 480-79BC. It is this second sense of panhellenism, the ideology of a united Greek crusadeagainst Persia, that I am concerned with here.4 This paper is an attempt to trace theevidence for panhellenism, so defined, throughout the fifthcentury by combiningdifferent kinds of evidence: that is, both poetic and historical texts, as well asthe testimonia formonuments which are no longer extant. I will argue that anythoughtof a panhellenic crusadewas impossible before thePersian invasions, butthat such an expedition was espoused by Cimon. After his death it remained anitem of popular talk for the rest of the century and this talk intensified duringthe second half of the Peloponnesian War.

I. PANHELLENISM IN THE EARLY FIFTH CENTURYDuring the fourth century BC Isocrates was the foremost advocate of a

panhellenic crusade for thepurpose of territorialexpansion intoAsia. This ideawas older thanIsocrates, as he himself readily admitted.5The scholarly consensusis that the origins of this scheme to invadeAsia belong to thewaning years of thefifth century at theearliest, andmore probably to thebeginning of the fourth.6 It isoften seen as an ideology bornof desperation and defeat. Some have connected itsgenesis specificallywith the sophisticmovement.7 But panhellenism had amuchlonger pedigree than that, far longer in fact thanmost modern scholars realize.It is easy for us to be misled because the firstexplicit evidence comes from theend of the fifth century.Gorgias may well have been the first to devote an entireoration topanhellenist views when he delivered his Olympic Oration in408 (seebelow), but he was not the first to espouse or hold them.8Such views, even ifonly implicitly and fragmentarily,can be found in a largenumber of fifth-centurywriters.The newly published papyrus fragments of Simonides' elegiac poem on theBattle of Plataea suggest that the idea of invading the interior of the Persian empirehad already been voiced in the 470s. Martin West has argued that fragment 14preserves part of a prophecy by the seer Tisamenus, who had been hired and given

4. Important discussions of panhellenism in this sense are Kessler 1911; Sussmann 1921;Mathieu 1925; Ryder 1965 for the general background;Dobesch 1968; Perlman 1976; Sakellariou1980; andGreen 1996. See also n. 118 below.

5. At Paneg. 3 he writes: "I have come for the purpose of giving advice concerning the waragainst the barbarian and concord amongst ourselves, not being unaware thatmany of thosewhohave claimed to be sophists have set out upon this topic."

6. E.g. Cartledge 1993: 43; deRomilly 1992: 225-33, Perlman 1976; andGreen 1996.7. De Romilly 1992: 225-33.8. Typical isMarkle 1976: 80: "(Isocrates) did not invent the so-called Panhellenic idea; itwas first proposed by Gorgias in 392 and again celebrated by Lysias in 384." But see Cawkwell

1982: 324-26.


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FLOWER:rom Simonides to Isocrates 67

citizenship by the Spartans (Hdt. 9.33-36). Even if the attribution toTisamenusas speaker is incorrect, some sortof prophecy isbeing reportedhere.9 In lines 7-8,as restored byWest, we find the following: "He [perhapsAres?] shall drive [theMedes, or Persians] out of Asia, [Zeus] having nodded in approval, favoring a[new or common] alliance."10

Restorations have an unfortunate tendency to take on a life of their own; butif this restoration is correct, Simonides must be referring to the future conquestof the Persian heartland by an alliance of Greek states. That is to say, to "drive outof Asia" entails thedissolution of the Persian empire.What else can thisphrasemean?West asserts that"'Asia' will heremean 'Ionia,' and the referencewill betodriving the Persians out of thatpart of theworld."" Every article on thispoemto date accepts this interpretationwithout question.'2 But this cannot possiblybe right. At the time when Simonides was writing, "Asia" was used to denotethe landmass which was coextensive with the entire Persian empire, apart from

Egypt which was considered part of Africa. It is always used in that sense byHerodotus andAeschylus, and in two epigrams attributed to Simonides (Page,FGE XXIV andXLV) Asia stands for theentire continent.'3Tomy knowledge no

9. It is possible that the prophecy inSimonides is not delivered by Tisamenus, but by a divinespeaker (as suggested by Rutherford 1996: 185). It strikes me that theprophecy, asWest restores it,is too elaborate to be the result of divination by the examination of entrails, which was the usual

method of campground divination in the fifth century. Perhaps Simonides had Tisamenus divine insome other, less prosaic, manner. (West 1993: 9 cites the example of Helenus, who somehow intuitsor overhears thedeliberations of the gods at Iliad 7.44-53.) On the other hand, inHerodotus' accountTisamenus was only concerned with whether theGreeks should cross theAsopus river or not; andthat is the standard type of question which a seer was competent to answer. Moreover, the fameof Tisamenus restedon his five victories, of which Plataea was the first.At the timewhen Simonidescomposed his poem Tisamemus' rolemay not have seemed as significant as itdid a generation or solater.The role and function of themilitary mantis in the Classical period, of which Tisamenus istheoutstanding example, is thoroughly examined by Pritchett 1979: 47-90; see also Jameson 1991.10. West 1992: 118-22 and 1993: 8-9. He offers two different restorations of lines 7-8. Inthe former publication (= IEG 112,p. 121) he restores the text as: si A]rL[rj]q zX&(a)sL, vEuCvro[/ 1VYV UA X[X]LTnv (pLXEG4V. In the apparatus criticus he suggests j age xal at the beginningof line 7 and Zinvo6 at the beginning of line 8. But in his article "Simonides Redivivus" (1993:8) he proposes: M'Bouq 8' E 'A]gL[-q] ED&(o)et, VeU'aov1[q A0ijv, / 4e4 AtOc, xXLt]v7au,uIc4[x]LTv teX&.[v / 'ApTr. In either case, the general sense is clear. Christopher Pelling hassuggested tome thatPlutarch Comparison of Aristides and Cato 2.3 may be a reminiscence of thisline: "For that victory (i.e. the battle of Thermopylae in 191 Bc), which was manifestly thework of

Cato, drove Asia out of Hellas (Ei'Xotae - 'EXX68oq -c'v Aoov) and in turn made it accessibletoScipio."11. Furthermore, in reference to his restorations of lines 7-13 (that of 9-13 being farmorespeculative), he comments (1993: 9): "Unless this is completely on thewrong track, it appears that

Simonides' poem was composed sometime after the establishment of theDelian League, whoseaspirations or achievements are here summarized."

12. Boedeker: 1995: 219; 1996: 236 n. 39. Rutherford 1996: 184-85 seems to accept thatAsia equals Ionia,but n. 61makes his position unclear: "But a fifth-centuryGreek might well haveimagined defeated Persians being driven out of Asia back to their homeland in southern Iran, farto the southeast." Yet what fifth-centuryGreek did not consider Iran tobe part of Asia?

13. See Hdt. 1.4 and 4.44-45; Aesch. Persians 12, 57, 61, 73, 249, 270, 549, 548, 763, 929. Itwas perhapsHecataeus ofMiletus who definitively gave Asia this broad sense; his Periodos ges was


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ancient authorunambiguously usesAsia to refer to Ionia in a limitedgeographicalsense. 14

The date and occasion for the first performance of Simonides' poem havealready been the subject of much speculation,'5 but few would disagree thatthe occasion was panhellenic and that it fell within a few years of the battle.

Thus during thevery period when theDelian League, underAthenian leadership,was attacking the territory of theKing of Persia, Simonides, at a panhellenicgathering, could indulge inwhat has aptly been labeled "panhellenistbig talk."'6The fact that this poem was meant for a wide audience, and may well have been aSpartancommission, undercuts thenotion thatpanhellenismwas especially, ifnotexclusively, connected with the ideology firstof theDelian League and thenof theAthenian empire.'7On theotherhand, ifAntonio Aloni iscorrect inhis suggestionthat thepoem was specifically commissioned by the regentPausanias, the victorof Plataea, thenSimonides may be reflectingPausanias' own personal aspirationsfor the future operations of theHellenic League.'8We would thenhave a furtherindication that hisMedism was an invention of his enemies (whetherSpartan or

Athenian),'" and thatPausanias himself was fully intending toprosecute thewaragainst Persia as vigorously as possible.

Is this fragmentary line of thePlataea elegy our only evidence for this "bigtalk" at such an early date? If the Oath of Plataea (as quoted by later authors)representswhat theGreek allies actually swore in479 BC, it ispossible that evenbefore the battle itself theywere thinkingof future revenge.20For the stipulationthat theGreeks would not rebuild the templeswhich thePersians had destroyed,but "allow them to remain as amemorial for future generations of the impiety of

divided into two books, called Europe and Asia (which for him includedAfrica). In the seventhcentury "Asia"was sometimes used todenote Lydia, as in the reference at Iliad 2.461 to the "Asianmeadow," apparently adistrict inLydia (see Leaf: 1900 andKirk: 1985 ad loc.), and inArchilochus F227 (West, IEG 12).

14. Pace Georgacas 1969: 22-24 and 1971: 27-28, it is not at all clear that inMimnermos F9 (West, IEG 112)Asia stands for the"areaaroundColophon in Ionia,"and inSappho F 44 (Campbell1982) for "Cilicia." In theMimnermos and Sappho passages Asia may just as well stand for theentire continent. If the subject of Archilochus F 227 isGyges (likely, but uncertain) thenAsia equalsLydia: "He is themaster of sheep-rearingAsia." Archilochus would here be influenced by HomerIliad 2.461. The earliest attestation of Asia inGreek literature isprobablyHesiod F 180 (MerkelbachandWest, OCT3), but the geographical designation is unclear.15. The main discussions to date areAloni 1997 (arguing for a Spartan commission); Boedeker1995, 1996, and 1998.

