GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION POST SADDAM HUSSAIN IRAQMuhammad Akram ZaheerPh.D Scholar (Political Science)akramzaheer227@gmail.comAbstract: It has long been stressed by the scholars and policy makers that the developing countries will be encouraged to become more democratic by the trade and financial liberalization. Since April 2003, the game of democracy in Iraq has played on a global stage, with policymakers, politicians, and pundits examining the composition of every scene. Iraq today possesses several features that will facilitate the reconstruction efforts. The Iraqi elections are being hailed as proof of the success of the American endeavor. The mushrooming of liberal and civil society institutions since April 2003 is an encouraging development towards globalization and democratization. The elections in January 2005 and March 2010, the results that followed were sobering. The study examines the process of democratization in Iraq as a developing country. The study draws on qualitative and statistical evidence published in reports by the international organizations and journalist.Key Words: Democratic development , Political culture, Political Parties Political institutions, Constitution and Election INTRODUCTIONGlobalization has to take place inevitably; therefore developing countries must carefully prefer the combination of policies that best allows them to seize opportunities from the globalization environment. It should be very cautiously decided by the countries to differentiate, what is needed to liberalize and what is needed to be protected in the best national interest. Globalization is such a complicated phenomenon that every country whether democratic or undemocratic, cannot escape from its influence. The democratic development of any country is not affected directly by globalization but the democratic development of the country has to face the influence of globalization and frame out suitable strategies to deal with the pressure of the globalization. Those countries that have withstood the havocs of globalization have been able to provide socioeconomic development to their country.Any developing country like Iraq has to face this most crucial challenge at the national level as how to deal with the process of globalization in a way that it can bring maximum opportunities for the betterment of the country. It may be argued that to gain maximum outcome of the opportunities of globalization, a developing country like Iraq must proceed cautiously. Being a developing country Iraq has seen democratic turmoil from time to time since post Saddam Hussain. After a long period of dictatorship, war, sanctions, occupation and civil conflict that started from 1979, it is still facing the economic and democratic challenges. As a result, a weak government has been formed in the country that has been unable to set viable policies to cope with the challenges of globalization. The current social and economic development of the county now totally relies on foreign aid and assistance from different corners of the world.The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was an indication of new dawn for the Iraqi people. The liberation from a brutal dictator was celebrated by the folk. In 2005 the majority of the Iraq is also thinking still in the same way. There were the folk who were looking for better future. Despite Saddam's long domination, democratic institutions are not completely unknown to the country. Before the elections January 2005 67% of the population supported the elections and 88 percent reported that they will take part in the voting. For I4.2 million Iraqis who were registered and eligible to vote, the day marked a historic opportunity to influence the shape and direction of their government. At the end 58 percent of the whole population voted, which is a good result for a country which makes its first experiences with democratic principles(Stolle, 2005).The January election was a significant step for the promising democracy. The National Assembly paved its presence and broadened its legitimacy by selecting a President Jalal Talabani, a Prime Minister Shiite Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and two Vice-Presidents, Shiite Adel Abdel Mahdi and Sunni leader Ghazi Al- Yawar; these leaders together functioned as the governing head during the transitional period. The First General Elections on January 30, 2005, saw Islam dominant in the political scenario. While in the Second General Elections on 7 March 2010, major changes took place, which highlight that the Political Islam is facing serious threats. The voters seemed inclined towards Secular Parties. Nori Al Maliki, who is an Islamist, projected this development before hand, and went ahead in making his own secular alliance The State of Law Coalition. This coalition did not consider its secular title and was supported mostly by the Muslim Shiite. On the other hand, Ayad Alawi recognized his secular front: The Iraqi List. Both of these parties achieved success in the second general elections, and laid foundation of stalemate in the political process. At the end of the day, the Iraqi people came to know that both of these parties had only worn the veil secularism in their content. Ayad Alawi, from the other hand, was supported by the Muslim Sunni. The development of secular political parties and increase in national secular numbers is encouraged and supported widely by the global world, especially the USA. Then Iraq will have deal with the situation to show its true and original secular nature as it had been during its long history. