global agenda council on institutional governance systems

Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems

Effective Leadership in International Organizations

April 2015

© World Economic Forum2014 - All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system.

The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of the World Economic Forum.

REF 211014

3Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership

Contents

5 Executive Summary

6 1. The Effective Leadership Project

6 a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

6 b. Why Focus on Leadership?

7 c. Constrained Leadership

7 d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?

8 e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

8 f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?

8 g. The Objectives of the Study

10 2. Emerging Good Practices

11 a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

11 b. Managing Performance

11 c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

12 d. Developing and Retaining Talent

12 e. Setting Strategic Priorities

13 f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

13 g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

14 3. Appendix: Leadership Practices

14 a. African Development Bank Group

19 b. Asian Development Bank

24 c. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

28 d. Inter-American Development Bank

32 e. International Monetary Fund

38 f. International Organization for Migration

42 g. United Nations Development Programme

45 h. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

50 i. World Bank Group

58 j. World Health Organization

60 k. World Trade Organization

66 References

4 Effective Leadership in International Organizations

Project Team

Ngaire Woods, Project Leader; Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Shubhra Saxena Kabra, Council Manager, Global Agenda Councils, World Economic Forum, [email protected] Hall, Fellow in Global Governance, Hertie School of Governance, Germany, [email protected] Taranova, Researcher, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Kellerman, Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Hugo Batten, Associate, McKinsey & Company, Australia, [email protected]

Members of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems

Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Chair; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University, USARobert C. Orr, Vice-Chair; Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, United Nations, New YorkCyrus Ardalan, Vice-Chairman and Head, UK and EU Public Policy and Government Relations, Barclays, United KingdomAnn M. Florini, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, SingaporeDavid Kennedy, Director, Institute for Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School, USAPascal Lamy, Chair (2012-2013); Honorary President, Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute, FranceJeffrey D. Lewis, Director, Economic Policy, Debt and Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, Washington DCLin Jianhai, Secretary, International Monetary Fund, Washington DCEmmanuel E. Mbi, First Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, African Development Bank, TunisiaRiyad Abdulrahman Al Mubarak, Chairman, Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority, United Arab EmiratesArunma Oteh, Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission, NigeriaKatharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, USAQu Bo, Associate Professor and Deputy Director, China Foreign Affairs University, People’s Republic of ChinaGabriela I. Ramos Patiño, Chief-of-Staff and OECD G20 Sherpa, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ParisNasser Saidi, President, Saidi & Associates, United Arab EmiratesJan Sturesson, Global Leader, Government and Public Services and Partner, PwC, SwedenNgaire Woods, Vice-Chair (2012-2013); Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Xue Lan, Dean, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, People’s Republic of ChinaYu Keping, Director and Professor, China Center for Global Governance and Development, People’s Republic of ChinaZhang Haibin, Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University, People’s Republic of China

Acknowledgements

The authors are particularly grateful to the World Economic Forum for providing inspiration and supporting this project, and the academic advisers, current and former officials who have helped along the way. Conversations with several leaders, who provided insights into the challenges faced by leaders of international organizations, were particularly inspiring, including those with Pascal Lamy, Gus Speth, Takehiko Nakao, Helen Clark, Suma Chakrabati and Donald Kaberuka.

Sincere thanks go to the many officials from the following organizations who answered questions: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). The authors would like to thank the following current and former officials from these organizations: Bjorn Gillsater, Brian Gleeson, Kazu Sakai, Margret Thalwitz, Inge Kaul and Max Watson.

A number of academic experts generously offered their insights and feedback, which made this study possible: Michael Barnett (George Washington University), Sam Daws (University of Oxford), Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (University of Oxford), Michael Doyle (Columbia University), Tana Johnson (Duke University), Jérôme Elie (Graduate Institute), Martha Finnemore (George Washington University), Guy Goodwin-Gill (University of Oxford), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales), Craig Murphy (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Catherine Weavers (University of Texas, Austin), and James Vreeland (Georgetown University).

Finally, the authors thank the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, and the Hertie School of Governance, Germany, for providing research support for this report.


Executive Summary

Good leadership in international organizations is necessary, but not sufficient, for their success. Structures supporting leadership vary enormously across global agencies. This report highlights some of the best practices across 11 organizations that facilitate good leadership. It also underscores that international institutions could learn from each other’s practices across seven domains: (1) selecting and re-electing leadership on merit, (2) managing performance, (3) setting and evaluating ethical standards, (4) developing and retaining talent, (5) setting strategic priorities, (6) engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, and (7) evaluating independently and effectively.


1. The Effective Leadership Project

a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

Over the last two decades, the world has suffered from a global governance deficit. This deficit comprises a lack of the following:

– Adequate mechanisms to deal with issues of international peace and security

– Satisfactory mechanisms to anticipate and counter global economic shocks

– Effective instruments to ensure important global public goods, not least in critical areas such as climate change and public health

In the early 2000s, it was expected that the international community would embark on a comprehensive effort to overhaul the multilateral system, with renewed rules and institutions to address the challenges posed by evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances. These ambitions included reform of World Bank and IMF governance; creation of a new world environmental institution; and ongoing attempts at United Nations (UN) Security Council reform. Recent history suggests, however, that such a comprehensive overhaul will not take place anytime soon.

Almost every effort to significantly transform the mechanisms for international cooperation and coordination has failed. The floundering of the 2005 UN World Summit, the collapse of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round, the disappointing progress on climate change, and the non-fulfilment of early and indispensable G20 commitments all suggest that governments are not ready, or not willing, to close the growing governance gap, at least within the next few years.

In other words, no transformative overhaul of international institutions should be expected in the foreseeable future. In no way should the pertinent players give up on existing institutions; rather, the only realistic alternative seems to be incremental reform.1 Scarce political capital should be applied to improving the performance of multilateral institutions, as radical transformations of the existing overall framework cannot be counted on. Based on this notion, this project addresses one aspect where incremental reform seems not only necessary, but feasible: in the leadership of international organizations (IOs).

b. Why Focus on Leadership?

Effective leadership in international agencies is crucial: the world relies on these organizations to ease cooperation – whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained, mail is delivered to foreign countries, or citizens can fly safely to other countries.

To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identify and deliver on organizational goals without the constraint of undue influence, by individual members or other stakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined the leader’s role, let alone recruited or managed that person on the basis of particular knowledge, competence and experience required to effectively lead the organization. In addition, democratic election processes and strong accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that the interests of executive management are aligned with the organization.

While good leadership is not enough for successful international cooperation, it is necessary for effective governance. However, leadership performance in organizations is often buried behind arguments about which country should get “the top job”. The presumption is that, once appointed, leaders have their hands tied by member states, and will predominantly serve their patrons’ interests. Indeed, leaders’ performance is seldom rigorously tested or measured. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the institutional features needed to promote effective and accountable governance.

This project of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems has taken up the challenge. First, the project has identified ways in which leadership makes a positive difference in the performance of international agencies. Second, the research team has investigated a sample of IOs, drawing out best (and other) practices that either illustrate or indicate a lack of high-performing leadership.

The report’s seven sections cover the positive practices emerging in IOs that support good leadership. This introduction sets out the conception of leadership, as well as the study’s rationale, method and strategy.


c. Constrained Leadership

Leaders influence their agencies’ operational and strategic direction. They work with member states to identify priorities and set strategy, and translate this into operational goals, which in turn are monitored and evaluated as progress is made towards them. Leaders direct a bureaucracy and see that it has sufficient staffing, expertise and financing to carry out mandated tasks. They also must consult and work with other stakeholders. While their room for manoeuvring is limited (see Figure), their actions and behaviour are vital to their organizations’ success. Finally, organizations that depend on ad-hoc funding also constrain their leaders.

In addition, the Council and team sought to capture innovations in leadership across the organizational cases.

Not all of the important elements could be measured. In fact, it was difficult to find a metric to measure the degree to which leadership structures permit resistance against “capture” by a powerful state, private companies or vested interests; and this despite that many instances exist of undue influences undermining an organization’s performance (an organization’s leadership can play a key role in ensuring this does not happen, or at least that it is brought to the public’s attention). Some of this dimension of leadership is covered in the report’s reflections on ethical standards, setting strategic priorities (e.g. the proportion of core vs earmarked funds) and procedures for electing an administrator, director-general (DG) or managing director (MD). Future research could investigate other measures of organizational independence and impartiality, such as whether heads of organizations should chair council or governing body meetings, and how effectively they can shape decision-making in these meetings to guard against special interests. Studies could also examine if an organization’s leader is able to publish reports, policy positions or advice in the organization’s name, without prior approval of member states.2

Another important element of leadership is the “speed of renewal” and the capacity to adapt to changing external environments. This was very difficult to measure or compare across the 11 different organizations, given the variety of environments and issue areas. In the future, studies could look at the extent to which IO heads can (and do) initiate projects, pilots or discussions to address emerging issues, and the leeway they have to shape these. Finally, the authors believe leaders play an essential role in ensuring their organizations collaborate with others to deliver cooperation and other public goods. Future research, it is hoped, will identify ways to track governance in this area.

The report reflects on practices from a pilot group of international organizations. In some cases, good practice seems relatively straightforward. For example, for the selection of an organization’s head: do clear and publicly available terms of reference (TOR) exist for both the position and a high-quality, exhaustive search process? As for ethical leadership, are leaders required to sign and adhere to the organization’s ethical codes, and publicly declare any conflicts of interest and their financial assets? In some cases, good practices may vary enormously – for instance, in how leaders attract and retain a diverse staff.This study benchmarks current practices and does not rank organizations against each other, as significant differences in the structure, size, nature and scope of IOs make ranking problematic. However, some common principles and structures could strengthen leadership possibilities in all organizations.

Political

Leader

Governments members of IOs

Bureau

cratic

IOs s

enior

manag

emen

t

Social and

economicforces

External

stakeholders

High performance in a leadership role has a major impact on an organization’s ability to deliver on tasks requested by its member states. An IO with weak operational planning, high staff turnover and vulnerability to special interests is unlikely to perform effectively. Not only do leadership governance and effectiveness need more attention in international organizations; a striking need also exists for more practice-focused comparisons across organizations so they can learn from each other.

An important caveat should be emphasized: improving leadership in IOs is just one part of improving their overall performance. Leaders are heavily constrained, relying on financing from the member states that select them. Some IO boards “monitor” their leadership and organizations’ architectures very closely, meeting weekly to discuss and provide regular input to operational business, while others may only convene several times a year. The enormous differences in the broader governance structures of IOs, which greatly influence their operations, are noted in this report.

d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?

Through extensive deliberations, the Council and project team have identified seven indicators of effective leadership structures:

1. Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit2. Managing performance 3. Setting and evaluating ethical standards4. Developing and retaining talent5. Setting strategic priorities6. Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders7. Evaluating independently and effectively

Figure: Types of Forces that Constrain Leadership


e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

The Council identified seven indicators contributing to effective leadership. The research team then determined questions for assessing IOs on each of the indicators and for using as the basis for studies of leadership practices in 11 organizations (see appendix): African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations were selected because they cover a broad range of issue areas (from health to migration and development), vary in size, and include regional and international bodies. However, the selection was not intended to be representative of all intergovernmental organizations, but rather to provide a basis for the pilot study of best practice in governance. Inclusion of other organizations in future studies is encouraged.

A research team initially conducted a desk-based study, looking for publicly available evidence of each indicator. Follow-up interviews with former and current senior officials of the organization, as well as key stakeholders and academic experts, were conducted. Their inputs were used to identify additional documentation of formal processes, and to identify relevant informal practices. Although the report is focused on the presence of formal processes (documented officially, wherever possible, when sufficient evidence is available), the differences between formal and informal processes have also been captured. The evidence included in the appendix is separated into two columns: “published rules”, based on official organizational documents; and “other factors”, which draw on a range of sources – including interviews with experts on the organization and staff – to gain more subjective insights into informal practice. Where possible, “decoupling” (when formal rules are in place but are not to be implemented in practice) is noted. While attempts were made to gather the most recent information for each organization, the study may not capture all organizational practices, as many of the organizations were undergoing significant reforms. A summary of good, formal leadership practices is shown in the Table.

The data for each question across the 11 organizations was analysed to identify variations in practice. The objective was not to derive an “ideal” best practice, although management and public administration studies were also consulted. The report is limited to practices in IOs from which other organizations could learn. Readers and organizations are invited to contribute input3 from practices and examples not discussed in this report.

f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?

An organization’s membership (represented on its board) and its senior management are collectively responsible for ensuring effective processes are in place. The membership or the board have responsibility for some criteria (election and re-election procedures for heads); other indicators fall under the scope of senior leadership (ethical codes, conflicts of interest), and some are shared (setting strategic priorities). In some organizations, a “grey zone” may exist, where it is not always clear who is responsible – the leader, senior management team, membership or board. By identifying these priority areas, organizations should be able to focus attention and clarify who will take the lead.

g. The Objectives of the Study

This study aims to inspire greater attention to leadership in international organizations, instigate learning across them and draw attention to good practice. Many organizations in this study are already engaged in reforming their governance mechanisms, strategic frameworks or other organizational processes. This study highlights leadership structures as one element that should be taken into account.It is planned to share results with relevant forums, bringing together boards and committees in the UN system, and across international financial institutions and development banks. Apparently, a number of these organizations are already sharing practices. It is hoped that the study will foster a more systematic comparison and identification of good practice, thus enabling more direct learning.


Table: Good Leadership Practices among the 11 Selected Organizations

Indicators Examples of Formal Practice

�Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit

1. Organizations should search for candidates with specific, relevant competencies, and test these against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.

Criteria/TOR for leadership are published online

Selection process updates are available online

Passport blind selection of candidates is done

Other candidates are always considered in re-elections

Performance is given formal consideration in re-elections

�Managing performance

2. Organizations should have clear expectations of performance, which are transparent and consistent with their goals, and facilitate leadership accountability.

Leaders are expected to set performance expectations in inaugural speech

Boards conduct regular individual performance appraisals

�Setting and evaluating ethical standards

3. Leadership should comply with clearly defined ethical standards.

Leaders are obliged to disclose financial assets and conflicts of interest

Leaders are obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics

Compliance with the code of ethics is enforced

�Developing and retaining talent

4. Leadership should attract, retain and develop talent throughout the organization.

Leaders carry out regular global staff surveys

Leaders ensure survey results are monitored and utilized

Leaders are obliged to participate in formal training programmes for their own professional development

�Setting strategic priorities

5. Leadership should have the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities due to changing circumstances.

Strategic documents include measurable objectives

�Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders

6. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with a wide range of stakeholders.

Meetings between stakeholder organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors occur on a regular, established basis

�Evaluating independently and effectively

7. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with internal and external evaluations.

Evaluation office reports directly to the board

Management must respond to evaluations

Source: Authors


2. Emerging Good Practices

a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

Many international organizations have no selection process that clearly searches for and tests candidates on relevant (and much-needed) leadership competencies in their domain. Often, leaders are selected in a political bargaining process. However, some changes are under way.

The review of leadership selection revealed four important practices, each of which is being used in at least one international agency: (1) the leadership role is clearly defined, (2) the competencies and experience needed to take up the role are clearly stated, (3) the role and competencies are openly advertised, and (4) the selection process is transparent and clear.

WHO, for example, set out a code of conduct in 2011 to ensure ethical and transparent nomination and election of leadership. It specifically notes that every candidate is expected to provide supporting evidence to match each of the published criteria for the Director General position. The executive board shortlists those candidates matching the criteria.4

In its selection process, the WTO actively seeks to reflect its membership’s diversity. An official WTO document (WT/L/509, published in 2002 and available online) invites nominations from across all regions and stipulates that, in the case of equally meritorious candidates for DG appointments, the diversity of WTO membership shall be taken into account.5 The document also gives the clear time frame for the process to start nine months before, and be completed 3 months prior to, the end of the incumbent’s term. The recent election of the WTO DG was a role model of transparency: all stages were well documented and exposed through a special page on the WTO website.

Although selecting its president remains non-exhaustive and without a clear formal process, the EBRD is introducing greater rigour at the vice-president (VP) level. For example, EBRD conducted an exhaustive review from over 850 applicants for the position of VP of banking operations (a post traditionally held by an American). The search was passport-blind, and included psychometric testing and multiple interviews.6

The IMF has been opening up its processes. In 2011, it published its first comprehensive terms of appointment for its Managing Director.7 In addition to its Articles of Agreement and By-Laws, which contain a standardized job description for executive directors, the IMF published complete terms of reference in the same year for the ethics advisor,8 ombudsperson9 and director of the Independent Evaluation Office.10 The IMF already instituted a rigorous process of candidate profiling in 2007, making available full job descriptions, and the desired qualities and experience of candidates. The executive board set out a timetable and invited nominations from executive directors for the post of MD, interviewing those that did apply.11 However, the IMF’s good formal practice is undermined by the informal convention that the organization’s European members, in consultation with the other members, ultimately select a European as MD.

In the WTO, all decisions, including selection of the DG, are made by consensus of all members. If a consensus cannot be reached in the appointed time, a provision allows for a vote by the General Council.12 In the 2012 DG selection process, WTO members officially nominated nine candidates, each of whom presented their vision for the WTO at a council meeting in January 2013. In the final two months of the process, the council chair consulted with members to build a consensus. The selection process concluded with a council meeting in May, where the decision to appoint the new DG was taken. Practices for re-election or reappointment are not particularly strong across organizations. Performance can be difficult to assess, as few international organizations have objectives for their leadership on this measure. WHO stands out in this regard. During the re-election of its DG in May 2012, the incumbent wrote a self-assessment that evaluated her first-term performance on the priorities she had set out; this was captured in a document and taken into account through the re-nomination process. The AfDB now considers a range of candidates alongside the incumbent for re-election, as does the EBRD, where Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected over the incumbent president in 2012.The more exhaustive, inclusive and meritocratic the process, the better the chance of not only the best candidate being chosen or reappointed, but also of full membership being engaged to hold that candidate accountable for performance.


b. Managing Performance

Governments expect that heads of international organizations, once appointed, will deliver on their mandated goals. However, individual states often have divergent views on organizational priorities and the role of leaders, and some states have greater influence over leadership selection and subsequent decision-making. It is thus critical that the membership and the leader agree together on performance expectations, particularly at the start of a new tenure. Furthermore, the leader’s responsibilities with respect to vision, goals and implementation need to be carefully differentiated from those of the board. Otherwise, lines of accountability and responsibility are blurred, and the board can no longer evaluate the leader’s performance without evaluating its own.13 Setting performance expectations can help prevent organizational capture (when the leader becomes the instrument of a few states) and enable performance management.

Despite the proliferation of results-based management, no organization in this study had an openly published formal procedure for setting performance expectations for the leader. However, all leaders were expected to report regularly to member states on overall organizational performance at board, council and other equivalent meetings.14

In some international organizations, incoming presidents or directors are expected to deliver a statement to the board or general council, setting out a vision and objectives for the organization during their tenure. Such a procedure, for example, took place at the WTO in 2009.15 In recent years, the president-elect of the AfDB also delivered a working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.16

If performance objectives are set, boards can conduct regular performance appraisals to give feedback on a leader’s successes and failures. Regular management of leaders’ performance is standard across the private and public sectors. A formal, annual process to evaluate chief executive officer performance exists in 80% of US non-profit boards and 96% of Standard and Poor’s 500 companies.17 However, very few international organizations have institutionalized annual performance appraisals of their leaders. One study found that none of the major international financial institutions conducted individual performance appraisals in 2008.18

More recently, some organizations have sought to address this deficit. Since 2009, the MD of the IMF has been evaluated annually by the board, based on agreed performance objectives. As part of the feedback, the MD also assesses the executive board’s performance. The framework is tailored by job position and based on the IMF’s annual performance review template. Annual salary adjustments for IMF management are linked to the consumer price index, and allow for performance-based merit increases.

In 2008, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, established Senior Managers’ Compacts for many senior UN officials. These compacts outline the roles of UN department heads, although they do not cover UNHCR or UNDP. Heads must report if they are spending their budgets according to programme objectives.19 In addition, they are reviewed on how well they promote gender diversity and follow geographic distribution requirements. The UN Secretariat’s Management Performance Board uses the compacts to assess senior UN leaders annually.20

c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

In recent years, a number of heads of major international organizations have resigned because of questions about their ethical conduct. 21 Three sets of practices are associated with upholding ethical standards: (1) an ethics code; (2) a clear authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing it, and dealing with non-compliance; and (3) formal declarations of any conflicts of interest and financial assets of senior leaders.

Every international organization examined in this study obliges all staff and heads to adhere to a code of ethics. However, not all codes are public, and not all are formally enforced. The EBRD has a defined formal code of conduct (updated in 2012), which is overseen by a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the president. The World Bank Group has its Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, an ethics helpline, a code of conduct for staff (2003) and the Code of Conduct for Board Officials, which focuses on disclosure policies.22 With women’s accession at the Group, the documents have recently been refined to include sexual harassment. Meanwhile, the WTO’s code of core values is only circulated internally. All UN staff are obliged to follow its code of conduct, and many UN agencies, such as UNHCR, have set their own codes of conduct.23

Some organizations require disclosures of conflicts of interest and financial assets. Declarations are filed annually at the AfDB, which also has an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an office to investigate disclosures. This was a product of a joint anti-corruption task force (2006) of international financial institutions.24 In the UN system, all senior officers must file an annual financial disclosure statement with the UN ethics office.25 Those who do not are charged and may be penalized by the UN’s Department for Administration and Management.26 The UNDP administrator and the UNHCR high commissioner have voluntarily disclosed their financial assets publicly, and made them available online.27 However, these organizations are exceptions: most leaders do not publicly disclose their financial assets.


d. Developing and Retaining Talent

A core responsibility of leaders at IOs is to attract, develop and retain outstanding staff. Leaders can thus help to ensure their workforces have the capacity and diversity to deliver on the organization’s vision and strategy, while proactively addressing gaps in capability.28 This is a challenge for international organizations, where it is understood that particular countries should hold certain positions, and staff selection is seen as requiring a balance of national diversity and merit. At worst, leaders may face pressure from states to hire particular individuals for high-level posts.

IOs can attract, develop and retain talent in many ways – for example, through policies for fair and transparent staff selection, and by ensuring diversity of staff at all levels. However, when trying to study staff diversity in gender and nationality across the 11 organizations, it was difficult to get accurate, comparable data for all organizations. For this reason, the use of staff surveys, while a limited measure, was seen as evidence of senior managements’ interest in staff welfare. Such surveys, as well as staff liaison organizations, are used by some organizations to monitor staff progression and ensure that it is, and is perceived to be, based on merit. UNHCR conducts staff surveys every three years, and has done so since 2006. The agency has a committee dedicated to carrying out survey recommendations and developing action plans.29 The High Commissioner has tasked the Deputy High Commissioner with following up recommendations from this committee’s deliberations. Responses to UNHCR’s staff survey have guided human resources reform and resulted in changes to the agency’s postings and promotions procedures.30 UNDP’s annual global staff surveys are conducted by an external independent organization. The EBRD has recently reprioritized staff surveys, conducting them annually rather than every three years.31 As yet, none of the international organizations examined makes staff survey results available online.

Heads of organizations mentor, support and coach their staff. While few formal processes exist for this, evidence does show widespread informal practices in many organizations. For example, IOM’s director-general makes it a priority to open the training of new chiefs of mission, outlines the organization’s vision and invites open dialogue with staff. 32

Finally, leadership training that ensures the strengthening of necessary senior management skills is occurring in a few agencies. The IMF has recently progressed with leadership training programmes. Most leaders are supported with and trained in organizational rules by their executive office staff and/or their chief of staff when they arrive. For instance, UNHCR’s chief of staff provides informal on-the-job training in UN rules and protocols to new high commissioners. UNHCR’s Global Learning Centre in Budapest has consolidated the agency’s learning activities and programmes, and has a position dedicated to developing and delivering training programmes for senior management. Many organizations are prioritizing senior staff development. The EBRD, for example, has a learning and development

team that works closely with the evaluation department to design measures addressing current weaknesses in programme delivery.

e. Setting Strategic Priorities

Most organizations have a mission statement and strategic goals that identify the raison d’être and ultimate objectives. To deliver on these, the organizations’ heads must translate the overarching organizational mission into a clear, detailed and measurable operational plan, and evaluate progress on a regular basis. International organizations vary greatly in their ability to do this. Some organizations have very broad strategic documents, with weak strategic direction, no measurable objectives and no mechanism to evaluate progress. Others have developed more detailed and measurable strategies, with timelines and budgets. Board members most often work with executive leadership to set strategic frameworks and evaluate progress towards them. Yet, their input varies greatly – in some cases, member states may lead on formulating strategic goals (e.g. IOM’s 12-point plan), and in others, the executive director will take the lead (for instance, the UNDP).

UNHCR and UNDP are committed to producing well-developed strategic documents. UNHCR details objectives in its Global Strategic Priorities, and evaluates progress towards them in global annual reports and strategic reviews. The priorities set out operational, support and management goals, and include specific “impact indicators” to evaluate progress.33 The agency has also established the Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF), which “comprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the organization and relates them to the corresponding management policies and guidance”.34 It works at country, regional and global levels to clarify the lines of accountability, responsibilities and functions. In addition, UNHCR has Focus, a software that integrates its results-based management at country and international levels. UNDP has a series of regular strategic plans covering about four years, and reports in depth on how it will implement, finance, measure and review progress towards these goals.35

In recent years, the IMF produced the Global Policy Agenda, the MD’s vision of the institution’s strategic priorities and actions. It serves as the basis for the biannual International Monetary and Financial Committee ministerial meetings that review and set the IMF’s broad goals, which the executive board‘s work programme subsequently operationalizes. This helps the IMF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances. Similarly, with its president setting priorities, the EBRD has rapidly expanded lending to North African clients in need of greater assistance in their transition to democracy and free markets. The ADB’s 2008 report, Strategy2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020, provided a 12-year framework, with measurable organizational objectives, to guide the organization. A midterm review of the bank’s performance, presented at the board of governors’ annual meeting in 2013, found that 80% of ADB’s operations in 2008-2012 were conducted in the five core areas outlined in the original strategic agenda: infrastructure, environment, regional cooperation, financial sector development and education.


An international organization’s flexibility is also influenced by its funding model. Providing discretionary, or “earmarked”, funding can rapidly spur specific activities and innovations. Discretionary and other tied funds – from private institutions, other multilaterals or trust funds – may enable leaders to expand into new areas and adapt to changing circumstances when they are explicitly sought for this purpose. However, because discretionary funds are tied to specific tasks, leaders may have little flexibility to redeploy these funds with changing external circumstances. Organizations with a small core budget, and highly reliant on discretionary financing, would be expected to respond more directly to donor demands to ensure their survival.

Most organizations studied had a high percentage of funds earmarked for specific issues or projects, implying that leadership has less flexibility and discretion in setting priorities. Over 97% of IOM’s financing is from non-core contributions.36 However, the organization’s director-general has actively lobbied states for an increase in IOM’s core funding, and has also established an audit and oversight committee.37 Similar numbers are seen in other organizations: in 2012, only 2% of UNHCR’s financing came from the UN regular budget, and 98% percent was voluntary; for WHO, 76% of financing was voluntary.38

WHO, as part of its extensive programme reform, has launched the “Financing Dialogue” initiative, spearheaded by Director-General Margaret Chan. Among other things, it aims to ensure that member states and other funders commit to fully aligning fund allocation to the approved programme budget. Funders should make their contributions public to increase transparency, and ensure the predictability and flexibility of their funds.39

f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

Every multilateral organization engages in some way with its members and a wider group of stakeholders, including beneficiaries, private-sector organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups. Some do this more effectively than others. The benefits from positive, well-structured engagement include better information, better-quality collaboration, heightened responsiveness, sharing responsibility, and better public understanding and cooperation with the agency. Most organizations have formal and informal mechanisms to engage with stakeholders – joint projects with NGOs and other multilateral organizations, discussions and dialogues at conferences, and structured forums to interact with leaders of academia and civil society. But as no established “most effective way” exists to conduct these engagements, the challenge is in measuring or attempting to report best practice. Evidence, however, points to the importance of regular, formal meetings between organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors. It becomes more difficult for civil society to have an impact when meetings are informal or irregular.

g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

In recent years, most international organizations have recognized that independent evaluations can provide timely, useful and robust information on their work.40 The World Bank created the Operations Evaluation Unit in the 1970s under its president, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), and renamed it as the Independent Evaluation Group in 2001. The same year, the IMF created an evaluation group, which it has subsequently and independently audited on two occasions.41

Besides serving as external appraisals, evaluations are also another way to ensure that members are aware of the governance, effectiveness, impact and use of their funds. The independence of these evaluations is critical and important to maintain, as are the channels through which evaluators’ findings are considered.

At the IMF, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is independent from management and reports to the board. As indicated in the IEO’s terms of reference, the office engages with executive management, the board and staff when they “respond to relevant parts of the evaluation”.42

At the World Bank and EBRD, independent evaluation teams report directly to the board of directors. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bank conducted a client survey in 2012 to determine both whether the bank was meeting clients’ needs and how clients perceived its impact, as one of the ways of engaging with the organization. At EBRD, engagement is done through links with key people, i.e. the chief compliance officer reports directly to the president, as does the internal audit team. The vice-president for risk also sits on the executive committee.

The AfDB has recently tried to strengthen independent internal and external evaluations. The Quality Assurance and Results department has established a round-table review mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.

The ADB has internal and external reviews. The internal compliance review panel investigates alleged non-compliance by the bank in its operational policies and procedures. It does not, however, investigate borrowing countries, the executing agency or private-sector clients, unless they are relevant to non-compliance. Externally, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) regularly evaluates the institution and individual members, especially large donors such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and conducts regular assessments to ensure their money is being spent safely and effectively.

Some organizations have recently taken steps to make sure they follow best practice. The UNDP, for example, revised its evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the Evaluation Office’s independence and ensure that all evaluations have a response from management. The office’s head reports directly and independently to the executive board. The administrator, however, is briefed before an evaluation is presented to the board, and the administrator’s office prepares a management response to evaluations. The administrator has the right to reply to evaluations, and discusses follow-up actions with the board.


3. A

pp

end

ix: L

ead

ersh

ip P

ratic

es

a. A

fric

an D

evel

op

men

t B

ank

(AfD

B)

Org

aniz

atio

nTh

e A

fDB

is a

regi

onal

dev

elop

men

t ban

k fo

unde

d in

196

3 to

fost

er e

cono

mic

gr

owth

and

regi

onal

inte

grat

ion

on th

e co

ntin

ent.

The

grou

p al

so c

onsi

sts

of th

e A

frica

n D

evel

opm

ent F

und

and

Nig

eria

n Tr

ust F

und.

43

Go

vern

ance

O

wne

d an

d fin

ance

d by

79

mem

ber

coun

trie

s (5

4 A

frica

n an

d 25

non

-Afri

can)

,44

the

bank

is c

urre

ntly

hea

dqua

rter

ed in

Tun

is, T

unis

ia, h

avin

g te

mpo

raril

y m

oved

th

ere

from

its

offic

ial h

eadq

uart

ers

in A

bidj

an, C

ôte

d’Iv

oire

. It h

as 3

7 fie

ld o

ffice

s,

6 cu

stom

ized

liai

son

offic

es, 2

regi

onal

reso

urce

cen

tres

, 56

depa

rtm

ents

, and

an

exte

rnal

repr

esen

tatio

n of

fice

in T

okyo

.

At t

he to

p of

the

AfD

B’s

org

aniz

atio

nal s

truc

ture

is th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

, w

hich

com

pris

es m

inis

ters

and

hig

h-le

vel o

ffici

als

of e

cono

mic

, fina

ncia

l and

de

velo

pmen

t ins

titut

ions

from

sha

reho

lder

cou

ntrie

s. T

he b

oard

of g

over

nors

m

eets

onc

e a

year

and

del

egat

es d

ay-t

o-da

y de

cisi

on-m

akin

g to

a 2

0-m

embe

r bo

ard

of d

irect

ors.

The

pre

side

nt, w

ho is

alw

ays

an A

frica

n an

d w

ho is

ele

cted

by

the

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs, c

hairs

the

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eA

rene

wab

le fi

ve-y

ear

term

.

Inco

me

As

of D

ecem

ber

2012

, the

AfD

B’s

cum

ulat

ive

auth

oriz

ed c

apita

l was

$10

3 bi

llion,

w

hile

the

subs

crib

ed c

apita

l sto

od a

t $10

0.2

billio

n (6

0% s

ubsc

ribed

by

regi

onal

m

embe

rs a

nd 4

0% b

y no

n-re

gion

al m

embe

rs).

Num

ber

of

staf

f2,

068

regu

lar

staf

f, as

of D

ecem

ber

2012

.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipIn

the

early

to m

id 1

990s

, AfD

B fa

ced

seve

re fi

nanc

ial c

rises

, com

poun

ded

by m

ajor

m

anag

emen

t pro

blem

s. D

istr

ust a

mon

g sh

areh

olde

rs, b

oard

, man

agem

ent a

nd

staf

f had

wea

kene

d ex

ecut

ive

func

tions

, pro

cedu

res

and

cont

rols

, as

wel

l as

polic

y an

d ov

ersi

ght f

unct

ions

. By

the

early

200

0s, t

he A

fDB

fixe

d its

bal

ance

she

et a

nd

rega

ined

its

AA

A c

redi

t rat

ing

via

mec

hani

sms

for

inst

itutio

nal r

efor

m. T

his

stra

tegi

c in

itiat

ive

has

been

rein

vigo

rate

d un

der

the

curr

ent p

resi

dent

.

Pre

viou

s pr

esid

ents

wer

e: M

amou

n B

ehei

ry (f

rom

Sud

an, 1

964-

1970

); A

bdel

wah

ab

Labi

di (T

unis

ia, 1

970-

1976

); K

wam

e D

onko

r Fo

rdw

or (G

hana

, 197

6-19

79);

God

win

G

ondw

e (M

alaw

i; ca

reta

ker

capa

city

, 197

9-19

80);

Willa

Mun

g’O

mba

(Zam

bia,

19

80-1

985)

; Bab

acar

N’d

iaye

(Sen

egal

, 198

5-19

95) a

nd O

mar

Kab

baj (

Mor

occo

, 19

95-2

005)

.

The

curr

ent p

resi

dent

is D

onal

d K

aber

uka

(Rw

anda

, 200

5-to

dat

e).

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Kab

eruk

a, R

wan

da’s

fina

nce

min

iste

r in

the

deca

de fo

llow

ing

the

geno

cide

, has

gi

ven

the

AfD

B in

tern

atio

nal p

rom

inen

ce, a

nd e

xpon

entia

lly in

crea

sed

lend

ing

to th

e pr

ivat

e se

ctor

, sin

ce ta

king

ove

r as

pre

side

nt. U

nder

his

lead

ersh

ip, t

he b

ank

has

rece

ived

mor

e co

nfide

nce

from

its

shar

ehol

ders

, as

evid

ence

d by

rece

nt v

otes

to

incr

ease

its

capi

tal b

ase

and

to re

plen

ish

its re

sour

ces.

A g

row

ing

num

ber

of A

frica

n co

untr

ies

now

see

the

bank

as

a le

nder

and

adv

iser

of fi

rst c

hoic

e, a

lthou

gh it

has

fe

wer

reso

urce

s th

an th

e W

orld

Ban

k. T

he A

fDB

’s s

trat

egy,

cov

ered

in A

t the

Cen

ter

of A

frica

’s T

rans

form

atio

n: S

trat

egy

for

2013

-202

2,45

pro

pose

s a

varie

ty o

f ref

orm

s of

lead

ersh

ip m

echa

nism

s. T

he n

ext b

oard

ses

sion

will

take

pla

ce in

Abi

djan

in

Sep

tem

ber

2014

.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess.

1D

oes

the

Mul

ti-la

tera

l Org

aniz

atio

n/In

tern

atio

nal O

rgan

izat

ion

(MO

/IO)

publ

ish

the

crite

ria/t

erm

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r le

ader

ship

onl

ine?

Nei

ther

term

s of

refe

renc

e no

r cr

iteria

for

the

pres

iden

t’s p

ositi

on a

re

foun

d op

enly

pub

lishe

d.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Full

mem

bers

hip,

but

with

diff

eren

t vot

ing

pow

er. T

he fo

undi

ng

Agr

eem

ent E

stab

lishi

ng th

e A

frica

n D

evel

opm

ent B

ank

(196

3) s

tate

s th

at th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

ele

cts

the

pres

iden

t “by

a m

ajor

ity o

f the

to

tal v

otin

g po

wer

of t

he m

embe

rs, i

nclu

ding

a m

ajor

ity o

f the

tota

l vo

ting

pow

er o

f the

regi

onal

mem

bers

”.46

Eac

h A

fDB

mem

ber

coun

try,

ho

wev

er, h

as a

n eq

ual n

umbe

r of

bas

ic v

otes

(625

) in

addi

tion

to th

e/a

num

ber

of v

otes

pro

port

iona

te to

its

paid

-in s

hare

s. T

he b

ank

lists

vo

ting

pow

ers

of e

ach

stat

e in

its

annu

al re

port

s in

a tr

ansp

aren

t tab

le

base

d on

sub

scrip

tions

and

con

trib

utio

ns.47

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed

and

exha

ustiv

e pr

oces

s fo

r le

ader

ship

se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

No.