16. The phrase is used in reference toAgesilaus andXenophon by Cawkwell 1978: 193n.17. See E. Hall 1989: 59-60.18. 1997: 25-27. The way inwhich Pausanias is introduced is emphatic (fr. 11, lines 33-34):"[The son of excellent Cleo]mbrotus led themout, thebestman ... Pausanias."19. See esp. P. J.Rhodes 1970 and Badian 1993c: 130-33. Hornblower 1985: 25 plausiblysuggests thatPausanias planned to supplement Sparta's supplies ofmanpower by drafting helots intothe army.That would be the truthbehind the allegation (Thuc. 1.132.4) thathe was intriguingwiththe helots.20. The textof the oath is recordedby LycurgusAgainst Leocrates 81;Diod. 11.29. 3;TodGHIii 204 (which does notmention the temples);with Siewert 1972.


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the barbarians"may also have been intended to remind theGreeks of the revengewhich they owed to theirAsian foes.21Be that as itmay, the idea that theGreekscould derive profit by ravaging the territory of the Persian King goes back tothe very foundation of theDelian League. As Thucydides writes at 1.96: "TheAthenians fixedwhich cities were tocontributemoney against thebarbarian,andwhich ships, a pretext being to revenge themselves for what they had sufferedby devastating the territoryof theKing."22The notion of profit, here as well as inIsocrates, is inseparablefrom thatof revenge.The Greeks would exact vengeanceby enriching themselves at theexpense of Persia.23

If there was indeed talk of invading Asia by land as early as the 470s, onemight expect some corroboration to be found inAeschylus' Persians, whichwas produced in 472 BC and thus is very close in date to Simonides' elegy. Inthe Persians much ismade of the total destruction of Persia's youth and of theexpectation of imminent rebellion by the peoples of Asia (584-90). But there isonly one vague reference to invasion by outsiders. At lines 751-52 theghost ofDarius exclaims, "I fear lestmy great wealth, the fruit of my labor,may becomeformen the prey of the firstcomer."This vagueness is not really surprising, sincethere is no explicit reference in the entire play to the operations of the Delian

League. All thatwe get is the chorus' description of theGreek cities which wereconquered by Darius (lines 852-907), which endswith the elusive words (lines904-907): "the reversal of this (our former prosperity) by the hand of God wenow suffer throughour wars, laid low by the crushing disasters at sea."24For amore explicit statementof panhellenist ideology we need to turnto awriter fromlater in the same century.

II. PANHELLENIST DISCOURSE IN HERODOTUSSeveral passages inHerodotus indicate that at the time when he was writing

his Histories there already was some talk of a future Greek conquest of Asia.My approach to these passages is not to argue for the historicity of the material(which is doubtful), but rather to interpretthem as revealing the thought patternsand agenda of Herodotus' own times. In other words, I will attempt to inferfromHerodotus' own account the contemporary preoccupations with which hisaccount is interacting. Although Herodotus' literary activity probably spanned

21. This is suggested by R. F.Rhodes 1995: 32-33. The northernwall of theAthenian Acropoliswas actually built with fragments of destroyed temples conspicuously displayed: column drums,frieze blocks, and cornices which were neatly ordered by type so as to be easily recognizable byanyone in the agorabelow.

22. For translation and interpretation, see Hornblower 1991: 144-45, although he underestimates the notion of "getting booty" which is implicit in theparticiple -noi3vacoq"devastating"or"ravaging").As Fornara and Samons 1991: 81-82 point out, "vengeance carried recompense."23. For the themeof revenge against Persia, see Bellen 1974 andGehrke 1987.

24. The translation is thatof Broadhead 1960: 222-23.


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the period between 450 and 426 BC, the specter of thePeloponnesian War hada perceptible impact on theway he viewed the past.25As Robin Osborne hasrecently emphasized, an oral tradition reflects the concerns of the last person totell it.26

Herodotus claims that at the time of the IonianRevolt in 499 BC,Aristagoras,tyrantof Miletus, with a bronze map of theworld in hand, tried to induce King

Cleomenes of Sparta (apparently in a privatemeeting) tomarch on Susa (5.49-50).By stressing the feebleness of the inhabitantsand the extraordinarywealth of theland, he hopes to entice Cleomenes not merely to assist the lonians inAnatolia,but to captureSusa itself (5.49.3-9, omitting 5-6):

Now, therefore, in thename of the gods of theGreeks, save the loniansfrom slavery,men who areof the same blood as yourselves. These thingsare easily able to turn out well for you. For the barbarians are not strongwarriors,while you have reached thehighest level of excellence inmatterspertaining to war. Their style of fighting is as follows: they use a bow anda short spear; and they go into battle wearing trousers and having capson theirheads. So easy are they to be subdued. The people who inhabitthis continent havemore good things than all other peoples put together:startingwith gold, there is silver and bronze, embroideredclothing, beastsof burden, and slaves. If you desire these things, they can be yours. [Insections 5-6 Aristagoras gives a description of the landsbetween Ioniaand Cissia, and we are meant to imagine him pointing at his map.] Thenext country along is Cissia and it is in this land that Susa lies alongthe river Choaspes. Here in Susa dwells the great King and here are histreasurehouses. Once you have seized this city you will be bold enoughtovie with Zeus himself concerning riches. But is it really necessary foryou to wage wars for territory that is neither large nor very good andover small borders, and to do so against Messenians, who are your equalsin strength, and againstArcadians andArgives, men who have neithergold nor silver (the zeal for which moves a man to fight and die)? Whenyou might so easily rule all of Asia, shall you choose something else?

This passage is truly remarkable for the way in which it anticipates so manyof the themes of fourth-century thought about thePersian empire.27Aristagorasclaims that the defeat of Persia will not be difficult because the barbarians areunwarlike and, given their equipment and method of fighting, easy to defeat.It is inconceivable that any Greek could have thought this before the battle of

25. I here accept the traditional view that theHistories were published in final form no laterthan 426 BC; contra Fomara 1971a and 1981, who argues for publication at a date close to 414.For the influence of the Archidamian War on Herodotus' perspective, see Fornara 1971b: 75-91and Raaflaub 1987.

26. 1996: 7.27. Cf. esp. Xen. Anab. 1.5.9; 1.7.3-4; 3.1.21-23; 3.2.24-26; Isoc. Paneg. 133-56. On

the panhellenism of Xenophon, seemost recently Dillery: 1995: 41-119 and on that of Isocrates.Masaracchia 1995: 47-79.


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FLOWER:rom Simonides toIsocrates 71

Marathon, and more probably not before Plataea.8 Before Marathon no Greeklandforcehad ever defeated thePersians andMedes. Indeed, a force of Athenians,

Eretrians, and lonians were thoroughly trounced by the Persians outside ofEphesus in 498 (Hdt. 5.102). So until the battle of Plataea had demonstratedwhat the Spartan hoplite could do in hand to hand combat on open ground withthemuch more lightly clad Persians, Aristagoras' pronouncements would nothave been likely to persuade anyone.29As Herodotus said ofMarathon (6.112.3):"Up to this time it frightened theGreeks even to hear the name of theMede."

What then did Aristagoras do and say at Sparta? That he brought a bronze mapwith him to Sparta is just the sort of striking and unusual detail thatoral traditionis likely to preserve. Herodotus indeed attributes this story to a Spartan source(5.49.1): "He had ameeting with Cleomenes, as theLacedaemonians themselvessay, having a bronze tablet (pinax) on which was engraved thecircuit of the entireearth, including every sea and all the rivers." The existence of suchmaps inIonia during this time period is strong circumstantial evidence thatAristagorasactually brought one to Sparta; but it does not constitute proof.30Three thingsneed to be kept inmind. First of all, when Herodotus says "theLacedaemonianssay" this does not necessarily entail an oral tradition. It may mean no morethan that someone toldHerodotus thataLacedaemonian had toldhim about thisincident.3' Secondly, Herodotus claims to be reporting a private conversationbetween Aristagoras and Cleomenes. There is, therefore, no reason to believethat the details of that meeting were generally made known to other Spartans.Perhaps it is suspicious thatHerodotus makes nomention ofAristagoras showinghis map at Athens (5.97), which would have been a public act before the assembly.Thirdly, this particularHerodotean logos fits aNear Eastern story patternwhichwas widely diffused. There are substantial fragmentsof anAkkadian epic poem ofca. 1400 BC (known inBabylonian, Hittite, andAssyrian versions), which tells

28. This was recognized long ago by Grote 1884: IV 214-15 andMacan 1895: 95. See alsoCawkwell 1982: 325; Starr 1976: 58-59; andAustin 1993: 203. Osborne 1996: 324, by contrast,implies thatAristagoras really did seek Spartan support for a campaign against Susa.

29. As Grote 1884: IV 215 aptly comments: "To talk about an easy march up to the treasuresof Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt,would have been considered asa proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartanswere morethan amatch for thePersians in the field; but even thusmuch would have been considered, in 502 BC,ratheras the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as theestimate of a sober looker-on."

30. According to a traditionwhich goes back to theHellenistic scholarEratosthenes of Cyrene,the firstmap of theworld (engraved on apinax, or tablet)was made byAnaximander ofMiletus (ca.610-540). This was later "mademore accurate"by Hecataeus ofMiletus (perhaps only by way ofa drawing), a contemporary of Aristagoras. For testimonia and discussion, see Kirk, Raven, andSchofield 1983: 104-105. For a discussion of what Aristagoras' map may have looked like, see

Myres 1953: 34-37 and Dilke 1985: 22-24. Fehling 1989: 144, on the other hand, not only arguesthatHerodotus made up themap, but thatEratosthenes later inferred theexistence of Anaximander's

map from this very passage of Herodotus. That goes too far; see the comments of Dover 1998:221-22.