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a central issue of democracy in the global age is unfolding debates. Since 2006, President Bush having so much raised the visibility of the democracy issue both radiate the war in Iraq as a democratizing and causes the war on terrorism in a global freedom agenda democracy.This study carries assumptions that 1- . Iraqi people, show its capability to maintain order and compromises, and promote the maturity of democratic institutions during the election 2005 and 2010.2- Political parties organizationally developed themselves to national interests.3- A country transits away from dictatorship towards democracy.4- A belief in the determinative importance of elections.The study draws on qualitative and statistical evidence published in reports by international organizations and journalists working in Baghdad, as well as on correspondence between the Iraqi sources and others. However, to the extent possible, it has relied on sources that represent events and experiences on the basis of interviews and surveys with a socioeconomically and religiously diverse cross-section of the city's population. It should also be noted that the scope of this study is limited to examining democratic challenges in the global world. The study calls for further research to investigate how the current socioeconomics and democratic development based political structure continues to reinforce and produce peace and prosperity in Iraq.First, it examines the relation of globalization and democratization in theoretical perspective. Last, it considers the factors upsetting the basis of democratic development. Then the work includes a comprehensive conclusion that sum up the entire situation dealt in this study. Globalization and DemocracyThe term globalization has been defined in many ways, but in the context of democracy it has been defined as follows: Globalization is the integration and democratization of the world culture, economy and infrastructure through transitional investment, rapid proliferation of communication and information technologies (Mujahid, 2002, p. 2). As free international transactions benefit society as a whole, democracy that renders leaders more accountable to the citizenry should be conducive to the removal of restrictions on such transactions(Garrett, 2000, pp. 341-391). The democracy and globalization nexus is reinforced by positive feedback from economic and financial globalization to political democratization. The exchange of goods and services is a channel for the exchange of ideas, and a more diverse stock of ideas encourages political competition(Mansoor, 2000, p. 12).In spite of many concerns and apprehensions, globalization has become a fact of modern life of people and nations. The countries having weak democratic institutions and that are externally dependent on economies become vulnerable under the pressure of globalization. The extent to which a country can cope with globalization depends on the strength of its democratic institutions and its capacity to diversify its economy. Globalization derives from conscious policy decisions which may serve to enhance or even erode the capacity of a country to become a part of the globalization process. Many countries are left with little choice but to embrace globalization oriented policies. The globalization process includes the concept of a free market or free economy, in which the free market must be allowed to function without interference of respective governments. The idea behind this is that a government must remove all barriers that prevent the full and free operation and movement of goods and services, capital, movement of firms, and financial institutions. In theory, globalization is good for all, but in reality, globalization was designed by developing countries on behalf of their companies and financial institutions. It is too dangerous to allow the free market and global institutions to assume the role of governments(Sobhan, 2007). Main objective behind the concept of globalization is to overcome the regulations set up by the developing countries to promote their domestic economy and local firms. Following these policies can bring new opportunities to the country but on the other hand it can also create enormous risk that will severely hit the prosperity of a country, as we have seen in the case of East Asia and Argentina. The national governments of developing countries, in order to protect their national prosperity and economy, should design national policies by themselves rather than letting global institutions or other countries carry out such policy designs on their behalf. Neoliberals observe the movement of global democratization as its cause and consequence. Free association of capital and labor strengthen and expand over the world social connectedness. Open markets and the unfettered spirit of enterprise, in turn, pave the way for democratic politics as institution and practice. Economic globalization, global culture and global