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The 7 July 2012 elections for the GeneralNational Congress marked the end of Libya’spostrevolution interim phase but certainly notthe end of its transition. While this successfuland relatively peaceful milestone represents asignificant achievement in a country with vir-tually no experience in modern democraticprocesses, the challenges ahead remaindaunting. The events of 11 September 2012in Benghazi, in which the US ambassadorand three other US consulate staff memberslost their lives, were symptomatic of the con-tinuing difficulties the country is facing in es-tablishing the rule of law and asserting gov-ernment control over the myriad militias.

While these events, along with other re-cent clashes throughout the country, mayhave dampened initial optimism followingthe fall of the Qaddafi regime and obscuredthe country’s electoral achievements and otheraccomplishments, they serve as a reminderthat revolutionary transitions are never linear,and that the fog of war often extends to its af-termath. This is one lesson that has guidedthe design, deployment, and work of the UNSupport Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) sinceits authorization by the Security Council on16 September 2011, through Resolution 2040.This lesson will also need to be firmly em-bedded in the mission’s strategies as it pre-pares to navigate, under new leadership, a tu-multuous period ahead.

In October 2012, Tarek Mitri of Lebanonreplaced Ian Martin as the Special Represen-tative and Head of Mission of UNSMIL.

Background

After forty-two years in power, ColonelMuam mar Qaddafi’s regime fell in August

2011 after a six-month offensive. The transi-tion was ignited by antigovernment proteststhat began in February. When the regimecracked down harshly in response, it promptedmore widespread protests and the creation ofthe National Transitional Council (NTC) tocoordinate resistance activities. Following aMarch 2011 Security Council resolution call-ing for member states to protect civilians andimposing a no-fly zone, NATO launched a se-ries of air strikes through Operation UnifiedProtector to support the NTC.

When, in April 2011, UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon named Ian Martin as

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Special Adviser for postconflict planning inLibya, the UN’s understanding of the Libyancontext was fairly limited. Despite a histori-cal presence dating back to Adrian Pelt’s daysas UN Commissioner to Libya in 1951, UNengagement in the country had since beenrather modest, with a small UN Country Teamimplementing individual government-fundedprojects. During the conflict, a majority ofthe humanitarian interventions, and staff,were confined to Benghazi, with only small-scale involvement throughout the rest of thecountry, and the west in particular, followingTripoli’s fall.

In this context, Special Adviser Martininitiated a pre-assessment process designed toupdate the organization’s collective knowl-edge of the Libyan context.1 Its findings in-formed, in part, the recommendation by theSecretary-General to the Security Council forthe phased deployment of a UN political mis-sion once the conflict entered its final phase.Be yond the need to provide immediate support

to the new authorities in several critical areas,an initial three-month mandate that began inSeptember 2011 under the leadership of Mar-tin as the then Special Representative of theSecretary-General (SRSG) provided UNSMILthe time to strengthen its situation analysis andengage with Libyan counterparts to formulateproposals for a longer-term mission. Becausethe formation of the government was delayed,the Secretary-General requested a three-monthextension to the mandate in November 2011 toallow the UN to fully engage with national in-terlocutors and confirm the areas for whichUN support would be requested. The missionplanning process for a longer-term mandatebegan in earnest upon the formation of the in-terim government in late November.

The Security Council authorized a newmandate for UNSMIL on 7 March 2012, onthe basis of the Secretary-General’s recom-mendations and the mission planning process,which identified a number of parameters forlonger-term engagement. The first parameterrelates to the recognition that, in a context ofhigh fluidity and uncertainty, national counter-parts would for the most part operate through-out the transition in a short-term, crisis-man-agement mode, rendering fixed, long-termplans and large contingents of foreign expert-ise somewhat unnecessary.

In addition, contacts with government of-ficials and civil society leaders confirmed apreference for a light UN footprint in recog-nition of Libya’s considerable human and fi-nancial resources as well as its historical mis-trust of international involvement. In thiscase, the local context, which dictated theneed for a “small” UN presence, also suitedthe broader geopolitical and economic realitiesin the Security Council, with several memberstates anxious to keep costs of peace opera-tions down and others harboring lingering re-sentment over NATO’s intervention in Libya.

Finally, it became evident that the UN’slegitimacy would be a function of its abilityto tailor the nature, content, and pace of itssupport to Libyan-defined parameters, in-cluding timing and depth of assistance, and

• Authorization and 16 September 2011 (UNSC Res. 2009)Start Date

• SRSG Tarek Mitri (Lebanon)• Budget $32.6 million (1 January 2012–

31 December 2012)• Strength as of Police: 131 October 2012 International Civilian Staff: 137

National Civilian Staff: 23For detailed mission information see p. 442

UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

• Authorization Date 20 October 2011 (PSC/PR/Comm/2.[CCXCVII])

• Head of Office Ambassador Mondher Rezgui (Tunisia)• Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 330 September 2012

AU Liaison Office in Libya

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that such parameters would vary according tothe evolving political realities of the country.As SRSG Martin indicated in the recommen-dations submitted to the Secretary-General,the UN’s role in Libya would need to beearned, not just claimed.

