global networking - dticglobal networking may–june 2005 pb 700-05-03 headquarters, department of...

Global Networking

MAY–JUNE 2005

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Army Logistician. Volume 37, Issue 3. May-June 2005

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PB 700–05–03VOLUME 37, ISSUE 3MAY–JUNE 2005

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General Ann E. DunwoodyCommanderArmy Combined Arms Support Command

MembersThe Honorable Claude M. Bolton, Jr.Assistant Secretary of the ArmyAcquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Lieutenant General C. V. ChristiansonDeputy Chief of Staff, G–4Department of the Army

General Benjamin S. GriffinCommanderArmy Materiel Command

ARMY LOGISTICSMANAGEMENT COLLEGE

Colonel Robert J. McNeilCommandant

Barbara G. MroczkowskiAssistant Commandant

STAFFJanice W. Heretick, EditorRobert D. Paulus, Associate EditorJanice L. Simmons, Assistant EditorApril K. Morgan, Assistant EditorLouanne E. Birkner, Administrative Assistant

Graphic arts and layout byRCW Communication Design Inc.

This medium is approved for the official dissemi-nation of material designed to keep individualswithin the Army knowledgeable of current andemerging developments within their areas ofexpertise for the purpose of enhancing their pro-fessional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

World Wide Web address:http://www.almc.army.mil/alog

Cover: To manage the increasing support requirements of the ModularForce, Army logisticians need a robust communications network that canprovide on-the-move access to critical information. The article beginningon page 2 summarizes developments in Army communications thataffect the logistician and the warfighter alike, such as the WarfighterInformation Network-Tactical (WIN–T) and the Joint Network TransportCapability-Spiral (JNTC–S). The cover photo shows a soldier with animportant component of the communications network, the Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal (CSS VSAT), which connectslogisticians to a global network of logistics information by satellite.

SANDRA R. RILEYAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army0505901

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

1 News

2 A Communications Network for Today’s Logisticians—Lieutenant Colonel Tony C. Munson and Lieutenant Colonel Forrest Burke

5 RFID Vision in the DOD Supply Chain—Alan F. Estevez

10 Information Technology for Marine Corps Ammunition—Steven M. Crittenden

14 Chronic Medications in Iraq: A True Army Lesson Learned—Major Greta L. Bennett

16 Patriot and Avenger Reset—Kim C. Russell and Mark L. Sheffield

19 Installation Management—From Camp Swampy to the StarshipEnterprise—John Di Genio

22 Equipping the Iraqi Security Forces—Chief Warrant Officer (W–3) Brian Edwards

24 LOGCAP 101: An Operational Planner’s Guide—Colonel Karen E. LeDoux

30 Airlift Operations During the Lebanon Crisis—Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Olinger

34 Commentary: Slaying the Manpower Dragon—James T. Delisi

36 Commentary: Confused or Absolved? Our COMMZ ‘Megaproblem’—Colonel Christopher R. Paparone

38 A New Tool for Simulation Modeling of Logistics Support—Alan Santucci and Dr. Tayfur Altiok

45 Writing for Army Logistician

ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS 1

ARMY BUDGET PLAN ADVANCESMODULAR FORCE AND FCS

The President’s budget proposals forwarded toCongress in February call for significant boosts in spending for two key Army Transformation efforts: the Modular Force and the Future CombatSystems (FCS).

The Army’s budget request for fiscal year 2006seeks to increase spending on the FCS program by$200 million, to a total of $3.405 billion. The high-er spending reflects the Army’s decision last July torestructure the program to introduce, or “spiral,”individual FCS capabilities to the field in 2-yearincrements as they mature, while continuing todevelop the overall “system of systems.”

The supplemental budget for fiscal year 2005asks for $5 billion for the Army’s transition to theModular Force. Under this program, the Army iscreating new, more flexible, more self-sufficientbrigades. These brigades will be the Army’s basiccombat units, shifting the Army from a division- toa brigade-centric organization. The requested fundswill support the standup of three new brigades thisyear as part of the Army’s plan to add 10 brigades tothe existing 33 in the Active Army.

The fiscal year 2006 budget seeks to acquire240 Stryker vehicles for $878 million to equip thesixth Stryker brigade combat team; 360 uparmoredhigh-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles(HMMWVs) and 1,705 heavy-chassis HMMWVsfor $224 million; 3,529 trucks in the family ofmedium tactical vehicles for $450 million; 2,002trucks in the family of heavy tactical vehicles for$207 million; and 41 UH–60 Black Hawk utilityhelicopters for $585 million.

Total Army spending under the proposed fiscalyear 2006 budget would be $98.6 billion, a slight de-cline (1.4 percent) from the $99.994 billionappropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2005.(These figures do not include supplemental appro-priations, which brought total spending for fiscalyear 2005 to $115.011 billion.) The Army budgetrequest amounts to 23.5 percent of the President’soverall Department of Defense budget request of$419.3 billion.

Fiscal year 2006 spending requests in the majorappropriation categories compare to fiscal year 2005

appropriations, excluding supplemental appropria-tions, as follows—

• Military personnel: $41.413 billion, up $2.466billion, or 6.3 percent.

• Operation and maintenance: $31.813 billion,down $45 million, or less than 1 percent.

• Procurement: $11.755 billion, down $1.330 bil-lion, or 10.2 percent.

• Research, development, test, and evaluation:$9.734 billion, down $807 million, or 7.7 percent.

• Military construction: $1.913 billion, down$211 million, or 9.9 percent.

• Family housing: $1.363 billion, down $202million, or 12.9 percent.

The funding proposed for fiscal year 2006 willsupport Active Army ground operating tempotraining annually for each vehicle of 765 live milesand 85 virtual miles and 13.1 live flying hoursmonthly for each aircrew in the Active Army. Italso will support 11 brigade rotations each throughthe National Training Center and the Joint Readi-ness Training Center, 4 brigade rotations throughthe Combat Maneuver Training Center in Ger-many, and 3 corps-level Warfighter exercises and 7division-level command and staff groups throughthe Battle Command Training Program.

The fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriationsrequest includes $3.3 billion for force protectionmeasures such as adding armor to convoy trucks and$5.4 billion for refurbishing and replacing worn-outor damaged equipment used in Operations IraqiFreedom and Enduring Freedom. (These figures aremostly, but not exclusively, for the Army.) OverallArmy spending in the supplemental request amountsto $41.216 billion.

The President also is seeking an Army budget of$110.081 billion in fiscal year 2007.

ARMY SETS NEW STRATEGICPLANNING GUIDANCE

Improving joint logistics capabilities is one of thestrategic imperatives announced in the new ArmyStrategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). The ASPG isa long-range planning guide that defines the Army’sstrategy for the next 10 to 20 years. Usually pub-lished every 2 years, this out-of-cycle revision of the2004 guidance was necessary to meet requirementsset forth in the Department of Defense StrategicPlanning Guidance. Secretary of the Army FrancisJ. Harvey approved the new ASPG in January.

ALOG NEWS

(ALOG NEWS continued on page 41)

MAY–JUNE 20052

team (BCT), unit of employment x (UEx, a divisionequivalent), and unit of employment y (UEy, a theaterand corps equivalent) warfighting platforms, strategicreach-back sites, and signal formations. This informa-tion technology effort includes hardware, software, train-ing, and elements of network management, informationassurance, and information dissemination management.

The Army’s Bridge to Future Networks (BFN) con-cepts are providing warfighters with the commercial off-the-shelf communications backbone that enablesvoice, data, and video information exchanges throughout

The challenge for the Armylogistics community is tosupport the speedy deploy-

ment of soldiers and equipmentand to sustain them through mis-sion accomplishment. A combattask force generates thousandsof supply requests a day. Tomanage that workload andquickly and efficiently processrequests from the battlefield insupport of the warfighter, thelogistician clearly needs a robustcommunications network.

Current tactical communica-tions systems, from the SingleChannel Ground and AirborneRadio System (SINCGARS) toMobile Subscriber Equipment(MSE) and the Tri-Services Tacti-cal Communications (TRI–TAC)system, served well to supportyesterday’s command, control,and support services, whichrelied heavily on voice and shorttext messaging at security levelsof secret collateral and below.But today’s commander needs anetwork that permits mountedand dismounted, on-the-move communications; dissem-inates information at all levels of security; extends reachand reach-back capabilities; and provides increasedthroughput to support warfighter operations.

Because the Army tactical communications networkof the 1990s does not support current needs, Army sig-nalers and logisticians have been designing connectivityand bandwidth capabilities that will allow warfighters toget the supplies they need when they need them. TheArmy is rapidly infusing state-of-the-art, commercialoff-the-shelf information technology into brigade combat

A Communications Networkfor Today’s Logisticians

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL TONY C. MUNSON AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL FORREST BURKE

The Army is improving its tactical communications systemsso that commanders and logisticians have the on-the-move accessto critical information they need on today’s battlefield.

The battlefield of the future, featuring the Army’s units ofemployment and brigade combat teams functioning as part ofjoint task forces, will depend on the infusion of state-of-the-art,commercial off-the-shelf information technology to providelogistics support to the warfighter.

Support andSustaining Base

Home StationOperations Center

Stryker BrigadeCombat Team

BrigadeCombat Team

Unit ofEmployment

Future CombatSystem

LandWarrior

MarineCorps

Joint Task Force

Naval Force

Joint Task Force

Joint, Interagency, and

Multinational

the tactical UEy and into the sustaining base. TheBFN is replacing the Area Common User SystemModernization Plan and takes advantage of existingand directed capabilities. The BFN primarily enhancesbattle command technological capabilities.

Communications capabilities for specific combatservice support (CSS) and intelligence programs con-tinue to be developed and recapitalized to meet program-specific requirements. Examples include theAN/TSQ–190 Trojan SPIRIT (Special Purpose Inte-grated Remote Intelligence Terminal), theAN/MLQ–40 Prophet system, and CSS businesscommunications initiatives like “Connect the Logisti-cian.” [Trojan SPIRIT is a satellite terminal that pro-vides access to intelligence systems. Prophet is theprincipal signals intelligence and electronic warfaresystem for the division and armored cavalry regiment.]

Major Change for the Signal CorpsThe Army’s new division construct—the BCT and

the UEx headquarters—is transforming the Army andthe signal services. In practice, all division-level sig-nal battalions in the Army are going away. To keep thenetwork whole, the UEx will have a G–6 who also willbe the “commander of the network” and will beresponsible for integrating the BCTs into the overallUEx network, managing the network, and defendingthe network at the UEx level.

Signal services will reside inside the BCTs as wellas inside the UEx. This arrangement will ensure that

each BCT can provide its own signal support withminimal dependence on higher echelons. This de-centralization promises to be a major change for theSignal Corps.

Each light BCT will consist of a brigade troop bat-talion that includes a signal company, an engineercompany, and a military intelligence company. ThisBCT also will have two infantry battalions similar tothe ones deployed in Iraq. This approach allows stafffunctions previously performed at the division level tobe pushed down to the infantry BCT level. A UEx willreplace division main headquarters.

Signal support organizations will drastically reducethe need for remote signal sites on hilltops, therebyminimizing the requirement for force protection ofthose remote sites, and reduce the wheeled-vehiclefootprint of existing signal support units at the UEy(theater and corps), UEx (division), and BCT levels.

Tactical Warfighter Information“The Army has accelerated the implementation

schedule of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN–T),” said Lieutenant General StevenBoutelle, the Army’s Chief Information Officer/G–6,“and is providing interim networking capability, band-width, and connectivity through the Joint NetworkTransport Capability-Spiral (JNTC–S).” The JNTC–Sfills a gap in bandwidth capability for command andcontrol, CSS, and intelligence beyond-line-of-sightcommunications support down to the battalion level.


Prophet (left) and Trojan SPIRIT (right) are tactical intelligence systems.

MAY–JUNE 20054

[WIN–T will replace MSE and TRI–TAC as the foun-dation system for routing tactical information.]

Currently, the JNTC–S is being fielded to the 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized) as it converts to lighterBCTs. JNTC–S will serve both the BCTs and the UExand will replace MSE as the networking element of thebattlefield infostructure.

The concept behind JNTC–S is that satellites play akey role in providing communications links. The 3dInfantry Division’s JNTC–S capability provides amixed satellite and line-of-sight architecture from theUEx level down to the battalion level. Voice over Inter-net Protocol (VoIP) will enable a commanding generalto talk to individual battalion commanders. The VoIPtelephones are slated to replace existing digital andmost circuit-based telephone systems, providinggreater bandwidth efficiency across the network.

The extended networking capability provided by theJNTC–S will affect the way in which the UEx allocatesforces. In the past, a division would dispatch a BCT tocarry out a mission 100 miles away. Now, with newsatellite assets, a battalion may be sufficient to per-form the same mission. Units not fielded with thiscapability will use gateway switches to interface withunits possessing the new technology.

Custom Network for Supply and MaintenanceWarfighters around the globe are starting to benefit

from the capabilities of new network systems. TheCSS Very Small Aperture Terminal (CSS VSAT) sys-tem provides Non-Secure Internet Protocol RouterNetwork (NIPRNET) access for logistics transactionsto CSS users almost anywhere on the planet using aglobal network that connects remote users to one ofseveral hub stations located around the world via sat-ellite. Soldiers often use the CSS Automated Informa-tion Systems Interface (CAISI) as a wireless local areanetwork to connect to the satellite. With the satelliteconnection, a soldier can check instantly on the statusof supplies and replacement parts.

CSS VSAT, which was first used by several divi-sions in the 2003 Iraq campaign, makes a huge differ-ence. This system enables individuals with minimaltraining in satellite communications to acquire NIPR-NET access. Setup time for the user generally is lessthan 30 minutes, depending on the field environment.By using a wireless interface, such as CAISI, CSSVSAT can be connected either to a local area networkvia a hub, router, or switch or to a wide area network.CAISI, which allows the operator at the terminal to bepositioned up to 4 miles away from the antenna, alsoallows supply troops to start checking immediately onthe status of desperately needed supplies and to enterrequests that combat units radio in while the logisti-cians themselves are on the move.

Bypassing “Sneaker Net” and Saving LivesCAISI allowed much more flexibility in the

positioning of units, both in tactical and garrison facil-ities, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. ExtendedNIPRNET connections allowed support personnel toexchange data over the network rather than travel andrisk exposure to hostilities. Troops also were able toavoid exposure by reducing the number of trips need-ed to move data by “sneaker net” from one location toanother. In Iraq, this reduction in travel and exposureto hostilities has become a lifesaver.

CAISI provides 11 megabytes of wirelessline-of-sight transmission, encryption on all wirelesslocal area network links, and a 2-megabyte DigitalSubscriber Line backup capability for non-line-of-sight requirements within a 4-mile distance. It extendsthe tactical connectivity capability from the theaterlevel to the brigade support area and provides acommunications capability that traditionally has beenlacking in such areas as supply chain management,maintenance, and CSS business systems.

New equipment training will serve as the basis fordeveloping institutional training, for unit sustainmenttraining, and for rapid train-up of replacement per-sonnel in support of contingency operations. All train-ing will exploit the right mix of hands-on training andclassroom training needed to maximize the effec-tiveness of individual and collective training. Thebridging strategy toward full WIN–T capabilities willreduce personnel, training, and equipment require-ments resulting from the anticipated consolidation ofcapabilities into common facilities. ALOG

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TONY C. MUNSON IS ASSIGNEDTO THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF INFORMATIONOFFICER/G–6, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. HE HAS AB.S. DEGREE IN INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY FROM JACKSONSTATE UNIVERSITY IN MISSISSIPPI AND AN M.A. DEGREE INNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM THE COLLEGE OF NAVALCOMMAND AND STAFF. HE IS A GRADUATE OF OFFICERCANDIDATE SCHOOL, THE SIGNAL OFFICER BASIC ANDADVANCED COURSES, AND THE ARMY COMMAND ANDGENERAL STAFF COLLEGE.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FORREST BURKE IS ASSIGNED TOTHE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–4,DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. HE WAS THE LOGISTICSAUTOMATION CHIEF IN KUWAIT WITH THE COALITIONFORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND DURING OPERA-TION IRAQI FREEDOM. HE HAS A B.S. DEGREE IN INDUS-TRIAL OPERATIONS FROM AUBURN UNIVERSITY INALABAMA AND M.S. DEGREES FROM FLORIDA INSTITUTEOF TECHNOLOGY AND THE AIR WAR COLLEGE. HE IS AGRADUATE OF THE ARMOR OFFICER BASIC COURSE, THEORDNANCE OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE, AND THE AIRCOMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE.


extensive RFID network in the world. Now, DOD isattempting to standardize the use of active RFID and ismoving ahead with the application of passive RFIDtechnologies. (Active RFID uses a battery within thetag to power the tag and its RF communications cir-cuitry. Passive RFID relies on radio frequency energytransferred from the reader to the tag to power the tag.)

Passive RFIDOn 30 July 2004, the Acting Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logisticsissued a policy requiring the implementation of RFIDacross DOD. DOD is taking a leadership role in passiveRFID, both as an early adopter of the technology and asthe developer of the technology and standards for its use.

