Globalization and the Sovereign State:

Authority and Territoriality Reconsidered

Stephen Paul Haigh

University of Otago

Department of Political Studies

Refereed paper presented to the

First Oceanic International Studies Conference

Australian National University, Canberra

14-16 July 2004

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Introduction

Widespread processes of global transformation are having a profound but

incompletely understood effect on states, and on the structure, configuration and

assumptions of the international state system as a whole. Most of the literature tends to

view the relationship between globalization and the state as inherently antagonistic or even

zero sum: as the forces of globalization increase, the power of the state erodes away, physical

boundaries become porous and ultimately meaningless, domestic economies fall prey to a

neo-liberal global trade and financial architecture, and national cultures and identities are

threatened by a tidal wave of external images, symbols, and desires. The result is a turbulent

mix of integration and fragmentation, with the state losing ground to either retrenched local

bodies based on narrowly conceived parochial ties, or to transnational actors with

universalising imperatives.

This (simplistically drawn) account misses the crucial fact that globalization and the

state are interdependent and mutually constitutive. Clearly, states act in response to

globalizing forces, but in so doing they set many of the parameters within which

globalization occurs -- and of course, much of globalization has been conceived and

initialized by states in the first place. In what follows I set out to analyze a crucial aspect of

the state/globalization relationship, namely, the way in which the notion and practice of

state sovereignty is affected by -- and affects -- the forces and processes of globalization1.

My approach is as follows. In Section One I examine the nature of sovereignty itself. What

1 This paper forms part of a doctoral thesis. As such it makes occasional reference to and partially relies upon other sections of the broader work. In consequence certain assumptions are made here that may appear untested. Chief among these are the characterization and meaning(s) of globalization, which in this article I take as given.

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does the concept really mean? Does it refer to substantive capacity, to juridical status, or to

some combination of the two? Is it absolute, or relative? Ultimately, is sovereignty still

relevant to discussions of the state in an ostensibly globalizing world?

Having concluded that sovereignty is in fact a matter of degree, and that it is flexible

enough to accommodate changes in the capacity and functions of the state without thereby

losing its substantive core, I proceed with an analysis of sovereignty across two vital

dimensions: authority and territoriality. In Section Two, I suggest that under conditions of

globalization sovereign authority is being redrawn, not lost. Paradoxically, the state often

yields authority (or presides over its redistribution) as a way of demonstrating it. Section

Three addresses the impact of globalizing forces on the notion of territoriality. To what

extent can the “hard-shelled” version of sovereign statehood be reconciled with global

political, economic and social trends? Does the porosity of borders lead to a commensurate

erosion of sovereignty, or, inasmuch as states participate in the acknowledgment and

institutionalization of this increasing ‘unboundedness’, can they actually help to further their

own interests? I argue that in order to protect what borders symbolize, it is possible, indeed

necessary, to loosen or open them up. Finally, by way of conclusion I assert that sovereignty

in the age of globalization is alive and well. The flexible and adaptive state looks set to

continue its role as central player in global politics.

Section One: Sovereignty in a Globalizing Age

The state has perhaps no greater function than the provision of sovereignty.

Sovereignty puts the state in an unassailable position -- reciprocally with respect to its equals

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abroad and absolutely with respect to its citizens at home. But sovereign immunity comes at

a price. The right of sovereignty generates for the state an attendant responsibility for

security: the security of its territorial boundaries both as intrinsic good and as precondition

for the physical, economic and cultural security of its citizens. Sovereignty and security are

thus the sine qua non of the state; and if globalization makes sovereignty an empty or

irrelevant concept then it also undermines the idea of the state as a political necessity.2

But to set globalization off against sovereignty is to miss or misunderstand the point.

In previous sections I have been referring to sovereignty in its pure or absolute form: the

sovereign has a monopoly on the means of violence and (uniquely) holds a place above the

law, immune to interference. With appropriate caveats, this definition does useful service in

descriptions of the Westphalian system, but globalization serves to expose its shortcomings.3

It highlights the need for a more nuanced and sophisticated analysis, one that better reflects

the changes wrought by globalizing forces on the sovereignty problematique.

Before proceeding, therefore, I will sketch out a revised or updated model of

sovereignty. Note first that sovereignty has both formal and substantive dimensions. At the

2 And yet there is also the counterargument that sovereignty is assisted or pushed along or enhanced by globalization: “One of the most remarkable features of the twentieth century is the globalization of independent – or sovereign – statehood.” Jackson, R. H. and James, A., “The Character of Independent Statehood,” in Jackson, R.H. and James, A. (eds.), States in a Changing World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 3. Having a sovereign state of one’s own “remains a powerful definition of what it means to be free and to be in control of one’s destiny … [it continues] to be the most meaningful definition of a people, and the best sign that they are recognized and respected by others.” Ibid; p. 11. This important reminder only serves to emphasize the interconnectedness of globalization and the state – and to cast further doubt on those who would have these two phenomena opposed. 3 To be sure, these shortcomings were recognized and debated long before the contemporary phase of globalization. States (and other actors) have always influenced the behaviour of other states, such influence falling somewhere between reasoned persuasion at one pole, and coercive force at the other. There has always been a tension between sovereign entitlement and effective political control. My claim is that globalization brings these issues into more urgent focus, which necessitates a more detailed and robust treatment of the sovereignty concept.

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extreme, this means that a state might have complete (juridical) authority along with absolute

lack of (substantive) control. The typical case is far less dramatic, suggesting only that “the

concept of sovereignty does not carry with it the clear expectation that sovereign actors have

the capacities to carry out [all of the] functions of rule, but affirms that they are recognized

as having the right to do so without undue let or hindrance from other state actors.”4

Fundamentally, the doctrine of sovereign equality means equal right, not equal capability.