31. This observation about the nature of source citations inHerodotus is well made by Dover1998: 222.


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how Semitic merchants petitioned Sargon I of Akkad (ca. 2334-2279) tomakean expedition against Nur-Dagan, the king of Burushhanda (in centralAnatolia),who was oppressing them. By way of persuasion, they detail thewealth whichlies en route: a mountain containing gold and lapis lazuli and a land abundant

with timber and exotic fruits. Ithas been claimed that this is the literaryprototypefor the storyof Aristagoras' mission to Sparta.32The resemblance between thesenarratives is not exact: themerchants do not display a map, the road is difficult,andSargon successfully makes theexpedition.33Nevertheless, thegeneral patternis similar: the petitioning of a king to attack a wealthy but distant land in ordertodeliver thepetitioners from oppression.

With or without amap, Aristagoras did go toSparta and it is legitimate to askwhat he is likely to have said inorder tomake his case for assistance.We cannot,of course, know this, but the following is a conjecture. What the occasion andcircumstances demandedwas not a demonstrationof how close Ioniawas toSusa,but how far away. Ionia, in fact, is some four to five times fartherfromSusa thanit is from Sparta. Aristagoras should have known (if the report is true) that theSpartans had warned Cyrus to leave the IonianGreeks alone in 546, but werereluctant to intervenemilitarily (Hdt. 1.152-53). Although the Spartanswereready enough tomake an alliance with Croesus and to send an expedition to aidhim against Cyrus (Hdt. 1.69, 83), his rapid fall must have shocked them intoamore cautious stance. Aristagoras had now to convince them that Ioniawasdefensible. If indeed he had amap, itwould have been logical forAristagorastomake an argument something like this: "Perhapsyou Spartans think thatPersiais close to Ionia and that thePersians can attackwithout warning. Well have alook at this map! Do you see how far away Susa is? It takes three months to marchfromSusa to the Ionian Sea."At the time,nomatter what Cleomenes himself mayhave thought, the Spartans as a whole were unwilling again to venture overseasafter the Samian debacle of the late 520s.34 Fifty or more years after his visit allthatwas rememberedwas the bronze map itself and the anecdote aboutGorgowarning her fathernot to be corrupted by the stranger.As conditions inGreecechanged, the point of the storywas altered in order to reflect present concerns.The details inHerodotus' version reflect the concerns of a later age when thequestion was no longer "can we defend Ionia" (which was a still a concern in479; cf. Hdt. 9.106) but rather,"canwe penetrate the interiorof Asia." That the

32. See Nenci 1995: 225, who gives a misleading paraphrase of the fragments of this poem(e.g. the textmakes no reference to themerchants displaying a map). Nenci cites themuch fullerdiscussion by Pizzagalli 1937, but he too wrongly believes that themerchants have amap. AnEnglish translation can be found in Foster 1993: 250-56 and, with greater accuracy, inWestenholz1997: 102-39. There is a brief discussion of Akkadian epic byWest (1997) 70-71.

33. Westenholz 1997: 119-21, Text 9B: "King of Battle," lines 28-35. The text, however, isfragmentary.

34. See Hdt. 3.46-47, 54-56 with Cawkwell 1993: 520-23. Some twenty or so years beforethe visit of Aristagoras, Cleomenes had already refused to assistMaeandrius of Samos (Hdt. 3.148).


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latterwas indeedpossible can only have been confirmed by the crushing defeat ofPersian landand naval forces at theEurymedon in 466 (discussed below).

Finally, Herodotus' own attitude to this narrative is telling. Because ofGorgo's intervention,Aristagoras did not get a chance to describe the royal roadfrom Sardis to Susa which an invading armywould want to traverse.Herodotushimself then does this forAristagoras in two pages of theOxford Classical Text.On one level this gives him an excuse to show off his knowledge of the royalroad, but his description is far from being rhetorically neutral. He emphasizesthe obstacles thatwould face an invading army: he details the three gates, thefour forts, and the seven rivers thatneed to be passed. ForHerodotus the notion oftaking this road for an attack on Susa was utterly absurd.When Cleomenes hadasked how long the tripwould take, we are told (5.50): "Aristagoras, althoughbeing wise inother respects and deceiving him well, stumbled on this point; foralthough therewas no need for him to tell the truth(at least if he really wishedto lead out the Spartans into Asia), he said that it was a journey of three months."

Later when Aristagoras went toAthens he tried the same argumentswith greatersuccess (5.97): "Aristagoras went before the people and said the same things

which he had said in Sparta about the good things in Asia and the war againstPersians, that they use neither shield nor spear and would be easily subdued.... It seems that it is easier to deceive many men than just one, if he had not

been able to deceive Cleomenes theLacedaemonian but had deceived 30,000Athenians."

Herodotus clearly believed thatAthenian assistance to the lonians had evilconsequences; forhe concludes his discussion ofAristagoras atAthens by sayingof the fleetwhich theAthenians voted to send to Ionia: "These ships proved tobe thebeginning of evils forbothGreeks andbarbarians."35onetheless, why didhe feel the need to emphasize the folly of marching inland on a three month trek inan attack on Susa? Or to put it another way, atwhom are these remarks aimed? Anobvious candidate are thoseGreeks, contemporaries or near contemporaries ofHerodotus himself, who argued that itwould be better for theGreek cities to stopfighting over trifles and to invade Asia for the purpose of seizing the enormous

wealth of the King. Herodotus' narrative goes far beyond merely demonstratingthe futility and evil consequences of Athenian and Eretrian participation in theIonian revolt; it also attempts to undercut the notion that an invasion of Asia bya coalition of Greek states, including Athens and Sparta, was feasible.

In Book 6.84 we are told the incredible story that Scythian ambassadorsproposed to this same Cleomenes a joint invasion of Media, with the Scythiansentering by way of the Phasis River and the Spartans marching inland fromEphesus:

35. This line, with its epic tone of foreboding,marks the first, fateful point of contact betweenAthenians and Persians. Compare with Iliad 5.63, 9.604; Hdt. 5.30.1, 6.98.1; and Thuc. 1.12.3.


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The Argives say that for this reasonCleomenes went mad and perishedbasely (i.e. because of his impiety), but the Spartans say thatCleomeneswent mad from no divine cause, but because he became a drinker of neatwine after consorting with Scythians. For the Scythian nomads desiredtopunish Darius because he hadmade an invasion into their land;and so,having sent toSparta, theywere trying tomake an alliance and to concludeanagreement thatitwas necessary for theScythians themselves to attemptto invadeMedia from thePhasis river, whereas they were bidding theSpartans, setting out fromEphesus, tomarch inland and to rendezvouswith them.They say thatCleomenes, when the Scythians had come forthispurpose, spent toomuch timewith them and, consorting with them

more thanwas proper, he learned from them to drink neat wine. TheSpartans believe thathe went mad for this reason. As a result of this,as they themselves say, whenever they wish to drink purer wine, theysay to pour a Scythian. Thus the Spartans explain what happened to

Cleomenes. But it seems tome thatCleomenes paid back this retributiontoDemaratus.

I have translated the entire anecdote because several striking features deservemention. First of all, inonly 17 lines of Oxford Classical textHerodotus tells usfive times that the Spartans themselves arehis source for this story. Secondly, it iscrucial tonote thatHerodotus does not specifywhether or not theScythians actually succeeded inmaking thealliance.36The infinitives (TCOLea6at,UVTL'OeaOL,and xeXeULv) probably represent imperfects ("trying to") in direct discourse.Nevertheless, Herodotus uses language that is ambiguous, and he certainly doesnot claim that the proposal was rejected out of hand. Moreover, the suggestionthatCleomenes spends a lotof time in their company indicates that theirmission

was takenseriously. That, of course, is incredible, and it isdifficult to conceive ofScythians being inSparta on any official business whatsoever. Thirdly, andmostobviously, this story is inconsistentwith theAristagoras episode discussed above.

Why should Cleomenes have been willing to invadeAsia when the Scythiansapproached him (sometime between 512 and 500 BC?),but then be unwilling todo so at thepromptingof Aristagoras? The two episodes are formally incompatible and reflect different concerns. At one level, theScythian anecdote explains aSpartandrinking custom (todrink neat wine inScythian fashion); and on anotherit exonerates the Spartans of any complicity in their king's apparent suicide byproviding an explanation for his madness. And this explanation, unlike the threeotherswhich Herodotus records (cf. 6.75-83), does not involve any imputationofimpietyor divine anger.37Yet, theSpartansneed only have related thatCleomeneshad learned to drink neat wine from Scythian guest friendswithout mentioninganything at all about negotiations for an offensive alliance. In other words, it

36. Hammond CAH2 IV:497 states it as a fact thatan alliance had beenmade.37. See Gould 1985: 12-13.


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looks as if the "invasion of Asia" motif has been grafted onto an older storywhichserved different purposes.When Herodotus heard this tale (regardlessof whetherwe can trusthis source citation here), panhellenist talkwas, or had recently been,in the air.Herodotus himself canmention it fairly casually; perhaps, of course,with the implicit suggestion that talk of this kind belongs in a context of drunkenexcess.

Near the beginning of Book 7 (11) Xerxes, who is eager to invadeGreece,says toArtabanus, who has just spoken against the idea:

Iwould not be born the son of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, the son ofTeispes, the son of Cyrus, the son of Cambyses, the son of Teispes, theson of Achaemenes, if Iwere not to punish theAthenians, knowing wellthat if we shall keep quiet, they shall not, but in very truth they shallattackour land, if it is right to form an estimate on the basis of what theydid first, theywho both burntSardis andmarched intoAsia. Therefore,it is not possible for either of us to retreat,but the contest before us iseither to take the initiative or to suffer, in order thateither all of Asiashould become subject to the Greeks, or all of Greece to thePersians;for there is nomiddle course in thisquarrel.

