Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151

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Language Sciences

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ langsci

Going further and further astray: why a loose explanationnever becomes tight

Seizi IwataDepartment of English Linguistics and Literature, Faculty of Letters-General Department of Humanities, Kansai University,3-3-35 Yamate-cho, Suita-shi, Osaka 564-8680, Japan

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 19 June 2014Accepted 29 June 2014Available online

Keywords:Unique path constraintConstruction grammarType A resultativeType B resultativeTight link

E-mail addresses: s_iwata@kcc.zaq.ne.jp, iwata@

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2014.06.0190388-0001/� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

In recent years, a “debate” has been going on in Language Sciences. First, Iwata (2006)criticized Broccias (2003). Seven years later, Broccias (2013) replied to Iwata (2006). ThenIwata (2014) replied to Broccias (2013), to be followed yet again by Broccias (2014).The purpose of this paper is to sort out the mess which this endless “debate” falls into. It isshown that all the arguments initially advanced by Iwata (2006) are practically unchal-lenged. So there is no longer any need for debate, although Broccias (2013, 2014) continuesthe “debate” by going astray from the original issues.It is also shown that Broccias’ (2014) “objections” against Iwata (2014) concerning the TypeA/Type B distinction and to one’s death are based on loose reasoning and severemisunderstandings.

� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In recent years, a “debate” has been brewing in Language Sciences. First, Iwata (2006) criticized Broccias (2003). Sevenyears later, Broccias (2013) replied to Iwata (2006). Then Iwata (2014) replied to Broccias (2013), to be followed yet again byBroccias (2014).

The purpose of this paper is to sort out the mess which this endless “debate” falls into. This paper is organized as follows.Section 1 reviews what issues Iwata (2006) raises in criticizing Broccias (2003) and how Broccias (2013) “replies.” Section 2considers why the “debate” does not end, despite the fact that all the arguments initially advanced by Iwata (2006) arepractically unchallenged. Sections 3 and 4 show that Broccias’ (2014) “objections” to Iwata (2014) are based on loosereasoning and severe misunderstandings. A conclusion is given in Section 5.

2. How Broccias (2013) “replies” to Iwata (2006)

2.1. The issues raised by Iwata (2006)

The essential claim of Iwata (2006) is as follows. In Goldberg’s (1995) constructional account of resultatives, resultativesare uniformly handled by means of constructions, i.e. form–meaning pairings. Iwata (2006) argues, however, that while

kansai-u.ac.jp.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151136

resultatives like (1a) and (1b) (¼Type A)may be handled along the lines of Goldberg (1995), those like (2a) and (2b) (¼Type B)are to be handled differently.1

1 In th

(1)

is paper

a.

, the t

He hammered the metal flat.

b. They yelled themselves hoarse.

(2)

a. The river froze solid. b. He tied his shoelaces tight.

Specifically, some resultatives like (3a) cannot possibly be analyzed by adding an AP to the VP as in (4). Rather, reference needsto be made to the syntactic frame [NP V NP AP] (or [Subj V Obj Obl]) to account for these resultatives, as Goldberg (1995)claims.

lf

(3) a. He laughed himse el

erms “Type A resultative

sick.

b. *He laughed hims f.

(4)

*[laugh himself] þ [sick] ¼> [laugh himself sick]

By contrast, resultatives like (2a) can be plausibly analyzed by adding an AP to the verb, as in (5). After all, the result phrase canbe deleted without affecting the well-formedness.

(5)

[freeze] þ [solid] ¼ [freeze solid]

(6)

The lake froze.

Thus there is no need to refer to the syntactic frame in accounting for Type B resultatives.Now a reviewer of the manuscript version of Iwata (2006) comments that “the distinction between Type A and Type B is

easily captured” if Broccias’s (2003) theory is adopted. This reviewer keepsmentioning Broccias (2003), and “Broccias (2003)”appears as many as eleven times in this reviewer’s comments.

In responding to this reviewer’s repeated and insistent references to Broccias (2003), Iwata (2006) adds an appendixpointing out problems with Broccias (2003). One can easily see what issues are raised by looking at the section titles in theappendix:

A.1. Does Broccias’ theory really account for Type A resultatives?A.2. Does Broccias really understand Goldberg’s theory?

A.2.1. How verbs and constructions interactA.2.2. The Unique Path Constraint

A.3. Can Broccias’ theory accommodate the distinction between Type A and Type B?

A.3.1. A possible analysisA.3.2. Selectional restrictions on APs

As noted above, Iwata (2006) is intended as an improvement over Goldberg’s (1995) constructional account of resultatives. Soif the distinction between Type A and Type B resultatives is “easily captured” in Broccias’ (2003) theory, as the above-mentioned reviewer insists, Broccias’ (2003) account must be at least as good as Goldberg’s (1995). That is why A.1 andA.2 are brought up in Iwata (2006).

As Broccias (2013) claims to be a reply to Iwata (2006), he should address all these issues. So let us see how Broccias (2013)responds to all of them.

2.2. Does Broccias’ theory really account for Type A resultatives?

Iwata (2006) points out that despite the fact that Cognitive Grammar posits only three components (semantic, phono-logical, and symbolic) to the exclusion of syntax, syntactic categories like VP or NP appear in Broccias’ (2003) account, which isa contradiction. Broccias’ (2013) reply is as follows:

Strictly speaking, Iwata is of course correct but it is convenient to use traditional categories such as V and N as ashorthand for semantic structure. (Broccias, 2013, p. 37, fn 8)

So Broccias (2013) is saying that strictly speaking, he cannot use syntactic labels like V or N, but loosely speaking, he can,because it is “convenient” to do so. But a loose theory is a bad theory. The fact remains that Broccias cannot possibly usesyntactic labels like NP or VP, no matter how “convenient” those labels are.

s” and “Type B resultatives” are used, as they seem to be the most neutral terms.

Fig. 1. Goldberg’s (1995) transitive resultative construction.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 137

Another issue concerns linking. As is well-known in the literature on English resultatives, the result phrase must bepredicated of the post-verbal NP, irrespective of whether the post-verbal NP is a subcategorized object or not. Thus in (7a) and(7b), flat and thin are predicated of the post-verbal NPs the metal and the pavement, respectively.

(7)

a. He hammered the metal flat. b. The joggers ran the pavement thin.

Various attempts have been made to describe or explain this fact (cf. a small clause analysis in Hoekstra, 1988; “Direct ObjectRestriction” in Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995). In Goldberg’s (1995) theory, this constraint is explicitly encoded in thetransitive resultative construction, in that the patient argument of CAUSE-BECOME is put into correspondence with the directobject, as shown in Fig. 1.

