global discourses for local aims in women empowerment efforts in cameroon_melinda adams_conference...

7/29/2019 Global Discourses for Local Aims in Women Empowerment Efforts in Cameroon_Melinda Adams_Conference Paper

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APPROPRIATING GLOBAL DISCOURSES FOR DOMESTIC AIMS: NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR

THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

Melinda Adams

Department of Political Science

James Madison University

[email protected]

For presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago,September 2-5, 2004.

Draft papernot for citation.


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The condition of women is one of our constant concerns. Our action for women will consist in

strengthening their integration into the political and economic life of the country.1

Paul Biya, October 1992

Cameroonian women, I pledge to foster womens advancement and shall not fail to do so. I

shall do my best to ensure that your efforts are recognized and valued everywhere. I shall ensurethat you are duly represented in all decision-making spheres of the country.2

Paul Biya, October 1997

Since 1962, the United Nations (UN) has advocated for the establishment of state

institutions to promote the status of women.3

At the First World Conference on Women in

Mexico City in 1975, the UN explicitly promoted the formation of national policy machineries

for the advancement of women, calling them effective transitional measures for accelerating the

achievement of equal opportunities for women and their full integration into national life.4

Over

twenty years later, the UN continues to emphasize the importance of effective institutional

mechanisms for the promotion of women. The Beijing Platform for Action, for example, calls on

states to establish a national machinery for women at the highest levels of government, to give

the machinery a clearly defined mandate, to provide it with adequate resources, and to ensure its

ability to influence relevant policymakers.5

The UN also supports additional women-friendly

initiatives like gender quotas and reserved seats for women in decision-making institutions.

1This speech was made in 1992 during a tightly fought presidential campaign. Ministry of Social and Womens

Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, National Plan of action to Integrate Women in Development (NAPWID), 1997, 3.

2See Ministry of Womens Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, The Policy of Womens Advancement in Cameroon,

2000 and Ministry of Womens Affairs, Republic of Cameroon, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy:

Working document for the national validation workshop, January 2002, 24. This speech was given on October 2

during the 1997 presidential election campaign.

3Bridget Byrne and Julie Koch Laier (with Sally Baden and Rachel Marcus), National Machineries for Women in

Development: Experiences, Lessons and Strategies for Institutionalising Gender in Development Policy and

Planning, Report prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for Development (DGVIII), Report

No. 36, Bridge Development-Gender, May 1996, 8.

4C.O.N Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice, and Training, New York: Routledge, 1993,

111as cited in Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 8.

5A national machinery for the advancement of women is the central policy-coordinating unit inside government.

Its main task is to support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspective in all policy areas. The


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This paper suggests that the Cameroonian state has strategically employed the

increasingly accepted global discourse on the need to establish institutions to promote the

advancement of women. It has created a network of national womens institutions in line with

this norm. The states use of women-friendly rhetoric and establishment of a womens

machinery helps to attract international assistance to state programs and agencies, funneling

money that donors might otherwise disburse to autonomous organizations into state coffers.6

The

state also takes advantage of the fact that international actors rarely examine the operations and

effectiveness of these machineries.

While the construction of the womens machinery provides low-cost international

legitimacy, it also advances the states domestic interests in two key ways. First, the

Cameroonian state has managed to integrate the womens machinery into the prevailing

patronage system. In fact, women at the local level often support the womens machinery, seeing

it as a source of favors and goods. Second, the state attempts to use the womens to channel

autonomous organizations towards state-delineated projects. The state exchanges access for

support.

The paper turns next to examine the broader literature on state feminism and its utility in

the Cameroonian case. It then provides four brief case studies that analyze specific components

necessary conditions for an effective functioning of such national machineries include: (a) Location at the highest

possible level in the Government, falling under the responsibility of a Cabinet minister; (b) Institutional mechanisms

or processes that facilitate, as appropriate, decentralized planning, implementation and monitoring with a view to

involving non-governmental organizations and community organizations from the grass-roots upwards; (c)

Sufficient resources in terms of budget and professional capacity; (d) Opportunity to influence development of allgovernment policies. See Beijing Platform for Action, Section H, Paragraph 201,

http://www.un.org/womenwatc/daw/beijing/plat1.htm.

6The SDF has, in fact, compared Chantal Biyas Cercle des amis du Cameroun [Circle of Friends of Cameroon]

(CERAC), a nominally independent philanthropic organization that uses state resources to Henriette Konan Bedies

Fondation Avenir[Future Foundation] in Cote dIvoire, which was found to be a huge network for siphoning of

aid. The Cameroonian state creates state and quasi-state institutions that compete with non-state organizations for

international aid. Given their insider status, they frequently succeed in winning international support. See SDF,

Expression Direct of the SDF 18-19 May 2000, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/releases/205.php.


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of the national womens machinery. The paper argues that the Cameroonian state has

appropriated a global norm in the service of its domestic interestsextending patronage

networks and its control over societal groups.

STATE FEMINISM

The concept of state feminism developed out of work focusing on Nordic countries.

Helga Maria Hernes defines state feminism as feminism from above in the form of gender

equality and social policies.

7

Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur define it as the

activities of government structures that are formally charged with furthering womens status

and rights.8

Vicky Randall argues that there are two ways that scholars generally define state

feminism. One group of scholars uses the term to refer to the tendency for feminists to achieve

positions of influence within government, while another group uses the term to indicate state

policies and procedureswhich are in some way designed to improve womens status and

opportunities.9

My use of state feminism is congruent with this second conception. I employ

it to mean state policies that seek to improve womens status in society.

As for the concept of national machinery, the United Nations Division for the

Advancement for Women defines it as any organizational structure established with particular

responsibility for the advancement of women and the elimination of discrimination against

women at the central national level. These include governmental, non-governmental or joint

7Helga Maria Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism, Oslo: Norwegian University

Press, 1987, 153.

8Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur eds., Comparative State Feminism, Thousand Oaks: Sage

Publications, 1995, 1-2.

9Vicky Randall, Gender and Power: Women Engage the State, In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds.

Gender, Politics and the State London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 201.


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governmental/NGO bodies, and could consist of one or several agencies.10

The United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) sees national machinery as a set of co-ordinated structures,

within and outside of government, which aim to achieve equality for women in all spheres of

life.11

Like these perspectives, I employ an inclusive definition that encompasses a wide variety

of institutional forms; some organized by the state, others by political parties and other societal

actors.

It is important to ascertain whether a national policy machinery provides opportunities

for women to achieve change or if it exists mainly to let governments say they are consulting

women and taking their needs into account.12 In determining whether womens policy

machinery are indeed feminist (i.e. has the purpose of improving the status of women as a group

and undermining patterns of gender hierarchy), Stetson and Mazur look at two criteriapolicy

influence and policy access.13

They define policy influence as the participation of each

womens policy office in the formation of feminist policies.14

Policy access refers to the

degree to which womens policy machineries develop opportunities for society-based actorsto

exert influence on feminist policies.15

Thus, state feminist institutions are those that are able to

shape the policies that promote womens advancement and/or provide opportunities for non-state

actors to voice their opinions to state agents and influence the policy process. Scholars have

10Division for the Advancement of Women, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, United

Nations Office at Vienna,Directory of National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, 1993, 1.