When Themistocles attempted to persuade theGreek commanders tobreak downthebridge across theHellespont after theirvictory atSalamis, theSpartan admiralEurybiades argued otherwise andconcludedwith a recommendation for the future(8.108.4): "after thePersian had returned tohis own country, thenwould be thetime to contend with him for the possession of that."At Book 9.2 the Thebans

warnMardonius that"if theGreeks are of one mind, as theywere previously, itwould be difficult even for thewhole of mankind tooverpower themby force."38

And finally, the ending of theHistories (9.122) may also be relevant to thistopic. The work endswith the curious anecdote of Cyrus advising thePersians nottomove to a soft land lest theybecome soft themselves. Recent interpretershaveseen this as containing a warning to theAthenians about the dangers inherentin imperialism.39Might itmore specifically be awarning, directed not just to

Athens but toSparta and her allies aswell, about territorialexpansion intoAsia?The IonianGreeks had a reputationfor luxurious livingwhich theywere thoughtto have acquired from theLydians; this, as much as anything, was thought to

38. At 5.3, in an authorial comment, Herodotus expresses a similar sentiment about theThracians, but with the qualification that they are incapable of unanimity.What Herodotus leavesimplicit, thata unitedGreece could not only resist conquest but conquer all others, Aristotle laterstatedmore openly inhis Politics (l327b29-33): "TheGreek race is both spirited and intelligent; andthis is why it continues to be free, to be governed in the best way, and to be capable of ruling allothers if it attains a single constitution."

39. See Moles 1996; Pelling 1997a; and Dewald 1997.Moles takes the ending as a "wamingto theAthenians," in the sense of Herodotus seeking to influence contemporary behavior; Pellingsees itmore as a use of contemporary realities to add an extra perspective to the treatmentof thePersianWars; Dewald seems closer toPelling thantoMoles, but regards thepotential "contemporaryperspective" as a shifting one, depending on how contemporary events turnout.


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76 CLASSICALNTIQUITY Volume 19/No. 1 /April 2000

have caused the failure of the Ionian revolt.' Thus Herodotus may have come tobelieve andmay be subtly indicating that itwas dangerous formainland Greeks,both Athenians and Spartans, to subjugate either Ionia or any part of Asia, lestthey adopt Eastern luxury and become corrupted by it.

All of these passages arewell known, to be sure; but theircombined implication has been noticed only once before, and thatvery briefly.41I find itextremelyunlikely thatAristagoras really advocated an expedition into the heart of thePersian empire in499 BC, or thatXerxes really thought thattheGreeks would invade

Asia unless he attacked them first,or that Scythians had proposed a coordinatedinvasion of Asia to the Spartans. Aristagoras' alleged reference to how easy it

would be for Spartans todefeat turban-wearing, trouser-clad, bow-shooting Persians clearly was written with hindsight after the battle of Plataea. So toowas theTheban claim toMardonius about the invincibility of a united Hellas. Herodotusis reflecting contemporary concerns and a contemporary debate as to the propergoals of Greek imperialism.What these stories tell us is thatwhen Herodotuswas composing his Histories during the third quarter of the fifth century, someGreeks believed that the conquest of thePersian empirewas possible, desirable,and the logical consequence of Xerxes' failure to subdue Greece. There are, tobe sure, other ways inwhich to "read" these passages individually.42Even so,taken together, they presuppose that the idea of Greeks conquering the interiorof

Asia had been voiced (however silly itmay have seemed toHerodotus, or, forthatmatter, tous) well before the end of the fifth century.

Herodotus' own attitude to this idea is negative and that in itself tells ussomething importantabout his views. Ina famous passage (8.3) he claims thatthe

Athenians did not dispute the command of the fleet in 480 because they realizedthat such a quarrel would lead to perdition for Greece. He then adds an authorialcomment: "They thought correctly, for internal strife is as much worse than aunited war as war itself is worse than peace." Although we might have expectedHerodotus to feel that a grand coalition against Persia was less evil than GreeksfightingGreeks, he could not condone themoral andpractical folly of thosewhoadvocated such a war.43

40. See Xenophanes F 1and Hdt. 6.11-15, with Flower 1994: 130-32 and 1997: 256-57.41. By Cawkwell 1997b: 38-39. Starr 1976: 58-59 realized the importance of the speech

of Aristagoras, but gives only a partial explanation for its genesis: "one might postulate thatthe combination of the themes of Persian ineffectiveness in battle and luxurious wealth was acompensatory release after thewar with Xerxes, designed at once to explain and also tomagnify thatvictory." That may be true,but it does not account for the further theme of aGreek invasion of Persia.

42. The concept of tisis is theguiding theme in two of them, but thatmay merely beHerodotus'own thematic overlay upon what his sources told him. The theme of retribution and vengeance(tisis) is pervasive in theHistories. See Lateiner 1989: 140-44, 193-96, 203-205. For the notion ofreciprocity, of which retribution is a component, see Gould 1989. Raaflaub 1987: 228 thinks that7.11.2-3 refers to the "them or us" attitude (in Athens and Sparta)which was current around theoutbreak of thePeloponnesian War.

43. See Fornara 1971b: 75-91 forHerodotus' attitude towardswar. Note also Raaflaub 1987:247-48.


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III. CIMON AND DUAL HEGEMONYAssuming that these passages do reflect talk thatwas current either prior to orduringHerodotus' own time of writing, whose talkwas it?There must have been

some Greeks, perhapsmany, who even in the early years of the PeloponnesianWar believed thattheAthenians and Spartans should have been fightingbarbanransrather than each other. But Athens and Sparta had clashed long before 431 BC,

most notably at the battle of Tanagra in 457, and the Spartans had previouslyinvaded Attica in 446." So popular talk of a reconciliation between these twocities could easily have preceded the outbreak of thePeloponnesianWar in 431. Infact, there is only one person whom we know of whose policy was panhellenicin the sense of waging incessant war on the possessions of the King of Persiaandwho was simultaneously well-disposed towardscooperationwith Sparta, andthatwas Cimon, the son ofMiltiades.45

In 466 Cimon won his most famous victory at the river Eurymedon inPamphylia;" it was the equivalent of Salamis and Plataea on a single day, oras Plutarch says (Cim. 13.3), "Cimon surpassed the victory at Salamis in thebattle on landand the victory atPlataea in thebattle at sea."There is exaggerationinPlutarch'swords, but not asmuch asonemight think.According toThucydides,twohundredenemy shipswere either capturedor destroyed; Plutarch adds thatanadditional eighty Phoenician shipswere sunk shortly afterwards.47Not even theKing of Persia could sustain defeats on this scale, and itmay not be coincidentalthatXerxes was assassinated in earlyAugust 465.Moreover, theamount of bootycapturedwas immense and this battle can only have whetted Cimon's appetitefor even more ambitious ventures.48The dedication atDelphi from the tenthofthe spoils was a gilded statue of Athena placed on a bronze palm tree; this is anunusual image and symbolizes victory over theEast, since thepalmwas aPersiansymbol of domain.49

Strangely,we do not hear of renewedAthenian operations againstPersian territoryuntilThucydides (1.104)mentions that in460 anAthenian fleet abandonedoperations against Cyprus inorder to intervene in the revolt of Egypt fromPersia.This lull should not be attributed to a diplomatic settlement between Athens andtheKing of Persia following the battle of the Eurymedon.50 The explanation

44. See Thuc. 1.107-108 and 1.1 14 respectively.45. A recent survey of Cimon's entire career can be found in Podlecki 1998: 35-45.46. The date is controversial; Badian 1993a: 6-10 argues for 466. Schreiner 1997 implausibly

places the battle in462.47. For accounts of the battle, see Thuc. 1.100.3; Plut. Cimon 12-13; andDiod. 11.60-61;

with Miller 1997: 12-13, 38-40. Thucydides is extremely brief andDiodorus is confused.48. Miller 1997: 38-40 discusses the booty, but note especially Plut. Cimon 13.5-7.49. Paus. 10.15.4-5; Plut. Nicias 13.3 andMor. 397f; andDiod. 11.62.3; with Stiihler 1989.50. 1cannot accept Badian's (1993a) theory thatAthens had concluded a short-lived Peace with

Persia in ca. 465, which was then renewed in 449; this is compellingly refuted byCawkwell 1997a,who makes the crucial observation thatuntil 462/1 Athens andSpartawere still allies against Persia.


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may be that theAthenians were otherwise occupied, especially with the revolt ofThasos. And if Cimon, as I am about to suggest, had intended to seek Spartanassistance for renewed attacks on Persia, thatwould have been postponed bythe great earthquakewhich devastated Sparta in 465 and the attendant revolt oftheMessenian helots. In 462, when urging the Athenians to help the Spartansput down this helot revolt, he uttered his famous dictum "thatGreece shouldnot be lamed nor Athens deprived of her yoke-fellow" (Plut. Cimon 16.8-10).

Modem scholars, ignoring the context in Plutarch, have taken this to refer tothemaintenance of a dual hegemony or "dyarchy"over Greece:51 theAtheniansruling the Greeks by sea and the Spartans by land. But if that were the meaning,Ion of Chios, Plutarch's source, would not have quoted itwith approval; for Iongreatly admiredCimon and is citing thisdictum tohis credit.52"Laming" in itselfimplies aweakening of Greece. Why talk aboutweakening except in a contextof contention against someone else?