But this constraint is not incorporated in Broccias’ (2003) diagrams, unlike all those accounts. Thus sometimes themanipulee (¼patient of the action) is linked to the direct object position, as shown in Fig. 2, but sometimes the theme(¼undergoer of a change) is linked to the direct object position, as in Fig. 3.

Iwata (2006) illustrates this problem by citing (8a) and (8b).

Consequently, linking is quite unconstrained in B’s theory: Themanipuleemay be linked to the direct object, but somaythe theme; the manipulee may be identical to the theme (.) but need not (.). But then, B cannot explainwhy [(8a)] isacceptable, but [(8b)] is not.

(8)

a. She sang the baby to sleep. b. *She sang the song to sleep. (Iwata, 2006, pp. 486–87)

Since either the patient or the undergoer of change may correspond to the direct object position, nothing in Broccias’ theorycan rule out (8b).

Just as B’s account allows the theme (the baby), as distinct from the manipulee (the song), to be linked to the directobject position, so it should allow the manipulee (the song), as distinct from the theme (the baby), to be linked to thedirect object position. (Iwata, 2006, p. 487)

In replying to this criticism, Broccias (2013) says as follows:

Rather, TH is construed as a manipulee thanks to the construal of the process in the event component as a force. But ifthe song is construed as a manipulee, then the string the song to sleep must be interpretable . (Broccias, 2013, p. 40,footnote 15)

But it is not clear what this “must be interpretable” is based upon. The word “must” makes sense only on the assumptionthat there is some constraint that requires the string the baby to sleep or the song to sleep to be “interpretable.”

All this shows is that Broccias (2013) finally comes to realize that (8b) is to be ruled out as a violation of the constraint thatthe result phrase be predicated of the post-verbal NP. But that is exactly what Iwata (2006) pointed out seven years before.

2.3. Does Broccias really understand Goldberg’s theory?

This issue has two parts (noted above as A.2.1 and A.2.2 from Iwata, 2006). As for A.2.1 (“How verbs and constructionsinteract”), nothing is mentioned at all in Broccias (2013). I take this silence as an admission on the part of Broccias thatBroccias (2003) is mistaken about how the interaction between verbs and constructions is treated in Goldberg’s theory.

Now in order to see whether and how a response is given for A.2.2 (“The Unique Path Constraint”) in Broccias (2013), acloser look is necessary. As is well-known among scholars working on resultatives, Goldberg (1991, 1995) proposes a UniquePath Constraint, which allows one to capture the fact that in (9) black and blue and out of the room cannot occursimultaneously.

(9)

a. *Sam kicked Bill black and blue out of the room. b. *Sam kicked Bill out of the room black and blue. (Goldberg, 1995, p. 81)

Now Broccias (2003) cites (10) as a counterexample to the Unique Path Constraint.

Fig. 2. Broccias’ diagram for John hammered the metal flat (Broccias, 2003, p. 177).

Fig. 3. Broccias’ diagram for They drank the pub dry (Broccias, 2003, p. 199).

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151138

(10)

The tyrant ordered them to jump to their death off the castle.(Broccias, 2003, p. 116)

Iwata (2006, pp. 488–89) points out that this is quite beside the point, since this type of example has already been handledby Goldberg (1991) in discussing sentences like (11).

(11)

He pushed her through the window to her death. (Goldberg, 1991, p. 372)

According to Goldberg (1991, p. 372), to her death, unlike to death, is an idiomwhichmetonymically stands for “the pathwhereshe died.” Consequently, sentences like (10) are not counterexamples to the Unique Path Constraint.

Iwata (2006) thus simply points out this oversight of Broccias. Strangely enough, however, the supposed response to thisissue by Broccias (2013) is as follows:

The tight linkmanifests itself overtly byway of the prepositional phrase to her death, which, unlike to death, presumes aphysical path. Hence, Iwata’s objection is not a counterexample to Broccias’ theory but rather provides a furthersubstance to it. (Broccias, 2013, p. 49, fn 29)

Here, what Iwata (2006) presents as an illustration of Broccias’ poor understanding of Goldberg’s theory is mysteriouslyturned into a “counterexample to Broccias’ theory.” This does not make sense. Obviously, this is no reply at all to the issueraised by Iwata (2006). The fact remains that Broccias (2003) misunderstands Goldberg (1991) by assuming that to her deathqualifies as a result phrase and thus breaches the Unique Path Constraint despite the fact that Goldberg (1991) has alreadyacknowledged the possibility and argued that there is no such problem.

2.4. Can Broccias’ theory accommodate the distinction between Type A and Type B?

This issue again has two parts. As for A.3.2 (“Selectional restrictions on APs”), nothing is said in the text of Broccias (2013).But abruptly in the Conclusion section, Broccias says as follows:

Iwata has a point here but I have argued in this paper that (a) reliance on the notion of tight links may go some waytowards solving this problem. (Broccias, 2013, p.51)

Nothing of the sort can be found in Broccias (2013).In order to see how A.3.1 (“A possible analysis”) is responded to, again aword is in order about the characteristics of Type B

resultatives. In the literature it has been observed that when change of state verbs are followed by result phrases, the resultphrase further specifies a change already entailed by the verb, rather than describing a second result state in addition to theentailed change (Pustejovsky, 1991, p. 76; Kaufmann, 1995, p. 416; Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995, p. 58; Tortora, 1998;

Fig. 4. The difference between the two types.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 139

Rapoport, 1999, p. 673; Washio, 1997; Horrocks and Stavrou, 2003, p. 317; among others). This point is most clearlydemonstrated by Pustejovsky (1991)

(12)

a. The river froze in 20 minutes. b. The river froze solid in 20 minutes. (Pustejovsky, 1991, p. 76)

The events in both [(12a)] and [(12b)] are coextensive. That is, it is not the case that the event denoted in (a) is a subpartof that denoted in (b); rather they are the same event, with different information being expressed about it. (Puste-jovsky, 1991, p. 76)

Accordingly, the two types of resultatives may be described as in Fig. 4.Thus besides the fact that a change is entailed in the verb in The lake froze solid (¼Type B resultative), but not in He

hammered the metal flat (¼Type A resultative), the fact that a verbal event and a change of state are co-extensive with theformer, but not with the latter, must be captured.

In order to capture the difference between verbs that entail a change and those that do not in Broccias’ (2003) theory, it isconceivable that verbs in Type A cases are linked to only the force component, whereas verbs in Type B cases are linked toboth force and change components. But in addition, Iwata (2006) suggests that in order to capture the co-extensivenessbetween the verbal event and the change, another change component be placed by the side of the change componententailed by the verb.

Now Broccias (2013) presents Fig. 5 as the representation for He cut the meat thin (a Type B resultative).