The

est

ablis

hing

Agr

eem

ent o

nly

stat

es th

at it

sho

uld

be “

a pe

rson

of

the

high

est c

ompe

tenc

e in

mat

ters

per

tain

ing

to th

e ac

tiviti

es,

man

agem

ent a

nd a

dmin

istr

atio

n of

the

Ban

k an

d sh

all b

e a

natio

nal o

f a

regi

onal

mem

ber

stat

e”.48

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns, w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

e le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity.

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

Ther

e is

no

offic

ial p

roce

dure

for

sett

ing

perfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns.

In p

ract

ice,

can

dida

tes

outli

ne th

e is

sues

or

them

es th

ey c

onsi

der

impo

rtan

t, an

d th

e pr

esid

ent-

elec

t is

expe

cted

to o

utlin

e th

eir

wor

king

pl

an a

t the

sw

earin

g-in

cer

emon

y.49

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of t

he

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear

stra

tegy

?

The

curr

ent p

resi

dent

has

take

n th

ings

furt

her

alon

g w

ith c

oncr

ete

step

s in

this

dire

ctio

n: (a

) the

ela

bora

tion

of th

e M

ediu

m-T

erm

Str

ateg

y 20

08-2

012

(MTS

) with

the

advi

ce o

f a h

igh-

leve

l pan

el o

f em

inen

t pe

ople

; and

(b) t

he A

fDB

Ten

-Yea

r S

trat

egy

(TYS

) for

201

3-20

22.50

In

add

ition

, the

new

AfD

B P

eopl

e S

trat

egy

2013

-201

7 pr

opos

es

to “

tran

sfor

m th

e le

ader

ship

sta

tem

ent i

nto

tang

ible

act

ions

that

m

anag

ers

can

enac

t with

sta

ff on

an

ongo

ing

basi

s”, a

nd th

at “

each

le

ader

and

man

ager

will

have

cle

ar p

eopl

e m

anag

emen

t goa

ls in

thei

r an

nual

obj

ectiv

es th

at li

nk to

thes

e st

anda

rds

and

goal

s”.51


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. T

he e

stab

lishi

ng A

gree

men

t sta

tes

“the

Ban

k, it

s P

resi

dent

, V

ice-

Pre

side

nts,

offi

cers

and

sta

ff sh

all n

ot in

terfe

re in

the

polit

ical

af

fairs

of a

ny m

embe

r; n

or s

hall

they

be

influ

ence

d in

thei

r de

cisi

ons

by th

e po

litic

al c

hara

cter

of t

he m

embe

r co

ncer

ned”

.52 T

his

prin

cipl

e of

impa

rtia

lity

is e

nfor

ced

thro

ugh

the

Sta

ff In

tegr

ity a

nd E

thic

s O

ffice

(SIE

O) a

nd th

e A

nti-C

orru

ptio

n D

epar

tmen

t tha

t inv

estig

ates

al

lega

tions

of p

rohi

bite

d pr

actic

es a

nd re

late

d st

aff m

isco

nduc

t.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s, e

qual

for

each

sta

ff m

embe

r of

the

bank

. The

re is

an

orga

niza

tion-

wid

e w

hist

le-b

low

ing

polic

y (2

007)

, ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

and

fraud

fra

mew

ork

(200

6) a

nd a

n in

vest

igat

ion

offic

e to

look

into

the

abov

e.

This

was

a p

rodu

ct o

f a jo

int I

FI a

nti-c

orru

ptio

n ta

sk fo

rce

(200

6). T

he

Ban

k al

so h

as a

199

9 co

de o

f con

duct

for

staf

f, as

wel

l as

a 20

07

code

of c

ondu

ct fo

r ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

s.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Not

form

ally

, but

the

new

AfD

B P

eopl

e S

trat

egy

2013

-201

7 pr

opos

es

that

in th

e ne

ar fu

ture

the

“lead

ersh

ip b

ehav

iour

s w

ill be

tran

slat

ed

into

spe

cific

beh

avio

ural

requ

irem

ents

, and

pro

gres

s w

ill be

mea

sure

d th

roug

h m

anag

emen

t effe

ctiv

enes

s an

d em

ploy

ee e

ngag

emen

t ind

ices

an

d 36

0 fe

edba

ck, a

nd s

uppo

rted

by

deve

lopm

ent i

nter

vent

ions

.”53

E

ach

VP

now

has

to s

ign

a “P

erfo

rman

ce C

ontr

act”

ann

ually

with

the

pres

iden

t.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No

evid

ence

.

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

No

offic

ial m

echa

nism

s es

tabl

ishe

d, b

ut s

uppl

ying

“m

anag

ers

with

co

ache

s or

men

tors

to p

rovi

de c

onfid

entia

l hel

p to

bec

ome

mor

e ef

fect

ive”

is o

ne o

f the

initi

ativ

es o

f the

new

AfD

B P

eopl

e S

trat

egy

2013

-201

7 (im

plem

enta

tion

bega

n in

the

3rd

quar

ter

of 2

013)

.54

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Yes.

Mai

nly

thro

ugh

stru

ctur

al c

hang

es in

the

Ban

k. D

ue to

the

esta

blis

hing

Agr

eem

ent t

he A

fDB

Pre

side

nt d

eter

min

es th

e or

gani

zatio

nal s

truc

ture

, fun

ctio

ns a

nd re

spon

sibi

litie

s as

wel

l as

the

regi

onal

and

cou

ntry

repr

esen

tatio

n of

fices

.55


2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

For

exa

mpl

e, th

e R

esul

ts M

anag

emen

t Fra

mew

ork

will

mon

itor

impl

emen

tatio

n of

the

new

Str

ateg

y fo

r 20

13-2

022

over

the

3-ye

ar p

lann

ing

horiz

on re

flect

ed in

the

rollin

g pl

an a

nd a

sses

s th

e de

velo

pmen

t effe

ctiv

enes

s of

the

inst

itutio

n.

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

The

Fund

has

ava

ilabl

e re

sour

ces

entr

uste

d to

it u

nder

Art

icle

8

of th

e fo

undi

ng A

gree

men

t (19

63),

whi

ch e

mpo

wer

s th

e Fu

nd to

re

ceiv

e ot

her

reso

urce

s in

clud

ing

gran

ts fr

om S

tate

Par

ticip

ants

, no

n-pa

rtic

ipat

ing

coun

trie

s, a

nd fr

om a

ny p

ublic

or

priv

ate

body

or

bodi

es.56

The

re h

as b

een

an in

crea

se in

trus

t fun

ds c

apita

l in

2010

–

73%

com

pare

d to

200

9 –

that

trig

gere

d a

trus

t fun

ds re

form

.57

As

of 2

012,

the

Ban

k m

obiliz

ed a

tota

l of $

127.

7 m

illion

from

don

ors

to re

plen

ish

the

exis

ting

them

atic

($13

0 m

illion

) and

bila

tera

l ($2

2.6

milli

on) T

rust

Fun

ds.

By

the

end

of 2

012,

the

Afri

can

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

k ha

d m

ade

subs

tant

ial p

rogr

ess

unde

r its

Tru

st F

und

Ref

orm

pol

icy

by m

ovin

g aw

ay fr

om ti

ed b

ilate

ral f

unds

to m

ulti-

dono

r Tr

ust F

unds

mos

t of

whi

ch a

re th

emat

ic in

nat

ure

(for

exam

ple,

Sou

th-S

outh

Coo

pera

tion

Trus

t Fun

d w

ith B

razi

l ($6

milli

on) a

ppro

ved

by th

e B

oard

in M

arch

20

11).

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

The

firs

t sta

ff su

rvey

was

con

duct

ed in

200

7. In

201

0 P

resi

dent

K

aber

uka

com

mitt

ed to

a re

gula

r co

rpor

ate

acco

unta

bilit

y ex

erci

se,

invo

lvin

g bo

th c

lient

sur

vey

and

a st

aff s

urve

y.58

The

mos

t rec

ent s

taff

surv

ey w

as c

ompl

eted

in D

ecem

ber

2013

with

res

ults

exp

ecte

d to

be

publ

ishe

d in

Feb

ruar

y 20

14.

Ther

e ha

ve b

een

a nu

mbe

r of

sta

ff su

rvey

s in

the

past

and

we

are

plan

ning

to in

stitu

tiona

lize

the

proc

ess

and

incl

ude

resu

lts (s

taff

enga

gem

ent

surv

ey) a

s pa

rt o

f our

Res

ults

Mea

sure

men

t Fr

amew

ork

– th

e fu

ndam

enta

l ben

chm

ark

agai

nst

whi

ch w

e as

sess

our

ow

n pe

rform

ance

. One

of

the

2013

-202

2 S

trat

egy59

goa

ls is

: to

put f

ocus

on

“per

form

ance

prio

ritie

s, ta

lent

man

agem

ent a

nd

succ

essi

on p

lann

ing”

.60

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

.


VII.

M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ng

age

wit

h d

iver

se r

ang

e of

sta

keh

old

ers

No.

Acc

ordi

ng to

the

Fram

ewor

k fo

r En

hanc

ed E

ngag

emen

t with

Civ

il S

ocie

ty O

rgan

izat

ions

(201

2), t

he B

ank

has

no m

echa

nism

s to

ens

ure

syst

emat

ic C

SO

s en

gage

men

t, bu

t aim

s at

str

engt

heni

ng a

nd in

stitu

tiona

lizin

g it.

61 T

he d

ocum

ent e

ncou

rage

s th

e st

aff (

man

agem

ent i

nclu

ded)

to e

ngag

e w

ith s

take

hold

ers.

62

Com

plia

nce

Rev

iew

and

Med

iatio

n U

nit (

CR

MU

) adm

inis

ters

Inde

pend

ent R

evie

w M

echa

nism

(IR

M) t

hrou

gh

whi

ch p

eopl

e ad

vers

ely

affe

cted

by

a pr

ojec

t fina

nced

by

the

AfD

B c

an re

ques

t the

Ban

k to

com

ply

with

its

own

polic

ies

and

proc

edur

es.

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

The

Ban

k ha

s st

ruct

ures

to d

eal w

ith b

oth

inte

rnal

/inde

pend

ent a

nd e

xter

nal e

valu

atio

ns.63

For

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

ns th

ere

is a

Man

agem

ent R

espo

nse

and

a M

anag

emen

t Act

ion

Rec

ord

(MA

R) t

hat

is p

ublis

hed

and

disc

usse

d w

ith th

e B

oard

. The

MA

R s

ets

out t

ime-

boun

d ac

tions

the

Ban

k w

ill (o

r w

ill no

t) ta

ke in

resp

onse

to R

ecom

men

datio

ns m

ade

by In

depe

nden

t Eva

luat

ors.

Man

agem

ent a

nd E

valu

ator

s th

en

join

tly tr

ack

impl

emen

tatio

n of

thes

e M

anag

emen

t Com

mitm

ents

. For

ext

erna

l Eva

luat

ions

(e.g

. UK

Mul

tilat

eral

A

id R

evie

w, A

ustr

alia

n M

ultil

ater

al A

id R

evie

w o

r M

OPA

N) t

he B

ank

prep

ares

Man

agem

ent R

espo

nses

(tho

ugh

not u

sual

ly a

n M

AR

).Q

ualit

y A

ssur

ance

and

Res

ults

Dep

artm

ent h

as e

stab

lishe

d a

Rou

ndta

ble

Rev

iew

Mec

hani

sm th

at b

rings

to

geth

er m

anag

emen

t fro

m v

ario

us re

leva

nt d

epar

tmen

ts to

revi

ew th

e ev

alua

tions

and

set

out

, whe

re

nece

ssar

y, a

ctio

n to

add

ress

them

.


b. A

sian

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Ban

k (A

DB

)

Org

aniz

atio

nFo

unde

d in

196

6 by

31

coun

trie

s to

sup

port

eco

nom

ic g

row

th a

nd re

gion

al

inte

grat

ion

in A

sia,

the

AD

B n

ow h

as 6

7 m

embe

rs. I

t pro

vide

s lo

ans,

gra

nts,

te

chni

cal a

ssis

tanc

e an

d eq

uity

inve

stm

ents

to s

over

eign

s, c

entr

al b

anks

, non

-pr

ofit o

rgan

izat

ions

and

priv

ate-

sect

or c

lient

s. T

he A

DB

dra

ws

from

ord

inar

y ca

pita

l res

ourc

es (O

CR

) and

eig

ht s

peci

al fu

nds,

incl

udin

g th

e A

sian

Dev

elop

men

t Fu

nd (A

DF)

.64 T

he b

ank

is h

eadq

uart

ered

in M

anila

, Phi

lippi

nes.

Go

vern

ance

The

AD

B g

rant

s al

l pow

ers

to th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

, com

pose

d of

one

re

pres

enta

tive

of e

ach

mem

ber.

The

boar

d m

ay d

eleg

ate

any

or a

ll po

wer

s to

the

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s, e

xcep

t tho

se p

ower

s ex

clus

ivel

y re

serv

ed fo

r th

e go

vern

ors.

65

The

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s ha

ndle

s da

y-to

-day

man

agem

ent i

n pr

actic

e, a

nd is

co

mpo

sed

of 1

2 m

embe

rs e

lect

ed b

y th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

(eig

ht b

y re

gion

al

mem

bers

and

four

by

non-

regi

onal

mem

bers

) for

rene

wab

le tw

o-ye

ar te

rms.

66

The

bank

’s p

resi

dent

cha

irs th

e bo

ard

of d

irect

ors

but h

as n

o vo

te, e

xcep

t in

the

even

t of a

n eq

ual d

ivis

ion,

in w

hich

cas

e th

e pr

esid

ent h

as th

e de

cidi

ng v

ote.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFi

ve y

ears

; re-

elec

tabl

e.

Inco

me

$9.4

billi

on in

app

rove

d O

CR

loan

s in

201

2. T

otal

sub

scrib

ed c

apita

l in

the

sam

e ye

ar w

as $

163.

129

billio

n, w

ith a

n op

erat

ing

inco

me

of $

464.

7 m

illion

.67

Num

ber

of

staf

f3,

045.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipE

very

pre

side

nt h

as b

een

Japa

nese

. The

pas

t pre

side

nts

wer

e: T

akes

hi W

atan

abe

(196

6-19

72),

Shi

ro In

oue

(197

2-19

76),

Taro

ichi

Yos

hida

(197

6-19

81),

Mas

au

Fujio

ka (1

981-

1989

), K

imim

asa

Taru

miz

u (1

989-

1993

), M

itsuo

Sat

o (1

993-

1999

), Ta

dao

Chi

no (1

999-

2005

) and

Har

uhik

o K

urod

a (2

005-

2013

).

The

curr

ent p

resi

dent

is T

akeh

iko

Nak

ao (2

013-

pres

ent).

The

elec

tion

of N

akao

, the

nin

th-c

onse

cutiv

e un

cont

este

d Ja

pane

se c

andi

date

in a

ro

w, h

as le

d m

any

to q

uest

ion

the

info

rmal

con

vent

ion

of J

apan

sel

ectin

g th

e A

DB

pr

esid

ent.68

For

exa

mpl

e, E

swar

Pra

sad,

Tol

ani S

enio

r P

rofe

ssor

of T

rade

Pol

icy,

C

orne

ll U

nive

rsity

, and

con

trib

utor

to th

e A

sian

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

k In

stitu

te69

, tol

d th

e Fi

nanc

ial T

imes

: “Th

e C

hine

se h

ave

long

wan

ted

[con

trol

of]

the

AD

B.”

70 C

hina

ha

s no

t pub

licly

con

firm

ed th

is d

esire

. How

ever

, dur

ing

an a

ddre

ss a

t the

AD

B’s

20

14 A

stan

a co

nfer

ence

, Chi

nese

repr

esen

tativ

e Ji

wei

Lou

not

ed: “

Em

ergi

ng

econ

omie

s in

the

regi

on a

re in

a p

ositi

on to

be

AD

B’s

fina

ncin

g pa

rtne

rs, b

ut

thei

r vo

ice

and

repr

esen

tatio

n ne

ed to

be

incr

ease

d th

roug

h th

e re

form

of A

DB

’s

gove

rnan

ce s

truc

ture

so

as to

ena

ble

them

to u

nder

take

mor

e re

spon

sibi

litie

s fo

r A

DB

’s d

evel

opm

ent.”

71

Furt

her,

man

y se

e C

hina

’s p

ropo

sal f

or a

n A

sian

Infra

stru

ctur

e In

vest

men

t B

ank

(AIIB

) as

a ch

alle

nge

to w

hat i

s pe

rcei

ved

to b

e a

Japa

nese

-dom

inat

ed

AD

B.72

Nak

ao h

as p

ublic

ly w

elco

med

the

new

ban

k.73

How

ever

, Rob

ert O

rr, U

S

Am

bass

ador

to th

e A

DB

, has

not

ed th

at C

hina

may

be

crea

ting

the

AIIB

out

of

frust

ratio

n, d

ue to

its

inab

ility

to in

crea

se it

s ca

pita

l con

trib

utio

n (a

nd th

us v

otin

g po

wer

) in

the

exis

ting

inst

itutio

n.74

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Nak

ao re

cent

ly p

ledg

ed to

act

ivel

y ex

plor

e op

tions

to a

ddre

ss th

e ba

nk’s

“re

sour

ce

chal

leng

e” a

nd ta

ke a

dvan

tage

of o

ppor

tuni

ties

to c

o-fin

ance

with

bila

tera

l and

pr

ivat

e-se

ctor

sou

rces

.75 F

urth

er, a

t the

47t

h A

nnua

l Mee

ting

of th

e B

oard

of

Gov

erno

rs in

201

4, N

akao

ann

ounc

ed p

lans

to c

ombi

ne th

e co

nces

sion

al A

DF

and

LIB

OR

-bas

ed O

CR

. The

mer

ger

of th

e fu

nds

aim

s to

incr

ease

AD

B’s

equ

ity b

ase

with

out i

ts h

avin

g to

requ

est a

dditi

onal

fund

s fro

m m

embe

rs.76

Ulti

mat

ely,

this

wou

ld

enha

nce

the

bank

’s c

apac

ity to

pro

vide

con

cess

iona

l fina

ncin

g fo

r de

velo

pmen

t pr

ojec

ts.


Indi

cato

rP

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

No

evid

ence

.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Form

ally

, ful

l mem

bers

hip.

(a) E

ach

Gov

erno

r ca

n no

min

ate

a ca

ndid

ate.

(b) E

ach

mem

ber

coun

try

has

one

vote

. The

Pre

side

nt is

el

ecte

d by

a s

impl

e m

ajor

ity o

f Gov

erno

rs re

pres

entin

g no

less

than

a

maj

ority

of t

otal

vot

ing

pow

er o

f all

mem

bers

.77 F

urth

er, t

he P

resi

dent

m

ust b

e a

natio

nal o

f a re

gion

al m

embe

r co

untr

y (e

.g.,

ther

e ca

nnot

be

an A

mer

ican

Pre

side

nt).78

Muc

h lik

e th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

trad

ition

of s

elec

ting

an A

mer

ican

Pre

side

nt, t

he A

DB

is c

omm

only

un

ders

tood

to o

pera

te u

nder

the

info

rmal

co

nven

tion

that

the

Pre

side

nt is

sel

ecte

d by

Jap

an

(Yas

utom

o 19

93, 1

995;

Wan

199

5; K

ilby

2006

, 20

11; L

im &

Vre

elan

d 20

13).

Eve

ry P

resi

dent

has

be

en J

apan

ese,

and

mos

t hav

e co

me

dire

ctly

from

th

e Fi

nanc

e M

inis

try

of J

apan

.79 L

im &

Vre

elan

d (2

013)

writ

e th

at in

add

ition

to it

s la

rge

form

al v

otin

g po

wer

, Jap

an “

exer

ts in

form

al in

fluen

ce th

roug

h its

de

fact

o ap

poin

tmen

t of t

he A

DB

pre

side

nt.”

80 A

DB

D

irect

or o

f Str

ateg

y K

azu

Sak

ai s

tron

gly

disa

gree

d w

ith th

e no

tion

that

Jap

an ‘d

e fa

cto’

app

oint

s th

e P

resi

dent

. He

rem

inde

d vi

a in

terv

iew

that

eve

ry

regi

onal

mem

ber

can

put f

orw

ard

a ca

ndid

ate,

and

th

at “

no o

ther

can

dida

te d

oes

not m

ean

ther

e w

as

no e

lect

ion;

ther

e w

as [s

till]

an e

lect

ion

and

votin

g.”

Num

erou

s ac

adem

ics

and

obse

rver

s m

aint

ain,

ho

wev

er, t

hat t

he s

tron

g in

form

al in

fluen

ce a

nd la

rge

mon

etar

y co

ntrib

utio

n of

Jap

an a

llow

s it

to p

ick

the

Pre

side

nt u

ncon

test

ed.81

But

as

Sak

ai c

orre

ctly

no

tes,

ther

e is

no

form

al e

vide

nce

that

wou

ld

confi

rm s

uch

an in

form

al a

rran

gem

ent,

asid

e fro

m

the

fact

that

ther

e ha

s ne

ver

been

a n

on-J

apan

ese

cand

idat

e pr

opos

ed b

y an

y m

embe

r.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

No

evid

ence

.


II.

The

lead

er h

as c

lear

per

form

ance

exp

ecta

tions

whi

ch a

re tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent w

ith M

O/IO

’s o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

and

whi

ch fa

cilit

ates

lead

ersh

ip

acco

unta

bilit

y

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

Yes.

The

AD

B is

larg

ely

guid

ed b

y go

als

stat

ed in

its

‘Str

ateg

y202

0’82

re

port

. To

mea

sure

the

Ban

k’s

perfo

rman

ce, a

‘Res

ults

Fra

mew

ork’

ap

prov

ed b

y th

e B

oard

of D

irect

or is

als

o pu

blis

hed.

83 T

he B

ank

also

fe

atur

es a

‘Dev

elop

men

t Effe

ctiv

enes

s R

evie

w,’84

an

Inde

pend

ent

Eva

luat

ion

Dep

artm

ent (

IED

)85, a

Com

plia

nce

Rev

iew

Pan

el (C

RP

)86, a

tr

ansp

aren

cy p

olic

y87, a

nd a

new

Vic

e-P

resi

dent

for

Adm

inis

trat

ion

and

Cor

pora

te M

anag

emen

t.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

Yes.

In O

ctob

er th

e cu

rren

t Pre

side

nt a

ddre

ssed

how

the

AD

B c

an

fulfi

l the

goa

ls o

f Str

ateg

y202

0 in

a w

ritte

n st

atem

ent s

ubm

itted

to

the

88th m

eetin

g of

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Dev

elop

men

t Com

mitt

ee in

W

ashi

ngto

n D

.C.88

At t

he A

DB

’s 2

014

Ann

ual G

ener

al M

eetin

g of

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs in

Ast

ana,

Nak

ao o

utlin

ed te

n pr

iorit

y ac

tion

area

s to

fulfi

l the

goa

ls o

f Str

ateg

y202

0 in

ligh

t of i

ts m

id-t

erm

revi

ew.89

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. T

he 2

011

Cod

e of

Con

duct

requ

ires

the

Pre

side

nt a

nd D

irect

ors

to d

iscl

ose

any

such

con

flict

s to

the

AD

B E

thic

s C

omm

ittee

.90

Ther

e ar

e al

so g

uide

lines

for

the

avoi

danc

e of

con

flict

s of

inte

rest

in

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

ns91

, and

all

staf

f inv

olve

d in

lend

ing

activ

ities

are

re

quire

d to

dis

clos

e su

ch in

tere

sts.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. T

here

is a

n E

thic

s co

mm

ittee

that

has

pub

lishe

d ru

les

on g

ifts

and

ente

rtai

nmen

t92, a

cces

s du

ring

inve

stig

atio

ns93

, gui

delin

es fo

r al

lega

tions

of m

isco

nduc

t94 a

nd g

ener

al c

ode

of c

ondu

ct fo

r al

l em

ploy

ees.

95

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

No

evid

ence

.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

Sal

ary

incr

ease

s fo

r m

ost e

mpl

oyee

s ar

e tie

d to

per

form

ance

but

it

is u

ncle

ar if

this

app

lies

to th

e P

resi

dent

. The

Pre

side

nt’s

exa

ct s

alar

y is

not

ava

ilabl

e bu

t the

hig

hest

sal

ary

cate

gory

(IS

10) r

ange

d fro

m

$257

,800

– $

322,

300

acco

rdin

g to

a 2

014

prop

osal

.96 E

xecu

tive

sala

ries

rem

ain

an e

xclu

sive

rig

ht o

f the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs.

The

Com

mitt

ee o

n R

emun

erat

ion,

est

ablis

hed

via

Res

olut

ion

No.

66

(and

am

ende

d by

Res

olut

ions

15

5 an

d 17

5) u

nder

take

s an

ann

ual r

evie

w o

f the

P

resi

dent

and

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s’ s

alar

ies.

It m

ay

subm

it a

prop

osal

to th

e B

oard

of G

over

nors

for

adju

stm

ents

to th

e B

oard

of D

irect

ors

ever

y ye

ar

and

the

Pre

side

nt e

very

oth

er y

ear.97

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

No

evid

ence

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n p

roce

ss is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.


2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e ha

s ne

ver

been

ano

ther

can

dida

te p

ut fo

rwar

d in

the

even

t of a

n el

ectio

n or

re-e

lect

ion.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt is

ent

rust

ed w

ith th

e au

thor

ity to

con

duct

the

‘bus

ines

s of

the

bank

.’98 H

owev

er, m

ajor

cha

nges

to s

trat

egic

prio

ritie

s (o

r co

ntin

uatio

ns o

f exi

stin

g st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s) re

quire

app

rova

l by

the

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s.

The

Pre

side

nt o

f the

AD

B is

wid

ely

unde

rsto

od

to e

xerc

ise

sign

ifica

nt p

erso

nal p

ower

with

in

the

orga

niza

tion.

99 O

ne fo

rmer

dire

ctor

-gen

eral

, sp

eaki

ng u

nder

con

ditio

n of

ano

nym

ity in

201

0, to

ld

Lim

and

Vre

elan

d (2

013)

: “th

e A

DB

is li

ke a

sta

te,

and

the

AD

B P

resi

dent

is li

ke it

s em

pero

r.”10

0 Th

is

inte

rpre

tatio

n w

as s

tron

gly

cont

este

d, h

owev

er, b

y A

DB

Dire

ctor

of S

trat

egy

Kaz

u S

akai

in a

n in

terv

iew

co

nduc

ted

for

this

repo

rt. S

akai

str

esse

d th

at th

e A

DB

’s 1

2-m

embe

r B

oard

of D

irect

ors

(ele

cted

by

the

Gov

erno

rs) m

ust a

ppro

ve a

ll m

ajor

dec

isio

ns

prop

osed

by

the

Pre

side

nt, a

nd th

at th

e ab

ove

quot

e is

a “

com

plet

e m

isre

pres

enta

tion

of th

e A

DB

.”10

1

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt c

an p

ut fo

rwar

d a

stra

tegi

c ag

enda

and

take

ste

ps

to fu

lfil i

ts g

oals

, as

exem

plifi

ed b

y S

trat

egy2

020.

Fur

ther

, the

AD

B

publ

ishe

s a

Wor

k P

rogr

amm

e an

d B

udge

t Fra

mew

ork

that

des

crib

es

how

the

AD

B w

ill im

plem

ent i

ts s

trat

egic

prio

ritie

s.10

2

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

App

roxi

mat

ely

$4 b

illion

(28.

6%) o

f AD

B fu

ndin

g is

Spe

cial

Fun

d R

esou

rces

fund

ed b

y a

subs

et o

f ful

l mem

bers

hip.

103

The

larg

est s

peci

al in

itiat

ive

is th

e A

sian

D

evel

opm

ent F

und

(AD

F). T

he c

umul

ativ

e to

tal o

f th

e A

DF

is a

ppro

xim

atel

y $3

3 bi

llion.

The

Fun

d is

con

trol

led

to a

larg

e ex

tent

by

a su

bset

of f

ull

mem

bers

hip.

But

at t

he e

nd o

f eac

h re

plen

ishm

ent

nego

tiatio

n pr

oces

s, u

nder

take

n on

ce e

very

four

ye

ars,

the

agre

emen

t bet

wee

n A

DB

man

agem

ent

and

AD

F do

nors

is p

ut in

to a

repo

rt c

alle

d th

e ‘D

onor

s’ R

epor

t.’ T

his

‘Don

ors’

Rep

ort’

is th

en

subm

itted

to th

e B

oard

mem

bers

for

appr

oval

. Th

us m

ajor

dec

isio

ns re

gard

ing

the

AD

F (e

.g.,

repl

enis

hmen

ts) a

nd in

divi

dual

AD

F pr

ojec

ts a

re

ultim

atel

y ap

prov

ed b

y th

e fu

ll se

t of A

DB

mem

bers

vi

a th

eir

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s re

pres

enta

tives

.104

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

The

AD

B c

ondu

cts

‘Sta

ff E

ngag

emen

t Sur

veys

’ eve

ry tw

o ye

ars.

105

In re

spon

se to

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys, A

DB

Man

agem

ent

take

ste

ps to

add

ress

sta

ff di

ssat

isfa

ctio

n at

bot

h th

e in

stitu

tiona

l and

de

part

men

t lev

el.


2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

Evi

denc

e.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

In 2

006

the

AD

B re

leas

ed a

gui

de o

n st

reng

then

ing

stak

ehol

der

enga

gem

ent,

focu

sing

on

the

part

icip

atio

n of

a d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

in th

e si

x st

ages

of t

he A

DB

Pro

ject

Cyc

le: 1

. Cou

ntry

Pro

gram

min

g; 2

. P

roje

ct P

roce

ssin

g; 3

. Ope

ratio

nal P

lann

ing;

4. I

mpl

emen

tatio

n, M

onito

ring

and

Rep

ortin

g; 5

. Sel

f-E

valu

atio

n;

and

6. P

ost-

Eva

luat

ion.

Whe

n re

view

ing

a po

licy,

str

ateg

y or

cou

ntry

pro

gram

me,

the

AD

B a

ims

to c

onsu

lt w

ith s

take

hold

ers

to id

entif

y w

ho h

as in

tere

sts

in a

giv

en a

ctiv

ity; d

eter

min

e st

akeh

olde

r gr

oup

inte

rest

s;

capi

taliz

e on

sta

keho

lder

’s e

xper

ienc

e an

d ex

pert

ise;

gai

n st

akeh

olde

r co

nsen

sus

on p

roje

cts;

and

max

imiz

e tr

ansp

aren

cy.10

6

In th

e m

ost r

ecen

t sur

vey,

thre

e-qu

arte

rs o

f sta

keho

lder

s ag

ree

that

the

AD

B is

doi

ng e

noug

h to

reac

h ou

t and

bu

ild p

artn

ersh

ips

with

the

priv

ate

sect

or, b

ut o

f priv

ate

sect

or re

spon

dent

s, th

at n

umbe

r is

onl

y on

e-th

ird.10

7

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

Inte

rnal

: The

Com

plia

nce

Rev

iew

Pan

el (C

RP

), an

inte

rnal

wat

chdo

g of

the

AD

B, i

nves

tigat

es a

llege

d no

ncom

plia

nce

by th

e ba

nk in

its

oper

atio

n po

licie

s an

d pr

oced

ures

that

has

cau

sed,

or

is li

kely

to c

ause

, di

rect

mat

eria

l har

m to

pro

ject

-affe

cted

peo

ple.

It d

oes

not,

how

ever

, inv

estig

ate

borr

owin

g co

untr

ies,

the

exec

utin

g ag

ency

or

priv

ate

sect

or c

lient

s un

less

rele

vant

to a

ccus

atio

ns o

f non

com

plia

nce.

Com

plai

nts

can

be fi

led

via

the

‘Acc

ount

abilit

y M

echa

nism

’ but

mus

t be

expr

esse

d in

writ

ing

and

sent

to th

e C

ompl

aint

s R

ecei

ving

Offi

cer

(CR

O).

Ther

e ar

e tw

o ad

ditio

nal l

evel

s of

inte

rnal

eva

luat

ion

in th

e or

gani

zatio

n. T

he fi

rst i

s se

lf-ev

alua

tion,

con

duct

ed b

y th

ose

resp

onsi

ble

for

indi

vidu

al c

ount

ry s

trat

egie

s, p

rogr

amm

es o

r pr

ojec

ts. T

he

seco

nd is

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

n co

nduc

ted

by th

e In

depe

nden

t Eva

luat

ion

Dep

artm

ent (

IED

), a

mem

ber

of

the

Eva

luat

ion

Coo

pera

tion

Gro

up o

f the

Mul

tilat

eral

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

ks (E

CG

). Th

e IE

D o

pera

tes

acco

rdin

g to

sta

ndar

ds o

f ins

ulat

ion

from

ext

erna

l infl

uenc

e an

d th

e av

oida

nce

of c

onfli

cts

of in

tere

st. I

ED

man

ager

s an

d ev

alua

tors

exc

lude

them

selv

es, f

or e

xam

ple,

from

eva

luat

ing

any

proj

ect/

prog

ram

me/

activ

ity/e

ntity

that

they

w

orke

d on

.108

Ext

erna

l: D

onor

s ev

alua

te p

erfo

rman

ce d

urin

g th

e re

gula

r ro

unds

of c

apita

l rep

leni

shm

ent.

Furt

her,

a su

bset

of

don

ors

crea

ted

the

Mul

tilat

eral

Org

anis

atio

n P

erfo

rman

ce A

sses

smen

t Net

wor

k (M

OPA

N),

whi

ch re

gula

rly

cond

ucts

eva

luat

ion

revi

ews

of in

stitu

tions

(suc

h as

the

AD

B) t

o w

hich

sai

d do

nors

con

trib

ute

fund

s.10

9 A

m

embe

r of

the

AD

B’s

top

man

agem

ent n

oted

via

inte

rvie

w th

at s

ome

indi

vidu

al d

onor

cou

ntrie

s ha

ve b

egun

to

con

duct

regu

lar

asse

ssm

ents

, citi

ng th

e U

nite

d K

ingd

om a

nd A

ustr

alia

as

the

mos

t not

able

cas

es. “

They

w

ant t

o in

crea

se th

e vo

lum

e of

thei

r de

velo

pmen

t ass

ista

nce

but w

ant t

o co

ntai

n th

eir

[ow

n] a

dmin

istr

ativ

e bu

dget

. The

sol

utio

n is

to c

hann

el th

eir

fund

s th

roug

h in

tern

atio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

like

us

[AD

B].

But

in o

rder

to

do th

at th

ey w

ant t

o ev

alua

te th

e pe

rform

ance

of i

nter

natio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

, and

they

wan

t to

put t

heir

mon

ey

in o

rgan

izat

ions

they

thin

k ar

e do

ing

a go

od jo

b… W

e ar

e re

gula

rly s

ubje

ct to

suc

h as

sess

men

ts.”

The

re is

al

so th

e In

tern

atio

nal A

id T

rans

pare

ncy

Initi

ativ

e (IA

TI),

of w

hich

the

AD

B b

ecom

e a

mem

ber

in 2

013.

110


c. E

uro

pea

n B

ank

for

Rec

ons

truc

tion

and

Dev

elo

pm

ent

(EB

RD

)

Org

aniz

atio

nA

mul

tilat

eral

dev

elop

men

t ban

k, th

e E

BR

D u

ses

inve

stm

ent a

s a

tool

to h

elp

build

mar

ket e

cono

mie

s in

the

regi

on o

f ope

ratio

ns s

tret

chin

g fro

m c

entr

al E

urop

e to

cen

tral

Asi

a, a

nd th

e so

uthe

rn a

nd e

aste

rn M

edite

rran

ean.

Go

vern

ance

The

EB

RD

’s p

resi

dent

repo

rts

to a

boa

rd o

f gov

erno

rs a

nd d

irect

s an

exe

cutiv

e co

mm

ittee

that

ove

rsee

s th

e im

port

ant a

spec

ts o

f str

ateg

y, p

erfo

rman

ce a

nd

finan

cial

ana

lysi

s. W

hile

the

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs re

pres

ents

don

or n

atio

ns, i

t de

lega

tes

mos

t of i

ts a

utho

rity

to th

e bo

ard

of d

irect

ors.

The

ban

k is

org

aniz

ed

into

sev

en o

pera

tiona

l gro

ups

incl

udin

g ba

nkin

g, fi

nanc

e, r

isk

and

polic

y, a

mon

g ot

hers

.

The

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs a

lso

appo

ints

or

reap

poin

ts th

e pr

esid

ent.

Mos

t oth

er

pow

ers

are

devo

lved

to th

e bo

ard

of d

irect

ors,

whi

ch o

vers

ees

the

oper

atio

ns o

f th

e pr

esid

ent a

nd th

e ex

ecut

ive

com

mitt

ee (m

ade

up o

f the

hea

ds o

f the

maj

or

inte

rnal

ope

ratio

nal g

roup

s).

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFo

ur y

ears

and

rene

wab

le, w

ith n

o lim

it on

the

num

ber

of te

rms

a pr

esid

ent c

an

hold

. The

vic

e-pr

esid

ent h

as a

five

-yea

r te

rm.

Inco

me

€9.1

billi

on in

inve

stm

ents

wer

e m

ade

in 2

011.