Plutarch also quotes a few lines of the comic poet Cratinus aboutCimon inwhich theword "Hov?XXivcv" (of all theGreeks) nearly has the resonanceof themodem "panhellenism": "in all things the best leaderof all theGreeks."53Lastly,thefact thatCimon gave his three sons thehighly unusual namesLacedaemonius,

Thessalus, and Oulius also attests to his panhellenic outlook and inclinations.54Lacedaemonius and Oulius were twins, born sometime in the470s. If thenameOulius (whichwas a cult titleof Apollo inMiletus, Delos, andLindus) refers toAthens' new role as Ionichegemon of theDelian League,55 thenperhapsCimon'schoice of names was already intended to reflect his belief in thepartnership anddual hegemony of Athens andSparta.

The concept of dual hegemony, which inelaborated form is the central tenetof Isocrates' Panegyricus of 380 BC, is already found inBook 9 of Herodotus.At 9.26-28 there is a dispute between the Tegeans and Athenians as to who wasmore worthy to hold one wing of the army (both conceding that the Spartansshould hold the other). If this debate actually took place, the Tegeans couldThucydides (1.102.4) says thatafter theSpartans dismissed theAthenians from the siege of IthometheAthenians "gave up the alliance thathad beenmade with them against theMede." As Cawkwellobserves (p. 115): "If Thucydides is tobe trusted, it is inconceivable thatAthens could earlier havemade peace with Persia even if itwas a very short-lasting peace, without thereby renouncing heralliance against theMede." For other cogent objections, see Briant 1996: 574-75. More generally, Ifind it inconceivable that Cimon would have wanted to put an end tomilitary operations againstPersia after his overwhelming victory at theEurymedon.51. E.g. Fomara and Samons 1991: 126.

52. Plut. Pericles 5.3. On Ion's attitude to theAthenian empire, see Dover 1986 and Strasburger1990.

53. Cimon 10.4 (= Cratinus F 1): xat 7t&vt'apL'TCOtxivHIavre)X vcv tpo,uco.All mss.have the unmetrical np6tc at the end of the line; I here accept the emendation 1top6lI, but thisis far from certain. See Kassel andAustin 1983: 122 andBlamire 1989: 131.54. Plut. Per. 29.2 has Pericles assert that these names were outlandish. On the significanceof their names, seeBarron 1980.55. See Davies 1971: 306-307 for the suggestion.


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hardly have made an argument less calculated towin the sympathy and supportof their Spartan allies. They begin by relating how their king had killed Hyllus,the son of Heracles, in single combat, an action which kept the Heracleidaefrom returning to the Peloponnese for a hundred years; and they conclude withthe boast that they had beaten the Spartans inmany subsequent battles. The

Athenian response ismuch more persuasive, laying stress on how they alone oftheGreeks had given refuge toHeracles' children and had defeated the PersiansatMarathon. We cannot know if Herodotus entirely made up these speecheshimself or adapted them from a source; but in either case they seem to reflecta contemporary sentiment that the Spartans had better reason to be friends withAthenians, who had preserved the ancestors of theirkings, thanwith Tegeans,who had done theirutmost to prevent those same ancestors from returninghome.The Spartans, not surprisingly, did not find theTegean argument very appealing;for at 9.28 we are told that "the entire army of the Lacedaemonians shoutedaloud that theAthenians were more worthy to hold the leftwing (of the armyat Plataea) than the Arcadians." Later, when the Spartans and Tegeans werebeing attacked by the Persian cavalry during the final confrontation at Plataea,Pausanias sent amessage to theAthenian contingent,which Herodotus representsas follows (9.60):

Men of Athens, with the greatest contest lying before us as towhetherGreece is to be free or enslaved, we Lacedaemonians and you Athenianshave been abandoned by our allies who ran away during the previousnight. It is clear, therefore,what we must do in the future, to defendourselves as best we can and to protect each other. If, then, the cavalryhad attacked you first, itwould indeed be necessary forus and theTegeans(who with us are not betraying Greece) to give assistance to you. But now,inasmuch as the entire cavalry has advanced against us, it is right that youcome and defend that portion which is being most of all hard pressed.If something makes it impossible for you to assist us, earn our gratitude

by sending us your archers. We are aware that throughout this presentwar you have been by far themost zealous of all, and so you will also payheed to this request.

TheAthenians attempted tohelp theSpartans,but theywere prevented fromdoingso by the Greeks who were fighting on the Persian side, towit, the Thebans. Likeso much else in the Histories, this would have struck the reader who was livingthrough the Peloponnesian War as particularly ironic, since it was the Thebans

who literallybegan thatwar with the surpriseattackon Plataea. Furthermore, theCorinthians, who were to do themost to push the Spartans into the Peloponnesian

War, were among the Greeks who had "abandoned" the Spartans and Atheniansat Plataea. Perhaps also, the reader (or listener) would have recalled Cimon'sattempt in 462 to help the Spartans in their siege of the rebel helots on Mt. Ithomeand his subsequent rebuff, allegedly because the Spartans were suspicious of


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Athenian intentions.56To anyone who knew the future, Pausanias' words werenot only ironic, but also pathetic. Yet it is highly unlikely that amessenger,at the critical moment of the battle, would have delivered so rhetorically andemotionally charged an address.

The notion of dual hegemony here expressed, thatAthens and Sparta shouldalways stand together and protect each other as the true leaders of Hellas, datesfrom a period later than Plataea and is consistent with the ideology of Cimonas expressed in his dictum of 462. It would be going too far to suggest thatCimon invented this concept, but in the period 481 to 477 dual hegemony wasnever seriously discussed. In 480 the allies would not even countenanceAtheniancommand over the naval forces of theHellenic League (Hdt. 8.3) and in 478Sparta handed over command of those forces toAthens without any thought offurtherparticipation. According toThucydides (1.95.7), the Spartanswanted tobe free of the "waragainst theMede," andbelieved that theAthenians were bothcompetent tocommand and friendly to themselves.57Whether or not Thucydideshas underestimated Spartan disquiet, therewas no outright breach between thetwo states until 461, when Cimon was ostracized and theAthenians renouncedtheirwartime alliance with Sparta, choosing instead to ally with Sparta's archenemy Argos.

Dual hegemony could, of course, be expressed in far more cynical termsthanwhat we find inHerodotus: towit, thatAthens and Spartawere schemingto enslave Greece in theirown interests. Thucydides (4.20.4) has the Spartanscynically propose in 424 that they and theAthenians should togetherdominatetheGreek world: "If you and we say the same things, you can be certain thatthe rest of Greece, being much inferior,will pay us the greatest honor."58Theevidence, tobe sure, is scattered andpiecemeal; yet it is sufficient to indicate thatwhat Cimon had inmind was not simply the self-interested division of Greecebetween the twohegemonic powers for thepurpose of preserving the statusquo,but an expedition against thePersian empire, by both land and sea, under the dualleadership of Athens and Sparta (the very policy advocated by Isocrates in thenext century)."9

56. Thuc. 1.102.57. Despite Thucydides, it is far from clearwhether Spartawillingly acquiesced in the formationof theDelian League or whether thiswas forced on her. The evidence is surveyed by Hornblower

1985: 21-24. Note alsoHornblower 1991: 142-43. If the"Hetoemaridas debate," recorded by Diod.at 11.50, has an historical core, this probably should be dated to 478/7 against Diodorus' date of475/4 (see Cawkwell 1997: 132 n. 55 ); it shows that some Spartanswere willing to contend withAthens for naval hegemony. Fornara and Samons 1991: 114-29, on the other hand, dismiss allthe evidence for tensions between Athens and Sparta during the period from 481 to 462 as laterinvention.

58. On this passage, seeHornblower 1996: ii, 176-77. Cf. Thuc. 5.29.3 andAristophanes Peace1080-82.

59. For the suggestion, see Cawkwell 1997b: 38-39. He comments: "It is reasonable to supposethatCimon ... was thinking of a great joint assault on Persia under thejoint hegemony of Athens andSparta."


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After Cimon returned rom exile in451, he helped to negotiate a five-year trucebetween Athens and Sparta (Diod. 1.86.1),? and then resumed thewar againstPersia by attacking Cyprus and Egypt in 450. What did he hope to accomplish? 61Diodorus (12.4) implies thatCimon's purpose in attempting to reduceCyprus wasto force the King of Persia to end the war and make peace. That is surely a case ofinferring themotive from thepresumed result, sinceDiodorus sees this expeditionas precipitating the Peace of Callias in 449/8. It is reasonable to look for anotherexplanation. Quite apart from the island's enormous wealth in timber, grain, and

metals, itwould be difficult to overestimate the strategic importanceof Cyprusfor any power wishing to control the easternMediterranean, as recent historystill testifies. If theAthenians had captured Cyprus, itwould have served as anideal base for attacking theLevantine coast, intercepting thePhoenician fleet, andintervening inEgypt. Of course, Cimon's operationsmay have had no furthergoalthan the consolidation and expansion of Athens' naval empire. But thatwouldnot have solved the problem of how theAthenian empire and the PeloponnesianLeague could co-exist nor could it prevent a repetition of theAthenian defeatby Sparta at Tanagra in 457. Or to put it differently, what did Cimon expect tohappen when the five-year trucewith Sparta expired? Did he foresee anothershort-term truce or renewed confrontation with Sparta? His concern both withfuture inter-Greek relations andwith Persian interference in those relations isindicated by the decree that he passed at this time against Arthmius of Zelea fortaking Persian gold into thePeloponnese.62

After thewastage of the Peloponnesian andCorinthianWars, Isocrates cameto the realization that theonly solution toantagonism between Sparta andAthensand to theproblem of Persian interference inGreek affairswas jointmilitary actionagainst a common foe. It is not altogether fanciful that this solution had occurredtoCimon as well, especially given his direct experience of the immense bootythat such a war could yield. Cimon would have realized that Athenian forcescould never proceed inland without Spartan assistance; for just as in 480-79Athens was preeminent on sea and Sparta on land. The five-year truce establishedin 451 was intended to give him enough time to annihilate the Persian fleetand capture its naval bases in the Levant, Cyprus, and Egypt before invitingSparta and her allies to participate in an invasion into the interior.63 Although

60. Cf. Thuc. 1.1 12. 1;Andocides 3.3-4; Theopompus FGrHist 115 F88; and Plut. Cimon 18.1.On the problems of chronology raised by these sources, see Blamire 1989: 177-78; Fornara andSamons 1991: 138-39; andPodlecki 1998: 43-45.