democracy are closely intertwined. The political spaces have opened up by the expansion of the free market. Liberal democracy facilitates and raises the human capacity to realize its natural economic senses. A global commercial culture shatters barriers of difference and identity(Holton, 2000).How globalization affects democracyThe developing world has made marvelous progress towards democracy over the last few decades. Particularly since the late 80s, 70% of less developed countries made substantial efforts to expand political freedoms (Rudra, 2005). It is significant to note that a more sweeping transformation that occurred in less developed countries in the early 80s: economic openness in trade and financial markets have caused these important political advancements. The extent to which political changes occurred after globalization pressures hit less developed countries provides immediate credibility to policy makers who have long assumed that globalization leads to improvements in democracy(Human Development Report, 2002). Yet, despite these developments, human freedom is still under threat in the developing world (Rudra, 2005). Several countries that took proper steps towards democracy during 80s have since become more politically repressive under the pressure of globalization and post Saddam Hussain Iraq was also one of them. The power of a country to cope with globalization depends on the stability of its democratic institutions and its capability to diversify its economy. More countries including India, Pakistan, Guatemala, Ghana, Thailand, Argentina, and Turkey seem to fluctuate, sometimes expanding political freedoms for the masses and sometimes contracting them. Almost 30% of less developed countries witnessed a decline in democratic rights since globalization took root in the 80s (Rudra, 2005).Globalization is also an approach by the existing authorities to provide social stability and maintain political support for them. Economic globalization, global culture and global democracy are closely intertwined. The political spaces have opened up by the expansion of the free market. Liberal democracy facilitates and raises the human capacity to realize its natural economic senses. A global commercial culture shatters barriers of difference and identity(Holton, 2000). But the democratic rights in lesser developing countries are improving. The long and short of the argument is that globalization leaves far reaching effects on the level of democracy because the security and cohesiveness of governing state become challenged. It is quite clear that the isolation of elites such as capitalists, military and bureaucrats is a prerequisite for prominent political change in any nation that has not yet achieved an absolute democracy. Globalization necessarily disentangles elite cohesiveness as the extent of control over economic policymaking and performance becomes significantly constrained, and nations have to face the higher levels of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and hence, social instability. The combination of private sector pressure and mass disillusionment result in the growing political isolation of rulers. Under these circumstances, governmental authorities face two options: greater political liberalization and political repression. For liberalization to take place, it must safe guard to some extent the power and privileges of the existing elites capable of invalidating it. Increasing wellbeing spending along with globalization can present this necessary protection for elites by encouraging social stability and discouraging voters from contesting power because the political and economic liberalization takes place. On the other hand, elimination of individual liberties will happen if elites do not have substitute means for retaining societal control. Certain sections of the elites will then recognize that the benefits of liberalization are smaller and so they will be more tending to support a hard-line position in favor of political domination. In these circumstances, the relationship between globalization and improvements in democratic conditions would be more restrictive. An interesting situation arises from the results. Liberalization in both trade and capital markets has a vigorous and indirect effect on democratization via social spending. Capital flows, like trade, reveal a positive relationship with democracy if and only if enhance in social spending goes along with increasing levels of globalization. In other words, when the trade and financial market integrate deeply, a significant level of welfare spending becomes necessary for real enhancement in democracy. If, however, the elites find increase in the social spending impracticable or they are unwilling to increase the social spending during globalization, then the democratization becomes suspicious in the eyes of the masses. Governments of these globalizing countries will adopt greater political repression. In the globalization scenario, greater democratic rights can be demanded in developing countries. Welfare spending for the masses plays a vital mediating part in this relationship. Ultimately under conditions of globalization, if governments expand the size of the welfare state, important advancements in human freedoms are likely to occur(Mujahid, 2002). This