11 Gender in the South African Government, Gender Update, Issue Two, June 2000,

http://www.undp.org.za/misc/genderupdate2.html.

12L. Pauline Rankin and Jill Vickers, Womens Movements and State Feminism: Integrating Diversity into Public

Policy, Status of Women Canada, May 2001, 6.

13Stetson and Mazur 1995, 16.

14Ibid.,274.

15Ibid.


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demonstrated that national machinery in many advanced industrial, democratic states achieve

one or both tasks.16

One limitation of work on state feminism is that it has focused overwhelmingly on liberal

democracies where, for the most part, societal actors view the state as a relatively benign

institution or as a neutral arbiter between different groups within society.17

Hernes Welfare

State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism draws empirical evidence from Nordic and

other European states. Stetson and Mazurs volume, Comparative State Feminism includes case

studies on Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United States, and Spain. For the most part, these

scholars employ a most similar case design that seeks to minimize differences among the

selected cases. Stetson and Mazur include Spain, a continuous democracy since only 1975, and

Poland, a post-Communist state that underwent a democratic transition in 1989, in their study as

two most different cases. Poland is the only case where researchers find that womens policy

machinery are not at all effective in improving womens status. This finding highlights the need

to look more closely at a broader array of countries to gain a fuller understanding of how state

feminism functions around the world. Many states in the developing world have established

womens policy machinery; yet little empirical work examines whether in these countries

institutions actually improve the status of women.

A few scholars are beginning to look at whether state feminism functions in similar ways

in newly democratic, semi-authoritarian, and even authoritarian states as it does in liberal

16Stetson and Mazur classify national policy machinery in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark as

High Influence, High Access. Sweden, Great Britain, and France are High Influence, Low Access and Germany,

United States, and Canada are considered Low Influence, High Access. All are considered state feminist. See

Stetson and Mazur 1995, 277.

17 Georgina Waylen, Gender, Feminism and the State: An Overview, In Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds.

Gender, Politics and the State London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 5.


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democracies.18

While it may at first seem counterintuitive that authoritarian states would

implement state feminist policies, even some of the most repressive regimes have pursued

policies to improve the status of women. Early in his tenure, for example, Saddam Hussein

promoted the emancipation of women through anti-discrimination legislation, paid maternity

leave, the construction of day-care centers, and adult literacy campaigns.19

He did so not out of

concern for women but as a way of breaking down traditional power structures that could pose a

threat to him. The vast majority of African statesmany of which are authoritarian or semi-

authoritarian in naturehave established some sort of womens machinery.

States may support feminist policies and programs for reasons other than their explicitly

stated goals, and these ulterior motives may undermine states commitment and ability to

promote womens and gender issues. Examining state feminism in non-democratic states and

how it compares to state feminism in democratic states, Aili Mari Tripp argues:

State feminism under a semi-authoritarian or authoritarian state is much more constrained

and subject to political manipulations than state feminism within a democracy. There is

an ambiguity within many of the female friendly policies under a semi-authoritarian

regime because they have the potential to enhance womens status and in many respectsthey actually accomplish those goals. But in other important ways, they can also be

subverted and turned against women.20

In non-democratic states, scholars and activists need to approach state initiatives with a degree of

skepticism. Women-friendly policies may promote the advancement of women. They may

18 See, for example, Susan Franceschet, State Feminism and Womens Movements: The Impact of Chiles

Servicio Nacional de la Mujeron Womens Activism,Latin American Research Review 38 (1): 2003, 9-40 and Aili

Mari Tripp, Regimes and the Politics of State Feminism: How and Why States Subvert Female-Friendly Policies,

forthcoming.

19Guilain Denoeux, Iraq, In Charles Hauss, ed. Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges

4th

ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson.

20Aili Mari Tripp, Regimes and the Politics of State Feminism: How and Why States Subvert Female-Friendly

Policies, forthcoming.


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also, however, advance a state agenda that works against womens interests. Thus, evaluations

of these initiatives in non-democracies must be grounded in empirical evidence.

Before delving into the Cameroonian case, it is important to ask whether state

feminism is the most appropriate term for discussing these state-led, women-friendly

initiatives in Africa. Within the African context, scholars have employed the term national

policy machinery far more frequently than state feminism when discussing institutional

mechanisms designed to promote the advancement of women. Feminism is a highly contested

term in Cameroon and throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa, and one with which few activists

closely identify. Indeed, within the Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF), high-level

personnel explicitly reject feminism, arguing that it is too divisive or a Western import that does

not fit the African context,. Thus, state feminism is not a term with which scholars, activists,

and bureaucrats on the ground identify. Moreover, the term has different connotations in African

contexts, one associated with the states instrumental use of women rather than with the

promotion of womens interests. State feminism has been defined as state controlled womens

organizations and institutions which address womens issues in a non-threatening way and often

act against the interests of women.21

From this perspective, state feminist initiatives do not

change womens situation but rather maintain existing power relations that marginalize women.

Stetson and Mazur define state feminist womens policy machineries as those

agencies that concretely achieve their formal charge in some way.22

Yet, as this chapter

demonstrates, womens national machineries do not always lead to changes in womens status.

The concept of national machinery, in contrast to that of state feminism, does not imply that

21E. Sisulu et al., Report on the Workship on Gender Analysis and African Social Science, CODESRIA Bulletin,

4, 1991, 9 quoted in Lisa Aubrey, Gender, Development, and Democratization in Africa, Journal of African and

Asian Studies, 36 (1): 2001, 104.

22Stetson and Mazur, 1995, 5.


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these institutions actually yield feminist results. The outcomes may be ambiguous or even

reinforce patriarchal institutions. Indeed, evidence below suggests that national womens

machineries fall far short of transforming gender hierarchies.

Finally, while the majority of work on state feminism neglects developing, non-

democratic states, work on national machinery has been more inclusive, encompassing a wider

range of states. The vast majority of sub-Saharan African states have established some sort of

national womens machinery.23

An 11-part series published by the Third World Network-Africa,

based in Accra, Ghana, examines national machinery in eight African states.24

The studies raise

important theoretical issues (e.g., on the nature of relationships between societal actors and state

feminist institutions and on where national machinery should be located for maximum benefit)

and provide empirical evidence drawn from the developing world to address these issues. They

address a number of questions, including: How did the national machinery come into being, how

was it established, and by whom and what are the implications of this for its work? What are the

structures, location, functions, powers, legal character and mandates of national machinery for

women in the study country and what are their implications for the work of the national

machinery? What are the achievements, failures and problems of the national machinery, and

how can the achievements be strengthened and the problems addressed? What is the relationship

between organizations in civil society and the national machinery?25

In short, the studies

challenge much of the conventional wisdom on national machinery and provide hypotheses to

23 For a list of national machineries, see Margaret C. Snyder and Mary Tadesse,African Women and Development:

A History, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995, Appendix 4. See alsoDirectory of National Machinery for

the Advancement of Women, DAWN, Vienna, Austria, 1993.