61. The strategic importanceof Cyprus and the limited success of thecampaign iswell analyzedby Parker 1976. For the chronology of the campaign, see Badian 1993a: 58-60.

62. Ibelieve that thisdecree should be dated to 451/50. Meiggs 1972: 508-12 thinks it genuine,but associates itwith the intrigues of Pausanias in the460s. Cf. Thuc. 1.109.2-3 for a failed Persianattempt in 457 to bribe theSpartans to invadeAttica in order to bring about the recall of Athenianforces from Egypt.

63. Cimon, of course, could not have issued an invitation to Sparta on his own authority; buthe could have attempted to persuade theAthenian Assembly to send an embassy to Sparta for the


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Cimon did not live to see it, the major naval victory off Cypnan Salamis in thespring of 449 proved yet again thatAthenian naval forceswere more thanequalto the task.Two literary sources lend support to this reconstruction, neither of which, it

must be admitted, are unproblematic. That Cimon foresaw friendly relations andcooperation between Athens andSparta is suggested by an elegy composed by Ionof Chios (F 27West IEG 112=Athen. 463a). This poem,which is inpraise ofwine,contains the lines: "Making holy libation toHeracles andAlcmena, toProcles andto thedescendants of Perseus, beginning with Zeus, letus drink, let us play."Westhas plausibly argued that this poem was performed at a symposium held inSpartain thepresence of theEurypontid kingArchidamus, who was a descendant of theindividualsmentioned throughProcles.' The most probable occasion was in451

when Cimon negotiated the five-year trucewith Sparta.Although one cannot ruleout Cimon's expedition toSparta in462, when Ionwas only 18 or 20 years old,his subsequent visit in 451 would have been an especially suitable occasion inwhich to sing of pouring libations to all of theking's ancestors. This praise ofSparta'sEurypontid house in themouth of anAthenian poet who was in thecircleof Cimon is remarkable.To be sure, it is notwhat we would call "propaganda,"but itdoes reflect themood of cooperation andgoodwill which was characteristicof Cimon's dealings with Sparta.

The only explicit piece of ancient evidence thatCimon's ultimate goal wasthe complete destruction of the Persian empire is a passage in Plutarch's Cimon(18). Plutarchclaims thatCimon's purpose in450 was "toget profit fromGreece'snaturalenemies" and that "he had inmind nothing less than the total destructionof theKing's power."65He thenadds an intriguingdetail: "Cimonhimself, aboutto setmighty conflicts inmotion and keeping his fleet togetheroff Cyprus, sent

men to the shrine of Ammon to put some question to the god. No one knows thepurpose of their visit nor did the god deliver an oracle to them, but as soon asthe sacred ambassadors approachedhe ordered them to leave; forCimon, he toldthem, already happened to be with him."' In other words, Cimon was dead by thetime the envoys had arrived. But what if he had lived? IfCimon's operations

were preliminary to a land invasion of Asia, for which he would need Spartan

purpose of arranging coordinatedmilitary operations, or he could have asked some of his Spartanfriends to approach theCouncil atAthens.64. West 1985: 74. Contra Jacoby 1947: 9, who argues for 462.

65. Cimon 18.1 and 18.6: ou8ev ltxpo6v, &X' ?XiUT&tn\o&vrtO , maLwe'w()'ye,uovrL'xouraxuOLv.This assessment of Cimon's plans was accepted byWade-Gery 1945: 219-22. Parker1976: 32, on the other hand, dismisses Plutarch's version of Cimon's goals as unrealistic on thegrounds that the Athenian expedition (200 ships inThuc., 300 in Plut.) was too small to effectthe complete destruction of Persian power in the easternMediterranean. But surely Cimon did notbelieve that he could accomplish that in a single campaigning season. The conquest of Cyprus wasthenecessary preliminary to anythingmore ambitious.

66. Cimon 18.7.


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aid, perhaps thatwas the subject of his attempted consultation of the oracle ofZeus Ammon at Siwah Oasis.67

Plutarch's version of Cimon's aims is important formy reconstruction, butit would be naive not to query where Plutarch obtained his information forCimon's last campaign. The source question is indeed critical. Since therewere no detailed contemporary accounts of the Pentecontaetia (cf. Thuc. 1.97.2),Plutarch's information is likely to have come fromwriters of the fourthcentury.Thucydides (1.112.1-4), Diodorus (12.3-4), and Plutarch (Cimon 18-19) allgive divergent accounts of this campaign.68Thucydides is highly compressed;Diodorus is confused and quite capable of distorting his source for this period,who was Ephorus of Cyme. Still, it does seem thatPlutarch and Diodorus arefollowing different authorities and thusEphorus cannot be Plutarch'smain sourcehere. That leaves Callisthenes of Olynthus as a likely source, whom Plutarchtwice cites in his life of Cimon (12.5 on the battle of the Eurymedon; 13.4 onPeace with Persia).

It has been suggested, not unreasonably, thatCimon's plan to destroy thePersian empire and his attempted consultation of the oracle of Zeus Ammonat Siwah Oasis, possibly about that very topic, were invented by Callisthenesof Olynthus for inclusion in his Deeds of Alexander in order tomake Cimona precursor to Alexander the Great.69 The reverse, however, may rather betrue. Alexander may have been consciously evoking the example of Cimon,

whom Plutarch (Cimon 19.5) calls "theGreek hegemon," by consulting Ammon.Alexander may have wanted the Athenians and other Greeks to see him ascompleting the taskwhich Cimon hadbegunmore thanacenturyearlier.This issuemight be clearer if we knew where Callisthenes had narratedCimon's campaigntoCyprus (if in fact he narrated it at all), since his historical works necessarily haddifferent biases and emphases.Was it in his Hellenica (which dealt with eventsbetween 386 and 356) or in his Deeds of Alexander? My own view is that theHellenica is themore likely venue, but this cannot be proved.70

67. Thuc. 1.1 12.4; Diod. 12.3. The epigram on this battle,which Diodorus (1 1.62.3)mistakenlyrefers to the Eurymedon, confirms that 100 Phoenician ships were capturedwith their crews. SeeBadian 1993a: 20,64-66.

68. SeeMeiggs 1972: 124-28.69. Schreiner 1977: 21-29. Even if this is correct, Callisthenes attributed toCimon an undertak

ing which he must have assumed would have been believable to his contemporaryGreek audience.Parke 1967: 215 suggests thatCimon may have tried to consult Zeus Ammon in an attempt to getoracular support for his aid toEgyptian insurgentsagainst Persia (Thuc. 1.112.3), but that the story,as Plutarch tells it, is a later invention. Thomas 1989: 203-205 points out thatCimon was littleremembered in fourth-centuryAthenian oral traditionand I suppose thatmight have made it easierforCallisthenes (or indeed someone else) to elaborate the details of his attempted consultation.

70. Bosworth 1990 (following Schwartz 1900: 109) argues thatCallisthenes' account of theEurymedon campaign appeared as a digression in his Deeds of Alexander and not, as is usuallyclaimed, in his Hellenica. If Bosworth is right, then the Cyprus campaign and the associatedconsultation of Ammon probably also appeared in theDeeds of Alexander. But Bosworth's theoryis not unproblematic. Callisthenes was writing up events as they occurred and must have been


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Callisthenes, however, is not theonly candidate,only themost likely. Plutarch(19.2) mentions a source by name for Cimon's death, Phanodemus, a fourthcentury atthidographerwhose fragments display an extreme Atheno-centrism.71On the one hand, itmay be that neither Callisthenes nor Phanodemus, bothof whom were writing at the end of the fourth century and who had veryparticular biases, are very good sources for what Cimon was thinking in 450.It is also a distinct possibility thatPlutarch has himself suppliedCimon's motives

without any authorization from a source, Plutarch's intention being to underscorethe pairing of Cimon with Lucullus, who attempted unsuccessfully to destroy

Mithridates of Pontus.2 Matters aremade more complicated still by Plutarch'sown panhellenist inclination and bias;73 or this sometimes leadshim to rhetoricalexaggeration of the intentions of his subjects.74On the other hand, extremeskepticism in source criticism can be as unwarranted as excessive optimism.It must be remembered thatwe know very little about the sources availableto Plutarch, much less toCallisthenes. Either of them could have drawn on

works contemporarywith Cimon, such as Ion of Chios' Epidemiai (which iscited three times by Plutarch in his Cimon and twice in his Pericles). AlthoughtheEpidemiai was awork of reminiscences and anecdotes, Ionmight well haveincludedmaterial, such asCimon's dictum in462, which highlighted his friend'spanhellenic aspirations.