theory asserts that decisions about democratization are arbitrated as international market exposure increases because it challenges the unity of the governing sections. Both the democracy and the consolidation literature recommend that the disunity of elite in time brings radical political change. In the arena of strong of private sector, increasing economic unrest, and the demonstrations growing popularity, elite division intensify as the usefulness of compulsion becomes widely disputed. Greater democratization can serve as a means to sustain legitimacy of existing elites, minimize domestic opposition, and increase the likelihood of social stability in the globalizing environment(Mujahid, 2002). However, according to the democracy literature, democratization has important fundamentals. Even group of elites favoring democracy will not be ready to grant greater political freedoms until they can employ a safeguard to secure their positions and privileges. Without such safety measures, the authorities will fear a risk of losing their political power and personal wealth with the increase in democracy, principally because the losers of globalization will be in a better position to demand significant political and economic change. The major groups in elites or antidemocratic and they think repression to be used to regain stability and order when the costs of using social spending as an device are perceived to be greater than the benefits. Globalization's effects on democratization are thus indirect, contingent upon the scope and desirability of redistributive policies(Guido, 2001). Key prerequisites for the failure or success of democratic revolution are economic role and its impact on people's lives. The more prosperous the country, the more likely it is to be democratic (Martin, 1960, pp. 45-76). According to Samuel Huntington, in poor countries democratization is unlikely; in rich countries it has already occurred. In between there is a political transition zone; countries in that particular economic stratum are most likely to transit to democracy. As countries develop economically and move into this zone, they become prospects for democratization (Huntington, 1991, pp. 59-72). Living standards and availability of work opportunities are the features of rising political stable democratic countries.Political Culture of Iraq In Iraq, most of the constituent elements towards the growth of a civil society, such as democratic and public institutions, have been weakened or neglected by decades. The Iraqis and their leadership may have to take some time to learn the communal tolerance and have to organize themselves for democratic government. Arab nationalism and decades monarchy had caused Iraqi society to suffer bitterly. Such a society finds very low levels of political trust, social tolerance, popular support for political liberty, and gender equality and is found far short of what is found in all established democracies (2003, p. 9) Iraq is deprived of almost every possible prerequisite for democracy. Throughout Iraq, people who have little bit of power are making their utmost endeavors to establish their own networks. All this is happening unnoticed. They will not give up this power willingly. No one ever does. Critically, both the Shiite and Sunni Muslim sects have a decidedly conservative view about a womans role in society. As the Washington Posts Sharon Waxman 27 Jan 2007 reported from Baghdad, Iraqi women live subject to the strictures of a patriarchal society that dictates when and where women may be seen, whom they can marry, under what circum- stances they can divorce (2003, p. C2). All over Iraq, democratization is facing obstacles by cultural and religious elements that neither motivate nor foster political liberty. These elements make the process of democratization much slower. On the other hand, Iraq is definitely not alone in its incapability to come to terms with the modern world. Historian Paul Kennedy relates: Far from preparing for the 21st century, much of the Arab and Muslim world appears to have difficulty in coming to terms with the 19th century, with its complex inheritance of secularization, democracy, laissez faire economics, transnational industrial and commercial linkages, social change, and intellectual questioning(Kennedy, 1993, p. 208). If one needs an example of the importance of cultural attitudes in explaining a societys response to change, contemporary Islam provides it.In the presence of approach of thought characteristic of tribal societies subjugated by a mythical conception of the world, certain cultural characteristics make the Iraqi democratization process that much harder. For example, more than 75% of Iraqis population live a tribal life and use the historian Abbas Kelidar, an Iraq specialist, terms primordial allegiances (Kelidar, 2003). Powerful family links, especially the presence of marriages between first or second cousins, prove to be an important obstruction to liberal democracy. According to anthropologist Robin Fox liberal democracy is based on the Western idea of autonomous individuals committed to a public good, but thats not how members of these tight and bounded kin groups see the world. Their world is divided into two groups: kin and strangers (Fox, 1996, p. 1). Comparing postwar Iraq with