globalization and national identity greek culture today

7/30/2019 Globalization and National Identity Greek Culture Today

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Portuguese Journal of Social Science Volume 5 Number 2. Intellect Ltd 2006.

Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/pjss.5.2.141/1

Globalization and national identity:Monitoring Greek culture today

Yannis Voulgaris Panteion University

AbstractAmong the ESS countries Greece occupies a particular place as it is characterized

by a marked orientation towards conservative values, which are weaved around

the concept of national and religious homogeneity. This article, firstly, substanti-

ates this particularity through the use of quantitative tools. Then, it focuses on

the apparent contradiction between an increasingly open and democratic society

on one hand, and the retreat to the primordial elements of national identity, on

the other. Trying to interpret this issue, the article examines some of the actual

social, political and cultural processes. With regard to the later, the article pro-

poses the idea of a cultural conservatism, which is rooted in the core of the Greek

national identity as a by-product of the historical process of its formation during

the long XIX century. This core cultural conservatism is materializing from

time to time depending on the historical context. Today, this context is provided

by the dialectic between globalization and the national identity, as well as the dis-

junction between State and Nation that this dialectic produces.

In no other country has the public airing of the results of the European

Social Survey (ESS1-2002) generated so much interest and discussion as

in Greece. It has made the front page of the main national newspapers,

and there have been a host of articles and interviews devoted to this topic.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that it is the first time Greece

has taken part in an international comparative programme of this breadth

and weight. The second is that the research results have disproved some of

the Greeks basic stereotypes and myths about themselves and other

people. One of these is the self-congratulatory stereotype according to

which Greeks are open, warm in a Mediterranean way and tolerant, in

contrast to Europeans (meaning the rich European countries), who are

cold, rational, calculating and self-seeking. The ESS results undercut these

perceptions. It is true that as a tool surveys have well-known limita-

tions and that they encourage and magnify stereotyped answers.

Nevertheless, the result of this particular survey must come as a shock to

public opinion, especially as it coincides with a period of conspicuous

success for Greece. (One has only to think of entry to European Monetary

Union, the entry of Cyprus into the European Union, Greeces successfulEuropean presidency, and the success of the Athens Olympics). Earlier

KeywordsGreece

European social surve

comparative politics

political culture

national identity

globalization


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nationwide studies had, of course, shown the falsity of the stereotypes,

with which we patted ourselves on the back as a nation. But the ESS was

the first occasion on which there had been direct and rigorous comparison

with virtually all other European countries, and the upshot of this com-

parison was seen as being far from flattering.

The data presented in this article is enough to explain why this may be

so. However, that is not the real purpose of the article. The intention,rather, is to provide a cultural profile of Greece today as it emerges from

the ESS by examining Greek citizens values and some of their typical

attitudes as compared with those of the Europeans. Unfortunately, there

are very few previous comparable surveys to enable one to trace political

and cultural developments. But where it is possible, I try to do it. In the

course of the article, I suggest some lines of interpretation intended to link

the cultural and political changes in an era of globalization with the actual

national conditions, as well as the long-term historical features of the

Greek national identity.

Greece as mirrored by EuropeThe analysis of values allows us to make a comprehensive comparison of

Greece with the other countries of Europe. The survey sets out 21 distinct

values, with respondents invited to say how far these describe them. A

compression of these 21 values to 10 has been proposed by Schwartz, and

it is this compressed list that we shall adopt here (see Schwartz 2003).

Figure 1 maps out the countries with respect to the ten values.

As is apparent, Greece holds a peculiar and characteristic position that

is defined by an orientation towards conservative values (tradition, confor-mity), security (state security) and values of personal power and achieve-

ment. In the case of Greece, the average terms of the original 21 values in

the categories above are such that they give a picture of national consen-

sus, with internal differentiation playing a secondary role.

Greek attitudes to and perceptions of poor foreigners and economic

immigrants are also characteristic of the same orientation. A single (but

telling) example regarding attitudes towards people of a different national

group and race is sufficient to illustrate this point.1

As can be seen from Figure 2, Greek attitudes are the most negative in

Europe. These attitudes are inextricably connected with the fact that,

during the 1990s, Greece was transformed from a country that exported

labour to one that received immigrants. With the collapse of the Eastern

bloc, holes opened up in Greeces northern borders, especially with

Albania. It has been calculated that total immigration both legal and

illegal accounts for as much as 10 per cent of the countrys population,

and that about half of these immigrants are Albanians who have come to

Greece in a desperate condition. In terms of stereotypes, this has meant that

in Greek eyes they are linked with rising levels of criminality and insecurity.