The RFID policy directs military services and Defense agencies to expand immediately the use of high-data-capacity active RFID that currently is used in theDOD operational environment. The policy also directsthe phased application of passive RFID by suppliers,who will be required to put passive RFID tags on casesand pallets of materiel shipped to DOD and on the pack-aging of all items requiring unique identification (UID).Beginning in 2005, DOD suppliers will be required toput passive RFID tags on shipments of selected classesof supply going to Defense Distribution Depot SanJoaquin, California (DDJC), and Defense DistributionDepot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania (DDSP). Additionalclasses of supply will be included and nodes will beadded over the next several years, with full implementa-tion expected by 2008.

The desired end state for the DOD supply chain is afully integrated, adaptive entity that uses state-of-the-artenabling technologies and advanced management infor-mation systems to automate routine functions andachieve accurate and timely in-transit, in-storage, andin-repair asset visibility with the least amount of humanintervention. RFID is a foundational technology on thepath to achieving this vision. Ultimately, DOD willoperate a single, seamless, responsive enterprise visibil-ity network that will be accessible across the networkbackbone and usable by both people and systemsthroughout the supply chain.

Today’s U.S. military is a dynamic, rapidly movingforce that is designed to be effective in anasynchronous battlespace. The enhanced mobility

and speed of today’s combat forces, which can performin austere theaters with limited infrastructure, createnew challenges for military logisticians. Logistics prob-lems experienced during the combat phase of OperationIraqi Freedom presented a compelling case for change.Contemporary military logisticians must meet the chal-lenge of supporting the transformed combat force withfast, accurate, flexible, and mobile sustainment.

Historically, military logisticians supporting combatforces have had limited information on assets, particularly in theater. This lack of information led toineffective inventory management, waste, inefficiency,and delay across the supply chain. Ultimately, theseshortfalls affected the warfighters’overall materiel readi-ness, their ability to close the force, and the operationalavailability of weapon systems. The lack of synthesized,end-to-end, real-time information on items at rest and intransit undercut the combatant commander’s ability toexercise directive authority for logistics.

The “bumper sticker” term that frequently is used torefer to the availability of information on assets intransit is “visibility,” but visibility is not an end in it-self. Visibility is a tool that helps to—

• Reliably deliver the required item to the right lo-cation, in the correct quantity, when it is needed, andfrom the most appropriate source.

• Make tools and information available to the deci-sionmakers who exercise effects-based management ofthe logistics network.

• Manage end-to-end capacities and available assets across the supply chain to best support war-fighter requirements.

• Enhance the ability of the supported combatantcommander to exercise directive authority over logistics.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is an ena-bling technology that allows military logisticians tosynthesize and integrate end-to-end information aboutassets. The Department of Defense (DOD) is a glob-ally sophisticated user of active RFID, with more thana decade of experience in this technology and the most

RFID Vision in the DOD Supply ChainBY ALAN F. ESTEVEZ

The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integrationbelieves that the real value of RFID lies not in what it can do today but in what it will do in the future.

MAY–JUNE 20056

DOD envisions using RFID as an integral part of acomprehensive suite of automatic identification tech-nologies (AITs) to facilitate accurate, hands-free datacapture in support of business processes in an inte-grated DOD supply chain enterprise. DOD will applyall of the AITs where appropriate in the supply chainto improve support to the warfighter.

RFID-Enabled Supply ChainThe chart above depicts an RFID-enabled DOD

supply chain. This high-level process view provides avisual representation of how DOD foresees usingRFID as materiel is moved from the manufacturers andsuppliers to the warfighter.

Clearly not all operations within the DOD supplychain are captured on this chart. However, the primaryactions performed by the physical nodes to movemateriel through the supply chain are the shipping,receiving, and transportation processes. The chartdepicts materiel movement that physically “touches”each node throughout the chain. Yet, materiel canstart, move through, and end on different pathsbetween logistics nodes.

The chart at right shows how materiel can move, invarious segments, through the supply chain. All ofthe segments depicted on the chart are affected byRFID. Materiel movement includes retrogradingthrough the supply chain. Again, the direct impact ofRFID on the retrograde and return process corre-sponds to the basic shipping, receiving, and transpor-tation processes.

With passive RFID, DOD will capture more granular[detailed] data automatically, injecting advanced tech-nology at the transactional level. This will streamlinethe movement of materiel through warehouses anddepots, increase inventory accuracy, and generate productivity improvements.

Active RFID is a cargo-tracking capability that pro-vides the ability to manage consolidated shipments. Byadding passive RFID to the technology portfolio, themilitary services will be able to develop an end-to-endcapability that relies on complementary active and pas-sive technologies to deliver an RFID suite applicable toall assets that are in transit, in process, or on the shelf.

Historically, information across the supply chain hasbeen captured only at the predefined nodal touchpoints.

When shipmentsare reconfigured, a

new RFID tag iscreated for the

pallet and associated with

cases on that pallet.

Items/cases/palletsare associated

with active RFIDto provide in-transitvisibility.

Items/cases/pallets arelabeled with passive RFID-enabled labels. A parent-to-

child relationship exists.

Data are timely and accuratevia network of linked

readers, allowing assetvisibility along the entire

supply chain.

Items/cases/palletsare read as they are received, and new

shipments are labeled.Orders are verified

for accuracy.

Customers have visibility of

requisitions and are confident in

the status provided by the

system.

The items/cases/pallets are received automatically with few disputes, and

information is shared with the automated information

systems. Reconfigured shipments receive a new

passive RFID tag.

The captured consolidated

shipment information is input into the automated information system.

Manufacturers/Suppliers Depots/Distribution Centers

Ports ofEmbarkation/Debarkation

Transportation/Supply Theater

Depots/Distribution

Centers

Customers

Timely and Accurate Data

RFID-Enabled DOD Supply Chain


wherever needed to support the requirements of thecombatant commander. Equally important, the adop-tion of passive RFID standards will circumvent thestovepipes and barriers to information flow throughoutthe services that historically have been a challenge forDOD. The military logistician will be able to deployand move a logistics infrastructure and visibility capa-bility as rapidly as the combatant commander candeploy and engage the combat force.

RFID is part of a larger suite of AITs that DOD willleverage in the supply chain where appropriate toimprove support to the warfighter. As an enablingtechnology, RFID data must be available to automatedinformation systems (AISs). Managers of majoracquisition programs must update their programs to incorporate RFID capabilities where applicable.

RFID/UID RelationshipActive and passive RFID will continue to comple-

ment one another as passive RFID technology is

This data capture generally has been used to update sys-tems of record and, in some situations, generate statusnotifications. To speed the adoption and implementa-tion of passive RFID technologies and accelerate thelearning curve, the military services initially are usingpassive capabilities for transaction sets similar or identical to legacy transactions. However, once thefoundational implementations are established, the truepromise of passive RFID can be realized.

The Stovepipe ChallengeRFID delivers near-real-time status and improves

inventory control, particularly in deployed or combatenvironments. It can make “track and trace” a realityaround the world, across system and organizationalstovepipes. No longer will DOD be limited to captur-ing information on at-rest and in-transit materiel atfixed locations. As RFID tagging becomes more andmore ubiquitous and RFID technology becomes moreportable, real-time information can be captured

Alternative Examples of DOD Supply Chain Segments

Manufacturers/Suppliers

Depots/DistributionCenters

Ports ofEmbarkation/Debarkation


Depots/Distribution

Centers

Customers

1

1

5

5

2a

2a

3

3

4

4

2b

2b

Manufacturers/suppliers to Defense Distribution Center for stock replenishment.

Defense Distribution Center to supply depots for stock replenishment in the continental United States.

Defense Distribution Center to supply depots/theater distribution centers for stock replenishment outside thecontinental United States.

Supply depots/theater distribution centers to customer.

Direct vendor delivery.

Return/retrograde. Active and passive RFID read-and-write capabilities will be required at the furthermostpoint in the supply chain delivery system to support retrograde. The return/retrograde process is the same asthe shipping process.

MAY–JUNE 20058

implemented throughout DOD. Many shipments mov-ing through the Defense Transportation System cur-rently are tracked using active RFID and a barcodedmilitary shipping label. The implementation of passive RFID will complement the current successes inusing active RFID for shipments outside the continentalUnited States.

The association of a passive tag to an active tagwill reduce container stuffing and unstuffing timeand provide more accurate “inside the box” visibility.This passive and active association is created bybuilding a “nested” structure of passive tags (UIDitem packaging and case and pallet tags) that are sub-ordinate to the active tags (SEAVAN container and463L pallet tags). Historically, active RFID has beenexcellent at providing nodal visibility. The use ofpassive tags will provide efficient and accurate itemand content visibility. The marriage of active andpassive RFID will result in more accurate and timelyautomatic capture and reporting of data within themultiple layers of information required in DOD’sdynamic environment.

RFID deployment also complements the ongoingUID initiative. Although the UID and RFID initia-tives are closely related, they have fundamental dif-ferences. UID is a permanent, unambiguous, andglobally unique item identifier. RFID is a means ofcollecting data using radio frequency technology.RFID will be used as a hands-free data-collectionmethod to identify UID items that are located withinvarious levels of packaging.

To identify a UID item using RFID, the data on theRFID tags on unit packs, shipping containers, exterior

containers, and palletized unit loads must be linked tothe UID information in a logistics system. UsingRFID tags to collect data and associating the tag datawith UID information will help to maintain preciseUID in-transit visibility and improve data quality, itemmanagement, and maintenance of UID materielthroughout the DOD supply chain.

Hands-free data collection will help extend andtake advantage of the UID policy. However, the UIDinitiative requires that a data matrix be applied to eachUID item. This data matrix is a two-dimensional barcode that is an alternative form of AIT. Incorpo-rating two-dimensional barcode and RFID technolo-gies into AIT equipment will facilitate the UID andRFID relationship.

The chart shown above depicts the “nested” struc-ture of active RFID, passive RFID, and UID items.In this nested structural relationship, passive RFIDwill be used to verify the accuracy, track the physi-cal movement of, and virtually build the contents ofa 463L pallet or SEAVAN container. Passive RFIDwill verify the contents in real time and convey thisinformation to the local AIS and the personnel phys-ically loading the pallet or container. Once the pal-let or container is configured properly, an active tagis attached to it to track and trace its movement. Atthe final destination, when the pallet or container isunloaded, passive RFID will again verify the con-tents and track the physical movement of the ma-teriel within the destination node. These nested dataalso will be used to create a transaction record andclose the transportation transaction once the itemsare received. The chart shown above right depicts

Nested Structure of Active RFID, Passive RFID, and UID Items

Active freight container(SEAVAN or 463L pallet)tag associated to a . . .

Passive palletized unit load tagassociated to a . . .

Pallet exterior containertag associated to . . .

8 UID unit pack tags,each with 1 associatedUID item.

Pallettag

Logistics systems receive the data from various RFID data collection points and create the nested associations.

•Active freight container tag•Palletized unit load tag

•Exterior container tag•UID unit pack tag

•UID item


how the passive–active–passive relationship couldlook across the DOD supply chain.

RFID Versus BarcodesRFID is part of a family of AIT devices that in-

cludes barcodes, optical memory cards, smart cards,microelectromechanical systems, and satellite trackingsystems. RFID and barcodes will coexist for severalyears because both technologies have merit. However,RFID provides a number of positive benefits over bar-codes. For example, RFID—

• Eliminates human error.• Improves data accuracy and asset visibility.• Performs in rugged, harsh environments.• Provides a dynamic, multiblock read-and-write

capability.• Facilitates source data collection.• Permits simultaneous reading and identification

of multiple tagsEach military service and Defense agency should

review its internal business processes to refine themost appropriate employment of RFID. The wide-spread integration of RFID into DOD business pro-cesses should be managed with the same level of attention given to a major system fielding.

Although RFID technology ensures accuracy and timeliness of data within current and future systems, implementing it will require significant plan-ning, equipment fielding, AIS changes, and training.Such an approach will ensure a long-term, fully inte-grated solution.

RFID is being recognized as a valuable componentof the suite of AITs because of the capabilities it pro-vides. Active RFID has improved the ability to track,trace, and locate materiel on demand throughout the

supply chain. Combining passive RFID technologywith the active RFID technology already in place willcreate greater efficiencies and data accuracy in theDOD supply chain. Leveraging RFID to the fullestextent possible will improve the services’ ability toget the right materiel to the warfighter at the rightplace, at the right time, and in the right condition.

The real value of RFID lies not in what it can dotoday but in what it will do in the future. DOD is inthe midst of the most fundamental transformation oflogistics capability ever attempted, and RFID is anintegral element of that transformation. By employ-ing RFID, DOD is laying a foundation that allowsmilitary logisticians to leverage new applicationsthat enable them to see and manage the supply chainfrom end to end and not be limited by enterprise-centric, stovepipe systems. With RFID, it will bepossible to control the supply chain from factory tofoxhole and deliver the right item to the right placeat the right time, even in the face of rapidly evolvingconditions in the battlespace. ALOG

ALAN F. ESTEVEZ IS THE ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATIONWITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OFDEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS. HE ISRESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINMANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION POLICIES AND PROCESS-ES TO SUPPORT THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OFWARFIGHTERS. HE HAS A BACHELOR’S DEGREE IN POLITICALSCIENCE FROM RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEWJERSEY, AND A MASTER’S DEGREE IN NATIONAL SECURITYRESOURCE STRATEGY FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OFTHE ARMED FORCES.

Passive-Active-Passive RFID Across the DOD Supply Chain

Manufacturers/Suppliers

Depots/DistributionCenters

Ports of Embarkation/Debarkation


Depots/Distribution

Centers Customers

Passive Active Passive

quantities of items, or items that malfunction or donot work as intended, or shipments that do not con-tain the items they ordered. Oh, by the way, yourcustomers’ very lives depend on the received itemsworking as advertised.

Welcome to the world of Marine Corps groundammunition, referred to in the military supply vo-cabulary as “class V(W).” The management of theCorps’ ground ammunition program, headed by theProgram Manager for Ammunition (PM-Ammo) atthe Marine Corps Systems Command, is big busi-ness. However, managing the Corps’ ground ammu-nition is not simply a matter of keeping worldwidetrack of 337 major end items, each with its ownDepartment of Defense Identification Code(DODIC). Many of these items include componentitems with separate national stock numbers (NSNs).There are literally thousands of NSNs to keep track

Imagine working for a company with a merchan-dise inventory valued at $4.2 billion and nearly1,500 employees working at 22 different locations

around the world. Your company’s inventory consistsof some 337 different major end items weighing atotal of 210,510 tons and is stored at over 150 placesworldwide, including stocks afloat on the oceans.Your company’s budget for the next 6 years for re-placing the items your customers are anticipated touse is $2.1 billion. Your company must train 450 newemployees a year to keep up with personnel turnover,and those employees must be trained to understandand comply with numerous, strict safety regulationsimposed by the Federal Government. Finally, thereare the customers—over 200,000 of them—whomyour company supplies with items from its inventory.They are extremely demanding and unforgiving, andthey will not tolerate late delivery or insufficient

MAY–JUNE 200510

Information Technologyfor Marine Corps AmmunitionBY STEVEN M. CRITTENDEN

The enterprise of managing Marine Corps ground ammunition requires new information systemsto support forces in the field.

increase the availability, timeliness, and accuracy ofammunition information.

Managing Ground AmmunitionThe mission of PM-Ammo is to conduct limited re-

search, development, and acquisition and execute life-cycle management support of all conventional groundammunition Marine Forces require to train for, andsuccessfully conduct, expeditionary maneuver war-fare. PM-Ammo’s corporate headquarters is locatedat Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, and in-cludes the PM, Deputy PM, and three divisions: In-ventory Management and Systems, AmmunitionPrograms and Budget, and Logistics (see the chart onpage 12). PM-Ammo is also the sponsor of occupa-tional field 23, Ammunition and Explosive OrdnanceDisposal, for the Corps’ ammunition community, bothofficer (restricted only) and enlisted. [“Restricted”refers to warrant officers and limited-duty officers.“Unrestricted” refers to the rest of the officer commu-nity. All officers in the Marine Corps ammunitioncommunity are restricted.]

PM-Ammo is responsible for managing the fol-lowing types of ground ammunition—

• Small arms.• Medium caliber.• Mortar.• Artillery.• Tank.• Grenade and pyrotechnics.• Demolition.• Rockets and missiles.

It does not, however, manage Navy-owned aviationordnance used by Marine Corps aviation units; theDeputy Commandant for Aviation is responsible forthose requirements.

Ammunition Knowledge Management PortalA significant information technology (IT) enabler

used to provide meaningful and timely informationin the conduct of the Corps’ ammunition business isa comprehensive repository of ground ammunitiondata with its own Web site known as the AmmunitionKnowledge Management Portal (KMP). Access to the KMP is controlled for security reasons.

Better support of the customer in the field isthe goal of Marine Corps ground ammunitioninformation technology programs. Here, aforklift unloads a crate of ammunition from aCH–53E Super Stallion Helicopter at CampKorea, Iraq. The customer being supported isthe 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.

of, not including the lot numbers assigned to batchesof a specific NSN-designated item by its manufactur-er. Items with the same lot number are assigned oneof 15 condition codes by DOD, and those conditioncodes can change throughout the life cycle of thoseitems. Items with the same lot number at the samestorage location also can have different conditioncodes. For example, the portable Anti-PersonnelObstacle Breaching System (APOBS) is one of the337 items managed by PM-Ammo. It incorporatescomponents with different NSNs, including themotor, grenade, fuze, detonation cord, and packag-ing, and each of those components potentially canhave different lot numbers and condition codes.