24These include Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania. The series also includes

two background pieces and a concluding essay that synthesizes the case studies. See Dzodzi Tsikata, Lip-Service

and peanuts: The State and National Machinery for Women in Africa,National Machinery Series No. 11, Ghana:

TWN-Africa, 2000. For a summary of the findings, see Dzodzi Tsikata, National Machineries for the

Advancement of Women in Africa: Are They Transforming Gender Relations? Social Watch, 73-74.


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test in other locales. Thus, unlike literature on state feminism, work on womens policy

machinery encompasses developing countries and those that are new democracies or even semi-

authoritarian states. It is for these reasons that I refer to women-friendly policies and

institutions in Cameroon as the national machinery rather than as state feminist institutions.

Nevertheless, I draw on scholarly work on state feminism and believe that this chapter

contributes to the broader body of literature that examines whether policy machineries yield

feminist results.

CAMEROON: FOUR CASES

On the face of it, Cameroon appears to have complied with global norms calling for the

establishment of a national framework for the promotion of womens and gender issues.

Cameroon, like many states, has created a national policy machinery to mainstream womens

and gender issues and to promote the status of women. In 1975, Ahmadu Ahidjos government

inaugurated the first program targeted specifically at women. Since then, the institutional

framework of the national policy machinery has grown more complex. The Ministry of

Womens Affairs, first created in 1984, occupies a central position in the national machinery.

Numerous other institutions, including the Consultative Committee on the Promotion for

Women, the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians, and a Womens and Gender Studies

Department at the University of Buea, support the work of the Ministry.

Leading politicians in Cameroon have appropriated global norms regulating discourses

on how states should address womens and gender issues. Cameroon has expressed a rhetorical

25Tsikata, 2000, 50-51.


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commitment to womens rights, to gender equity in decision-making positions, and to programs

supporting womens and gender issues. The two quotations cited at the beginning of this chapter

are illustrative of politicians rhetorical support for improving the status of women. In his

October 2, 1997 speech in Maroua, Paul Biya identified the advancement of women as a priority

area for his seven-year term as president. In his contract with women, Biya specifically

committed himself to increasing womens access to health care, to ensuring that their work is

recognized and valued, to adopting a family code, to increasing womens representation in

decision-making positions, and to adopting a law that addresses violence against women.26

As

this term comes to a close, one can begin to evaluate Biyas commitment to womens and gender

issues. The cases below investigate whether Biya and other politicians back up their words with

actions.

The Ministry of Womens Affairs

Up until 1975, Cameroon did not have any state institutions that explicitly focused on

women. In 1975, Ahmadu Ahidjos government established the Ministry of Social Affairs

(MINAS) within which a Service in Charge of the Advancement of Women existed. The mission

of this founding structure of the national machinery was to gather data on the situation of

women, to ensure the full participation of women in development, and to establish contacts with

private and international organizations.27 In the 1970s, Ahidjos government also created a

26See Mve Minsta, Le Candidat Paul Biya: 10 Points Pour Assurer le Mieux-Etre des Camerounais, Cameroon

Tribune, October 10, 1997; J.M. Ahanda, Paidoyer pour les femmes, Cameroon Tribune, October 10, 1997; and

Essama Essomba, Le Candidat Paul Biya: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau contrat de confiance, Cameroon Tribune,

October 6, 1997.

27Sectoral Stategy Workshop, May 13, 2002, Yaound.


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Womens Agricultural Activities Service within the Department of Community Development in

the Ministry of Agriculture. This service targeted female farmers, a previously neglected

population despite the fact that they comprise the vast majority of farmers in Cameroon. Thus,

institutional predecessors to MINCOF existed, but these agencies were small and embedded in

various ministries and government institutions.

In 1984, immediately preceding the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya,

Cameroon established a Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF).28

It is no coincidence that

Cameroon created the Ministry at this moment. At the urging of the United Nations, states across

the continent and the globe were developing similar institutional mechanisms to promote the

advancement of women. In the 1980s, MINCOFs major focus was integrating women into

development. The Ministry consisted of three technical structures: the Legal Research Unit, the

Economic Research Unit, and the Socio-cultural Research Unit.29

As their titles indicate, all

three units focused on research, and their key responsibility was to carry out studies in their

domains.

Thus, MINCOFs first incarnation existed only at the central level, and, in contrast to

larger, more established ministries, it lacked a presence in the field. Its inability to reach out to

the grassroots impeded its ability to induce tangible, positive changes in womens lives. In

addition, insufficient funding, an ambiguous relationship with other ministries, and inadequate

training of personnel combined to render MINCOF largely ineffective in its early years.

According to the National Plan of Action on the Integration of Women in Development

(NAPWID) drafted by the Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs (MINASCOF) in 1997:

28Decree no. 84/95 of March 26, 1984.

29MINCOF, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy: Working Document for the National Validation

Workshop, January 2002, A14.


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[T]he ministry was conceived for technical activities on the field, which explains the lack

of peripheral structures. It had to play a watch role. Unfortunately, understanding of thismandate was neither evident for the ministries, which did not want to see their actions

controlled by another ministry, nor for the Ministry of Womens Affairs, whose expertise

in matters of women and development was still too young.30

MINCOF was supposed to be a watchdog, but it lacked the power to hold other institutions

accountable. At a meeting organized by MINCOF in May 2002 to develop a sector strategy for

womens advancement, a MINCOF representative reiterated that this first incarnation of

MINCOF was marred by the absence of external services that would actually work in the

field.31

It is easy to identify structural weaknesses that impeded MINCOFs ability to fulfill its

mandate. It is also important, however, to recognize that these problems were not merely

technical. They clearly demonstrated the states weak commitment to womens and gender

issues. Paul Biyas government created a structurally weak and under-financed ministry saddled

with the immense task of promoting the advancement of women. MINCOF was fighting an

uphill battle from its inception, and one that other state institutions were making only more

difficult.

Barbara Lewiss study of the Saa Womens Agricultural Project administered by

Ministry of Womens Affairs (MINCOF) highlights the intra- and inter-ministerial battles that

confronted MINCOF during this era. Explaining the finding that MINCOF favored small,

inefficient projects, she argued:

That a womens ministry should tap the technical, administrative, and field resources of

other ministries to serve women appears essential, given the lack of specialized personnel

within the womens ministry. But the preceding analysissuggests that a convergence of

bureaucratic interestswithin the womens ministry, within the womens wing of the

party, and in the larger ministerial contextfavors autonomous projects.

30Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs,National Plan of Action on Integration of Women in Development

(NAPWID), Institutional Framework, April 1997, 239.

31Sectoral Strategy Workshop, May 13, 2002, Yaound.


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Lewis asserts that the newly appointed minister needed the support of local party leaders. She,

therefore, had an interest in designing small development projects that could be used for political

gain. Since ministries function as patronage networks, there are few incentives for inter-

ministerial cooperation. Thus, the bureaucratic culture in Cameroon supports competition rather

than collaboration and leads to inefficient outcomes. The state used patronage as a means of co-

opting and demobilizing womens groups.

In September 1988, the state fused the Ministry of Womens Affairs with the Ministry of

Social Affairs to create the Ministry of Social and Womens Affairs (MINASCOF).32

The state

generally cites budgetary constraints as the impetus behind the decision.

33

Yet, this explanation

begs the question: why did the state choose not to fuse other ministries with overlapping

mandates? The government, to cite a few examples, could have joined the Ministry of

Agriculture and the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries, the Ministry of

Higher Education and the Ministry of Scientific or Technical Research, and/or the Ministry of

Towns and the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning. The states decision to fuse only the

Ministry of Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs demonstrates its lack of

commitment to these issue areas. If budgetary concerns were the primary impetus for the

decision, one would expect that other ministries would have been merged as well.34

MINASCOFs mission was similar to that of MINCOF, though it took a broader

approach to achieving this mandate. A key difference was that MINASCOF inherited the

32 See decree 88/1281 of September 22, 1988.

33Cameroons initial report to the CEDAW Committee notes, for example: With the economic crisis, which

became increasingly serious after 1987, Cameroon adopted a structural adjustment plan which called for a cutback

in public expenditure and, among other measures, the restructuring of the Government. Thus, the Ministry of

Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs were merged. See United Nations, Committee on the

Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Initial Reports of State Parties: Cameroon, CEDAW/C/CMR/1, May

9, 1999, 16.

34I thank Lotsmart Fonjong for raising this point.


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external services of Ministry of Social Affairs; thus, unlike MINCOF, it had a presence on the

ground that facilitated closer relations with its target population. To a certain extent, this ability

to reach grassroots populations facilitated MINASCOFs work. Its internal organization also

differed from MINCOF. MINASCOF consisted of three services on Womens Education,

Womens Economic Integration, and Womens Organizations Relations.35

Budgetary constraints,

duplication of services, and the limited effectiveness of outreach services, however, continued to

impede its ability to fulfill its mandate. Thus, while MINASCOFs existence brought national

and international attention to womens and gender issues throughout Cameroon, the institutions

relative lack of power and insufficient resources continued to impede its ability to effect

substantial changes in womens lives in Cameroon. Once again technical problems were only the

tip of the iceberg, indicating the existence of deeper political obstacles.

In 1997, Cameroon re-established a separate Ministry of Womens Affairs.36

Again, this

permutation of the ministry differed from its predecessors in a number of important ways. The

internal organization of the ministry changed. Since a reorganization in May 1998, MINCOF has

been composed of four departmentsthe Division for Studies, Planning and Co-operation, the

Department for the Socioeconomic Advancement of the Woman, the Department for the

Promotion of Womens Rights, and the Department of General Affairs.37

MINCOFs second

incarnation also developed a stronger presence outside Yaound. Provincial, divisional, and sub-

divisional delegations support the work of the central ministry. Womens Empowerment Centers

(WECs), Appropriate Technology Centers (ATCs), and rural animation pools, all of which target

grassroots populations, further supplement the ministry. Moreover, MINCOFs mandate is both

35Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 60.

36Decree no. 97/205 of December 7, 1997.

37Decree no. 98/68 of May 4, 1998.


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broader and clearer than those of its predecessors. Among other things, MINCOF is responsible

for the drawing up and implementation of measures relating to the respect of womens rights in

society; the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women; and the increase of

equality guarantees in the political, economic, and socio-cultural domains.38

In July 1999,

Cameroon adopted a National Policy on Women in Development (NAPWID). The document

identifies seven priority areas (1) improving womens living conditions; (2) improving

womens legal status; (3) empowering women in all areas of development, (4) womens effective

participation in decision-making; (5) the protection and advancement of the girl-child; (6)

violence against women; and (7) improving the institutional framework. NAPWID also outlines

strategies to meet MINCOFs objectives in each of the seven priority areas. Thus, NAPWID

along with international documents, like CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, provides

MINCOF with a sense of direction.

These changes have combined to make MINCOF stronger and more effective than its

predecessors. Contrasting the MINCOF of 1984 with that of 1997, Cameroons initial report to

CEDAW stated: In contrast to the spirit of the decree of February 1984, which restricted the

role of the Ministry of Womens Affairs essentially to carrying out studies, the new Ministry had

its powers of intervention reinforced and a general secretariat, a gender inspectorate, specialized

technical directorates and local departments in the provinces were placed under its authority.39

Clearly, todays MINCOF has a more formidable structure than its predecessors possessed. It is

less clear, however, whether its content and power are also stronger. Still, its extension into

society grants it more contact with grassroots groups and, perhaps, more influence over these

groups.

38MINCOF, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy, A16.


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Still, MINCOF continues to encounter problems. Like earlier manifestations, it suffers

from a lack of resources. Table 6.2 provides a summary of MINCOFs budget allocations from

1998 to 2004. Though the amount of money allocated to MINCOF has risen, MINCOFs

percentage of the total national budget has fallen. Compared with other Ministries, MINCOFs

budget is tiny. The 2004 budget allocated just 3,538,000,000 FCFA (approximately US

$6,803,846) to the Ministry of Womens Affairs.40 As Table 6.1 demonstrates, MINCOF is not a

budget priority. Out of 37 government bodies, MINCOF ranked 32nd

, receiving 0.43 percent of

the total budget. The data belies the governments claim that the promotion of women remains

one of the major axes of the political program of this seven-year term of office.

41

In speeches,

President Paul Biya continues to express a strong commitment to womens and gender issues. He

has even identified the advancement of women as priority for his current presidential term. Yet,

Biya has failed to follow through on these commitments, and his government has not provided

MINCOF with sufficient resources.

Table 6.1: MINCOF Budget Allocations, 1998-2004

Fiscal Year Budget (FCFA) Percent of Total

Annual Budget

1998-1999 2,980,000,000 0.631999-2000 3,216,000,000 0.662000-2001 2,300,000,000 --42

2001-2002 3,194,161,000 0.41

2002-2003 --

43

--

39CEDAW/C/CMR/1, 16.

40See La Rpartition de lEnveloppe Budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune, December, 11, 2003.

