1931 Scottsboro case

1933 Franklin Rooseveltinaugurated president

Bank holiday

The Hundred Days

21st Amendment ratified

1934 Upton Sinclair runs forgovernor of California

Huey Long launches theShare Our Wealth movement

American Liberty Leagueestablished

Indian Reorganization Act

Herbert Hoover’s TheChallenge to Liberty

1935 Supreme Court rules theNational Recovery Associationunconstitutional

John L. Lewis organizes theCongress of IndustrialOrganizations

Second New Deal launched

1936 Supreme Court rules theAgricultural AdjustmentAct unconstitutional

United Auto Workers sit-downstrike

John Maynard Keynes’sThe General Theory ofEmployment, Interest,and Money

1938 Fair Labor Standards bill

House Un-American ActivitiesCommittee established

Martha Graham’s AmericanDocument

1939 John Steinbeck’s The Grapesof Wrath

1940 Smith Act

C H A P T E R 2 1

T h e N ew D e a l ,1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0

This panel depicting the construction of a dam was painted in 1939 by William Gropperas part of a mural for the new Department of Interior building in Washington, D.C. Bornon New York City’s Lower East Side to a Jewish immigrant family, Gropper became aprominent “social realist” artist, whose works depicting scenes of American life includedsatirical cartoons of political and business leaders and paintings of labor struggles of the1930s. Like other artists who found it difficult to obtain work during the Depression, hewas hired by the Works Projects Administration, a New Deal agency, to paint murals forgovernment buildings. This one was inspired by the construction of the Grand CouleeDam on the Columbia River and the Davis Dam on the Colorado River, two of the manyNew Deal projects that expanded the nation’s infrastructure and provided employment tovictims of the Depression.

THE FIRST NEW DEALFDR and the Election of 1932The Coming of the New DealThe Banking CrisisThe NRAGovernment JobsPublic-Works ProjectsThe New Deal and AgricultureThe New Deal and HousingThe Court and the New Deal

THE GRASSROOTS REVOLTLabor’s Great UpheavalThe Rise of the CIOLabor and PoliticsVoices of Protest

THE SECOND NEW DEALThe WPA and the Wagner ActThe American Welfare StateThe Social Security System

A RECKONING WITH LIBERTYFDR and the Idea of FreedomThe Election of 1936The Court FightThe End of the Second New

Deal

THE LIMITS OF CHANGEThe New Deal and American

WomenThe Southern VetoThe Stigma of WelfareThe Indian New DealThe New Deal and Mexican-

AmericansLast Hired, First FiredA New Deal for BlacksFederal Discrimination

A NEW CONCEPTION OFAMERICAThe Heyday of American

CommunismRedefining the PeoplePromoting DiversityChallenging the Color LineLabor and Civil LibertiesThe End of the New DealThe New Deal in American

History

arly in 1941, the unemployed Woody Guthrie, soon to become one ofthe country’s most popular songwriters and folk singers, brought hisfamily to Portland, Oregon. He hoped to star in a film about the greatpublic-works projects under way on the Columbia River. Given atemporary job by the Bonneville Power Authority, the public agencythat controlled the Columbia dams, Guthrie produced a song every

day for the next month. One, “Roll on, Columbia,” became a popularstatement of the benefits that resulted when government took the leadin economic planning and in improving the lot of ordinary citizens:

And on up the river is the Grand Coulee Dam,The biggest thing built by the hand of a man,To run the great factories and water the land,So, roll on, Columbia, roll on. . . .Your power is turning our darkness to dawn.So, roll on, Columbia, roll on.©

The Columbia River winds its way on a 1,200-mile course from Canadathrough Washington and Oregon to the Pacific Ocean. Because of its steepdescent from uplands to sea level, it produces an immense amount ofenergy. Residents of the economically underdeveloped Pacific Northwesthad long dreamed of tapping this unused energy for electricity andirrigation. But not until the 1930s did the federal government launch theprogram of dam construction that transformed the region. The projectcreated thousands of jobs for the unemployed, and the network of damsproduced abundant cheap power.