Notice also that the predicate hammered has only been connected to the event component in Fig. 6.. By contrast, sincecut entails a change of state, cut has been connected to both the force component and the change component inFig. [5]. (Broccias, 2013, p. 38)

In Fig. 5, the verb cut is linked to both the force and change components, so as to capture the fact that cut entails a change.Significantly, however, this diagram fails to capture the co-extensiveness between the verbal event and the change of state, inthat it lacks a second change component, which Iwata (2006) suggests needs to be placed by the side of the changecomponent entailed by the verb.

Moreover, Fig. 5 suffers from one more serious shortcoming as well. The verb cut entails a change from being not cut tobeing cut. Alternatively, cut as in cut – into slicesmay be regarded as entailing a change in the Identificational field in the senseof Jackendoff (1983,1990). Either way, the change component in Fig. 5 should express this lexically entailed change. Strangely,however, what the change component in Fig. 5 actually encodes is a change of becoming thin.

Here Broccias (2013) is confusing a lexically-entailed change with a property predicated of the entity having undergonethe change. A correct diagram should be as in Fig. 6, where a property of being thick is placed by the side of the changecomponent and that property is predicated of the result of an Identificational change (i.e. slices).

Thus the diagram for Type B resultatives presented in Broccias (2013) suffers from fundamental problems.Another characteristic of Type B resultatives is that they may be counter-examples to the Unique Path Constraint. Thus in

(13) and (14) adjectival result phrases and path PPs co-occur.

(13)

He spread the butter thin/thick on the bread. (Iwata, 2006, p. 463)

(14)

a. Amelia rolled up Nina’s torn sleeve and tied the tourniquet tight around her upper arm. b. Out in the corral, tied so tight to the big stake in the centre that the Argentines call a

palenque that she couldn’t even move her head, was the little grey pony.

c. I should be bound even tighter to my mother.

(all from BNC, cited in Iwata, 2006, p. 464)

Fig. 5. Broccias’ diagram for He cut the meat thin (Broccias, 2013, p. 39).

Fig. 6. Alternative diagram for He cut the meat thin.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151140

Broccias (2013) tries to account for these counter-examples by claiming that the result phrase and the path PP are “tightlylinked.”

I would like to contend that the occurrence of multiple RPs here, unlike impossible examples such as *Sam kicked Billblack and blue out of the room (.) is quite triviallymotivated by the fact that the two RPs are tightly linked, i.e. they referto (or specify) two intrinsic facets of the same common event.(Broccias, 2013, p. 47)

What Broccias (2013) actually does, however, is simply use the label “tight link” to refer to the counter-examples to theUnique Path Constraint which are observed by Iwata (2006), without giving a definition. Thus a number of problems can bepointed out: This is a rephrasing of what Iwata (2006, 2008) observes; this is nothing more than a metaphor; no definition isgiven, either in prose or in diagrams, so this is circular.

2.5. Summary

Let us now summarize. As for A.1 (“Does Broccias’ theory really account for Type A resultatives?”), the answer is no.Broccias (2003) indeed suffers from the problems which Iwata (2006) points out, so Broccias’ (2003) account of resultativescannot achieve the same effect as Goldberg’s (1995).

As for A.2 (“Does Broccias really understand Goldberg’s theory?”), the answer is unequivocally no. Broccias (2003) indeedfails to understand Goldberg’s theory correctly, exactly as Iwata (2006) points out. This enhances the conclusion arrived atconcerning A.1. Since Broccias (2003) is so full of misunderstandings about Goldberg’s (1995) theory, he cannot possiblyconstruct a better theory than Goldberg’s.

As for A.3 (“Can Broccias’ theory accommodate the distinction between Type A and Type B?”), the answer is again no.Broccias’ (2013) diagrams still fail to capture important characteristics of Type B resultatives; his “tight link” account fallsshort of an adequate analysis.

It can be safely concluded, therefore, that all the arguments advanced by Iwata (2006) are valid.

3. Why does the “debate” not end?

3.1. What Broccias (2014) should have done

Broccias (2014) advances no convincing arguments to refute this conclusion. Thus in response to the charge that heconfuses “an Identificational changewith a property predicated of the entity having undergone the Identificational change” indrawing the diagram for cut – thin, all Broccias (2014) says is “Be that as it may” (on p. 42); Broccias (2014) does not present arevised diagram that overcomes the problem raised by Iwata (2014). As for the lack of definition of his “tight link,” Broccias(2014) does not offer any definition. And so on.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 141

Given that all the arguments initially advanced by Iwata (2006) are unchallenged, there is no need for debate any longer.But why does Broccias (2014) continue to engage in the “debate,” then? This is because every time he is presented with aproblem which he cannot handle, Broccias responds evasively (e.g. “Strictly speaking Iwata is of course correct but.” or “Bethat as it may”) and instead shifts to a different issue, claiming that Iwata has a “problem” there.

Apparently, Broccias seems to think that he can win a score by attacking Iwata’s account on matters that are not of directrelevance to the issues raised. But this is fundamentally wrong. All the issues raised concern Broccias’ theory, not Iwata’s.

A.1. Does Broccias’ theory really account for Type A resultatives?A.2. Does Broccias really understand Goldberg’s theory?A.3. Can Broccias’ theory accommodate the distinction between Type A and Type B?

As pointed out above, the conclusion is already obvious. If Broccias does not agree, then he should present positive argumentsto prove that his theory CAN do such and such. Thus Broccias should have drawn diagrams that capture the co-extensivenessbetween the verbal event and the change of state, or he should have illustrated his “tight link” in the diagram, etc.

This should be the case, particularly since Broccias (2003) and the first half of Broccias (2013) unquestionably imply that theirargumentative strength (and thus the superiority of Broccias’ account) derives from the very idea that their reasoning can beexpressed so accurately indiagrams,which, consequently, is assumed tobe theweakeningof Goldberg’s and Iwata’s approaches.2

2 By

However, this causal relation. cannot be read off any of the representations offered by Goldberg/Iwata (nor is it to befound in other approaches such as those mentioned above).(Broccias, 2013, p. 40)

Strangely, though, in the latter half of Broccias (2013) and Broccias (2014), no diagrams appear. Accordingly, his “tight link”is never made explicit in his diagram, despite the fact that it supposedly plays a central role in his theory.

3.2. Logical incoherency

It is possible that in the course of a debate a very meaningful discussion may arise as a spin-off that departs from theoriginal issues, and I do not deny the possibility here. In the case of the “debate” at hand, however, the chances are sohopelessly slim: Broccias’ (2003, 2013, 2014) “arguments” are based upon sloppy understanding and loose reasoning, whichprevent his “arguments” from being logically coherent.