Greece also has highly positive attitudes to religiousness and confidencein the Church (Figure 3). We should not be too hasty to draw conclusions

1 QuestionnaireRound 1, questionD5: How aboutpeople of differentrace or ethnic groupfrom most Greekpeople? (ESS1-2002).


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Figure 1: Joint map of countries and values.

Figure 2: Attitudes towards foreigners of different ethnic group and race per country.


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here. The religious feeling of Greeks is, first and foremost, an assertion of

national identity rather than a statement of a metaphysical faith. In

answering the question Are you Greek orthodox? it was more or less asthough respondents were answering I am Greek. The reason for this can

be found in the way national consciousness came into being in the last

years of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Greeks relationship with their

religion is quite secularized and, in any event, religious belief is far less

binding than that of Roman Catholicism or Protestantism. The declaration

of belief entails neither strict rules of conduct nor moral imperatives.

Nevertheless, the result of the ESS shows an intensification of religious

belief and observance. Compared to the corresponding figures for 1989,

they indicate an increase in frequency of church-going and prayer. In

1985 only 12 per cent of respondents said that they went to church every

Sunday or more than once a week, and the percentage was effectively the

same in 1989. But the 2003 survey shows that it had gone up to 27.2 per

cent (daily, more than once a week, and once a week). In 1989, 41.6

per cent of respondents said they prayed every day, and 36 per cent said

they prayed rarely or never. In the 2003 survey, the corresponding

figures were 47 per cent and 14.5 per cent (NCSR 1985, 1989, 1990,

1996; Greek Review of Social Research 1996). The Greek Church, as an

institution, scored high on positive ratings, even during the leftist years of

the 1980s, when its cooperation with the Colonels dictatorship(19671974) was still fresh in peoples memory. This meant that up until

Figure 3: Religiousness and religious practices.


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the 1990s, the bishops and clergy had to be extremely discreet about their

political activities, and had to concentrate on their church duties. But with

the ideological avalanche that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and

with the eruption of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (an

eruption that also affected Greece), the Church was once more able to play

an active political role that centred upon preserving national identity and

the traditions of our land. The ESS data should be viewed in this new

political context.

Also very typical has been the importance attached by Greek citizens to

national homogeneity based on tradition and religion. Figure 4 shows,

once again, that there is a difference between Greece and most otherEuropean countries.

Lack of space makes it impossible to extend this analysis, but the

picture is clear. We need simply to add the great casualties like politics

and its institutions and procedures.

Politics and parties: The great casualtiesThe ESS has confirmed that the crisis of politics and political institutions

and of citizen mistrust of political parties and their leaderships is pan-

European in extent. However, the effects vary from country to country,

depending on the importance and the function politics has in organizing

social life as a whole, and determining social relations in each. In this

sense, politics in Greece has always had and continues to retain a very

pronounced significance. Thus, the demise of politics and of the ideologi-

cal-political formations in post-dictatorship Greece a phenomenon that

emerged during the mid-1980s and which continues struck at the orga-

nizational nerve-centre of the citizens ideological, moral and cognitive

perceptions of society and the world as a whole.2 It was a decline that

affected the link between official Greece and the lifeworld of Greek people,

a role of strong educational values that, for most of the twentieth century,had been specifically played by the great political formations and parties.

2 The classic questionabout interest inpolitics shows amarked decline from1985 to the present(see NCSR 1985,1989, 1990, 1996,ESS1-2002).

Figure 4: National homogeneity.


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We all know how television took advantage of this crisis in party politics to

insinuate itself into these same functions, but as a novel link, television

has proved to be all too neurotic, fickle and excitable. Its effects have been

contradictory, to say the least, and very much less coherent than party

credos, if not actually conducive to disintegration. This is a phenomenon

that has taken on particularly worrying proportions in Greece.