41La promotion de la femme demeure lun des axes majeures du programme politique du septennat.Ibid.

42Data missing for total annual budget.

43Data missing for MINCOFs budget allocation in the 2002-2003 fiscal year.


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2003-2004 3,538,000,000 0.43Sources: Ministere de lEconomie et des Finances, Loi de Finance 1999/2000,

http://www.camnet.cm/investr/minfi/loi.htm; United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination

against Women, Twenty-third session, Summary record of the 483rd

meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, June

26, 2000, CEDAW/C/SR.483, 2; Budget du Cameroun anne 2001-2002, http://www.ambafrance-

cm.org/html/camero/econo/budget.htm; and La Rpartition de lEnveloppe Budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune,

December 11, 2003.


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Table 6.2: Cameroons 2003-2004 Budget Breakdown

Ministry/Government Body % Total Budget

Ministry of National Education 22.29

Ministry of Defense 14.18

Ministry of Public Health 7.08

Ministry of Public Works 6.44

General Delegation of National Security 5.08

Ministry of the Economy and Finance 4.71

The Presidency of the Republic 3.90

Ministry of Technical Education and Professional Training 3.58

Ministry of Agriculture 3.41

Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation 3.05

Ministry of Higher Education 3.02

Ministry of Public Investment and Regional Development 2.80

Ministry of External Relations 2.15

Ministry of Housing and Town Planning 1.81Ministry of Youth and Sports 1.43

Ministry of Justice 1.28

Services of the Prime Minister 1.27

National Assembly 1.03

Ministry of Towns 0.99

Ministry of the Environment and Forest 0.96

Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 0.96

Ministry of Public Service and Administration Reform 0.88

Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries 0.85

Ministry of Transport 0.82

Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research 0.73

Ministry of Mines, Water Resources and Power 0.73

Services attached to the Presidency of the Republic 0.67

Ministry of Communications 0.62

Ministry of Social Affairs 0.55

Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development 0.48

Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Insurance 0.47

Ministry of Womens Affairs 0.43

Ministry of Culture 0.41

Ministry of Tourism 0.37

Supreme Court 0.27The Ministry of Supreme State Audit 0.20

Economic and Social Council 0.12

TOTAL 100.00

Source: La rpartition de lenveloppe budgetaire 2004, Cameroon Tribune, December 11, 2003.


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Funding shortfalls have forced MINCOF to seek funding from alternate sources,

primarily foreign funding agencies. The fact that MINCOF is able to gain external funding also

allows the government to under fund it. In the past, the Canadian International Development

Agency (CIDA) provided funding as part of its Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme.44

Other bilateral sources like the lAmbassade de France au Cameroun have provided significant

support to MINCOF.45 Recently, MINCOF received nearly 800 million FCFA from two

sourcesla Fondation pour le Renforcement des Capacit en Afrique (ACBF) and le Collectif

des Organisations de Promotion des Femmes du Cameroun (COFEF)in 2003 to support a

project that aims to reinforce the capacity of womens networks in Cameroon.

46

While merely

illustrative, these donations place the states budget allocation in perspective, demonstrating just

how far state budgetary allocations fall short of covering MINCOFs expenses as well as the

extent to which external funding supports the work of the ministry.

The lack of adequate funding has led to a number of technical problems. MINCOF

offices, particularly the provincial, divisional, and sub-divisional delegations, severely lack

human and material resources. Operational costssalaries for MINCOF employees, money to

pay rent, to repair buildings, or to pay utilitiesare the very costs that external funding agencies

are the least likely to cover. When MINCOF personnel leave or retire, positions remain unfilled

for months or even years.47

In addition, MINCOF staff members sometimes wear two or more

44Byrne and Koch Laier, 1996, 60.

45lAmbassade de France au Cameroun gave 300,000,000 FCFA over 36 months between 2000 and 2003 to the

Ministry of Womens Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs to support social development. See

http://www.ambafrance-cm.org/html/camfra/actions/coops/social/social1.htm.

46See 800 Millions pour la Promotion de la Femme, Cameroon Tribune, January 12, 2004.

47For example, describing MINCOFs presence in the province, a staff member in the Northwest Provincial office

noted that there were four chiefs of service in the provincial office but only three of the four positions were currently

filled. He also indicated that only four of seven divisions currently had divisional delegates. Personal interview,

Bamenda, February 20, 2002.


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hats, serving, for example, as both a divisional and sub-divisional delegate. Offices lack

material resources like computers, documents, and vehicles, which would enable staff members

to do their jobs more effectively.48

Moreover, MINCOF personnel frequently possess insufficient expertise in gender and

womens issues. MINCOF has acknowledged as much, organizing a three-day conference in

February 2003 that brought together personnel from the central Ministry, provincial delegations,

and womens promotion centers. At the conference, the participants were acquainted with their

various functions and receive[d] lectures on governments policy in the domain of womens

promotion with relation to good governance, fight against corruption, poverty, and

HIV/AIDS.49

The workshops goal was to reinvigorate the Ministry and to give a new impulse

to MINCOF services.50

Inadequate gender training among MINCOF personnel points to a lack of coordination

among the various arms of the national machinery. The Womens and Gender Studies (WGS)

program at the University of Buea, for example, could serve both as a source of qualified

personnel and as a mechanism for training existing employees. Many ministries in Cameroon

have specialized training programs that seek to build the capacity of civil servants; some even

have special schools. MINCOF lacks these sorts of training programs and has hired few WGS

graduates.

48To be sure, civil servants in other departments face similar challenges.

49MINCOF: Women to Get VIP Treatment, Cameroon Tribune, February 18, 2002. See also La Condition

fminine se modernise, Cameroon Tribune, February 21, 2003.

50Ibid.


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22

Moreover, Ministry personnel recognize that a lot is yet to be done.51

MINCOF

personnel tend to emphasize insufficient resources as the primary obstacle blocking MINCOF

from fulfilling its mandate. Speaking at the Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and

Peace for the Twenty-first Century in New York in June 2000, Julienne Ngo Som, the Minister

of Womens Affairs from March 2000 to April 2001, stated that the major obstacle encountered

by my government in the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action has been the lack of

financial resources.52

MINCOFs Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy of January 2002

echoed this complaint. It highlighted a shortage of human, material, information and financial

resources by the external services and a highly insufficient state budget allocation.

53

Insufficient funding, however, is symptomatic of a larger problemthe states lack of a

commitment to creating a strong, effective national policy machinery. The political will needed

to make MINCOF effective is absent in Cameroon. Politicians give lip service to womens and

gender issues, especially during political campaigns, but they fail to follow through on these

rhetorical commitments and rarely back up their speeches with money and action. The state-

controlled media (e.g. CRTV and the Cameroon Tribune) are powerful tools that propagateand

rarely challengethese claims. Many MINCOF personnel are highly committed to their work

and sincerely attempt to improve womens life conditions in Cameroon. Despite their

commitment, political obstacles, frequently emanating from other state agencies and actors,

impede their ability to realize this goal.