Num

ber

of

staf

fA

ppro

xim

atel

y 1,

700

on p

erm

anen

t con

trac

ts, w

ith 1

,250

at t

he L

ondo

n he

adqu

arte

rs a

nd 4

00 in

cou

ntry

offi

ces.

A s

igni

fican

t num

ber

of a

dditi

onal

em

ploy

ees

are

on te

mpo

rary

con

trac

ts.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipE

BR

D p

resi

dent

s ha

ve ty

pica

lly s

erve

d fo

ur-y

ear

term

s; o

nly

Jean

Lem

ierr

e ha

s se

rved

th

e fu

ll ei

ght-

year

dou

ble

term

. Pas

t pre

side

nts

incl

ude

Jacq

ues

Att

ali (

1991

-199

3),

Jacq

ues

de L

aros

ière

(199

3-19

98),

Hor

st K

öhle

r (1

998-

2000

), Je

an L

emie

rre

(200

0-20

08) a

nd T

hom

as M

irow

(200

8-20

12).

The

curr

ent p

resi

dent

, Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti, w

as e

lect

ed in

201

2.

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

All

lead

ers

prio

r to

Sir

Sum

a w

ere

eith

er F

renc

h or

Ger

man

, and

had

ban

king

ba

ckgr

ound

s. S

ir S

uma

repr

esen

ts a

cha

nge

in e

mph

asis

, giv

en h

is e

xten

sive

ex

perie

nce

in m

anag

ing

larg

e pu

blic

-sec

tor

orga

niza

tions

. He

has

intr

oduc

ed a

wid

e-ra

ngin

g re

form

pro

gram

me

to im

prov

e or

gani

zatio

nal e

ffici

ency

and

del

iver

y, in

clud

ing

a sh

ift to

gre

ater

tran

spar

ency

in h

iring

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t, an

d gr

eate

r em

phas

is

on p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t of s

enio

r le

ader

ship

.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

Ther

e ar

e no

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r th

e P

resi

dent

’s ro

le. E

mpl

oym

ent

cont

ract

is p

ublis

hed

onlin

e in

clud

ing

sala

ry, t

erm

s of

dis

mis

sal.

Ther

e ar

e te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

the

Vic

e P

resi

dent

s.B

oard

of G

over

nors

, Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s an

d P

resi

dent

’s ro

le is

laid

out

‘B

asic

Doc

umen

ts o

f EB

RD

’ in

som

e de

tail,

but

ther

e is

no

deta

iled

disc

ussi

on o

f any

oth

er ro

les.

111

They

are

con

side

ring

writ

ing

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r th

e P

resi

dent

’s ro

le in

futu

re. T

his

mos

t lik

ely

wou

ld b

e dr

afte

d by

sen

ior

EB

RD

sta

ff m

embe

r. Th

e P

rinci

pals

wou

ld d

eleg

ate

this

role

to th

e B

oard

of

Dire

ctor

s w

hom

pre

dom

inan

tly s

erve

nat

iona

l in

tere

sts.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Form

ally

, the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs h

as ro

unds

of m

ajor

ity v

otin

g to

el

imin

ate

cand

idat

es a

nd d

eter

min

e th

e P

resi

dent

for

4-ye

ar te

rms

(and

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent t

erm

s).11

2

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti is

the

first

non

-Fre

nch

or

Ger

man

Pre

side

nt o

f the

Ban

k. T

radi

tiona

lly F

ranc

e an

d G

erm

any

agre

ed o

n th

e ca

ndid

ate.

How

ever

, in

the

mos

t las

t ele

ctio

n th

ere

was

a c

ompe

titiv

e pr

oces

s as

the

‘gen

tlem

en’s

agr

eem

ent’

brok

e do

wn.

113

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Pre

side

nt s

elec

tion

rem

ains

non

-exh

aust

ive

and

with

out a

cle

ar fo

rmal

pr

oces

s.A

t the

Vic

e P

resi

dent

ial l

evel

gre

ater

rig

or h

as b

een

intr

oduc

ed to

the

lead

ersh

ip p

roce

ss. T

here

is a

cle

ar fo

rmal

pro

cess

for

VP

leve

l lea

ders

th

at w

as e

ffect

ivel

y te

sted

for

VP

CFO

, VP

CA

O, V

P R

isk,

and

VP

P

olic

y as

wel

l as

the

Gen

eral

Cou

nsel

. For

exa

mpl

e, a

n ex

haus

tive,

pa

sspo

rt-b

lind

inte

rvie

w s

earc

h of

ove

r 85

0 ap

plic

ants

was

con

duct

ed

for

VP

of b

anki

ng o

pera

tions

(a ro

le tr

aditi

onal

ly h

eld

by a

n A

mer

ican

) in

201

2. .11

4

In th

e la

st e

lect

ion

the

role

was

adv

ertis

ed to

sh

areh

olde

rs, s

ever

al c

andi

date

s w

rote

man

ifest

os

to v

oter

s ou

tlini

ng th

eir

visi

on fo

r th

e B

ank,

and

four

of

the

five

gave

inte

rvie

ws

to th

e C

entr

e fo

r G

loba

l D

evel

opm

ent,

follo

wed

by

hear

ings

with

the

EB

RD

B

oard

115

This

was

the

mos

t pub

licly

tran

spar

ent

elec

tion

proc

ess.

How

ever

it is

not

a c

odifi

ed

proc

ess.

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

No

publ

icly

ava

ilabl

e ev

iden

ce.

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abat

i mad

e hi

s go

als

clea

r th

roug

h hi

s el

ectio

n M

anife

sto

to s

hare

hold

ers.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of t

he

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear

stra

tegy

?

No

evid

ence

. Th

e pe

rform

ance

obj

ectiv

es fo

r th

e E

xecu

tive

Man

agem

ent a

re p

ublis

hed

on th

e in

tran

et a

nd

effe

ctiv

ely

refle

ct th

e P

resi

dent

’s g

oals

(tak

en a

s a

sum

). Th

ese

perfo

rman

ce o

bjec

tives

are

then

ca

scad

ed d

own

to th

e re

st o

f the

org

aniz

atio

n.Th

e st

rate

gic

plan

ning

cyc

le d

oes

not l

ink

to th

e pr

esid

entia

l ele

ctio

n cy

cle.

The

Ban

k ha

s a

five

year

“C

apita

l, R

esou

rces

, Rev

iew

”, w

hich

it m

ust d

eliv

er

on. H

owev

er, a

n in

com

ing

Pre

side

nt h

as li

mite

d fle

xibi

lity

to re

set t

hese

goa

ls a

nd a

dapt

to c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s.

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?D

iscl

osur

es o

f con

flict

of i

nter

est a

re m

anda

ted

unde

r th

e fo

rmal

Cod

e of

Con

duct

.Th

e E

BR

D h

as a

n an

nual

dis

clos

ure,

whi

ch is

sc

rutin

ized

by

the

chie

f com

plia

nce

offic

er, a

nd

ther

e is

a p

roce

dure

for

follo

w-u

p an

d en

forc

emen

t.


4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?E

BR

D h

as a

defi

ned

form

al C

ode

of C

ondu

ct (w

hich

was

upd

ated

in

2012

) ove

rsee

n by

a C

hief

Com

plia

nce

Offi

cer

who

repo

rts

dire

ctly

to

the

Pre

side

nt. R

espo

nsib

le fo

r rep

utat

iona

l ris

ks a

nd s

taff

mis

beha

viou

r an

d ov

erse

eing

the

Pro

ject

Com

plia

nce

Mec

hani

sm.11

6

EB

RD

pra

ctic

es a

re s

omet

imes

str

icte

r th

an th

e fo

rmal

Cod

e of

Con

duct

as

it ca

n be

pol

itica

lly

sens

itive

for

seni

or s

taff

to b

e no

n-ex

ecut

ive

mem

bers

of B

oard

s in

the

priv

ate

or c

harit

y se

ctor

(e

ven

if of

ficia

lly th

ey m

ay b

e ab

le to

do

so).

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Det

ails

abo

ut p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t are

not

out

lined

onl

ine

or

publ

icly

. Th

ere

is n

o fo

rmal

app

rais

al o

f the

Pre

side

nt. T

his

wou

ld b

e di

fficu

lt fo

r th

e B

oard

of D

irect

ors

or

Prin

cipa

ls’ t

o ca

rry

out a

s th

ey d

o no

t hav

e su

ffici

ent

info

rmat

ion

on th

e P

resi

dent

’s ro

le.11

7

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

Ann

ual r

epor

t dis

cuss

es ‘r

ewar

ds a

nd b

enefi

ts’ d

esig

ned

to e

ncou

rage

su

perio

r pe

rform

ance

, but

it is

not

cle

ar w

heth

er th

e po

licy

incl

udes

le

ader

ship

.118

The

Pre

side

nt m

ust h

ave

Boa

rd a

ppro

val f

or a

n in

crea

se in

sal

ary.

119

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

EB

RD

has

a le

arni

ng a

nd d

evel

opm

ent t

eam

who

wor

k cl

osel

y w

ith

the

Eva

luat

ion

Dep

artm

ent (

EvD

) tea

m to

des

ign

prog

ram

mes

that

ad

dres

s ex

istin

g w

eakn

esse

s in

pro

gram

me

deliv

ery.

The

y do

not

fo

cus

on th

e P

resi

dent

.

The

Pre

side

nt a

nd o

ther

sen

ior

man

agem

ent h

ave

coac

hing

ava

ilabl

e on

requ

est.

Man

y se

nior

sta

ff ha

ve p

erso

nal c

oach

es.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n p

roce

ss is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

The

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent p

roce

ss is

sim

ilar

to th

e ap

poin

tmen

t pro

cess

in

that

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs re

quire

a m

ajor

ity v

ote,

but

freq

uent

ly

info

rmal

neg

otia

tions

prio

r to

the

form

al v

ote

are

deci

sive

.

No

as th

ere

is n

ot a

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

of

the

Pre

side

nt.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

The

EB

RD

con

side

red

a fu

ll ra

nge

of c

andi

date

s fo

r re

-app

oint

men

t in

the

last

ele

ctio

n. F

or e

xam

ple,

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti w

as s

elec

ted

over

th

e in

cum

bent

Pre

side

nt in

201

2, T

hom

as M

irow

.

How

ever

, the

re is

no

codi

fied

rule

that

oth

er

cand

idat

es m

ust b

e co

nsid

ered

in th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s. It

is li

kely

that

the

next

ele

ctio

n w

ill al

so b

e op

en a

nd c

onte

sted

. 120

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

Pre

side

nt h

as a

utho

rity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies.

For

exa

mpl

e,

in c

onju

nctio

n w

ith B

oard

of G

over

nors

/ D

irect

ors,

Pre

side

nt h

as

expa

nded

lend

ing

to N

orth

Afri

can

clie

nts

as th

e ne

ed to

ass

ist t

hem

in

tran

sitio

ning

to d

emoc

racy

and

free

-mar

kets

has

em

erge

d.

Due

to th

e m

ism

atch

bet

wee

n st

rate

gic

plan

ning

an

d th

e el

ectio

n cy

cle

it is

ext

rem

ely

diffi

cult

for

the

Pre

side

nt to

ada

pt th

e E

BR

D’s

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies.

It

can

occu

r in

reac

tion

to a

maj

or c

risis

suc

h as

the

Ara

b S

prin

g.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt c

arrie

s ou

t str

uctu

ral r

efor

ms

to fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

and

evol

ve a

fter

the

glob

al

finan

cial

cris

is a

nd th

e co

ntin

uing

gre

at re

cess

ion.

For

inst

ance

, the

Pre

side

nt h

as d

evel

oped

a n

ew p

olic

y ro

le th

at th

e B

oard

app

rove

d as

wel

l as

a ne

w C

orpo

rate

Lea

ders

hip

Gro

up. I

n ad

ditio

n, th

e P

resi

dent

has

dev

elop

ed 1

2 in

tern

al ta

skfo

rces

to re

view

in

tern

al p

roce

sses

and

str

uctu

res.

A n

ew p

olic

y op

erat

iona

l gro

up h

as

also

bee

n cr

eate

d to

bet

ter

conv

ey th

e E

BR

D’s

pol

icy

expe

rtis

e to

cl

ient

cou

ntrie

s.

Ther

e is

no

budg

et fo

r sp

ecia

l ini

tiativ

es.

Furt

herm

ore

the

Boa

rd c

ontr

ol th

e bu

dget

, sal

ary

of s

taff

and

tota

l num

ber

of fi

xed

empl

oyee

s. T

his

mak

es it

ext

rem

ely

diffi

cult

for

the

Pre

side

nt to

mak

e st

rate

gic

chan

ges

with

exi

stin

g st

aff a

s th

e E

BR

D is

on

ly a

ble

to h

ire s

taff

on s

hort

-ter

m c

ontr

acts

.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

The

EB

RD

feat

ures

17

Spe

cial

Fun

ds e

arm

arke

d by

spe

cific

pro

ject

ty

pe a

nd/o

r ge

ogra

phic

are

a an

d fu

nded

by

subs

ets

of d

onor

s (to

tallin

g €8

27 m

illion

in 2

011,

equ

ival

ent t

o 9%

of t

he €

9.1

billio

n in

tota

l com

mitm

ents

). In

add

ition

to th

ese

fund

s, th

e E

BR

D r

uns

a nu

mbe

r of

bila

tera

l and

mul

tilat

eral

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

fund

s in

the

Sou

ther

n an

d M

edite

rran

ean

(SE

ME

D) r

egio

n, to

tallin

g €2

.574

billi

on in

20

11.12

1

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

The

EB

RD

has

shi

fted

from

sur

veys

eve

ry 3

yea

rs to

ann

ually

.122

Thes

e su

rvey

s ha

ve b

een

used

.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

. Th

e P

resi

dent

is n

ot fo

rmal

ly a

sses

sed

on th

is (o

r an

ythi

ng e

lse)

, how

ever

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abat

i has

de

dica

ted

time

to m

ento

ring

seni

or s

taff.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

The

EB

RD

has

a C

ivil

Soc

iety

Pro

gram

me

whe

re e

xecu

tive

man

ager

s sp

end

two

days

with

civ

il so

ciet

y gr

oups

to g

arne

r fe

edba

ck o

n E

BR

D p

erfo

rman

ce. I

t als

o co

nduc

ts a

bus

ines

s fo

rum

whe

re th

e P

resi

dent

an

d B

oard

of D

irect

ors

inte

ract

with

bus

ines

s le

ader

s. In

201

2 th

e E

BR

D s

igni

fican

tly e

nhan

ced

its c

ivil

soci

ety

initi

ativ

es. T

he E

BR

D M

inin

g O

pera

tions

Pol

icy

was

impl

emen

ted

that

yea

r in

con

sulta

tion

with

mor

e th

an 1

,500

org

aniz

atio

ns in

clud

ing

min

ing

com

pani

es, c

ivil

soci

ety

grou

ps a

nd a

cade

mic

s. F

urth

er, P

hase

3

of th

e S

usta

inab

le E

nerg

y In

itiat

ive

(SE

I) w

as la

unch

ed, w

ith c

onsu

ltativ

e m

eetin

gs in

Geo

rgia

, Kaz

akhs

tan,

R

ussi

a, T

urke

y an

d U

krai

ne. T

he E

BR

D a

lso

revi

ewed

its

polit

ical

met

hodo

logy

in 2

012,

hol

ding

wor

ksho

ps in

Lo

ndon

, Sta

nfor

d, B

elgr

ade,

Mos

cow

and

Cai

ro. A

ccor

ding

to it

s 20

13 p

rosp

ectu

s, th

e E

BR

D a

lso

plan

ned

on re

view

ing

thre

e po

licie

s la

st y

ear

in c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith c

ivil

soci

ety

grou

ps a

nd a

wid

e va

riety

of o

ther

st

akeh

olde

rs: t

he 2

009

Pro

ject

Com

plai

nt M

echa

nism

Rul

es o

f Pro

cedu

re, t

he 2

008

Env

ironm

enta

l and

Soc

ial

Pol

icy,

and

the

2011

Pub

lic In

form

atio

n P

olic

y.12

3

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

EB

RD

has

a d

efine

d E

valu

atio

n P

olic

y th

at h

as re

gula

rly b

een

upda

ted

sinc

e 19

92 (E

BR

D E

valu

atio

n P

olic

y,

2013

). E

BR

D h

as a

n E

valu

atio

n D

epar

tmen

t (E

vD) w

hich

repo

rts

to a

Chi

ef E

valu

ator

whi

ch is

par

t of a

co

mpl

emen

tary

web

of i

nstr

umen

ts –

e.g

. wor

k pr

ogra

mm

es a

nd b

udge

ts, r

esul

ts fr

amew

orks

, per

form

ance

sc

orec

ards

, etc

. The

eva

luat

ion

team

repo

rts

dire

ctly

to th

e B

oard

of D

irect

ors.

In a

dditi

on, t

he C

hief

C

ompl

ianc

e O

ffice

r re

port

s di

rect

ly to

the

Pre

side

nt, a

s do

es th

e in

tern

al a

udit

team

. The

Vic

e-P

resi

dent

for

Ris

k al

so s

its o

n th

e E

xecu

tive

Com

mitt

ee.

EB

RD

als

o fe

atur

ed in

the

2006

Mul

tilat

eral

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

k (M

DB

) Com

mon

Per

form

ance

Ass

essm

ent

(CO

MPA

S) r

epor

t, w

here

MD

Bs

join

tly p

ublis

h in

form

atio

n on

how

they

con

duct

bus

ines

s an

d or

gani

ze

them

selv

es to

ens

ure

that

thei

r op

erat

ions

are

gea

red

tow

ards

resu

lts.12

4


d. In

ter-

Am

eric

an D

evel

op

men

t B

ank

(IDB

)

Org

aniz

atio

n Fo

unde

d in

195

9 as

a p

artn

ersh

ip b

etw

een

Latin

Am

eric

an c

ount

ries

and

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

the

IDB

sup

port

s cl

ient

gov

ernm

ents

, priv

ate

entit

ies

and

non-

profi

t sec

tors

with

cap

ital f

or d

evel

opm

ent o

pera

tions

. The

Inte

r-A

mer

ican

D

evel

opm

ent B

ank

Gro

up (I

AD

B) i

s co

mpo

sed

of th

e ID

B, t

he In

ter-

Am

eric

an

Inve

stm

ent C

orpo

ratio

n (II

C) a

nd th

e M

ultil

ater

al In

vest

men

t Fun

d (M

IF),

the

latt

er

bein

g ad

min

iste

red

by th

e ID

B. T

he g

roup

is h

eadq

uart

ered

in th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s (W

ashi

ngto

n D

C).

Go

vern

ance

The

IAD

B is

hea

ded

by a

boa

rd o

f gov

erno

rs, w

hich

del

egat

es o

vers

ight

of b

ank

oper

atio

ns to

a b

oard

of e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s (re

pres

enta

tives

from

48

coun

trie

s).

The

man

agem

ent t

eam

run

s da

y-to

-day

ope

ratio

ns. E

lect

ed b

y th

e bo

ard

of

gove

rnor

s, th

e pr

esid

ent c

hairs

the

mee

tings

of t

he b

oard

of e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s,

but h

as n

o vo

te.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFi

ve y

ears

; can

be

re-e

lect

ed.

Inco

me

$11.

4 bi

llion

in le

ndin

g w

as a

ppro

ved

in 2

012.

The

sub

scrib

ed c

apita

l to

the

IDB

, af

ter

the

nint

h ge

nera

l cap

ital i

ncre

ase,

will

amou

nt to

$17

0.9

billio

n.

Num

ber

of

staf

fA

bout

2,0

00.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ip

The

thre

e pr

ior

pres

iden

ts s

erve

d se

vera

l ter

ms:

Fel

ipe

Her

rera

(fro

m C

hile

, 196

0-19

71);

Ant

onio

Ort

iz M

ena

(Mex

ico,

197

1-19

88) a

nd E

nriq

ue V

. Igl

esia

s (U

rugu

ay,

1988

-200

5).

The

curr

ent p

resi

dent

, Lui

s A

lber

to M

oren

o (C

olom

bia;

200

5-pr

esen

t), h

as a

lso

serv

ed m

ore

than

one

term

.

In th

e 19

70 e

lect

ions

, bot

h A

rgen

tina

and

Vene

zuel

a no

min

ated

diff

eren

t ca

ndid

ates

, but

on

27 N

ovem

ber,

Ort

iz re

ceiv

ed th

e m

ajor

ity o

f vot

es. D

avid

M.

Ken

nedy

, US

sec

reta

ry o

f the

trea

sury

, rep

orte

d to

Pre

side

nt R

icha

rd N

ixon

that

the

elec

tion

had

been

“co

nten

tious

”.12

5

The

And

ean

Dev

elop

men

t Cor

pora

tion

(CA

F) fu

nded

mor

e La

tin A

mer

ican

in

frast

ruct

ure

proj

ects

in 2

012

than

the

IAD

B a

nd W

orld

Ban

k co

mbi

ned.

126

Acc

ordi

ng to

Hum

phre

y an

d M

icha

elow

a (2

013)

, the

att

ract

iven

ess

of C

AF

vis-

à-vi

s th

e IA

DB

is it

s fa

st p

roce

ssin

g tim

es a

nd lo

w s

ocie

tal a

nd e

nviro

nmen

tal s

tand

ards

. S

uch

adva

ntag

es, t

he a

utho

rs a

rgue

, are

per

haps

mad

e po

ssib

le b

y C

AF’

s la

ck o

f no

n-re

gion

al m

embe

rs.12

7

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Sin

ce M

oren

o as

sum

ed th

e pr

esid

ency

in O

ctob

er 2

005,

the

bank

has

und

ergo

ne a

m

ajor

resh

apin

g of

its

orga

niza

tiona

l str

uctu

re, a

nd h

as e

stab

lishe

d a

refo

rm a

gend

a lin

ked

to th

e ni

nth

gene

ral i

ncre

ase

in re

sour

ces

man

date

.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I. Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

No.

The

Cha

irman

sub

mits

the

term

s of

the

cont

ract

for

empl

oym

ent

for

the

Pre

side

nt to

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs in

a c

onfid

entia

l man

ner.12

8

Som

e ob

serv

ers

cele

brat

e th

e IA

DB

’s g

over

nanc

e st

ruct

ure,

arg

uing

that

it b

ette

r pr

eser

ves

the

inte

rest

s of

regi

onal

mem

bers

than

oth

er m

ultil

ater

al

inst

itutio

ns. N

ancy

Bird

sall

(201

4), f

or e

xam

ple,

no

tes

that

in th

e IA

DB

regi

onal

mem

bers

hol

d a

maj

ority

of t

he v

otin

g po

wer

, whe

reas

non

-bo

rrow

ing

mem

bers

col

lect

ivel

y ho

ld a

maj

ority

in

the

Wor

ld B

ank.

129

Num

erou

s au

thor

s ha

ve w

arne

d,

how

ever

, tha

t vot

ing

wei

ght i

s an

insu

ffici

ent

mea

sure

of p

ower

and

influ

ence

with

in a

n or

gani

zatio

n (S

chot

ter

1981

; Hos

li 19

96).13

0 S

tran

d (2

003)

, em

ploy

ing

the

John

ston

vot

ing

pow

er in

dex,

ca

lcul

ates

the

actu

al d

istr

ibut

ion

of v

otin

g po

wer

in

the

IAD

B b

ased

on

indi

vidu

al c

ount

ries’

vot

ing

pow

er w

ithin

coa

litio

n gr

oups

and

the

pow

er o

f the

co

aliti

on g

roup

itse

lf. A

ccor

ding

to th

is c

alcu

latio

n,

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

hold

s 80

% o

f vot

ing

pow

er w

ithin

th

e IA

DB

.131

Furt

her,

as B

irdsa

ll (2

014)

not

es h

erse

lf,

the

US

, via

its

de fa

cto

veto

pow

er, c

ontr

ols

the

sele

ctio

n of

the

IAD

B’s

Exe

cutiv

e V

ice-

Pre

side

nt

(EV

P).

This

is s

igni

fican

t giv

en th

at th

e E

VP

cha

irs

the

Loan

Com

mitt

ee th

at m

ust a

ppro

ve a

ny p

roje

ct

befo

re it

reac

hes

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs fo

r fin

al

appr

oval

.132

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip e

lect

ion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Full

mem

bers

hip.

(a) E

ach

Gov

erno

r ca

n no

min

ate

a ca

ndid

ate.

(b)

Eac

h m

embe

r co

untr

y ha

s eq

ual a

mou

nt o

f vot

es (1

35) p

lus

one

vote

fo

r ea

ch s

hare

of o

rdin

ary

capi

tal (

OC

) sto

ck o

f the

Ban

k. T

he m

ajor

ity

of to

tal v

otin

g po

wer

of m

embe

r co

untr

ies

elec

ts th

e P

resi

dent

, in

clud

ing

an a

bsol

ute

maj

ority

of g

over

nors

of r

egio

nal m

embe

rs.13

3 Vo

ting

pow

er a

mon

g m

embe

r co

untr

ies

of th

e ID

B is

as

follo

ws:

Lat

in

Am

eric

an a

nd th

e C

arib

bean

hav

e 50

.015

%, U

nite

d S

tate

s 30

.006

%,

Can

ada

4.00

1% a

nd th

e no

n-re

gion

al m

embe

rs 1

5.97

9%.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

elec

tion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes.

The

com

preh

ensi

ve s

et o

f reg

ulat

ions

134

toge

ther

with

the

agre

emen

t est

ablis

hing

the

Ban

k135

is p

ublis

hed

onlin

e.


II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

The

IDB

has

a s

erie

s of

str

ateg

ies

to a

chie

ve it

s in

stitu

tiona

l m

anda

tes.

136

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

It is

unc

lear

if th

ere

is a

spe

cific

, for

mal

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

Pre

side

nt

do s

o. H

owev

er, P

resi

dent

Lui

s M

oren

o di

d re

leas

e a

five-

year

pla

n tit

led

Bui

ldin

g O

ppor

tuni

ty fo

r th

e M

ajor

ity in

200

6 th

at li

sts

a nu

mbe

r of

spe

cific

str

ateg

ies

and

goal

s fo

r th

e 20

07-2

012

perio

d.13

7

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. A

ll ID

B e

mpl

oyee

s m

ust d

iscl

ose

confl

ict o

f int

eres

ts to

pre

vent

th

e si

tuat

ion

from

esc

alat

ing

into

an

alle

gatio

n of

Mis

cond

uct.13

8

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. A

ll ID

B e

mpl

oyee

s ad

here

to s

tric

t eth

ical

sta

ndar

ds la

id o

ut in

th

e 20

12 C

ode

of E

thic

s an

d P

rofe

ssio

nal C

ondu

ct.13

9 Th

e B

oard

of

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors

is s

ubje

ct to

its

own

Cod

e.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

No

evid

ence

.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No.

As

of D

ecem

ber

2012

, the

Pre

side

nt h

as a

fixe

d sa

lary

of

$440

,798

(doe

s no

t inc

lude

Exe

cutiv

e A

llow

ance

of $

78,8

89).1 4

0

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

No

evid

ence

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t cr

iteria

con

side

red

by th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

the

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.


V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

Pre

side

nt m

akes

pro

posa

ls o

n th

e ge

nera

l pol

icy

of th

e B

ank

for

cons

ider

atio

n by

the

Boa

rd.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

No

evid

ence

.

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Of t

he 2

012

tota

l app

rova

ls, $

10.8

billi

on w

as fr

om th

e O

rdin

ary

Cap

ital (

OC

), $3

20 m

illion

from

the

Fund

for

Spe

cial

Ope

ratio

ns (F

SO

) (b

efor

e 19

65 w

as c

alle

d S

ocia

l Pro

gres

s Tr

ust F

und)

.141

Con

trib

utio

ns

to th

e FS

O a

re m

ade

in th

e fo

rm o

f non

-neg

otia

ble,

non

-inte

rest

be

arin

g de

man

d ob

ligat

ions

in li

eu o

f the

imm

edia

te p

aym

ent o

f all

or

any

part

of a

mem

ber’s

con

trib

utio

ns q

uota

s.

The

Boa

rd a

lloca

tes

the

reso

urce

s.14

2 (S

teph

en D

. Kra

sner

writ

es th

at

for

the

FSO

act

iviti

es v

otin

g, th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s ha

ve a

blo

ckin

g ve

to.)14

3

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

Wor

king

on

the

Hum

an C

apita

l Str

ateg

y (2

011)

,144

a br

oad

cons

ulta

tion

proc

ess

was

und

erta

ken

by M

anag

emen

t to

iden

tify

the

key

chal

leng

es

perc

eive

d by

sta

ff th

roug

h an

ele

ctro

nic

surv

ey s

ent o

ut to

500

em

ploy

ees.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

man

agem

ent t

o en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

Mos

t im

port

antly

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns (C

SO

s) m

ay a

lso

be e

ligib

le to

rece

ive

finan

cing

from

the

Ban

k.A

lso,

acc

ordi

ng to

the

Str

ateg

y fo

r P

rom

otin

g C

itize

n P

artic

ipat

ion

in B

ank

Act

iviti

es (2

004)

,145

Ther

e ar

e fo

ur

area

s of

Ban

k ac

tivity

in w

hich

citi

zen

part

icip

atio

n ca

n be

sys

tem

atic

ally

inco

rpor

ated

: (i)

Ban

k in

put i

nto

the

shap

ing

of c

ount

ry d

evel

opm

ent p

olic

ies,

pla

ns a

nd a

gend

as; (

ii) s

ecto

r st

rate

gy a

nd c

ount

ry s

trat

egy

form

ulat

ion,

(iii)

pro

ject

pre

para

tion

and

impl

emen

tatio

n, a

nd (i

v) e

valu

atio

n of

Ban

k ac

tiviti

es. T

here

are

ann

ual

CS

O m

eetin

gs a

nd C

SO

Con

sulti

ng G

roup

s fu

nctio

ning

thro

ugh

the

year

.

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

exec

utiv

e m

anag

emen

t tho

roug

hly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

Eva

luat

ion

at th

e ID

B is

a s

hare

d re

spon

sibi

lity

betw

een

man

agem

ent a

nd th

e O

ffice

of E

valu

atio

n an

d O

vers

ight

(OV

E).

Man

agem

ent f

ocus

es o

n pr

ojec

t eva

luat

ions

and

mon

itorin

g po

rtfo

lio p

erfo

rman

ce. O

VE

is in

depe

nden

t of

man

agem

ent a

nd a

nsw

ers

to th

e B

oard

of E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s. It

s ac

tiviti

es in

clud

e en

surin

g th

at s

trat

egie

s,

polic

ies

and

prog

ram

mes

com

ply

with

the

IDB

’s o

bjec

tives

and

man

date

s. O

VE

ove

rsee

s th

e B

ank’

s in

tern

al

mon

itorin

g m

echa

nism

s an

d co

nduc

ts e

x-po

st p

roje

ct e

valu

atio

ns.

OV

E h

as o

rgan

izat

iona

l and

beh

avio

ural

inde

pend

ence

, and

is fr

ee fr

om e

xter

nal p

ress

ure

and

confl

icts

of

inte

rest

acc

ordi

ng to

the

crite

ria e

stab

lishe

d by

the

Eva

luat

ion

Coo

pera

tion

Gro

up o

f the

Mul

tilat

eral

D

evel

opm

ent B

anks

(EC

G),

of w

hich

the

IDB

is a

foun

ding

mem

ber.


e. In

tern

atio

nal M

one

tary

Fun

d (I

MF

)

Org

aniz

atio

n E

stab

lishe

d af

ter

the

Sec

ond

Wor

ld W

ar a

s pa

rt o

f the

inte

rnat

iona

l eco

nom

ic

infra

stru

ctur

e ag

reed

at B

rett

on W

oods

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes)

, the

IMF

is c

omm

itted

to

prom

otin

g in

tern

atio

nal m

onet

ary

coop

erat

ion

and

high

leve

ls o

f em

ploy

men

t and

in

com

e, a

s w

ell a

s fa

cilit

atin

g in

tern

atio

nal t

rade

.146

Go

vern

ance

The

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs is

the

IMF’

s hi

ghes

t dec

isio

n-m

akin

g bo

dy. I

t con

sist

s of

one

gov

erno

r an

d on

e al

tern

ate

gove

rnor

for

each

of t

he 1

88 m

embe

r co

untr

ies.

The

gov

erno

rs, a

ppoi

nted

by

thei

r re

spec

tive

mem

ber

coun

trie

s,

are

usua

lly m

inis

ters

of fi

nanc

e or

the

head

s of

thei

r co

untr

ies’

cen

tral

ban

k.

The

boar

d re

tain

s th

e rig

ht to

app

rove

quo

ta in

crea

ses,

the

adm

ittan

ce o

f new

m

embe

rs, c

ompu

lsor

y w

ithdr

awal

of m

embe

rs, a

nd a

men

dmen

ts to

the

Art

icle

s of

Agr

eem

ent a

nd B

y-La

ws.

The

boa

rd is

adv

ised

by

two

min

iste

rial c

omm

ittee

s:

the

Inte

rnat

iona

l Mon

etar

y an

d Fi

nanc

ial C

omm

ittee

(IM

FC) a

nd th

e D

evel

opm

ent

Com

mitt

ee.

The

exec

utiv

e bo

ard

cons

ists

of 2

4 ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

s re

pres

entin

g al

l 188

m

embe

r co

untr

ies,

and

con

duct

s th

e IM

F’s

busi

ness

. Cur

rent

ly, t

he fi

ve la

rges

t qu

ota

cont

ribut

ors

appo

int t

heir

own

exec

utiv

e di

rect

or, a

nd th

e ot

her

coun

trie

s el

ect a

n ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

bas

ed o

n co

nstit

uenc

ies.

Und

er th

e qu

ota

and

gove

rnan

ce re

form

s, a

dopt

ed in

201

0 bu

t not

yet

in fo

rce,

all

24 e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s w

ould

be

elec

ted

by m

embe

r co

untr

ies,

mak

ing

the

IMF

the

only

in

tern

atio

nal i

nstit

utio

n w

ith a

n al

l-ele

cted

boa

rd.14

7

The

IMF

is le

d by

the

man

agin

g di

rect

or (M

D),

who

is th

e he

ad o

f sta

ff an

d ch

airm

an o

f the

exe

cutiv

e bo

ard.

The

MD

is a

ssis

ted

by a

firs

t dep

uty

man

agin

g di

rect

or a

nd th

ree

depu

ty m

anag

ing

dire

ctor

s. T

he m

anag

emen

t tea

m o

vers

ees

the

staf

f and

mai

ntai

ns h

igh-

leve

l con

tact

with

mem

ber

coun

trie

s, p

rivat

e-se

ctor

or

gani

zatio

ns, t

he m

edia

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns, t

hink

tank

s, a

cade

mia

and

ot

her

inst

itutio

ns.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eA

rene

wab

le fi

ve-y

ear

term

.

Tota

l quo

tas

$360

billi

on, a

s of

Mar

ch 2

013.

Num

ber

of

staf

fA

ppro

xim

atel

y 2,

700.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipLe

ader

ship

recr

uitm

ent a

t the

IMF

and

Wor

ld B

ank

has

deal

t with

the

natio

nalit

y pr

inci

ple

– a

long

stan

ding

con

vent

ion

by w

hich

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

and

Eur

ope

divi

de m

anag

emen

t of t

he re

spec

tive

orga

niza

tions

. The

IMF’

s M

D is

sel

ecte

d by

its

exe

cutiv

e bo

ard,

whi

ch a

lso

appr

oves

the

MD

’s c

ontr

act.

A g

over

nor

or a

n ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

may

nom

inat

e ca

ndid

ates

with

out r

egar

d to

thei

r na

tiona

lity,

al

thou

gh a

ll M

Ds

have

bee

n E

urop

ean:

Cam

ille G

utt (

from

Bel

gium

, 194

6-19

51);

Ivar

Roo

th (S

wed

en, 1

951-

1956

); P

er J

acob

sson

(Sw

eden

, 195

6-19

63);

Pie

rre-

Pau

l S

chw

eitz

er (F

ranc

e, 1

963-

1973

); H

. Joh

anne

s W

ittev

een

(Net

herla

nds,

197

3-19

78);

Jacq

ues

de L

aros

ière

(Fra

nce,

197

8-19

87);

Mic

hel C

amde

ssus

(Fra

nce,

198

7-20

00);

Hor

st K

öhle

r (G

erm

any,

200

0-20

04);

Rod

rigo

de R

ato

(Spa

in, 2

004-

2007

) an

d D

omin

ique

Str

auss

-Kah

n (F

ranc

e, 2

007-

2011

).

The

IMF’

s cu

rren

t lea

der,

Chr

istin

e La

gard

e (F

ranc

e, 2

011-

pres

ent),

is a

lso

its fi

rst

fem

ale

MD

.

The

MD

pos

ition

has

bee

n ac

com

pani

ed b

y its

sha

re o

f con

trov

ersy

. In

2000

, the

U

nite

d S

tate

s ch

alle

nged

the

Ger

man

nom

inat

ion

of C

aio

Koc

h-W

eser

, the

reby

tr

igge

ring

confl

ict:

Japa

n an

d de

velo

ping

cou

ntrie

s si

gnal

led

that

the

conv

entio

n w

as to

be

calle

d in

to q

uest

ion

(lack

of t

rans

pare

ncy

and

dela

ys in

app

oint

men

t ha

ve b

een

clos

ely

rela

ted

to th

e co

nven

tion)

. Lat

er, i

n 20

07, R

odrig

o de

Rat

o’s

resi

gnat

ion

halfw

ay th

roug

h hi

s te

rm d

ue to

per

sona

l rea

sons

sho

cked

the

orga

niza

tion.