Independent television was introduced in Greece only in 1989, and despitethe low quality of its offering, the survey shows that Greek citizens spend a

lot of time watching it in order to keep them informed.

The loss of politics multiple functions is compensated in two directions

downwards by the primordial structures of solidarity (family and friends)

that has always been of crucial significance in Greece, and upwards by

recourse to non-representative state institutions, or the Church or the

police. In the survey, we Greeks have one of the most positive responses to

the question about always obey[ing] law and order.3 Not only does this

bring us into conflict with the ghost of Antigone, it goes entirely against

everyday Greek behaviour. Greeks would laugh if told that they had been

proclaimed European champions for faithful observance of the law (we

need to only think of tax returns and driving habits!). But this split con-

sciousness, this contrast of moral rectitude and actual behaviour cannot be

dismissed as mere mendacity. A truth lurks within the response expresses

a sense of insecurity the need for a more stable framework of daily life.

Some general cultural trendsThe picture painted by the surveys data only makes sense when incorpo-

rated into a broader interpretative scheme that can encapsulate theperiods main features by bringing attitudes, perceptions and values into

relation with major political dilemmas and socio-economic developments.

It is within this general context that citizens stereotypes, deeper percep-

tions and collective representations operate (whether we are speaking of a

country or of various different social groups).

What are the dominant features today? It is hard to tell for Greece as

much as for Europe as a whole as there is a markedly unstable amalgam

where experience, symbols, perceptions and emotions that are derived from

three major developments are all enmeshed. The first of these developments

is the neo-conservative and neo-liberal atmosphere. This has shed the

aggressiveness of the 1980s, but even in its milder form it remains

active at the symbolic level, fashioning a common sense, and all the more

so because it feeds on the policies of globalizations central institutions (see

Almeida 1988). The second development is the aftermath of the fall of the

Berlin Wall. As well as dramatically weakening the potency of the great

ideologies, this event has also affected the patterns of thought and values

that the majority of citizens (above all in Greece and southern Europe)

used in order to read international politics and to evaluate events. The

third development consists of the new conditions set by the first years ofthe new millennium, such as economic recession, 9/11, the international

3 QuestionnaireRound 1, questionE24: To be a goodcitizen, howimportant would yousay it is for a personto always obey lawsand regulations?(ESS1-2002).


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crisis and the war in Iraq, the contradictions of globalization and the con-

stant appeal to security measures. Thus we have come from the aggressive

egotism, cynical assertion of self, hedonism and conspicuous consumption of

neo-liberalism at its height, to a mild individualism that is, nevertheless, not

averse to sharing in primordial collective credos mainly via insecurity and

fear of the other. The rise of fundamentalist phenomena (for instance in the

United States) is a possibility not to be discounted. The pursuit of individualautonomy proceeds in parallel to peoples acceptance of extreme security mea-

sures, which are often detrimental to personal freedom. On occasions, also,

insecurity boosts choices that are typical of the extreme right. Macho behav-

iour has given way to the feminization of the workforce and society, but there

are strong signs that gender and family relations are becoming more conserv-

ative. The need for meaning and for more substantial social relations is no

longer to be found in the great ideologies and conflicts, but the need continues

to exist and seeks its fulfilment in the everyday life of interpersonal relation-

ships and in the assurance of the coherence of our own biography.

Some suggested interpretationsThe confusion and instability of general trends in Greece is particularly

pronounced. The country looks as though it is going through a phase in

which the dynamics of an even more open and democratic society coex-

ists, and yet it is in conflict with the retreat to the primordial elements of

national identity. On the one hand, Greeces geopolitical horizons are

expanding, its distance from developed Europe is shrinking and its actual

and symbolic frontiers are becoming more open; on the other, a large

section of society is reacting by turning inwards, developing communalreflexes and searching for homogeneity on the basis of national religious

identity when faced with otherness.

It is the second of these two faces that is most evident in the survey, for

such is the nature of the tool. Yet the results must be seen in their socio-

political context. It is a fact that at the start of the twenty-first century,

Greece like other countries of southern Europe has achieved important

goals. It has political stability to a degree not seen in the previous century.