This dualistic notion of sovereignty has the virtue of accommodating changes -- at the

formal-legal level, as well as with regard to the state’s ability to exercise effective authority in

its various functional areas -- without having to abandon the concept altogether once

sovereign power is diluted, reinterpreted, or undergoes some form of redistribution.

Sovereignty, in other words, is a matter of degree. According to James Rosenau it

“needs to be viewed as a continuous rather than as a dichotomous variable.”5 Rosenau goes

on to posit a sovereignty continuum, ranging from “convenience-of-state” at one end, to

“states-are-obliged-to-go-along” at the other. Thus conceived, sovereignty is a function of

four sets of determinants (situational, domestic, international and legal), which combine in

highly complex permutations to create a sovereignty “value” corresponding to a specific

location on the continuum.6 Anchoring Rosenau’s formulation is a convincing rationale:

that under conditions of globalization, sovereignty is pervaded by and embedded within

dynamic, constantly iterative, turbulent political processes, and that, just as these processes

translate into movement by states into new positions along the continuum, so too does the

fixing of new positions trigger further turbulent processes that unsettle and then relocate

4 Axford, B., The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture, (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 136-137. 5 Rosenau, J., “Sovereignty in a Turbulent World,” in Lyons, G.M. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltmiore: Johns Hopkins, 1995), p. 195. 6 Ibid; pp. 195-199.

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sovereignty, almost ad infinitum, at further points up and down the line. “Each increment of

diminished (or enhanced) sovereignty,” he says, “may alter the global context and thereby

pave the way for subsequent increments.”7

At any rate, Rosenau believes that, overarching the wave-like movement of increase

and decline, there is a general and expanding trend away from sovereignty as convenience-

of-state. Backed by increasingly skilled and politically sophisticated individuals and groups,

by widespread crises of authority, and by the bifurcation of global structures into “a multi-

centric world of diverse, relatively autonomous actors,” states must increasingly share center

stage (while, notably, still occupying it), since “they are faced with the new task of coping

with disparate rivals from another world as well as with challenges posed by counterparts in

their own world.”8 Adopting Rosenau’s more finely tuned model allows us to examine his

contentions. How are the sovereignty functions of the state transformed by forces of

globalization?

Section Two: Sovereignty as Authority

Sovereignty is bound up in two distinct yet overlapping conceptual dimensions:

authority and territoriality. Taking authority first, a revealing comparison can be made

between the state in an international world, and the state under globalization.9 Returning to

the notion that sovereignty contains both formal and substantive elements, it is easy to see

how the rising number of economic, political and other transactions comprising

7 Ibid;. p. 197. 8 Ibid; p. 210. 9 For a detailed distinction between nationality-internationality and globality, see Shaw, M., Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution, (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).

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internationalization leads inexorably to increasing interdependence, which by definition

entails a certain loss of state autonomy. In other words, it is easy to postulate an erosion of

substantive sovereign capacity. Under conditions of interdependence the state is to a greater

degree than before constrained in its ability to make domestic policy or to act independently

on the international stage.10 But autonomy -- the possession of effective, substantive control

-- is only one variable in the calculus of sovereignty, and it is not the crucial one. First, at no

time in the history of the state has autonomy been complete. Absolute power is a myth.

Second, autonomy is not the same as authority.11 At its core, authority is embodied in the

formal-legal dimension of sovereignty, which gives the latter its deeper historical meaning.

And so, if sovereignty is “the recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the

exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory,” then there is a strong

sense in which the international regime of interdependent states has actually relied on

sovereign authority to flourish.12 Curiously, under conditions of internationalization

10 Krasner, for one, questions this assertion. He suggests that “political and economic development has made it generally easier for States to finance their activities,” so that “the basic long-term trend has been one in which States have become less dependent on the external environment.” Krasner, S., “Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood,” in Jackson, R.H. and James, A. (eds.), States in a Changing World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993), p. 314. The net effect is one in which “state control has actually increased over the long term: de facto sovereignty has been strengthened rather than weakened.” Ibid, p. 318. Nonetheless, Krasner hedges his arguments, particularly when he addresses international capital flows, macroeconomic policies, and other such “global interactions,” which he distinguishes from earlier periods of internationalization. Ibid; pp. 318-319. Furthermore, the majority of interdependence theorists would disagree. 11 The distinction is summed up by Hinsley, who says that to argue from a decline in states’ freedom of manoeuver is to “associate the attribute of sovereignty with the possession by the state of freedom to act as it chooses instead of with the absence over and above the state of a superior authority.” Hinsley, F.H., Sovereignty, 2nd. Edn., (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), p. 226. 12 The quote, with emphasis added, is from Thompson, J.E., “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol 39, No.2, 1995, p. 219. She calls it a “working definition … with which most theorists would not take (serious) issue.” Ibid, p. 219. As for reliance on juridical sovereignty, the latter has been proposed as the instrument that best protects the overarching international legal structure for property rights on which interdependence rests (Camilleri, J.A. and Falk, J., The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992, p. 25). More generally, the interdependent state benefits from and thus is strengthened by its (authoritative) support of economic, scientific and technological advance (Jackson, R. H. and James, A. “The Character of Independent Statehood,” p. 6). Finally, from the fact that “weak states” have looked to and insisted upon legal sovereignty as the only real guarantor of political survival, we can infer that until recently at least, the institution of formal authority has been considered the ultimate buttress of the system. See Linklater, A. and MacMillan, J. (eds.), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, (Pinter: London, 1995).