And

his

suc

cess

or, D

omin

que

Str

auss

-Kah

n, re

sign

ed in

May

201

1 af

ter

bein

g ar

rest

ed.

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

It is

wid

ely

reco

gniz

ed t

hat,

to b

e ef

fect

ive,

the

IM

F go

vern

ance

str

uctu

re m

ust

repr

esen

t th

e in

tere

sts

of a

ll its

mem

bers

and

refl

ect

the

curr

ent

wor

ld e

cono

my.

Th

is w

as s

een

in th

e 20

06 re

form

s, w

hich

incl

uded

wid

e-ra

ngin

g qu

ota

real

ignm

ents

(in

crea

sing

the

vot

ing

pow

er o

f dyn

amic

em

ergi

ng-m

arke

t co

untr

ies,

con

sist

ent

with

th

eir g

row

ing

rela

tive

impo

rtan

ce in

the

wor

ld e

cono

my)

, a s

igni

fican

t inc

reas

e in

bas

ic

vote

s an

d a

chan

ge in

how

they

are

det

erm

ined

, to

prot

ect t

he v

otin

g po

wer

of s

mal

l an

d lo

w-in

com

e co

untr

ies.


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

Yes.

Ter

ms

of A

ppoi

ntm

ent f

or C

hris

tine

Laga

rde

wer

e pu

blis

hed

on

July

5, 2

011

in fo

rm o

f a p

ress

rele

ase.

148

The

Fund

’s A

rtic

les

of A

gree

men

t and

By-

Law

s of

fer

stan

dard

ized

job

desc

riptio

n fo

r E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s.14

9 Th

ere

are

also

com

plet

e TO

Rs

for

the

ethi

cs a

dvis

er,15

0 th

e om

buds

pers

on,15

1 an

d th

e In

depe

nden

t E

valu

atio

n O

ffice

.152

Bef

ore

2007

ther

e w

as n

o st

atem

ent o

f the

qu

aliti

es, e

xper

tise

and

expe

rienc

e th

at c

andi

date

s sh

ould

hav

e. T

he p

roce

ss im

prov

emen

ts s

tart

ed

with

the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

set

ting

out a

tim

etab

le a

nd

invi

ting

nom

inat

ions

from

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors

for

the

post

of M

D, a

nd in

terv

iew

ing

thos

e w

ho a

pplie

d.15

3

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

The

entir

e m

embe

rshi

p. A

ny IM

F m

embe

r, th

roug

h its

Gov

erno

r or

E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

, can

nom

inat

e a

cand

idat

e fo

r th

e po

st o

f Man

agin

g D

irect

or. A

ccor

ding

to th

e qu

ota

form

ula,

“th

e to

tal v

otes

of e

ach

mem

ber

shal

l be

equa

l to

the

sum

of i

ts b

asic

vot

es a

nd it

s qu

ota-

base

d vo

tes”

.154

In D

ecem

ber

2010

, the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs a

ppro

ved

a qu

ota

and

gove

rnan

ce re

form

that

is to

shi

ft m

ore

than

6%

of q

uota

sh

ares

to e

mer

ging

mar

ket a

nd p

rote

ct th

e qu

ota

shar

es a

nd v

otin

g po

wer

of t

he p

oore

st m

embe

rs.15

5

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Yes.

The

pro

cess

for

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

is p

art o

f the

foun

ding

A

rtic

les

of A

gree

men

t of t

he In

tern

atio

nal M

onet

ary

Fund

and

is

publ

ical

ly a

vaila

ble.

156

The

proc

edur

es a

nd ti

met

able

for

2011

sel

ectio

n of

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or w

ere

publ

ishe

d th

roug

h a

serie

s of

pre

ss

rele

ases

.157

Ther

e is

a n

omin

atio

n pe

riod,

follo

wed

by

shor

tlist

ing

of c

andi

date

s (in

cas

e th

ere

are

mor

e th

an th

ree)

by

a m

ajor

ity o

f vot

es c

ast b

y th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. O

nce

the

shor

tlist

is p

ublis

hed

24 E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s in

terv

iew

eac

h ca

ndid

ate.

Th

e ca

ndid

ates

then

mak

e st

atem

ents

to th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd (w

hich

are

pub

lishe

d), f

ollo

win

g by

a Q

&A

ses

sion

. The

Boa

rd th

en m

akes

the

final

se

lect

ion

trad

ition

ally

bas

ed o

n co

nsen

sus

(alth

ough

a

maj

ority

of v

otes

cas

t is

form

ally

requ

ired)

. The

se

lect

ed c

andi

date

is n

otifi

ed a

nd a

nnou

nced

pu

blic

ly, i

nclu

ding

the

hirin

g co

ntra

ct.

II.

The

lead

er h

as c

lear

per

form

ance

exp

ecta

tions

whi

ch a

re tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent w

ith M

O/IO

’s o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

and

whi

ch fa

cilit

ates

lead

ersh

ip

acco

unta

bilit

y

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

Yes.

The

resp

onsi

bilit

ies

of m

anag

emen

t of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion

are

divi

ded

betw

een

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or a

nd fo

ur D

eput

y M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

s (D

MD

s). E

ach

DM

D h

as a

pur

view

of c

ount

ries

and

subj

ect m

atte

rs fo

r w

hich

he/

she

is re

spon

sibl

e an

d ty

pica

lly o

vers

ees

the

inte

rnal

revi

ew

proc

ess

for

each

Boa

rd p

aper

and

cha

irs re

late

d B

oard

mee

tings

. In

addi

tion

to th

e co

untr

ies

and

subj

ects

und

er h

is/h

er p

urvi

ew, t

he F

irst

Dep

uty

Man

agin

g D

irect

or is

resp

onsi

ble

for

all i

ssue

s th

at a

re n

ot in

th

e pu

rvie

w o

f the

oth

er D

MD

s an

d as

sist

s th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

in

the

com

preh

ensi

ve o

vers

ight

of t

he in

stitu

tion.

The

Boa

rd a

lso

sets

ob

ject

ives

for

asse

ssin

g th

e pe

rform

ance

of t

he M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

(a

nd D

MD

s), a

nd s

uch

asse

ssm

ent t

akes

pla

ce a

nnua

lly.

Com

mitm

ents

are

som

etim

es m

ade

unof

ficia

lly a

nd

befo

re th

e se

lect

ion

is m

ade.

For

exa

mpl

e, J

acqu

es

de L

aros

ière

com

mitt

ed to

cha

ir th

e B

oard

mee

tings

pe

rson

ally

, and

he

kept

the

prom

ise.

158


2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

Yes.

Alth

ough

it is

n’t i

n th

e te

rms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ent.

Man

agin

g D

irect

or

pres

ents

thei

r go

als

and

visi

on to

the

inst

itutio

n’s

min

iste

rial p

olic

y ad

viso

ry c

omm

ittee

, the

IMFC

, tw

ice

a ye

ar in

the

Glo

bal P

olic

y A

gend

a.15

9 IM

FC d

iscu

sses

and

pro

vide

s its

vie

ws,

whi

ch a

re th

en

tran

slat

ed b

y th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

into

an

oper

atio

nally

poi

nted

set

of

pro

posa

ls a

s th

e S

tate

men

t on

the

Wor

k P

rogr

am o

f the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

, whi

ch is

dis

cuss

ed a

nd e

ndor

sed

by th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd.16

0

The

Wor

k P

rogr

am (t

wic

e a

year

) is

then

con

tinuo

usly

mon

itore

d by

the

MD

and

the

Boa

rd, a

nd re

vise

d in

ligh

t of d

evel

opm

ents

to e

nsur

e its

ef

fect

ive

impl

emen

tatio

n. T

he M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

and

the

man

agem

ent

team

ove

rsee

the

inst

itutio

n’s

Acc

ount

abilit

y Fr

amew

ork

to e

nsur

e th

at

seni

or m

anag

ers

(Dep

artm

ent H

eads

) mee

t the

str

ateg

ic g

oals

set

by

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or.

The

regu

lar

stru

ctur

ed d

iscu

ssio

ns b

etw

een

depa

rtm

ent d

irect

ors

and

man

agem

ent f

ocus

on

key

depa

rtm

enta

l obj

ectiv

es, i

nclu

ding

on

budg

et

and

hum

an re

sour

ce p

riorit

ies.

Dep

artm

enta

l ob

ject

ives

flow

from

the

annu

al s

tate

men

t of

Man

agem

ent’s

Key

Goa

ls, w

hich

is d

eriv

ed fr

om

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or’s

Glo

bal P

olic

y A

gend

a.

Man

agem

ent h

olds

sem

i-ann

ual d

iscu

ssio

ns w

ith

each

Dire

ctor

to d

iscu

ss p

rogr

ess

mad

e w

ith c

urre

nt

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

and

to re

view

per

form

ance

ag

ains

t bud

get a

nd p

eopl

e m

anag

emen

t ind

icat

ors.

N

ew g

oals

and

targ

ets

are

also

dis

cuss

ed fo

r th

e pe

riod

ahea

d. T

his

proc

ess

help

s im

prov

e de

part

men

tal a

lignm

ent t

o in

stitu

tiona

l prio

ritie

s an

d en

hanc

es c

olla

bora

tion

betw

een

depa

rtm

ents

by

spec

ifyin

g jo

int o

bjec

tives

, whi

le p

rom

otin

g m

ore

effe

ctiv

e m

anag

emen

t of b

udge

ts a

nd p

eopl

e.16

1

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. P

arag

raph

27

of th

e C

ode

of C

ondu

ct16

2 es

tabl

ishe

d th

e pr

inci

ple

that

“an

y st

aff m

embe

r w

ho c

onsi

ders

that

he

or s

he m

ight

be

in

a po

sitio

n of

act

ual o

r ap

pare

nt c

onfli

ct o

f int

eres

t sho

uld

disc

lose

th

e m

atte

r” to

his

or

her

supe

rvis

or o

r to

the

Com

plia

nce

Offi

cer.

Sub

mis

sion

of a

nnua

l fina

ncia

l cer

tifica

tion

form

is a

lso

part

of M

D’s

co

ntra

ct. T

he C

ode

of C

ondu

ct is

als

o co

nsid

ered

in th

e as

sign

men

t of

staf

f tas

ks, i

nclu

ding

that

a m

issi

on c

hief

/rev

iew

ed c

anno

t be

assi

gned

to

a c

ount

ry o

f whi

ch h

e/sh

e is

a n

atio

nal.

In a

dditi

on, t

he E

thic

s C

omm

ittee

of t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd d

eals

with

any

pos

sibl

e co

nflic

ts o

f in

tere

st a

mon

g E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s.

Acc

ordi

ng to

the

IEO

, the

Fun

d’s

gove

rnan

ce

fram

ewor

k is

not

wel

l des

igne

d to

iden

tify

actu

al

and

pote

ntia

l con

flict

s of

inte

rest

or

ethi

cal p

robl

ems

of th

e M

D.16

3 N

amel

y, th

ere

is n

o “w

hist

le-b

low

er”

prot

ectio

n fo

r pe

rson

s w

ho re

port

mis

cond

uct,

and,

in

par

ticul

ar, t

here

is n

o m

echa

nism

for

com

plai

nts

and

conc

erns

abo

ut E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s, th

e M

D, a

nd o

ther

sen

ior

offic

ers

that

gua

rant

ees

the

confi

dent

ialit

y of

the

sour

ce.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. T

he c

urre

nt M

D is

sub

ject

to th

e st

aff C

ode

of C

ondu

ct u

nder

the

term

s of

the

lett

er o

f app

oint

men

t. Th

ere

is a

Boa

rd E

thic

s C

omm

ittee

, w

hich

is s

epar

ate

from

Eth

ics

Offi

cer.16

4

As

the

IEO

not

es, i

t is

not c

lear

who

wou

ld b

e in

a

posi

tion

to a

pply

this

Cod

e to

the

MD

, giv

en th

at

thos

e re

spon

sibl

e fo

r its

app

licat

ion

repo

rt to

the

MD

.165


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Yes.

The

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

con

duct

s a

dire

ct A

nnua

l Per

form

ance

R

evie

w o

f the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or (a

nd D

MD

s), d

urin

g w

hich

MD

pr

ovid

es fe

edba

ck o

n he

r ow

n as

sess

men

t and

that

of t

he B

oard

in

the

sam

e co

ntex

t.166

This

ann

ual e

xerc

ise,

intr

oduc

ed in

200

9, is

bas

ed o

n a

defin

ed

fram

ewor

k. E

ach

year

, bot

h th

e B

oard

and

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or

spec

ify p

erfo

rman

ce o

bjec

tives

for

each

oth

er, a

gain

st w

hich

an

asse

ssm

ent i

s co

nduc

ted

in th

e fo

llow

ing

year

. In

cond

uctin

g th

is

exer

cise

, the

Boa

rd e

ach

year

app

oint

s a

wor

king

gro

up o

f five

E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s (w

ith g

eogr

aphi

cal r

epre

sent

atio

n) to

ove

rsee

the

proc

ess.

The

pro

cess

com

pris

es s

ever

al it

erat

ions

and

invo

lves

all

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

Chr

istin

e La

gard

e’s

term

s of

app

oint

men

t ide

ntify

a fi

xed

sala

ry o

f $4

67,9

40 p

er a

nnum

, whi

ch is

adj

uste

d by

the

incr

ease

in c

onsu

mer

pr

ice

inde

x in

the

grea

ter

Was

hing

ton

area

.167

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Yes.

IMF

orga

nize

s m

anag

eria

l cou

rses

; the

man

agem

ent t

eam

has

ac

cess

to th

em.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n p

roce

ss is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

The

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

, in

cons

ulta

tion

with

the

entir

e m

embe

rshi

p,

dete

rmin

es w

heth

er to

re-a

ppoi

nt th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

. In

doin

g so

, it

take

s an

acc

ount

of M

D’s

per

form

ance

.

Acc

ordi

ng to

IEO

, the

Boa

rd h

as th

us fa

r pl

ayed

on

ly a

pro

form

a ro

le in

sel

ectin

g M

Ds

and

rene

win

g th

eir

appo

intm

ents

, with

the

actu

al d

ecis

ion

bein

g m

ade

by a

sub

set o

f mem

ber

coun

trie

s’ a

utho

ritie

s th

roug

h an

opa

que

proc

ess.

168

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

In c

onsi

derin

g an

y re

-app

oint

men

t of t

he M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

, the

E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd, r

epre

sent

ing

the

mem

bers

hip,

con

side

rs a

ll op

tions

.A

ccor

ding

to IE

O, t

here

is n

o fo

rmal

pro

cess

for

sear

chin

g fo

r ca

ndid

ates

. The

con

vent

ion

that

the

gove

rnm

ents

of t

heir

coun

trie

s of

orig

in p

ropo

se

cand

idat

es h

as in

the

past

resu

lted

in s

ome

com

pete

nt p

ossi

ble

cand

idat

es n

ot b

eing

put

fo

rwar

d fo

r a

varie

ty o

f rea

sons

incl

udin

g do

mes

tic

polit

ical

fact

ors

or la

ck o

f ent

husi

asm

by

the

natio

nal

auth

oriti

es.16

9


V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Yes.

The

Man

agin

g D

irect

or p

rese

nts

her

Glo

bal P

olic

y A

gend

a,

outli

ning

the

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

of th

e in

stitu

tion,

twic

e pe

r ye

ar to

th

e m

inis

teria

l pol

icy

advi

sory

com

mitt

ee, t

he IM

FC, a

fter

clos

e co

nsul

tatio

n w

ith th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. S

houl

d ci

rcum

stan

ces

war

rant

, th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

can

act

qui

ckly

to c

onsu

lt w

ith th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd o

n re

finin

g th

e st

rate

gy in

the

inte

rim p

erio

d.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

The

Man

agin

g D

irect

or ro

utin

ely

cons

ults

with

the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

on

all s

trat

egic

mat

ters

. In

addi

tion,

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or o

ften

mee

ts w

ith s

enio

r po

licy

mak

ers

durin

g he

r tr

avel

to m

embe

r co

untr

ies

and

disc

usse

s th

e st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s of

the

inst

itutio

n, in

clud

ing

emer

ging

issu

es.17

0

The

EIO

sta

tes

that

ther

e ar

e al

so in

form

al p

ract

ices

th

at fa

cilit

ate

nego

tiatio

ns. E

.g.:

disc

ussi

ons

and

deci

sion

mak

ing

shift

out

of t

he B

oard

and

into

a

smal

ler

grou

p of

pol

icy

mak

ers

who

are

not

bou

nd

by v

otin

g ar

rang

emen

ts o

r fo

rmal

pro

cedu

res;

thei

r di

alog

ue ta

kes

plac

e th

roug

h co

nfer

ence

cal

ls a

nd

priv

ate

mee

tings

whe

re o

ffici

al m

inut

es a

re r

arel

y ke

pt.17

1

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Sup

plem

enta

ry fi

nanc

ing

arra

ngem

ents

exi

st b

etw

een

the

IMF

and

a su

bset

of m

embe

rs. P

rimar

y am

ong

thes

e ar

e th

e N

ew A

rran

gem

ents

to

Bor

row

bet

wee

n th

e IM

F an

d 38

mem

ber

coun

trie

s. T

here

is s

ome

disc

retio

nary

bud

get o

n te

chni

cal a

ssis

tanc

e: 4

0% ($

107

milli

on, 4

6%

of e

xter

nal fi

nanc

ing

over

199

0-20

12 p

erio

d is

Jap

anes

e) o

f IM

F’s

budg

et d

evel

opm

ent a

nd m

ore

than

70%

of fi

eld

deliv

ery.

Som

e fu

nds

are

cont

rolle

d by

all

mem

bers

hip,

for

exam

ple

the

Pov

erty

Red

uctio

n an

d G

row

th F

acilit

y (P

RG

F).

The

finan

cing

mad

e av

aila

ble

to th

e IM

F un

der

such

cr

edit

arra

ngem

ents

are

inte

nded

to b

e av

aila

ble

to

any

mem

ber

coun

try

if ne

eded

.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

The

re a

re p

erio

dic

IMF-

wid

e st

aff s

urve

ys o

n a

wid

e ra

nge

of

issu

es, w

ith th

e m

ost r

ecen

t con

duct

ed in

201

3. T

he m

anag

emen

t te

am s

hare

s its

resu

lts d

irect

ly w

ith a

ll th

e st

aff (

but d

oes

not p

ublic

ly

publ

ish

them

).

Ther

e is

an

inte

nse

follo

w-u

p w

ith s

taff,

incl

udin

g to

wn

hall

mee

tings

with

all

staf

f, an

d ac

tion

plan

s on

a w

ide

varie

ty o

f spe

cific

issu

es a

re d

evel

oped

, im

plem

ente

d, a

nd m

onito

red

clos

ely.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

The

man

agem

ent t

eam

is a

sses

sed

on a

ll is

sues

. In

the

MD

’s s

elf-

asse

ssm

ent m

anag

emen

t of s

taff

is a

n im

port

ant e

lem

ent.17

2


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

The

annu

al re

port

men

tions

IMF

coop

erat

ion

with

labo

ur g

roup

s (m

ostly

, tho

ugh

disc

ussi

ons)

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns (t

hrou

gh c

onfe

renc

es, m

eetin

gs, s

emin

ars

and

fello

wsh

ip p

rogr

amm

e th

at c

ould

cou

nt a

s lim

ited

inst

itutio

naliz

atio

n), a

cade

mia

(aca

dem

ic fe

llow

ship

pro

gram

me)

, as

wel

l as

legi

slat

ors.

The

IMF

Man

agin

g D

irect

or a

nd th

e W

orld

Ban

k P

resi

dent

als

o ho

ld a

civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns to

wn

hall

mee

ting

durin

g th

e A

nnua

l Mee

tings

.

Mor

e re

cent

ly, t

he IM

F ha

s in

crea

sed

its

enga

gem

ent w

ith la

bour

gro

ups.

Sin

ce 2

010,

co

llabo

ratio

n be

twee

n th

e IM

F an

d th

e In

tern

atio

nal

Labo

ur O

rgan

izat

ion

(ILO

) has

not

icea

bly

incr

ease

d,

with

gre

ater

focu

s on

soc

ial p

rote

ctio

n flo

ors,

na

tiona

l soc

ial d

ialo

gue,

and

rese

arch

on

jobs

an

d gr

owth

. The

IMF

enga

ges

with

the

ITU

C o

n a

regu

lar

basi

s, a

nd th

e tw

o or

gani

zatio

ns h

old

annu

al

disc

ussi

ons

with

repr

esen

tativ

es o

f nat

iona

l lab

our

unio

ns. T

he IM

F al

so re

gula

rly e

ngag

es w

ith g

loba

l m

edia

and

hol

ds re

gula

r pr

ess

brie

fings

on

coun

try

and

polic

y m

atte

rs.17

3

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

the

lead

er th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

The

Inde

pend

ent E

valu

atio

n O

ffice

(IEO

) was

est

ablis

hed

in 2

001

to c

ondu

ct o

bjec

tive

eval

uatio

ns o

f Fun

d po

licie

s an

d ac

tiviti

es. U

nder

its

Term

s of

Ref

eren

ce, i

t is

fully

inde

pend

ent f

rom

the

Man

agem

ent o

f the

IMF

and

oper

ates

at a

rm’s

leng

th fr

om th

e B

oard

of E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s. It

pub

lishe

s on

e re

port

a y

ear

on a

spe

cific

IM

F po

licy

(role

of I

MF

as tr

uste

d ad

vise

r, in

tern

atio

nal r

eser

ves,

rese

arch

at t

he IM

F). A

s in

dica

ted

in th

e te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

IEO

,174

it en

gage

s w

ith e

xecu

tive

man

agem

ent,

the

boar

d an

d th

e st

aff w

hen

they

“re

spon

d to

re

leva

nt p

arts

of t

he e

valu

atio

n”.17

5 Fr

om a

mor

e op

erat

iona

l ang

le, t

he O

ffice

of I

nter

nal A

udit

and

Insp

ectio

n in

depe

nden

tly e

xam

ines

the

effe

ctiv

enes

s of

the

risk

man

agem

ent,

cont

rol,

and

gove

rnan

ce p

roce

sses

of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion.

Eac

h ye

ar, O

IA

cond

ucts

aud

its a

nd re

view

s, w

hich

incl

ude

finan

cial

aud

its, i

nfor

mat

ion

tech

nolo

gy a

udits

, and

ope

ratio

nal

and

effe

ctiv

enes

s au

dits

. OIA

may

als

o pr

ovid

e co

nsul

ting

serv

ices

, e.g

., he

lp id

entif

y co

ntro

ls fo

r ne

w

proc

esse

s. T

he o

vera

ll pu

rpos

e is

to e

nsur

e th

at th

e IM

F op

erat

es in

line

with

bes

t int

erna

tiona

l pra

ctic

es.

The

IMF

also

con

duct

s re

gula

r an

d ex

tens

ive

inte

rnal

sel

f-as

sess

men

ts o

f its

wor

k. T

here

is a

com

preh

ensi

ve

inte

rnal

revi

ew p

roce

ss fo

r al

l IM

F do

cum

ents

, pol

icy

anal

ysis

, and

lend

ing

oper

atio

ns, w

hich

beg

ins

with

an

inte

rdep

artm

enta

l sta

ff re

view

. Man

agem

ent i

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r th

e fin

al c

lear

ance

of a

ll of

ficia

l doc

umen

ts

befo

re is

suan

ce to

, and

con

side

ratio

n by

, the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

. The

reaf

ter,

mos

t doc

umen

ts a

re p

ublis

hed.

E

xam

ples

of i

nter

nal s

elf-

asse

ssm

ent i

nclu

de e

x po

st a

sses

smen

ts/e

valu

atio

ns o

f fina

ncia

l pro

gram

mes

(for

ex

ampl

e, a

rece

nt a

sses

smen

t of t

he G

reec

e pr

ogra

mm

e).17

6


f. In

tern

atio

nal O

rgan

izat

ion

for

Mig

ratio

n (IO

M)

Org

aniz

atio

n IO

M w

orks

with

par

tner

s to

sup

port

sta

tes

in m

eetin

g th

e gr

owin

g op

erat

iona

l ch

alle

nges

of m

igra

tion

gove

rnan

ce; a

dvan

ce u

nder

stan

ding

of m

igra

tion

issu

es;

enco

urag

e so

cial

and

eco

nom

ic d

evel

opm

ent t

hrou

gh m

igra

tion;

and

uph

old

the

wel

l-bei

ng a

nd h

uman

rig

hts

of m

igra

nts.

IOM

has

a lo

ng-s

tand

ing,

ext

ensi

ve a

nd c

lose

ly c

oord

inat

ed w

orki

ng re

latio

nshi

p w

ith th

e U

N, a

t pol

icy

and

oper

atio

nal l

evel

s. A

t the

ope

ratio

nal l

evel

, IO

M c

hief

s of

mis

sion

par

ticip

ate

in h

uman

itaria

n co

untr

y te

ams

and

in v

irtua

lly a

ll U

N c

ount

ry

team

s. IO

M c

ontr

ibut

es to

sys

tem

-wid

e op

erat

ions

thro

ugh

its p

artic

ipat

ion

in th

e In

ter-

Age

ncy

Sta

ndin

g C

omm

ittee

(IA

SC

), an

d is

an

activ

e pa

rtne

r, le

ad a

nd c

o-le

ad in

sev

eral

clu

ster

s in

man

y co

untr

ies

arou

nd th

e w

orld

.

At t

he g

loba

l lev

el, t

he U

nite

d N

atio

ns H

igh

Com

mis

sion

er fo

r R

efug

ees

and

IOM

ar

e th

e ca

mp

coor

dina

tion

and

cam

p m

anag

emen

t co-

clus

ter

lead

age

ncie

s.

At t

he p

olic

y le

vel,

IOM

was

cha

ir of

the

Glo

bal M

igra

tion

Gro

up in

the

seco

nd

sem

este

r of

201

3, le

adin

g th

e gr

oup’

s pr

epar

atio

ns fo

r th

e se

cond

UN

Hig

h-Le

vel

Dia

logu

e on

Mig

ratio

n an

d D

evel

opm

ent.

From

201

1 to

201

3, th

e IO

M d

irect

or-

gene

ral (

DG

) led

sys

tem

-wid

e ef

fort

s to

sup

port

pre

vent

ion

of s

exua

l exp

loita

tion

and

abus

e (P

SE

A) a

s th

e P

SE

A c

ham

pion

. Int

er-in

stitu

tiona

l coo

pera

tion

is

mai

ntai

ned

by IO

M’s

hea

dqua

rter

s; th

e pe

rman

ent o

bser

ver

in N

ew Y

ork,

thro

ugh

ongo

ing

liais

on w

ith th

e U

N s

ecre

taria

t; an

d sp

ecia

l lia

ison

mis

sion

s in

the

field

. Tw

enty

-six

UN

age

ncie

s ar

e re

pres

ente

d in

IOM

as

Obs

erve

rs.

Go

vern

ance

The

IOM

Cou

ncil,

com

pris

ing

repr

esen

tativ

es o

f 157

mem

ber

stat

es, d

eter

min

es,

exam

ines

and

revi

ews

polic

ies,

pro

gram

mes

and

act

iviti

es, a

nd re

view

s an

d ap

prov

es th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

budg

et, e

xpen

ditu

res

and

acco

unts

. As

the

high

est

auth

ority

, the

cou

ncil

revi

ews

the

repo

rts,

and

app

rove

s an

d di

rect

s th

e ac

tiviti

es,

of it

s su

bsid

iary

bod

ies.

Mee

ting

regu

larly

at i

ts a

nnua

l ses

sion

and

in s

peci

al

sess

ions

, the

cou

ncil

may

adm

it no

n-m

embe

r st

ates

upo

n th

eir

appl

icat

ion.

It m

ay

also

adm

it in

tern

atio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

and

civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns to

par

ticip

ate

in it

s se

ssio

ns a

s no

n-vo

ting

obse

rver

s. P

repa

ratio

ns fo

r co

unci

l ses

sion

s ar

e m

ade

thro

ugh

othe

r go

vern

ing

body

str

uctu

res,

incl

udin

g th

e st

andi

ng c

omm

ittee

on

pro

gram

mes

and

fina

nce

(SC

PF)

, inf

orm

al c

onsu

ltatio

ns a

nd w

orki

ng g

roup

s.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFi

ve y

ears

; ren

ewab

le o

nce.

Inco

me

Refl

ectin

g IO

M’s

exp

ansi

on, t

he o

rgan

izat

ion’

s bu

dget

reac

hed

$1.3

billi

on in

201

3,

the

fifth

-con

secu

tive

year

of g

row

th.17

7

Num

ber

of

staf

fA

ppro

xim

atel

y 8,

500

glob

ally

, with

mor

e th

an 4

80 fi

eld

loca

tions

.178

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipW

hen

sele

ctin

g th

e D

G, m

embe

r st

ates

hav

e tr

aditi

onal

ly e

lect

ed th

e ca

ndid

ate

nom

inat

ed b

y IO

M’s

larg

est d

onor

cou

ntry

, with

one

exc

eptio

n: B

astia

an H

avem

an,

Net

herla

nds

(196

1-19

69).

IOM

’s le

ader

ship

com

pris

es a

dep

uty

dire

ctor

-gen

eral

(D

DG

), w

ho is

als

o an

ele

cted

offi

cial

.

Pas

t lea

ders

of I

OM

and

its

pred

eces

sor

orga

niza

tions

wer

e: H

ugh

Gib

son

(from

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

195

2-19

54);

Har

old

Titt

man

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

195

5-19

58);

Mar

cus

Dal

y (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

958-

1961

); B

astia

an H

avem

an (N

ethe

rland

s, 1

961-

1969

); Jo

hn

Thom

as (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

969-

1979

); Ja

mes

Car

lin (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

979-

1988

) and

B

runs

on M

cKin

ley

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

199

8-20

08).

The

curr

ent l

eade

r is

Willi

am S

win

g (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 2

008-

pres

ent).

179

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Afte

r ta

king

offi

ce,

Sw

ing

emba

rked

on

a st

ruct

ural

rev

iew

tha

t co

nsol

idat

ed I

OM

’s

field

str

uctu

res

and

ensu

red

grea

ter c

oher

ence

at h

eadq

uart

ers;

180 i

ncre

ased

the

core

fu

ndin

g;18

1 an

d st

reng

then

ed in

tern

al c

ontr

ols

by e

stab

lishi

ng a

n au

dit

and

over

sigh

t co

mm

ittee

.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/ter

ms

of re

fere

nce

for

the

lead

er o

nlin

e?Ye

s. T

he IO

M C

onst

itutio

n, w

hich

is a

vaila

ble

onlin

e, o

utlin

es th

e D

G’s

fu

nctio

ns. A

ccou

ntab

le to

the

Cou

ncil,

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

form

ulat

es

prop

osal

s re

late

d to

the

adm

inis

trat

ive

and

exec

utiv

e fu

nctio

ns o

f IO

M, i

n ac

cord

ance

with

the

Con

stitu

tion

and

Cou

ncil

polic

ies

and

deci

sion

s.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

of th

e le

ader

?

Spe

cial

Cou

ncil

Ses

sion

s in

vite

all

votin

g M

embe

r S

tate

s to

par

ticip

ate

in th

e el

ectio

n pr

oces

s. T

he D

irect

or-G

ener

al a

nd th

e D

eput

y D

irect

or-

Gen

eral

(DD

G) a

re e

lect

ed b

y a

two-

third

s m

ajor

ity o

f all

part

icip

atin

g vo

ting

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

of th

e C

ounc

il.18

2 Th

e C

onst

itutio

n ou

tline

s th

e cr

iteria

for

Mem

ber

Sta

tes’

loss

of v

otin

g rig

hts.

A M

embe

r S

tate

w

hich

is in

arr

ears

in th

e pa

ymen

t of i

ts fi

nanc

ial c

ontr

ibut

ions

to th

e O

rgan

izat

ion

lose

s its

vot

ing

right

if th

e am

ount

of i

ts a

rrea

rs e

qual

s or

exc

eeds

the

amou

nt o

f the

con

trib

utio

ns d

ue in

the

prec

edin

g tw

o ye

ars.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

ies

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes.

The

pro

cess

of D

G a

nd D

DG

sel

ectio

n is

det

aile

d in

the

Con

stitu

tion,

whi

ch is

ava

ilabl

e on

line.

Add

ition

al e

lem

ents

for

the

elec

tion

of th

e le

ader

ship

, ado

pted

by

the

Cou

ncil

on 3

0 N

ovem

ber

2007

, stip

ulat

e th

e re

quire

men

t tha

t the

nom

inat

ion

of c

andi

date

s be

pr

esen

ted

by M

embe

r S

tate

s to

the

Cou

ncil

Cha

irper

son

no la

ter

than

tw

o m

onth

s pr

ior

to th

e el

ectio

ns.

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

the

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

acc

ount

abilit

y

1D

oes

the

lead

er s

et c

lear

pe

rform

ance

exp

ecta

tions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent

and

cons

iste

nt?

Yes.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

’s a

ccep

tanc

e sp

eech

to th

e C

ounc

il up

on

elec

tion

outli

nes

the

over

arch

ing

prio

ritie

s fo

r th

e m

anda

te a

head

. The

D

irect

or-G

ener

al re

port

s bi

annu

ally

--

to th

e C

ounc

il an

d to

the

SC

PF

-- o

n th

e pe

rform

ance

of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion

unde

r hi

s le

ader

ship

. The

re

port

spe

cifie

s ho

w th

e w

ork

of th

e O

rgan

izat

ion

rela

tes

to e

ach

of

the

poin

ts o

f the

IOM

Str

ateg

y es

tabl

ishe

d by

the

Cou

ncil.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of t

he

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear

stra

tegy

?

Yes

– m

anda

ted

by th

e C

ounc

il, IO

M h

as p

roce

sses

that

est

ablis

h ac

tion

plan

s of

the

Org

aniz

atio

n’s

Str

ateg

y. T

he R

egio

nal S

trat

egie

s ar

e op

erat

iona

l too

ls th

at il

lust

rate

how

the

glob

al IO

M S

trat

egy

(12-

Poi

nt S

trat

egy)

is im

plem

ente

d at

the

regi

onal

leve

l. Tw

o co

ordi

natin

g co

mm

ittee

s fo

r m

anag

emen

t coo

rdin

atio

n (M

CC

) and

po

licy

form

ulat

ion

(PFC

C) f

acilit

ate

cohe

renc

e, c

omm

unic

atio

n an

d co

oper

atio

n be

twee

n H

eadq

uart

ers

and

the

Fiel

d an

d en

hanc

e th

e qu

ality

of d

ecis

ion-

mak

ing

and

com

plia

nce

thro

ugho

ut th

e O

rgan

izat

ion.

The

Sen

ior

Man

agem

ent T

eam

join

s fo

r a

bien

nial

retr

eat

to re

view

and

ope

ratio

naliz

e m

ulti-

annu

al o

rgan

izat

iona

l goa

ls w

ith

targ

ets.

In a

ltern

atin

g ye

ars,

the

DG

con

vene

s a

Glo

bal C

hief

s of

M

issi

on m

eetin

g, w

here

Fie

ld a

nd H

Q c

omm

unic

ate

and

cons

ult o

n ke

y in

stitu

tiona

l prio

ritie

s an

d ch

alle

nges

.


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s, th

e D

G, t

he D

DG

and

all

IOM

sta

ff ar

e re

quire

d to

dec

lare

any

co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t. Th

e C

onst

itutio

n st

ipul

ates

that

in th

e pe

rform

ance

of

thei

r du

ties,

thes

e sh

all n

eith

er s

eek

nor

rece

ive

inst

ruct

ions

from

an

ext

erna

l aut

horit

y. A

ll em

ploy

men

t by

IOM

is s

ubje

ct to

sig

natu

re

of a

dec

lara

tion

to th

is e

ffect

. The

Eth

ics

and

Con

duct

Offi

ce p

rovi

des

advi

ce o

n re

ques

t for

invo

lvem

ent i

n an

y ac

tivity

out

side

IOM

that

may

in

volv

e a

confl

ict o

f int

eres

t.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?A

ll em

ploy

men

t in

IOM

is s

ubje

ct to

a s

igne

d co

mm

itmen

t to

adhe

re

to th

e IO

M S

tand

ard

of C

ondu

ct. A

ll IO

M s

taff

mem

bers

hav

e an

ob

ligat

ion

to re

port

any

alle

ged

viol

atio

ns to

the

Eth

ics

and

Con

duct

O

ffice

, who

man

ages

refe

rral

s co

ncer

ning

alle

gatio

ns o

f mis

cond

uct

and

unet

hica

l beh

avio

ur.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

The

DG

repo

rts

regu

larly

to M

embe

r S

tate

s an

d gi

ves

a fu

ll ac

coun

t of

the

orga

niza

tion’

s pr

ogra

mm

atic

and

fina

ncia

l per

form

ance

s in

m

eetin

gs o

f the

Gov

erni

ng B

odie

s.

2A

re re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

The

DG

’s re

mun

erat

ion

is d

eter

min

ed b

y th

e C

ounc

il, b

ased

on

the

UN

pa

y sc

ale

and

fixed

for

the

entir

e du

ratio

n of

his

man

date

. 183

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Yes.