Yet, even if one is hesitant to accept Plutarch's attribution of motive, theconsultation of Ammon ismost likely tobe historical. For it isone thing to inventor infermotives, quite another to fabricate theevent itself. At aminimum Cimonshould have inquired about his chances of success inEgypt, which would nothave been anunreasonable question given theAthenian disaster inEgypt in455/4(Thuc. 1.109-10). But like Philip II in336 (Diod. 16.91.2), he could have asked a

more far-reachingquestion, "whetherhewould conquer theking of thePersians."pressed for time, especially if, as seems likely, his narrative of Alexander's deeds was publishedin installments (perhaps in the form of dispatches) for an audience back inGreece. Would he havehad the leisure to describe Cimon's expeditions of 466 and450 inany detail? Bosworth (p. 6) arguesthat therewould have been little space in the firstbook of theHellenica for a preliminary digressioninto the fifth century. But one should also keep inmind thepossibility that theDeeds ofAlexanderonly comprised a single book (as suggested by Parke 1985: 63), and as such could not have containedany but the sparsest of digressions. For the standardview that theHellenica openedwith a survey ofrelations between Persia andGreece up to theKing's Peace of 387/6 BC, see esp. Pedech 1984, 27-31and Prandi 1985: 53-54.

71. FGrHist 325. Cf. F 13 and 14.72. Note, inparticular,Comparison of Lucullus and Cimon 2.5: "Both had attempted to destroygreat empires and to subdue thewhole of Asia and both left theirwork unfinished."

73. Plutarch's own attitude towardspanhellenism is revealed atAges. 15.3-4 and Flam. 10-11.Cf. Shipley 1997: 45-46.74. For example, Plutarch claims atAges. 15.1 thatAgesilaus haddecided "to fight for theperson

of theKing and thewealth of Ecbatana and Susa."No other sourcementions so grandiose a schemeand Idoubt if it is based on anything more substantial thatXenophon's assertion in his encomium(Ages. 1.36) thatAgesilaus "was expecting todestroy theempire thathadmade an expedition againstGreece." Cf. Shipley 1997: 202.


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IV. A STRANGE PASSAGE IN DIODORUSAND THE CIMONIAN MONUMENTS

There is,moreover, another literary source which bears on the question ofCimon's panhellenic propaganda and aims andwhich can be used to corroboratePlutarch's assessment of them.We are told by Diodorus (10.27), whose source forthe PersianWars was Ephorus of Cyme,75 that the following conversation tookplace between Miltiades and the Persian general Datis on the eve of the battleofMarathon:

Datis, the general of the Persians, being a Mede by race and having received the tradition from his ancestors that the Athenians werethe descendants of Medus who had established Media, sent a message to theAthenians explaining that he was present with an army forthe purpose of demanding back the sovereignty which had belongedto his ancestors. For he said that Medus, who was the oldest of hisown ancestors, having been deprived of his kingship by theAthenians,moved toAsia and foundedMedia. If, therefore, they should return thesovereignty to him, theywould be released from this accusation andfrom their expedition against Sardis. But if they should oppose him,theywould suffer farmore terrible things than had theEretrians.Miltiades, giving the opinion of the ten generals, replied that accordingto the argument of the envoys it was more appropriate for the Athenians to hold the mastery over the empire of the Medes than for Datisto hold it over the city of the Athenians; for an Athenian man had established the kingdom of the Medes, whereas no man of Median racehad ever controlled Athens. After Datis had heard this reply he preparedfor battle.

Ephorus consulted a wide variety of sources in both prose and poetry,76 and itis impossible for us to be certain whether this story originated in the fifth or fourthcenturies or even whether it actually happened.77 It does, however, fit in with

75. This is generally agreed. See Volquardsen 1868; Schwartz 1903: col. 679; Hornblower1994: 36-38; and Stylianou 1998: 49-50.

76. On Ephorus' sources for his PersianWar narrative, see Flower 1998. Although Ephorusmay be reflecting thepanhellenist concerns of his own time (the fourth century), it is unlikely thathe was either a student of Isocrates or a cipher for Isocrateanpanhellenism. See Flower 1994: 42-62.77. Georges 1994: 66-68 believes that this anecdote preserves authentic Persian diplomaticpropaganda: "If the Isocrateanmot of Miltiades isdiscarded from the Ephoran account of Diodorus,what is left is a straightforward Persian diplomatic approach to Athens very like thatmade to theArgives in481." At Hdt. 7.150 Xerxes is said to have despatched a herald toArgos to inform themthat the Persians were descended from Perses, the son of Perseus and Andromeda, and so weredescendants of theArgives; andHecataeus (FGrHist 1F 286) claimed thatMedia was named after

Medus, the son of Medea (presumably by Aegeus, the king of Athens). These passages indicatethatGeorges may well be right that the anecdote is based on an actualmessage of Datis, but the

mot, inmy view, isnot Isocratean, butCimonian.


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86 CLASSICALNTIQUITY Volume 19/No. 1/ April 2000

theway Cimon was commemorating (and perhaps exaggerating78)his father'sachievements through large scale works of art atDelphi andAthens. The publiccommemoration of Miltiades on thesemonuments indicates thatCimon himselfmay ultimately have been the author of the response which his father gave toDatis. If so, the anecdote was intended to bolster his policy of invading theIranianheartland; for theAthenians had a "historical" claim to ruleMedia.

One of thesemonuments was agroupof thirteenstatuesatDelphi, dating fromeither the460s or the450s, which was "dedicated from a titheof the spoils from

Marathon" (Paus. 10.10.1-2). The group included the gods Athena and Apollo,Miltiades, most of theAttic phyle heroes, andTheseus. The near-heroization ofMiltiades is remarkableand, inconjunctionwith thedate of themonument, makesithighly probable thatthiswas Cimon's private dedication.79Theremay also havebeen a statueof Cimon's eponymous ancestor, Philaeus, the son of Telamon.80

The other work of art is,of course, thedepiction of the battle ofMarathon inthe Stoa Poikile.81 This building must have been in some way commissionedby Cimon's brother-in-law Peisianax, since it was originally called the StoaPeisianacteios.82 If nothing else, this indicates thatPeisianax must have paid formost of the construction or decoration, perhaps fromCimon's share of the spoilsfrom theEurymedon campaign.83Both the literaryand archaeological evidenceindicate that theStoa was constructed sometime between 470 and460 BC.84 mongthe figures representedon theMarathon painting, including Theseus rising fromthe ground, pride of place was given toMiltiades; he was depicted stretchingout his hand and urging theGreeks on against the Persians.85The glorificationofMiltiades by the circle of Cimon isobvious enough. Can one go further?

The artistic program of the Stoa, which comprised four separate paintings,was unusual for its juxtapositionofmythic andhistoric subjects.Pausanias (1.15)

78. See Lazenby 1993: 57-58. Modem scholars arewont to speak of Cimon's "rehabilitation"of his father's reputation, since Miltiades died in disgrace (Hdt. 6.136; Plut. Cimon 4.4); but"glorification"more aptly describes the tenor of the artistic representationsdescribed below.

79. See Castriota 1992: 81 andMiller 1997: 31-32 who cite earlier bibliography.80. But this depends on emending the textof Pausanias from theotherwise unknown "Phileus/

Phyleus" of themanuscripts to"Philaios."This emendation is highly probable: asVidal-Naquet 1986:304-305 points out, Phileus (which is the reading of the best manuscripts) is an easy corruption ofPhilaios. See alsoMills 1997: 40-41 and n. 174.

81. See Castriota 1992: 76-89, 127-33; Mills 1997: 40-42; and Holscher 1998: 166-67.Pausanias 1.15 gives the fullest description of the four paintings; the literary testimonia is collectedbyWycherley 1957: 31-47.82. On Peisianax, seeCastriota 1992: 259 n. 84 with Plut. Cim. 4.6 andDiogenes Laertius 7.1.5.

83. See Holscher 1973: 74. Boersma 1970: 55-56, on the other hand, implausibly argues thatPeisianax merely was theman who proposed the building of the Stoa in theAthenian assembly.

84. For the date, see the excavation report in Shear 1984: 13-15, 18. Note that the potteryfragments found in the red-earth foundation fill give a terminus ante quem of ca. 460 for thebuilding's completion; they do not prove that thebuilding was actually completed in 460. This isan importantdistinction and is usually overlooked.

85. See Aeschines Against Ctesiphon 186; Aelius Aristides On theFour 174; scholiast onAristides On theFour 174; Nepos Miltiades 6.3; with Harrison 1972: 356-57.


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describes thepaintings in this order: thebattle of Argive Oenoe betweenAtheniansandLacedaemonians, thebattle of Theseus and theAthenians with theAmazons,the trial of Ajax for the rape of Cassandra after the fall of Troy, and the battleof Marathon.86The first painting does not fit inwith theothers. The latter threeimply the continuity of Athenian victory over barbarians from the heroic ageto the present, but the first painting represents a victory over fellow Greeks.