51Statement by H.E. Julienne Ngo Som, Minister of Womens Affairs, Head of the Cameroonian Delegation to the

23rd

Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and

Peace for the Twenty-First Century held in New York in June 9, 2000. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/

daw/followup/beijing+5stat/statments/cameroon9.htm.

52Ibid.

53 Ministry of Womens Affairs, Womens Advancement Sectorial Strategy: Working Document for the National

Validation Workshop, January 2002, A23.


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The Consultative Committee for the Promotion of Women54

Created in the same year as MINCOF, the mission of the Consultative Committee for the

Promotion of Women is to: (a) study any matter relating to the status or condition of the

Cameroonian woman; (b) give opinion on draft instruments relating to womens advancement

which are forwarded to the Ministry; and (c) propose any action aimed at ensuring optimum

participation of women in the development effort.55

Appointed by decree, members of the

Committee include representatives of ministries, trade unions, the National Assembly, and

political parties.

The Committee has been wholly ineffective. After 12 years, it had met only three times

and had made little tangible progress towards accomplishing its objectives. Commenting on the

Committees weaknesses in 1997, MINASCOF noted: The reduction of the budget of

MINASCOF, the absence of a permanent secretariat and the lack of autonomy vis--vis the

ministry have not permitted [the Committee] to evolve normally.56

The same document noted

that a project to revitalize [the Committee] is under way.57

At the 23rd

Session of the

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in June 2000, Minister Ngo

Som noted in response to questions about the Committee that it worked in close consultation

54This body le Comit Consultatif pour le Promotion de la Femmehas also been translated as the National Advisory

Board for the Advancement of Cameroon Women. See Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations,

Directory of National Machinery for the Advancement of Women, 1993, 28.

55Decree no. 84/324 of May 23, 1984 established the Committee. See MINASCOF 1997, 240.

56United Nations, Press Release, CEDAW, 23

rdSession, 483

rdMeeting, June 26, 2000,

http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/4CFE43B7B3F4D10DC125690B002978BE?opendocument.

57Ibid.


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with the Ministry.58

At the session, Ngo Som acknowledged that after just three meetings the

Commission no longer met but indicated that it would become active again soon. Four years

later, the Committee is moribund.

The overlapping mandates of MINCOF and the Committee did not facilitate positive

interactions between the institutions. The Committees lack of resourceshuman, financial, and

materialand its subordination to MINCOF meant that it was fighting a losing battle with the

ministry. By withholding funding and refusing to provide the Committee with office space and

other necessary materials, MINCOF easily emasculated the Committee. One woman involved in

the Committee noted that the then Minister of Womens Affairs, Yaou Aissatou, did not make

funds available to the Committee and did not provide office space for it to work or meet.59

These frictions are not unique to Cameroon. Conflict between rival state agencies

charged with the advancement of women occurs in other African states as well. In Nigeria, for

example, power struggles between the national machinery and organizations run by the first

ladies marred the work of national machinery.60

Amina Mama found that decades of high

profile first lady programmes for women led to instrumentalism and in some cases opportunism

among groups.61

Indeed, certain womens organizations were established solely to enjoy such

benefits. Writing during Abachas military regime, Mama noted: today, womens organisations

are more likely to be paying courtesy calls on the wives of military administrators than taking to

the streets.62

Across the continent, first ladies establish and support their pet NGOs, many of

58 United Nations, Press Release, June 26, 2000, 23rd Session of CEDAW, 2.

59Personal interview, Limbe, April 10, 2002.

60See Dzodzi Tsikatas Lip-service and Peanuts: The State and National Machinery for Women in Africa,

National Machinery Series No. 11, Accra: TWNAfrica, 2000.

61Ibid, 23-24.

62Mama cited inIbid., 24. See also Amina Mama, Feminism and the State in Nigeria: The National Machinery for

Women, National Machinery Series No. 4, Accra: TWNAfrica, 2000.


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which undermine the effectiveness of official state institutions by diverting funding and attention

towards the NGOs and away from the womens machinery.

Similar power struggles are visible in Cameroon not only between MINCOF and the

Consultative Committee for the Promotion of Women but also between MINCOF and Chantal

Biyas Circle of Friends of Cameroon [Cercle des amis du Cameroun] (CERAC). CERAC is a

philanthropic organization that addresses issues like poverty, HIV/AIDS, health care, and

education. Targeting underprivileged groups, it finances social welfare programs and distributes

goods like farm implements, food, and clothing to citizens. CERAC has won the hearts of

women because of its better financial standing than MINCOF.

63

In addition, the presence and

support of Chantal Biya draws media attention to CERACs activities, which are widely covered

by CRTV and the Cameroon Tribune.64

The organization also draws on presidential resources

(e.g. vehicles and staff) in ways that MINCOF cannot. Discussing CERAC, the SDF, admittedly

not an unbiased source, observed: When CERAC comes, the long lines of vehicles of all makes

virtually all belong to the state; and the civil servants, ministers and other politicians who come

around are paid from the state treasury. Who says that the gifts of CERAC are not also bought

with tax payers money?65

In short, CERAC, a quasi-state agency that targets women, outshines

MINCOF. The existence of multiple organizations that compete rather than collaborate sacrifices

the effectiveness of the national machinery for political gains.

By creating MINCOF and the Consultative Committee simultaneously, the Cameroonian

state may have consciously pursued a strategy of divide and conquer, heightening tensions

63Personal communication, March 18, 2004.

64A quick search of the online version of the Cameroon Tribune revealed that in the past two years the paper

published 115 articles on CERAC compared with 53 articles on MINCOF. An additional 93 articles coverLa

Fondation Chantal Biya, another philanthropic organization led by the First Lady. Cameroon Tribune, searched on

June 15, 2004, http://www.cameroon-tribune.cm.

65SDF, Expression Direct of the SDF 18-19 May 2000, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/releases/205.php.


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between the two institutions. Yaou Aissatou, a Francophone from the north headed MINCOF,

and later MINASCOF, while Gwendoline Burnley, an Anglophone from the Southwest, led the

Consultative Committee. Personal differences in priorities and perspectives exacerbated the

already existing institutional tensions. At the very least, the state lacked the political will to

establish an effective advisory body. It created the Committee as a hollow institution without any

real power to influence policy. Lacking resources and infrastructure, it should be no surprise that

the Committee failed.