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sovereignty-as-capacity is diminished at the same time as juridical sovereignty is confirmed --

in which case, where it does not actually enhance sovereign authority, interdependence

leaves it firmly intact.

Globalization, however, is a more invasive and destabilizing phenomenon. Not only

does it signal heightened interconnectedness, but it encroaches into those formal-legal

aspects of sovereignty that secure or tie down authority in the first instance, and benefit

from it in the second. In other words, the transnational connections inherent in

globalization are significant on a qualitative as well as a quantitative level.13 But what new

patterns of authority are emerging here?

It is said of sovereignty that there is plenty of it around, but that as a result of

globalization “the sites for its concentration have changed.”14 According to this argument

states are being forced to concede certain of their sovereign powers to regional, transnational

or world bodies on one hand, and to local and other sub-national institutions on the other.

While there is clear empirical evidence to support this claim, it must be borne in mind that

the delegation of power ‘away’ from the state is authorized, and that the authorizing body is

still and always the state. So, what might appear at first blush as an unalloyed erosion of

state competence becomes on closer inspection a more modest “extension of a ‘constituted’

exception to sovereignty”15 at state behest.

13 See Williams, M., “Rethinking Sovereignty,” in Kofman, E. and Youngs, G. (eds.) Globalization: Theory and Practice, (Pinter: London, 1996), p. 118. 14 Sassen, S., Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, (New York: City Press, 1996), p. 30. 15 Clark, I., Globalization and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 83.

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This exception can be categorized. Authority works on two levels, the first

conventionally understood, the second at one remove. The latter has been referred to as

“meta-political” authority, because it resides in the power to decide what issues, activities

and practices ought to be classified as political in the first place, and because it carries a

corresponding power to delegate or assign both political and designated non-political

matters to appropriate forums of choice.16 The fact that for more than three hundred years

exceptions to sovereign authority have been limited to state-authorized exceptions means

that the state retains full meta-political authority and has been in this regard inviolate. You might

say that the state yields its authority as a way of demonstrating it.

This is not just a matter of semantics. To the contrary, the idea that removing state

authority from particular issue areas amounts to little more than a forced consequence of

globalization’s corrosive action can with some justification be turned on its head: voluntary

withdrawal, in which the state confers part of its power onto, say, a transnational body such

as the World Trade Organization, can be legitimately construed as a necessary precondition

for globalization, which would flounder without precisely this kind of purposive assistance

from the state.17 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that when the state retreats from

one domain, it often advances in another -- and that such ebbs and flows are causally

16 For a more detailed examination of meta-political authority, see Thompson, J. E., “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research.” 17 See the discussion in Clark, I. Globalization and International Relations Theory, p. 86. Another noteworthy effect of giving authority away is that it can actually serve the narrower interests of states. Krasner points out how Westphalian leaders “chose to surrender their control over religion because it proved too volatile,” thus illustrating the axiom that “effective control can be enhanced by walking away from issues [states] cannot resolve.” Krasner, S., “Sovereignty: History of the Concept,” Foreign Policy, January 2001, p. 24.

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related.18 Authority changes sites, but only conditionally; and then typically the state either

establishes the conditions or sets the guidelines around which those conditions are met.

In spite of all this, it might still be argued that, inasmuch as the sovereign state

system exists for the purposes of stability and order, transferring authority to a proliferating

number of non-state actors can only undermine stability and order in the long run. By

giving control away, the state jeopardizes the health of its environment. The common form

of this assertion relates to so-called external instability: as state authority decreases, inter-

state anarchy grows. But the idea that anarchy prevails outside while sovereign authority

reigns inside is fallacious from the start. Anarchy within states is often rife; whereas

relatively speaking the international order is … orderly.19 More to the point, the effects of

ceding authority, either to the “outside” or the “inside,” are not zero-sum. Received wisdom

suggests that declining authority corresponds to increasing anarchy, but there is no hard

evidence to support this claim. In fact, it seems more likely that loosening the strings of

conventional (as opposed to meta-political) authority might actually serve to reduce the

overall potential for anarchy because it defuses tensions, forestalls antagonisms, and

generally opens up the democratic process -- which is to say that anarchy and authority

might commonly move in the same direction, not inversely.20 That being the case, we can

now understand how the state might wish to transfer authority in the first place. If the

18 For example, in the United States economic decision-making authority is being relegated to the market at the same time as state intrusion into private life “is reaching astonishingly high levels.” Thompson, J. E., “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” p. 224. The state vacates traditional roles only to occupy new ones. 19 In the period from 1900-1987, governments murdered almost 170 million of their citizens, whereas ‘only’ 34 million people died in all interstate wars. Falconer, B., “Murder by the State,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 292, No. 4, January 2003, pp. 56-57. 20 Clark suggests that the weakening of sovereignty occurs alongside the weakening of anarchy, and that “both dilute each other to some degree.” Clark, I., Globalization and International Relations Theory, p. 87.

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outcome was increased anarchy, why would the state abdicate control? Why would it preside

over its own decline?

Indeed, given the helpful distinction between conventional and meta-political

authority the danger seems spurious. Globalization exerts (self-imposed as well as

unanticipated) pressures on the state, which is forced to adapt. Part of that process involves

a redistribution of conventional authority to other bodies, in accordance with the meta-

political authority that remains vested in the state. To be sure, the state may in consequence

have less direct power. Its sovereign capacity might diminish. Essentially however, it retains

its position as the central actor in the system.21 The state continues to rule, albeit with a

lighter hand.