We have already seen one good (or bad?) illustration of this in 1.3: Broccias (2003) presents a sentence involving to one’sdeath as a counterexample to the Unique Path Constraint in Goldberg (1991), despite the fact that to one’s death is discussed inthat very paper; what Iwata (2006) presents as an illustration of Broccias’ poor understanding of Goldberg’s theory ismysteriously turned into a “counterexample to Broccias’ theory” in Broccias (2013).

One more illustration comes from the following statement by Broccias (2014), which is supposed to be a response toIwata’s (2014) remark that the co-extensiveness between the verbal event and the change of state as observed with Type Bresultatives was not duly recognized before Iwata (2006).

Iwata (2014) ignores the work by Wechsler (2005) on “homomorphism.”(Broccias, 2014, p. 43, fn 11)

But what Wechsler (2005) attempts to account for is the correspondence between the temporal progress of a verbal event(e.g. drinking) and the volume of an incremental theme object being affected (e.g. wine).

“t

(15)

hose men

a.

tioned

John drank wine (for an hour/*in an hour).

b. John drank a glass of wine (*for an hour/in an hour).

(Wechsler, 2005, p. 260)

This “homomorphism,” which is intended to capture the aspectual correlation between events and incremental themes, isentirely different from the co-extensiveness observed between the verbal event and the change of state in Type Bresultatives.

In fact, even apart from this category mistake, “homomorphism” and “co-extensiveness” are different notions, as clearlyindicated in Wechsler’s (2005) definition.

1. The telic event and the path must be (a) homomorphic (parts of the event must correspond to parts of the path andvice versa) and (b) coextensive (the event must beginwhen the affected theme is at the start of the path and end whenthe affected theme reaches the end of the path).

2. The affected theme must be an argument of the event-denoting predicate.(Wechsler, 2005, p. 260)

above” are meant Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), and Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2001).

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151142

Furthermore, the distinction between the two types of resultatives is never mentioned in Wechsler (2005). On the con-trary, Wechsler (2005) cites both wipe the table clean (Type A resultative) and freeze solid (Type B resultative) as instances ofControl Resultative.

(16)

a. He wiped the table clean.

es

0

He wiped the table. b. The water froze solid. 0 The water froze. (Wechsler, 2005, p. 257)

Thus what Broccias (2014) presents as an oversight of Iwata (2014) actually exposes Broccias’ misunderstanding of key no-tions. If one’s “arguments” are based on such loose reasoning and severe misunderstandings, it is inevitable that those pu-tative arguments will never lead to a valid conclusion.

For reasons of space, I cannot discuss all examples of such loose reasoning and severe misunderstandings in Broccias(2013, 2014). But I must at least dispel some of the misunderstandings about the important distinction between Type Aand Type B resultatives, as well as those concerning to one’s death. In what follows, I will discuss them in turn.

4. The distinction between the two types once again

4.1. The real significance of the distinction

It is true that Iwata (2006) illustrates Type B resultatives by citing the sentences in (17), where both freeze and paint arechange-of-state verbs.

(17)

a. The lake froze solid. b. John painted the wall red.

But this does not mean that only change-of-state verbs may appear in Type B resultatives.Rather, the distinction is motivated by whether the string [NP V NP AP] (or [Subj V Obj Obl]) needs to be held responsible

for the resultative semantics or not, as indicated in 2.1. Tomake this point clearer, Iwata (2014) employs the terms “fixed stringanalysis” and “AP-addition analysis.” Type A resultatives are those calling for a fixed string analysis. After all, laugh himself sickcannot possibly be formed by adding the AP sick to laugh himself.

(18)

a. He laughed hims lf sick. b. *He laughed him elf.

(19)

*[laugh himself] þ [sick] ¼> [laugh himself sick]

By contrast, Type B resultatives are those which are better analyzed bymeans of an AP-addition analysis. Thus freeze solid andpaint the wall red can be formed by adding solid and red to freeze and paint the wall as in (21a) and (21b), respectively, in thatthe result phrases can be omitted without affecting the well-formedness, as in (22).

(20)

a. The lake froze solid. b. He painted the wall red.

(21)

a. [freeze] þ [solid] ¼ [freeze solid] b. [paint the wall] þ [red] ¼ [paint the wall red]

(22)

a. The lake froze. b. He painted the wall.

Now, given that the fundamental distinction between the two types of resultatives as conceived in Iwata (2006)concerns whether the resultative is to be handled by a fixed string analysis or an AP-addition analysis, important con-sequences automatically follow. First, an AP-addition analysis may be called for even by verbs which do not strictly entaila change.

This is in fact the position that has been consistently taken by Iwata (2006, 2008). Thus, Iwata (2006) cites the followingsentences as three further types of Type B resultatives where the verb does not strictly entail a change.

(23)

a. The door swung open. b. The door slides open. (Iwata, 2006, p. 473)

(24)

a. However, if fire is an immediate danger, you must jump clear of the vehicle. b. She danced/swam free of her captors. c. They slowly swam apart.

(Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995, cited in Iwata, 2006, p. 473)

(25)

a. Not only has he again fallen flat on the ground, but his head and his hands have broken offand lie at the entrance of the building.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 143

b.

Sheila . found herself suddenly jerked forward, lost her balance, and fell flat on her handsand face on the path. (both from BNC, cited in Iwata, 2006, p. 473)

Similarly, Iwata (2008, p. 1071) explicitly mentions that Type B resultatives are not limited to those like (17).Second, since the distinction between the two types of resultatives cannot be reduced to the types of verbs, there can be no

“Type A verbs” or “Type B verbs.” Again, this is made explicit in Iwata (2006), who observes that change-of-state verbs mayappear either as Type A resultative or as Type B resultative, citing (26) and (27).

(26)

I have painted my fingers black and blue when I painted the walls in this room.(Hoekstra, 1988, p. 117)

(27)

He painted the wall black.

(26) is a Type A resultative (“I have made my fingers black and blue by painting”), whereas (27) is a Type B resultative whereblack is further specifying the change in color entailed by paint (Iwata, 2006, p. 470).

4.2. Putative “arguments” in Broccias (2013, 2014)

Now let us turn to the putative “arguments” in Broccias (2013, 2014). As the following passage illustrates, Broccias isequating telic verbs with “Type B verbs” and atelic verbs with “Type A verbs.”

Still, it should be observed that the ties between the causing event and the caused event are tighter when the causingevent is telic (i.e. with Iwata’s Type B verbs) than they are when non-telic predicates (i.e. Iwata’s Type A verbs) areused. (Broccias, 2013, p. 49, emphasis mine)

This is doubly mistaken. First, verbs that occur in Type A resultatives and Type B resultatives cannot be distinguished interms of aspect. Iwata (2014) thus points out Broccias’ misconception by observing that Type A resultatives are possiblewhether the verb is durative (e.g. shake and beat) as in (28) or punctual (e.g. kick and shoot) as in (29).