IOM

has

a s

taff

and

deve

lopm

ent p

rogr

amm

e w

hich

pro

vide

s co

achi

ng a

nd d

evel

opm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to th

e D

G, D

DG

and

oth

er

staf

f mem

bers

.

IV.

Re-

elec

tion

of th

e le

ader

is b

ased

on

tran

spar

ent p

roce

sses

and

met

rics

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

The

perfo

rman

ce is

sub

ject

to th

e cr

iteria

est

ablis

hed

by e

ach

of th

e vo

ting

coun

trie

s in

divi

dual

ly. R

e-el

ectio

n, li

ke th

e in

itial

ele

ctio

n, is

de

term

ined

by

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

thro

ugh

an e

lect

ion

proc

ess.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

Fol

low

ing

the

proc

ess,

all

nom

inat

ed c

andi

date

s ar

e co

nsid

ered

.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Yes.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

put

s in

to a

ctio

n, v

aryi

ng th

e em

phas

is

as a

ppro

pria

te to

circ

umst

ance

s, th

e IO

M S

trat

egy

esta

blis

hed

by

Mem

ber

Sta

tes.

Mor

eove

r, th

e IO

M C

onst

itutio

n re

ques

ts th

e D

G to

‘fo

rmul

ate

prop

osal

s fo

r ap

prop

riate

act

ion

by th

e C

ounc

il’, p

ropo

sals

th

at h

ave

incl

uded

new

str

ateg

ic im

pera

tives

. 184

2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

Yes,

the

DG

impl

emen

ts n

ew s

trat

egic

prio

ritie

s in

con

sulta

tion

with

in

IOM

, the

Org

aniz

atio

n’s

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

as w

ell a

s re

leva

nt p

artn

ers.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

an

d co

ntro

lled

by a

sub

set o

f the

full

mem

bers

hip?

3% o

f IO

M’s

ann

ual b

udge

t com

es fr

om a

sses

sed

cont

ribut

ions

and

is

use

d to

cov

er th

e co

re s

truc

ture

. The

ope

ratio

nal p

art o

f the

bud

get

(97%

) is

prov

ided

by

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

and

othe

r do

nors

for

spec

ific

proj

ects

that

fall

unde

r IO

M’s

man

date

and

str

ateg

y –

both

of w

hich

ar

e es

tabl

ishe

d th

ough

a u

nani

mou

s de

cisi

on o

f the

Mem

ber S

tate

s. 1

85

IOM

als

o m

anag

es s

peci

al fu

nds

who

se c

riter

ia a

nd p

roce

dure

s ar

e es

tabl

ishe

d by

the

full

mem

bers

hip.

The

se fu

nds

allo

w s

wift

resp

onse

s to

em

erge

ncie

s w

hile

wai

ting

for

fund

ing

to b

e cl

eare

d (M

igra

tion

Em

erge

ncy

Fund

ing

Mec

hani

sm) o

r to

ass

ist v

ulne

rabl

e m

igra

nts

who

wou

ld n

ot b

e el

igib

le u

nder

oth

er fu

ndin

g m

echa

nism

s (G

loba

l A

ssis

tanc

e Fu

nd fo

r V

ictim

s of

Tra

ffick

ing)

. In

addi

tion,

the

IOM

D

evel

opm

ent F

und

seed

s in

nova

tive

pilo

t pro

ject

s.

Som

e re

spon

dent

s ha

ve n

oted

that

this

fund

ing

stru

ctur

e in

fluen

ces

IOM

’s a

ctiv

ities

. 186

For

inst

ance

on

e U

K D

FID

repo

rt, n

oted

that

as

IOM

is a

‘p

roje

ctis

ed o

rgan

isat

ion’

the

UK

‘onl

y se

ek[s

] to

influ

ence

[it]

on a

pro

ject

bas

is’.18

7

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

IOM

has

car

ried

out a

num

ber

of s

urve

ys, m

ost n

otab

ly th

e “G

loba

l Sta

ff S

atis

fact

ion

Sur

vey”

. It i

s al

so c

arry

ing

out a

revi

ew o

f its

or

gani

zatio

nal r

estr

uctu

ring

whi

ch in

clud

es s

urve

ys to

sta

ff m

embe

rs.

IOM

als

o us

es o

rgan

izat

ion-

wid

e an

onl

ine

staf

f eva

luat

ion

surv

ey,

as o

ne o

f DG

’s p

riorit

ies

will

cont

inue

to b

e “s

taff

prof

essi

onal

ism

”. In

ad

ditio

n, IO

M h

as a

sm

all t

eam

focu

sing

on

tale

nt m

anag

emen

t in

the

orga

niza

tion.

The

lead

ersh

ip h

olds

regu

lar

cons

ulta

tions

with

the

Sta

ff A

ssoc

iatio

n C

omm

ittee

.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

The

DG

set

s pr

iorit

ies

for

coac

hing

of s

taff.

He

has

been

invo

lved

with

th

e tr

aini

ng o

f new

Chi

efs

of M

issi

on b

y ar

ticul

atin

g IO

M’s

vis

ion

and

hold

s re

gula

r op

en d

ialo

gues

with

sta

ff.18

8

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

Yes.

One

of D

G S

win

g’s

prio

ritie

s re

volv

es a

roun

d th

e th

eme

of “

part

ners

hips

”. IO

M is

a p

erm

anen

t obs

erve

r to

th

e U

N a

nd a

sta

ndin

g in

vite

e to

IAS

C m

eetin

gs. T

he O

rgan

izat

ion

is a

mem

ber

of th

e G

loba

l Mig

ratio

n G

roup

, th

e pr

inci

pal i

nter

-age

ncy

coor

dina

tion

mec

hani

sm o

n m

igra

tion,

and

wor

ks c

lose

ly w

ith th

e G

loba

l For

um fo

r M

igra

tion

and

Dev

elop

men

t (G

FMD

), in

clud

ing

thro

ugh

supp

ort t

o th

e G

roup

’s S

ecre

taria

t and

the

Foru

m’s

S

uppo

rt U

nit.

IOM

hol

ds re

gula

r co

nsul

tatio

ns w

ith p

artn

er N

GO

s an

d ho

sts

an a

nnua

l glo

bal c

ivil

soci

ety

cons

ulta

tion

in H

Q. T

he O

rgan

izat

ion

prov

ides

sub

stan

tive

and

logi

stic

al s

uppo

rt to

regi

onal

coo

pera

tion

mec

hani

sms

on m

igra

tion

invo

lvin

g a

broa

d ra

nge

of s

tate

and

non

-sta

te s

take

hold

ers.

In re

cent

yea

rs, t

he

Org

aniz

atio

n ha

s pl

aced

gre

ater

em

phas

is o

n ou

trea

ch to

the

priv

ate

sect

or.

VIII

.Th

e IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

the

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

Yes,

bot

h ex

tern

al a

nd in

tern

al. I

OM

’s O

ffice

of t

he In

spec

tor

Gen

eral

con

trib

utes

to th

e ov

ersi

ght o

f the

O

rgan

izat

ion,

thro

ugh

its fu

nctio

ns o

f int

erna

l aud

it, e

valu

atio

n, r

apid

ass

essm

ent a

nd in

vest

igat

ion.

An

exte

rnal

aud

itor,

repo

rtin

g to

the

mem

bers

hip,

car

ries

out p

erfo

rman

ce a

udits

and

exa

min

es th

e an

nual

fin

anci

al s

tate

men

ts o

f IO

M, i

n re

latio

n to

acc

epte

d in

tern

atio

nal a

uditi

ng s

tand

ard.

In a

dditi

on to

that

, an

Aud

it an

d O

vers

ight

Adv

isor

y C

omm

ittee

(AO

AC

), es

tabl

ishe

d to

incr

ease

the

tran

spar

ency

and

acc

ount

abilit

y of

IOM

, is

com

pose

d of

five

mem

bers

sel

ecte

d by

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

that

repo

rt a

nnua

lly to

the

SC

PF.

Fin

ally

, ex

tern

al e

valu

atio

ns c

ondu

cted

on

the

requ

est o

f don

ors

are

liste

d on

the

web

site

and

ava

ilabl

e up

on

requ

est.18

9


e. U

nite

d N

atio

ns D

evel

op

men

t P

rog

ram

me

(UN

DP

)

Org

aniz

atio

nA

s th

e U

N’s

larg

est a

nd le

ad d

evel

opm

ent a

ctor

, the

UN

DP

’s m

issi

on is

to

assi

st c

ount

ries

to “

achi

eve

sust

aina

ble

hum

an d

evel

opm

ent”

. Its

four

cor

e ar

eas

are:

the

mille

nniu

m d

evel

opm

ent g

oals

and

pov

erty

redu

ctio

n; d

emoc

ratic

go

vern

ance

; env

ironm

ent a

nd e

nerg

y; a

nd c

risis

pre

vent

ion

and

reco

very

.190

Go

vern

ance

The

UN

DP

has

an

exec

utiv

e bo

ard

of 3

6 st

ates

, whi

ch s

erve

on

a ro

tatin

g ba

sis

unde

r th

e au

thor

ity o

f the

Eco

nom

ic a

nd S

ocia

l Cou

ncil

(EC

OS

OC

).191

The

boar

d is

resp

onsi

ble

for

prov

idin

g po

licy

guid

ance

, mon

itorin

g pe

rform

ance

and

de

cidi

ng o

n ad

min

istr

ativ

e an

d fin

anci

al p

lans

.192

Sin

ce 2

001,

the

boar

d ha

s he

ld

two

regu

lar

sess

ions

and

an

annu

al s

essi

on e

ach

year

.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFo

ur y

ears

; can

be

rene

wed

twic

e.

Inco

me

The

UN

DP

’s in

com

e fro

m a

ll co

ntrib

utio

ns w

as $

4.64

billi

on in

201

2.19

3

Num

ber

of

staf

f8,

000.

194

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipTh

e U

ND

P a

dmin

istr

ator

was

trad

ition

ally

an

Am

eric

an, n

omin

ated

by

the

US

go

vern

men

t and

reco

mm

ende

d by

the

UN

sec

reta

ry-g

ener

al (S

G) t

o th

e G

ener

al

Ass

embl

y. T

his

chan

ged

in 1

999,

whe

n M

ark

Mal

loch

Bro

wn

(Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

) be

cam

e ad

min

istr

ator

. The

sub

sequ

ent a

dmin

istr

ator

was

from

Tur

key,

and

the

curr

ent o

ne is

from

New

Zea

land

.

Pas

t lea

ders

of t

he U

ND

P w

ere:

Pau

l Hof

fman

(fro

m th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

966-

1972

); R

udol

ph P

eter

son

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

197

2-19

76);

Fran

k M

orse

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

197

6-19

86);

Willi

am D

rape

r (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

986-

1993

; Jam

es G

us

Spe

th (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

993-

1999

); G

eorg

e M

allo

ch B

row

n (U

nite

d K

ingd

om,

1999

-200

5) a

nd K

emal

Der

vis

(Tur

key,

200

5-20

09).

The

curr

ent l

eade

r is

Hel

en C

lark

(New

Zea

land

, 200

9-pr

esen

t).

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

In A

pril

2011

, Cla

rk la

unch

ed a

n “a

gend

a fo

r or

gani

zatio

nal c

hang

e”,19

5 se

ekin

g to

en

hanc

e or

gani

zatio

nal e

ffect

iven

ess

by im

prov

ing

UN

DP

’s s

trat

egic

pla

nnin

g an

d or

gani

zatio

nal p

erfo

rman

ce. C

lark

intr

oduc

ed th

e an

nual

bus

ines

s pl

an in

201

2,

whe

re o

rgan

izat

iona

l goa

ls “

casc

aded

” to

uni

t wor

k pl

ans

in o

rder

to s

tren

gthe

n al

ignm

ent o

f act

ions

and

reso

urce

s.19

6 Th

e U

ND

P w

as r

anke

d in

the

top

10 o

f 72

orga

niza

tions

in th

e 20

12 A

id T

rans

pare

ncy

Inde

x.19

7

Cla

rk w

as re

-ele

cted

in A

pril

2013

for

a se

cond

four

-yea

r te

rm, a

nd in

201

4 sh

e la

unch

ed a

ser

ies

of h

uman

reso

urce

refo

rms.

The

se in

clud

ed re

duci

ng s

taff

at

head

quar

ters

and

regi

onal

leve

ls b

y 10

%; r

ever

sing

the

staf

f dis

trib

utio

n ra

tio s

o th

at

60%

of e

mpl

oyee

s w

ould

be

base

d at

regi

onal

and

cou

ntry

offi

ces,

and

40%

at t

he

New

Yor

k he

adqu

arte

rs; a

nd in

tegr

atin

g po

licy

and

supp

ort-

prog

ram

me

effo

rts

into

a

sing

le b

urea

u to

redu

ce s

taffi

ng c

osts

.198


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/ter

ms

of re

fere

nce

for

the

lead

er o

nlin

e?Th

ere

are

no p

ublic

ally

acc

essi

ble

term

s of

refe

renc

e on

line

for

the

lead

ersh

ip.19

9 U

ND

P’s

foun

ding

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y re

solu

tions

do

not

outli

ne th

e A

dmin

istr

ator

’s fu

nctio

ns.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip e

lect

ion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

The

Adm

inis

trat

or is

offi

cial

ly a

ppoi

nted

by

the

UN

Sec

reta

ry G

ener

al

(SG

), in

col

labo

ratio

n w

ith th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd, a

nd th

en c

onfir

med

by

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y fo

r a

term

of f

our

year

s.20

0 O

ffici

ally

all

mem

ber

stat

es o

f the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y ha

ve a

say

.

How

ever

, unt

il 19

99 th

e U

S P

resi

dent

pro

pose

d th

e U

ND

P A

dmin

istr

ator

, who

m th

e S

G th

en

reco

mm

ende

d to

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y fo

r co

nfirm

atio

n.20

1 K

ofi A

nnan

intr

oduc

ed a

new

, mor

e m

erit-

base

d an

d op

en s

elec

tion

proc

ess.

202

The

la

rges

t don

or s

tate

s ha

ve te

nded

to h

ave

the

mos

t in

fluen

ce o

n th

e S

G’s

dec

isio

n.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

elec

tion

of

the

lead

er th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Ther

e is

no

form

aliz

ed p

roce

ss o

ffici

ally

doc

umen

ted.

Ann

an’s

new

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s in

trod

uced

: fo

rmat

ion

of s

peci

alis

t sea

rch

sele

ctio

n co

mm

ittee

s w

ho c

ondu

cted

rese

arch

and

inte

rvie

ws

and

reco

mm

ende

d a

cand

idat

e to

the

SG

. 203

Thi

s ca

ndid

ate

coul

d be

vet

oed

by th

e S

G a

nd h

ad

to g

ain

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y ap

prov

al. H

owev

er th

e S

G’s

sel

ectio

n co

mm

ittee

s w

ere

not f

orm

aliz

ed

and

ther

e ar

e no

form

al d

ocum

ents

out

linin

g th

is

proc

ess.

204

Furt

herm

ore

the

sele

ctio

n pr

oces

s is

st

ill po

litic

ized

: can

dida

tes

mus

t be

reco

mm

ende

d by

a g

over

nmen

t and

gov

ernm

ents

can

vet

o th

e de

cisi

on.

IITh

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

acc

ount

abilit

y

1D

oes

the

lead

er s

et c

lear

pe

rform

ance

exp

ecta

tions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent

and

cons

iste

nt?

UN

DP

pub

lishe

s th

e A

dmin

istr

ator

’s A

nnua

l Rep

ort w

hich

out

lines

the

orga

niza

tion’

s pe

rform

ance

to th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. H

owev

er th

ere

are

no s

epar

ate,

indi

vidu

al p

erfo

rman

ce s

tand

ards

for

the

Adm

inis

trat

or.20

5

The

Ann

ual R

epor

t is

repo

rted

ly w

idel

y re

ad b

y al

l st

aff t

o kn

ow th

e A

dmin

istr

ator

’s p

riorit

ies.

206

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of t

he

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear

stra

tegy

?

UN

DP

has

set

spe

cific

, mea

sura

ble

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in S

trat

egic

P

lans

suc

h as

the

curr

ent 2

014

– 20

17 S

trat

egic

Pla

n.20

7 U

ND

P h

as

also

exp

lain

ed h

ow th

eir

stra

tegi

c go

als

will

be im

plem

ente

d an

d m

easu

red

in d

etai

l.208


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?A

ll se

nior

offi

cers

in th

e U

N s

yste

m m

ust fi

le a

fina

ncia

l dis

clos

ure

stat

emen

t ann

ually

with

the

UN

eth

ics

offic

e.20

9 C

urre

nt A

dmin

istr

ator

H

elen

Cla

rk h

as d

iscl

osed

her

fina

ncia

l ass

ets

publ

ical

ly.21

0

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?A

ll U

N s

taff,

incl

udin

g th

e A

dmin

istr

ator

, are

obl

iged

to fo

llow

the

UN

C

ode

of C

ondu

ct.21

1

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

n an

nual

pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

UN

DP

’s A

dmin

istr

ator

is a

ccou

ntab

le to

the

UN

DP

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

.W

e fo

und

no e

vide

nce

(form

al o

r in

form

al) o

f an

indi

vidu

al p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me

or

appr

aisa

l for

the

Adm

inis

trat

or.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

The

UN

Hum

an R

esou

rces

rul

es a

nd re

gula

tions

on

rem

uner

atio

n se

ts a

cle

ar, fi

xed

pay

scal

e fo

r al

l sta

ff de

pend

ing

on th

eir

rank

. The

A

dmin

istr

ator

is p

aid

at th

e U

nder

Sec

reta

ry G

ener

al p

ay g

rade

.212

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

UN

DP

has

an

exte

nsiv

e pr

ogra

mm

e fo

r le

ader

ship

dev

elop

men

t and

m

anag

emen

t ski

lls w

hich

ove

r 60

0 st

aff p

artic

ipat

ed in

201

2. 2

13 S

enio

r le

ader

ship

can

att

end

Exe

cutiv

e E

duca

tion

Pro

gram

mes

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n p

roce

ss is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e is

no

docu

men

tatio

n of

a fo

rmal

per

form

ance

app

rais

al o

f the

ca

ndid

ate.

All

Adm

inis

trat

ors

who

hav

e so

ught

a s

econ

d te

rm h

ave

been

reap

poin

ted

by th

e U

NS

G, w

ith

the

Boa

rd’s

app

rova

l. In

terv

iew

ees

clai

med

that

th

ere

are

info

rmal

dis

cuss

ions

bet

wee

n th

e S

G,

key

dono

rs, o

ther

pol

itica

l gro

ups

such

as

the

G7

and

regi

onal

gro

ups

over

the

Adm

inis

trat

or’s

pe

rform

ance

but

no

form

aliz

ed a

ppra

isal

pro

cess

. 214

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess?

No

offic

ial e

vide

nce

of th

is.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

Adm

inis

trat

or o

pera

tes

unde

r th

e po

licy

guid

ance

of t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. 2

15 T

he A

dmin

istr

ator

can

pur

sue

new

initi

ativ

es b

ut m

ust g

et

the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

’s a

ppro

val.21

6

The

Adm

inis

trat

or m

ay in

fluen

ce B

oard

dec

isio

ns

and

does

not

alw

ays

have

gai

n fo

rmal

app

rova

l th

roug

h a

maj

ority

vot

e to

beg

in w

ork

in n

ew a

reas

. 217

2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

UN

DP

has

a s

enio

r m

anag

emen

t com

mitt

ee w

hich

dis

cuss

es n

ew

prio

ritie

s an

d w

ill ev

alua

te a

ll do

cum

ents

bef

ore

they

go

to th

e E

xecu

tive

Com

mitt

ee w

ith re

ques

ted

actio

ns. 21

8


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

In 2

012,

ear

mar

ked

cont

ribut

ions

from

bila

tera

l ($1

.33

billio

n) a

nd

mul

tilat

eral

par

tner

s ($

1.53

billi

on) a

ccou

nted

for

22%

of t

he o

vera

ll in

com

e.21

9 U

ND

P’s

cor

e re

sour

ces

are

disb

urse

d by

the

Gen

eral

A

ssem

bly

and

have

sta

gnat

ed in

rece

nt y

ears

: in

2012

they

wer

e 20

%

of it

s ov

eral

l fina

ncin

g.22

0

UN

DP

is re

port

ed to

‘act

ivel

y’ p

ursu

e ‘n

on-c

ore

finan

cing

by

pres

entin

g do

nors

with

pro

gram

mes

th

at a

ppea

l to

them

’.221

UN

DP

has

als

o di

vers

ified

its

sou

rces

of fi

nanc

ing

in re

cent

yea

rs w

ith

finan

cing

from

: oth

er m

ultil

ater

al s

ourc

es (s

uch

as th

e E

urop

ean

Com

mis

sion

and

the

Glo

bal

Env

ironm

ent F

und)

and

priv

ate

finan

cing

(whi

ch

cons

titut

es a

lmos

t a th

ird o

f the

bud

get).

It h

as

gain

ed fi

nanc

ing

from

em

ergi

ng c

ount

ries

who

pay

di

rect

ly fo

r se

rvic

es p

rovi

ded

by U

ND

P.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

UN

DP

con

duct

s an

nual

Glo

bal S

taff

Sur

veys

whi

ch a

re c

arrie

d ou

t by

an

exte

rnal

, ind

epen

dent

org

aniz

atio

n. In

add

ition

, UN

DP

has

pr

iorit

ized

sup

port

ing

staf

f in

its 2

014

– 20

17 S

trat

egic

Pla

n w

hich

st

ates

that

“U

ND

P w

ill lif

t its

peo

ple

man

agem

ent c

apab

ilitie

s w

ith

spee

dier

recr

uitm

ent a

nd in

itiat

ion

prog

ram

mes

that

sup

port

sta

ff to

be

com

e ef

fect

ive

mor

e qu

ickl

y, e

nsur

e di

vers

ity, m

anag

e ta

lent

and

de

liver

bet

ter

succ

essi

on p

lann

ing

for

key

post

s.”

222

2Is

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t ass

esse

d on

men

torin

g an

d co

achi

ng o

f su

bord

inat

e st

aff?

They

are

not

form

ally

exp

ecte

d to

do

this

.

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

UN

DP

is m

anag

er o

f the

UN

Res

iden

t Coo

rdin

ator

Sys

tem

. In

this

role

it h

as to

coo

rdin

ate

and

faci

litat

e pr

ogra

mm

ing

and

com

mon

‘bus

ines

s op

erat

ions

’ of o

ther

UN

age

ncie

s at

cou

ntry

leve

l. Th

ey h

ave

prop

osed

ev

alua

ting

thei

r pa

rtne

rshi

ps w

ith p

artn

ers’

sat

isfa

ctio

n su

rvey

s w

ith U

ND

P.22

3

VIII

.Th

e IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

UN

DP

revi

sed

its e

valu

atio

n po

licy

in 2

011

to e

stab

lish

the

Eva

luat

ion

Offi

ce’s

inde

pend

ence

and

ens

ure

that

al

l eva

luat

ions

hav

e a

man

agem

ent r

espo

nse.

224 Th

e he

ad o

f the

UN

DP

Eva

luat

ion

Offi

ce re

port

s di

rect

ly to

th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. T

he A

dmin

istr

ator

is b

riefe

d be

fore

and

thei

r of

fice

prep

ares

a m

anag

emen

t res

pons

e to

ev

alua

tions

. The

Adm

inis

trat

or h

as th

e rig

ht o

f rep

ly to

eva

luat

ions

and

dis

cuss

es fo

llow

-up

actio

ns w

ith th

e B

oard

.


h. U

nite

d N

atio

ns H

igh

Co

mm

issi

one

r fo

r R

efug

ees

(UN

HC

R)

Org

aniz

atio

nU

NH

CR

’s c

ore

man

date

is th

e pr

otec

tion

of re

fuge

es. I

n re

cent

yea

rs, t

he a

genc

y ha

s al

so ta

ken

a ro

le in

hum

anita

rian

cris

es a

nd s

ituat

ions

invo

lvin

g in

tern

ally

di

spla

ced

pers

ons

(IDP

s).22

5

Go

vern

ance

UN

HC

R is

a s

ubsi

diar

y bo

dy o

f the

UN

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y, e

stab

lishe

d un

der

Art

icle

22

of th

e U

N c

hart

er. T

he h

igh

com

mis

sion

er (H

C) a

cts

unde

r th

e au

thor

ity

of a

nd re

port

s an

nual

ly to

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y. T

he U

NH

CR

sta

tute

aut

horiz

es

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y an

d th

e E

cono

mic

and

Soc

ial C

ounc

il (E

CO

SC

O) t

o gi

ve th

e of

fice

polic

y gu

idan

ce.22

6 H

owev

er, U

NH

CR

’s p

rinci

pal e

xecu

tive

and

advi

sory

bod

y is

the

Exe

cutiv

e C

omm

ittee

of t

he P

rogr

amm

e of

the

UN

HC

R (E

xCom

), co

mpr

ised

of

87

mem

ber

stat

es a

s of

Jul

y 20

13.22

7 E

xCom

is re

spon

sibl

e fo

r ap

prov

ing

UN

HC

R’s

bud

get a

nd p

rogr

amm

e, a

nd p

rovi

ding

gui

danc

e on

the

agen

cy’s

m

anag

emen

t and

prio

ritie

s.22

8

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eN

o tim

e lim

it ha

s be

en s

tate

d; in

the

past

, HC

s ha

ve s

erve

d up

to th

ree

term

s. A

te

rm is

com

mon

ly fi

ve y

ears

(e.g

. Sad

rudd

in A

ga K

han

was

HC

for

12 y

ears

).

Inco

me

UN

HC

R’s

ann

ual b

udge

t is

need

s-ba

sed,

and

in 2

012

was

$4.

3 bi

llion

(incl

udin

g su

pple

men

tary

pro

gram

mes

).229

How

ever

, its

inco

me

is ty

pica

lly fa

r be

low

the

budg

et: i

n 20

12, i

t rec

eive

d on

ly a

bout

$2.

3 bi

llion

in v

olun

tary

fund

ing.

230

Num

ber

of

staf

fO

ver

6,80

0, w

ith m

ore

than

150

nat

iona

litie

s w

orki

ng a

t 259

offi

ces

in 1

18

coun

trie

s.23

1

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipTh

e pa

st le

ader

s of

UN

HC

R w

ere:

Ger

rit J

an v

an H

euve

n G

oedh

art (

from

the

Net

herla

nds,

195

1-19

56);

Aug

uste

Lin

dt (S

witz

erla

nd, 1

956-

1960

); Fé

lix S

chny

der

(Sw

itzer

land

, 196

0-19

65);

Sad

rudd

in A

ga K

han

(Iran

, 196

5-19

77);

Pou

l Har

tling

(D

enm

ark,

197

8-19

85);

Jean

-Pie

rre

Hoc

ké (S

witz

erla

nd, 1

986-

1989

); Th

orva

ld

Sto

ltenb

erg

(Nor

way

, 199

0-19

90);

Sad

ako

Oga

ta (J

apan

, 199

0-20

00) a

nd R

uud

Lubb

ers

(Net

herla

nds,

200

1-20

05)

The

curr

ent H

C is

Ant

ónio

Gut

erre

s (P

ortu

gal,

2005

-pre

sent

).

UN

HC

R h

as h

ad s

ever

al h

igh-

profi

le le

ader

ship

sca

ndal

s. J

ean-

Pie

rre

Hoc

ké

(198

6-19

89) h

ad to

resi

gn a

s H

C a

fter

he a

nd h

is w

ife fl

ew fi

rst c

lass

whi

le d

onor

s w

ere

dem

andi

ng g

reat

er b

udge

t res

tric

tions

for

the

agen

cy.23

2 H

C R

udd

Lubb

ers

(200

1-20

05) a

lso

dam

aged

UN

HC

R’s

repu

tatio

n w

hen

he w

as fo

rced

to re

sign

in

200

5 du

e to

alle

gatio

ns o

f sex

ual a

buse

.233

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

SG

Jav

ier

Per

ez d

e C

uélla

r no

min

ated

Vire

ndra

Day

al, t

he c

hief

of h

is o

wn

exec

utiv

e of

fice

and

who

had

pr

evio

usly

wor

ked

at U

NH

CR

. The

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

and

othe

r m

ajor

don

ors

expr

esse

d co

ncer

n, a

rgui

ng th

ere

was

insu

ffici

ent c

onsu

ltatio

n, a

nd th

e S

G w

ithdr

ew D

ayal

’s

nom

inat

ion.

234

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Und

er G

uter

res’

lead

ersh

ip, U

NH

CR

has

mad

e pr

ogre

ss o

n in

tern

al re

form

s.23

5 Th

e H

C o

ffice

has

intr

oduc

ed re

sults

-bas

ed m

anag

emen

t, a

new

IT s

yste

m a

nd

an e

thic

s of

fice.

In 2

012,

the

HC

app

oint

ed a

n in

depe

nden

t aud

it an

d ov

ersi

ght

com

mitt

ee to

revi

ew a

nd s

tren

gthe

n th

ese

func

tions

.236

UN

HC

R h

as a

lso

rest

ruct

ured

and

redu

ced

staf

f cos

ts fr

om 4

1% o

f tot

al e

xpen

ditu

re in

200

6 to

26%

at

the

begi

nnin

g of

201

3.23

7 G

uter

res

has

soug

ht a

gre

ater

role

in p

rote

ctin

g ID

Ps

and

peop

le d

ispl

aced

by

natu

ral d

isas

ters

. How

ever

, som

e do

nors

are

con

cern

ed

that

UN

HC

R is

exp

andi

ng b

eyon

d its

man

date

and

not

prio

ritiz

ing

prot

ectio

n of

re

fuge

es.23

8

Tow

ards

the

end

of 2

012,

UN

HC

R e

stab

lishe

d an

org

aniz

atio

n-w

ide

risk

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k. In

this

pha

se, t

he w

ork

on e

nter

pris

e ris

k m

anag

emen

t (E

RM

) con

cent

rate

d on

dev

elop

ing

a dr

aft p

olic

y fra

mew

ork

and

impl

emen

tatio

n to

ols,

whi

ch h

ave

been

test

ed a

t hea

dqua

rter

s an

d in

four

fiel

d op

erat

ions

th

roug

hout

201

3. A

chi

ef r

isk

offic

er re

port

s di

rect

ly to

the

depu

ty H

C. G

loba

l im

plem

enta

tion

of E

RM

will

cont

inue

thro

ugho

ut 2

014.

239


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors24

0

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/ter

ms

of re

fere

nce

for

the

lead

er o

nlin

e?Th

e co

re fu

nctio

ns o

f the

HC

(HC

) are

out

lined

in U

NH

CR

’s S

tatu

te, a

s ef

fect

ivel

y re

vise

d an

d ex

tend

ed th

roug

h su

cces

sive

GA

reso

lutio

ns.24

1 Th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

pro

pose

s th

e te

rms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ent w

hich

ar

e th

en b

y ap

prov

ed b

y th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly.

242

The

HC

’s fu

nctio

ns

are

also

des

crib

ed in

UN

HC

R’s

man

ual (

chap

ter

II) w

hich

is a

vaila

ble

on th

e In

tran

et a

nd a

cces

sibl

e to

per

man

ent m

issi

ons

and

UN

HC

R’s

pa

rtne

rs.24

3

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

ele

ctio

n an

d re

-ele

ctio

n of

the

lead

er in

pra

ctic

e?

Acc

ordi

ng to

UN

HC

R’s

Sta

tute

, the

HC

is e

lect

ed b

y th

e U

N G

ener

al

Ass

embl

y on

the

reco

mm

enda

tion

of th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

.244

The

Sec

reta

ry G

ener

al c

onsu

lts th

e fiv

e ge

ogra

phic

al g

roup

s of

the

Gen

eral

A

ssem

bly

and

mem

bers

of t

he S

ecur

ity C

ounc

il. 2

45

The

HC

has

ofte

n co

me

from

a s

igni

fican

t don

or

stat

e (th

e cu

rren

t HC

is a

n ex

cept

ion

to th

is).

Mea

nwhi

le, t

he p

ost o

f Dep

uty

HC

has

alm

ost

alw

ays

been

a U

S N

atio

nal.24

6 P

ower

ful d

onor

sta

tes

have

a s

tron

g in

fluen

ce o

n th

e de

cisi

on a

nd h

ave

frequ

ently

vet

oed

pote

ntia

l ca

ndid

ates

.247 T

here

has

onl

y be

en o

ne c

onte

sted

el

ectio

n fo

r th

e H

C, w

hich

was

in 1

950

for

the

first

H

C.24

8

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

sele

ctio

n of

th

e le

ader

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

No.

The

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s is

larg

ely

a pr

oces

s of

con

sulta

tions

be

twee

n th

e U

N S

G a

nd k

ey d

onor

sta

tes.

Th

e G

uter

res

elec

tion

was

repo

rted

ly m

ore

tran

spar

ent t

han

prev

ious

as

it ‘in

volv

ed s

ome

prio

r pu

blic

scr

utin

y of

the

cand

idat

es’ 24

9, d

onor

s st

ill ha

d a

larg

e in

put. 2

50

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

the

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

oes

the

lead

er s

et c

lear

pe

rform

ance

exp

ecta

tions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent

and

cons

iste

nt?

The

HC

set

s ou

t his

/her

obj

ectiv

es in

a n

umbe

r of

UN

HC

R re

port

s,

incl

udin

g th

e an

nual

Glo

bal R

epor

ts a

nd th

e G

loba

l Str

ateg

ic P

riorit

ies.

25

1

Thes

e ar

e or

gani

zatio

n-w

ide

goal

s, n

ot s

peci

fic to

the

HC

.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

In a

dditi

on to

the

Glo

bal S

trat

egic

Prio

ritie

s, U

NH

CR

has

est

ablis

hed

a G

loba

l Man

agem

ent A

ccou

ntab

ility

Fram

ewor

k (G

MA

F). T

he G

MA

F re

port

edly

‘com

preh

ensi

vely

map

s ac

coun

tabi

litie

s, re

spon

sibi

litie

s an

d au

thor

ities

acr

oss

the

orga

niza

tion

and

rela

tes

them

to th

e co

rres

pond

ing

man

agem

ent p

olic

ies

and

guid

ance

’.252

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?A

ll se

nior

offi

cers

in th

e U

N s

yste

m m

ust fi

le a

fina

ncia

l dis

clos

ure

stat

emen

t ann

ually

with

the

UN

eth

ics

offic

e.25

3 G

uter

res

has

volu

ntar

ily

disc

lose

d th

is p

ublic

ally

.254

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?A

ll U

NH

CR

sta

ff in

clud

ing

the

seni

or m

anag

emen

t are

ask

ed to

sig

n th

e U

NH

CR

Cod

e of

Con

duct

.255

Sta

ff m

ay d

ecid

e no

t to

sign

the

code

of c

ondu

ct, i

n w

hich

cas

e th

ey a

re o

blig

ed to

exp

lain

thei

r de

cisi

on

in w

ritin

g.25

6


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Ther

e is

no

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t app

rais

al fo

r th

e H

C.

How

ever

, the

HC

repo

rts

annu

ally

to th

e E

xecu

tive

Com

mitt

ee a

nd to

th

e Th

ird C

omm

ittee

of t

he G

ener

al A

ssem

bly,

and

in U

NH

CR

’s a

nnua

l re

port

s.25

7

The

Dep

uty

HC

and

the

Ass

ista

nt H

Cs

have

per

form

ance

ap

prai

sals

.258

The

offic

e w

as c

reat

ed w

ith a

hig

h de

gree

of

auto

nom

y an

d al

thou

gh th

e U

NS

G s

igns

the

cont

ract

app

oint

ing

the

HC

, the

UN

SG

doe

s no

t ha

ve a

role

in p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t. 25

9

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

The

HC

has

a fi

xed

sala

ry a

nd s

tand

ard

entit

lem

ents

like

any

oth

er

UN

sta

ff m

embe

r. W

hen

on m

issi

on, h

e re

ceiv

es a

sta

ndar

d tr

avel

al

low

ance

like

all

othe

r U

N s

taff.

260

The

UN

Hum

an R

esou

rces

rul

es

and

regu

latio

ns o

n re

mun

erat

ion

gove

rn th

e H

C’s

sal

ary.

261

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Ther

e is

no

form

al o

r st

anda

rd tr

aini

ng p

rogr

amm

e or

coa

chin

g fo

r th

e H

C. T

he C

hef d

u C

abin

et p

rovi

des

info

rmal

on

the

job

trai

ning

in U

N

rule

s an

d pr

otoc

ols

to n

ew H

Cs.

262

UN

HC

R h

as e

stab

lishe

d a

Glo

bal

Lear

ning

Cen

tre

(GLC

) in

Bud

apes

t to

cons

olid

ate

its le

arni

ng a

ctiv

ities

an

d pr

ogra

mm

es. I

t has

a p

ositi

on d

edic

ated

to d

evel

opin

g an

d de

liver

ing

trai

ning

pro

gram

mes

for

seni

or m

anag

emen

t but

this

doe

s no

t inc

lude

the

HC

, Dep

uty

or A

ssis

tant

HC

s.26

3

How

ever

, the

y ca

n as

k fo

r th

is a

dditi

onal

trai

ning

if

need

ed.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

If m

embe

r st

ates

are

con

tent

with

the

wor

k of

the

HC

, the

SG

will

nom

inat

e hi

m/h

er fo

r re

-ele

ctio

n by

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y.26

4 Th

ere

is

no fo

rmal

app

rais

al p

roce

ss.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Trad

ition

ally

the

HC

is re

-ele

cted

by

the

GA

if s

/he

stan

ds. T

here

is n

o st

ated

tim

e lim

it; th

e H

C c

an s

tand

for

a th

ird m

anda

te.