To improve the management of ground ammuni-tions and thus improve support to logisticians andoperating forces in the field, the Marine Corps is de-veloping several information systems that will


MAY–JUNE 20051212

qualification and certification(Qual/Cert) training records on theKMP. Once it is fully implemented,the e-Qual tool will be updated regu-larly by Marine OnLine, therebyeliminating the current manual recordkeeping system. [“MarineOnLine” is a secure site linked to theHeadquarters Marine Corps Web sitethat allows marines to log in withtheir name and password and thenaccess personal records data (in-cluding pay matters), review theirpersonal records for accuracy, andsubmit a request for corrections orupdates.] Currently, e-Qual is sched-uled to be delivered this spring.

Ammunition Budget ManagementThe IT primer of the Corps’

ammunition enterprise is the Ammu-nition Budget Management System(ABMS). ABMS is used to formu-late the Marine Corps’ ammunitionbudget and support and defend theexpenditure of Procurement Ammu-nition, Navy and Marine Corps,appropriations. It is a central in-

formation repository with a browser-based interface thatis accessible to any authorized client through the KMP.

Ordnance Information SystemAs defined in paragraph 1007.1a of Marine Corps

Order 4400.150E, Consumer-Level Supply PolicyManual, ammunition is classified as a nonexpendableitem. Because of this classification and the sensitivenature of ammunition and explosives, accountabilityfor these commodities is critical. The Corps currentlyuses as many as seven different end-user applicationsystems to keep track of its ground ammunition. As aresult of DOD’s transformation initiatives, that multi-plicity of systems is about to change. The Corps haspartnered with the Navy to adopt a single system,called the Ordnance Information System (OIS), thatwill manage all ground conventional ammunition andaviation ordnance within the Department of the Navy.

OIS will allow authenticated users to interact withthe database from their desktops using a Web browser,Web-enabled forms, and specialized applications. Italso will be capable of interfacing with the GlobalCombat Support System (GCSS). GCSS-MarineCorps (GCSS–MC) will field a collaborative logisticsIT suite that is built on a rich operational architecture,operates in a shared data environment, serves theentire business enterprise (garrison and deployed), and

The KMP includes data on the following ammunition-related subjects—

• Class V(W) ground ammunition assets.• Life-cycle management.• Marine Corps stockpile by age.• Malfunction histories.• Notice of Ammunition Reclassification (NAR)

histories.• Engineering change proposals.• Lot manufacture dates.• Current NARs.• Muzzle velocity adjustments.• “Preferred for training lots” ammunition (a classi-

fication of ammunition that should be used for training).The KMP is an evolving service provided to the

Marine Corps ammunition enterprise that is updatedsystematically to provide “added value” to the viewer.Resource links are regularly added to the alphabetizeddirectory located on the KMP home page.

e-QualAnother IT enabler under development is the Elec-

tronic Ammunition and Explosives Qualification andCertification Program, known as e-Qual, that will al-low Marines in the ground conventional ammunition,aviation ordnance, explosive ordnance disposal, andother explosives-handling communities to view their

The Program Manager for Ammunition supervises three divisions:Inventory Management and Systems, Ammunition Programs andBudget, and Logistics.

Inventory Accuracy

Team

SystemsTeam

InventoryManagement

andSystemsDivision

Inventory Management

Team

Infantry Weapons

AmmunitionTeam

Large CaliberAmmunition

Team

AmmunitionPrograms

andBudget Division

StrategicAmmunitionBusiness andOperations

TeamProgramManager

OfficeManager

Deputy ProgramManager

LogisticsDivision

Marine AirGround Task

Force OperationsCoordination

Team

Environmentaland Explosives

Safety Team

ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF

supported unit to track its allowances and record itsexpenditures, which permits near-real-time expendituretracking and makes end-of-year expenditure reportingless labor-intensive and more reliable.

Munitions Readiness ReportAnother key IT enabler is the Munitions Readiness

Report (MRR), another Army-led initiative that isbeing reengineered as a result of input from a workinggroup. The Marine Corps’ initial effort to provide asimilar capability was known as the AmmunitionReadiness System (ARS). ARS will continue to ma-ture to produce a mirror-like application of the currentArmy MRR. Ultimately, MRR will be a joint, com-mon readiness application for all services and willmeet the munitions-related requirements of the De-fense Readiness Reporting System.

The Marine Corps’ ground ammunition communityis “leaning forward” in many areas to improve andmodernize its business enterprise practices. It is doingso in ways that complement and support many ongoingtransformation and modernization efforts, includingthe U.S. Transportation Command’s DistributionProcess Owner, Naval Logistics Integration, and theMarine Corps’ Logistics Operational Architecture ini-tiatives. In the final analysis, it is all about supportingcustomers throughout the world with the timely deliv-ery of the right amount, the right type, and the rightcondition of class V(W) products. ALOG

STEVEN M. CRITTENDEN CURRENTLY WORKS FORCACI, INC., IN STAFFORD, VIRGINIA, AND IS THE MAN-AGING EDITOR OF AMMUNITION QUARTERLY, WHICH ISTHE PM-AMMO’S QUARTERLY PUBLICATION. HE RETIREDFROM THE MARINE CORPS IN 1991 AS A LIEUTENANTCOLONEL IN THE INFANTRY.

is scalable, interoperable, and joint. GCSS–MC is cur-rently one of only two programs to be designated as aMarine Corps Acquisition Category I program, theother being the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (for-merly the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle).

Common Logistics Command and Control SystemThe Marine Corps ground ammunition community

is working on several other IT initiatives that will givethe community, combat service support (CSS) units,and the “trigger pullers” in the operating forces (theirprimary customers) a better feel for ammunition visi-bility and logistics situational awareness, both on thebattlefield and in garrison. One such initiative is en-suring integration of ammunition into the Corps’ Com-mon Logistics Command and Control System(CLC2S). CLC2S is designed to give the CSS deci-sionmakers better data and asset visibility.

Supported Unit Ammunition ModuleDuring combat, the Marine Corps component com-

mander must provide a daily Munitions Status Report(MUREP) to the combatant commander. TheMUREP’s influence extends beyond the theater ofoperations, reaching back to the service headquarters,the Joint Staff, and, for some types of ammunition, tothe Commander in Chief (the President). Currently, nofully accredited IT solution is in place to provide visi-bility of ammunition assets once they have been issuedto the operating forces from the retail supply pointsthat maintain accountable records. PM-Ammo is con-sidering designing a tool called the Supported UnitAmmunition Module (SUAM) to establish and main-tain ammunition awareness and standardize the collec-tion and reporting of relevant ammunitioninformation. SUAM would provide supported units atall levels with the common automated tools they needto obtain enhanced asset visibility, improved and stan-dardized expenditure reporting, enhanced planningcapabilities, centralized data storage and management,and improved communications. SUAM could be builtusing the technologies and the lessons learned with theUnit Level Ammunition Status (ULAS) conceptdemonstration initiative. It is envisioned that SUAMcould be a capability within OIS or CLC2S.

Training Ammunition ManagementA garrison-level initiative known as the Training

Ammunition Management Information System-Redesigned (TAMIS–R) is an Army-developed, Web-based application that allows supported units to forecasttheir ammunition training requirements to ammunitionsupply points worldwide in order to support the logisticsfunctions of request management, order management,and capacity management. TAMIS–R also allows a

MORE INFORMATIONON MARINE GROUND AMMUNITION

For more information on the various Marine Corpsground ammunition systems, go to the PM-Ammo Web siteat http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/am/ammunitionand click on “Ammo Quarterly.” The following articles arerecommended reading—

• “The Winds of Change . . .Ammunition Logistics FocusTeam (ALFT),” January 2003, page 4.

• “Inventory Management and Systems Division(IM&SD) Sets Sail,” January 2004, page 10.

• “ E Qual,” January 2004, page 32.• “Ammunition Knowledge Management Portal News,”

January 2004, page 33.• “Ammunition Budget Management System (ABMS),”

January 2004, page 35.• “Marine Corps Ammunition Procurement Budget in

Review—2005,” July 2004, page 2.

MAY–JUNE 2005

Concept of Medical Logistics SupportThe underlying concept for medical logistics sup-

port in Operation Iraqi Freedom was to make themaximum use of distribution in order to relieve theforward units of the burden of managing and movinglarge quantities of supplies. The goal was to havemedical units deploy with their required materiel andequipment. However, this proved to be more difficultthan expected because combat unit medical supplies,which are generally too expensive to keep on theshelf during peacetime, were not readily available.This placed a significant burden on the medical sup-ply system and commercial partners to manage thesurge in requirements.

Based on the assumption that Operation Iraqi Free-dom would be similar to Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm, guidance was issued that each soldierwould deploy with a 90-day supply of chronic mainte-nance medications. However, most of the medicationswere consumed before the soldiers departed fromhome station because the medications were issuedweeks in advance of deployment. Planners hadassumed that soldiers would be able to use the Depart-ment of Defense Mail-Order Pharmacy System forrefills, but no process was ever developed and put intoplace to make that a realistic alternative.

By late April 2003, the need to obtain prescriptionrefills was becoming an overwhelming problem in theSouthwest Asia theater of operations. Nearly 10 per-cent of all soldiers had prescription requirements, andit was almost impossible to predict each soldier’s actu-al drug and dosage requirements because chronic med-ications were not identified before deployment. With120,000 soldiers in theater, over 12,000 prescriptionshad to be refilled.

As the problem escalated, it was discovered thatunits did not know what specific chronic medicationstheir soldiers used. Once medications were consumed,the medical materiel system could not handle the vol-ume of requirements and process requisitions in time to

14

BY MAJOR GRETA L. BENNETT

After medical logistics officers found that their plans for supplying soldiers in Iraqwith chronic maintenance medications did not work, they developed a process that ensures soldiers will receive their medications without having to order them.

Chronic Medications in Iraq: A True Army Lesson Learned

Nearly 2 years ago, our country was faced with adilemma: Declare war on Iraq immediately, orallow United Nations inspectors to complete

their inspections and proceed based on their findings.While this decision was being made, the militaryforces were busy with operational planning, which hadto be conducted with high levels of secrecy. The U.S.military already was supporting combat operations inAfghanistan; however, establishing a logistics supportconcept—particularly medical logistics support—forIraq was a completely different matter. Military med-ical materiel managers had to keep in mind that theymight have to deal with the effects of biological orchemical weapons if the United States went to warwith Iraq. The planning phase was extremely detailedand labor intensive. Many scenarios were discussedbefore logistics support concepts were developed.

The focus of medical materiel managers duringoperational and tactical planning for Operation IraqiFreedom was combat healthcare operations. They hadto ensure that soldiers stayed healthy and protectedfrom diseases and biological weapons and that the com-bat healthcare system could respond to combat injuriesquickly. However, they did not anticipate the durationof the deployment. What initially had been envisionedas a “quick” war similar to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 quickly turned into multiple deployments of 12 months or longer. The extended deployments sig-nificantly affected the maturing supply-chain manage-ment of medical materiel; specifically, the refilling ofprescription medications that the Army identifies aschronic maintenance medications.

Chronic maintenance medications are those med-ications needed to treat or control chronic health conditions of individual soldiers. Maintenance med-ications normally are used on a regular, predictableschedule rather than sporadically as needed. Examplesinclude medications used to treat high blood pressure,high cholesterol, thyroid disease, diabetes, ulcers,depression, and chronic pain.

15ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

get prescription refills to soldiers. As a result, units ini-tially bypassed the system and reached back to homestation hospitals to have refills shipped into the theater.

To correct the problem, combat support hospitalpharmacies began collecting prescription requirementsand stocking chronic medications for soldiers in theirarea. Units were instructed to provide detailed listingsof the chronic maintenance medications their soldiersneeded. This requirement led to a major reengineeringof the deployment process to ensure that prescriptionrequirements are compiled in a clinical database dur-ing predeployment processing. Soldiers now arerequired to deploy with 8-month supplies of medica-tions, and female soldiers using oral contraceptivesmust take 14-month supplies.

Data CollectionData on chronic maintenance medications for

deploying soldiers are now captured and managed by aWeb-based system called the Predeployment Medica-tion Analysis and Reporting Tool (P–MART). TheDepartment of Defense Pharmacoeconomic Center inSan Antonio, Texas, issues a P–MART report to helpcommanders and medical officers accurately identifythe chronic medications being used by their soldiers.

Once a unit has been identified for deployment, itssoldiers must pass through medical readiness checks.One such check, called the Soldier Readiness Program,offers soldiers the opportunity to create wills, establishpowers of attorney, make financial allotments, get med-ical assessments that identify immunizations they need,and verify their medical histories. After this process iscomplete, each unit commander or unit medical officerprovides the Pharmacoeconomic Center a by-name ros-ter of all personnel within the unit designated fordeployment. The center generates a P–MART report

that lists soldiers’ chronic medications and the approx-imate dates they will need to be refilled.

The P–MART report goes a step further. Once infor-mation is captured in the system, refills are automati-cally filled and shipped to the medical logistics battalionin Iraq and then distributed to the deployed unit. UsingP–MART, the battalion receives bulk shipments ofchronic medications and immediately forwards themedications to the appropriate unit for distribution tosoldiers. Refills normally are shipped at the 4-monthmark for the deployed unit. This ensures that medica-tions are received in a timely manner and neither the soldier nor his unit has to initiate the request.

Deployments to combat operations present soldiersand their units with many challenges. Fortunately,providing chronic medications is no longer one ofthem. Drawing from lessons learned, the Army nowhas a system in place that ensures that soldiers havethe chronic medications they need and combat hospi-tals stock the pharmaceuticals required by the soldiersthey serve. ALOG

MAJOR GRETA L. BENNETT IS THE V CORPS MEDICALLOGISTICS OFFICER. SHE HAS A BACHELOR’S DEGREE INBUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FROM HOWARD UNIVERSITYIN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND A MASTER’S DEGREE IN PUB-LIC ADMINISTRATION FROM TROY STATE UNIVERSITY INALABAMA. SHE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ARMY MEDICALDEPARTMENT OFFICER BASIC COURSE, THE COMBINEDLOGISTICS OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE, AND THE COM-BINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL.

Pharmacists at the 21st Combat Support Hospitalin Balad, Iraq, are responsible for ensuring thatsoldiers have the medications they need.

Patriot Missile SystemThe Patriot is the Army’s most advanced air defense

system. Since it was fielded in 1982, it has provenitself to be a combat multiplier for combatant com-manders. Capable of defeating both high-performanceaircraft and tactical ballistic missiles, it is the only oper-ational air defense system that can shoot down attackingmissiles. A Patriot battery (the basic firing unit) con-sists of a phased-array radar set, an engagement-controlstation, computers, power-generating equipment, andup to eight launchers, each holding four ready-to-firemissiles. Approximately 90 soldiers are assigned to abattery, but only 3 are needed to operate the batteryin combat.

During the earlystages of OperationsEnduring Freedomand Iraqi Freedom,the Patriot batterieswere exposed toextremely harsh envi-ronments. Sand sig-nif icantly degradedtheir condition duringboth transport andoperation. The expo-sure to the environ-ment, coupled withexposure to hostilef ire, resulted in severely damagedbatteries. The impactof the damaged Patri-ots on the deployedair defense artilleryfleet was severe andhad to be addressed to maintain accept-able long-term levelsof readiness.

Patriot experts fromthe Lower Tier ProjectOffice of the ArmyAviation and Missile

MAY–JUNE 200516

At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,coalition forces repeatedly relied on the Patriotair defense missile system to knock out Scud

missiles launched toward coalition command posts,base camps, and advancing troops. On 20 March2003, Patriot batteries successfully intercepted and de-stroyed two Iraqi tactical ballistic missiles fired atKuwait. In the days that followed, other missiles weresuccessfully destroyed. Air defense artillery units per-formed brilliantly in Operation Iraqi Freedom, inter-cepting every Iraqi missile fired toward Kuwait orcoalition forces except those whose trajectories indi-cated that they would fall harmlessly into the emptydesert or the ocean.

BY KIM C. RUSSELL AND MARK L. SHEFFIELD

Applying Lean Manufacturing techniques during the restoration of the Patriotand Avenger air defense systems reaped significant savings for the Government.

Patriot and Avenger Reset

A Patriot launching battery typically has eight launching stations. Thislaunching station is mounted on an M860 semitrailer towed by a 10-tonM983 heavy, expanded-mobility tactical truck.

Letterkenny’s Logistics Center of Excellence(LCOE) at Fort Bliss was the second location used forthe reset program. One of the first employees to arriveat the LCOE was a member of Letterkenny’s LeanManufacturing Core Team. The Patriot Lean ValueStream Analysis (a process that helps identify a sys-tem’s values and pinpoints areas needing im-provement) identified opportunities to save money andtime by reducing travel distances and turnaround time.For example, a major bottleneck in the cleaning, plat-ing, and painting operations was identified and miti-gated. The Lean Manufacturing process reduced a 3-to 4-week backlog of material to a less than 1 daybacklog and sped up component parts processing by87 percent.