It has strong alliances and a strong currency. It has entered the turbulent

post-bipolar world in the safest manner imaginable. Those same Greeks,

who in the survey retreat to the ethnic-communitarian particular, are

living in an increasingly cosmopolitan environment. They consume multi-

nationally, they travel abroad often and in large numbers, and in the

summer months they play host to millions of tourists from all over the

world. They share in global mass culture. Even many of them speak a

foreign language. They have unloaded the nasty jobs to the very same

immigrants they say they fear, and so on and so forth. But this upgrad-

ing of Greece does not seem to be accompanied with a sense of security,

whether in the psychological, cognitive or socio-economic sense.

Social psychology teaches us that at times of great transformationthere develops a predisposition to resist change and to stick with the


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world we know. Indeed, when big ideas are missing this leads to visions

that make the future more familiar. It should not be surprising that citi-

zens feel threatened by society itself, and not just by foreigners. This

general context does not, however, explain exactly what form this particu-

lar negative dialectic takes or why Greece is experiencing it in such an

intense and defensive manner.

How could we interpret this phenomenon? To start with, we mustavoid repeating unsuitable interpretative schemes for instance, the evo-

lutionary structuralistfunctionalist approach to the analysis of Greek and

southern European (political) culture.4 As is well known, this approach

stemmed from modernization theory and its presupposition was a linear

evolution from underdevelopment to development in the context of the

Parsonian system. A backward Greece (or a backward southern Europe)

was seeking to catch up with the West. As it went along, traditional cul-

tural values and perceptions will have given place to the contemporary

values of self-fulfilment and universalism. This approach has been notori-

ously superseded for a variety of empirical and theoretical reasons, which

we have no space to refer to here. As mentioned above, transformations in

developed societies are generating perceptions and provoking reactions,

not even excluding fundamentalist phenomena. This fact is confirmed by

the frequent manifestations of far-right populist nationalism. Hence, a dif-

ferent approach is needed, one that is non-evolutionary and sensitive to

interaction with broader contexts, as globalization processes complicate

the relationship between national and supranational, creating hybrid cul-

tural forms and the interweaving of old and new of underdevelopment and

development (Appadurai 1996; Jameson and Masao 1998; Featherstone1990; Held and McGrew 2001).

These methodological notes are useful for the cultural trends in Greece

today. As the main interpretative key is, in my opinion, a cultural dialectic

between the process of globalization and Europeanization on the one hand

and national culture on the other. This dialectic expresses itself not only by

means of readjustments, acceptance of globalized myths and symbols,

consent to the countrys prospects in Europe, but also resistance, insecu-

rity and phobias about change in our Lebensraum. The persistent invoca-

tion by one section of Greek society of the trinity of traditional values

motherland, religion and family is not just a continuation or a residue of

traditionalism; it is a phenomenon driven by the globalized digital capital-

ism. Thats why there is a very broad consensus about a united Europe

a national resolve that the future of Greece is in Europe (all the more so

because, to quote our national slogan, Greece gave the West the lights of

civilization). On the other hand, people try to reassure themselves by

evoking representations of nation, religion and communitarianism that

present no threat either actual or intended to the countrys prospects.

Why do the Greeks adopt such a highly defensive attitude? We might

put it down to a series of social, political and cultural factors. Prominentamong the social factors is the aftermath of the disorderly mass influx of

4 This approach owesmuch to theanthropologicalstudies on Greece (seeCampbell 1964) andto the political culturestudies inspired byAlmonds and Verbasclassic work on Civic

Culture (see Pollis1977). The followinggeneration of Greekpolitical culturestudies distanced itselffrom this approach(see, e.g.,Diamandouros 1983;Demertzis 1990,1996).


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immigrants during the 1990s. It is known that xenophobic attitudes come

to the fore much more acutely when the experience is recent. There is a

second, less evident factor: broad social strata that have experienced rapid

upward social mobility within barely a single generation now feel an

increasing precariousness. Many indicators persuade us that, along with

unease about consolidating their newly-won status, there are obstacles

blocking the path of this upward mobility. This refers mainly to the middleclasses who are called upon to pay an ever higher price for reproducing their

status and passing it on as a legacy to their children. It is unfortunate that

public opinion polls in Greece have been unable to make use of income or job

variables to give a trustworthy picture of socio-economic stratification.