The

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y ra

rely

goe

s to

a fu

ll vo

te a

s th

e H

C is

nor

mal

ly re

appo

inte

d by

con

sens

us.26

5 O

ther

nom

inee

s w

ill be

put

forw

ard

only

if th

ere

is

not a

con

sens

us.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

UN

HC

R S

tatu

te s

tate

s th

at th

e H

C s

hall

follo

w ‘p

olic

y di

rect

ives

’ fro

m th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

or E

CO

SO

C, a

nd th

at th

e of

fice

may

en

gage

in ‘s

uch

addi

tiona

l act

iviti

es’ a

s th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

may

de

term

ine.

266

The

HC

can

acc

ept,

influ

ence

and

gen

erat

e po

licy

dire

ctiv

es in

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y, E

CO

SO

C

and

ExC

om.26

7 Th

e H

C s

ets

UN

HC

R s

trat

egic

pr

iorit

ies

in c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith s

enio

r m

anag

emen

t, fie

ld o

pera

tions

, per

sons

of c

once

rn, p

artn

ers

and

mem

ber

stat

es. T

hese

prio

ritie

s ha

ve e

volv

ed,

as re

flect

ed in

the

Str

ateg

ic R

evie

w, f

or in

stan

ce

UN

HC

R h

as d

evel

oped

an

‘age

, gen

der

and

dive

rsity

’ app

roac

h an

d fo

cuse

d in

crea

sed

atte

ntio

n on

sex

ual a

nd g

ende

r ba

sed

viol

ence

in o

pera

tions

an

d on

LG

BTI

per

sons

of c

once

rn.26

8


2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

UN

HC

R h

as a

num

ber

of m

echa

nism

s, in

clud

ing:

its

glob

al n

eeds

as

sess

men

t (w

hich

iden

tifies

its

need

s-ba

sed

annu

al b

udge

t, ba

sed

upon

con

sulta

tion

with

per

sons

of c

once

rn a

nd p

artn

ers)

, the

Glo

bal

Str

ateg

ic P

riorit

ies,

EXC

OM

con

clus

ions

, the

ann

ual H

C’s

Dia

logu

es o

n P

rote

ctio

n C

halle

nges

.269

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

UN

HC

R is

alm

ost c

ompl

etel

y vo

lunt

arily

fund

ed a

nd h

as a

ver

y sm

all

UN

regu

lar

budg

et. 27

0 In

201

2, 9

8% o

f fun

ding

was

vol

unta

ry a

nd o

nly

2% c

ame

from

UN

Reg

ular

Bud

get (

asse

ssed

con

trib

utio

ns) t

o co

ver

adm

inis

trat

ive

cost

s.27

1 E

xCom

mus

t app

rove

UN

HC

R’s

bud

get,

and

even

sup

plem

enta

ry a

ppea

ls w

hich

are

issu

ed d

urin

g th

e ye

ar.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

UN

HC

R c

ondu

cts

Glo

bal S

taff

Sur

veys

regu

larly

. Th

ese

wer

e fir

st a

dmin

iste

red

in 2

006

and

have

bec

ome

a re

gula

r bi

annu

al e

xerc

ise.

The

HC

has

task

ed th

e D

eput

y H

C w

ith fo

llow

ing-

up o

n re

com

men

datio

ns th

at c

ome

out o

f the

sta

ff su

rvey

. 272

Acc

ordi

ng to

Tur

k an

d E

yste

r (2

010)

, re

spon

ses

from

the

surv

ey h

ave

guid

ed H

uman

R

esou

rces

refo

rm a

nd re

sulte

d in

cha

nges

to

UN

HC

R’s

pos

tings

and

pro

mot

ions

pro

cedu

res.

273

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

The

HC

is n

ot a

sses

sed

form

ally

on

the

men

torin

g or

coa

chin

g of

su

bord

inat

es.

How

ever

, the

role

mea

ns s

/he

info

rmal

ly m

ento

rs h

is/h

er te

am o

f se

nior

man

ager

s (2

0 bu

reau

hea

ds a

nd d

irect

ors

who

mee

t wee

kly

as

wel

l as

the

‘troi

ka’ o

f the

Dep

uty

HC

and

the

Ass

ista

nt H

Cs)

. 274

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

The

HC

mee

ts re

gula

rly w

ith th

e E

xecu

tive

Com

mitt

ee. S

/he

has

also

est

ablis

hed

info

rmal

dia

logu

es w

ith

dono

rs w

ho g

ive

mor

e th

an $

20m

illion

, Reg

iona

l Gro

ups

and

refu

gee

host

ing

coun

trie

s.In

add

ition

, the

HC

hol

ds: a

n an

nual

mee

ting

with

NG

Os,

regu

lar

high

-leve

l bila

tera

l mee

tings

with

key

hu

man

itaria

n ag

enci

es, a

nd a

dia

logu

e on

Pro

tect

ion

Cha

lleng

es. U

NH

CR

incl

udes

per

sons

of c

once

rn a

nd

part

ners

in th

eir

plan

ning

and

prio

rity

sett

ing.

VIII

.Th

e IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

The

Pol

icy

Dev

elop

men

t and

Eva

luat

ion

Sec

tion

is p

art o

f UN

HC

R’s

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ion

and

Man

agem

ent

Div

isio

n an

d re

port

s di

rect

ly to

the

HC

. The

re a

re a

num

ber

of o

ther

ove

rsig

ht fu

nctio

ns w

hich

eng

age

seni

or

man

agem

ent w

ith e

valu

atio

ns a

nd fi

ndin

gs o

f oth

er o

vers

ight

mec

hani

sm.


i. W

orl

d B

ank

Gro

up (W

BG

)

Org

aniz

atio

nTh

e W

BG

con

sist

s of

five

inst

itutio

ns: I

nter

natio

nal B

ank

for

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

and

Dev

elop

men

t (IB

RD

),275

Inte

rnat

iona

l Dev

elop

men

t Ass

ocia

tion

(IDA

),276

Inte

rnat

iona

l Fin

ance

Cor

pora

tion

(IFC

),277

Mul

tilat

eral

Inve

stm

ent G

uara

ntee

A

genc

y (M

IGA

),278

and

Inte

rnat

iona

l Cen

tre

for

Set

tlem

ent o

f Inv

estm

ent D

ispu

tes

(ICS

ID).27

9 Th

e W

BG

is h

eadq

uart

ered

in W

ashi

ngto

n D

C a

nd h

as m

ore

than

124

co

untr

y of

fices

.

Go

vern

ance

Man

y of

the

bank

’s in

stitu

tiona

l fea

ture

s re

sem

ble

thos

e of

the

IMF.

Mem

ber

coun

trie

s (1

88) g

over

n th

e W

BG

thro

ugh

the

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs a

nd b

oard

of

exec

utiv

e di

rect

ors.

280

The

25 re

side

nt e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s (E

Ds)

are

resp

onsi

ble

for

the

cond

uct o

f the

ban

k’s

gene

ral o

pera

tions

und

er d

eleg

ated

pow

ers

from

the

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs.

Five

ED

s ar

e ap

poin

ted

by th

ose

mem

ber

stat

es w

ith th

e la

rges

t sha

res

(Fra

nce,

G

erm

any,

Jap

an, U

nite

d K

ingd

om a

nd U

nite

d S

tate

s). T

he re

mai

ning

25

ED

s ar

e el

ecte

d ev

ery

2 ye

ars

by c

onst

ituen

cies

mad

e up

of t

he re

mai

ning

mem

bers

. S

audi

Ara

bia,

Chi

na a

nd th

e R

ussi

an F

eder

atio

n, h

owev

er, a

re s

ingl

e-m

embe

r ch

airs

, mea

ning

that

they

exe

rcis

e th

eir

vote

s al

one

rath

er th

an d

oing

so

in

cons

titue

ncie

s of

mul

tiple

mem

ber

stat

es. T

he E

Ds

sele

ct th

e pr

esid

ent.

Jim

Yon

g K

im is

the

WB

G’s

12t

h pr

esid

ent a

nd is

cha

irman

of t

he b

oard

of E

Ds

(ele

cted

in

2012

).

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFi

ve y

ears

; can

be

rene

wed

twic

e.

Inco

me

The

boar

d of

ED

s ap

prov

ed a

ppro

xim

atel

y $3

1.55

billi

on in

fina

ncia

l ass

ista

nce

in fi

scal

yea

r 20

13, w

ith $

40.8

4 bi

llion

pred

icte

d fo

r 20

14.28

1 Th

e 20

13 to

tal

com

pris

ed $

15.2

billi

on in

IBR

D le

ndin

g an

d $1

6.3

billio

n in

IDA

sup

port

, with

an

adm

inis

trat

ive

budg

et o

f app

roxi

mat

ely

$1.9

billi

on fo

r fis

cal y

ear

2014

.282

In 2

012,

Ji

m Y

ong

Kim

, the

new

pre

side

nt, a

nnou

nced

a th

ree-

year

pla

n to

dec

reas

e th

e ba

nk’s

bud

get b

y 8%

, or

$400

milli

on.28

3

Num

ber

of

staf

fO

ver

9,00

0 em

ploy

ees

from

mor

e th

an 1

68 c

ount

ries.

284

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipA

n un

writ

ten

rule

exi

sts

that

the

US

pre

side

nt s

elec

ts th

e W

BG

pre

side

nt.28

5 U

p un

til 2

011,

the

choi

ce o

f an

Am

eric

an a

s pr

esid

ent o

f the

WB

G w

as n

ot o

penl

y ch

alle

nged

by

the

prop

osal

of a

com

petin

g ca

ndid

ate.

In th

at y

ear,

how

ever

, tw

o no

n-U

S c

andi

date

s –

Jose

Ant

onio

Oca

mpo

(Col

ombi

a) a

nd N

gozi

Oko

njo-

Iwea

la

(Nig

eria

) – w

ere

put f

orw

ard.

286

Jim

Yon

g K

im, a

n A

mer

ican

, won

the

nom

inat

ion.

The

follo

win

g w

ere

past

pre

side

nts

of th

e ba

nk: E

ugen

e M

eyer

(194

6-19

46),

John

J.

McC

loy

(194

7-19

49),

Eug

ene

R. B

lack

, Sr.

(194

9-19

63),

Geo

rge

Woo

ds (1

963-

1968

), R

ober

t McN

amar

a (1

968-

1981

), A

lden

W. C

laus

en (1

981-

1986

), B

arbe

r C

onab

le (1

986-

1991

), Le

wis

T. P

rest

on (1

991-

1995

), Ja

mes

Wol

fens

ohn

(199

5-20

05),

Pau

l Wol

fow

itz (2

005-

2007

) and

Rob

ert Z

oellic

k (2

007-

2012

).

App

oint

ed p

resi

dent

in 2

012,

Kim

pro

pose

d a

num

ber

of in

stitu

tiona

l cha

nges

in

2013

afte

r a

surv

ey o

f app

roxi

mat

ely

10,0

00 e

mpl

oyee

s re

veal

ed a

“cu

lture

of f

ear”

, “f

ear

of r

isk”

and

a “

terr

ible

” en

viro

nmen

t for

col

labo

ratio

n.28

7 K

im’s

cha

nges

hav

e,

how

ever

, bee

n m

et w

ith c

ritic

ism

. The

dec

isio

n to

alte

r th

e ba

nk’s

org

aniz

atio

n, fo

r ex

ampl

e, h

as b

een

deem

ed u

nnec

essa

ry.28

8 H

iring

the

man

agem

ent c

onsu

lting

firm

M

cKin

sey

& C

ompa

ny fo

r th

e re

stru

ctur

ing

was

als

o co

ntro

vers

ial,

give

n th

at th

e fir

m h

ad d

esig

ned

the

exis

ting

stru

ctur

e (a

nd a

ll pr

evio

us s

truc

ture

s si

nce

the

bank

’s

1972

reor

gani

zatio

n un

der

Pre

side

nt M

cNam

ara)

289 ,

and

had

com

pete

d di

rect

ly w

ith

the

Wor

ld B

ank

in a

dvis

ing

gove

rnm

ents

.290

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

The

Wor

ld B

ank’

s or

gani

zatio

nal r

efor

ms

com

e at

a ti

me

of in

crea

sing

com

petit

ion

from

oth

er m

ultil

ater

al d

evel

opm

ent i

nstit

utio

ns. A

stu

dy b

y H

umph

rey

and

Mic

hael

owa

(201

3), f

or e

xam

ple,

foun

d th

at, u

nder

cer

tain

mac

roec

onom

ic

circ

umst

ance

s, in

divi

dual

bor

row

ers

in L

atin

Am

eric

a of

ten

pref

er to

wor

k w

ith th

e IA

DB

and

CA

F du

e to

thei

r fa

ster

pro

cess

ing

times

and

less

bur

eauc

ratic

soc

ial a

nd

econ

omic

lend

ing

requ

irem

ents

.291

Furt

herm

ore,

num

erou

s ob

serv

ers

see

the

New

D

evel

opm

ent B

ank,

com

pose

d of

Bra

zil,

the

Rus

sia

Fede

ratio

n, In

dia,

Chi

na a

nd

Sou

th A

frica

(BR

ICS

), as

a p

oten

tial c

ompe

titor

to th

e W

orld

Ban

k an

d th

e IM

F.29

2


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

Yes.

Ter

ms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ents

wer

e re

cent

ly m

ade

publ

icly

ava

ilabl

e,

alth

ough

Bob

Zoe

llick’

s co

ntra

ct is

eas

ier

to fi

nd th

an D

r K

im’s

.293

The

forc

ed re

sign

atio

n of

Wor

ld B

ank

Pre

side

nt P

aul

Wol

fow

itz in

200

7 fo

r vi

olat

ing

cont

ract

ual c

laus

es

rela

ting

to e

thic

al a

nd g

over

ning

prin

cipl

es in

dica

tes

that

the

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n ar

e ta

ken

serio

usly

and

are

enf

orce

able

.294

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

All

mem

ber

stat

es v

ote

durin

g el

ectio

ns a

nd re

-ele

ctio

ns e

ither

al

one

(as

in th

e ca

se o

f Sau

di A

rabi

a, R

ussi

a an

d C

hina

) or

via

thei

r co

nstit

uenc

y re

pres

enta

tive.

In p

ract

ice,

mem

bers

app

rove

the

cand

idat

e pu

t fo

rth

by th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s.29

5

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Yes.

Eac

h of

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up o

rgan

izat

ions

ope

rate

s ac

cord

ing

to p

roce

dure

s es

tabl

ishe

d by

its

Art

icle

s of

Agr

eem

ent,

whi

ch in

clud

e te

rms

of s

ervi

ces

for

the

Pre

side

nt.29

6

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

Ther

e is

no

proc

edur

e fo

r th

at. S

ome

set p

erso

nal s

tand

ards

dur

ing

inau

gura

l spe

eche

s or

pro

noun

cem

ents

at t

he B

oard

mee

tings

(see

th

e m

inut

es).29

7

Lead

ers

focu

s on

bro

ad s

trat

egic

poi

nts,

but

ther

e is

no

set o

f com

mitm

ents

.298

Rob

ert M

cNam

ara

and

Geo

rge

Woo

ds a

re th

ough

t to

be m

ost c

lear

on

thei

r pe

rform

ance

obj

ectiv

es.29

9

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

Onl

y th

roug

h su

bsec

tion

and

stra

tegi

c re

port

s. Im

port

ant t

o no

te th

at

expe

ctat

ions

com

e fro

m a

ver

y di

vers

e gr

oup

of s

take

hold

ers

(see

W

BG

Str

ateg

y fo

r 20

30 a

ppro

ved

in A

pril

2013

).300

The

deba

te is

als

o ab

out d

efini

ng e

xpec

tatio

ns

(diff

eren

t at d

iffer

ent t

imes

) and

wha

t lea

ders

hip

does

to u

nder

stan

d w

hy re

sults

don

’t m

eet t

hem

.301

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. A

ll th

e m

id-le

vel e

mpl

oyee

s ha

ve to

dis

clos

e fin

anci

al in

vest

men

ts,

incl

udin

g th

e P

resi

dent

. A s

epar

ate

Cod

e of

Con

duct

for

Boa

rd

Offi

cial

s se

ts th

e sa

me

stan

dard

.302

In p

ract

ice,

the

Ban

k’s

com

plia

nce

with

the

disc

losu

re p

rinci

ple

was

pro

ven

on th

e W

olfo

witz

’s

case

in 2

007.

The

Wor

ld B

ank

Boa

rd lo

st

confi

denc

e in

the

Pre

side

nt W

olfo

witz

afte

r a

spec

ial

inve

stig

ativ

e co

mm

ittee

foun

d he

had

vio

late

d hi

s co

ntra

ct b

y br

eaki

ng e

thic

al a

nd g

over

ning

rul

es

in a

rran

ging

a p

rom

otio

n pa

ckag

e fo

r hi

s pa

rtne

r S

haha

Ali

Raz

a. W

olfo

witz

resi

gned

bef

ore

his

term

ha

d en

ded.

303

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. C

ode

of e

thic

s eq

ually

app

lies

to e

very

sta

ff m

embe

r. Th

ere

is a

n O

ffice

of E

thic

s an

d B

usin

ess

Con

duct

, an

ethi

cs h

elpl

ine,

a C

ode

of

Con

duct

for

Sta

ff (c

reat

ed in

200

3), a

s w

ell a

s a

Cod

e of

Con

duct

for

Boa

rd O

ffici

als.

It h

as b

een

rece

ntly

refin

ed to

incl

ude,

for

exam

ple,

se

xual

har

assm

ent (

due

to a

cces

sion

of w

omen

at t

he W

BG

).304


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Yes,

but

not

to th

e sa

me

exte

nt a

s th

e re

gula

r st

aff.

The

eval

uatio

n of

the

orga

niza

tion

and

the

Pre

side

nt a

re o

ne a

nd th

e sa

me

if th

e P

resi

dent

is h

eld

resp

onsi

ble

for

its p

erfo

rman

ce. I

nter

nal E

valu

atio

n G

roup

(IE

G) “

Eva

luat

ion

of th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

Org

aniz

atio

nal

Effe

ctiv

enes

s”30

5 re

port

pub

lishe

d in

Apr

il 20

12 in

clud

ed a

spec

ts o

f le

ader

ship

.

Ther

e ar

e in

form

al p

roce

sses

that

info

rm th

e m

anag

emen

t.306

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No,

var

iatio

n is

ver

y lim

ited.

Sal

arie

s fo

r to

p m

anag

emen

t are

dis

clos

ed

in a

nnua

l rep

orts

.307

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

Onl

y on

an

ad-h

oc b

asis

. D

r K

im h

as a

per

sona

l coa

ch n

amed

Mar

shal

l G

olds

mith

.308

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.Th

e tw

o B

rett

on W

oods

org

aniz

atio

ns –

IMF

and

Wor

ld B

ank

– sh

ow th

at re

-app

oint

men

t is

base

d on

two

crite

ria: (

1) w

heth

er th

e in

cum

bent

wis

hes

to

stay

; and

(2) t

he d

omin

ant p

oliti

cs.30

9

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

In

pra

ctic

e, c

ompe

ting

non-

Am

eric

an c

andi

date

s ha

ve n

ot b

een

cons

ider

ed u

ntil

the

2011

ele

ctio

n in

whi

ch tw

o no

n-U

S c

andi

date

s w

ere

put f

orth

for

elec

tion.

310

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Yes,

the

Pre

side

nt c

an re

com

men

d sh

ifts

of s

trat

egy

thor

ough

de

liver

ing

repo

rts

for

the

Dev

elop

men

t Com

mitt

ee.31

1 Th

e go

vern

ors

appr

ove

the

prop

osal

s.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Unc

lear

. Am

ong

mec

hani

sms

that

par

tly fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

str

ateg

ies:

repo

rts

of th

e D

evel

opm

ent C

omm

ittee

; age

nda

and

sum

mar

ies

of m

eetin

gs; A

ppra

isal

repo

rts

(Inte

rnal

Com

plet

ion

Rep

orts

(IC

R);

Pro

ject

Com

plet

ion

Rep

orts

(PC

R) e

tc.);

Inte

rnal

E

valu

atio

n G

roup

(IE

G) r

epor

ts (t

he u

nit r

epor

ts to

the

Boa

rd o

f G

over

nors

, not

man

agem

ent o

f the

Ban

k); I

nter

natio

nal D

evel

opm

ent

Ass

ocia

tion

(IDA

) rep

orts

.

The

only

con

stra

ints

are

the

Art

icle

s of

A

gree

men

t.312


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Ther

e is

a r

apid

gro

wth

in “

trus

t fun

ds”,

non

-dis

cret

iona

ry b

udge

t th

at is

bei

ng e

arm

arke

d.31

3 Id

eally

, tru

st fu

nds

wou

ld b

e cl

osel

y lin

ked

to th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

stra

tegy

, pro

cess

es a

nd o

vers

ight

. How

ever

, si

nce

trus

t fun

ds a

dd 2

5% to

the

Ban

k’s

adm

inis

trat

ive

budg

et, t

he

ince

ntiv

es to

alig

n ar

e w

eak.

In

add

ition

, the

big

gest

con

trib

utor

s in

201

2 ar

e U

S a

nd U

K ($

4,5b

n,

mor

e th

an o

ne th

ird o

f tot

al),

whi

ch in

crea

ses

risk

of c

aptu

re b

y th

ese

two

coun

trie

s.

Trus

t fun

ds in

fluen

ce b

ehav

iour

s an

d pr

iorit

ies;

do

nors

wan

t thi

s. It

als

o di

stra

cts

othe

r re

sour

ces

(not

onl

y fin

anci

al, b

ut a

lso

hum

an re

sour

ces,

for

exam

ple)

. Als

o co

nsid

er R

eim

burs

able

Adv

isor

y S

ervi

ces

– w

hen

coun

trie

s as

k fo

r ex

tra

serv

ices

(m

anag

emen

t, fo

r ex

ampl

e, R

AM

P p

rogr

amm

e w

here

for

a fe

e th

e W

orld

Ban

k un

dert

akes

m

anag

emen

t of a

sset

s).31

4

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes.

The

re a

re: (

1) b

road

sta

ff su

rvey

s co

nduc

ted

ever

y 18

mon

ths

to re

veal

sta

ff sa

tisfa

ctio

n w

ith m

anag

ers,

(2) “

360

degr

ees”

exe

rcis

e w

here

one

sol

icits

inpu

ts o

f sub

ordi

nate

s an

d (3

) a m

echa

nism

of p

eer

revi

ew in

pla

ce to

mak

e re

com

men

datio

ns fo

r co

rrec

tion.

Jim

Yon

g K

im re

cent

ly c

ondu

cted

a s

urve

y of

its

10,0

00 e

mpl

oyee

s. It

reve

aled

a

“cul

ture

of f

ear,”

per

vasi

ve “

fear

of r

isk”

and

a “

terr

ible

” en

viro

nmen

t for

co

llabo

ratio

n.31

5

Sta

ff su

rvey

s ha

ve b

een

play

ing

a su

rpris

ingl

y la

rge

role

sin

ce K

im c

ame.

316

2Is

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t ass

esse

d on

men

torin

g an

d co

achi

ng o

f su

bord

inat

e st

aff?

No

evid

ence

. It

is “

not a

prio

rity

ques

tion”

.317


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

With

in it

s S

ocia

l Dev

elop

men

t Dep

artm

ent,

the

Par

ticip

atio

n an

d C

ivic

Eng

agem

ent G

roup

pro

mot

es th

e pa

rtic

ipat

ion

of p

eopl

e an

d th

eir

orga

niza

tions

to in

fluen

ce in

stitu

tions

, pol

icie

s an

d pr

oces

ses

for

equi

tabl

e an

d su

stai

nabl

e de

velo

pmen

t. Th

e gr

oup

assi

sts

Wor

ld B

ank

units

, clie

nt g

over

nmen

ts a

nd c

ivil

soci

ety

orga

niza

tions

. A C

ivil

Soc

iety

Pol

icy

Foru

m, o

rgan

ized

join

tly w

ith th

e W

orld

Ban

k, in

par

alle

l with

the

Ann

ual

and

Spr

ing

Mee

tings

of t

he IM

F an

d W

orld

Ban

k th

at c

over

s a

wid

e ra

nge

of to

pics

, inc

ludi

ng m

any

sugg

este

d by

CS

Os

them

selv

es. C

SO

con

sulta

tions

are

now

com

mon

pra

ctic

e (if

not

requ

ired)

as

part

of p

roje

ct

appr

aisa

l pro

cess

es, n

otifi

catio

n of

pro

cure

men

t bid

s, a

nd p

art o

f the

WD

R p

roce

ss (p

ublis

hing

ear

ly c

once

pt

note

s an

d in

itial

dra

fts fo

r pu

blic

com

men

ts).

Ther

e ar

e al

so s

truc

ture

s in

pla

ce:

Glo

bal P

artn

ersh

ip fo

r S

ocia

l Acc

ount

abilit

y, a

mul

ti-do

nor

trus

t fun

d to

sup

port

CS

Os

that

wor

k in

soc

ial

acco

unta

bilit

yS

eats

in c

omm

ittee

s an

d W

B a

dvis

ory

boar

ds a

nd g

over

ning

bod

ies

(non

-vot

ing

seat

) for

WB

trus

t fun

ds

(ofte

n do

nor-

spec

ific)

Par

ticip

atio

n at

WB

Ann

ual m

eetin

gIn

volv

emen

ts o

n pr

ojec

ts, c

onsu

ltatio

ns

Dev

elop

men

t Gra

nt F

acilit

y (fi

nanc

e an

d P

artn

ersh

ips)

Ext

erna

l Ind

ustr

y In

itiat

ive

(EII)

whe

n W

B a

cts

as a

trus

tee

and

adm

inis

ters

mon

eyTh

roug

h co

untr

y of

fices

– d

onor

mee

tings

and

cou

ntry

rela

tions

Th

roug

h pr

ojec

ts –

rela

tions

on

the

grou

nd

Sta

keho

lder

s su

rvey

ed b

y M

OPA

N in

201

2 ra

ted

the

Ban

k ad

equa

te in

coo

rdin

atin

g w

ith c

lient

s in

the

desi

gn o

f pro

ject

s, fo

r th

e cl

arity

of i

ts p

roce

dure

s, fl

exib

ility,

and

resp

onsi

vene

ss to

cha

nges

in th

e pr

ojec

t im

plem

enta

tion

cont

ext.

In th

eir

writ

ten

com

men

ts, t

hey

note

d th

at th

e B

ank’

s pr

oced

ures

are

rig

id a

nd th

at

bure

aucr

atic

pro

cess

es o

ften

dela

y im

plem

enta

tion.

318

The

new

str

ateg

y pr

opos

es th

at th

e B

ank

will

focu

s on

cus

tom

ized

dev

elop

men

t sol

utio

ns a

nd a

lign

all i

ts a

ctiv

ities

with

the

two

goal

s: w

ork

mor

e in

pa

rtne

rshi

p w

ith o

ther

s, in

clud

ing

the

priv

ate

sect

or;

and

sign

ifica

ntly

incr

ease

col

labo

ratio

n ac

ross

its

agen

cies

.319

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

Inde

pend

ent E

valu

atio

n G

roup

’s (I

EG

) str

ateg

ic g

oal i

s to

influ

ence

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up’s

abi

lity

to a

chie

ve

deve

lopm

ent o

utco

mes

glo

bally

and

with

its

part

ner

coun

trie

s. It

repo

rts

dire

ctly

to th

e B

oard

s of

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors,

whi

ch o

vers

ee IE

G’s

wor

k th

roug

h th

e C

omm

ittee

on

Dev

elop

men

t Effe

ctiv

enes

s. T

he IE

G

cond

ucte

d a

clie

nt s

urve

y in

201

2 to

det

erm

ine

whe

ther

the

Ban

k w

as m

eetin

g cl

ient

s’ n

eeds

and

how

they

pe

rcei

ve it

s im

pact

. The

sur

vey

findi

ngs

are

base

d on

iden

tical

sur

veys

car

ried

out a

mon

g th

ree

audi

ence

s:

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up B

oard

mem

bers

and

adv

iser

s, W

orld

Ban

k G

roup

sta

ff, a

nd e

xter

nal s

take

hold

ers

(aca

dem

ia, p

rivat

e co

mpa

nies

, non

gove

rnm

enta

l org

aniz

atio

ns, g

over

nmen

ts, i

nter

natio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

, do

nor

orga

niza

tions

, and

med

ia).

The

Ban

k al

so fe

atur

es th

e D

evel

opm

ent I

mpa

ct E

valu

atio

n In

itiat

ive

(DIM

E),

whi

ch s

eeks

to in

crea

se th

e us

e of

impa

ct e

valu

atio

n (IE

) in

the

desi

gn a

nd im

plem

enta

tion

of b

ank

proj

ects

. D

IME

eva

luat

es p

rogr

amm

es b

ased

on

IE s

tand

ards

, thu

s en

tailin

g an

add

ition

al in

tern

al e

valu

atio

n of

pe

rform

ance

.320

It is

goo

d th

at IE

G a

nd th

e B

ank

carr

y ou

t suc

h su

rvey

s, b

ut th

e B

ank

as a

glo

bal p

laye

r ha

s to

w

eigh

cou

ntry

prio

ritie

s w

ith g

loba

l prio

ritie

s an

d na

tura

lly th

ey d

on’t

mat

ch.32

1


j. W

orl

d H

ealth

Org

aniz

atio

n (W

HO

)

Org

aniz

atio

nW

HO

, the

dire

ctin

g an

d co

ordi

natin

g au

thor

ity fo

r he

alth

with

in th

e U

nite

d N

atio

ns

syst

em, i

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r pr

ovid

ing

lead

ersh

ip o

n gl

obal

hea

lth m

atte

rs, s

hapi

ng

the

heal

th re

sear

ch a

gend

a an

d se

ttin

g no

rms

and

stan

dard

s. H

eadq

uart

ered

in

Gen

eva,

Sw

itzer

land

, it h

as s

ix re

gion

al o

ffice

s (B

razz

aville

, the

Rep

ublic

of

Con

go; W

ashi

ngto

n D

C, U

SA

; New

Del

hi, I

ndia

; Cop

enha

gen,

Den

mar

k; C

airo

, E

gypt

; and

Man

ila, P

hilip

pine

s) a

nd 1

50 c

ount

ry o

ffice

s.

Go

vern

ance

The

194

mem

ber

coun

trie

s go

vern

WH

O, m

eetin

g an

nual

ly a

t the

Wor

ld H

ealth

A

ssem

bly

(WH

A).

The

asse

mbl

y ap

poin

ts th

e di

rect

or-g

ener

al (D

G),

supe

rvis

es

the

orga

niza

tion’

s fin

anci

al p

olic

ies,

and

revi

ews

and

appr

oves

the

prop

osed

pr

ogra

mm

e bu

dget

. The

WH

A is

adv

ised

by

the

exec

utiv

e bo

ard

(34

mem

bers

), w

ho a

re te

chni

cally

qua

lified

in th

e he

alth

fiel

d an

d ar

e el

ecte

d fo

r a

thre

e-ye

ar

term

.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFi

ve y

ears

.

Inco

me

The

prop

osed

bud

get f

or 2

014-

2015

is $

3.98

billi

on.

Num

ber

of

staf

f8,

000,

spr

ead

over

hea

dqua

rter

s, re

gion

al o

ffice

s an

d co

untr

ies.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipP

ast d

irect

or-g

ener

als

wer

e: B

. Chi

shol

m (f

rom

Can

ada,

194

8-19

53);

M.G

. C

anda

u (B

razi

l, 19

53-1

973)

; H. M

ahle

r (D

enm

ark,

197

3-19

88);

H. N

akaj

ima

(Jap

an, 1

988-

1998

); G

.H. B

rund

tland

(Nor

way

, 199

8-20

03);

Lee

Jong

-woo

k (R

epub

lic o

f Kor

ea, 2

003-

2006

[die

d in

offi

ce])

and

And

ers

Nor

dstr

öm (S

wed

en,

2006

-200

7 [a

ctin

g D

G, r

epla

cing

Lee

]).

Mar

gare

t Cha

n, th

e cu

rren

t DG

, was

app

oint

ed o

n 9

Nov

embe

r 20

06.

Ther

e ha

ve b

een

no o

utw

ard

scan

dals

rega

rdin

g an

y of

the

lead

ers.

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Und

er C

han’

s le

ader

ship

, WH

O h

as u

nder

take

n m

ajor

fina

ncia

l, m

anag

eria

l and

go

vern

ance

-rel

ated

refo

rm, l

ayin

g ou

t its

pro

ject

ed ti

mel

ine,

inte

rmed

iate

che

ck-in

po

ints

and

gui

delin

es. T

his

refo

rm h

as b

een

both

inte

rnal

and

ext

erna

l-fac

ing,

the

latt

er c

over

ing

WH

O’s

act

iviti

es w

ith e

xter

nal s

take

hold

ers,

incl

udin

g co

untr

ies

and

non-

stat

e en

titie

s.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

The

re is

no

evid

ence

of a

“te

rms

of re

fere

nce”

onl

ine

or in

any

pub

lic

reco

rd. H

owev

er, t

he W

orld

Hea

lth O

rgan

izat

ion

has

a de

taile

d,

thor

ough

pro

cess

of n

omin

atin

g an

d el

ectin

g th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al,

the

deta

ils o

f whi

ch a

re o

n th

e w

ebsi

te, a

nd p

art o

f the

pub

lic re

cord

s.

This

pro

cess

incl

udes

the

step

s ne

cess

ary

for

mem

ber

stat

es to

no

min

ate

an a

ppro

pria

te c

andi

date

, det

ails

of t

he q

ualifi

catio

ns n

eede

d to

be

a ca

ndid

ate,

spe

cific

dea

dlin

es a

nd in

terv

iew

gui

delin

es.32

2

Ther

e is

a la

rge,

ong

oing

dis

cuss

ion

on th

e el

ectio

n of

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

, and

it h

as b

een

high

-leve

l ag

enda

item

in th

e 13

2nd

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

mee

ting

in 2

013.

The

cur

rent

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

has

bee

n a

stro

ng p

ropo

nent

of b

ringi

ng c

larit

y to

the

proc

ess

of s

elec

tion,

and

has

suc

ceed

ing

in m

akin

g ke

y ch

ange

s to

ens

ure

grea

ter

tran

spar

ency

. Th

e un

ique

asp

ect o

f WH

O is

that

all

the

Reg

iona

l D

irect

ors

(RD

s) a

re a

lso

elec

ted

by th

e m

embe

r st

ates

of t

he re

spec

tive

regi

on, a

s op

pose

d to

nom

inat

ed th

roug

h ot

her

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

or

gani

zatio

ns

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip e

lect

ion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

The

Wor

ld H

ealth

Ass

embl

y (c

ompo

sed

of a

ll 19

4 co

untr

ies)

ele

cts

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

, on

the

reco

mm

enda

tion

of th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd

(com

pose

d of

34

mem

bers

).

The

mem

bers

hip

of th

e E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd is

ske

wed

be

caus

e th

e w

eigh

ting

give

n to

diff

eren

t reg

ions

is

not

bas

ed o

n po

pula

tion,

but

rat

her

on th

e nu

mbe

r of

mem

ber

stat

es in

that

regi

on. T

here

is

als

o co

nsid

erab

le v

aria

bilit

y in

the

cons

ulta

tive

proc

edur

es b

y re

gion

. The

re h

as b

een

som

e fru

stra

tion

by L

atin

Am

eric

a, A

frica

and

Sou

th A

sia

due

to a

lack

of D

irect

or-G

ener

al re

pres

entin

g th

ese

regi

ons,

but

it w

as b

ecau

se m

ost c

ount

ries

not

supp

ortin

g th

eir

bids

.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

elec

tion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes,

the

abov

e-m

entio

ned

docu

men

ts li

st o

ut th

e ex

act p

roce

dure

s,

incl

udin

g a

time-

line

and

othe

r de

tails

for

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion.

It

lays

out

inst

ruct

ions

for

cand

idat

es to

pro

vide

sup

port

ing

evid

ence

to

mat

ch e

ach

of th

e pu

blis

hed

crite

ria fo

r th

e po

st o

f the

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al. T

here

are

als

o se

t gui

delin

es to

sub

mit

a cu

rric

ulum

vita

e an

d ot

her

inst

itutio

naliz

ed p

roce

sses

.

Ther

e is

als

o an

exh

aust

ive

docu

men

t whi

ch la

ys

out a

cod

e of

con

duct

to p

rom

ote

ethi

cal p

ract

ices

an

d tr

ansp

aren

cy th

roug

hout

the

nom

inat

ion/

elec

tion

proc

ess.