When the Grand Coulee Dam went into operation in 1941, it was thelargest man-made structure in world history. It eventually produced morethan 40 percent of the nation’s hydroelectric power. The dam providedthe cheapest electricity in the country for towns that sprang up out ofnowhere, farms on what had once been deserts in eastern Washington andOregon, and factories that would soon be producing aluminum for WorldWar II airplanes. The project also had less appealing consequences. Fromtime immemorial, the Columbia River had been filled with salmon. But theGrand Coulee Dam made no provision for the passage of fish, and thesalmon all but vanished. This caused little concern during the Depressionbut became a source of controversy later in the century as Americansbecame more concerned about preserving the natural environment.

The Grand Coulee Dam was part of what one scholar has called a “publicworks revolution” that transformed the American economy and landscapeduring the 1930s. The Roosevelt administration spent far more money onbuilding roads, dams, airports, bridges, and housing than any other activity.

Franklin D. Roosevelt believed regional economic planning like that inthe Northwest would promote economic growth, ease the domestic andworking lives of ordinary Americans, and keep control of key naturalresources in public rather than private hands. “It promises,” one supporter

• What were the majorpolicy initiatives of the NewDeal in the Hundred Days?

• Who were the mainproponents of economicjustice in the 1930s, andwhat measures did theyadvocate?

• What were the majorinitiatives of the SecondNew Deal, and how didthey differ from the FirstNew Deal?

• How did the New Dealrecast the meaning ofAmerican freedom?

• How did New Dealbenefits apply to womenand minorities?

• How did the PopularFront influence Americanculture in the 1930s?

FOC U S QU E ST I O N S©lE

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 6 1

wrote, “a world replete with more freedom and happiness than mankindhas ever known.”

The Columbia River project reflected broader changes in American lifeand thought during the New Deal of the 1930s. Roosevelt oversaw thetransformation of the Democratic Party into a coalition of farmers,industrial workers, the reform-minded urban middle class, liberalintellectuals, northern African-Americans, and, somewhat incongruously,the white supremacist South, united by the belief that the federalgovernment must provide Americans with protection against thedislocations caused by modern capitalism. “Liberalism,” traditionallyunderstood as limited government and free market economics, took on itsmodern meaning. Thanks to the New Deal, it now referred to active effortsby the national government to uplift less fortunate members of society.

Freedom, too, underwent a transformation during the 1930s. TheDepression had discredited the ideas that social progress rests on theunrestrained pursuit of wealth and that, apart from unfortunates likewidows and orphans, most poverty is self-inflicted. The New Dealelevated a public guarantee of economic security to the forefront ofAmerican discussions of freedom. The 1930s were a decade of dramaticsocial upheaval. Social and political activists, most notably a revitalizedlabor movement, placed new issues on the political agenda. When onewriter in 1941 published a survey of democratic thought beginning in theancient world, he concluded that what distinguished his own time was itsawareness of “the social conditions of freedom.” Thanks to the New Deal,he wrote, “economic security” had “at last been recognized as a politicalcondition of personal freedom.” Regional economic planning like that inthe Northwest reflected this understanding of freedom. So did other NewDeal measures, including the Social Security Act, which offered aid to theunemployed and aged, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, whichestablished a national minimum wage.

Yet while the New Deal significantly expanded the meaning of free-dom, it did not erase freedom’s boundaries. Its benefits flowed to industri-al workers but not tenant farmers, to men far more fully than women,and to white Americans more than blacks, who, in the South, still weredeprived of the basic rights of citizenship.