postwar Germany and Japan led journalist Steve Sailer to conclude: The deep social structure of Iraq is the complete opposite of those two true nation states, with their highly patriotic, cooperative, and out bred peoples(Sailer, 2003, pp. 20-22).In addition, one third of Iraqi population adopt a traditional tribal culture that reveals itself in many of the medieval conventions of Islamic law, like unquestioning obedience to tribal elders, to such anachronistic principles as thar and fidya and such customs as polygamy. Identity politics still dominates Iraqi political culture (Liu, 2003, p. 31) and (Ghattas, 2003, p. 9) That is, the priority of ethnic and religious solidarity over all other values, including individual liberty. In such highly paternalistic political culture, political leaders are frequently considered as super human heroic figures able to liberate the general public from danger or despair. In such an atmosphere, mostly people assume a political submissiveness that acts as a hurdle on the development of the principles such as personal responsibility and self help vital to the development of economic and political liberalism. Consequently, political freedom is an unfamiliar concept to most Iraqis. Naturally, therefore, the available evidence indicates that most Iraqis are not passionate about Western style, liberal democracy. The first scientific public opinion survey conducted since the fall of the Sadaam Hussain regime in April 2003 found results unsatisfactory to those people expecting an overflow of pro-democracy attitude flowing through the Iraqi political system. In a survey about the kind of political system they would like to see in Iraq, only 36 percent of Baghdad residents favored British or American style democracy in which various parties compete openly for government.Transition to DemocracyA new born Iraqi democracy prepared on the model of the international community, is playing role of a midwife for democracy to grow. Yet if all is going well, it is still a challenge for the new government to get the trust of Iraqi people, show its capability to maintain order and compromises, and promote the maturity of democratic institutions. In fact, the democracy in Iraq which the political process and government designed to ensure that all of Iraq's communities have a voice will not be able to endure the challenges it will face in its significant early years. Because Saddam cultivated inter communal detestation, minor aggravations could twist out of control and spark great effort within a group conflicts in the early months after his fall. The first pictures after the fall of Baghdad showed that the population felt their suffering under Saddam is over. The liberation from a brutal dictator was celebrated by the folk yet in 2005 the majority of the Iraq was still thinking in the same way. There were the folk who were looking for better future. 67 % people have opinion that their country will turn to a better route. Before the elections January 2005 67% of the population supported the elections and 88 percent reported that they will take part in the voting. At the end 58 percent of the whole population voted, which is a good result for a country which makes its first experiences with democratic principles (Stolle, 2005, p. 18).As has often happened in a different places around the world, bigoted leaders of all of Iraq's communities might use a weak, new government by using their newborn freedom of speech and assembly to mix up hatred without any sentence. Some groups might take advantage of a new state's weakness to press for secession particularly the Kurds. Those who became rich and powerful under the Saddam Hussain regime might use their early advantages to maintain their continued supremacy by ignoring results of election. Establishing democratic institutions will be dependent on creating mutual expectations of cooperation and nonaggression both among leaders and the electorate, but developing these expectations requires time and peace to take root.Constitutional ChallengesThe plan for the democratization of Iraq by Bush administration is based upon adoption of the new short term constitution that can be successfully implemented by groups of Iraqi elites negotiating with one anothers concerns (Inglehart, 2000, p. 96). On the other hand, democracy cannot be achieved simply by introducing institutional changes through elite level maneuvering. Iraqis belong to tribes whose decision making is dominated by tribal elders(Ghattas, 2003, p. 31) History of Iraq shows that no government, including Saddam Husseins, could survive without considerable tribal support. In fact, the importance of tribes, which was falling down as Iraq urbanized, was revived by Saddam Husseins quest for political support. U.S. military capability cannot change that reality. Although American forces have arrested several tribal leaders under suspicion of supporting pro Hussein resistance; the CPA has largely sought to placate and mollify tribal leaders. According to Munqith Daghir, head of polling at the Iraqi Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, only 5 percent of Iraqis surveyed in June 2003 said they wanted to be governed by political parties. When asked what kind of political system they would like to see in Iraq, only 36 percent favored a