(28)

a. He shook her awake. b. . until he eventually beat her senseless and killed her.

(29)

a. Without compunction, Fox kicked him awake. b. Some were shot dead when thousands of women, protesting against the killings, tried to march

on the President ’s residence. (all from BNC)

But Broccias (2014) still thinks that this counts as a problem for Iwata’s theory, and repeats his “argument” in Broccias(2013) as follows. According to Broccias (2014), (30b), unlike (30a), may depict a scene in which the change of state isinstantaneous.

(30)

a. He punched him to death. b. He punched him dead.

Can one really say that the instantaneous change from life to death in [(30b)] is conceptualized as a property pathchange as envisaged by Iwata (2006)? (Broccias, 2014, p. 42)

I do not see why this counts as a problem. First, it has been known in the literature that aspect and lexical decompositionare distinct from each other (Declerck, 1979; Jackendoff, 1987; Levin, 2000; among others). Second, even to-PPs may be usedto describe punctual events, as Wechsler (2005) observes.

More generally, and not just in the context of resultatives, to-PP paths can be long or short, hence appear with durativeverbs (walk to NP) and punctual verbs (give it to NP). (Wechsler, 2005, p. 267)

So we must allow for an instantaneous change to be expressed by what is clearly a path expression, anyway.Third, and most seriously, recall that in Broccias’ (2013) diagram for cut – thin, an instantaneous change of state is depicted

as a property path change, as shown in Fig. 5, repeated here as Fig. 7.Thus Broccias is contradicting himself.Now another respect inwhich Broccias is mistaken in equating telic verbs with “Type B verbs” and atelic verbs with “Type

A verbs” is that there are no “Type A verbs” or “Type B verbs” in the first place. After all, change-of-state verbs, which mayappear as Type B resultatives, may appear as Type A resultatives as well, as demonstrated in the last section.

Note, further, that by pushing this reasoning still further, there is a possibility that verbs that are often found to occur inType A resultatives may also appear in Type B resultatives, i.e. those that are to be approached by means of an AP-additionanalysis. The resultatives in (31) are a case in point.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151144

(31)

a. He wiped the blade clean on his skin coat and walked out. b. Afterwards he washed the tin out in the stream, splashed water over his face and hands and

wiped them dry on a handkerchief.

c. The lad on its back, dolled up as King William, had been crushed to death against the wall.

(BNC, cited in Iwata, 2014, p. 22)

Thus the clean and dry in He wiped it {clean/dry} are the result phrases that are to be accommodated bymeans of a fixedstring analysis, but those in [(31)] are to be accommodated by means of an AP-addition analysis, as noted in section2. (Iwata, 2014, p. 22, fn 4)

But since Broccias (2014) completely fails to see what is meant by Iwata (2014), a clarification is in order.

4.3. He wiped the blade clean on his skin coat

Notice that by removing the result phrases from the sentences in (31), the following sentences result.

(32)

a. He wiped the blade on his skin coat. b. He wiped them on a handkerchief. c. The lad has been crushed against the wall.

Significantly, wipe and crush appear in the [V NP on NP] and [V NP against NP] frames, respectively.Clearly, this wipe is distinct from the wipe as in wipe the table. With the former, the post-verbal NP expresses something

that is caused tomove on a surface, as in (33a), whereas with the latter, the post-verbal NP expresses a surface, with the entitythat is caused to move on this surface being expressed via a with-phrase, as shown in (33b).

(33)

a. Teeny appeared in the doorway, wiping her hands on the dish-towel. b. Inside the room he wiped his face and neck with a piece of old toweling.

(both from BNC)

Thus the twowipes as exemplified in (33a) and (33b) can be said to enter into a complement alternation, which is reminiscentof the complement alternation which the verb hit enters into, as observed in Fillmore (1970).

(34)

a. John hit the fence with the stick. b. John hit the stick against the fence.

It should be obvious by now that the resultatives in (31) can be accommodated by means of an AP-addition analysis. Thuswipe the blade clean on his skin coat can be formed by adding clean to wipe the blade on his skin coat.

(35)

[wipe the blade on his skin coat] þ [clean] ¼ [wipe the blade clean on his skin coat]

This is the analysis suggested in Iwata (2014).As should be clear from the discussion up to this point, this analysis is quite consistent with Iwata (2006, 2008). In fact,

similar instances of resultatives were already discussed in Iwata (2006).

(36)

The dog, which had followed its master onto the roof, jumped down towards the lifeless body, missed,and fell dead on the stones below.(BNC, cited in Iwata, 2006, p. 473)

Just as the state of being dead is a direct result of the dog’s falling on the stones in (36), so the state of being clean, dry, or deadas expressed by the result phrase is a direct result from the motion as expressed by the [V PP] sequence in (31). It’s just thatthe result phrase is added to an intransitive verb in (36) whereas in (31) it is added to transitive verbs.

Fig. 7. Broccias’ diagram for He cut the meat thin (Broccias, 2013, p. 39).

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 145

4.4. Broccias’ (2014) “objections”

It is now time to see whether Broccias’ (2014) “objections” to this analysis really count or not. Broccias’ first objection is asfollows:

But He wiped the blade and He wiped his hands do not entail a change of state, so [(31a)] and [(31b)] cannot be treated asType B examples . (Broccias, 2014, p. 44)

Evidently Broccias is preoccupiedwith the idea that only examples like freeze solid or paint the wall red are Type B resultatives.This is simply a mistake, as already noted above.

Broccias’ second objection is as follows:

[(31c)] is not relevant because Iwata’s (2006) approach only deals with AP resultatives .

(Broccias, 2014, p. 44)

Again, this is entirely beside the point. First, all the sentences in (31) are presented as problems for Broccias, not for Iwata. SoBroccias cannot run away from this data by the allegation that PP resultatives are outside the scope of Iwata (2006). On thecontrary, Broccias (2013) claims that his account is superior to Iwata’s because PP resultatives are covered in his account.

Even if Broccias suddenly changes his position for the sole purpose of running away from (31c), AP resultative counterpartsare not hard to come by.

(37)

I then cut the extra twine off and hammered the hooks flat against the frame so they would hang flushagainst the wall.(http://buttonsbirdsandbs.blogspot.jp/2011/11/frames-and-twine.htm)

So the resultatives in (31) are indeed relevant.Broccias’ third objection is as follows:

. on his skin coat in [(31a)] and on a handkerchief in [(31b)] are obviously not RPs since they refer to locationswhere thetwo events of wiping take place, i.e. they are locative phrases rather than goal phrases. (Broccias, 2014, p. 44)

But a true locative phrase can co-occur with the on-PP in (31a).