Section 3: Sovereignty as Territoriality

In the traditional view, states are not truly states unless they have clearly defined

boundaries. These boundaries help constitute a hard shell, without which the state would be

fatally exposed. In exalting “the political independence and territorial integrity” of the state,

for example, the U.N. Charter hints at the relationship between territoriality and political

viability, and serves to confirm the suspicion that allegiance to authority or at least 21 For Hirst and Thompson, the state is still the “crucial relay between the international level of governance and the articulate publics of the developed world.” Hirst, P. and Thompson, G., Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 191. Ikenberry likens it to a “bi-directional valve” that responds to pressure by releasing it onto various sub- or supra-state entities so as to reinforce its vitality. Ikenberry, G. J., “The State and Strategies of International Adjustment,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1986, p. 76. Robert Cox has a different view: he speaks of the state as a “transmission belt” that conveys external norms and pressures onto citizens. States are thus reduced to “agencies of the globalizing world” (quoted in Scholte, J.A., “The Globalization of World Politics,” in Baylis, P. and Smith, S. (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 15) and have largely been emasculated. I do not share this view, in part because Cox’s analysis is marked by unresolved tensions between the idea of state as puppet, and that of hegemonic states such as the U.S.A., whose colossal power dominates all other actors.

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compliance with it is ultimately compelled not by religion or tribe or ethnicity or even

nationality, but by the brute fact of residence inside a legally recognized and delimited

geographical space.22 But to call these ideas “traditional” is misleading, since they are

historically unique; for at no time have physical territory and sovereign jurisdiction been so

tightly woven together as during the era of the modern state, where they become mutually

inextricable. By way of contrast, in the medieval era sovereign rule was more a question of

clan or tribal affiliation: leaders typically exercised authority not over borders but over

members of closely knit collectives. Obviously these kinship communities occupied physical

space, but this was never the defining characteristic of power. The case of nomadic tribes,

whose claims to territorial sovereignty varied with the seasons or with changing trade routes,

exemplifies the difference. Yet even in the settled and sedentary relations between lord and

peasant in which jurisdiction over manors and lands was more tangible, strong territoriality

was never a prominent feature. First, boundaries were vague and ill-defined, often no more

than “floating zones” made up of buffers, protectorates, trusteeships, suzerainties or neutral

spaces that served as mechanisms for keeping the peace.23 Second, we have seen how

medieval rule was highly segmented, how it was shared or disputed by multiple and

overlapping authorities. Under these circumstances the feudal political structure could

hardly have been built upon the foundations of unambiguously divided territory.

22 This is a paraphrase of Philpott, D., “Westphalia, Authority, and International Society,” in Jackson, R. H. (ed.) Sovereignty at the Millenium, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 148. For Spruyt, individuals in the modern state are “in a sense amorphous and undifferentiated entities;” thus “one must make Acquitanians, Normans and Bretons into French people.” Spruyt, H., The Sovereign State and its Competitors, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 35. Jackson states that according to convention a people does not determine the sovereignty of territory; rather territory defines and delimits the sovereign jurisdiction of a people. Jackson, R. H., “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape,” in Jackson, R.H. (ed.), Sovereignty at the Millenium, p. 24. 23 See Kratochwil, F., “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the States System,” World Politics, Vol. 39, October 1986, p.36.

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Given therefore that strong territoriality is historically contingent -- or more

accurately, unprecedented -- it should come as no surprise that novel and complex forces of

globalization might in turn call these ‘traditional’ or state-based ideas of territoriality into

question. Because the literature associated with this issue is so vast -- and the assertions in

favour of “supraterritoriality” within it so common as to be almost trite -- it is neither

possible nor desirable at this point to present anything more than a brief and perhaps

incomplete summary of the familiar claims. With that in mind, I shall give a concise but (I

hope) representative overview, followed by a few critical observations in which I maintain

that conventional arguments in favour of declining territorial significance tend to miss the

point.

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3.1: The Deterritorialist View

First, perhaps, among novel forces of globalization is the transnationalization of

trade, production and finance, which singly and in concert are said to make borders porous

and so effectively meaningless. If multi- and trans-national corporations have no need of

physical bases; if factories (and labour) can be effortlessly relocated offshore to minimize

production costs; and if massive amounts of “footloose capital” can move from one country

to another at light speed; then geographical boundaries are of little or no consequence in

matters of economic life – which is to say that, insofar as we are meant to be a species of

homo economicus, territory no longer counts.24

An important corollary to this set of arguments relates to the functional advantages

that have traditionally accrued to economies based in and upon place. In the main,

economic activity and investment have only been possible through the evolution of an

intricate system of legal rights, which in turn contain political guarantees for the maintenance

of those property relations essential to overall capitalist development. Historically, such

rights and guarantees have been strictly coterminous with and dependent upon the rise of

the territorial state.25 But if the broad regime of rules, regulations, and institutions that

enabled nationally based economies to flourish has now been successfully transplanted onto

24 Of course, we cannot so easily be reduced to economic animals. Moreover and aside from this, “‘economic sovereignty’ is a conflation of two different concepts that are best kept in separate compartments if we wish to be clear.” There is sovereignty, and there is economic autonomy, and the relation is contingent, not conceptual. Jackson, R.H., “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape,” p. 10. 25 In giving a detailed account of this lockstep process, Spruyt shows how states based on strict control over territory were better able than their contemporaries (specifically, the Hanseatic League and the Italian city-states) to effect the sorts of policies that conduced to economic growth, the accumulation of capital, and the general consolidation of the state system. See Spruyt, H., The Sovereign State and its Competitiors, especially Chapter 8.

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the global stage -- and if state economies are now integrally related to the global structures of

production and exchange that rest on this newly transplanted apparatus -- then strong

territoriality in economic production is destined to wither away.