British or American style multiparty democracy (Clover, 2003). However, 50 percent opted for one of the five variants of Islamic, presidential, or one-party, rule. A more recent survey of Baghdad residents conducted by the Gallup Organization found comparable results(Poll, 2003). While 39 percent of respondents would prefer a multiparty parliamentary democracy, 47 percent would prefer some form of Islamic-centered government. Present day Iraqi politics is truly something of a hornets nest. Consider, for example, the complex world of anti Baathist politics, where widespread manipulation among the numerous political groups places a further hindrance in the path of representative government. At present, popular debates in Iraq center more on past injustices rather than on future potentials. The new political fabric of the country must hold, for example, the likes of the Iraqi National Congresss Ahmad Chalabi, a Shiite, and other leaders of the group four million strong exile communities. Internally, although the main groups against Sadaam Hussein are Kurdish and Shiite, still a large number of parties and other political organizations are either being established or regrouping themselves on the political picture, from the communists on the far left to the constitutional monarchists on the conservative right(Basham, 2005, p. 9) Everyone is desirous of benefiting from the fall of the Hussein scene, if possible at the expense of opponents. Yassir Muhammad Ali, who leads a million-strong tribe, candidly asserts, We need guarantees that our tribe will be looked after in the new regime(Telegraph, 2003). There must be a balance of power between those promising to different elucidation of the Muslim faith. Shiite Arabs including Iranian supported fundamentalists, dominate demographically throughout southern Iraq. Sunni Arabs formed the demographic backbone of Husseins regime; they live mainly in central and northern Iraq. There is a large Sunni Kurdish majority in northern Iraq. Iraq, therefore, must tackle the ground reality that the more harmonized population of the society, the more possibility there is to occurrence of peaceful democratization (Barro, p. 28) It is the first opportunity for the Shia community to dominate Iraqi politics. In the short term, the possibility for Shia to politically dominate is supported by a hierarchical organizational structure relative to the Sunni organizational arrangement. Hence, new political institutions of Iraq must be fabricated to prevent the long suppressed fundamentalist Shia from, first, tacking severe revenge upon the minority Arab Sunnis, who have governed Iraq since the days of the Ottoman Empire, and, second, disregarding the legitimate needs of the Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrian Christians, urban secularists, and others. It will be dreadfully difficult to recognize a new Iraqi political leadership that could be acceptable to all Iraqi sects. Political restoration means signaling a new political negotiation among the same old groups with contradictory interests and demands that historically have seen Iraq a deeply static country. Consequently, it is a common understatement to suggest that it will require a highly experienced political leadership to successfully form a track through the diverse sections carrying out Iraqs domestic politics(Kelidar, 2003). The first five of the following subsections deal with the constitutional options that are the most commonly discussed instruments for determining the makeup of Iraqs new governing structure. Other challenges are discussed thereafter.Democratic DevelopmentShort after the fall of Saddam's regime, most Iraqi towns and cities, including the major urban areas, established governing councils that were chosen through negotiation processes, often involving elections. The example of genuine 'grassroots democracy' in Baghdad is particularly enlightening. Despite having a severe problem of law and order, the city was still able in autumn 2003 to form 88 neighborhood councils, which then in turn elected a 37 member council for the whole city (Friedman, 12 October 2003). In spite of continual threats from anti democratic forces, the council continued to regularly hold public meetings and formulate policies. The growing of local self government councils proved to be one of the major successes under the occupation. Though the councils were not elected yet were selected through peaceful and relatively negotiations, and provided forums for exceptional amounts of open debate and public contribution. As such the selected councils also highlighted remarkable signs of progress, and would finally be brought under the electoral principle exclusive of fundamental disturbance(Dawisha, 2005, p. 733) On the other hand, the national level saw, the unitary and all encompassing Ba'th Party being replaced by an excess of political parties. These ran the ideological scope from left to right, and symbolized secular as well as religious apprehensions. Some political parties organizationally developed themselves to a national reach with offices in more than one city. On the other hand some of them concentrated their attention on building support on narrower ethnic or tribal bases. Many of these parties stepped forward to build alliances, combining around a common