Avenger Air Defense SystemPatriot was not the only weapon system used to

cover the coalition forces advancing from the Kuwaitborder to Baghdad International Airport. Avenger airdefense systems also were deployed and used by someArmy units, usually in extremely adverse conditions.The Avenger is the Army’s premier line-of-sight,mobile, shoot-on-the-move air defense system. It is akey element of the air defense architecture. TheAvenger system carries eight Stinger missiles in twofour-missile launch pods ready for rapid firing from agyro-stabilized turret mounted on a high-mobility,multipurpose wheeled vehicle.


Command’s Integrated Materiel Management Center(AMCOM IMMC), at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,along with personnel from Letterkenny Army Depot,Pennsylvania, developed a detailed plan to restore thePatriot systems to their predeployment condition. Theplan was called Patriot Reset, and its stated objectivewas to increase readiness by making the equipmentfully mission capable. Letterkenny’s mission was toreset three Patriot battalions in a year.

The Patriot Reset program showcased Letterkenny’scapabilities and commitment. The depot is the Army’scenter of technical excellence for air defense and tac-tical missile ground support equipment. Letterkennyhad saved the Patriot Lower Tier Project Office $1.2million in fiscal year 2003 using the Lean Manufac-turing process. Lean Manufacturing is a set of princi-ples and practices directed toward revamping theproduction process in a way that includes eliminatingwaste, removing inventory buffers, and focusing onquality. Using the earlier success as a model, Let-terkenny’s Lean Manufacturing Core Team designedthe reset program using Lean Manufacturing tech-niques, a system of cross-training, and flexible man-agement that focused on customer needs.

From the initial planning stages, Letterkenny repre-sentatives used “out-of-the-box” thinking to create anefficient plan. This plan eventually allowed the depotto complete the project 2½ months ahead of scheduleand $1.5 million under budget. The plan called for thePatriot systems to be overhauled in two locations bythree organizations. Using the ongoing Patriot re-capitalization program as a model, equipment wasdivided between the assets that could be reset at FortBliss, Texas, and those that had to be returned to Let-terkenny for repair.

Letterkenny technicians developed a reset scheduleand synchronized it with the three air defense battal-ions at Fort Bliss to ensure that reset operations wouldnot interfere with the units’ deployments, re-deployments, or training missions. Then, more than100 technicians at the depot worked two shifts 7 daysa week to ensure the success of the reset mission.They disassembled and cleaned all major items, re-paired or replaced their components, and reassembledthem. The technicians successfully reset 16 Patriotradar sets, 15 engagement-control stations, 3 infor-mation and coordination centrals (command and con-trol elements), 15 electric power plants, and 30generator sets. During the system integration andcheckout conducted at the Tobin Wells Training Areaat Fort Bliss, the Patriot equipment was determined tobe fully mission capable and was accepted by the fireunits. The final product was a revitalized Patriot airdefense system that soldiers could trust to accomplishtheir missions.

A missile fired from a Patriot launcher headstoward a target detected by the system'sengagement-control station.

The Avengers used by the coalition forces weresandblasted by windstorms, and many suffered battleor transportation damage. Letterkenny crews exam-ined the Avengers front to back, top to tires, and dis-covered that nearly everything needed to be “redone.”

“We’ve had to adapt to significant changes in main-tenance requirements as a result of how Avengers arebeing used in the AOR [area of responsibility],” saidMichael McGee, director of IMMC’s Short-RangeMissile Directorate. “Although designed as an airdefense system, Avengers have assumed an expandedbattlefield role of extensive force protection. [Thishas] . . . changed our thinking on how to resetAvengers. For example, the 3d Armored Cavalry Reg-iment drove their individual Avengers over 70,000miles in a single year. . . . You can imagine the degreeof stress that places on the . . . system since it wasn’tspecifically designed for that type of combat role.”

“During the reset of our first Avenger battalion—from the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Geor-gia—we decided that we would ask the unit torelinquish control of the vehicles and ship the fireunits to Letterkenny [for] more detailed maintenance,”said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Tom LaFontaine of theShort-Range Air Defense Project Office. “To maintain

MAY–JUNE 200518

unit confidence in our ability to reset and return fireunits consistent with their internal training schedules,we invited the units to send their maintenance techni-cians to Letterkenny to assist in hands-on repair of theAvengers. . . . Soldier involvement is especially criti-cal considering the maintenance challenges facingAvengers returning from the area of responsibility.”

All Avenger vehicles were returned to Letterkennyfor reset. Together, Letterkenny personnel and TeamRedstone developed a reset plan for the Avengers thatwould meet redeployment schedules and, at the sametime, save IMMC $1 million. In the assembly and dis-assembly areas, technicians made many recom-mendations that eliminated unnecessary steps in therefurbishment process. Some improvements to theprocess included the use of portable light fixtures to aidin disassembly and reassembly and the creation of a“parts supermarket” close to the work cells. At times,as many as 40 Letterkenny maintenance personnel and4 to 6 soldiers were involved in reset activities.

In an August 2004 ceremony, the commander ofLetterkenny Army Depot presented IMMC with a cer-emonial check representing the combined $2.5 millionin savings realized through the center’s application ofLean Manufacturing techniques to the Patriot andAvenger missile systems reset programs. The checkwas “endorsed” and returned to the depot’s coffers byJohn Chapman, IMMC Executive Director. “Everydollar we can save by improving our processing . . . [is]a good thing for the taxpayer and a good thing for thebudget,” Chapman said.

In addition to having Patriot and Avenger missilesystems back in the field faster than expected, soldiersalso benefit from the refurbishment because the moneysaved can be used to support other unfunded projects.

As the Army transforms, the Avenger and Patriot airdefense systems must remain lethal, survivable, andsustainable with reduced operating costs. Maintainingthe highest level of unit and system readiness is theArmy’s dominant objective, and the Letterkenny ArmyDepot Avenger and Patriot reset programs are theArmy’s proven solution. ALOG

KIM C. RUSSELL IS A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SPECIALIST AT LET-TERKENNY ARMY DEPOT, PENNSYLVANIA, WHERE SHE HASBEEN EMPLOYED FOR 27 YEARS. SHE HAS A BACHELOR’SDEGREE IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS FROM WILSON COL-LEGE IN PENNSYLVANIA.

MARK L. SHEFFIELD IS THE CHIEF OF THE TRANSFOR-MATION OFFICE AT LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT. HE HAS ABACHELOR’S DEGREE IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS FROMWILSON COLLEGE IN PENNSYLVANIA.

A soldier with the Oklahoma Army NationalGuard maintains site security at a remote Patriotmissile battery tactical site in Southwest Asia.


On “Star Trek,” a groundbreaking televisionseries in the 1960s, humans and aliens servedtogether on the Starship Enterprise. A sequel,

“Star Trek: The Next Generation,” was even morevisionary, making the Enterprise home to both the crewand their families. While the crew deployed on mis-sions, family members enjoyed the amenities on theEnterprise. Today’s Army installations are movingtoward the environment portrayed in “Star Trek: TheNext Generation.”

The traditional image of the young, unattached GI isa thing of the past. The typical American soldier todayhas a high school diploma and may be college educated.Over half of the members of our military forces are mar-ried. Many have children attending Department ofDefense Dependents Schools.

Unfortunately, because their infrastructures havenot kept pace with the changes in Army demographics,many military installations continue to be much likeCamp Swampy, the post portrayed in the “Beetle Bai-ley” comic strip. In these places, existing facilities areinadequate for today’s soldiers. Housing suitable for asingle soldier is unacceptable for a service memberwith a family. Recreational facilities and activities thatonce were appropriate for the unaccompanied drafteeare unappealing to professional soldiers and their fam-ilies. The Army can no longer consider only the sol-dier; it now must address the broader concerns of thesoldier and his family. When a soldier has to serve ina dependent-restricted area, he must be confident thathis family is well cared for back home.

Professional installation management personnel—military and civilian alike—play a pivotal role in meet-ing soldier needs. Installation management personnelmust provide enough funding for Army facilities toaccomplish missions during both peacetime and mobi-lization. They also must recruit and retain people withthe skills necessary to make Army installations viablepower-projection “flagships”—installations capable ofsustaining and supporting forces anywhere in the worldat any time.

Installations as FlagshipsIn 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J.

Schoomaker designated “Installations as Flagships”as one of the Army’s 16 focus areas. Installation

management personnel at Headquarters, Departmentof the Army (HQDA); Headquarters, InstallationManagement Agency (IMA); the seven IMA regionaloffices; and individual Army garrisons are key torealizing the Chief of Staff ’s vision and makinginstallations more efficient and effective.

Providing resources for realistic standard levels ofservices at each Army installation ensures that supportand services are equitable and consistent. Realizingeconomies at the facility level gives leaders flexibility toresource key initiatives that will make installations bothexcellent communities and power-projection flagships.

Flagships are places where military personnel live,work, and train and from which they deploy and are sup-ported during contingency operations. A flagship instal-lation needs a standard installation infrastructure that isaligned to the needs of the professional soldier and hisfamily. For example, Quonset huts and gang latrines areno longer acceptable. Recreational activities should bemore family oriented. Training ranges should be mod-ernized to support interservice, simultaneous collectivetraining. Professional warriors should have the electron-ic capabilities needed to reach back to the home stationfor support when they are deployed. Essentially, theArmy is striving for excellent communities that providequality-driven installation support within the frameworkof essential common levels of services.

Visionary leaders at HQDA, IMA, the IMA regions,and the individual installations are creating a corporateculture that is receptive to emerging, challenging rolesand responsibilities. Although the flagships are Armyinstallations, the key stakeholders at the installationscould very well be from other services. Installationmanagement personnel therefore should think “purple,”or “joint.”

Joint MindsetWith the Department of Defense’s increasing pro-

motion of joint expeditionary forces, other militaryservices share the Army’s flagships and could deployfrom an Army installation. Consequently, they arekey stakeholders in the operations at that installation.Installation management personnel should becomebetter acquainted with joint doctrine because, as flag-ships, Army installations need to focus on joint expe-ditionary forces.

Installation Management—From Camp Swampy to the Starship Enterprise

BY JOHN DI GENIO

Performance Improvement Criteria to installations tomake them “communities of excellence.”

PersonnelTo restructure successfully the way the Army con-

ducts its installation support mission, it must train per-sonnel to meet future challenges. Managers play acrucial role in ensuring that soldiers and civilian employ-ees are ready to assume responsibilities on the flagship.Forward-thinking managers at HQDA, the IMA regions,and the individual installations should concentrate onfunding required training to equip personnel with theskills they need to support the flagship during peacetimeand contingency operations.

For example, the traditional roles of installationcomptrollers are expanding rapidly. Historically, instal-lations were staffed to execute a budget given to them bya major command. However, under the flagship conceptof installation management, resources flow directlyfrom the IMA to the installations without passingthrough a major command. Installations now have toplan and program for their resources to accomplish anevolving base-operations mission—one that supportsexcellent communities designed to standards, realistictraining, reach-back capabilities, and power receptionand projection.

Modularity ties in nicely with the flagship concept.Military and civilian personnel will be required to per-form diverse duties and responsibilities. New skills willhave to be learned and rehearsed during training exercis-es. The flagship will need installation personnel who arefamiliar with operations during mobilization. Hence,positions at the IMA regions and the installations may bestaffed with emergency-essential civilians and contrac-tors with wartime provisions in their contracts. Civilianpersonnel may be required to train on common battle-field skills and tasks to support the installation’s wartimemission. Emergency-essential civilian personnel andcontractors will expedite a seamless transition from apeacetime or armistice environment to a wartime pos-ture, thereby facilitating deployment and supporting theexpeditionary force without interruption or costly delays.[Emergency-essential civilians are Department ofDefense civilian employees who perform specific battletasks during mobilization.]

Installation management personnel can cultivate anenvironment that is receptive to joint operations by pur-suing initiatives that benefit the different service compo-nents. Installation management professionals couldpromote “jointness” through initiatives that maximizesavings for all of the services supported by the Armyinstallation. For example, one way to foster a jointatmosphere is to allow the other services on an installa-tion to share in the accrued savings or cost avoidances ofan activity-based cost management project that crossesservice lines.

Having a vision and fostering the right state of mindat the installation are only part of the challenge. Flagshippersonnel must be ethical and competent to achieve theIMA vision.

Installation QualityA disparity exists in the quality of facilities and ser-

vices available at Army installations. Some installations(the “haves”) provide adequate support for soldiers andtheir families and civilian employees. “Have” installa-tions provide decent housing; office space; dining, recre-ational, and athletic facilities; and training ranges. At theother end of the spectrum are the “have not” installa-tions, which are unable to provide the needed level ofsupport services. Quonset hut buildings and ganglatrines are often still found at these installations.

“Have” and “have not” installations need to bereplaced by excellent communities that provide equi-table support and services. Training ranges, deploymentfacilities, equipment, and state-of-the-art technologiesshould be readily adaptable for use by members of otherservice components. Providing common levels of sup-port is a way to reduce, if not eliminate, the gap between“have” and “have not” installations. Under the commonlevels of support concept, installations are being fundedto provide equitable services throughout the Army.With this funding, an installation in Korea will be ableto provide the same level of support services as aninstallation in Texas. Housing and office space defi-ciencies also are being addressed. For example, Quon-set huts are being replaced with modern buildings inKorea. Essentially, the Army’s goal is to provide equalservices at all installations. In the next stage of thisreform effort, IMA will focus on applying the Army

This inside view of aQuonset hut shows whateach of the three soldierswho share this domicile getsfor his $614 a month basicallowance for quarters.

The life expectancy of the Korean War-era Quonset hutwas 20 years. Although they do not meet the Army’sminimum standards of acceptability for dwellings,many are still used in Korea to house soldiers.


Trained personnel work to execute the IMA leader-ship’s plans for the future. However, nothing derailsfuture plans better than archaic processes that add novalue to installation management and support services.To avoid this problem, action officers at HQDA, theIMA regions, and the installations are reviewingprocesses and improving methods to ensure efficien-cies and effectiveness.

Robust ProcessesAll installation management action officers should be

the standard bearers for creative ideas that conserve pub-lic resources, eliminate redundant operations andprocesses, reengineer staffing and positions to makeadministrative procedures less bureaucratic, and promotean expeditious transition to a wartime posture.

Flagships should enhance the Army’s capability totransition rapidly from peace to war. Redundant pro-cedures could hinder this transition and increase thelikelihood of the loss of lives and assets. Therefore,costly, outmoded, labor-intensive processes should bestreamlined to help ensure mission success and real-ize efficiencies.

Taking advantage of regional contracts is an effectiveway to generate efficiencies. For example, installationmanagement personnel within the IMA Korea RegionOffice noticed that the region was spending too muchfor utilities. To improve efficiency, the Korea RegionOffice is creating region-wide contracts to provide util-ities and construction materials at the enduring installa-tions on the peninsula. [As part of the Land PartnershipProgram and Future of the Alliance Talks, the UnitedStates will be returning installations to the Korean Gov-ernment. Enduring installations are the facilities thatthe United States will continue to use.] Another excesscost is caused by warehouse managers at the installa-tions’ Directorates of Public Works using an outdatedpencil-and-paper method of accounting for stocks in thewarehouses, which results in higher ordering and stor-age costs. The Korea Region has contractors develop-ing integrated processes that will address warehousing,logistics, and an in- and out-processing system.

Another cost-saving effort from the Korea RegionOffice is the use of the traditional Korean real estate“key-money,” or “chunsae,” system to obtain housingfor civilians and military personnel living off post.With the key-money system, the renter gives the land-lord a percentage of the value of the property up front.This lowers the amount that must be paid monthly. Cur-rently in Seoul, the cost of off-post housing is astro-nomical. A typical four-bedroom apartment in a highrise can cost the U.S. Government $35,000 to $40,000per year. The Government pays between $90 millionand $100 million a year to house personnel off post inSeoul. The chunsae initiative potentially could save $25

million a year that could be redirected to finance higherpriority requirements.

The Korea Region Office participates in major exer-cises to rehearse its critical role in supporting warfight-ers during a contingency. The Korea Region Officereceives personnel and materiel at the installations andpushes them forward to sustain mobilization efforts. Thewarfighters are the “tooth.” IMA regions, like the KoreaRegion Office, that have a wartime mission represent thelogistics tail that sustains operations.

Installation management personnel play a crucial rolein transforming Army garrisons into viable flagshipswhere military personnel live and train and from whichthey deploy to protect U.S. interests. Installation man-agement personnel must find creative ways to supportinitiatives that provide quality services to military mem-bers and their families. This includes providingdeployed service members with reach-back capabilities.

Installation management personnel must eliminatewasteful practices and reallocate installation assets toresource standard levels of services equitably. They mustbe familiar with modularity in order to provide supportand services to deployed personnel and their families.Installation management personnel must provide train-ing that prepares military and civilian employees to meetthe challenges of operating a flagship within a joint envi-ronment. Essentially, dedicated installation managementpersonnel make the difference between Camp Swampyand the Starship Enterprise. ALOG

JOHN DI GENIO IS A MANAGEMENT ANALYST WITH THEINSTALLATION MANAGEMENT AGENCY KOREA REGIONOFFICE. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ARMY MANAGEMENTSTAFF COLLEGE AND THE ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENTCOLLEGE’S OPERATIONS RESEARCH/SYSTEMS ANALYSISMILITARY APPLICATIONS COURSE.