(38)

a. He wiped the blade clean on his skin coat on the balcony. b. On the balcony, he wiped the table clean on his skin coat.

Clearly, it is on the balcony, not on his skin coat, that truly expresses a locationwhere the event of wiping takes place. Since onhis skin coat is part of the VP, it necessarily precedes the locative phrase on the balcony (except in fronting as in (38b)).

(39)

??He wiped the blade clean on the balcony on his skin coat.

Thus none of Broccias’ “objections” really counts as objections against Iwata (2014). On the contrary, a careful look atBroccias’ “objection” reveals a deeper problem on the part of Broccias. Recall the following remark by Broccias:

But He wiped the blade and He wiped his hands do not entail a change of state, so [(31a)] and [(31b)] cannot be treated asType B examples. (Broccias, 2014, p. 44)

If Broccias really understood the meanings of (31a) and (31b), this passage should go as: “He wiped the blade on his skin coatandHewiped his hands on a handkerchief do not entail a change of state.” In other words, Broccias completely fails to see thatwipe – on is distinct from the simple transitivewipe. The onlyway tomake sense out of all these “objections” is to suppose thatBroccias (2014) mistakenly understands (40a) in the same way as (40b).

(40)

a. He wiped the blade clean on his skin coat. b. He wiped the table clean on the balcony.

Such a basic mistake is incredible.

5. To one’s death

5.1. How the debate should have proceeded

As already seen in 2.3, Broccias’ (2003, 2013) remarks about to one’s death have completelymissed the point. First, Broccias(2003) misses the fact that to one’s death has already been discussed in Goldberg (1991). Broccias (2013) likewise misses thepoint that the example offered in Iwata (2006) is simplymeant to illustrate Broccias’ poor understanding of Goldberg’s theory,not to act as a “counterexample to Broccias’ theory.”

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151146

The tight linkmanifests itself overtly byway of the prepositional phrase to her death, which, unlike to death, presumes aphysical path. Hence, Iwata’s objection is not a counterexample to Broccias’ theory but rather provides a furthersubstance to it. (Broccias, 2013, p. 49, fn 29)

Nevertheless a scholarly exchange could still be salvaged out of this chaos created by Broccias. Note that Goldberg (1991)claims that to one’s death is not a counter-example to the Unique Path Constraint, because it is not a result phrase in the firstplace. Now in claiming that to one’s death is a counter-example to the Unique Path Constraint, Broccias (2003) thus assumesthat to one’s death is in fact a result phrase. Accordingly, Broccias (2003) could be considered relevant if one regards Broccias(2003) as challenging Goldberg (1991) on the status of to one’s death (i.e. whether it is a result phrase or not).

Thus the “debate” should have either ended or proceeded as illustrated in Fig. 8. First, it is indisputable that Broccias (2003)overlooks the fact that to one’s death has already been discussed in Goldberg (1991), so he should first admit this fact. Thenthere would be two options available: one would be to agree with Goldberg (1991) that to one’s death is indeed not a resultphrase, which would end the debate; the other would be to not agree with Goldberg (1991), in which case the next step forBroccias would be to prove that to one’s death is in fact a result phrase.

Instead of following the course of argumentation one might expect, however, Broccias (2013) is intent on attackingGoldberg’s (1991) metonymy account of to one’s death. Note that this is quite different from showing to one’s death to be aresult phrase. Logically, even if a metonymy analysis of to one’s death were incorrect (which concerns how the facts are to beanalyzed), it would be possible that to one’s death is not a result phrase (which concerns what the facts are). So Broccias wouldstill have to prove that to one’s death is indeed a result phase, anyway.

Broccias (2013) also claims that to one’s death may co-occur with jump because of the “tight link,” assuming that to one’sdeath is a result phrase. Therefore, what Broccias should have done is to first advance arguments proving that to one’s death isa result phrase, rather than simply assuming it. This would have lent at least slightly more credence to his “tight link”approach while also providing a logical basis for a disagreement with Goldberg (1991).

5.2. Iwata (2014)

Now Iwata (2014) arbitrates in this (pseudo-)debate which Broccias (2013) started (Note that it is Goldberg (1991), notIwata (2006), who originally advanced a metonymic account of to one’s death). Essentially, Iwata (2014) makes the followingtwo arguments. First, Broccias (2013) bases his “tight link” account on examples like (41) alone, for which this “tight link”concept might appear to be plausible.

(41)

The tyrant ordered them to jump to their death off the castle.

But there are many attested instances of to one’s death in which the motion is not causally related to one’s death. Thus in (42)neither walking nor going results in death. Rather, he walked or went to a place where his capital punishment was to beexecuted.

(42)

a. He walked to his death at Reading on 7 July 1896, the famous hangman Billingtonin charge of operations.

b.

Or did he go to his death in the anguished conviction that he was responsible for his master’s?(both from BNC)

Also, in (43a) Yugoslavs and Cossacks were sent to the battlefield; and in (43b) the Russian prisoners were handed to theconcentration camp where death awaited them.

(43)

a. . over a pamphlet accusing him of deliberately sending 70,000 Yugoslavs and Cossacks totheir death in 1945.

b.

If we hand the Russian prisoners back to their death, it will be the military authorities who do so, onmy instructions . (both from BNC)

Again, therefore, the physical motion in itself does not cause the death.

Goldberg (1991): “To one’s death is not a result phrase”

Broccias (2003): “To one’s death is a result phrase.”

Broccias admits his oversight.

Agreeing with Goldberg (1991). Not agreeing with Goldberg (1991).

To prove that to one’s death is a result phrase.

Fig. 8. The course of argumentation that Broccias should have taken.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 147

Note further that in the above examples there can be a time lag between reaching the place and dying. Thus in (42), onedoes not die the moment one arrives at the place of execution. The same is true of (43). In this sense, to one’s death signif-icantly departs from true result phrases: It is well-known in the literature on resultatives that “the change of state must occursimultaneously with the endpoint of the action denoted by the verb,” a constraint known as the Aspectual constraint inGoldberg (1995, p. 194). The only conclusion that can be safely drawn, therefore, is that to one’s death is not a result phrase.

But if to ones death is not a result phrase, what is it, then? Iwata (2014) argues that death, being a deverbal noun, reifies aprocess (i.e. die). The reified process as a whole stands for the place where one is presumed to die.

3 In B.

(Bro

The spatial location of a reified process is highlighted, yielding the interpretation “to a place where he is presumed todie.” In this sense, one’s death indeed metonymically stands for the place of his presumed death. (Iwata, 2014, p. 27)

Thus to one’s death indeed metonymically stands for the place where one is presumed to die, in accordance with Goldberg(1991).