Second amongst forces acting against territory is technological innovation and its

direct effect on human consciousness. Most significantly, the rise and rapid proliferation of

worldwide electronic communications and global media have led to what many perceive as a

novel form of psychological delocation. When Nelson Mandela becomes more familiar than

your neighbour, then rootedness gives way to a kind of detachment or deracination, in which

everyplace is our place (or, in cases where local culture is buckling under the stress of distant

influences, their place), so that the idea of border as a sort of cultural fence no longer has any

force. Notably, this phenomenon is closely associated with dramatic increases in the ease of

international travel: the more people can freely move about, the less likely they are to

acknowledge the significance of borders, or to deeply identify with the concept of bounded

space.26

Third, economic and technological forces like those touched on above give rise to

second-order global processes with significant territorial implications of their own. As

global industry, commerce and traffic extends, quickens and intensifies, so too do trans-

border health and environmental problems, which by definition pay no respect to lines on

the map. Traditional or domestically driven attempts to grapple with disease and

environmental degradation are thus wrongheaded from the start. Inasmuch as they suggest

“an image of global civil society artificially partitioned into national communities which are 26 Most of the world’s people cannot move freely about. However, those who can increasingly do, and this activity contributes to the common consciousness that lies at the heart of globalization.

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thereby insulated from the global co-operation needed to prevent the rapid deterioration of

their global environment,”27 they are doomed to failure. AIDS and greenhouse gases, say,

are amenable to effective solutions only in the measure that geographical and political

boundaries are set aside. Attempts to rope territory off against these novel threats are not

only futile but dangerously counterproductive.

Fourth, just as borders no longer make perfect sense in terms of disease and the

environment, they seem not to offer much hope in the fight against global crime and terror.

When and wherever the state had a monopoly on the means of coercive force, strict

territorial delimitation had a powerful attendant logic. Violence within state boundaries was

either violence perpetrated by the bounded state itself -- in which case norms of sovereign

independence gave it full sanction -- or came as a result of intervention by some other state,

which was then answerable to those same norms as they applied to the sanctity of state

boundaries, namely, to prohibitions against extraterritorial interference. Globalization,

however, has engendered substantial growth in what might be called “private, coercive

activities”28 conducted by increasingly sophisticated sub- or non-state organizations having

recourse to increasingly destructive levels of force. As recent terrorist activity has shown,

many of these groups have no allegiance to borders and are not much hampered by them.

Under such conditions it is becoming clear that, “far from delineating the domain within

which state sovereignty is exercised, [state boundaries] represent instead a porous membrane

through which both state and nonstate actors formulate their policies and conduct their

27 Camilleri, J. A. and Falk, J., The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, p. 58. 28 Thompson, J. E., “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” p. 229.

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transactions.”29 For many -- particularly those in the Realist school -- states arose and grew

to dominate precisely because they were able to maintain exclusive control over force,

coercion and organized violence. Arguably, those singular powers lay at the core of the state

system and provided it with its deepest de facto rationale. If such power could be successfully

challenged -- if territory could no longer be effectively policed -- then the state could no

longer legitimately claim to be master of its own house.

International crime and terror illustrate in microcosm the problems of territorial

security in a globalizing world, but a much broader security issue arises out of radical

advances in military technology and subsequent attempts to manage them by way of new

institutional arrangements. In this regard, it is safe to say that the advent of nuclear weapons

has diluted both the logic and the political force of territorial demarcation, for nuclear arms

have “dramatically extinguished the boundaries between destruction and the destroyer.”30

What does a border mean, when the sovereign who ostensibly controls it is in fact heavily

reliant on the continued sanity of his opponent(s)?31 The connection between the

acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and the formalization of the Cold War lies

beyond the scope of this thesis, but there is no doubt that one of the institutional offspring

of that linkage -- to wit, collective security -- constitutes an assault on some of the key

principles underlying territorial division. Reduced to its essence, the argument is circular but

forceful. By its potential to render territory absolutely irrelevant, nuclear weaponry made a

29 Camilleri, J. A. and Falk, J., The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World, p. 166. 30 Weiss, T. G. and Chopra, J., “Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian Space,” in Lyons, G. M. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995), p. 97. From (at least) the security point of view, this makes the concept of MAD seem quite absurd. 31 Addressing this question, Harknett interprets Herz’s thesis as concluding that “[s]tate territoriality in a nuclear context becomes a misnomer.” Harknett, R. J., “Territoriality in the Nuclear Era,” in Kofman, E. and Youngs, G. (eds.), Globalization: Theory and Practice, p. 142.

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necessity, or at least a perceived necessity, out of collective security. Now, collective security

is nothing more than the formal realization and acknowledgement that we share a common

fate. Or again, it is the structural and institutional concretization of what might be called the

‘territorial irrelevance potential’ of the bomb. Boundaries set us apart; nuclear weapons

trump boundaries; collective security is entailed; the meaning of boundaries is thereby

diminished. The bomb poses an institutional problem whose solution is corrosive of

territorial demarcation. The fallout, if you will, is that states seem to lose ground.