T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

F D R A N D T H E E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 3 2

It is indeed paradoxical that Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been raised inprivilege on a New York country estate, came to be beloved as the symbol-ic representative of ordinary citizens. But like Lincoln, with whom he is

Hydroelectric generators at the GrandCoulee Dam.

often compared, Roosevelt’s greatness lay in his willingness to throw offthe “dogmas of the quiet past” (Lincoln’s words) to confront an unprece-dented national crisis. FDR, as he liked to be called, was born in 1882, a fifthcousin of Theodore Roosevelt. He graduated from Harvard in 1904 and sixyears later won election to the New York legislature from Duchess County,site of his family’s home at Hyde Park. After serving as undersecretary ofthe navy during World War I, he ran for vice president on the ill-fatedDemocratic ticket of 1920 headed by James M. Cox. In 1921, he contractedpolio and lost the use of his legs, a fact carefully concealed from the publicin that pre-television era. Very few Americans realized that the presidentwho projected an image of vigorous leadership during the 1930s and WorldWar II was confined to a wheelchair.

In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for president in 1932,Roosevelt promised a “new deal” for the American people. But his campaignoffered only vague hints of what this might entail. Roosevelt spoke of thegovernment’s responsibility to guarantee “every man . . . a right to make acomfortable living.” But he also advocated a balanced federal budget andcriticized his opponent, President Hoover, for excessive government spend-ing. The biggest difference between the parties during the campaign was theDemocrats’ call for the repeal of Prohibition. Battered by the economic

8 6 2 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

C O L U M B I A R I V E R B A S I N P R O J E C T , 1 9 4 9

Boise

Pocatello

Helena

Portland

Astoria

Tacoma

SeattleSpokane

Lewiston

Hells Canyon Dam(proposed)

McNary Dam(building)

Four NavigationDams (authorized)

John Day Dam(proposed)

The Dalles Dam(proposed)

BonnevilleDam

Priest Rapids Dam(proposed)

Rock Island Dam

Chief Joseph Dam(building)

Grand CouleeDam

Libby Dam(proposed)

Albeni Falls Dam(proposed)

Hungry Horse Dam(building)

Glacier View Dam(proposed)

OREGON

WASHINGTON

IDAHO

MONTANA

CANADA

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.

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100 kilometers

A 1949 map of the Columbia Riverproject, showing its numerous dams,including the Grand Coulee, the largestman-made structure in the world at thetime of its opening in 1941.

crisis, Americans in 1932 were desperate for new leader-ship, and Roosevelt won a resounding victory. He received57 percent of the popular vote, and Democrats swept to acommanding majority in Congress.

T H E C O M I N G O F T H E N E W D E A L

The Depression did not produce a single pattern of interna-tional public response. For nearly the entire decade of the1930s, conservative governments ruled Britain and France.They were more interested in preserving public order thanrelieving suffering or embarking on policy innovations. InGermany, Adolf Hitler, leader of the Nazi Party, establishedone of the most brutal dictatorships in human history. Hitlerbanned all political opposition and launched a reign of ter-ror against Jews and others deemed to be “un-German.” Inthe Soviet Union, another tyrant, Joseph Stalin, embarked onsuccessive five-year plans that at great social cost producedrapid industrialization and claimed to have eliminatedunemployment. The militarist government of Japan invadedChina in 1937, and hoped to extend its rule throughout Asia.

Roosevelt conceived of the New Deal as an alternative to socialism on theleft, Nazism on the right, and the inaction of upholders of unregulated capital-ism. He hoped to reconcile democracy, individual liberty, and economic plan-ning. “You have made yourself,” the British economist John Maynard Keyneswrote to FDR, “the trustee for those in every country who seek to mend theevils of our condition by reasoned experiment within the framework of theexisting social system.” If Roosevelt failed, Keynes added, the only remainingchoices would be “orthodoxy” (that is, doing nothing) or “revolution.”