Iwata (2014) thus brings back the “discussion” to the original course, and settles the matter in favor of Goldberg (1991).Given that to one’s death is not a result phrase, as Goldberg (1991) originally observes, to one’s death is outside the scope ofresultatives. What more could there be to discuss?

5.3. Running away from the problem

But Broccias (2014) goes astray from the original course (again). As just seen, the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn fromdata like (42) and (43) is that to one’s death is not a result phrase. Instead of admitting this, Broccias claims that “examplessuch as (42) do not bear on Broccias’s argument.”

But nowhere does Broccias (2013) claim that death is always the result of physical motion. Broccias (2013) just statesthat this is the case in [(41)] so that examples such as [(42)], whether causal or not, do not bear on Broccias’s argumentthat Goldberg’s/Iwata’s metonymic analysis cannot be maintained in [(41)]. (Broccias, 2014, p. 44)

The only possible way to make sense out of this passage is to suppose that according to Broccias, to one’s death is a resultphrase evincing a “tight link” when it accompanies fall or jump, but not when it appears with other motion verbs like go orwalk.

This might be justified if Broccias can successfully demonstrate that the to one’s death in (41) is different from the to one’sdeath in (42). In the absence of such a justification, Broccias is simply running away from data that he cannot handle.

5.4. A mistaken view of metonymy

Broccias (2013) argues against a metonymy account of to one’s death by citing (44).

rboc

(44)

occias’ (2th the mcias, 201

.the bomber instead chose to leap from the balcony’s rail to his death on the ground below. (web)

Broccias’ reasoning goes as follows: The metonymic source expression (i.e. to one’s death) and the metonymic targetexpression (e.g. on the ground) co-occur, so to one’s death cannot metonymically stand for the place.3

But thismakes sense only if one commits to a ‘substitution theory’ ofmetonymy.Metonymy is a general process bywhich alinguistic expression naming one entity A stands for another entity B. A substitution theory of metonymy holds that B issimply substituted for A, which entails that the denotation of a metonymic expression consists of B alone, to the exclusion ofA. Thus (45) should be identical in meaning to “A book written by Dickens is on the top shelf.”

(45)

Dickens in on the top shelf.

But metonymy does not consist of simple substitution. This point can be demonstrated by drawing upon the now classicwork on metaphor and metonymy, i.e. Lakoff and Johnson (1980). As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) observe, in (46) strong bodies,good heads, and new blood stand for strong people, intelligent people, and new people, respectively.

(46)

a.

013) oetony3, p. 4

We need a couple of strong bodies for our team. (¼strong people)

b. There are a lot of good heads in the university. (¼intelligent people) c. We need some new blood in the organization. (¼new people)

(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 36)

According to the substitution theory, then, bodies, heads, and blood, all of which metonymically stand for people, would becompletely identical in meaning. But of course this is absurd.

riginal exposition, ‘target’ and ‘source’ are confused:mic source expression (e.g. on the ground) and the metonymic target expression (e.g. to one’s death) may be expressed .

9, fb 29)

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151148

Whenwe say that we need some good heads on the project, we are using “good heads” to refer to “intelligent people.”The point is not just to use a part (head) to stand for awhole (person) but rather to pick out a particular characteristic ofthe person, namely, intelligence, which is associated with the head. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 36)

This is another way of saying that in cases of part-for-whole metonymy like (47), the part is not suppressed but is still in theconceptual scene.

The same is true of whole-for-part metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) go on to observe as follows:

When we say “The Times hasn’t arrived at the press conference yet,” we are using “The Times” not merely to refer tosome reporter or other but also to suggest the importance of the institution the reporter represents. (Lakoff andJohnson, 1980, pp. 36–37)

Again, the substitution theory is tantamount to claiming that the two sentences in (47) are identical in meaning.

(47)

a. The Times has not yet arrived for the press conference. b. Steve Roberts has not yet arrived for the press conference.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that this is not the case.

“The Times has not yet arrived for the press conference” means something different from “Steve Roberts has not yetarrived for the press conference,” even though Steve Roberts may be the Times reporter in question. (Lakoff andJohnson, 1980, pp. 36–37)

Thus, in both part-for-whole and whole-for-part metonymies, parts and wholes are present in conceptual scenes.Let us call the view held by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) a standard view. According to the standard view of metonymy, part-

for-whole metonymy and whole-for-part metonymy may be described as in Fig. 9.Both part and whole are present in conceptual scenes, as noted above. The difference between the two types of metonymy

resides in which is profiled.By contrast, the substitution theory of metonymy may be illustrated as in Fig. 10.What is designated is the whole alone or the part alone.It goes without saying that the standard view of metonymy is indeed standard among practitioners of Cognitive Lin-

guistics. Thus Langacker (2008) explicitly states that metonymy is essentially a matter of profiling:

Profiling figures crucially in the pervasive phenomenon known as metonymy. In a narrow sense, we can characterizemetonymy as a shift in profile. (Langacker, 2008, p. 69)

5.5. A metonymy account based on the standard view

Now the metonymic account of to one’s death as developed by Iwata (2014) is clearly built on the standard view. As seenabove, Iwata (2014) holds that being a reified process, death includes in its conception its spatial location. By highlighting thisspatial location, we can understand one’s death to mean the location of one’s death. At the same time, the reified process maybe modified by the on-PP as in (48).

(48)

In the dark, panic-stricken by what she’d done, she ran down the wrong passage, towards the seainstead of towards the land, slipped and fell to her death on the rocks below. (BNC)

This is exactly parallel to (49), where the temporal location of a reified process is highlighted, and the reified process ismodified by the in-PP.

(49)

J Edgar Hoover ran the Federal Bureau of Investigation for nearly 50 years, from 1924 tohis death in 1972. (BNC)

Thus Iwata’s (2014) point is that Broccias’ (2013) arguments against Goldberg’s (1991) metonymy analysis, which cruciallyrest on the substitution theory of metonymy, fall apart once one adopts the standard view of metonymy.

Iwata’s (2014) arguments are presented in such a way as to make this fundamental position clear enough. Thus Iwata(2014) identifies his metonymy account with a theory of ‘contextual modulation’ (Cruse, 1986; Taylor, 2003), according to

Fig. 9. Standard view of metonymy.

Fig. 10. Substitution theory of metonymy.

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151 149

which a part is simply highlighted, rather than selected. This is undoubtedly a kind of part-for-whole metonymy built on thestandard view.