Of course, the Cold War was at least as much an expression of political and

ideological division as it was about the capacity of nuclear weapons to erase the meaning of

borders. But paradoxically, the territorially based Eastern and Western blocs that served as a

physical reflection of those ideological divisions were themselves damaging to the territorial

principle:

Each bloc consisted of a complex network of bilateral and multilateral agreements governing the establishment and operation of military bases, the stationing of troops, combined military exercises, weapons procurement and the adoption of joint conventional and nuclear strategies. These agreements, concluded between seemingly sovereign entities, in effect constituted the legal instrument used by the dominant powers to intrude inside the boundaries of their allies.32

Since these blocs are no longer extant, it would be unwise to infer too much from their

relatively brief appearance.33 Of undeniable importance, however, has been their legacy: an

ever-expanding latticework of transnational cooperation whose continuing elaboration

32 Camilleri, J. A. and Falk, J., The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World, pp. 142-143. 33 In arguing this way I am aware that forces and processes attributable to the Cold War are not identical with those of globalization. As Shaw notes, distinctions between these two “narratives of transition” are possible -- but it is less than abundantly clear what they are; at the very least it must be fair to say that Cold War blocs are inexplicable without reference to globalizing forces. See Shaw, M., Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution.

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constitutes the deepest and most meaningful challenge yet mounted to Westphalian-style

territorial norms and practices.34

The rise of this complex transnational web of institutions, regimes, agreements and

understandings is the last of the “supraterritorial” or “deterritorializing” forces I shall list

here -- and I do so only to defer detailed analysis to a later chapter. Clearly, the transnational

institutional bulwark that is growing up through and around Shaw’s common consciousness

of world society has the greatest potential of all to call borders into question; for under its

auspices sanctions and interventions in the name of universal human rights are coming to

rival sovereign territorial independence as the prescriptive norm that underpins or ought to

underpin the political actions of states. For the purpose of my thesis, this means that the

issue is better addressed under the rubric of norms, identity and culture. Suffice it to say

here that globalizing forces of this kind are tending to recast security in terms of people, not

territory, which means that territory can no longer be thought of as sacrosanct.

3.2: Counterarguments to the Deterritorialist View

It seems to me that arguments for the radical erosion of territory are misleading in a

number of ways, and can either be sidestepped or finessed. In summarizing the most

common assertions, I have suggested that globalization allegedly exerts significant and

deleterious effects on the status of territory through economics (trade, production and

34 It is only superficially strange that this multialteral framework could originate in the antagonistic climate of the Cold War; in fact there is no better catalyst to cooperative exercise than the threat of destruction on a colossal scale. Indeed, there is broad agreement amongst students of international relations that Cold War conflict management lies behind the accelerated growth of cooperative international institutions in the post-WWII period. See in particular the works of Ruggie and Jervis in this regard.

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finance); electronic communications (mass media) and travel; disease and environmental

degradation; and finally through a broad spectrum of security issues that include transborder

crime and terror, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the rise of transnational regimes in

which principles of collective security on one hand, and individual rights on the other, are

leading to the obsolescense of territoriality and as a result, of sovereign statehood. These

arguments contain flaws, to which I now turn.

To properly frame the issue, a few general observations apply. First of all, with

regard to the Westphalian system I have already noted the (largely unquestioning, mostly

unquestioned) tendency in the literature to conflate state and place. Historically the

assumption has been that all matters incorporated within its boundaries must be the

exclusive preserve of the state. This might be called a Westphalian first principle, or

orthodoxy. But if we focus instead on state functions -- on the role of the state as producer

and provider of a comprehensive range of social goods -- then a different picture emerges.

In this light, notions of “state as country,” in which physical boundaries are the inflexible

referents of political community, can be discarded in favour of the idea of “state as

organization,” wherein emphasis on territory is reduced to levels that more realistically

accord with the complex, mutually constitutive interplay between state structures and the

myriad forces of globalization. Boundaries still matter, but in a globalizing world especially,

they are more fluid and accommodating than the traditional model warrants. 35 Seen through

this lens, erosion or porosity of borders is much less threatening to the integrity of the state,

35 See Brown, R., “Globalization and the End of the National Project,” in Linklater, A. and MacMillan, J. (eds.), Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, (Pinter: London, 1995), p. 63.

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since it is only when boundaries are deemed sacred that demonstrations of their permeability

can undermine the faith.36

A second observation flows on from the first. While I would say that strong

territoriality is exclusive to portraits of the Westphalian system and ought now to be cast

aside, it certainly does not follow that territory plays little part in politics or political

organization per se. For example, to maintain as I do that bounded physical space was never

the defining characteristic of political power in medieval times, is not to say that it didn’t

matter. All political communities “express and nurture a certain attachment to territory,”37

and this remains true despite significant historical variation in the structure and intensity of

that attachment and the political form it takes. The key factor, surely, is the extent to which

political structures can tolerate and absorb threats to territorial control or independence

while remaining fully viable.

Oddly, enough, we need look no further than Westphalia for illustrations of how

hard-shelled territoriality is often honoured in the breach. Over the last three-and-a-half

centuries there have been numerous occasions in which a state’s territorial integrity has been

“persistently challenged … [by] rebels, terrorists, criminal organizations, and private

corporations … yet the state’s sovereignty was not questioned.”38 Is American sovereignty

any less secure because the state is conspicuously absent from south-central Los Angeles?

What about Northern Ireland for the British? Or repeated military interventions into Third

36 To the contrary, globalization makes it much easier to see that “extraterritoriality was developed as a necessary part of a state system, and is fully compatible with sovereignty.” Clark, I., Globalization and International Relations Theory, p. 84. 37 Camilleri, J. A. and Falk, J. The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World, p. 141. 38 Thompson J. E., “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” p. 225. The three examples that follow this quote are from Ibid.

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World states by the Great Powers? The point is that, to the degree in which it matters in the

first place, territoriality is a systemic feature of international society, and therefore robust

enough to survive more-or-less regularized incursions into individual states.