policy or political demand. One example was the co-ordination among leftist parties in highlighting the plight of the unemployed. Some other various, politically disparate, groups strived to work out coalitions of parties opposed to the interim government of Iyad Allawi (Al-Zaman, 29 July 2004) This protest of opposition peacefully and within the democratic 'rules of the game' is one such sign one expects to see if democracy in Iraq is to be persistent. At the level of civil society many important professional sections representing journalists, physicians, engineers, lawyers, writers, university professors, pharmacists and others have rejected the old leaders that Saddam forced on them and elected new ones in their place. These newly established sections not only demanded for the institution of a democratic political system, but were also keen to take active part in the political life of the new Iraq. On the preparatory committee of the physicians' syndicate, for example, sat doctors who also held memberships in 14 of the new political parties. Additionally, large numbers of literary and artistic groups put on productions and festivals that celebrated freedoms they had not enjoyed for more than four decades.First Election in Iraq Post Sadaam HussainThe concept of democracy first became clear in June 2004, when the US Coalition Provisional Authority transferred partial control to a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government with Iyad Allawi as its prime minister. The Allawis government was formed with an intention to provide the US another half year to continue to outline Iraqs governance before elections created a new and more lasting body. Practically, on the other hand, the lack of Iraqi Sunni participation in the general elections on January 30, 2005, was a benefit to Iran and a blow to the American goal of creating a comprehensive political process that would bring stability to Iraq(Cordesman, July 3, 2012, p. 36). The elections were made-up to form a broadly based 275 member National Assembly that would write Iraqs new constitution. However, the Sunni boycott was apparent in the results, as 240 of the 275 seats were won by three parties: the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won 140 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance won 75 seats, and the Iraqiyya List, led by Iyad Allawi, won 40 seats (Population Estimates and Voter Turnout for Iraq's 18 Provinces, 2005). The UIA coalition integration was the hallmark of the election which was intensified by a pivotal role by Iran in bringing most of the Iraqs Shiite political groups together, most important of these were the Abdul Aziz al Hakim led Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Nouri al Malikis Dawa Party (Population Estimates and Voter Turnout for Iraq's 18 Provinces, 2005). In the Kurdistan Alliance, there were two major parties i.e. the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUKs leader Jalal Talibani became President of Iraq and Massoud Barzani became President of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Ibrahim al Jaafari of the Dawa Party became Prime Minister.A new 275-member Council of Representatives was formed in the second round of elections on December 15, 2005, having a five year term. Once again by winning 128 seats, the Shiite dominated United Iraqi Alliance became the largest bloc in the Council of Representatives. The bloc gained even more strength this time by joining of Muqtada al Sadrs followers to the bloc. This resulted in up lift of Islamic parties and many leaders, who had been exiled in Iran, got leading positions. The Kurds won 53 seats. The Sunni Arab Tawafuq party, also known as the Iraq Accord Front, won 44 seats and remains third. Allawis former coalition Iraqiyya List joined others to form the Iraqiyya National List, which won only 25 seats. Iran was instrumental in assembling the United Iraqi Alliance, whose formation of the government that followed saw Nouri al Maliki of the Shiite Dawa Party replace Jaafari as Prime Minister, SCIRI gain several important ministerial posts, and five Sadrists take ministerial posts (Cordesman, July 3, 2012, p. 36).

Provincial Election 2009The last Iraqi elections paved the way to division of Iraq, challenging its progress in governance, and making it difficult for Iraq and the US to move forward in reaching feasible plans to put into practice their Strategic Framework Agreement. The January 2009 provincial elections experienced the breaking up of the Iranian backed coalition that had formed the United Iraqi Alliance. Malikis Dawa Party separated from ISCI and formed a new list called State of Law. The three major Iraqi Shiite parties were competing with each other; further reducing Irans influence(Cordesman, July 3, 2012, p. 37) State of Law came in first in most Shiite governorates; while ISCIs best performance in the South was in Najaf, where it tied with State of Law for seven seats each out of 28 in the governorate council. Sadrs list performed even worse, failing to win any governorate outright (Cordesman, July 3, 2012, p. 37). Despite the failure of Irans attempt to renew the United Iraqi Alliance, yet the post- election complications provided Iran a major role in forming the next Iraqi government.Parliamentary Elections The bicameral