Roosevelt did not enter office with a blueprint for dealing with theDepression. At first, he relied heavily for advice on a group of intellectualsand social workers who took up key positions in his administration. Theyincluded Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, a veteran of Hull House andthe New York Consumers’ League who had been among the eyewitnessesto the Triangle fire of 1911; Harry Hopkins, who had headed emergencyrelief efforts during Roosevelt’s term as governor of New York; Secretary ofthe Interior Harold Ickes, a veteran of Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressivecampaign of 1912; and Louis Brandeis, who had advised Woodrow Wilsonduring the 1912 campaign and now offered political advice to FDR whileserving on the Supreme Court.

The presence of these individuals reflected how Roosevelt drew on thereform traditions of the Progressive era. But Progressivism, as noted inChapter 18, was hardly a unified movement, and Roosevelt’s advisers didnot speak with one voice. Brandeis believed that large corporations not onlywielded excessive power but had contributed to the Depression by keepingprices artificially high and failing to increase workers’ purchasing power.They should be broken up, he insisted, not regulated. But the “brainstrust”—a group of academics that included a number of ColumbiaUniversity professors—saw bigness as inevitable in a modern economy. Thecompetitive marketplace, they argued, was a thing of the past, and largefirms needed to be managed and directed by the government, not disman-tled. Their view prevailed during what came to be called the First New Deal.

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 6 3

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A LE L E C T I O N O F 1 9 3 2

8

5

223 4

3 3

6

34

4 4

4

7

9

11

23

1112

11

15

9

109 11 12

7

811

1113118

261429

1938

47

3 4 5

174816

38

DemocratRepublican

PartyRooseveltHoover

CandidateElectoral Vote

(Share)472 (88.9%)59 (11.1%)

Popular Vote(Share)

22,821,857 (57.7%)15,761,841 (39.8%)

A celebrated cover of The New Yorkerdepicts a morose Herbert Hoover and ajaunty Franklin D. Roosevelt riding toRoosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933.

T H E B A N K I N G C R I S I S

“This nation asks for action and action now,” Roosevelt announced on tak-ing office on March 4, 1933. The country, wrote the journalist and politicalcommentator Walter Lippmann, “was in such a state of confused desperationthat it would have followed almost any leader anywhere he chose to go.”FDR spent much of 1933 trying to reassure the public. In his inauguraladdress, he declared that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” (Seethe Appendix for the full text.)

Roosevelt confronted a banking system on the verge of collapse. As bankfunds invested in the stock market lost their value and panicked depositorswithdrew their savings, bank after bank had closed its doors. By March 1933,banking had been suspended in a majority of the states—that is, peoplecould not gain access to money in their bank accounts. Roosevelt declared a“bank holiday,” temporarily halting all bank operations, and calledCongress into special session. On March 9, it rushed to pass the EmergencyBanking Act, which provided funds to shore up threatened institutions.

Further measures soon followed that transformed the American financialsystem. The Glass-Steagall Act barred commercial banks from becominginvolved in the buying and selling of stocks. Until its repeal in the 1990s, thelaw prevented many of the irresponsible practices that had contributed to thestock market crash. The same law established the Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation (FDIC), a government system that insured the accounts of indi-vidual depositors. And Roosevelt took the United States off the gold standard—that is, he severed the link between the country’s currency and its goldreserves, thus making possible the issuance of more money in the hope ofstimulating business activity. Together, these measures rescued the financial

8 6 4 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

A “run” on a bank: crowds of people waitoutside a New York City bank, hoping towithdraw their money.

system and greatly increased the government’s power over it. About 5,000banks—one-third of the nation’s total—had failed between 1929 and 1933,representing a loss of tens of millions of dollars to depositors. In 1936, not asingle bank failed in the United States.

T H E N R A

The Emergency Banking Act was the first of an unprecedented flurry oflegislation during the first three months of Roosevelt’s administration, aperiod known as the “Hundred Days.” Seizing on the sense of crisis and themomentum of his electoral victory, Roosevelt won rapid passage of laws hehoped would promote economic recovery. He persuaded Congress to createa host of new agencies, whose initials soon became part of the language ofpolitics—NRA, AAA, CCC. Never in American history had a president exer-cised such power or so rapidly expanded the role of the federal governmentin people’s lives.