323

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

The

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

put

fort

h a

clea

r lis

t of p

erso

nal e

xpec

tatio

ns fr

om

her

tenu

re w

hich

she

sha

red

publ

icly

at t

he s

tart

of h

er te

rm

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

No

avai

labl

e in

form

atio

n


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?N

o in

form

atio

n av

aila

ble

publ

icly

Eve

ry s

taff,

P5

and

abov

e (in

clud

ing

the

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al) h

as to

dec

lare

con

flict

s of

inte

rest

ann

ually

. Th

is p

roce

ss is

con

duct

ed b

y th

e le

gal t

eam

in

tern

ally

, and

is v

ery

stric

t hav

ing

been

upd

ated

re

cent

ly. T

hese

dec

lara

tions

are

con

fiden

tial

in n

atur

e, b

ut th

e or

gani

zatio

n is

look

ing

into

pu

blis

hing

them

in th

e fu

ture

, bas

ed o

n th

e U

nite

d N

atio

ns m

odel

.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Th

ere

is a

cod

e of

con

duct

and

ext

ensi

ve r

ules

and

regu

latio

ns

gove

rnin

g W

HO

sta

ff,32

4 ho

wev

er, t

here

is n

othi

ng s

peci

fical

ly d

etai

led

for

seni

or le

ader

ship

.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Ther

e is

no

men

tion

of a

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

on

the

publ

ic p

orta

l. H

owev

er, t

he c

urre

nt D

irect

or-G

ener

al p

ublis

hed

a se

lf-as

sess

men

t of h

er o

wn

perfo

rman

ce a

t the

cul

min

atio

n of

her

fir

st te

rm, w

here

all

her

man

date

s at

the

time

of h

er e

lect

ion

wer

e co

mpa

red

to h

er a

chie

vem

ents

. Alth

ough

, thi

s ap

prai

sal w

asn’

t co

nduc

ted

obje

ctiv

ely,

it s

till l

ays

out s

ome

perfo

rman

ce m

etric

s.

Ther

e is

a v

ery

robu

st p

erfo

rman

ce p

rogr

amm

e th

roug

hout

the

orga

niza

tion

at e

very

leve

l. M

OPA

N re

view

has

hig

hlig

hted

big

cha

nges

bei

ng

unde

rtak

en b

y H

R to

impr

ove

the

proc

ess;

how

ever

, th

ere

is n

o fo

rmal

sys

tem

of a

ppra

isal

of t

he

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

. She

has

pre

viou

sly

cond

ucte

d he

r pe

rson

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

pub

licly

but

as

it is

a

self-

eval

uatio

n, it

is n

ot in

here

ntly

un-

bias

ed.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

A g

uide

for

man

ager

s in

app

lyin

g W

HO

per

form

ance

com

pete

ncie

s ha

s be

en is

sued

. A p

olic

y on

rew

ards

and

reco

gniti

on w

ill be

issu

ed

shor

tly. F

urth

erm

ore,

a g

uide

to h

elp

supe

rvis

ors

man

age

perfo

rman

ce

is in

the

final

sta

ges

of d

evel

opm

ent.32

5

WH

O o

pera

tes

at th

e sa

me

pay

scal

e as

the

rest

of

the

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

sys

tem

, par

ticul

arly

in li

ne

with

the

UN

DP.

In p

ract

ice,

WH

O p

artia

lly fo

llow

s a

mod

el o

f rem

uner

atio

n tie

d to

out

com

es o

f the

pe

rform

ance

man

agem

ent a

nd th

ere

are

som

e w

ithin

-gra

de p

ay in

crea

ses

for

high

per

form

ance

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

A g

loba

l eLe

arni

ng p

latfo

rm w

ill be

laun

ched

in S

epte

mbe

r th

is y

ear.

Pro

posa

ls fo

r th

e de

velo

pmen

t of a

man

agem

ent d

evel

opm

ent

prog

ram

me

are

curr

ently

bei

ng e

valu

ated

.326

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

sel

ecte

d th

e G

loba

l Lea

ders

hip

Com

mitt

ee h

erse

lf an

d th

ere

is m

uch

mor

e fo

cus

on le

ader

ship

ski

lls a

nd m

anag

emen

t (e-

lear

ning

, gr

oup

lear

ning

and

men

tors

hip

prog

ram

mes

). Th

ere

is a

two

year

pro

gram

me

for

seni

or m

anag

emen

t in

clud

ing

coac

hing

, tra

inin

g an

d m

anag

emen

t ski

lls

but t

his

is n

ot th

e ca

se fo

r th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al.


IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t cr

iteria

con

side

red

by th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

the

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess?

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

pre

sent

ed h

er o

rigin

al p

riorit

ies

and

man

date

w

hen

she

was

sta

ndin

g up

for

elec

tion

for

her

first

term

. At t

he re

-ap

poin

tmen

t for

her

sec

ond

term

, she

pre

sent

ed a

doc

umen

t with

a

self-

asse

ssm

ent o

f how

wel

l she

per

form

ed o

n th

ose

prio

ritie

s. T

his

was

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt th

roug

h th

e re

-nom

inat

ion

proc

ess.

327 Th

ese

wer

e no

t spe

cific

ally

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent,

but h

ow w

ell t

he

orga

niza

tion,

und

er h

er le

ader

ship

, tac

kled

the

maj

or c

halle

nges

.

It w

as g

ener

ally

laud

ed th

at th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al

star

ted

the

proc

ess

of s

elf-

eval

uatio

n, b

ut th

is

shou

ld b

e ex

pand

ed to

the

regi

onal

-dire

ctor

s as

w

ell.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

wan

ts to

cre

ate

an

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

n sy

stem

for

her

posi

tion

at a

la

ter

stag

e as

wel

l.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e is

opp

ortu

nity

to s

tand

up

agai

nst t

he in

cum

bent

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al in

a re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s an

d ea

ch c

andi

date

is e

valu

ated

on

the

sam

e ob

ject

ive

scal

e as

is u

sed

for

a ne

w e

lect

ion.

The

re h

ave

been

cas

es o

f sitt

ing

Reg

iona

l Dire

ctor

s be

ing

chal

leng

ed b

y ot

her

qual

ified

can

dida

tes.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

was

not

cha

lleng

ed a

t the

pr

evio

us re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s si

nce

she

had

prov

ed

hers

elf t

o be

a s

tron

g ca

ndid

ate,

the

oppo

rtun

ity to

pu

t for

war

d ot

her

cand

idat

es e

xist

ed.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces

1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

Ther

e ar

e so

me

“cor

e fu

nctio

ns”

that

are

spe

cifie

d in

the

orga

niza

tion,

th

at h

ave

been

set

out

in th

e G

ener

al P

rogr

amm

e of

Wor

k an

d th

at

cove

r a

10 y

ear

perio

d (2

006–

2015

).328

Thes

e ar

e re

lativ

ely

un-

chan

geab

le s

ince

this

has

bee

n de

cide

d as

long

-ter

m ‘r

aiso

n d’

être

’ of

the

orga

niza

tion.

How

ever

, the

cur

rent

DG

has

spe

cifie

d he

r ow

n pr

iorit

ies

stem

min

g fro

m th

ese

core

func

tions

, and

has

ask

ed to

be

eval

uate

d on

thes

e sp

ecifi

c pr

iorit

ies.

“I w

ant m

y le

ader

ship

to b

e ju

dged

by

the

impa

ct o

f our

wor

k on

the

heal

th o

f tw

o po

pula

tions

: w

omen

and

the

peop

le o

f Afri

ca.”

– M

arga

ret C

han32

9 Th

ere

is a

lso

a W

HO

refo

rm p

roce

ss b

eing

und

erta

ken,

of w

hich

a m

ajor

com

pone

nt

is im

prov

ed h

ealth

out

com

es, i

n lin

e w

ith th

e ag

reed

glo

bal h

ealth

pr

iorit

ies.

As

a st

rand

in th

e re

form

pro

cess

, WH

O is

wor

king

with

its

mem

ber

stat

es to

set

prio

ritie

s fo

r its

wor

k in

ord

er to

focu

s its

ac

tiviti

es a

nd d

eliv

er m

ore

effe

ctiv

ely.

330

Ther

efor

e, it

can

be

said

th

at b

oth

the

lead

ersh

ip a

nd th

e m

embe

r st

ates

do

have

a c

erta

in

disc

retio

n to

tailo

r th

e co

re fu

nctio

ns in

to s

trat

egic

prio

ritie

s ac

cord

ing

to c

urre

nt re

aliti

es a

nd n

atio

nal/i

nter

natio

nal p

riorit

ies.

Ther

e is

no

auth

ority

to c

hang

e th

e m

anda

te a

way

fro

m h

ealth

, for

exa

mpl

e to

topi

cs s

uch

as tr

ade

or

agric

ultu

re.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes,

ther

e is

a p

roce

ss to

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew p

riorit

ies

as

disc

usse

d ab

ove.

Eve

ry D

G c

an p

riorit

ize

cert

ain

spec

ific

stra

tegi

es/

dise

ases

or

aspe

cts

durin

g th

eir

tenu

re, a

nd th

ere

is a

pro

cess

dur

ing

the

Wor

ld H

ealth

Ass

embl

y w

here

mem

ber-

stat

es c

an h

ave

inpu

t int

o th

e st

rate

gic

prio

rity

sett

ing.

331

Ext

ra-O

rdin

ary

mee

tings

of t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd

have

bee

n ca

lled

in th

e pa

st fo

r ch

angi

ng s

trat

egie

s.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

76%

of W

HO

’s fu

nds

are

‘vol

unta

ry c

ontr

ibut

ions

’ with

mos

t of t

hem

be

ing

high

ly s

peci

fied

as to

whi

ch d

epar

tmen

t or

heal

th in

terv

entio

n th

ey s

houl

d be

use

d fo

r. (h

ttp:

//w

hqlib

doc.

who

.int/

pb/2

012-

2013

/P

B_2

012%

E2%

80%

9320

13_e

ng.p

df )

The

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

is tr

ying

to e

nsur

e a

fully

-fin

ance

d bu

dget

, thr

ough

the

Fina

ncin

g D

ialo

gue

Initi

ativ

e. C

urre

ntly

, som

e pa

rts

of th

e bu

dget

are

ov

er-f

unde

d an

d so

me

are

unde

r-fu

nded

. Acc

ordi

ng

to Ia

n S

mith

, Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

or, D

irect

or G

ener

al’s

O

ffice

, the

crit

ical

ele

men

ts to

a fi

nanc

ed b

udge

t is

pred

icta

bilit

y an

d al

ignm

ent.

It is

ess

entia

l tha

t we

know

how

muc

h m

oney

we

have

, and

whe

n w

e w

ill re

ceiv

e it.

Add

ition

ally

, it i

s im

port

ant t

hat t

he

reso

urce

s ar

e al

igne

d w

ith th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

wor

k,

with

the

regi

ons,

sta

ffing

and

act

iviti

es. T

he W

HO

is

dev

elop

ing

a po

rtal

whi

ch w

ill be

tran

spar

ent,

show

ing

all t

he re

sour

ces,

whe

re th

ey h

ave

been

sp

ent a

nd to

wha

t the

y ha

ve b

een

dedi

cate

d to

. Th

is is

not

a u

niqu

e id

ea (U

ND

P h

as a

mul

ti-do

nor

trus

t fun

d w

ebsi

te a

s an

exa

mpl

e), b

ut w

ill be

so

met

hing

new

for

WH

O.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes,

the

orga

niza

tion

cond

ucts

and

pub

lishe

s a

“sta

keho

lder

sur

vey”

w

hich

incl

udes

bot

h ex

tern

al s

take

hold

ers

and

inte

rnal

sta

ff. T

he

resu

lts a

re p

ublis

hed

in a

repo

rt, a

vaila

ble

on th

e w

ebsi

te. I

t see

ms

that

from

the

2012

sur

vey,

one

of t

he k

ey fi

ndin

gs w

as th

at “

21%

of

ext

erna

l and

25%

of i

nter

nal r

espo

nden

ts h

ave

doub

ts re

gard

ing

WH

O’s

abi

lity

to ta

ke th

e ne

cess

ary

mea

sure

s to

ens

ure

the

inde

pend

ence

of i

ts p

ublic

hea

lth e

xper

ts, s

imila

r pr

opor

tions

voi

ced

conc

erns

abo

ut W

HO

’s in

depe

nden

ce fr

om in

appr

opria

te in

dust

ry

influ

ence

.” T

he fu

ll re

port

with

the

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs is

als

o on

the

web

site

. (ht

tp:/

/ww

w.w

ho.in

t/ab

out/

who

_per

cept

ion_

surv

ey_2

012.

pdf)

Ther

e is

ano

ther

sur

vey

calle

d th

e “P

erce

ptio

n S

urve

y” th

at is

led

by th

e D

epar

tmen

t of

Com

mun

icat

ions

, led

by

an e

xter

nal a

genc

y. It

is

shar

ed w

idel

y in

tern

ally

and

wid

ely

disc

usse

d by

th

e A

ssis

tant

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

s an

d th

e R

egio

nal

Dire

ctor

s.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

This

is p

art o

f the

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent s

yste

m

(PM

DS

) and

is ta

ken

into

acc

ount

info

rmal

ly.


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

man

agem

ent t

o en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

WH

O is

fairl

y co

nser

vativ

e in

this

mat

ter.

Ther

e is

an

ong

oing

pro

cess

of r

efor

m fo

r en

gagi

ng in

non

-st

ate

acto

rs. T

he c

ateg

orie

s of

eng

agem

ent a

re

the

follo

win

g: 1

) Gov

erna

nce

(whe

re s

take

hold

ers

can

enga

ge in

gov

erna

nce

mat

ters

of W

HO

), 2)

C

olla

bora

tion

(join

t wor

k-pl

an, p

roje

cts,

offi

cial

re

latio

ns w

ith N

GO

s et

c.),

3) C

onsu

ltatio

n (m

ore

ad-

hoc,

due

-dilig

ence

, con

flict

of i

nter

est,

deve

lopm

ent

of s

tand

ards

, sha

ring

of in

form

atio

n, e

xper

tise

and

know

-how

), 4)

Fin

ance

(non

-sta

te a

ctor

s ca

n m

ake

a co

ntrib

utio

n to

WH

O),

5) C

ontr

acts

giv

en to

the

priv

ate

sect

or fo

r ca

rryi

ng o

ut s

peci

fic p

iece

s of

w

ork.

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

exec

utiv

e m

anag

emen

t tho

roug

hly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

WH

O is

com

mitt

ed to

a p

rogr

am o

f reg

ular

ev

alua

tions

, mai

ntai

ning

inde

pend

ence

, and

en

gagi

ng in

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

ns. t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd w

ill co

nduc

t and

eva

luat

e th

ese

for

the

WH

O.


k. W

orl

d T

rad

e O

rgan

izat

ion

(WT

O)

Org

aniz

atio

nR

epla

cing

the

Gen

eral

Agr

eem

ent o

n Ta

riffs

and

Tra

de, t

he W

TO is

the

mul

tilat

eral

fo

rum

for

nego

tiatin

g gl

obal

trad

e ag

reem

ents

and

ens

urin

g th

at th

e ru

les

of

inte

rnat

iona

l tra

de a

re c

orre

ctly

app

lied

and

enfo

rced

.332

Go

vern

ance

The

WTO

des

crib

es it

self

as “

a ru

les-

base

d, m

embe

r-dr

iven

org

aniz

atio

n –

all

deci

sion

s ar

e m

ade

by M

embe

rs, a

nd th

e ru

les

are

the

outc

ome

of n

egot

iatio

ns

amon

g M

embe

rs”.

333

All

160

mem

ber

coun

trie

s m

ay p

artic

ipat

e in

all

coun

cils

an

d co

mm

ittee

s, e

xcep

t the

dis

pute

set

tlem

ent p

roce

dure

s an

d th

e co

mm

ittee

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r pl

urila

tera

l agr

eem

ents

. Whi

le W

TO a

gree

men

t for

esee

s th

e us

e of

vot

es w

hen

cons

ensu

s ca

nnot

be

reac

hed

in s

ever

al s

peci

fic s

ituat

ions

, co

nsen

sus

dom

inat

es th

e de

cisi

on-m

akin

g pr

oces

s. M

embe

rs m

ake

deci

sion

s re

late

d to

new

rul

es a

nd th

eir

impl

emen

tatio

n, a

s w

ell a

s to

org

aniz

atio

nal m

atte

rs

such

as

the

budg

et a

nd a

ctiv

ities

of t

he s

ecre

taria

t, an

d on

the

appo

intm

ent o

f th

e di

rect

or-g

ener

al (D

G).33

4

The

Min

iste

rial C

onfe

renc

e, w

hich

mus

t mee

t at l

east

onc

e ev

ery

two

year

s, is

m

ost i

mpo

rtan

t. Th

e co

nfer

ence

can

take

dec

isio

ns o

n al

l mat

ters

und

er a

ny o

f th

e m

ultil

ater

al tr

ade

agre

emen

ts. T

he G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eets

regu

larly

in G

enev

a to

car

ry o

ut W

TO fu

nctio

ns; i

t has

repr

esen

tativ

es fr

om a

ll m

embe

r go

vern

men

ts,

and

has

the

auth

ority

to a

ct o

n be

half

of th

e m

inis

teria

l con

fere

nce.

The

WTO

ha

s th

ree

furt

her

coun

cils

and

ove

r 20

com

mitt

ees

rele

vant

to th

e va

rious

WTO

ag

reem

ents

and

the

secr

etar

iat’s

act

iviti

es; t

hrou

gh th

ese

grou

ps, m

embe

rs m

ake

deci

sion

s, m

onito

r pr

ogre

ss a

nd c

arry

out

the

orga

niza

tion’

s da

y-to

-day

wor

k.

Alth

ough

not

a fo

rmal

par

t of t

he W

TO s

truc

ture

, a tr

ade

nego

tiatio

ns c

omm

ittee

, ch

aire

d by

the

DG

, was

est

ablis

hed

by m

embe

rs in

the

cont

ext o

f the

Doh

a R

ound

of t

rade

neg

otia

tions

. In

the

proc

ess

of n

egot

iatio

ns, W

TO m

embe

rs,

vario

us c

omm

ittee

cha

irs a

nd th

e D

G c

onve

ne a

ran

ge o

f diff

eren

t inf

orm

al

grou

ps a

nd p

roce

sses

, suc

h as

“G

reen

Roo

ms”

, whi

ch a

re c

ompr

ised

of

vario

us c

onfig

urat

ions

of m

embe

rs w

ith th

e ai

m o

f infl

uenc

ing

nego

tiatio

ns a

nd

build

ing

cons

ensu

s. T

his

can

then

faci

litat

e de

cisi

on-m

akin

g in

the

form

al W

TO

com

mitt

ees.

The

secr

etar

iat i

s he

aded

by

the

DG

and

pro

vide

s su

ppor

t to

WTO

mem

bers

on

all

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

activ

ities

. As

only

mem

bers

mak

e de

cisi

ons,

the

secr

etar

iat h

as n

o de

cisi

on-m

akin

g po

wer

s w

ith re

gard

to th

e co

nten

t, co

mpl

etio

n

or im

plem

enta

tion

of W

TO a

gree

men

ts. T

he s

ecre

taria

t doe

s, h

owev

er, m

ake

inte

rnal

man

agem

ent d

ecis

ions

rele

vant

to im

plem

entin

g th

e w

ork

prog

ram

me

and

budg

et a

ppro

ved

by m

embe

rs.

Leng

th o

f le

ader

ship

man

dat

eFo

ur y

ears

; can

be

rene

wed

onc

e.

Inco

me

Tota

l bud

get f

or 2

013

was

CH

F 19

7.2

milli

on.

Num

ber

of

staf

fIn

the

secr

etar

iat:

639,

from

77

coun

trie

s (a

s of

Mar

ch 2

013)

.

His

tory

of

lead

ersh

ipTh

e W

TO le

ader

ship

app

oint

men

t pro

cess

is o

pen

and

com

petit

ive,

in th

at a

ny

mem

ber

coun

try

can

put f

orw

ard

a ca

ndid

ate.

An

unde

rsta

ndin

g ex

ists

am

ong

coun

trie

s th

at th

e po

sitio

n sh

ould

alte

rnat

e be

twee

n de

velo

ped

and

deve

lopi

ng

coun

try

mem

bers

.335

WTO

’s fi

rst D

G w

as P

eter

Sut

herla

nd (f

rom

Irel

and,

199

3-19

95).

Div

isio

n an

d de

adlo

ck a

risin

g fro

m th

e fa

ilure

of m

embe

rs to

reac

h co

nsen

sus

on a

new

D

G re

sulte

d in

the

shor

tene

d te

rm o

f Ren

ato

Rug

gier

o (It

aly,

199

5-19

98) a

nd a

te

rm-s

harin

g ag

reem

ent b

etw

een

Mik

e M

oore

(New

Zea

land

, 199

8/9-

2002

) and

S

upac

hai P

anitc

hpak

di (T

haila

nd, 2

002-

2005

). Th

e su

bseq

uent

two

DG

s w

ere

Pas

cal L

amy

(Fra

nce,

200

5-20

13; r

eapp

oint

ed in

200

9) a

nd R

ober

to A

zevê

do

(Bra

zil,

2013

-pre

sent

).

In 1

994-

1995

, the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

resi

sted

Rug

gier

o’s

sele

ctio

n on

the

grou

nds

that

th

e ap

poin

tmen

t of a

n Ita

lian

wou

ld v

iola

te a

n in

form

al u

nder

stan

ding

that

Eur

opea

n D

Gs

shou

ld n

ot b

e fro

m o

ne o

f the

larg

e E

urop

ean

econ

omie

s. In

the

late

199

0s,

disc

ord

amon

g m

embe

rs re

sulte

d in

a d

ecis

ion

to s

plit

the

term

bet

wee

n tw

o D

Gs

– on

e fro

m a

dev

elop

ed a

nd th

e ot

her

from

a d

evel

opin

g co

untr

y.

Cur

rent

tra

ject

ory

Aze

vêdo

’s p

ositi

on a

s D

G s

tart

ed o

n 1

Sep

tem

ber

2013

. In

2014

, he

inte

nds

to

unde

rtak

e a

com

preh

ensi

ve o

rgan

izat

iona

l rev

iew

, inc

ludi

ng o

n go

vern

ance

and

st

rate

gy (b

ut e

ssen

tially

on

staf

fing)

.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n p

roce

ss s

earc

hes

and

test

s fo

r sp

ecifi

c, re

leva

nt c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for

lead

ersh

ip

onlin

e?

Term

s of

refe

renc

e ar

e no

t ava

ilabl

e on

line.

How

ever

, the

role

of t

he

DG

is d

efine

d in

bro

ad te

rms

in W

TO le

gal t

exts

, whi

ch a

re a

vaila

ble

on th

e w

ebsi

te.33

6 A

200

2 G

ener

al C

ounc

il de

cisi

on in

200

2 (d

ocum

ent W

T/L/

509)

de

fines

requ

ired

qual

ifica

tions

for

the

job.

337

Term

s of

refe

renc

e ar

e pu

blis

hed

with

the

notic

e in

vitin

g ca

ndid

atur

es fo

r D

G, i

.e. w

ith “

Vaca

ncy

Not

ice”

; thi

s is

pos

ted

on-li

ne.33

8 In

tere

stin

gly,

the

Enh

ance

d In

tegr

ated

Fra

mew

ork

(a W

TO-r

elat

ed o

rgan

izat

ion

for

the

deliv

ery

of

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

and

capa

city

bui

ldin

g to

de

velo

ping

cou

ntrie

s) h

as s

ever

al p

ublic

ly a

vaila

ble

TOR

s.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Dec

isio

ns –

incl

udin

g D

G s

elec

tion

– ar

e m

ade

by c

onse

nsus

of a

ll m

embe

rs. T

here

fore

, all

Mem

bers

can

be

invo

lved

in th

e le

ader

ship

ap

poin

tmen

t and

reap

poin

tmen

t pro

cess

.

The

degr

ee o

f inv

olve

men

t by

Mem

bers

var

ies

wid

ely

depe

ndin

g on

thei

r ca

paci

ties

in te

rms

of

hum

an re

sour

ces

and

thei

r ec

onom

ic/p

oliti

cal

sign

ifica

nce

in th

e sy

stem

. Alth

ough

man

y in

form

al

and

form

al o

ppor

tuni

ties

exis

t, th

e de

gree

of

enga

gem

ent a

nd in

fluen

ce v

arie

s. S

ome

grou

ps,

such

as

the

Afri

can

Gro

up, c

olle

ctiv

ely

wei

gh in

for

part

icul

ar c

andi

date

s as

the

proc

ess

adva

nces

.339

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for

lead

ersh

ip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

The

“200

2 de

cisi

on”

desc

ribes

in d

etai

l the

lead

ersh

ip a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess.

It la

ys o

ut a

cle

ar ti

mef

ram

e fo

r a

proc

ess

to c

omm

ence

9

mon

ths

befo

re a

nd b

e co

mpl

eted

3 m

onth

s be

fore

the

expi

ry o

f an

incu

mbe

nt’s

term

. Onl

y m

embe

r co

untr

ies

can

nom

inat

e ca

ndid

ates

, w

ho m

ust b

e th

eir

own

natio

nals

, and

nom

inat

ions

mus

t be

mad

e w

ithin

one

mon

th o

f the

sta

rt o

f the

pro

cess

. Th

ere

is a

n ag

reed

des

crip

tion

of th

e re

quire

d qu

alifi

catio

ns fo

r th

e po

st, w

ith “

the

desi

rabi

lity

of re

flect

ing

the

dive

rsity

of t

he W

TO’s

m

embe

rshi

p in

suc

cess

ive

appo

intm

ents

to th

e po

st”

also

list

ed a

s an

exp

licit

fact

or to

be

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt. C

andi

date

s pr

ovid

e C

Vs,

an

d m

eet w

ith a

nd m

ake

pres

enta

tions

to th

e W

TO G

ener

al C

ounc

il.

Then

in th

e fin

al tw

o m

onth

s of

the

proc

ess

the

Cha

ir of

the

Cou

ncil,

as

sist

ed b

y th

e C

hair

of th

e D

ispu

te S

ettle

men

t Bod

y an

d C

hair

of th

e Tr

ade

Pol

icy

Rev

iew

Bod

y as

Fac

ilitat

ors,

con

sult

with

mem

bers

and

se

eks

to b

uild

a c

onse

nsus

. The

re is

a p

rovi

sion

for

the

Cou

ncil

to v

ote

if a

cons

ensu

s ca

nnot

be

reac

hed

in th

e ap

poin

ted

time.

340

In th

e re

cent

app

oint

men

t pro

cess

, WTO

mem

bers

offi

cial

ly n

omin

ated

9

cand

idat

es fo

r th

e po

st o

f the

new

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

from

1 to

31

Dec

embe

r 20

12. A

ll th

e ca

ndid

ates

mad

e a

pres

enta

tion

on th

eir

visi

on fo

r th

e W

TO a

t a G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

g in

Jan

uary

201

3. T

he

appo

intm

ent p

roce

ss c

oncl

uded

with

a G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

g on

14

May

201

3, a

t whi

ch th

e re

com

men

datio

n to

app

oint

Rob

erto

Aze

vêdo

as

the

new

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

was

app

rove

d.

Dur

ing

the

two

mon

ths

of c

onse

nsus

bui

ldin

g un

dert

aken

by

the

Cha

ir of

the

Gen

eral

Cou

ncil,

th

e tr

ansp

aren

cy a

nd o

ppor

tuni

ties

for

part

icip

atio

n de

pend

on

the

spec

ific

proc

esse

s pu

rsue

d by

the

Cha

ir. T

he p

roce

ss a

nd c

riter

ia b

y w

hich

Cha

irs

conc

lude

that

can

dida

tes

are

rem

oved

from

the

shor

t-lis

t is

not a

lway

s tr

ansp

aren

t.341


II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tr

ansp

aren

t and

con

sist

ent?

No

offic

ial p

roce

dure

in p

lace

. Alth

ough

the

new

DG

gen

eral

ly d

eliv

ers

a st

atem

ent t

o ou

tline

his

vis

ion

and

goal

s, a

s w

ell a

s hi

s fo

rmal

ob

ligat

ions

, in

front

of t

he G

ener

al C

ounc

il, th

ere

is n

o pr

oces

s fo

r se

ttin

g cl

ear

perfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns o

r re

view

.

The

deba

tes

over

the

role

of t

he D

G a

nd th

e ap

poin

tees

’ sco

pe fo

r ta

king

lead

ersh

ip c

ompl

icat

e th

e ab

ility

of th

e le

ader

to s

et c

lear

exp

ecta

tions

of

them

selv

es a

nd g

oals

. Man

y m

embe

rs a

re re

luct

ant

to s

ee th

e D

G ta

ke a

n ac

tion

or in

itiat

ive

that

is n

ot

sim

ply

the

impl

emen

tatio

n of

dec

isio

ns ta

ken

by th

e M

embe

rshi

p. G

iven

deb

ates

on

the

broa

der

mis

sion

an

d pu

rpos

e of

the

orga

niza

tion

limit

the

polit

ical

sc

ope

for

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

to e

xplic

itly

lay

out a

cl

ear

agen

da fo

r ac

tion

or c

hang

e.34

2

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r st

rate

gy?

Yes.

As

part

of t

he s

elec

tion

proc

ess,

all

cand

idat

es n

omin

ated

for

the

posi

tion

of D

irect

or-G

ener

al m

ake

a pr

esen

tatio

n of

thei

r vi

sion

fo

r th

e W

TO a

t a G

ener

al C

ounc

il, a

nd a

gain

upo

n th

eir

appo

intm

ent.

For

exam

ple,

Rob

erto

Aze

vêdo

gav

e hi

s vi

sion

spe

ech

to th

e G

ener

al

Cou

ncil

on 9

Sep

tem

ber.34

3 Th

is is

als

o do

ne th

roug

h th

e an

nual

bu

dget

pro

posa

l to

mem

bers

.344

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

is e

xpec

ted

to re

port

to

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

at th

e re

gula

r G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

gs o

n pr

ogre

ss a

nd a

ctiv

ities

of t

he

Sec

reta

riat.

A fu

rthe

r in

stru

men

t is

the

elab

orat

ion

of

WTO

Ann

ual R

epor

t, su

perv

ised

by

the

DG

, whi

ch

sum

mar

izes

the

prog

ram

mes

and

act

iviti

es o

f the

or

gani

zatio

n.34

5

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Th

e di

sclo

sure

pol

icy

only

ava

ilabl

e in

tern

ally

. E

xecu

tive

man

agem

ent,

like

all s

taff

mem

bers

, are

ex

pect

ed to

abi

de b

y th

e co

de o

f cor

e va

lues

. The

S

taff

Rul

es a

lso

requ

ire th

at s

taff

seek

aut

horiz

atio

n fo

r ou

tsid

e ac

tiviti

es a

nd d

iscl

ose

any

pote

ntia

l fin

anci

al in

tere

sts.

346

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. H

owev

er, t

he c

ode

of c

ore

ethi

cs is

onl

y ci

rcul

ated

inte

rnal

ly.

The

code

of c

ore

valu

es o

f the

WTO

Sec

reta

riat

exis

ts in

tern

ally

and

all

staf

f are

requ

ired

to s

ign

the

oath

of o

ffice

upo

n en

try

into

the

orga

niza

tion.

347

The

new

ly a

ppoi

nted

DG

has

sig

ned

the

Oat

h of

O

ffice

. A tr

aini

ng m

anua

l on

WTO

cor

e va

lues

is

avai

labl

e to

all

staf

f.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

prog

ram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Not

at t

he le

vel o

f DG

. Dire

ctor

s, h

owev

er, a

re s

ubje

cted

.D

irect

ors’

per

form

ance

s ar

e as

sess

ed b

y th

e D

G

or re

spec

tive

DD

G th

roug

h th

e an

nual

per

form

ance

ev

alua

tion

repo

rt.34

8 Th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al p

lans

to

unde

rtak

e an

obj

ectiv

e ca

scad

ing

exer

cise

sta

rtin

g ne

xt y

ear.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No

evid

ence

.W

hile

ther

e is

a P

erfo

rman

ce R

ewar

ds s

chem

e fo

r st

aff m

embe

rs, t

his

is n

ot a

pplic

able

to D

irect

ors,

D

eput

y D

irect

ors

Gen

eral

and

the

DG

.349


3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

Yes,

upo

n re

ques

t.350

Coa

chin

g an

d ex

ecut

ive

man

agem

ent s

essi

ons

by

exte

rnal

coa

ches

are

offe

red

to s

enio

r m

anag

emen

t up

on re

ques

t. S

enio

r E

xecu

tive

Ret

reat

s (fo

r D

G; D

DG

s an

d D

irect

ors)

hav

e be

en in

trod

uced

to

dis

cuss

ope

nly

and

colle

ctiv

ely

the

WTO

’s

perfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me

and

deve

lopm

ent f

eedb

ack.

351

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip r

e-el

ectio

n is

bas

ed o

n tr

ansp

aren

t pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes,

if n

ew c

andi

date

s ar

e no

min

ated

. In

pra

ctic

e, a

t the

end

of t

he n

omin

atio

n pe

riod

in

2009

, Pas

cal L

amy

was

the

only

can

dida

te a

nd w

as

re-a

ppoi

nted

.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

rio

ritie

s to

mee

t cha

ngin

g ci

rcum

stan

ces


1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

orga

niza

tion

is m

embe

r-dr

iven

. Hen

ce, i

t is

the

mem

bers

who

set

th

e st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s fo

r WTO

. Yet

the

DG

can

hav

e an

indi

rect

impa

ct

on M

embe

rs’ c

onsi

dera

tion

of th

e O

rgan

izat

ion’

s st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s.

For

exam

ple,

form

er D

irect

or-G

ener

al, P

asca

l Lam

y, c

onve

ned

a pa

nel

on d

efini

ng th

e fu

ture

of t

rade

in A

pril

2012

. The

pan

el re

port

“Th

e Fu

ture

of T

rade

: The

Cha

lleng

es o

f Con

verg

ence

” w

as re

leas

ed in

Apr

il 20

13.35

2 A

t the

sta

rt o

f the

200

8 cr

isis

Lam

y in

itiat

ed a

mon

itorin

g of

pr

otec

tioni

sm, w

hich

was

sub

sequ

ently

val

idat

ed b

y th

e M

embe

rs;

he a

lso

conv

ened

an

expe

rt g

roup

on

trad

e fin

ance

to a

sses

s ne

eds

in th

e m

arke

t and

info

rm p

oten

tial a

ctio

ns to

eas

e ac

cess

to tr

ade

finan

ce.35

3

Vie

ws

on th

e de

sira

ble

scop

e fo

r le

ader

ship

and

in

depe

nden

t act

ion

by th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al v

ary

amon

g M

embe

r S

tate

s an

d de

pend

ing

on th

e is

sue.

Giv

en th

e le

gally

-bin

ding

nat

ure

of W

TO

agre

emen

ts, a

nd th

eir

econ

omic

sig

nific

ance

, mos

t M

embe

rs re

solu

tely

obj

ect t

o th

e no

tion

that

the

DG

sho

uld

have

any

dec

isio

n-m

akin

g au

thor

ity w

ith

resp

ect t

o ne

gotia

tion,

form

atio

n or

impl

emen

tatio

n of

WTO

rul

es. H

owev

er, s

ome

have

arg

ued

that

the

WTO

DG

‘s ro

le s

houl

d be

mor

e cl

early

spe

cifie

d w

ith re

gard

to th

e ne

gotia

tion

proc

ess

– en

ablin

g fo

r in

stan

ce th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al to

form

ally

pro

pose

an

d pu

sh fo

r po

litic

al s

olut

ions

to p

robl

ems

or

brok

er d

eals

to b

ring

nego

tiatio

ns to

a c

lose

. In

prac

tice,

the

DG

is in

volv

ed a

ctiv

ely

in th

e pr

oces

s of

con

sens

us-b

uild

ing

thro

ugh

the

proc

ess

of

chai

ring

info

rmal

Gre

en R

oom

mee

tings

, min

i-m

inis

teria

l and

the

trad

e ne

gotia

tions

Com

mitt

ee.

Thes

e in

form

al p

ract

ices

mee

t with

var

ying

deg

rees

of

sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d ap

prov

al b

y M

embe

rs g

iven

the

subs

tant

ive

diffe

renc

es a

mon

g M

embe

rs o

n w

hat

kind

s of

agr

eem

ents

and

pro

visi

ons

shou

ld b

e pu

rsue

d, a

nd o

ver

the

obje

ctiv

es o

f the

org

aniz

atio

n as

a w

hole

. D

urin

g hi

s te

nure

as

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

, Pas

cal

Lam

y pr

ovid

ed s

trat

egic

lead

ersh

ip to

Mem

bers

on

the

impo

rtan

ce o

f Aid

for

Trad

e, a

nd a

dvoc

ated

to

Mem

bers

the

impo

rtan

ce o

f thi

s in

itiat

ive.