UNSMIL’s Mandate and Concept of OperationsUNSMIL’s mandate spans a wide range oftasks, from supporting the democratic transi-tion, including the electoral and constitutional

process, to assisting authorities in ensuringpublic safety, countering the illicit prolifera-tion of weapons, protecting human rights andpromoting the rule of law, managing a transi-tional justice process, and coordinating inter-national assistance.

To meet these broad responsibilities, UNSMIL has implemented a particular con-cept of operations. While not small in ab-solute terms (UNSMIL’s 2012 budget calledfor 272 staff), the mission has operated with asignificantly lighter footprint compared to

LIBYA • 105

UN personnel in peacekeeping and politi-cal missions operate in hazardous envi-ronments that are often experiencing orjust emerging from violent conflict. In thisregard, 2012 was a particularly importantyear as UN peace operations were de-ployed in environments with continuingviolence, as in Syria, and into newly se-cured areas, as is the case with the UN’sPolitical Office for Somalia (UNPOS).

As of October, UN peace operationssuffered seventy-nine fatalities in 2012,with significant losses in theaters suchas Darfur, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, and Côte d’Ivoire. This repre-sents a nearly 20 percent decrease fromfatalities that occurred in the same pe-riod in 2011, an important signal ofprog ress in the UN’s agenda on increas-ing the safety of the environments inwhich its personnel operate. However,despite the decrease in overall fatalitiesin UN peace operations, UN personnelin the field are often subject to harass-ment, intimidation, and kidnappings.While peacekeepers often suffer dispro-portionate fatalities in the field, politicalmissions are also subject to hazardousenvironments. The attack on the convoyof the Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General in Libya in April and a

repeated attack on a UN convoy there inDecember 2012, as well as the restrictedmovement that encumbers staff membersof the UN Political Office for Somalia,underscore these challenges. The UN hassought to address these issues by enact-ing new security policies and programsaimed at managing risk.

The UN’s security risk managementsystem has responsibility for over 150,000personnel in over 170 countries, over 80percent of whom are active in peace oper-ations.1 The UN’s Department of Safetyand Security, the body responsible forthe oversight of the security managementsystem, has sought to further strengthenits management capacity by analyzingsystemwide best practices and informa-tion on the range and scope of safety andsecurity incidents involving its person-nel. Concurrently, the UN introduced asecurity policy manual in 2011 to reflectthe changes in its security policy. Themanual is available to all UN personnel,including nationally recruited staff.

Despite these measures, the primaryresponsibility for the safety of UN per-sonnel remains with the member states.However, less than half of the UN’s 193member states are signatories to the 1994Convention on the Safety and Security of

United Nations and Associated Person-nel. In August 2010 the convention wasextended to include personnel providingpolitical or peacebuilding assistance.While this was an important step in fur-thering legal protection to staff ers, onlytwenty-eight member states have ratifiedthe optional protocol.

In 2012, peace operations conductedtheir work in challenging security envi-ronments. Security concerns hamperedthe reporting and monitoring activitiesof the UN Supervision Mission in Syria(UNSMIS) and ultimately contributed tothe mission’s suspension. In light of a deteriorating security environment, theUN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)took measures to increase the protectionof its personnel, while the UN Operationin Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) deferred theplanned drawdown of military person-nel. While peace operations will continueto work in precarious security environ-ments, operational challenges, includinginadequate coordination between the UNand host governments and lack of ade-quate resources, hamper the ability ofpersonnel in the field to safely and se-curely fulfill the Security Council’s man-dated tasks.

Safety and Security in UN Peace Operations

Note: 1. These include uniformed personnel, civilian personnel, and UN volunteers.

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most UN missions deployed in the immediateaftermath of conflict, most of which also in-clude large military or police components orboth. Its modus operandi requires, in part, theuse of external civilian capacity modalities tocomplement the work of a core staff of UNadvisers who focus on providing strategic-level assistance while identifying the mostappropriate technical-level sources of exper -tise to meet Libyan requests.

Key Developments

Given the tight transitional timeline that theNational Transitional Council had articulatedin the summer of 2011, UNSMIL’s concept ofoperations was put to the test as soon as itwas deployed. The immediate focus was oninitiating support for the electoral process,with UNSMIL advisers presenting differentelectoral systems and building the knowledgebase of the electoral commission. With theNTC’s adoption of an electoral legal frame-work in January 2012, the emphasis thenswitched to operational requirements, withUNSMIL, in partnership with the UN Officefor Project Services (UNOPS) and the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP), workingto support the national electoral commissionwhile launching a countrywide civic educa-tion campaign.

The electoral support culminated in thehistoric elections of July 2012, the peacefultransfer of power between the NTC and thenew General National Congress, and the nom-ination of a new president and a new primeminister by September 2012.

In addition to assisting with this transferof power, UNSMIL has also been working tosustain and enhance the nascent electoral ca-pacities in preparation for the next steps inthe transition, including the constitutionalreferendum. The mission’s electoral supportstrategy reflects its overall approach of gen-erating options and explaining the require-ments, while leaving responsibility and thusownership for hard political choices through-out the process entirely with the Libyans.