Third, there is a somewhat paradoxical sense in which multilateral institutions --

which to some are agents of supraterritoriality pure and simple -- are in fact essential to

territorial sovereignty. Just as disease, pollution, crime, terror and armies penetrate borders,

so too must the political instruments designed to combat their effects. By definition,

globalization consists of transborder processes, so it would appear incumbent upon states to

pursue transborder policies by means of transborder institutions in order to manage them.

But crucially, this does not signal the wholesale erosion of territoriality within sovereign

statehood. The argument that multilateral institutions perversely transform recognition of

territorial vulnerability into fully realized agencies that actively exploit and increase that

vulnerability is specious. Instead, it is only by banding together -- by pooling boundaries, as

it were, so that borders become as porous to policy as they are to drug smuggling or Al-

Qaida -- that states ensure their (territorial) survival in a globalizing world.

Here again, it must be noted that multilateral institutions do not stand outside the

state system; rather “exercises in global reform need to thread their way through the modern

state.”39 As with authority, so with territory: multilateral treaties and conventions

notwithstanding, “no legal authority exists which can go beyond the state’s own

39 Linklater, A. and MacMillan, J., “Introduction: Boundaries in Question,” in Linklater, A. and Macmillan, J., Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, p. 14.

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interpretation of its legal obligations.”40 Nevertheless, the hard-shelled, state-as-country

version of territoriality is ill-equipped to explain complex twenty-first century political

realities. It is partially true, for example, to assert that “institutions like the European Union

or the United Nations are composed of territorial member states, rendering their authority

territorially derived.”41 Partially true -- but incomplete, for such a formulation begs the

question of these bodies’ existence. By the criteria of the rigid territorial model, the EU and

the UN would have no place.

* * *

The spirit of these observations applies to the specific vectors of globalization as

described above. Beginning with economics (trade, production and finance), I have

indicated elsewhere42 how territory remains vitally important. Even those who believe that

the global marketplace has made a “residual” entity of the state must admit that place … still

has its place. Philip Cerny, for example, draws an analogy between the contemporary state --

which he calls a “competition state” by virtue of the fact that its structural capacity is said to

be undercut by economic globalization -- and American state governments, whose power

over internal economic structures was both constitutionally limited from the start and

subject (over two full centuries) to further erosion at the hand of an increasingly open

market. Despite these handicaps, he concedes,

40 Brace, L. and Hoffman, J., “Introduction: Reclaiming Sovereignty,” in Brace, L. and Hoffman, J. (eds.) Reclaiming Sovereignty, (Pinter: London, 1997), p. 4. 41 Philpott, D., “Westphalia, Authority, and International Society,” in Jackson, R.H. (ed.) Sovereignty at the Millenium, p. 148. 42 In the chapter entitled “A Globalizing World” in my forthcoming doctoral thesis.

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[American states’] ability to control development planning, to collect and use the tax revenues they do impose … to build infrastructure, to run education and training systems and to enforce law and order gives these subnational states a capacity to influence the provision of immobile factors of capital in significant ways.43

No doubt, the global diffusion of free-market capitalism poses difficulties for longstanding

ideas of territoriality; however, so long as the state retains a virtual monopoly over the right

of taxation, and so long as “powerful social groups look to the state for protection against

corporate capitalism and for resistance against the spread of a universalizing Western

ideology,”44 borders will remain important determinants in political life.

Second, in providing what may be the single most important contribution to what

Shaw calls the idea of a common consciousness of human society on a world scale, it can be

argued that media, communications and global travel subvert territory to a greater degree

than more purely material forces of globalization. But again -- or in this case especially -- the

dangers of misrepresenting the meaning and significance of territory are acute.

Stepping back for a moment, my overall thesis is an attempt to trace the contours of

the universal and heterogeneous state, which by definition can only obtain when local or

parochial ties coexist with and are actively complemented by universal, cosmopolitan ideals.

Now, in the universal and heterogeneous state, territory is home, and can hardly be irrelevant

to its inhabitants. Territoriality, on the other hand, might be conceived as an integral part of

what Shaw would call the particularist vision, a vision that can only be disturbed and

unsettled by the circulation of people and ideas across state borders. Global movements of

43 Cerny, P., “What Next for the State?” in Kofman, E. and Youngs, G. (eds.), Globalization: Theory and Practice, p. 132. 44 Linklater, A. and MacMillan, J., “Introduction: Boundaries in Question,” p. 12.

25

this nature help to tip the balance between division and commonality, between what Shaw

would call nationality-internationality and globality. Globality supersedes territoriality, and is

brought forward by the sort of deep cultural interpenetration inherent in travel and

communications.

Seen through this globality lens, the distinction between territory and territoriality

should help clarify the more profound effects of mass media, electronic communications,

and global travel. On one plane, there is the erosion of territoriality and the rise of a

universalist or cosmopolitan vision. This leads to a kind of homogenization: a world society

of global brands, firms, consumption patterns, norms and culture. On another plane,

however, there occurs a reaffirmation of territory, of local community, of the intimate,

homegrown culture of place. What cannot be overstressed here is the fact that these local,

heterogeneous cultural (re)awakenings are at least partially products of globalization in

themselves. Globalization subverts territoriality in one dimension, while in another it

strengthens and revitalizes territory as the foundation of local community: “the very

technologies that create a world society may also help individuals to preserve their local

affiliations.”45 Territory is at once exalted and downplayed, and states sit squarely in the

middle of that ambiguous, yet scarcely contradictory process.