The

ac

hiev

emen

t of t

he la

unch

of t

his

initi

ativ

e is

wid

ely

attr

ibut

ed to

that

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

. Sim

ilarly

, in

the

face

of t

he m

ost r

ecen

t eco

nom

ic c

risis

, the

D

irect

or-G

ener

al a

ppro

ved

an in

itiat

ive

by th

e S

ecre

taria

t to

mon

itor

incr

ease

s in

pro

tect

ioni

sm

amon

g M

embe

r S

tate

s. A

lthou

gh th

e D

G d

id n

ot

form

ally

app

roac

h th

e M

embe

rshi

p fo

r ap

prov

al o

f th

is a

ctio

n, m

ost M

embe

rs a

ppea

r to

con

cur

that

th

is w

as a

use

ful s

trat

egic

effo

rt o

n th

e D

G’s

par

t.354

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

No

evid

ence

.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for

spec

ial i

nitia

tives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

No

earm

arke

d bu

dget

. The

WTO

der

ives

its

inco

me

from

Mem

bers

’ co

ntrib

utio

ns, w

hich

are

bas

ed o

n a

form

ula

that

take

s in

to a

ccou

nt

each

one

’s s

hare

of i

nter

natio

nal t

rade

. Mis

cella

neou

s in

com

e is

min

or

(con

trib

utio

ns fr

om o

bser

vers

and

sal

es).35

5

Som

e M

embe

rs d

o pr

ovid

e ex

tra

budg

etar

y re

sour

ces

to th

e W

TO S

ecre

taria

t and

to th

e E

nhan

ced

Inte

grat

ed F

ram

ewor

k fo

r ca

paci

ty

build

ing

to d

evel

opin

g co

untr

ies,

som

e of

whi

ch a

re

earm

arke

d fo

r sp

ecifi

c tr

aini

ng, t

echn

ical

ass

ista

nce,

or

Aid

for

Trad

e ac

tiviti

es in

par

ticul

ar c

ount

ries.

356

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

dev

elo

p t

alen

t th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n

1D

oes

the

orga

niza

tion

take

sta

ff su

rvey

s to

ass

ess

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d pe

rform

ance

and

do

lead

ers

utiliz

e th

e re

sults

of t

hese

sur

veys

?

Yes,

ther

e ar

e re

gula

r re

port

s on

sta

ff sa

tisfa

ctio

n.35

7

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truc

ture

s th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

en

gag

e w

ith

div

erse

ran

ge

of s

take

hol

der

s

The

maj

or a

nnua

l out

reac

h ev

ent i

s th

e P

ublic

For

um, w

hich

att

ract

s ab

out 1

,000

par

ticip

ants

. Dur

ing

pres

s br

iefin

gs, t

he D

irect

or-G

ener

al re

gula

rly p

rese

nts

rem

arks

. Bey

ond

annu

al e

vent

s, s

uch

as th

e pu

blic

foru

m

and

mee

tings

with

par

liam

enta

rians

, the

org

aniz

atio

n do

es n

ot h

ave

form

al m

echa

nism

s in

tend

ed to

ens

ure

regu

lar

inte

ract

ion

with

sta

keho

lder

s fro

m in

dust

ry, c

ivil

soci

ety

or p

arlia

men

ts. R

athe

r th

ese

occu

r th

roug

h pa

rtic

ipat

ion

in a

d ho

c m

eetin

gs a

nd c

onfe

renc

es a

rran

ged

by th

e S

ecre

taria

t or

the

rele

vant

sta

keho

lder

s.35

8

Ther

e ar

e no

form

al m

echa

nism

s fo

r re

curr

ing

stak

ehol

der

cons

ulta

tions

with

the

DG

or

accr

edita

tion

for

inpu

t in

to th

e w

ork

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n or

ong

oing

neg

otia

tions

. The

WTO

’s re

gula

r co

mm

ittee

s ar

e op

en o

nly

to

Mem

ber

Sta

tes,

alth

ough

sta

keho

lder

s ca

n no

w o

bser

ve s

elec

ted

part

s of

dis

pute

set

tlem

ent p

roce

edin

gs.

The

WTO

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

inte

ract

s in

form

ally

with

th

e he

ads

of m

any

inte

rnat

iona

l org

aniz

atio

ns. T

he

WTO

is n

ot a

spe

cial

ized

UN

age

ncy.

How

ever

the

head

of t

he W

TO d

oes

part

icip

ate

in th

e U

N C

hief

E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd m

eetin

g. T

he W

TO D

G p

artic

ipat

es

in th

e G

20 p

roce

ss, b

ut w

ithou

t a c

lear

man

date

fro

m M

embe

r S

tate

s. T

he p

revi

ous

DG

app

rove

d th

e S

ecre

taria

t’s p

ursu

it of

wor

k w

ith th

e O

EC

D,

the

WH

O a

nd o

ther

inte

rnat

iona

l age

ncie

s on

join

t re

sear

ch a

nd m

onito

ring.

The

WTO

als

o pu

rsue

s jo

int a

ctiv

ities

with

org

aniz

atio

ns s

uch

as W

IPO

on

the

impl

emen

tatio

n of

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

rela

ted

to it

s ag

reem

ents

.M

any

WTO

Com

mitt

ees

incl

ude

IOs

amon

g th

eir

obse

rver

s, b

ut th

ere

is n

o sp

ecifi

c pr

oces

s fo

r th

e W

TO to

eng

age

with

hea

ds o

f oth

er IO

s. T

his

norm

ally

occ

urs

thro

ugh

bila

tera

l mee

tings

invo

lvin

g th

e D

G o

r ot

her

seni

or W

TO s

taff.

VIII

.M

O/IO

has

str

uctu

res

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

ern

al e

valu

atio

ns

Det

aile

d ex

pend

iture

s ar

e gi

ven

in a

nnua

l rep

ort,

as w

ell a

s m

embe

rs’ c

ontr

ibut

ions

. Int

eres

tingl

y, W

TO h

as a

n in

tern

al a

udit

offic

e. T

his

audi

t’s re

sults

are

pre

sent

ed to

the

mem

bers

and

pub

lishe

d in

the

Ann

ual R

epor

t.359

The

orga

niza

tion

is re

view

ed b

y ex

tern

al a

udito

rs o

n fin

ance

and

hum

an re

sour

ces

mat

ters

on

a re

gula

r ba

sis,

who

se a

udit

repo

rts

are

subm

itted

to th

e C

omm

ittee

of B

udge

t, Fi

nanc

e an

d A

dmin

istr

atio

n fo

r re

view

.360


References

Babb, S. Behind the Development Banks. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Bernes, T. “Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation”. Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation. CIGI Paper No. 13, February 2013.

Cox, R. “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization. In R. Cox and T. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 317.

Culpeper, R. The Multilateral Development Banks: Titans or Behemoths? Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.

English, E. P. and Mule, H. The African Development Bank. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

Goodin, R. (Ed.). The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Harman, S. “Searching for an Executive Head? Leadership and UNAIDS”. In Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 2011, 17:4, pp. 429-446.

Ivanova, M. “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location”. In Global Environmental Politics, 2010, 10:1, pp. 30-59.

Jupille, J., Mattli, W. and Snidal, D. Institutional Choice and Global Commerce. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Kahler, M. Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001.

Keohane, N. “On Leadership”. In Perspectives on Politics, 2005, 3:4, pp. 705-722.

Kilby, C. “Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank”. In The Review of International Organizations, 2006, 1:2, pp. 173-195.

Kilby, C. “Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank”. In The Review of International Organizations, 2011, 6:3, pp. 223-257.

Kraske, J. Bankers with a Mission: The Presidents of the World Bank (1946-91). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Martinez-Diaz, L. “Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation”. Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund, 2008.

Martinez-Diaz, L. “Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design”. In The Review of International Organizations, 2009, 4:4, pp. 383-406.

Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results: UNDP. p. 28. MOPAN, 2012.

Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Annual Report 2012. Paris: MOPAN, 2013.

Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Assessment of the Asian Development Bank. Paris: MOPAN, 2013.


Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Common Approach Methodology. Paris: MOPAN, 2013.

Parmenter, D. Key Performance Indicators: Developing, Implementing, and Using Winning KPIs. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

Price, T. Understanding Ethical Failures in Leadership. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Turk, V. and Eyster, E. “Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR.” In International Journal of Refugee Law, 2010, 22:2, pp. 159-172.

UK Department for International Development (DFID). Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations. London: DFID, 2011.

United Nations (UN). Secretary-General’s bulletin: Financial disclosure and declaration of interest statements (ST/SGB/2006/6), 10 April 2006.

United Nations (UN). Press Conference on Senior Managers’ Performance Compact Agreements, Department of Public Information, 4 February 2008.

United Nations (UN). Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. New York: UN, 2013.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Budget Estimates, 11, 2011.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). “Global Strategic Priorities 2012-2013”. UNHCR Global Appeal 2012-2013. Geneva: UNHCR, 2013a.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. Geneva: UNHCR, 2013b.

Wan, M. “Japan and the Asian Development Bank”. In Pacific Affairs, 1995, 68:4, pp. 509-528.

White, J. Regional Development Banks: A Study of Institutional Style. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1971.

Woods, N. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers. New York: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Yasutomo, D. Japan and the Asian Development Bank. Studies of the East Asian Institute. Praeger, 1983.

Yasutomo, D. “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition”. In B. Koppel and R. Orr (Eds), Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

Yasutomo, D. The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995.

Yew Mao Lim, D. and Vreeland, J. “Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council”. In World Politics, 2013, 65:1, pp. 34-72.


Endnotes

1. Jupille, Mattli and Snidal (2013).

2. This occurs in the OECD. Source: email correspondence with an OECD senior official, 17 June 2014.

3. Please send your input to Shubhra Saxena Kabra, World Economic Forum at [email protected]

4. See: http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf.

5. See: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm.

6. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI.

7. The terms of appointment were published in a press release on 5 July 2011. See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm.

8. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm.

9. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm.

10. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?mappingid=y3p1dhO74YQ%3d&img=i6nZpr3iSlU%3d.

11. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.

12. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.

13. Martinez-Diaz (2009).

14. Unlike the private sector, remuneration and benefits in international organizations are, in most cases, not tied to performance management indicators. Instead, such organizations set fixed salaries for all staff, including their leadership. Those within the UN system – and even some outside it, such as IOM – follow a standardized pay scale. Although benefits may vary, they are generally determined by the cost of living in the respective locations of headquarters (e.g. New York, Geneva, Washington DC) rather than by a leader’s performance.

15. For example, Pascal Lamy in 2009. See: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_29apr09_e.htm.

16. For example, Donald Kaberuka’s statement in 2005. See: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/.

17. Martinez-Diaz (2008), p. 388.

18. Martinez-Diaz (2008) looked at the following: IMF, World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IDB and EBRD.

19. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].

20. MOPAN (2012).

21. For instance, Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, resigned in 2007 over an alleged conflict of interest in respect to employment.

22. See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf.

23. UN (2013). See: http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardsE.pdf [accessed 6 September 2014].

24. AfDB also has a code of conduct for staff (1999), and one for leaders (2007).

25. UN (2006). See: http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml [accessed 18 September 2014].

26. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].

27. The list of 2012 disclosures is available from: http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml.

28. See also: New Zealand State Services Commission (2012). Leadership Success Profile. Wellington: State Services Commission.

29. Interview with the senior staff development officer, 26 July 2013.


30. UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360-degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. This was in response to staff criticism that promotions were “not based on skills and suitability”, but on “seniority and influence of sponsors” (UK Department for International Development [DFID], Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). For more on the survey, see: Turk and Eyster (2010).

31. EBRD (2012). Annual report [online]. See: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.

32. Interview with senior IOM official, 31 July 2013.

33. UNHCR (2013a).

34. Turk and Eyster (2010), p. 170; UNHCR (2013b).

35. UNDP (2011). Budget Estimates, 11.

36. In 2012, IOM’s total revenue was $1.2 billion, and only 0.7% or $9 million was unearmarked. See: IOM (2013). IOM Financial Report for the Year Ended 31 December 2012. Geneva: IOM.

37. Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 Sept 2013.

38. This consisted of: 20% unrestricted, 32% broadly earmarked (i.e. at the regional, subregional or thematic level) and 47% tightly earmarked (country or sector). Source: UNHCR (2012).

39. See: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2013/key_principles_WHO_financing_dialogue.pdf.

40. MOPAN (2013), Annual Report 2012. See: http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_Annual_Report_2012.pdf.

41. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/Origins.aspx.

42. For an example of the response in 2008, see: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf.

43. For the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, 2011 edition, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf.

44. This number increased with the creation of South Sudan in 2011. It will increase again, to 80, once the processing of Luxembourg’s application for membership is complete.

45. For the 2013-2022 strategy, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB_Strategy_for_2013%E2%80%932022_-_At_the_Center_of_Africa%E2%80%99s_Transformation.pdf

46 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf

47 See p.180 of the Annual Report 2012: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf


49 For example, see Kaberuka’s statement 2005: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/

50 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf)

51 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf







57 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Corporate-Procurement/Departmental_Annual_Reports/AfDB%20TFAR%202010%20Final.pdf

58 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-president-declares-2010-successful-but-momentous-year-at-annual-meetings-opening-ceremony-8143/

59 AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf

60 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf

61 Framework for enhanced engagement with civil society organizations 2012 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf

62 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf

63 MOPAN evaluation of AfDB 2012 http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012.pdf; http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf ; http://www.ausaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/afdb-assessment.pdf

64 The other funds are the Technical Assistance Special Fund, Japan Special Fund, Pakistan Earthquake Fund, Regional Cooperation and Integration Fund, Climate Change Fund and Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, as well as grant co-financing activities. The ADB also manages a number of trust funds, including the Japan Scholarship Program and Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. ADB Financial Profile 2013, Asian Development Bank, 2013, p. 27-33. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-financial-profile-2013.pdf.

65 Those powers reserved for the board of governors include the following: – Admit new members and determine the conditions of their admission – Increase or decrease the bank’s authorized capital stock – Suspend a member – Decide appeals from interpretations or applications of this agreement given by the board of directors – Authorize the conclusion of general agreements for cooperation with other international organizations – Elect the bank’s director and president – Determine the remuneration of the directors and their alternates, and the salary and other terms of the president’s

service contract – Approve the general balance sheet and the bank’s profit-and-loss statement, following review of the auditor’s

report – Determine the reserves and the distribution of the bank’s net profits – Amend this agreement – Decide to terminate the bank’s operations and distribute its assets – Exercise such other powers as are expressly assigned to the board of governors in this agreement

Source: Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 28. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1965/charter.pdf.

66 Ibid; on term limits: Article 30 (3).

67 Asian Development Bank Financial Profile 2013, p. 6-8.


68 Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank: Time for new leadership”. Embassy, 13 March 2013. See: http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank presidency: looking beyond Japan”. Guardian, 22 April 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Bernes, T. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. CIGI Papers, No. 13, February 2013. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. See: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf.

69 For Eswar Prasad’s ADB publications, see: http://www.adbi.org/viewcontact.php?contactid=2091&sectionID=217.

70 Sender, H. “Bankers fear Chinese push to head ADB”. Financial Times, 28 February 2013. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0df9d2c8-81d9-11e2-ae78-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.

71 Jiwei, L. “China’s Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Kazakhstan, Astana. 2014. Asian Development Bank; see: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/2014/gov/PRC_47th_AM_GS-17.pdf.

72 Anderlini, J. “China Expands Plans for World Bank Rival”. Financial Times, 24 June 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1012282-fba4-11e3-aa19-00144feab7de.html#axzz3GKKD6HtZ ; Smith, G. “China aims to break U.S. hold in Asia with rival to World Bank”. Fortune, 25 June 2014. See: http://fortune.com/2014/06/25/china-aims-to-break-u-s-hold-in-asia-with-rival-to-world-bank/.

73 Pilling, D. “Japan head of ADB welcomes rival Chinese fund”. Financial Times, 29 May 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66a56628-e581-11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.

74 Wilson, E., Rowley, A. and Gilmore, S. “New Chinese-led development bank seen as threat to ADB.” Emerging Markets, 3 May 2014. See: http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3337351/New-Chinese-led-development-bank-seen-as-threat-to-ADB.html. The difficulty of China increasing its quota was also confirmed in an interview by Kazu Sakai, ADB Director of Strategy and Policy. Sakai noted that such a change would be politically difficult, given the United States’ interest in preventing an increase in Chinese influence within the institution, and especially vis-à-vis Japan with whom it has a close relationship.

75 Nakao, T. “Closing Statement at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors”. 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Manila, 5 May 2013.

76 Nakao, T. “Opening Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Astana, 4 May 2014. See: http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches.

77 Ownership as of 2012: Japan (15.6%), United States (15.6%), China (6.4%), India (6.3%), Australia (5.8%), Remaining 62 members (50.3%). Annual Report 2012. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-annual-report-2012.pdf

78 The election of the most recent President has brought this trend under intense scrutiny. See: John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank: Time for New Leadership.” Embassy [Ottawa] 3 Mar. 2013. Web. http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank Presidency: Looking beyond Japan.” Guardian [London] 22 Apr. 2013. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Thomas Bernes. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. Working paper no. 13. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013. CIGI Papers. Web. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf

79 Yasutomo, Dennis. “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition.” Japan’s Foreign Aid. Ed. Bruce Koppel and Robert Orr. Westview, 1993, p. 318.

80 Ibid, p. 44.

81 Lim & Vreeland (2013).

82 STRATEGY2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Strategy2020-print.pdf


83 ADB Results Framework. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/r166-08.pdf

84 2012 Development Effectiveness Review. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/defr-2012.pdf

85 Link to Annual Evaluation Reviews: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/resources/1222

86 Link to Reports: http://compliance.adb.org/dir0035p.nsf/alldocs/BDAO-7Y65HQ?OpenDocument&expandable=4

87 Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pcp-2011.pdf

88 Nakao, Takehiko. “Address to 88th Meeting of the Development Committee.” 88th Meeting of the Development Committee of the World Bank. Washington, DC. 12 Oct. 2013. Web. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/16/000442464_20131016104728/Rendered/PDF/818700BR0State0C00Box379845B000Copy.pdf

89 Takehiko Nakao. “Opening Address.” 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors. Astana. 4 May 2014. Web. http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches

90 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila. Asian Development Bank (June 2011): http://www.adb.org/documents/code-conduct

91 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AT ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GUIDELINES TO AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Conflict-of-Interest-18December2012.pdf

92 Guidelines for Gifts and Entertainment. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Gifts-Entertainment.pdf

93 GUIDELINES ON ACCESS DURING INVESTIGATIONS TO RECORDS, EMAILS AND DOCUMENTS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Access-during-investigations.pdf

94 Guidelines on Form and Content of Allegations. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Form-Content-Allegations.pdf

95 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/code-of-conduct.pdf

96 Annual Review of Salary and Benefits for International Staff, National Staff, and Administrative Staff. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2013. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/salary-benefits-review-2013.pdf, p. 5

97 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy.

98 Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 34, Point 5.

99 Daniel Yew Mao Lim and James Vreeland. “Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council.” World Politics 65.1 (2013), p. 44.

100 Ibid.

101 The former director-general speaking to Lim & Vreeland in 2010, however, noted that if projects don’t acquire Japanese support, they do not proceed to the Board in the first place (Ibid, p. 44).

102 Work Program and Budget Framework 2013-2015. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/work-program-budget-framework-2013-2015_0.pdf

103 Funds and Resources. Asian Development Bank (2013): http://www.adb.org/site/funds/main


104 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy

105 Olivier Serrat. Engaging Staff in the Workplace. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2010. Web. http://adbdev.org/sites/default/files/publications/27586/file/engaging-staff-workplace.pdf

106 Strengthening Participation for Development Results. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/strengthening-participation-development-results.pdf, p. 20-30.

107 ADB Perceptions Survey (2013), p. 7.

108 Independent Evaluation website: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/attributes-independence

109 See, for example, a recent assessment of the ADB: Assessment of the Asian Development Bank. Rep. MOPAN, 2013. Web. http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/Main_findings-_ADB_2013_assessment.pdf

110 International Aid Transparency Initiative. Asian Development Bank Becomes IATI Signatory. N.p., 30 Jan. 2013. Web. http://www.aidtransparency.net/timeline/asian-development-bank-becomes-iati-signatory;

111 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml

112 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml

113 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014

114 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI

115 http://www.cgdev.org/blog/cgd-europe-asks-who-should-be-ebrds-next-president

116 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf


118 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf



121 EBRD Financial Report 2011 (pp. 72-76): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/fr11e.pdf.

122 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.

123 “The EBRD and Civil Society in 2012/2013.” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May 2013): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/factsheets/csoE.pdf

124 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/about/compas06.pdf

125 Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon. US Department of State Archives (12 December 1970). See: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d43.

126 Mander, B. “Mutual aid works for Latin America”. Financial Times, 24 September 2012. See: http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/c1628ce2-03a3-11e2-bad2-00144feabdc0.pdf.

127 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.

128 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132

129 Nancy Birdsall. “The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank: Fit for the 21st Century?” Center for Global Development no. 039 (April 2014).


130 A. Schotter (1981). “The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.” Power, Voting, and Voting Power (ed. M.j. Holler). Physica-Verlad, Wurzburg; M.O. Hosli (1996). “Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34(2): 255-273.

131 Jonathan Strand (2003). “Measure voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank.” Economics of Governance (4): 19-36.

132 Birdsall (2014), p. 7.

133 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080

134 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132

135 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080

136 Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare (March 2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36399223

137 Building Opportunity for the Majority (2007). Inter-American Development Bank (Washington D.C.): http://www.iadb.org/news/docs/BuildingOpp.pdf

138 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737

139 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737

140 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856

141 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856

142 Proposal for allocation of FSO resources (2013-2014): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37360465

143 Krasner, Stephen D. Power Structures and Regional Development Banks. International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring, 1981: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706477

144 Human Capital Strategy (2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36290863

145 Strategy for Promoting Citizens Participation in Bank Activities (2004): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=483088

146 See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.

147 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington DC.

148 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm

149 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main6.pdf

150 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm

151 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm

152 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm

153 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf

154 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm

155 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2012/eng/pdf/ar12_eng.pdf


156 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm

157 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC

158 Interview with a former IMF official, June 2013, Oxford

159 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/101213b.pdf

160 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/112513.pdf


162 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm







169 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf





174 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm

175 See example of the response in 2008: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf

176 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1364.htm177 IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures, available at: http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-IOM/docs/facts_figures_

en.pdf; and IOM. 2012. Financial Report: 18.

178 IOM. 2012. Human Resources Report, Annex. Geneva: IOM; and IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures. Geneva: IOM.

179 Reinalda, B. 2011. “Secretaries-General of International Organizations and their Career Development: An Analysis of Nine Humanitarian IGOs”. In Paper for the World Conference on Humanitarian Studies, 2-5 June, at Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA.

180 IOM. 2009. Review of the Organisation Structure of IOM. Geneva: IOM.

181 Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 September 2013. Swing made performance management and ownership of the organization by member states top priorities. He has put strong emphasis on proper use of the performance appraisal system, which is currently being updated to account for organizational changes of the past five years. The DG has also established good measures to ensure that HR policy responds to the organization’s needs; implemented a mandatory rotation process; revamped staff regulations to harmonize conditions of service; taken a zero-tolerance approach to fraud, corruption and unethical behaviour; and taken steps to ensure good gender distribution. (DFID. Working Paper on IOM, 17).

182 See IOM Constitution. 1989. Article 18 (1).


183 The DG is paid at the salary rate of an Assistant Secretary General. Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013 and Interview with senior IOM officials, September 2 2013.

184 IOM 1989. Constitution, Article 18(2).

185 See also IOM Organizational Structure, http://www.iom.int/cms/about-iom/organizational-chart accessed 4 August 2014.

186 See for example: F. Georgi, 2011. For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and its Global Migration Management. In The Politics of International Migration Management. M. Geiger and A. Pecoud. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 45 - 72.

187 DFID, Multilateral Review 2011. Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK aid through multilateral organizations, March 2011, DFID: London: 1987.

188 Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013.

189 For a listing of IOM’s evaluations see: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/organizational-structure/evaluation/external-evaluations.html

190 The four core areas are detailed in the UNDP strategic plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating global progress on human development. The UNDP also manages the UN’s “resident coordinator” system to ensure in-country coordination between UN agencies, and publishes an annual report on human development. These are reformulated in the most recent strategic plan, and three areas of work are highlighted: inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience; and sustainable development pathways. See: UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 20.

191 For more on the selection of board members, see: UNDP. Information note about the Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPs, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive_board/information_noteontheexecutiveboard [accessed 19 September 2014].

192 UN. 1994. General Assembly Resolution 48/162, Article 22. New York: UN.

193 The UNDP’s expenditure was $4.53 billion for development activities (provisional for 2012). UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 25.

194 See: http://www.undp.ro/undp/human-resources/ [accessed 19 September 2014]; and UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 5.

195 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results: UNDP, 3.

196 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 24.

197 Ibid.

198 Rogers, K. “UNDP cuts HQ staff, creates new lower-level jobs”. Devex, 3 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-cuts-hq-staff-creates-new-lower-level-jobs-83612 [accessed 14 July 2014]; and Santamaria, C. “UNDP to establish crisis response unit”. Devex, 16 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-to-establish-crisis-response-unit-83693 [accessed 14 July 2014].

199 The researchers were unable to find these online and no interview participants were aware of one. However, the MOPAN review 2012 UNDP is rated well for ‘key documents available to the public’ MI 1.3. As 77% of survey respondents rate it as adequate or above in transparency.

200 This policy was established in 1958 for UNDP’s predecessor – the Special Fund - and continues to apply for the Administrator. See: General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York. GA Resolution 2029 (XX) Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a United Nations Development Programme. It was subsequently outlined in UN General Assembly. 2005. ‘Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments: confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme’ Note by the Secretary General, A/59/240, 3 May 2005.

201 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.



203 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013.

204 Interview with former senior UNDP staff member, 7 August 2013.

205 Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo 2009. “Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design.” Review of International Organizations 4(4): 403. MOPAN donors at headquarters were asked about the extent to which ‘senior management demonstrates leadership on results management. More than 70% rated UNDP as adequate or above on this indicator’. MOPAN, UNDP Report, MOPAN, 2012: 21.

206 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.

207 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.

208 UNDP, 2011, Budget estimates: p.11.

209 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.

210 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013.

211 UN. 2013. Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. UN: New York. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/transparency/overview.html UNDP also has an Ethics office (established in 2007), which creates UNDP’s ethics policy and coordinates with UN ethics committee.

212 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.

213 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York: 24.

214 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013; Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 28 August; Email correspondence with UNDP senior staff member, Feb 27, 2014.

215 General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York, article 21. This Resolution stipulated the conditions for UNDP’s predecessor, the Special Fund, which the UNDP inherited. These were: ‘The Special Fund shall be administered by a Managing Director under the policy guidance of the Governing Council. The Managing Director shall have the over-all responsibility for the operations of the Fund, with sole authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects submitted by Governments’. For more on the Board’s functions see: UN General Assembly. 1994. Resolution 48/162, Article 3. New York: United Nations.

216 As stipulated by the Resolution: ‘projects shall be undertaken only at the request of a government or group of governments eligible to participate in the Special Fund’. General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, Article 31, 1958, New York. The resolution stipulates other tasks such as: ‘the managing director shall establish and maintain close and continuing working relationships with the specialized agencies concerned with those fields of activity in which the Special Fund will operate, and with the International Atomic Agency…’. The Managing director shall be responsible for the evaluation of project requests…and authorized to contract the services off other agencies. The Managing Director shall make appropriate arrangements to follow the execution of projects. The Managing Director shall report to the Governing Council on the status of projects and the financial position of the projects and programmes’.


218 Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 7 August 2013.

219 The percentage of earmarked contributions were calculated from the UNDP Cumulative Review as follows. Total contributions: 4.64 (regular and other resources) + 1.33 (bilateral earmarked) + 1.53 (multilateral earmarked) + 0.93 (programme contributions) = 8.43 billion; Total earmarked: 1.53 + 1.33 = 1.88 billion and Percentage Earmarked = 1.88/8.43 or 22%. UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York, p.25.

220 The UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017 highlights declining core financing as a one of UNDP’s top challenges. See: UNDP. 2014. ‘Changing the World, UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017’, UNDP: 8. For a clear overview of UNDP’s


financing sources see Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.

221 Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.

222 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.

223 UNDP. 2011. UNDP Institutional Budget Estimates for 2012 – 2013. Executive Board of the UNDP, UNFPA and the UNOPS: New York: 24 – 27.

224 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results, UNDP. Xiii.

225 As part of a broader humanitarian response, UNHCR is typically the cluster lead for protection, shelter and camp management/camp coordination in IDP situations. UNHCR’s total “population of concern” (including refugees and internally displaced persons) is 35.8 million. UNHCR. 2013. Displacement – The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012. Geneva: UNHCR, 3.

226 UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950, Annex, UNHCR Statute.

227 UNHCR holds annual plenary meetings with ExCom and regular meetings with its standing committee throughout the year. For information on UNHCR, ExCom members and how to apply, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html [accessed 19 September 2014]. With its membership growing rapidly, ExCom has become increasingly unwieldy as a governing committee (interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013).

228 UNHCR’s ExCom also submits an annual report to the third committee. Although it was created by ECOSCO, it functions like a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. See Betts, A., Loescher, G. and Milner, J. 2012. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Second Edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 108-109.

229 UNHCR. 2013. Global Report 2012. Geneva: UNHCR.

230 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.

231 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. “Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 22:2, 159–172.

232 Loescher, G. 2002. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

233 BBC News. 2005. “Lubbers quits over UN sex claims”. 20 February 2005. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4282333.stm [accessed 19 September 2014].

234 Goodwin-Gill, G. 1991. “Developments”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 3, 120.

235 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198.

236 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. Geneva: UNHCR.

237 Ibid. The new Global Service Centre based in Budapest, Hungary has centralized administration and support functions at a reduced cost, compared with having these staffed in Geneva.

238 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198. Note that some donors are supportive of UNHCR taking a more expansionist role in humanitarian coordination and natural disasters.

239 Email correspondence with the UNHCR executive office, 11 November 2013.

240 Main sources: Interview with Jane McAdam, 24 July 2013; Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013 and Email Correspondence, 20 May 2014; Interview with UNHCR Personnel Administration, Payroll and Performance Management, Human Resources (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Senior Staff Development Officer (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.


241 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter II, Functions of the High Commissioner, paragraphs 8 – 12.

242 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, Article 13. The UN Secretary General has a contract with the High Commissioner which outlines his salary and other job details. Telephone interview with Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. However the HC is elected by the General Assembly and, in principle, should not be subject to authority or direction by the SG. Email correspondence with International Refugee Law Expert, 19 May 2014.

243 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013. Also note that UNHCR does make much of its policy and other terms of reference available online. They do have a draft of new terms of reference for Assistant High Commissioner (protection) on the website as this was a newly created post (2005).

244 For more detail on this see G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.

245 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, paragraph 13.

246 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

247 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

248 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013. The Secretary General on this occasion engaged in extensive consultations with Member states and as no single candidate emerged he submitted two candidates to member states. See: G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.

249 NGOs argued that candidates should be interviewed and their biographies and answers were made public. Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

250 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013.

251 For details on the Global Strategic Priorities see: UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2014 - 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec230e916.html

252 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 22, 2: 170.

253 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.

254 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013. UNHCR established an independent Ethics Office in 2008 which reports directly to the HC. Its functions are to: provide confidential advice to staff and senior management on ethical issues (e.g. conflicts of interest; gifts; use of UN assets); promote a culture of integrity and accountability; raise awareness and develop standards and education of ethics issues; administer the financial disclosure programme; implement the policy on the protection of staff from retaliation. Executive Office of the United Nations High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee. 2009. Report on the Ethics Office, EC/60/CRP.21, 24 August 2009.

255 UNHCR, 2004. Code of Conduct, 1.

256 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.

257 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. The Global Trends Report details the numbers of ‘persons of concern’ including refugees, IDPs, stateless and other displaced peoples. Note that evaluating UNHCR and the High Commissioner’s performance solely on these numbers is problematic as they are affected by factors beyond UNHCR’s control.

258 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.


260 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. Note that UNHCR develops its own independent guidelines based on these. Interview with UNHCR Human Resources Official, Budapest, 26 July 2013.


261 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.


263 Through the GLC, UNHCR hopes to ‘measure more systematically the impact of learning on staff to ensure that approaches used add real value’ and are adjusted to remain relevant (Turk and Eyster, 2010: 171). UNHCR have a Senior Staff Development Officer, Head, Management, Leadership & Communications based in Budapest. They develop and convene a leadership programme for senior staff (such as heads of missions). The role of the Senior Staff Development Officer is to ‘support the work of the management/leadership and external relations Unit, with a primary responsibility for the conceptualization, design, development and delivery of management and leadership related learning programmes for various levels of management. S/he is accountable for pro-actively supporting the learning culture in UNHCR by aligning effective learning with institutional goals’. See UNHCR, Job Description, Senior Staff Development Officer (Management and Leadership), 2012 available online. They provide training up D1 level Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.

264 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.

265 Telephone Interview with UNHCR 30 July 2013.

266 The High Commissioner’s functions are outlined in the UNHCR Statute, Chapter II, paragraphs 6 – 12. The Statute also states that ‘The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies’ and that he ‘shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council…’ UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Paragraph 11.

267 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.

268 These shifts are captured in: UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.

269 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013.

270 Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.

271 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.

272 UNHCR established a committee to develop action plans and carry-out survey recommendations in 2011. Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.

273 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 22, 2: 159 – 172.

Staff surveys, according to DFID’s working paper, found that staff are dissatisfied with promotions and postings as it is felt that promotions are ‘not based on skills and suitability’ but ‘seniority and influence of sponsors’ (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). To increase staff confidence in the transparency and fairness of recruitment and promotion UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360 degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). This suggests senior management are responding to staff surveys.

274 Telephone interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.

275 IBRD articles of agreement; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20049557~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.

276 IDA articles of agreement and by-laws; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:21353441~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.

277 IFC articles of agreement; see: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/Articles+of+Agreement/.

278 MIGA convention; see: http://www.miga.org/documents/miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.


279 ICSID convention; see: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.

280 WB organization chart; see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf.

281 World Bank projects and operations; see: http://www.worldbank.org/projects.

282 World Bank. Annual Report 2013; see: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16091/9780821399378.pdf?sequence=1, p. 6.

283 Thorton, P. “World Bank Revamp”. Guardian, 18 November 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/08/world-bank-job-cuts-jim-yong-kim.

284 World Bank. Annual Report 2012; see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf.

285 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

286 Rushe, D. “World Bank candidate Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says job will go to Jim Yong Kim”. Guardian, 16 April 2012. See: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/16/world-bank-president-jim-kim.

287 Lowrey, A. “World Bank, Rooted in Bureaucracy, Proposes a Sweeping Reorganization”. The New York Times, 6 October 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=0.

288 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.

289 World Bank Archives. “Robert Strange McNamara”. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html.

290 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.

291 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.

292 Farnsworth, E. “The BRICS Try to Bank”. U.S. News & World Report, 18 July 2014. See: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/07/18/brics-development-bank-could-challenge-world-bank-and-imf.

293 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/PresContConfCopy.pdf

294 Steven Weisman. “Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank.” The New York Times (May 18th, 2007): http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all

295 Kahler, Miles. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Institute for International Economics; Washington, DC 2001

296 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford

297 Minutes of the WBG Board meetings http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64256109&piPK=64818889&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=51146024

298 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC

299 World Bank Archives. The Presidency of Robert McNamara: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html;.

300 WBG Strategy for 2030 approved in April 2013 http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-goals2013.pdf


302 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf


303 See Steven R. Weisman, ‘Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank’ New York Times, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

304 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHICS/Resources/ethics_code_2013-Mar13-CRA.pdf.

305 IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s organizational effectiveness http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/matrix_eval.pdf


307 WBG Annual Report 2012 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf

308 Harding, “World Bank: Man on a mission,” Financial Times.


310 See Note xii.

311 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html

312 Interview with a former official, July 2014

313 IEG evaluation of trust funds (2011): http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/tf_eval.pdf


315 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=4&



318 MOPAN Annual Report 2012 on the World Bank http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012_1.pdf http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf.

319 World Bank Group Strategy, attached for the October 12, 2013 meeting of the Development Committee: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html.

320 World Bank. DIME: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,contentMDK:23422972~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3998212,00.html

321 Interview with a former official, July 2014

322 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdfhttp://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB132/B132_R14-en.pdf

323 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf

324 http://www.who.int/employment/staff_regulations_rules/EN_staff_regulations_and_staff_rules.pdf

325 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5

326 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5

327 http://www.who.int/dg/Report_card_cover_28_06.pdf

328 http://www.who.int/about/role/en/index.html, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/GPW_eng.pdf


329 http://www.who.int/about/agenda/en/index.html

330 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html

331 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html

332 Van Grasstek, C. 2013. The History and Future of the World Trade Organization, Part V. See: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_14_e.pdf.

333 “Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.

334 World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO legal texts”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.

335 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

336 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm

337 http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/509.doc

338 Interview with former WTO official, July 2014

339 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014

340 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.



343 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/gc_09sep13_e.htm

344 WTO Annual Report 2012: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf


346 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013




350 Interview with a former WTO official, July 2014


352 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dft_panel_e/future_of_trade_report_e.pdf



355 WTO Annual Report 2013: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_chap8_e.pdf




359 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf


World Economic Forum91–93 route de la CapiteCH-1223 Cologny/GenevaSwitzerland

Tel.: +41 (0) 22 869 1212Fax: +41 (0) 22 786 2744

[email protected]

The World Economic Forum is an international institution committed to improving the state of the world through public-private cooperation in the spirit of global citizenship. It engages with business, political, academic and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. Incorporated as a not-for-profit foundation in 1971 and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the Forum is independent, impartial and not tied to any interests. It cooperates closely with all leading international organizations.