Family housing, such as the newly constructedBurke Towers in Yongsan, is replacing antiquatedhousing throughout Korea.

One of the 1st Infantry Division’s tasks duringOperation Iraqi Freedom II was to oversee theestablishment of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

within Task Force Danger’s area of responsibility. Thiswas a very important mission because the ISF is essen-tial to the successful transfer of authority to the Iraqi peo-ple. Equipping the ISF and maintaining asset visibilityfor all the equipment issued to it was, and continues tobe, a large project for the 1st Infantry Division PropertyBook Office.

The ISF consists of four organizations: the IraqiNational Guard, the Iraqi Security Police, the Depart-ment of Border Patrol, and the Facilities Protection Ser-vices. The members of all four organizations wererecruited from the Iraqi population, and most of theirequipment consists of weapons the recruits furnishedand vehicles they confiscated.

This eclectic collection of equipment presented sever-al challenges to the ISF leaders. First, they had no wayto determine combat power. The commanders had diffi-culty determining which units were prepared for securi-ty operations and which were not. Because its membersbrought varying amounts of equipment to the ISF, someunits were well equipped and others had very little equip-ment on hand. This created an extremely difficult envi-ronment for commanders at all levels. Second, theUnited States was in the process of purchasing largequantities of equipment for the ISF. Without a goodunderstanding of individual unit equipment levels, itwould be very difficult to field equipment to the unitsthat had the most pressing requirements. Finally, inorder to build a professional force, the ISF needed to

develop supply discipline, which is an important compo-nent of unit discipline. The Division Property BookOffice was tasked to develop a property managementsystem that would address all of these shortcomings.

Gaining Control of the EquipmentThe division’s first step was to gain visibility and con-

trol of the equipment already possessed by the ISF unitsin the Task Force Danger area. Each unit, in coordina-tion with its U.S. partner unit, conducted an inventory ofits equipment and reported the information to the ISFcell located in the Division G–3. The ISF cell, in turn,relayed the information to the Division Materiel Man-agement Center (DMMC) and the Division PropertyBook Office. After this information was gathered andconsolidated, the Property Book Office began building aproperty book for the ISF forces using the StandardProperty Book System–Redesign. Once accountabilitywas established, copies of the 60 primary hand receiptswere sent to the U.S. partner units for distribution to, andvalidation with, the ISF units.

At the same time, sub-hand receipts and individualclothing and equipment documents were prepared anddistributed in both Arabic and English. This allowed theIraqis to begin establishing accountability and supplydiscipline at the unit level.

Equipping the ForceThe most difficult and dangerous part of building

the ISF was receiving their equipment and fielding it tothem. The ISF lacked most of the equipment needed to maintain a credible force. The Multinational

Equipping the Iraqi Security Forces

BY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (W–3) BRIAN EDWARDS

Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division’s701st Main Support Battalion pull securityas an explosive ordnance disposal teamdestroys a roadside improvised explosivedevice (IED) during a combat logisticspatrol transporting ISF equipment.

Coalition-Iraq established a central dis-tribution center for all ISF equipment atForward Operating Base Cooke in Taji,which is just north of Baghdad andapproximately 130 kilometers south ofForward Operating Base Speicher inTikrit. Because the 1st Infantry DMMCand Property Book Office were locatedat Forward Operating Base Speicher,that base was chosen as the distributioncenter for all ISF units in Task ForceDanger’s area of responsibility.

The Division Property Book Office,along with the division’s ammunition andgeneral supply offices, conducted severalcombat logistics patrols from Tikrit to Tajiin an effort to fill the ISF’s equipmentneeds. As equipment was received, it wasprepared for issue and provided to the ISFunits when needed.

Receiving and issuing equipment is anongoing process. After each receipt ofequipment, the DMMC develops a distri-bution plan and coordinates issue of theequipment to the ISF units through the U.S. partnerunits. Before the equipment is issued, the partner unitand ISF representative conduct a joint inventory. Theequipment then is issued to the ISF representative,who then sub-hand receipts it to the individual units.

At first, the Iraqis had little concept of maintainingaccountability and responsibility for equipment intheir possession. They wanted the equipment; theyjust didn’t want to sign for it. However, over time theymade significant progress and now have a much betterunderstanding of the requirements and benefits ofequipment accountability.

Maintaining the ForceAt first, the ISF property records were maintained in

one Standard Property Book System–Redesign systemat the Division Property Book Office. Once the ISFunits were established and the influx of new equipmentslowed, the Division Property Book Officer decided touse a team method similar to the one used by the 1stInfantry Division to manage its property. The divisionplaces a property book team inside each brigade com-bat team (BCT), collocating each property book teamwith the forward support battalion supporting thatbrigade. This has worked very well for the geographi-cally dispersed BCTs. The team chiefs have betterknowledge of the commands they support, and, becauseof the collocation, units travel less for support.

Accounting for ISF equipment is an additional dutyfor the 1st Infantry Division property book teams.Each team is responsible for a BCT and all ISF units


collocated with it. They maintain the Standard Prop-erty Book System–Redesign records with input fromISF soldiers and the U.S. partner units. The originalplan was to have ISF soldiers stationed with each team.However, because of the difficulty of finding an ISFsoldier who could use a computer and read and writeEnglish, the idea was abandoned.

Overseeing the establishment of the ISF units hasbeen a unique and challenging mission. Soldiers rarelyhave the opportunity to help establish a military organi-zation from scratch. Each day brings new improvementsin both the capabilities of the ISF units and the supplydiscipline they practice. In 3 months, the ISF transi-tioned from an underequipped, nascent organization to abetter equipped, more disciplined force. They still havea long journey ahead, but the foundations have been laid.

By January 2005, the ISF in the Task Force Dangerarea had received over 70,000 major end items, includ-ing 25,000 weapons, nearly 4,500 radios, and over 1,800vehicles. They also had developed a better understand-ing and appreciation for property accountability andasset visibility practices. ALOG

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (W–3) BRIAN EDWARDS ISTHE ASSISTANT DIVISION PROPERTY BOOK OFFICER FORTHE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AND IS CUR-RENTLY DEPLOYED TO IRAQ. HE HOLDS A MASTER’S DEGREEIN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT FROM BOWIE STATE UNIVERSITYIN MARYLAND.

Two soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division Property Book Officeissue weapons to ISF soldiers.

Army forces during wartime. AMC Pamphlet 700–30outlines procedures for commanders at both the DA andregional COCOM levels to follow when requesting andimplementing LOGCAP services.

However, the pamphlet does not discuss operationaland tactical execution or program mechanics. Nordoes it explain fully how to maximize the program’scapabilities or establish who is responsible foridentifying or validating LOGCAP requirements, writ-ing statements of work (SOWs), preparing inde-pendent cost estimates, tracking funds obligatedagainst the SOWs, or reviewing the technical execu-tion program at the operational and tactical levels.Likewise, the responsibilities of the requiring andusing activities are not addressed in the pamphlet.

LOGCAP ObjectivesAccording to AR 700–137, the four main objectives

of LOGCAP are to—• Resolve the combat support (CS) and combat

service support (CSS) unit shortfalls represented inoperation plans (OPLANs) and in the Army program.

During my deployment to Iraq to provide supportto Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanderssometimes expressed frustration that the Logis-

tics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) did notmeet their expectations. I believe the commanders’perceptions stemmed, in part, from the fact that theydid not fully understand their roles and responsibilitiesin planning and executing the program and did notalways have realistic expectations of the program’scapabilities. LOGCAP’s strengths lie in preplannedsupport and economies of scale and effort. Thesestrengths have not been exploited fully because ofincremental, bottom-up planning rather than top-down,integrated staff planning; underdeveloped theater con-tracting management processes; and a lack of knowl-edge at all levels of what the program can do and howto access it.

Two major findings of a 2004 Government Ac-countability Office audit of LOGCAP operations inOperations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedomwere that the Department of Defense did not complyfully with guidance on identification of contractingrequirements early in the planning process and thatthe LOGCAP contractor was not adequately involvedin the planning process. I believe that Army MaterielCommand (AMC) Pamphlet 700–30, LOGCAP, doesnot detail the tactical- and operational-level mechan-ics of LOGCAP or provide “how to” information thecombatant commanders (COCOMs) and Army ser-vice component commanders (ASCCs) need to prop-erly implement the contract during contingencyoperations. In this article, the first of two on properplanning and employment of LOGCAP, I will attemptto help fill some of the voids in that doctrine.

LOGCAP DoctrineArmy Regulation (AR) 700–137, Logistics Civil

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), establishes De-partment of the Army (DA) policies, responsibilities,and procedures for implementing LOGCAP to augment

MAY–JUNE 2005

LOGCAP 101: An Operational Planner’s Guide

BY COLONEL KAREN E. LEDOUX

24

In the first of two articles on the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the authordiscusses the commander’s role in planning and executing the program successfully.

. . . it is imperative that logisticiansfully integrate, in logistics plans andorders, the functions performed bycontractors together with those per-formed by military personnel andgovernment civilians.

—Joint Publication 4–0,Doctrine for Logistics Support

of Joint Operations

This article expresses views of the author, not those of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.


services such as humanitarianassistance, disaster relief, peaceenforcement, and peacekeeping.

Civilian contractor support ina theater of operations frees sol-diers and other military person-nel to perform combat arms andCS missions. During the mili-tary drawdown of the 1990s,some Army CS and CSS func-tions were reduced and personneltransferred from Components(Compos) 1, 2, and 3 (ActiveArmy, Army National Guard, andArmy Reserve, respectively) toCompo 9 (LOGCAP).

Although LOGCAP is anArmy program, it can, withproper preplanning, coordina-tion, and training, support otherservices in joint operations,Federal agencies through mem-orandums of agreement, andcoalition partners throughacquisition and cross-servicingagreements.

The need for LOGCAP hasincreased as a result of reduc-tions in the military force struc-ture and reallocation of CS andCSS manpower to sustain the

Army’s combat arms capabilities. Mandated forcestructure caps also have increased the need for con-tractors. The escalated U.S. involvement in militaryoperations other than war, such as those in Somalia,Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and East Timor, have strainedthe military operating tempo (OPTEMPO). LOGCAPprovided support in those operations to reduce the“green-suit footprint,” decrease individual soldierOPTEMPO, and improve the deployed soldiers’quality of life.

LOGCAP ContractThe LOGCAP base contract operates under an

indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity umbrellacontract (one that covers many functional areas inone or more locations). The base contract providesfor the winning contractor to develop a worldwide

A KBR employee demonstratesproper sawing techniques to two Iraqi laborers as theyconstruct a new militarycamp near Baghdad.

• Consider conversion of existing support unitsbased on availability of contract support in wartime.

• Provide rapid contracting capability for contin-gencies not covered by global OPLANs.

• Provide for contract augmentation in the conti-nental United States during mobilization.

LOGCAP provides for preplanned use of globalcorporate resources to support worldwide contingencyoperations. The program is designed to provide sup-port primarily in areas of operations where no bilateralor multilateral agreements or treaties exist, but it maybe used to provide additional support in areas whereformal host nation support agreements are in place.This support is provided by augmenting CS and CSSforces with contractors. Civilian contractors providethe Army with additional means to support current andprogrammed military forces by performing selected

Field Services

BilletingSanitationFacilitiesFood serviceFacilities operation and

maintenanceInformation operationsPersonnel and administrative

supportLaundry and bathMorale, welfare, and recreationClothing exchange and repairMortuary affairsLegal services

management plan; participate in exercises as directed;when requested by DA or funded by a COCOM, pre-pare LOGCAP annexes to joint OPLANs; and executeplans or provide logistics support to operations whendirected by the contracting officer.

The LOGCAP contract was awarded competitively; ithas a 1-year base period and nine 1-year renewal options.The current contract was awarded to Kellogg Brown &Root (KBR) in December 2001. The contract does notstipulate a monetary ceiling; however, the number ofevents or contingencies KBR can support is limited.

The chart above shows some of the services LOG-CAP can provide. This is not a complete list; in fact,there are few restrictions on the services that can beprovided as part of the LOGCAP contract.

Legal LimitationsOne of the most frequent misperceptions about

LOGCAP is the fact that it is a service contract, not asupply contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to buyitems or products. For example, the LOGCAP con-tractor can operate a motor pool and provide mainte-nance services for nontactical vehicles, but theGovernment cannot use the LOGCAP contract as ameans to purchase the vehicles. The LOGCAP con-tractor can provide billeting services with environmen-tally controlled housing, but the contractor should notbe used simply to purchase the housing. However, the

contractor may purchase the items necessary to per-form the services required under the contract.

All LOGCAP SOWs must be legally reviewed bythe requesting command and the Army Field SupportCommand (AFSC) to determine if the requested workis permissible under current U.S. law, if the work iswithin the scope of the underlying LOGCAP contract,and if the requirements are properly funded.

LOGCAP is not a personal services contract.Therefore, it cannot be used to hire personnel whotake day-to-day direction from military personnel orDOD civilians.

Planners must factor legal reviews into their plan-ning timelines and work with their Judge AdvocatesGeneral and LOGCAP advisors to ensure compli-ance with Department of Defense and Army FederalAcquisition Regulations.

Support NetworkThe Department of the Army (DA) Deputy Chief of

Staff, G–4, is the Army’s proponent for the LOGCAPprogram, and he approves its use in all operations.AMC is the Army’s executive agent for LOGCAP andhas task-organized LOGCAP operations underAFSC. AFSC has three organic elements dedicatedto LOGCAP operations—

• The Directorate of LOGCAP Operations (DLO)(formerly PM LOGCAP) manages LOGCAP. The DLO

MAY–JUNE 200526

Direct and GeneralSupport Operations1

Class I (subsistence)Class II (clothing and individual

equipment)Class III (bulk and packaged

petroleum)Class IV (construction materials)Class V (ammunition)Class VI (personal demand

items)Class VII (major end items)Class VIII (medical supplies)Class IX (repair parts)

Other Operationsand Services

Airfield operationsRetrograde operationsEngineering and constructionSignal operationsPower generation and

distributionTransportation operationsMaintenance and motor pool

operationsStandard Army

Management InformationSystems operations

Medical servicesPhysical security 2

Convoy support centersForce Provider operations

1. Supported unit must provide accountable officer(s).2. Guard services cannot be provided in a hostile environment. LOGCAP contract prohibitsarming the contractor.

prioritizes planning requirements based on funding,workload, and DA guidance and advises theCOCOMs on LOGCAP capabilities. DLO opera-tions personnel are stationed forward with AMClogistics support elements (LSEs) in Southwest Asia,Europe, and the Far East.

• The LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) provides thesoldier, or “green-suit,” interface between the CO-COM or ASCC and the contractor; it deploys world-wide in support of LOGCAP operations. The LSU isresponsible for advising the COCOM, ASCC, or jointtask force commander on how to access, use, and inte-grate LOGCAP properly in contingency operations. Insmall, single-site operations, such as the 1999 hu-manitarian mission in East Timor, an LSU soldier alsomay serve as the contracting officer’s representative.The LSU has three detachments of logistics and engi-neer officers with teams aligned to support each of theCOCOMs. Four Active Guard/Reserve officers areincluded in the structure.

• The Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO)manages the LOGCAP contract and subordinate taskorders and statements of work during peacetime andcontingency operations.

During contingency operations, these three ele-ments deploy into the theater of operations and serve


under the operational control of the theater AMC LSEForward. Additional Department of Defense and DAassets from the Defense Contracting ManagementAgency (DCMA) and the Army Corps of Engineersmay be task-organized with the LSU, DLO, and PCOto form “Team LOGCAP.”

DCMA administers the contract in theater as dele-gated by the PCO and provides quality oversightthrough its quality assurance representatives. Theagency develops, trains, and manages the contractingofficer’s technical representatives in the supportedunits. DCMA also evaluates contractor performanceand issues letters of technical direction when needed.When required, the Army Corps of Engineers providesengineering and construction contracting officer’s tech-nical representatives to evaluate LOGCAP operations.

Although Team LOGCAP facilitates implementa-tion of the LOGCAP contract, the supported unit is themost critical “member” of the team when executingthe contract. Supported units include the COCOM, theASCC, the joint force land component command, jointtask force, and their subordinate units. LOGCAP isnot a “fire-and-forget contract” (a reference to a typeof missile that does not require further guidance afterlaunch). To maximize LOGCAP capabilities, the con-tractor must be fully integrated into staff planning and

KBR Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

In November 2002, KBR deployed to Kuwait to prepare Camp Arifjan inKuwait for the anticipated influx of U.S. troops. Since that time, KBR has—

• Prepared more than 160 million meals. • Washed more than 6.2 million bundles of laundry. • Produced more than 1 billion gallons of potable water. • Transported more than 300 million gallons of fuel. • Hosted more than 18 million patrons at morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. • Delivered more than 560,000 bags of mail. • Logged more than 50 million miles transporting supplies and equipment for the military (with more than 900 trucks on the road each day).