Iwata (2014) also explicitly states that to one’s death does not express a location alone, and in fact presents evidence forstating so:

4 Act

I

ByBut

As a matter of fact, there is evidence that one’s death does not express a location pure and simple. First, death may bepluralized as in the following:

ua

n

ths

(50)

lly, the d

my view

is passagince Broc

a.

ifferen

, death

e Matcias (2

The two German tourists who fell to their deaths while on holiday on Skye have been crematedat a ceremony in Perth.

b.

The Valley Bridge, which links the South Cliff with the town centre, became notorious for peoplejumping to their deaths and, since 1970, 47 have died there.

c.

. the incorporation of wrought-iron latticework in the unglazed windows to prevent thelovelorn emulating their Latin counterparts by leaping to their deaths in the river. (all from BNC) (Iwata, 2014, p. 28)

Despite all these clear indications, however, Broccias completely fails to see Iwata’s point. Broccias (2014) is still not aware ofthis fact.

On the contrary, Broccias (2014) still seems to believe in his “arguments” against a metonymy account and reiterates themby citing Matsumoto’s (2013) following observation:

“if [to one’s death] means ‘to the place one dies’ one would expect one can say [(51a]), but this is unacceptable.

(51)

a. *He threw himself from the balcony to his death, the place later visited by many of his followers. b. He threw himself from the balcony to his death, a death that was sad to everyone.

(Matsumoto, 2013, p. 10)

Again, this makes sense only if one commits to the substitution theory of metonymy.4

Apparently, Broccias cannot understand metonymy other than in terms of the substitution theory.

Because clear-cut metonymic examples . should suppress the metonymic source in favour of the metonymic tar-get. (Broccias, 2014, p. 45)

But clear-cut metonymic examples should not suppress the metonymic source, as amply demonstrated above.It seems safe to say that few scholars familiar with Cognitive Linguistics would seriously commit to the substitution theory

of metonymy. Broccias turns out to be among those few.

5.6. Coercion

Lastly, let us turn to still another “argument” from Broccias (2014) against the metonymy account in Iwata (2014). As seenabove, Iwata (2014) claims that in (52) the on-PP is a modifier of to his death.

(52)

.the bomber instead chose to leap from the balcony’s rail to his death on the ground below. (web)

Broccias (2014) claims that the on-PP cannot be a modifier of one’s death, for the on-PP may occur evenwithout to one’s deathas in (54).

(53)

She fell to her death on the rocks below.

(54)

She fell on the rocks below.

ce between Matsumoto (2013) and Iwata (2014) is practically terminological. Matsumoto (2013) concludes as follows:

in this phrase represents an event of dying, and to indicates the participation in this event. (Matsumoto, 2013)

sumoto clearly means that death is a reified process, in accordance with Iwata (2014).014) holds that to one’s death is a result phrase, his claim is actually at odds with Matsumoto (2013).

S. Iwata / Language Sciences 45 (2014) 135–151150

Broccias (2014) simply fails to see that the on-PP in (52) and that in (54) function differently. The on-PP in (54) is a case ofcoercion. It has been observed in recent years (Thomas, 2004; Nikitina, 2008; Beavers et al., 2010; among others) that locativeprepositions may receive a goal interpretation, as in (55a) and (55b)

(55)

a. John walked in the room. b. Kim jumped on the bed. (Beavers et al., 2010, p. 363)

According to Beavers et al. (2010, p. 363), locative phrases are understood as goals precisely in those contexts that allow areader or hearer to infer that a goal interpretation is intended. Thus a goal interpretation is available if John is standing justoutside the room in (55a) and if Kim is standing next to the bed in (55b).

As amatter of fact, it is not rare for locative prepositions to receive a goal interpretation. Thus verbs like drop, fall, and sit, allof which lexically incorporate downward movement, are often accompanied by the on-PP, in addition to the onto-PP.

(56)

a. Out of the corner of my eye I watched him wipe himself with Kleenex tissues and drop themon the floor, indifferent to the smears of blood on them.

b.

He finishes the cigarette, drops the butt onto the floor and mashes it into the carpet slowly.(both from BNC)

(57)

a. Bits of mud fell on the floor. b. He bit through the frond; half of it fell onto the floor. (both from BNC)

(58)

a. A small, fair woman came into the lounge, picked up an embroidery frame from the table, turneda chair away from the television, sat on the chair and began to sew.

b.

. so that he sits down onto the chair. (both from BNC)

This is probably because what undergoes downward movement is practically guaranteed by the working of gravity to land onthe ground, i.e. reach the goal. Clearly, the on-PP in (54),which accompanies the verb fall, is to be assimilated to these instances.

By contrast, the on-PP in (52) cannot be an instance of coercion. Note that in (52) from appears, which is an explicit markerof source and therefore needs to be matched with an explicit marker of goal (i.e. to or onto).

(59)

a. *.the bomber instead chose to leap from the balcony’s rail on the ground below. b. .the bomber instead chose to leap from the balcony’s rail to/onto the ground below.

Accordingly, the on-PP in (52) is interpretable only as a modifier of his death.Once again, therefore, what Broccias (2014) presents as an argument against Iwata (2014) actually reveals that he is not

paying enough attention to the data.

5.7. Interim conclusion

Iwata (2014) adduces evidence that to one’s death is not a result phrase, and further gives substance to the claim byshowing that to one’s death indeedmetonymically stands for the placewhere one is presumed to die. And all the arguments sofar in this section confirm that Iwata (2014) is indeed correct. In this sense, all the arguments in this section, as well as those inIwata (2014), concerning to one’s death can be said to be advanced for the sole purpose of keeping to the original agenda(determining whether to one’s death is a result phrase or not).

If Broccias is still convinced that his account remains defensible, he should devote his energy specifically to the crucialpoint on which this debate truly hands: proving that to one’s death is a result phrase.

6. Conclusion

Neither Broccias (2013) nor Broccias (2014) counts as a reply to the original issues raised in Iwata (2006) or Iwata (2014):All the arguments from Iwata (2006) remain practically unchallenged by Broccias’ “arguments,” which are based on loosereasoning and serious misunderstandings, so there is no need for prolonging debate. Nevertheless, Broccias (2013, 2014)indulges in just such an endeavor, going further and further astray from the original issues and unfortunately hinderingrather than promoting a better understanding of resultatives.

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my gratitude to Tony Higgins, who acted as an informant and suggested stylistic improvements.Thanks are also due to Fred Anderson andMary Noguchi for acting as informants. This work is financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), No. 25370558, 2013–2015 from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

References

Beavers, J., Levin, B., Weitham, S., 2010. The typology of motion expressions revisited. J. Linguist. 46, 331–377.Broccias, C., 2003. The English Change Network: Forcing Changes into Schemas. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin & New York.

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