Party Gender Quotas

Scholars and activists have devoted significant attention to the role that gender quotas,

reserved seats, and other affirmative action measures play in increasing womens participation in

decision-making spheres. The Cameroonian state has yet to implement any affirmative action

measures targeting women. The two leading political partiesthe Cameroon Peoples

Democratic Movement (CPDM) and the Social Democratic Front (SDF)have, however, set

intra-party gender quotas, although neither party has yet to enforce them.66

The CPDM announced support for affirmative action measures in favor of women in

1996. At its Second Ordinary Congress in Yaound in December 1996, the party took two steps

toward achieving greater gender balance within the decision-making organs of the partyit

increased the number of women on the Central Committee and announced a 30 percent gender

66Though these policies are not state policies but rather ones established by political parties, I include them in my

discussion of Cameroons national machinery since affirmative action measures are frequently an important

component of state feminist initiatives. Hernes notes, for example: State feminism has often been identified with

the use of quota systems, and especially with rules of positive discrimination in hiring. See Hernes, Welfare State

and Woman Power, 1987, 24. Moreover, in Cameroon, the line between the ruling party and the state itself is

frequently blurred. One could make the argument that party policies, in the case of the CPDM, are in fact state

policies.


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27

quota that would be enforced in future elections.67

Describing these decisions, Alice Mungwa

writes: In the heat of impending parliamentary and presidential elections, the number of women

represented in the partys Central Committee was raised to 20, while a thirty percent quota was

announced for female candidacies in future elections.68

Mungwa links the CPDMs

commitment to gender equity to the uncertain political context. As elections loomed, the CPDM

gave lip service to gender equity within the party. While gender quotas lack grassroots

support, they are popular with certain segments of the population, namely some womens

activists and female members of political parties. Once the elections passed, however, the party

weakened its commitment to affirmative action measures. In fact, it has never fully implemented

the 30 percent gender quota. Recently, party documents tend to discuss gender equity in general

terms, noting merely that electoral lists should include traditionally under-represented

constituencies like women and youth. The Modalits de slection et d'investiture des candidats

drawn up for the 2002 municipal and parliamentary elections, states, for example, that CPDM

electoral lists must accord a just attention to women and to youth.69

It gives no indication of

what just attention constitutes.

Not to be outdone, the SDF responded to the CPDMs quota with its own intra-party

gender quota of 25 percent. The May 1990 SDF Manifesto noted: The SDF shall ensure the

equality of Women in society. It shall ensure their full involvement and participation in all

aspects of national life. The SDF shall enable women in rural areas to have greater access to

agricultural credits. It shall ensure a wider literacy rate among women and further ensure that

67Alice Aghenebit Mungwa, The Mandatory Nature of Affirmative Action for Womens Political Rights in

Cameroon, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Nashville, November 1999,

14-15.

68Ibid, 14.

69RDPC/CPDM, Modalits de slection et d'investiture des candidats,

http://www.rdpcpdm.cm/rdpc_inf/index.htm.


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many more women assume greater responsibilities in policy-making in politics, administration,

banking and finance.70 At the Fifth Ordinary National Convention of the SDF held in Yaound

in April 1999, the party resolved to create a quota of at least 25 percent for Women in all organs

of the Party.71

While this resolution and the one listed on the Socialist International web site

indicate that the SDFs 25 percent gender quota applies only to party structures, other SDF

documents imply that the quota encompasses nominations for elections as well.72 The

Conditions on National Elections in the SDF, which was adopted by the National Executive

Committee in June 2001, explicitly recognizes gender quotas for women. Article II states: For

all list elections (Municipals/Legislative) the party officials at the base must respect the quota

allocated to women. The National Investiture Committee should make sure that the quota for

women is respected.73

While the document does not stipulate the exact quota, it indicates that

the quota pertains to list elections as well as positions within the party.

Moreover, the SDF led donors to believe that it would implement gender quotas in the

2002 municipal and legislative elections. Although it has moved away from programs that

specifically target women, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FEF), which works with the SDF,

70Manifesto of the Social Democratic Front, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/references/17.php.

71SDF, Resolutions: Fifth Ordinary National Convention of the Social Democratic Front, Yaound, 16

thto 20

th

April 1999, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/resolutions/194.php. The document goes on to say that the SDF

Enjoins the National Executive Committee to ensure through this quota system that women are well represented at

all levels of the Party and in all Partys decision-making bodies. It also Enjoins the National Executive Committee

to use informal and formal meetings, training, seminars, conferences and social events to give support,

encouragement, confidence skills to women in the Party to permit them to play their full role and have their voices

heard within the mainstream of the Party.

72The Socialist International supports gender quotas, and the SDF is a member of the organization. The Socialist

International indicates that the SDF has a 25 percent gender quota for party structures only. See Socialist

International, http://www.socintwomen.org.uk/QUOTA/QUOTAEng1.html.

73SDF, Conditions on National Elections in the SDF, http://www.sdfparty.org/english/references/287.php. See

also Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Sminaire sur Femmes et Elections Lgislative 2002, Mbalmayo, June 16-20 2001,

Yaound: Strategies, 18.


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organized a series of workshops to increase the efficacy of female political candidates.74

Discussing the outcome of the workshops, a FEF program officer noted that the Foundation

spent 100 million FCFA to train women to be political leaders but it hasnt been successful. She

indicated that the SDF applied gender quotas in the reorganization process, rejecting lists that did

not include a sufficient number of women. This led the FEF to believe that the SDF would

enforce the quotas during the 2002 elections, but the party failed to do so.

Like the CPDM, the SDFs commitment to gender quotas has wavered. In the past, the

SDF sought to gain the support of women and to be viewed as the party that truly supports

gender equality. It challenged the existing political system, including discriminatory gender

relations embedded within it. Unlike the majority of political parties in Cameroon, it did not

establish a separate womens wing, arguing that women should participate in the central party

structure. Yet, it does not want to be bound by gender quotas when fighting tight electoral

competitions. A high-level, female member of the SDF reflected this ambivalence. She stated:

[In] every election everyone is encouraged to run for positions they think they can occupy.

Gender quotas are a good way to increase womens participation, [but we] want to feel that men

should not say that position is for the women. [We] should be given positions because we merit

them not because were women. [We] should prove we can do the job.75

The respondent was

torn over the issue of gender quotas. On one hand, she believed that they would quickly increase

the number of women in party and elected positions. On the other hand, she feared that quotas

would devalue the position of women in the party, as female political leaders would be seen as

the beneficiaries of quotas rather than as meriting their spots in leadership roles.

74These and other training programs are discussed in greater detail in chapter eight. The workshops addressed issues

such as how to develop a campaign platform, raise money, and speak effectively in public.



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The SDF, like other political parties, tends to nominate women in constituencies where

they are unlikely to win. In the 1997 election, the SDF won 45 seats in parliament, a woman

occupied just one of these seats. The SDF dominates the Northwest province: it swept all 20

parliamentary seats in the 1997 elections and won 19 out of 20 seats in the 2002 legislative

elections. Yet, the SDF nominated no female candidates there. In contrast, women were better

represented on lists in other regions, where they were far less likely to win.76 Thus, women tend

to be nominated in constituencies where they are expected to lose, while men retain the positions

with real power for themselves. This strategy is not a particularly effective one, since the party

fails to deliverer additional seats to women. Yet, the lack of an alternativeno party has carried

through on its commitment to increase womens representationmeans that the SDF does not

come out looking all that bad.