KBR now has 48,000 employees and subcontractors deployed to Kuwait andIraq to support the U.S. military. Although KBR and its subcontractors havelost a number of their personnel to hostile actions, they continue to honortheir commitment to ensure that the troops serving in Iraq have the best food,shelter, and quality of life possible.

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execution processes, then monitored closely byDCMA and the supported unit. Without the full en-gagement of the supported unit, contractor capabilitiesand performance will be reduced.

LOGCAP EnablersThe keys to maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities are

integrated military and contractor preoperation planningand standard support criteria for using the program in atheater. An LSU support officer must be included in thestaff planning process before and throughout the opera-tion to advise the commander on LOGCAP’s capabilities.

DLO and LSU personnel are trained to advise com-manders on the entire menu of LOGCAP services, in-form them of program capabilities and limitations, andadvise them on how to establish processes that willensure effective operation of the program. These LOG-CAP liaisons are not trained strategic planners; they arelogistics and engineer officers or DA civilians. In pastoperations, DLO and LSU personnel have often been

called “planners,” which misled the supported units toassume they were qualified planners (perhaps with func-tional area 59, Strategic Plans and Policy, or skill identi-fier 6Z, Strategist, designations) and expect them toconduct LOGCAP planning for their units. On the con-trary, the supported command is responsible for planningand integrating LOGCAP into its OPLAN.

LOGCAP personnel can be accessed through the DAG–4 or through AMC LSE elements in Southwest Asia,Europe, the Far East, and the Army Forces Command inthe United States. These elements have organic DA civil-ian LOGCAP operations personnel. The AFSC’s DLOalso has DA civilian and contracted operations personnel.

The LSU has the most experience in executingLOGCAP operations on the ground in combat opera-tions. During peacetime, ASCCs and personnel in the-ater support and corps support commands can learnmuch by tapping into the LSU’s collective experience,knowledge, and capabilities during theater and joint exer-cises. Participation in an exercise requires coordination

On average, KBR produces 74 million gallons of water per month for LOGCAP.


through overseas coordination conferences and theASCC G–3 in order to document future overseas deploy-ment training requirements.

LOGCAP MobilizationBecause LOGCAP is not automatically approved for

use in COCOM OPLANs or contingency plans (CON-PLANs) and must be approved by the DA G–4, the LSUis not included in the time-phased force and deploymentdata (TPFDD) on any existing OPLANs. In OperationsEnduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this disconnectresulted in an “ad hoc” mobilization and deploymentprocess, which impeded LOGCAP capabilities. To pre-vent a recurrence in future operations, the DA G–3should be notified in a general-officer-level requirementletter from either the DA G–4 or AMC to mobilize LSUpersonnel as soon as theater planning begins and arequirement for LOGCAP has been identified, validated,and approved. LSU personnel then can be called for-ward into theater by the AMC LSE Forward commanderas needed.

It is absolutely critical that the LOGCAP contractorbe involved in the planning process as soon as possibleto ensure that he has enough time to formulate the plan,

hire and train the required personnel, and procure theproper type and quantity of equipment and move it intothe theater to support the mission. Without a com-prehensive, upfront SOW, additional costs are sure toresult from unknown requirements. A good initial SOWthat is designed to augment organic military capabilitieswill help ensure proactive planning and performance.

To enhance the integrated planning process, CO-COMs and ASCCs must ask that a LOGCAP contractorplanning cell be incorporated into their theater planningcell. Since the LOGCAP contract is preawarded, con-tractor input during the planning process does not pres-ent a conflict of interest. An underused provision of theLOGCAP base contract calls for the contractor to pro-vide a planning cell to analyze existing theater OPLANsand CONPLANs and write the LOGCAP annexes dur-ing periodic reviews of those plans. It is critical that theCOCOM specify that personnel in the LOGCAP con-tractor planning cell must have CS or CSS theater-levelplanners’ backgrounds and top-secret security clear-ances. Quality, upfront integrated planning, sufficienttime, and adequate funding of the SOW will help ensuresuccess in providing support during the operation. Thenorthern theater-opening option through Turkey thatwas developed by U.S. European Command and U.S.Army Europe at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Free-dom is a good model for a theater-funded contractorplanning cell. It is unfortunate that diplomatic barriersforced the 4th Infantry Division to deploy throughKuwait and those plans were not carried out.

In the July–August issue of Army Logistician, I willdiscuss planning considerations and identify criticaltasks and management processes that will assist theU.S. military in maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities infuture operations. ALOG

COLONEL KAREN E. LEDOUX IS A STUDENT AT THEARMY WAR COLLEGE. SHE WAS THE COMMANDER OFTHE LOGCAP SUPPORT UNIT FORWARD IN THE ARMYMATERIEL COMMAND LOGISTICS SUPPORT ELEMENT(AMC LSE) FORWARD-SOUTHWEST ASIA WITH THECOALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND ANDTHE AMC LSE IRAQ SUPPORTING COMBINED JOINT TASKFORCE 7. SHE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE AND THE ARMY LOGISTICSMANAGEMENT COLLEGE’S ASSOCIATE LOGISTICS EXECU-TIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSE, JOINT COURSE ON LOGIS-TICS, AND MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS COURSE.

THE AUTHOR WOULD LIKE TO THANK MAJOR JEANINECUNLIFFE, S–2/3 OF THE LOGCAP SUPPORT UNIT ANDLOGCAP SUPPORT OFFICER IN THE MULTINATIONALDIVISION-CENTRAL SOUTH, AND MAJOR KARL “RUDY”SCHELLY, LOGCAP OPERATIONS OFFICER IN COMBINEDJOINT TASK FORCE 7, FOR THEIR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCEIN THE PREPARATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

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Airlift of a Marine Corps battalion to Lebanon demonstrated that deploying contingency forces from the continental United States to an overseas operation was feasible and expeditious.

In his paper, “Not War But Like War: The AmericanIntervention in Lebanon,” prepared for the ArmyCommand and General Staff College’s Combat StudiesInstitute, Roger J. Spiller notes—

The Military Air Transport Service could de-liver up to 188 million ton-miles of mobility un-der the general war scenario, and it was calculatedthat the Army’s part would come to 80 millionton-miles of the total. From these figures, theArmy’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,Major General Earle Wheeler, made the assumption that “if the general war requirementcould be met, it would seem likely that the limit-ed war requirement of the Army could be met inmost circumstances.”

Although the STRAC mission was to provide aneasily deployable force for use in a limited war or otheremergency, its ability to deploy overseas was limitedby airlift constraints. Without the declaration of anational emergency, the required lift assets would notbe released to support a STRAC deployment.

Overseas OperationsIn March 1957, a year after its deployment to Ger-

many, the 11th Airborne Division was organized under the “Pentomic” structure. A poorly conceivedorganization, the Pentomic division was cellular instructure and designed to fight on nuclear and con-ventional battlefields. Five infantry battle groups replaced three infantry regiments and became thebasic fighting units of the division. Each battle groupcontained a headquarters company; five rifle compa-nies; an organic mortar battery; and the recon-naissance, antitank, and logistics units needed to makeit an independent, self-sustaining fighting force. Thedivision’s supporting units (artillery, signal, engineer,support, and command and control) were organizedsimilarly in cellular multiples of five.

Airlift Operations During the Lebanon Crisis

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK A. OLINGER

During the Cold War, the United States deployedits Armed Forces to support the national objec-tives of various countries around the globe.

The majority of those operations were short in dura-tion and occurred in underdeveloped areas of theworld. Most were joint operations, and some wereconducted with forces from allied nations. Nearly allof them were contingency operations in which thegoals, the time available, and the operational area werelimited. One such mission was Operation Bluebat, thecode name for the U.S. military intervention inLebanon in 1958. That country, which is situatedbetween Israel and Syria, was threatened by a rebellionaimed at toppling its pro-Western government.Because the resources needed to deploy an airbornebrigade were limited, Operation Bluebat was one of themost complex operations of the Cold War.

A Continental U.S. Strike CapabilityThe XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, was designated as the Strategic Army Corps(STRAC) in 1958. The designation was, in reality, theassignment of an additional mission rather than a truedesignation. The additional mission was to provide aflexible strike capability that could deploy worldwideon short notice without declaration of an emergency.The 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington,and the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell,Kentucky, were designated as STRAC’s first-line divi-sions, while the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley,Kansas, and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Braggwere to provide backup in the event of general war.The 5th Logistical Command (later inactivated), alsoat Fort Bragg, would provide the corps with logisticssupport, while Fort Bragg’s XVIII Airborne CorpsArtillery would control artillery units.

Airlift assets were made available to U.S. forces basedon the possible outbreak of a general war in Europe.

Based at Augsburg, the 11th Airborne Division wasforward deployed, which limited its use as an airbornecounterattack force. The division planned for numer-ous contingency missions requiring an airborne assaultcapability, not only in Europe but also in other parts ofthe world. However, the 11th Airborne Division wasinactivated 1 July 1958, and its assets were transferredto the 24th Infantry Division, also in Germany.

Two-thirds of the 24th Infantry Division was organ-ized as airborne, which made the division the firstinfantry division to have organic airborne assault units.Airborne elements of the division consisted of two bat-tle groups; an artillery battery; a cavalry troop; twoengineer companies; a parachute supply and main-tenance company; and signal, ordnance, supply, andmedical detachments provisionally formed into an air-borne brigade known as the 24th Airborne Brigade.

Unrest in the Middle EastIn the spring of 1958, U.S. interests in the Middle

East were compromised when nationalist uprisingsthreatened pro-Western governments. In May, troublessprang up in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. On 14July, King Faisal and Crown Prince Abdul Illah of Iraqwere assassinated in a coup d’état led by BrigadierGeneral Abdul Karim al’Kassim, a nationalist. At thesame time, it was rumored that another coup was in themaking against King Hussein of Jordan.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, reacting to theoverthrow of King Faisal’s government in Iraq, alertedU.S. forces and deployed to Europe a tactical strikeforce from the Ninth Air Force at Shaw Air Force Base,South Carolina, and transport planes from Donaldson

Air Force Base, South Carolina. A naval task force of75 ships, including three aircraft carriers and twocruisers, and 45,000 men, 5,000 of whom weremarines, was deployed to the Middle East from theSixth Fleet in Italy.

The Government of Lebanon, faced with politicalturmoil, requested United States military interventionto prevent a collapse. With the situation deteriorating,President Eisenhower ordered U.S. forces to begindeploying on 14 July. The purpose of Operation Blue-bat was to bolster the pro-Western government of Pres-ident Camille Chamoun against internal oppositionand threats from Syria and Egypt. The plan was tooccupy and secure Beirut International Airport, a fewmiles south of the city, then secure the port of Beirutand the approaches to the city.

Because it was difficult to obtain sufficient airliftassets, the decision was made to employ forces thatwere closer to the region rather than STRAC elements.Contingency plans that had been formulated in 1956for such an eventuality gave the 11th Airborne Divi-sion responsibility for the mission. The 24th InfantryDivision assumed the mission after the 11th AirborneDivision was inactivated.

Force Package DeploymentAlthough both Army and Marine Corps troops were

ordered to Lebanon, only Marine Corps units madeassault landings. On 15 July, within 30 hours of thePresident’s order, a battalion landing team from the 2dBattalion, 2d Marine Regiment, from Camp Lejeune,North Carolina, arrived at Red Beach—only 700 yardsfrom Beirut International Airport—and went ashore on

This truck and tank convoy of marines from the2d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, was the firstconvoy to enter Beirut in July 1958. (MarineCorps photo.)

MAY–JUNE 200532

landing craft or amphibious tractors. In cooperationwith the Lebanese Army, marines kept the airport openfor commercial air traffic. The following day, a secondbattalion landing team from the 1st Battalion, 8thMarine Regiment, also from Camp Lejeune, landed atYellow Beach 4 miles north of Beirut.

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was to provideforces as stipulated in the February 1958 revision ofEmergency Plan 201. This plan directed the formationof Army Task Force (ATF) 201 to handle emergencies inthe Middle East. The task force would consist of twoairborne battle groups that were reinforced with minimalcombat support and combat service support elements.The task force would comprise five echelons, four ofwhich were committed to the operation in Lebanon.

Force Alpha, which was composed of the task forcecommand group and the 1st Airborne Battle Group,187th Infantry Regiment, received orders to movefrom Germany to Adana, Turkey. On 16 July, the unitdeparted an air base near Munich, Germany, for a stag-ing area in Adana and then moved to Beirut Interna-tional Airport on 19 July.

On 18 July, the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment,arrived in Beirut by airlift through Port Lyautey, Mo-rocco. It took 34 hours in the air on board 26C–124C Globemaster II aircraft and 54 hours overallfor approximately 800 marines and their equipmentto reach their destination. In less than a week, 7,200combat troops were in Beirut, including three battal-ions of marines.

The troops established Camp Zeitune in an olivegrove near the airport and manned a perimeter defensearound the airport. All three marine battalionsassumed positions northeast of the city. U.S. soldiers

Marines arrive at the port area in Beirut to establishsecurity around the congested facility. In the photoat right, marines man machinegun positions atopbuildings near the dock. (Marine Corps photos.)


and marines made ashow of force in andaround the area. By theend of July, they encir-cled Beirut with anarmed perimeter. Sincecombat did not developin Lebanon, a secondairborne battle group,Force Bravo, and theadvance headquarters ofATF 201 never deployedfrom Germany.

Force Charlie, madeup of combat, combatsupport, and combatservice support units,deployed from Germanyby sea and air beginning19 July and closed onBeirut by 25 July. By thetime the airlift phase wascompleted, over 1,600soldiers and 1,718 tonsof equipment had beenflown into Beirut in 166C–124C Globemaster II

and C–130 Hercules transports from four separate air-fields in Europe.

According to Emergency Plan 201, Force Echo, amedium tank battalion, was to move by sea. LeavingGermany on 22 and 23 July, the battalion arrived atBeirut on 3 August. Force Delta, which was the seaechelon of the second airborne battle group, left Ger-many on 26 July and closed on Beirut between 3 and 5August. By 5 August, all major ATF 201 forces hadreached Beirut and the bulk of their equipment and ini-tial resupply had arrived or was en route. A total of3,234 personnel and more than 2,310 tons of equip-ment were airlifted for the Army in 242 aircraft. Alloperations had gone according to plan, and conditionsremained stable until a new government was installedin Lebanon.

Political SituationPlans to end the intervention were underway as soon

as it began, and President Eisenhower called on theUnited Nations to safeguard Lebanese independence.However, a Japanese resolution in the Security Coun-cil calling on the United Nations to protect Lebanonwas vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Robert D. Murphy, Under Secretary of State forPolitical Affairs, arrived in Beirut on 17 July asPresident Eisenhower’s personal representative. Histask was to speed a political solution to the internal

Lebanese problems that had led to the intervention.He and U.S. military leaders believed that the causesof Lebanon’s internal conflict were domestic andbore little relationship to international issues.

As the political situation cleared, U.S. forces trainedLebanese forces to use American weapons and con-ducted a combined land-sea-air training exercise onthe shore adjacent to the historic ruins of Byblos. U.S.Army and Marine Corps units continued to mancheckpoints and conduct patrols, and the 1st AirborneBattle Group jumped occasionally.

In October, after 3½ months in Lebanon, the UnitedStates began to withdraw its forces and the confronta-tion subsided. On 23 October, the Lebanese formed abalanced government with representatives from eachof the major parties. Two days later, the remainingU.S. Army forces left the country. During OperationBluebat, one U.S. soldier was killed by sniper fire andfour others died in accidents during what a Pentagonspokesman told the New York Times on 16 July was“not war, but like war.”

The absence of opposition during Operation Blue-bat and the underlying dilemma of whether contin-gency forces should be supplied by USAREUR orSTRAC in the United States were significant factors inthe Lebanon operation. Airlift of a Marine Corps bat-talion from the continental United States to the objec-tive area demonstrated that such a movement wasfeasible and could be done quickly. The airliftincreased the difficulty of justifying the need for aUSAREUR contingency force for the Middle Eastwhen STRAC was being maintained for that purpose.

Although the intervention did not solve Lebanon’schronic political chaos, it helped maintain peace anddemonstrated that the United States would support asmall country that wanted to maintain its independ-ence. The United States did not use its military powerto sustain one faction against the other, but its presencemade it possible for the Lebanese to devise a tempo-rary political solution. Importantly, U.S. forces pulledout voluntarily as soon as possible.

Operation Bluebat was a nominal test of power.Because its amphibious and air landings were unop-posed, the operation has been recorded in history onlyas a brief note. That it might have been the beginningof a conflict of Korean War proportions is overshad-owed by the fact that it was not. ALOG

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK A. OLINGER IS THE SECRE-TARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF V CORPS IN HEIDELBERG,GERMANY. HE HAS A BACHELOR’S DEGREE FROM CALI-FORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY AT POMONA ANDIS A GRADUATE OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY COURSE ANDTHE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE.

Suppose you are the commander or chief of a tableof distribution and allowances (TDA) logisticsactivity. You receive a letter from your major

Army command stating that a manpower assessmentand review team is scheduled to visit your organizationand validate its manpower requirements during thenext fiscal year.