Success on the electoral front marks astark contrast with the challenges in the areaof security sector reform and the disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) ofmilitia members. While the various militiasthat took part in the revolution have contin-ued to provide the only source of security,safeguarding vital economic infrastructure inparticular, they have also been involved in anumber of factional clashes and have beenunable to prevent a string of attacks, sinceFebruary 2012, on the international commu-nity. Repeated attempts by the NTC to rein inthe militias have failed to produce agreementson ways to either integrate militia membersinto the armed services or reintegrate theminto their communities.

While UNSMIL has regularly providedstrategic and technical advisory services, in-cluding through the sharing of similar experi-ences in other contexts, the DDR process hasbeen repeatedly undermined by competingclaims of authority within the Libyan govern-ment and the absence of a single legitimateentity that is sufficiently strong to settle theongoing power struggles. The establishmentof a nationally elected government is nowlikely to offer an opportunity for UNSMILand other partners to leverage its legitimacy,accelerate the DDR process, and build on theinitial efforts in early 2012 in order to de-velop a vision for the security sector as awhole through the drafting of a white paperwith external expertise provided at regular intervals.

The promotion of rule of law and respectfor human rights has also presented a set ofdistinct challenges. While UNSMIL has stayedclear of certain sensitive issues that lie beyondits remit, such as the trial of Saif al-Islam,Muammar Qaddafi’s son and a prominent op-ponent of the NTC during the uprising, it hasregularly reminded the Libyan authorities oftheir obligations and commitments, and of-fered assistance in particular for the transferof an estimated 7,000 conflict-related detain -ees from militia-supervised facilities to gov-ernment control. While some progress was

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LIBYA • 107

reported by September 2012, completion ofthe process has been delayed by a lack ofgovernment capacities and lingering reluc-tance on the part of several militias to pro-vide information on their detainees, let alonetransfer them. The absence of a nationallyelected government in UNSMIL’s first yearof operations also prevented progress on tran-sitional justice mechanisms, an area wherethe mission has focused its efforts on raisingawareness and sharing experiences from othercountries. In early 2012, a series of incidentsinvolving the large migrant community pri-marily from North and sub-Saharan Africa inSabha as well as in Tripoli also led the mis-sion to intervene and remind Libya of its ob-ligations to protect the rights of migrants andrefugees.

UNSMIL has had to leverage its coordi-nation mandate to address unforeseen chal-lenges. In December 2011, delays in unfreez-ing Libya’s foreign assets sparked fears of anacute liquidity crisis and threatened to under-mine Libya’s trust in the international com-munity. Throughout the process, UNSMIL,through its interventions in Libya and at theSecurity Council, played an important role inhighlighting the political repercussions of aprolonged delay and in providing the plat-form on which partners could engage and ad-dress the range of technical obstacles to re-leasing the funds. Since then, UNSMIL hasconvened similar platforms, notably on bor-der management and weapons proliferation,supporting the work of the UN Sanctions Com-mittee on Libya, which oversees sanctions re-garding the freezing of assets, travel bans,and arms embargo.

The mission should expect to be calledupon to play a similar role in the com-ing months, notably on the issue of transi-tional justice and rule of law. Coordination of international assistance, however, one of UNSMIL’s core mandate areas, has been prob-lematic at times, notably in the security sector,given the high stakes involved and the com-peting agendas among various internationalactors.

Conclusion

Libya’s transition has inevitably been a hap-hazard affair, sputtering forward, sideways,and backward, with little visibility and fewcertainties. The postconflict environment andthe specific parameters set by the Libyan au-thorities have made it difficult for the UN toset up and abide by long-term plans and es-tablish a large permanent presence.

Instead, the outlook for the months aheadwill require UNSMIL and UN agencies tocontinue to manage such volatility in partner-ship with Libyan authorities, and be able torevisit plans, modify deployments, and avoidimplementation approaches that leave littleroom for adaptation to changing circum-stances. As UNSMIL has repeatedly empha-sized, the fulfillment of Libyans’ democraticaspirations will take time, and be subjected tomultiple sources of pressure. This messagehas been critical in providing Libyan author-ities with the space and the time to definetheir own priorities and learn the processesand habits of democratic governance.

Girls wave and flash victory signs at a passing helicopter during a military parade on 11 June 2012 in the western Libyan city of Zawia to mark the anniversary of an uprising in 2011 that cleared the way

for the thuwwars’ (freedom fighters) march on Tripoli.

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108 • MISSION NOTES

If the recent surge in violence across thecountry is any indication, both time and spaceare now shrinking. The immediate challengewill now be for the newly elected governmentto assert full control of the country andpeacefully address historical grievances thathad been suppressed for decades. The reform

of the security sector and the transitional jus-tice process in particular will test UNSMILand the UN system’s capacity more generallyto manage those turbulences and navigatethrough the country’s democratic transition aseffectively as possible.

Note

1. This assessment covered Libya’s history, institutions, political dynamics, and socioeconomic re-alities in order to generate a number of common assumptions about the postconflict context, whichwould require validation once deployment became permissible and appropriate.

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