Educational level is, here as elsewhere, a more reliable variable for socio-

economic stratification, but this makes it impossible for us to make a strict

distinction between socio-economic status and cultural capital. Still, the data

shows that insecurity and shutting off in the face of change is due to cul-

tural as well as socio-economic factors which is why it is so widespread.

Political factors also have an importance of their own. Taken as a

whole, the trajectory of Greek society is towards conservatism. This can

quite clearly be seen by comparing the data from the 1980s (although

these are not comparable with any exactness) with the recent survey

data.5 The picture presented by the survey highlights the transformation

of a strongly politicized, left-wing anti-imperialist climate with a tendency

to mobilize and participate that had prevailed in the past. The decisive

factor has certainly been the retreat of leftist perceptions. The powerful

culture of the Greek anti-imperialist left, and the anti-American feeling so

prevalent in Greek society, is hostile to globalization, especially globaliza-tion that is hegemonized by the United States. At the same time there has

been a shift in the priorities of the right-wing ideologies. As soon as it

ceased to have a stake in the fight against Communism, traditional Greek

conservatism began distancing itself from its post-war adherence to the

West and the United States, with nationalism and religiousness becoming

more dominant in its ideology (Voulgaris 2001, 2004; Clogg 1983, 1993).

Another structural cause should also be taken into account, as has been

argued, globalization entails some disjunction between the state and the

nation, both are permeated by global flows, but these are either different,

or of dif ferent intensity, in each case. In Greece (and countries like Greece),

this disjunction would appear to make the obligation for adjustment differ-

ent in degree. The state ought to adjust itself promptly if it does not want

to put its power, its geopolitical security and its ability to carry out its

essential functions at risk. The nation (in the sense of national identity),

on the other hand, can afford to adjust itself more slowly, or even resist.

Potentially, the nation can undermine the state. So far, the resistance of

nationhood seems to have manifested itself in ways that have not

required the state to readjust itself.6

Lastly, we come to the cultural factors the deepest cultural stereo-types. These are of decisive importance. As I have already suggested, we

5 There is a perceptiblshift to the right, asshown on the left-right citizenself-placement scale(see NCSR 1985,1989, 1990, 1996,ESS1-2002). (Whilethe earlier surveys

employ ten-pointscales, the ESS (2003uses 11-point scales,with the result thatexact comparisons adifficult to make.Nevertheless, thetrend is clear.)

6 In presenting theESS1-2002 to a Greeaudience, I attempteto summarize theconclusion in the

comment that Greechas made moreprogress than theGreeks.


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must take into account a kind of cultural conservatism that lurks in the

very marrow of Greek national identity. This cultural conservatism,

which has a strong whiff of populism and nationalism, came into being

during the formation of the modern Greek state and nation. As a result of

the Greeks victory in the 1921, War of Independence from the Ottoman

Empire, which was itself inspired by the French Revolution, Greece became

a national state earlier than many other European states (seePanagiotopoulos 2004). The achievement of integrated nationhood was,

however, a long drawn-out process, which only ended in 1922 with the

drawing of what were effectively the same boundaries as the present ones.

This had been a century of several different irredentist hopes that arose at

the same time as the Ottoman Empire entered its long death-throes, which

came into conflict with the nationalist hopes of the other Balkan coun-

tries. By the mid-nineteenth century, romantic nationalism determined

the conceptions of nationhood and of folk ways. It did not cancel out the

original Enlightenment mentality that was crystallized in the institutions

of parliamentary democracy despite clientelistic deformations. What

romantic nationalism now produced was a non-historical perception of

the nation, stressing the ethnic nature of the nation rather than the civic,

and its integrative rather than liberal function. This effect was magnified

by the fact that throughout these 100 years the ethnic state was virtually

detached from the liberal state at various times the nation would act as if

it was a powerful autonomous lever intent on urging a weak state into ful-

filling irredentist aspirations. Geopolitically speaking, the historical condi-

tions meant that this ethnic nationalism often found itself in a

relationship of attraction towards, or repulsion from the West (althoughGreece never considered the east as a real alternative). The decisive cir-

cumstance in this respect was that the fulfilment of national hopes was

dependent on the goodwill of Europes Great Powers and on the outcome

of their rivalries concerning the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks developed an

intensely ambivalent attitude towards the Great Powers. Not only had they

a sense of grievance about their national right not being acknowledged,

they were only too well aware that none of their claims would ever be real-

ized without the support of one or other of the Powers. The twin images of

the person with a grievance and the weakling when confronted with for-

eigners also produced a number of popular stereotypes and deepened even

more the chasm that divided Orthodox Greece from the Catholic or

Protestant West.