Your reaction may be one of sheer panic. You envi-sion a massive reduction in personnel or perhaps abol-ishment of your entire organization. You and yoursubordinates resign yourselves to the probability thatthe “manpower dragon” will cut a preset percentage ofspaces and that personnel losses are inevitable. As aresult, you do not devote much time and effort to pre-paring for the assessment.

Contrary to what you may have heard, a manpowerassessment and review team does not arrive at an or-ganization with predetermined cuts in mind. Instead,its mission is to determine the minimum number ofpersonnel required by the organization to perform allmissions and tasks directed by regulation or higherheadquarters. Therefore, the success of the assessmentis directly related to the length of time you spend onmeaningful preparation for the team’s visit. By pro-viding detailed information that accurately portraysyour organization’s workload, you can slay the “man-power dragon.”

Baseline SubmissionManpower assessment and review teams ask work

centers for a baseline submission before the assess-ment. Elements such as teams, branches, divisions,and directorates that are set apart as separate para-graphs on an organization’s TDA usually are consid-ered to be work centers. The TDA indicates if thespaces in the work centers are overhead, supervision,or worker positions.

Each work center involved in the manpowerassessment must prepare a baseline submission. Thisis a comprehensive document that provides informa-tion on the work center’s mission, functions, organ-izational structure, workload, and manpower

resources. The mission is why an organization existsand originates from regulation, public law, or otherdelegation of authority. A short description of themission is usually found in the activity’s organizationand functions manual.

The directive that assigns an organization’s mission,along with directives for any new missions, should beincluded in the baseline submission. For example, arecently received memorandum from the Army DeputyChief of Staff, G–4, tasking the Army Forces Com-mand (FORSCOM) to provide equipment to supportseveral Army marksmanship matches yearly obviouslywould increase the FORSCOM workload. Therefore,a copy of the memorandum should be included in thebaseline submission.

Functions are the actual work performed. Forexample, functions derived from the marksmanshipmission would include identifying FORSCOMsources of equipment to support the matches and pro-viding shipping instructions. An organization chart,which shows organizational, command, and supervi-sory chains, should be included in the submission be-cause it addresses command and control andoperating relationships.

Workload is the major output, product, or serviceprovided by a work center. Determining the workloadis probably the most time-consuming part of devel-oping a baseline submission. However, this elementof the submission is the most critical because the

Slaying the Manpower DragonBY JAMES T. DELISI

The success of a manpower assessment and review is directly related to the length of time spent on meaningful preparation.

Properly portraying your mission,type of work, output, and time

spent producing that output will greatly aid the manpowerassessment and review team in

determining the proper staffing levelfor your organization.

COMMENTARY

MAY–JUNE 200534

manpower assessment and review team will validateworkload data during an on-site audit to determinestaffing requirements.

Most work centers have several different workloads.Each should be identified and data on it collected for ahistorical period—normally 1 year. However, thisdata-collection period should represent the normalperiod of work. For example, a resource managementactivity may use a 2-year timeframe because that col-lection period most accurately portrays the ProgramObjective Memorandum process.

Individual Task SheetsTo ensure that the workload is defined accurately

within a work center, each employee should completean individual task sheet. This sheet should contain —

• Office name.• Employee name, grade, and rank.• Position title, TDA line number, and paragraph

number.• Date assigned and date reassigned (if incumbent

has departed the work center).• Documented overtime and compensatory time

hours.• Number of hours of annual leave taken.• Number of hours of other types of leave taken

(sick leave, annual training, etc.).• Description of duties. The description of duties should portray the main

outputs, services, or products generated by the em-ployee. The number of tasks performed may vary byposition. The employee also must indicate the fre-quency of outputs, number of times services and prod-ucts were provided, and actual man-hours spent on eachtask during the data-collection period. For example,over a collection period of 1 year, an individual mayprocess 15 credit card transactions per week, handle 10

equipment turn-ins per month, andmaintain 4 hand receipts, spending400 actual man-hours on credit cardtransactions, 800 man-hours onequipment turn-ins, and 540 man-hours on maintaining hand receipts.This information will provide thesurvey team a starting point for vali-dating the center’s workload. Anycontractor workload also must be

captured and presented in a summary of the work per-formed and total hours devoted to each task.

Individual task sheets should be completed for posi-tions that were vacant during the data-collection peri-od. These sheets should describe the backlog resultingfrom each vacancy. Backlog is defined as those tasksrequired to be completed in order to accomplish thework center’s mission but are not being completedbecause of personnel shortfalls. The work center su-pervisor must explain how failure to complete thesetasks adversely impacts its mission. Finally, the workcenter must provide the number of officers, warrantofficers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and contractorpersonnel required, authorized, and assigned.

The work center supervisor may want to add com-ments about the backlog, staffing and overtime pat-terns, and projected future mission changes. Thisinformation will facilitate manpower and data analysisand serve as justification for additional manpowerrequirements in the work center.

Properly portraying your mission, type of work, out-put, and time spent producing that output will greatlyaid the manpower assessment and review team in deter-mining the proper staffing level for your organization.Developing this information also will help you to bet-ter understand your workload and be prepared torespond to questions the team may ask. If you do yourhomework, you can “slay the manpower dragon.”

JAMES T. DELISI WORKS PART-TIME FOR A NONPROFITORGANIZATION. HE RETIRED FROM FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICEAS A MANAGEMENT ANALYST WITH THE ARMY FORCESCOMMAND. HE ALSO RETIRED AS A LIEUTENANT COLONELIN THE ARMY RESERVE. HE HAS A B.A. DEGREE IN POLIT-ICAL SCIENCE FROM DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY IN PENNSYL-VANIA AND AN M.A. DEGREE IN BUSINESS MANAGEMENTFROM CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY.

To ensure that the workload isdefined accurately within a workcenter, each employee shouldcomplete an individual tasksheet.


Confused or Absolved? Our COMMZ ‘Megaproblem’

BY COLONEL CHRISTOPHER R. PAPARONE

repeatedly experienced in the COMMZ include a lack ofcentralized control, insufficient ground transportationand movement control, inadequate distribution and assetvisibility, and unsatisfactory reporting of logistics status.

In his seminal book, The Sinews of War: Army Lo-gistics, 1775–1953, James A. Huston writes of the WorldWar II (WWII) logistics experience—

Ill-defined lines of authority and responsibilitybred chronic problems of coordination throughoutthe war in Europe. Appointment of LieutenantGeneral John C. H. Lee to be Deputy TheaterCommander for Administration and CommandingGeneral, Communications Zone, appeared for atime to give a certain integration to the structure;but this was deceptive, for field commanders resis-ted the arrangement and General [Dwight D.]Eisenhower [the Supreme Allied Commander inEurope] finally rescinded it. The result was ananomalous situation in which theater and COMMZstaffs overlapped (where the chiefs of technicalservices had theater-wide responsibilities) but theCOMMZ commander had no theater-wide respon-sibility as such. It was confusion between theaterand COMMZ organization—indeed confusion inconception—which would not end with WW II.

A more holistic “system of systems” perspective bet-ter reveals our COMMZ megaproblem and the fact thatwe have framed “joint logistics” problems by trying toisolate them from other problems, such as joint com-mand and control and battlespace awareness. After afunctional analysis, we attempt to reintegrate solutionsacross other problems; for example, through the JointCapabilities Integration and Development System, orJCIDS. The inherent problem with this operationsresearch/systems analysis methodology is that we areconstrained by the functional areas we have chosen.These choices are based on existing functional expertisein stovepiped organizations, so we restate subproblemsin what we think are simplified cause-and-effect rela-tionships. However, when we, as functional problem-solvers, attempt to reintegrate subproblems and the

In his book, Managing the Dream: Reflections onLeadership and Change, Warren Bennis quotes ahigh-level executive in a large organization as saying,

“If you’re not confused, you don’t know what’s goingon.” Our military leadership culture seems to be ori-ented toward a different philosophy: “Only if you areclear and have identified the problem will you knowwhat’s going on.”

Rather than trying to remove confusion about“megaproblems,” I believe we should attempt to ap-preciate the level of our confusion about complex jointmission areas. By “megaproblem,” I mean a “mess,” orconglomeration, of problems—a network of problemsthat are interconnected and interactive, creating com-plexity on a grand scale. We are accustomed to using the“scientific” method of breaking down problems intosmaller pieces and attacking each one. This results infunctional (isolatable) problems, such as “joint theaterlogistics” and its subproblems. As we attempt to defineand manage smaller parts of a megaproblem, we oftenare surprised to find that the problem we have focused onhas “morphed” from its original state and is now a “mov-ing target” for resolution. We execute solutions that wehope will solve the problem; however, because we didnot address the larger network of problems, we some-times create even more confusion. This is why, if youtake a look at the logistics problems experienced duringOperations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, youwill find repeats of some of the documented “lessonslearned” in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Stormand even as far back as World War II.

In a contingency operation, the communications zone(COMMZ) is a complex joint mission area. The Depart-ment of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms defines “communications zone” as “the rear partof a theater of war or theater of operations (behind butcontiguous to the combat zone) which contains the linesof communications, establishments for supply and evac-uation, and other agencies required for the immediatesupport and maintenance of the field forces.” Problems

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MAY–JUNE 200536

It is time to appreciate the magnitude of this COMMZmegaproblem and at least share confusion about itscomplexity across functional stovepipes.

In trying to solve the problem, our initial impulsemight be to assign it to a matrixed team for solution.Unfortunately, the complexity of megaproblems exceedsthe problem-solving capability and authorities of lowerlevel officers and civilians who often are assigned tocapabilities-based analysis teams, working groups, taskforces, and other ad hoc assemblies.

Russell Ackoff, a noted management and organizationscholar and author, would criticize this method for threereasons. First, assigning a team to study a small portionof the megaproblem and eventually recommend a solu-tion assumes that, while the team is working on the prob-lem, the problem is not changing. Second, these sorts ofteams typically come up with a recommended solutionthat ultimately is not implemented. Finally, Ackoffwould suggest that the main reason for failure is thatsuch teams do not take into account the whole—thecomplete set of interdependent relationships within amission area.

Megaproblem management requires the supervisionof a high-level general or flag officer who is chargedwith handling these interdependencies as a normalcourse of his work. Unfortunately, the COMMZmegaproblem has no such executive assigned to it. Per-haps this is something we need to consider if we intendto solve it.

In Ackoff’s Best: His Classic Writings onManagement, the author suggests four ways to treata problem—

• Absolve it (by ignoring it and hoping it solvesitself).

• Resolve it (by applying a clinical approach of di-agnosis and treatment that results in a satisfactory out-come).

• Solve it (by doing something that yields the bestpossible outcome).

• Dissolve it (by redesigning the system that has theproblem in order to reach an ideal state).

Have we inadvertently chosen to absolve theCOMMZ megaproblem? Go ahead—admit that youare confused about the complex interdependencies as-sociated with the COMMZ megaproblem. In admit-ting your confusion, you actually are revealing that youknow what is going on.

COLONEL CHRISTOPHER R. PAPARONE IS THE DEPUTYDIRECTOR (J3/4) FOR LOGISTICS AND ENGINEERING AT THEU.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND. A QUARTERMASTER OFFI-CER, HE HAS SERVED WITH VARIOUS COMMANDS AND STAFFSIN HIS 27 YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY. HE HAS A PH.D. FROMPENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY. HE CAN BE CONTACTED BYEMAIL AT [email protected].

identified solutions, which often are really solutions thatwere looking for problems, we discover we cannot put“Humpty Dumpty” back together again.

Take, for example, the current efforts toward institu-tionalizing new theater logistics “organizational solu-tions” such as the deployment and distributionoperations center (DDOC). As valiant and progressiveas they are, these efforts do not holistically address ahigher systems-level view. The DDOC is a “solution”that places national-level organizational representativesforward or adjacent to the joint operations area to man-age distribution. One of the most confusing aspects ofprosecuting the full range of military operations is that ofprosecuting COMMZ capabilities efficiently and effec-tively. The DDOC does seem to address a critical sub-problem of the joint operator—enabling the nationalsupport structure to establish liaison and a “managementreachback” capability with regional combatant com-mander organizations. However, it does not provide aholistic solution of the megaproblem of integrating thedifferentiated, interdependent missions of theater infra-structure development; general engineering; commu-nications; intelligence; security or force protection;enemy prisoners of war and detainee processing; rearcombat operations; survivability; area (land) man-agement; host nation support; coalition support; em-bassy liaison; integration of interagency andnongovernmental organizations; or traditional logisticssustainment and joint reception, staging, onward move-ment, and integration. The DDOC solution does notaddress these rear area concerns that together constitutethe COMMZ megaproblem.

How can we renew some mental models that mighthelp us appreciate this COMMZ megaproblem? Globaloperations now and in the foreseeable future will requirea base or bases of operations and corresponding nation-al and regional lines of operation (LOOs) and lines ofcommunication (LOCs). These positional conceptsremain the fundamentals of strategic and operational art.Even in nonlinear or noncontiguous operations, imagi-nary lines will exist between the base, the objective, andthe forces (internal and external LOOs and LOCs). Ihave heard more than one senior officer say that there areno rear areas in noncontiguous operations. However, theinsightful Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–41.1,Rear Area Operations, demonstrates how “rear” areas arelikely to be with us always.

Managing all of the supporting activities required tosustain the LOOs and LOCs effectively and efficientlyis a critical megaproblem for the U.S. military, at boththe department and combatant commander levels.When expressed in operational art terms, the problemseems manageable. Nevertheless, we have not taken anintegrated system of systems view of this megaproblem.


MAY–JUNE 200538

The Modular Force concept attempts to buildbrigade unit organizations supported by a distribu-tion management system with nodes that are posi-

tioned based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, timeavailable, and civilian considerations (METT–TC). Asa result, support functions previously accomplished at asingle level have been redistributed and embedded withcombat units to make those units more self-reliant.Although the workload of these combat service supportassets remains the same, personnel and their equipmenthave been realigned to allow for greater autonomy ofbrigade combat teams (BCTs). Effective combat poweris directly related to the amount of sustainment availableto the maneuver BCTs. This embedded combat servicesupport must be agile enough that it will not limit themaneuver commander’s flexibility.

Operational performance and capacity planning decisions are often evaluated using computer simula-tion techniques such as discrete event simulation mod-eling, which is commonly used for analyzing complex systems. This technique creates a simplified represen-tation of the system under study. It uses Monte Carlorandom number and random variate generation meth-ods to create sample paths of the system’s behavior. Itthen experiments with the simulated system, guided bya prescribed set of goals such as improved systemdesign, cost and benefit analysis, and sensitivity todesign parameters. Experiments are conducted bygenerating system histories, observing system behav-ior over time, and examining system statistics. Therepresentation created describes system structure,while the histories describe system behavior.

Typical deployment and sustainment questionsinclude—

• How much of each supply class will have to bemoved? When? By whom?

• What is the capability of the current distributionsystem?

• What changes are expected to affect the system’sperformance?

• How does the distribution system respond under asurge of heavy demand?

• What is the system’s resource availability undervarious surge scenarios?

• What alternative courses of action will alleviateshortfalls? What does each cost?

VisioSimThe Logistics Research and Development Branch of

the Armament Research, Development, and EngineeringCenter at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, in partnershipwith the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineer-ing at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, devel-oped a means of expanding the simulation modelingcapability by increasing its ease of use and practicality.The project, known as “VisioSim,” aims at combining thesimple flowcharting capability of Microsoft Visio withthe simulation capability of Arena, a simulation tooldeveloped by Rockwell Software. The user can placeprocedural and auxiliary information into the modelwithout having to understand the technicalities of asophisticated modeling environment. The flow-chartingconcept of VisioSim can be used to describe or demon-strate any operational procedure that may later becomepart of a bigger simulation model. VisioSim has beentested successfully by the Center for Army Analysis andhas been used to model pierside ship ammunition loadingoperations at Naval Weapons Station Earle, New Jersey.

Overview of VisioSimVisioSim uses the Active X Automation technology

and the Visual Basic Applications programming envi-ronment to allow Arena and Visio to communicatewith each other. Data transfer is achieved by usingMicrosoft Access database constructs to pass informa-tion from one application to another.

A New Tool for Simulation Modeling of Logistics Support

BY ALAN SANTUCCI AND DR. TAYFUR ALTIOK

A new computer simulation tool combines Microsoft Visio's flowcharting capability and Rockwell Software's Arena simulation tool to help Army planners ensure that embedded combat service support units remain agileenough to support the Modular Force effectively.


VisioSim is intended primarily for use by subject-matter experts to document “as is” process flows usingbasic and advanced flowcharting objects and to assistmodelers in transferring this knowledge into Arenamodels to carry out detailed analysis. VisioSim’sobjective is to provide an effective method of transfer-ring credible workflows between user groups with dif-ferent functions, thereby reducing process validationtime considerably.

The VisioSim interface is similar in layout to astandard Microsoft Visio template. Objects withassociated dialog boxes are dragged into the modelwindow area to progressively build workflows. TheVisioSim template contains two customized Visiostencils: Basic VisioSim and Advanced VisioSim(above).