45 Brown, C., Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 214. See also Kofman, E. and Youngs, G., “Introduction: Globalization – The Second Wave,” in Kofman, E. and Youngs, G. (eds.), Globalization: Theory and Practice, p. 7. Brown extends this argument by suggesting that global media and communications technology can strengthen local communities by establishing a network of reinforcing feelers abroad. He cites Arjun Appadurai, who “has traced the way in which the meaning of migration has changed in the modern world; cheap air-fares, fax, telex, satellite TV and the Internet mean that populations can relocate around the world, without losing touch with their home base … indeed, their contribution [to community]… may be more intense than that of many who have stayed at home.” Brown, C., Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today, p. 214.

26

Prima facie, disease and environmental degradation give the clearest illustration of the

need to detach global issues from the strictures of hard-shell territoriality, since in this case

lines drawn on maps have no intrinsic meaning. Borders are abstractions inscribed on thin

air: pathogens and pollutants don’t so much ignore them as emphatically demonstrate their

futility. The need to invoke transborder institutions could not be more pressing here. Once

again, however, this does not herald the end of the territorial state, for only by transcending

border constraints through multilateral “pooling” of sovereignty can what those borders

symbolize be honoured. It must be remembered that while disease and environmental

destruction are global problems, from the point of view of individual states and peoples the

material consequences are ever and always firmly rooted on the ground. Radically exposed

and vulnerable, the state in this instance simply cannot rely on self help alone. In much the

same way that the state yields authority in order to demonstrate it, so too must it eschew

territoriality in order to fully and effectively protect its territory.

Security in the narrower, more traditional sense -- transnational crime and terror;

nuclear weapons proliferation and the arrangements for collective security -- succumbs to

the same curious logic, wherein territorial sovereignty hinges on the state relaxing its

presumed grip on borders. Not surprisingly, multilateralism is once again the fulcrum on

which the distinction between territory and territoriality must turn. Institutionalized as

collective security, the multilateral approach reveals a more nuanced role for states: under

globalizing conditions they “have a monopoly on the ability to legitimize violence, but they do

not have the ability to monopolize violence.”46 Here as always, however, sovereignty does not

thereby slip through state fingers. First, as Alexander Wendt points out, collective security is 46 Deudney, D., “Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States,” in Lipschutz, R. D. (ed.), On Security, (New York: NYU Press, 1995); p. 97.

27

never fully locked in: since states retain formal sovereignty no amount of collective identity

and cooperation can undercut the right to secede from agreements at some future date.47 In

other words, collective security is never totally binding. Second, it may be the case that a

sort of soft-shell territoriality is engendered by the possession of nuclear weapons. In

conventional warfare, protection of territory is associated with the potential to physically resist

the attacker, whereas “territoriality in the nuclear era can be conceptualized not as a hard-

shell of defence, but rather as a soft-shell of deterrence.”48 In dissuading the enemy, nuclear

capability vastly reduces the possibility of harmful action -- and by that same measure the

state retains independent territorial control.

The force and logic of multilateralism applies equally to threats posed by

transnational, sub- or non-state criminal and terror groups. Suppressing or eliminating

amorphous networks such as Al-Qaida will no doubt require concerted effort by states

acting together under the aegis of a host of multilateral agencies and institutions.

Nonetheless, terrorist attacks occur on sovereign territory, costing the lives of citizens whose

most direct political relationship remains (for better or worse) with the state. This fact is of

no small consequence. In the aftermath of the Al-Qaida attacks on the United States

anyone who took seriously the notion of a ‘borderless world’ will find that, for the foreseeable future, borders will be even more heavily policed than they have been in the past. The war against terrorism will place in the hands of state authorities all sorts of powers of surveillance and regulation; moreover, it seems likely that the general public will accept, and perhaps welcome, this extension of state control -- so far, the popular reaction to the fear that global terrorism has generated has been to look to the state for protection.49

47 Wendt, A., “Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy,” http://political-science.uchicago.edu/faculty/wendt.htm, July 17, 2003, pp. 47-49. 48 Harknett, R. J., “Territoriality in the Nuclear Era,” p. 146. Harknett makes the additional point that small or relatively weak states can actually enhance their territorial sovereignty by possessing nuclear weapons, whose deterrence potential is enough to significantly redress conventional imbalances of power. Ibid, pp. 146-148. 49 Brown, C., Sovereignty, Rights, and Justice: International Political Theory Today, p. xiii.

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The intervening few years have at least partially borne this assertion out; and if it

contains a grain of truth then even in its most destructive and virulent guise globalization

is not enough to detach sovereignty from its territorial base. In the most immediate and

direct ways, states retain both their vital authority and their ground.

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Conclusion

Under conditions of globalization the state loses possession neither of its

authority nor its territory. Rather, globalizing processes serve in an unprecedented way to

focus attention on what “possession” actually entails. The foregoing examination reveals

that sovereignty is flexible, that the state adapts, and that flexibility and adaptability are

for the state a source of considerable strength. Forces that permeate boundaries are

dangerous only if we believe that boundaries must be impermeable. Forces that result in

delegated authority are threatening only if we say of authority that it cannot be distributed

or shared. Possession, in other words, is not about solid walls or supreme autonomy. To

the contrary (and under globalizing circumstances especially), supreme autonomy and

solid walls can only have disastrous effects. Attempts to secure them are precisely why

states such as North Korea are, by any reasonable criteria, abject failures.

Globalization exposes the sovereign state to novel pressures. Conventional

wisdom has it that significant erosion of state power is the inevitable result. I argue that

such a view misunderstands or even fails to acknowledge the distinction between

openness and emasculation. The one does not lead to the other; rather it would be more

accurate to say that openness is almost a sine qua non, that it is the only available course of

action by which states and the international system they comprise might be strengthened.

Indeed, this truth makes a good deal more intelligible the fact that the state sponsors and

encourages globalization in the first place. Otherwise, why unchain the beast?

30

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