This cultural conservatism is steadily reproducing itself. It is reviving

and acquiring special forms of expression depending on what political or

social circumstances it encounters. It can legitimize the political author-

ity or delegitimize it. It may be the ally of the enlightenment traditions

(as evidenced by the national struggle against fascism) or it may be their

foe. In any event, it plays a key role in selecting and reshaping memory and

tradition. It is present and cuts across the culture of all three historical


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Greek political formations: right, centre and left. This is how it managed

to write itself both into the nationalist ideology used by the right to

govern the country from its victory after the 1949 civil war until the fall

of the military dictatorship in 1974, and into the discourse of national

liberation during occupation by the Axis powers from 1941 to 1944. It

was a part of the anti-imperialist discourse of the left and the centre-left

during the first years following the fall of the junta, and it was also partof the increasingly nationalistic conservatism of the 1990s, as shown in

the handling of the question of the Macedonia issue. This presence

across the board explains why today there is a consensus about ethnic

and populist conceptions.

But there is also the other side of the coin to look at. Today, more than

ever before, these stereotypes and this xenophobia can never provide a

mass basis for reactionary movements and forces. Expressions of religious-

ness can never bring a political army to the support of any public figure

whether from inside or outside the church who mean to exploit them. In

Greece, extremist movements of this sort have never existed. Nor does it

seem remotely likely that Greece will tolerate serious far-right movements

of the kind that are cropping up in several other European countries. To

put it another way, democratic politics makes it possible to cope with the

friction and the breaches between a dynamic, extrovert democratic ten-

dency and an ethnic and populist entrenchment that pushes in the oppo-

site direction. Indeed, this is what emerges from the survey. Greek citizens

have always put their hopes on politics, democracy, participation and soli-

darity or communal philanthropy.7

Greece and Europe: Convergence or divergence?So what does this picture of Greece ultimately show? Is it an idiosyncratic

place that goes to the very limits of being essentially different? Is there

convergence or divergence? As we have seen above, much of the data show

a tendency to be different in a way that is not very flattering in terms of

tolerance and autonomy. Certainly, we must reckon with the effects of the

nations difficult course through history, but this course has taken place

within Europe and its direction was from the periphery towards the

central core. It would be quite wrong to interpret the things that make

Greece different in the terms of Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilizations

scheme. On the contrary, and in order to conclude briefly, I shall sum up

my argument by with the following words: By and large, from the mid-

eighteenth century onwards, Greece has managed to join in all the great

encounters of history, and the great transformations taking place in the

group of advanced European countries. Putting it another way, Greece is

travelling on the best train the world has had so far, anyway. But it has

always been a passenger in the last carriage; it has always arrived late and

got on the train at the last moment.

7 QuestionnaireRound 1, questionsE16, B32 and E22:How important ispolitics in your life?;On the whole, howsatisfied are you withthe way democracyworks in Greece?; an

To be a good citizenhow important woulyou say it is for aperson to supportpeople who are worsoff than themselves?respectively(ESS1-2002).


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Suggested citation

Voulgaris, Y. (2006), Globalization and national identity: Monitoring Greek culture

today, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 5: 2, pp. 141153, doi:10.1386/pjss.5.2.141/1

Contributor details

Voulgaris Yannis is the associate professor of Political Sociology at PanteionUniversity of Athens. He is the National Coordinator of European Social Survey forGreece (1st and 2nd round). His main research interests are contemporary Greek

politics and society, comparative politics of Southern Europe, globalization as the

new great transformation. Contact: Voulgaris Yannis, Panteion University,

Department of Political Science and History, Sigrou Avenue 136, 176 71 Athens,

Greece. http//www.panteion.gr

E-mail: [email protected]


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globalization and national identity greek culture today

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