parliament is called National Assembly according to the Constitution of 2005. The Council of Representatives consist of 325 deputies is the lower house, and the Council of Union is the upper house. The results March 7, 2010 parliamentary elections showed a very different outcome than earlier elections, and which virtually paralyzed many aspects of Iraqs political, economic, and security development. Iyad Allawis Iraqiyya list won the most seats with 91, while Maliki and his allies who split from the United Iraqi Alliance to form the State of Law list won 89. The successor to the UIA, the Iraqi National Alliance, won 70 seats and the Kurds 57 (Iraqi COR Election Results," the Independent High Electoral Commission, 2010). These election results to begin with looked encouraging to the US, because the two candidates considered largely as more secular and less connected to militias had scored the most votes, and the likelihood for comprehensive government seemed promising. Iran had pushed for a unity Shiite alliance, though according to Reidar Visser, it only wanted to allow Sunnis token power. Allawi had also often warned in Iraq and foreign cities of the danger of Iranian influence. Allawi initially had broad-based appeal(The Washington Post, 2010). In one poll, 56% of Iraqis said they would not see the government as fully legitimate if Allawi was not part of it, while 31% said they would see it as legitimate or somewhat legitimate (Fadel, 2010). The Reliability of the vote was challenged by Maliki who acted rapidly to form a new coalition that gave him more votes in Parliament than Allawi. He held the office proficiently and expelled Iraqiyya list and his main rivals from power effectively. This coalition not only permitted Maliki to govern by giving him control over much of the budget and the ability to dominate Iraqs security forces which also included the authority to put supporter in many key command positions by making temporary appointments, and enduring the sale of other positions and exploiting the security structure by those he considered loyalists.Election 2014After the departure of the American troops from the Iraq, first parliamentary elections held on 30 April 2014. There is not yet formed the upper house, the elections were held only for the lower house. There were 107 registered political parties and 9040 candidates including 2612 women. There were 20.6 million voters on the electoral roll.(Ivanov, May 13, 2014, p. 1) A serious terrorist threat in the country was still present but the voting was held with the highest possible security measures in place. Markedly, there were only two instances of attacks on polling stations registered on the day of voting which shows the success of the security plan on the occasion. It has already become clear that none of the political parties represented on the Iraqi political arena will be able to qualify on its own for the sole unconditional victory in these parliamentary elections again, Nori al Maliki has suggested that, after the election results are finalised, a government of parliamentary majority should be formed, which will supposedly reflect the mood of the majority of Iraqs population (Ivanov, May 13, 2014, p. 1).ConclusionThe situation of Iraq highlights clearly the Iraqi society has not yet been able to recognize democratic culture as was expected from the Bush policy in the country and the larger Middle East region had hoped. The ethnic and sectarian division within the society manifested by inflexible violence continues to destroy and characterize the Iraqi political system even after eleven years. In this very short period, Washington and the international community cannot publicize democratic culture in Iraq. This is further intensified by the fault of the current political, religious, ethnic, and sectarian lines which are deeply embedded in Iraqi society. No doubt, Iraqis are already being provided the opportunity to fabricate a stable democracy with the assistance of American military. But a hard work is certainly required on the part of Iraqi people to bridge their ever increasing divides, exceed ethnocentric hostility and will have to include all voices in the political process, and will have to start building a national identity which can submerge all ethnic identities and form a unified Iraq. It is also very important for the United States to take Iran and other regional neighbors who continue to retain client networks in Iraq over security issues, stability and reconstruction in Iraq in to consultation. If these internal ethno sectarian disputes in Iraqi society are properly handled by the Iraqi political leadership, democracy in Iraq may turn out to be just fine in the long term. This may calm down the uneasiness in Sunni circles and their fears may greatly be abolished. But this is a real test of ability of the Iraqi political leadership. The results depend intensely upon cultivating a new mindset by the Iraqi political leadership,a mindset that gives priority to building a national identity over ethno sectarian identity. That is, a new way of thinking about the future of their country, a shared future in which every Iraqi, Shiite, Sunni or Kurd is embraced, and has a place and a voice in rebuilding their nation.

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