Despite support for gender quotas among certain activists and party militants, the general

population is ambivalent toward the issue of quotas, questioning whether they will actually

promote womens interests.77

More women in parliament may not translate into better policies

for women. Women who win their partys nomination are generally handpicked for their party

loyalty. Once in office, they face pressure to toe the party line.

In sum, both CPDM and the SDF have expressed a commitment to gender quotas; yet,

neither party has implemented them. The fact that neither the CPDM nor the SDF has held true

to its promises of greater gender equity creates a mutually beneficial stalemate. Both can

continue to call themselves the party most committed to women, but neither needs to follow

through on these verbal commitments. They have appropriated global discourses to legitimate

76See Cameroon Tribune, Elections Lgislatives et Muncipales du 23 Juin 2002: Listes Compltes des Candidats

de tous les Partis Politiques en Comptition, June 12, 2002,

77Chapter eight provides a more detailed analysis of campaigns to increase womens representation in Cameroon

and their shortfalls.


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their policies and to win the support of Cameroonian women. The lack of a strong, autonomous

womens movement means that parties face little accountability.

Womens Parliamentary Caucus

In 1992, in the first multi-party National Assembly since 1966, female parliamentarians

established an Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians, informally referred to as the

Womens Caucus. The Caucus sought to bring together female Members of Parliament (MPs)

across party lines to support policies that would advance the status of women. From 1992 to

1997, 16 representatives of the CPDM and 7 members of the National Union for Democracy and

Progress (NUDP) participated in the Caucus. In June 1994, the Womens Caucus jointly

organized with UNICEF a Seminar of Women Parliamentarians on the Family, which brought

together MPs from the four parties represented in parliament to discuss the Draft Family Code.

Representatives of the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians participated in numerous

regional and international conferences. These include the First Pan-African Conference of

African Women Parliamentarians in Burkina Faso in February 1994, the African Regional

Conference on Women in Senegal in November 1994, the Regional Conference of African

Women Ministers and Parliamentarians in Burkina Faso in July 1995, and the Fourth World

Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995.78

In June 1997, the Womens Caucus

published Profiles of Women Parliamentarians, which provides bibliographic information on all

female MPs since Cameroons independence.

78SeeLivre dOr des Femmes Parlementaires: Les Femmes Camerounaises au Parlement Bilan et

Perspectives/Profiles of Women Parliamentarians: Cameroon Women in Parliament Achievements and Perspectives,

Yaound, April 1997, 103-113.


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The Womens Caucus was active throughout the 1992-1997 legislature. After the 1997

parliamentary elections, however, the Inter-Party Group of Women Parliamentarians quickly fell

apart. Between 1997 and 2002, women comprised just 10 out of the 180 MPs, compared to 23

out of 180 in the previous National Assembly. Moreover, nine out of the ten female MPs elected

in 1997 were members of the ruling CPDM. Only one female MP was a member of the

opposition, Victoria Tomedi Ndando of the SDF. The declining number of female

representatives and the fact that the female MPs overwhelmingly represented the same political

party partially account for the demise of the Womens Caucus. In addition, the CPDM and

NUDP arguably enjoyed friendlier relations after the 1992 elections than the CPDM and SDF did

after the 1997 elections. In fact, in December 1997, the leader of the NUDP, Bello Bouba

Maigari, cut a deal with the CPDM, earning himself an appointment as Minister for Industrial

and Commercial Development and two additional ministerial positions for NUDP stalwarts. The

SDF, in contrast, maintained a critical stance toward the government, making collaboration

between the two parties all the more difficult.

Still, the changing composition of parliament cannot fully account for the failure of the

Womens Caucus. One female MP noted that the [Womens Caucus] started during the first

year of last legislature. [It] didnt work out. [It] wasnt long lasting.79

Although she was

reluctant to discuss the demise of the organization, she indicated that male MPs wanted to know

what the women were talking about and were not receptive to the Caucus. Another female

parliamentarian stated that in the 1992-1997 parliament, women tried to create an inter-party

group to think about womens common problems. After 1997, it was no longer an initiative. The

goal was to create common strategies. We produced the book, organized a training seminar on



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rights of the family. Describing why it fell apart after 1997, she noted: It is the men. The

women in 1992-1997 wanted to go. The men refused them, but they still went. In 1997, men

refused again and women were notworthy. When the men barred their path, [they] didnt

protest. These women lacked the daring, audacity, courage to say no to these men. [They] were

not conscious of women as a marginalized group.80

These statements indicate that the failure of

the Womens Caucus was not simply a result of the changing composition of the National

Assembly. Male MPs felt threatened by the organization and sought to eliminate it. It was

political obstacles rather than technical difficulties that ultimately led to the demise of the

Womens Caucus.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Why did the state create the womens machinery? It did so in part as a response to

international pressure to do so. This pressure came not in the form of coercive threats, but

rather in the form of international norms that indicate how states shouldrespond to womens and

gender issues. International organizations like the United Nations have called on states to

establish womens machinery and other institutional mechanisms to promote womens

advancement and eliminate gender inequities.

But self-interest also influenced Cameroons decision to create a national womens

machinery. Like other states in the developing world, Cameroon stood to benefit from its

compliance with global norms. It gained recognition as a good state that supported womens

and gender issues and enabled Cameroon to obtain international funding for MINCOF and

80Personal interview, Yaound, June 6, 2002.


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MINASCOF programs. This was a particularly important development in the early 1990s as

many funding agencies directed their attention to empowering civil societal actors to counteract

corrupt and undemocratic states. In this environment, it was important that the state find ways to

attract external resources into state coffers.

This revenue is important because it assists in the maintenance and extension of

patronage networks. The womens machinerys legitimacy among grassroots populations is

linked to its ability to deliver goods to local womens associations. By distributing farm tools,

small machinery, and other goods to registered groups, the state creates incentives for

cooperation and bolsters its support among grassroots organizations.

The creation of a national womens machinery has also helped the state to assert control

over the increasingly diverse field of womens activism. In particular, the re-establishment of a

separate and revitalized Ministry of Womens Affairs in 1997 reflected the states desire to

regain control over the field of womens activism. It has done this through setting policy

priorities and establishing a partnership initiative that seeks to create formal linkages between

MINCOF and societal groups working on womens and gender issues. The fact that ministries in

Cameroon are the primary source of legislation and policy means that societal groups working in

this field need access to MINCOF to have their voices heard. In this case, then, the norm in favor

of the creation of national machinery for the advancement of women has served to strengthen the

state, reinforcing its power over societal groups.

global discourses for local aims in women empowerment efforts in cameroon_melinda adams_conference...

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