Although the Basic VisioSim stencil incorporatesbasic Arena modules, such as Begin, Terminate, Delay,and Process, the Advanced VisioSim stencil includesthe more involved and capable Arena modules, such asActivate, Batch, Separate, and Match. Both of thesestencils are integral parts of VisioSim. Most high-level processes can be modeled accurately using theBasic stencil; however, the Advanced stencil is neededto achieve more complex procedures.

Six SigmaVisioSim allows subject-matter experts to docu-

ment every step of the industrial, administrative,

engineering, and business processes used for design,analysis, and training purposes in support of Six Sigmalean enterprise analysis. [Six Sigma is a structuredapproach to solving complex problems by implement-ing data-driven improvement projects. Lean enterpriseanalysis looks at a business process and seeks ways tooptimize elements of it to make it more productive.]

The resulting value map, the VisioSim chart, is auto-matically exported to Arena to create a working Arenamodel that has a one-to-one relationship with theVisioSim chart. A simulation modeler gathers variousVisioSim charts and exports them into Arena to mergethem into a unified model that simulates the entire sys-tem. The resulting model then can be tailored withspecific resource costs, capacities, and purposes tomake the “to be” representation ready for any “whatif ” analysis.

Basic and Advanced stencils in VisioSim.

Basic VisioSim Advanced VisioSi m

Begin Terminate Process

Decide Assign Delay

Record SubModel Text Tool

Activate Batch Sep arate Pickup Dropoff

Free Halt Hold Match Move

Station Pick Stat ion ReadWrite Seize Release

VisioSim allows subject-matterexperts to document every step of the industrial, administrative,

engineering, and businessprocesses used for design, analysis,

and training purposes in support of Six Sigma lean enterprise analysis.

40

model for a detailed study of the logistics and sus-tainment issues.

VisioSim provides a structured, well-definedprocess for capturing the knowledge of various subject-matter experts. It provides them with thecapability to develop a high-fidelity model suitablefor in-depth analysis of the tasks by capturing thisknowledge and mapping it. For more information onVisioSim and how to obtain it, send an email [email protected]. ALOG

ALAN SANTUCCI IS THE CHIEF OF THE LOGISTICSRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BRANCH IN THE LOGIS-TICS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE OF THEARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERINGCOMMAND-ARMAMENT RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, ANDENGINEERING CENTER AT PICATINNY ARSENAL, NEW JER-SEY. HE HAS AN M.S. DEGREE IN COMPUTER SCIENCEFROM POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY IN BROOKLYN, NEWYORK, AND AN M.B.A. DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITYOF PHOENIX.

DR. TAYFUR ALTIOK IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THEDEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEER-ING AT RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY.HE HAS A PH.D. IN INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING FROMNORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY.

A Simple VisioSim ModelFor demonstration purposes, we will show how

the tasks handled by an ammunition accountableofficer at an ammunition storage area can be mod-eled using VisioSim. Typically, an ammunitionaccountable officer handles five segments of theammunition flow: receipt, shipment to other facili-ties, issue to a unit, turn-in of unused ammunition,and maintenance of ammunition. The ammunitionaccountable officer processes the necessary paper-work and sends ammunition and documentation toother nodes. The chart above shows a VisioSimmodel of the procedure the officer follows in direct-ing ammunition flow. Most of the objects used in theVisioSim model are Delay and Process objects thatrepresent processing times, Route objects to sendeither ammunition or documents, and a Decideobject to direct the traffic. Each object has a dialogbox that contains details about the particular processit represents.

A typical VisioSim study includes descriptions ofall the business processes involved at either the oper-ational level or a higher level. It may be completedusing operational details that VisioSim provides toproduce an operational flow chart or usingVisioSim’s conversion function to produce an Arena

VisioSim model of the workflows handled by an ammunition accountable officer.

Arrival ofrequisition

Ammunitionaccountable

officer

Type of workflow

Authenticaterequest Issue request Send convoy to

inspection

Approve turn in

Approveshipment

Process shipment To stacks

Initiate materielrelease order

(MRO)

Send MRO to ammunition supply

point

Send to inspection

Begin Process Decide

Delay Delay Route

Process

Process

Process

Process

Route

Route

Route

MAY–JUNE 2005


ALOG NEWS(continued from page 1)

The new guidance has 10 strategic imperatives.The other nine are—

• Implement transformation initiatives.• Improve capabilities for homeland defense.• Improve proficiencies against irregular challenges.• Improve capabilities for stability operations.• Achieve Army force capabilities to dominate in

complex terrain.• Improve Army capabilities for strategic

responsiveness.• Improve global force posture.• Improve capabilities for battle command.• Improve joint fires capability.Three of the imperatives—improve capabilities

for homeland defense, improve capabilities for sta-bility operations, and improve proficiencies againstirregular challenges—are new Army focus areas.

The ASPG addresses the requirement for logisti-cians to provide a supply chain that reaches across ajoint, interagency, and multinational theater. Themeans of accomplishing this include developing com-bat service support concepts, policy, and doctrine thatsupport both theater-opening and distribution-basedlogistics and establishing end-to-end asset visibility.

The format of the new ASPG makes it easier forthe reader to understand the Army’s strategicobjectives and how the Army plans to achievethem. The 2005 ASPG can be found on line atwww.army.mil/references.

NEW LAB TO TEST FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Army and Boeing Company officials cut the rib-bon on 28 January for the 140,000-square-foot Sys-tem of Systems Integration Laboratory (SoSIL) inHuntington Beach, California. The SoSIL is a test-ing and simulation lab in which soldiers and civilianexperts together will develop, test, and evaluate theFuture Combat Systems (FCS) network that willconnect vehicles and warfighters on the battlefield.The $35-million laboratory is a part of the Army’s$21.4-billion FCS program that is scheduled to befielded by 2014.

Colonel Charles Jorgenson, chief of staff in theOffice of the Program Manager, FCS Unit ofAction, said the facility “will allow us to test all 18

platforms in the network-centric warfare we’re try-ing to move to. We’ll move some of those capabili-ties to a test unit beginning in 2008. And we’realready using some of the technology.”

Boeing’s Frank DeMattia said the new high-techlaboratory also will link suppliers and subcontrac-tors nationwide in real time. DeMattia said thatFCS will network the new manned and unmannedground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles andintegrate all the communications nodes in abrigade-sized unit of action. SoSIL will enablethose vehicles, the soldiers’ individual equipment,and stationary sensors throughout the battlefield towork together, he added.

Soldiers will be involved with the system’s devel-opment early in the process in an effort to reduce thenumber of difficulties encountered in the field. “Wewant to get the warfighter involved in the develop-mental process, so if he’s looking at a display, for ex-ample, and it doesn’t look right to him, we can makechanges before we’re fully committed to a design,”DeMattia said.

The first integration test is set to begin in Octoberand end in the spring of 2006 with a mission test inwhich soldiers will use the equipment in a simulat-ed battle.

According to DeMattia, the SoSIL will allow theArmy to bring both hardware and software into thefield gradually, with various components of FCS be-ing fielded in 2008, 2010, and 2012 before the fullsystem is in use in 2014.

EUROPE-BASED AMC BRIGADEDEPLOYS TO IRAQ

The Army Materiel Command Field SupportBrigade-Europe (AMC FSB–E) deployed to Iraqfrom Germany just 2 months after it was establishedto provide expeditionary logistics support to forcesin the field.

“This deployment is exactly why the unit wasformed [on 18 November],” said Colonel Max Lobe-to, the brigade commander. “Ours is the first suchbrigade in [the] Army Materiel Command, and [it] isdesigned to match up with the expeditionary Army.”

The deploying contingent includes the com-mander and the brigade operations command post,which is made up of both soldiers and civilianemployees. “Although many members of our com-mand have deployed individually, this is the firsttime we are going as a unit,” said Tommy Lane,

MAY–JUNE 200542

CDDOC INITIATIVESREDUCE CONVOY RISKS

An initiative of the U.S.Central Command’s Distri-bution and DeploymentOperations Center (CDDOC)reduces the number of U.S.truck drivers who have totransit some of Iraq’s mostdangerous roads each week.CDDOC is charged withsynchronizing strategic andintratheater airlift for theU.S. military.

In the past, large cargo air-craft flew into airfields thatwere located in some of themost dangerous areas of Iraq,and truck convoys then deliv-ered supplies to forward-deployed military forces.

CDDOC’s improved dis-tribution plan calls for stra-tegic transports to delivercargo directly from the

United States to several airfields that canaccommodate large aircraft. Then the cargo isflown from those airfields on smaller C–130 Her-cules transport aircraft to airstrips that are locatednear large numbers of military forces.

This initiative has not totally eliminated the needfor convoys to travel in high-risk areas, but, so far, ithas removed approximately 1,280 convoy driversper week from Iraqi roads.

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRESSES

The Army is scheduled to begin disposing ofchemical agents at a sixth site this spring. The facil-ity, at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, will destroy ap-proximately 3,850 tons of the nerve agents GB andVX and the blister agents HT and HD. That amountsto 12 percent of the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents.

As of 2 February, the Army had destroyed 11,076tons of chemical agents, or about 35.1 percent ofthe total U.S. stockpile of chemical agents, andabout 42 percent of all U.S. chemical munitions(mainly rockets and landmines).

The Army’s first chemical agent disposal facilityopened at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific in 1990 and

A loadmaster conducts a preflight inspection of his C–130 Hercules aircraftbefore takeoff from an air base in Iraq. The C–130s are used to transportsupplies over areas where truck drivers face the greatest threat.

the brigade’s civilian deputy. “It makes good sense:we are experienced professionals and have all thetools to organize the effort on the ground and reachback into AMC’s arsenal of expertise and equipment.”

Plans call for the brigade to exercise commandand control over all AMC activities and personneluntil later this year, when it will hand over authorityto another brigade. “We’re setting the standard forproviding a modular solution to the logistics chal-lenges raised by an enduring and global battleagainst terrorism,” said Steve Lockridge, brigadechief of plans and operations. “What we do andwhat we learn will contribute to Army MaterielCommand’s continuing transformation. We’vealways operated in support of fighting forces, butnow we are doing so in a formation that looks andacts just like the combatant commands. They’redeploying as brigade units, organized and equippedfor the mission [and] so are we.”

While the brigade command is in Iraq, more than1,000 members of the brigade will continue to pro-vide logistics assistance and combat-ready equip-ment from operating locations across Europe andbeyond. “This new mission is an additional task.The essential logistics support provided to U.S.Army Europe and U.S. European Command willcontinue at full speed,” said Lobeto.

completed its work in 2000, destroying approxi-mately 6 percent of the Army’s chemical agents.Other disposal facilities (with the percentages of theArmy’s chemical agent stockpile they store) beganoperating at Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah, in 1996(44 percent); Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, in2003 (7 percent); Aberdeen Proving Ground, Mary-land, in 2003 (5 percent); and Umatilla ChemicalDepot, Oregon, in 2004 (12 percent). The disposalfacility at Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana (4 per-cent), is scheduled to begin operations later thisyear. Other facilities are planned for Blue GrassArmy Depot, Kentucky (2 percent), and PuebloChemical Depot, Colorado (8 percent).

The Deseret, Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Blufffacilities use incineration to destroy chemical agents,as did Johnston Atoll. Aberdeen uses a neutralizationtechnology, as will Newport, Blue Grass, and Pueblo.

ARMY SAFETY CENTER SHIFTS FOCUSTO RISK MANAGEMENT

The Army is changing its safety program to incor-porate safety into the fabric of daily operations. As apart of this change, the Army Safety Center at FortRucker, Alabama, became the Army Combat Readi-ness Center (USACRC) in February. The organiza-tional change is designed to advance the concept ofcomposite risk management, which seeks to develop afuller evaluation of potential dangers and thus create


more effective risk mitigation. Composite riskmanagement will focus on sustaining readiness andmanaging all risks—those posed by the enemy, theenvironment, materiel and systems, and human error—by shifting from an accident-centricapproach to a soldier-centric approach.

According to Brigadier General Joseph A. Smith,USACRC Commander, “The change is intended tomove beyond the old concept of ‘safety,’ which hadbecome viewed by many soldiers as an occasionalaction rather than a constant foundation for all otheractivities. In some cases, soldiers do not grasp theoutcome of being unsafe until ‘one of their own’ isinvolved—recognizing, too late, the consequencesof the accidental loss in making the unit less pre-pared, lowering its readiness, and potentially puttingthe unit mission at risk.”

The Army Safety Office in Washington, D.C.,will focus on the compliance aspects of safety andreinforce the use of composite risk management asa tool to help prevent all loss. USACRC will func-tion as a field operating agency under the Office ofthe Chief of Staff of the Army. Safety remains afoundational component of the new organization.The USARC mission includes—

• Investigating Army accidents.• Initiating the necessary cultural changes and

developing the processes, structure, and trainingneeded to implement composite risk managementArmy wide.

• Developing predictive trend analysis using digitaltechnology and data mining in order to identify losstrends and preventive measures.

TRADOC IMPLEMENTSLEARNING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) is implementing the new, Web-basedArmy Learning Management System (ALMS),which will help students, trainers, and training man-agers to conduct and manage training throughoutstudents’ Army careers. The system is an integralcomponent of the Army Distributed Learning Pro-gram that provides professional military and self-development training and education.

The ALMS provides automated individual train-ing management and distributed learning capabili-ties. It will be used to register and enroll students;monitor testing and student progress; distribute,store, and present education and training products;

A forklift operator loads a pallet of VX rocketsinto an on-site container for movement fromstorage to the Tooele Chemical Agent DisposalFacility at Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah.

MAY–JUNE 200544

maintain training and education records; collect andstore feedback and evaluations; and provide a databaseof education and training products and resources. Itwill enable soldiers to take distributed learning cours-es and manage their training records and allow civil-ians to take Department of the Army-directed training.

The ALMS is accessible from the Army Knowl-edge Online Web site, providing one central locationfor soldier and civilian employee training needs.Implementation of the ALMS began with FortLeonard Wood, Missouri, and is scheduled to becomplete throughout TRADOC early in 2006.Fielding to the remaining major Army commandswill begin shortly thereafter, with full fielding com-pleted by 2008.

PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY PROMISESMULTIPLE BENEFITS TO MILITARY

Researchers at the Army Soldier Systems Centerat Natick, Massachusetts, believe the potential ben-efits to the military of a new generation of photo-voltaic (PV) technologies are unlimited.

PV solar cells convert light energy into electricitywithout noise, moving parts, fuel consumption, orpollutant emissions. In the last 5 years, PV technol-ogy has evolved from the use of large, heavy, rigid,reflective, and expensive glass panels to the use oflightweight and inexpensive devices that can be inte-grated directly into textiles and warfighter systems.

When used in combination with rechargeable bat-teries to power such items as night-vision goggles,PV cells could cut warfighters’ battery-load weightin half. “On 72-hour and longer missions, it makesa lot more sense to carry rechargeable batteries,”said Steven Tucker, an electrical engineer in the cen-ter’s Collective Protection Directorate. “You get ridof that logistics tail by minimizing resupply withdisposable batteries. The weight payback for a pho-tovoltaic charger and rechargeable battery combi-nation is incredibly quick, and out past 72 hours itjust keeps getting better.”

Less weight means better mobility, and the abili-ty to recharge batteries on the move can increasesustainability, extend mission time and distancefrom tactical operations centers, and reduce logis-tics support requirements. Replacing or decreasingthe number of liquid-fuel-powered generatorsreduces logistics requirements further and lowersthe heat and sound signature in the field forimproved stealth operations.

A “power shade” that fits over two kinds of Armytents has PV material laminated into a mesh fabricthat reduces the cumulative solar irradiance by 80 to90 percent while generating up to 1 kilowatt of powerfor shelter electronics or battery recharging. On a lar-ger scale, PV cells on shelters for aircraft or field hos-pitals that cover thousands of square feet couldgenerate 40 to 60 kilowatts of energy in peak sunlight.

Eventually, direct integration of PV technologyinto soldier-borne systems may create electronicallyactive textiles that minimize the need for cables andconnections and provide a more streamlined andmultifunctional warfighter system. A new Scienceand Technology Objective that will continue through2008 is looking at achieving PV power generationfrom virtually any surface.

Armored personnel carriers are stagedfor loading at Port Beaumont, Texas, inpreparation for deployment to SouthwestAsia. Nearly 2,900 tanks, trucks, andsupport vehicles, or approximately 85percent of the assets of the 116th Brigade Combat Team, were loadedonto MVs Cape Knox, Race, and Riseand USNS Yano in October by the MilitarySurface Deployment and DistributionCommand’s 842d Transportation Battalionand deployed to Southwest Asia to supportthe 116th in Operation Iraqi Freedom III.The 116th includes Army National Guardsoldiers from Idaho, Montana, New Jersey,North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,and Utah.


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Official Business

• MTS: A Success Story for Battlefield Logisticians

• Combat Service Support in Baghdad

• Berlin Airlift

• Who Will Rule Logistics?

• What DOD Logisticians Should Know About the Army

• When the Air Force Needs a Lift

• The Support Leader Digital Assistant

• Tracking Materiel From Warehouse to Warfighter

• Maintenance Reinvention

• Designing Logistics Activity Improvements

Coming in Future Issues—