The standard interpretation is that the battle of Oenoe was between Argos (withAthenian assistance) and Sparta, that it took place during the period 461 to 451,and that the painting depicting itwas a later addition to the Stoa and celebrated thesuccessful reversalofCimon's foreign policy.87What I findparticularly interestingabout thisensemble (although it is notmentioned by anyone in the vast literatureon this topic) is that the original three paintings may each have depicted theancestors of Cimon: Theseus in theAmazon painting; perhaps Theseus' sonsAcamas andDemophon in the sack of Troy;88and both Theseus andMiltiades inthebattle ofMarathon.Might theoverall effect of this family portraithave been tosuggest a future invasionof Asia by landunder the leadershipof Cimon, thedirectdescendantofTheseus andMiltiades?89 Isay "suggest"because themeaning eitherof this or of any other monument is never fixed, butmay "mean" significantlydifferent things todifferent viewers (regardless of the creator's intention).Whenthe paintings were first displayed the ensemble may have suggested to thoseviewers who were sympathetic tohis policies what Cimon could still achieve by

86. We should reject the radical interpretationof Francis and Vickers 1985a and 1985b (andFrancis 1990: 85-89) that the battle of Oenoe was not a battle at all, but rather a meeting of theAthenian and Plataean forces in the vicinity of Marathon soon after the Plataeans had departed fromtheAttic village of Oenoe. The Francis-Vickers theory is accepted by Castriota 1992: 78-79, 260-61,but rejected by Badian 1993b: 210 n. 39, Bollansee 1991, Develin 1993, and Holscher 1998: 166,among others. Castriota, however, seems to think (p. 78) that the painting depicted ameeting intheAttic village of Oenoe itself (which would be amore compelling argument), but that is not whatFrancis andVickers are claiming, nor could such ameeting have taken place.

87. This view isbest represented byMeiggs 1972: 96-97, 469-72. This battle is also mentionedby Pausanias at 10.10.2 in reference to anArgive dedication atDelphi. Pritchett 1994, however,argues that Pausanias' original text read "Omeai" and that this was subsequently miscopied as"Oinoa"; he further suggests that the painting depicted the battle of Orneai in 417 BC,which isbriefly narrated atThuc. 6.7.1-2. But it should be noted thatThucydides merely mentions a siege(not a pitched battle) and specifies that only a few troops from theLacedaemonian army wereinvolved.

88. They are not actuallymentioned by Pausanias, who describes thepainting thus: "theGreekshave captured Troy and the kings (PocaLXEbr)ave assembled on account of the outrage of Ajaxagainst Cassandra." Yet itwould be unusual if theywere not depicted: forAcamas andDemophon,despite their absence in the Iliad, figure prominently as the representatives of Athens at Troy infifth-centuryAthenian art and literature (for the evidence, seeMills 1997: 9-10). Furthermore,Polygnotus, who painted theTroy picture in the Stoa, included them in his much more detaileddepiction of the capture of Troy in theCnidian Lesche atDelphi (Paus. 10.25-27; with Castriota1992: 127-28).

89. Barron 1980makes a strong,but circumstantial case, thatPherecydes of Syrosmade Theseusan ancestor of Cimon by substitutingTheseus for Telamon as the father of Ajax by Eriboia. Cimon'sfamily, thePhilaids, claimed descent fromPhilaeus, the son of Ajax.


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comparisonwith the exploits of his ancestors, whereas after his death, itmay havebrought tomind what Cimon might have done had he lived. In either case, thecontemporary viewer's interpretationwould have been informed by knowledgeof Cimon's public utterances and speeches, of which we have only the faintestglimpse.

Lastly, at the timewhen the original threepaintings were completed, probablybetween 466 and 462 (for the archaeological evidence does not preclude a datebefore Cimon's ostracism in 461), enough space was left for at least one morepainting on the same scale as the others. Although Pausanias' description of thedisposition of the paintings is ambiguous, it is likely enough that all fourwere onthe rearwall. Why was a fourth painting not commissioned right from the start?Other considerations aside, reasonsof artistic coherence are sufficient to accountfor the absence of Salamis; for sea battles are "hard toportray in successful art,at least with the sort of human detail which would have dominated the otherscenes.")9 Itwould have been just as difficult to portray the double victory attheEurymedon, especially if the landbattle, asDiodorus (11.61.2-7) describesit, took place at night. Nor was theEurymedon campaign conclusive in thewaythat the capture of Troy was; itwas a great achievement to be sure, but there

was still much to be done. So perhaps the intentionwas to fill this spacewitha depiction of a joint Spartan and Athenian victory, with Cimon as anAtheniangeneral, over the land armies of the Persian king, in a battle thatwould resultin the breaking up of thePersian empire. Such a scene would have completedthe symmetry of theensemble, with twodecisive victories over barbarians takingplace inGreece and two inAsia. If this was the original intention of the Stoa'ssponsors, the eventual additionof apainting showing thevictory ofAthenian overSpartan hoplites was an ironic insult indeed toCimon and his supporters.

After Cimon's death in 450 BC any realistic hope of cooperation betweenAthens and Sparta for a war against Persia came to an end. In 449 the Peace ofCallias between Athens and Persia was negotiated by Cimon's own brother-inlaw,Callias the son of Hipponicus.9' The Delian League's war against Persiawasnow over and the original justification for theLeague's existence was renderednull and void. Pericles may have tried to divert attention away from the policyof Cimon, while at the same timegiving anew justification for theDelian League,by means of theCongress Decree.92 In practical termsCimon's death and thesubsequentPeace were providential forPersia, for therewas no longer the threat

90. So Pelling 1997b: 11 explains the absence of Salamis from the Stoa, while arguing (9-13)against the tendency to explain the choice of scenes in terms of aCimonian pro-hoplite ideology.

91. The existence of thispeace (which is firstmentioned by Isocrates in thePaneg.) is one of themost famous cruxes in the study of Greek history. Among recent treatments, see Badian 1993a: 1-72and Cawkwell 1997a.

92. But since the authenticity of this decree (forwhich Plut. Per 17 is the sole authority) isexceptionally problematic, this cannot be pressed. Cawkwell 1997a makes as strong a case for itspurpose and authenticity as one possibly can. For a different view, see esp. Bosworth 1971, who


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of major battles with Hellenic forces. This situation is well encapsulated in therebukewhich Plutarch (Per. 28.6) claims thatElpinice directed atPericles in 439BC on the occasion of his funeral oration for theAthenians who had died in thereduction of Samos: that Pericles had lost many brave citizens, not in wagingwar with Phoenicians andMedes, as had her brother Cimon, but in subduingan allied and kindred city. But the Peace of Callias did not mark the end ofpanhellenist discourse, in the sense of Athens and Sparta jointly leading theirrespective alliances in an attack on the Persian empire.

V. PANHELLENISM AT THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURYAlthough we have no means of quantifying public opinion inAthens, much

less in otherGreek cities, panhellenist sentiments seem to have intensifiedduringthe last decade of the fifth century. As the PeloponnesianWar dragged on, andas internalcivil strife became endemic, and especially when the Persians beganto aid Sparta, we may suspect that ever more Greeks began towonder if instead offighting each other theywould be better off attacking a common enemy. Spartanacceptance of Persian aid in particular, beginning in 412, must have causedwide-spread resentment, and not only among Athenians. For Callicratidas, theSpartan admiral in 406 BC, resented having to beg Cyrus formoney and vowedto reconcile Athens and Sparta.93Such sentiments are reflected in a wide rangeof contemporary literature in various genres. Two texts often cited inmodemdiscussions areAristophanes' Lysistrata of 411 BC andEuripides' Iphigenia at

Aulis of ca. 407 BC.94 Towards the end of the former play, Lysistrata says totheAthenian and Spartan delegates (lines 1128-34): "Now that I have got youhere, Iwish to reproach you in common, and justly so. You who at Olympia, atThermopylae, and at Delphi (how many other places could Imention if it werenecessary forme to speak at great length?) purify the altars, like kinsmen, witha single sprinkling of lustral water, are destroying Greek men and Greek cities,although enemies are at hand with a barbarian army."95 Although strictly speakingLysistrata's words are awarning that Greece should not be laid open to barbarianargues that it was forged by Anaximenes of Lampsacus in order to suit the propaganda needs ofPhilip of Macedon in 338/7.

93. Xen. Hell. 1.6.7. His words seem to be echoed by Agesilaus' brother Teleutias atXen.Hell. 5.1.17. Perhaps, as Cawkwell (1979: 79, 250) suggests, both Callicratidas andTeleutias werepanhellenists. Xenophon's portrayal of Callicratidas is subtly analyzed byMoles 1994.94. Lines 1128ff. and lines 1259-75, 1375-1401. On the panhellenism of Aristophanes, seeHugill 1936, which is an unjustly berated study. For my purpose here, itdoes not matter whetherAristophanes himself was a panhellenist or was simply putting an oft-repeated sentiment intoLysistrata'smouth.

95. The significant phrase is eXOpJv ntcapo6vv ocxpf3&ppxpaTep axTL.oes this have aspecific reference? Sommerstein 1990: 213 suggests that the "enemies" are the Persian satrapsTissaphernes and Pharnabazus, who were seeking to detach theGreek cities in Asia from theAthenian empire and bring them back under Persian rule. Hugill 1936: 16-20 surveys other lesspersuasive interpretations.


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attack, the implicitmessage is that itwould be farbetter todestroy barbarianmenand barbariancities thanGreek men andGreek cities.

The Iphigenia at Aulis is a difficult play to interpret,not least of all becausechanges of mind occur more often in this play than inany other extant tragedy.96When Agamemnon decides once and for all to sacrifice his daughter (lines 126975) his reason is interesting: he claims thathe is under constraint to do so inorderto ensure thatGreece should be free and to prevent the rapeof Greek wives bybarbarians.His words soundmore like a patently specious pretext than a genuineappeal to theconcept of Greeks uniting against barbarianswhich Euripides hopedwould move his audience.97Moreover, any "triumphalist"reading of these linesis undercut by Euripides' treatmentof noble Trojans and ignoble Greeks in hisearlier plays Hecuba, Andromache, and TrojanWomen.98At the end of theplayIphigenia steels herself to sacrifice her life for the greater good of Hellas; buthere again it is not so clear thatEuripides meant his audience to commend herdecision.99Her declaration that the life of one man isworth more than the livesof ten thousandwomen seems perverse, even byAthenia

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