The centerpiece of Roosevelt’s plan for combating the Depression, theNational Industrial Recovery Act, was to a large extent modeled on thegovernment–business partnership established by the War Industries Board ofWorld War I. Roosevelt called it “the most important and far-reaching legisla-tion ever enacted by the American Congress.” The act established the NationalRecovery Administration (NRA), which would work with groups of businessleaders to establish industry codes that set standards for output, prices, andworking conditions. Thus, “cutthroat” competition (in which companies tooklosses to drive competitors out of business) would be ended. These industry-wide arrangements would be exempt from antitrust laws.

The NRA reflected how even in its early days, the New Deal reshapedunderstandings of freedom. In effect, FDR had repudiated the older idea ofliberty based on the idea that the best way to encourage economic activityand ensure a fair distribution of wealth was to allow market competition tooperate, unrestrained by the government. And to win support from labor,section 7a of the new law recognized the workers’ right to organizeunions—a departure from the “open shop” policies of the 1920s and a steptoward government support for what workers called “industrial freedom.”

Headed by Hugh S. Johnson, a retired general and businessman, the NRAquickly established codes that set standards for production, prices,and wages in the textile, steel, mining, and auto industries.Johnson launched a publicity campaign to promote theNRA and its symbol, the Blue Eagle, which stores andfactories that abided by the codes displayed. But afterinitial public enthusiasm, the NRA became mired incontroversy. Large companies dominated the code-writing process. An inquiry conducted by the laborlawyer Clarence Darrow in 1934 concluded that theyused the NRA to drive up prices, limit production, layoff workers, and divide markets among themselves atthe expense of smaller competitors. Many anti-unionemployers ignored section 7a. The governmentlacked the manpower to police the 750 codes in effectby 1935. The NRA produced neither economic recovery norpeace between employers and workers.

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 6 5

The Spirit of the New Deal, a 1933cartoon in the Washington Star, depictsthe federal government, through theNational Recovery Administration,promoting peace between workers andemployers.

G O V E R N M E N T J O B S

The Hundred Days also brought the government into providing relief tothose in need. Roosevelt and most of his advisers shared the widespreadfear that direct government payments to the unemployed would undermineindividual self-reliance. Indeed, one of the first measures of the HundredDays had been the Economy Act, which reduced federal spending in anattempt to win the confidence of the business community. But with nearlya quarter of the workforce unemployed, spending on relief was unavoid-able. In May 1933, Congress created the Federal Emergency ReliefAdministration, to make grants to local agencies that aided those impover-ished by the Depression. FDR, however, much preferred to create tempo-rary jobs, thereby combating unemployment while improving the nation’sinfrastructure of roads, bridges, public buildings, and parks.

In March 1933, Congress established the Civilian Conservation Corps(CCC), which set unemployed young men to work on projects like forestpreservation, flood control, and the improvement of national parks andwildlife preserves. By the time the program ended in 1942, more than 3 mil-lion persons had passed through CCC camps, where they received govern-ment wages of $30 per month.

P U B L I C - W O R K S P R O J E C T S

One section of the National Industrial Recovery Act created the PublicWorks Administration (PWA), with an appropriation of $3.3 billion. Directedby Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, it built roads, schools, hospitals, andother public facilities, including New York City’s Triborough Bridge and theOverseas Highway between Miami and Key West, Florida. In November, yetanother agency, the Civil Works Administration (CWA), was launched. ByJanuary 1934, it employed more than 4 million persons in the constructionof highways, tunnels, courthouses, and airports. But as the cost spiraled

8 6 6 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

A Civilian Conservation Corps workforcein Yosemite National Park, 1935.

upward and complaints multiplied that the New Deal was creating a class ofAmericans permanently dependent on government jobs, Roosevelt orderedthe CWA dissolved.

Some New Deal public-works initiatives looked to government-plannedeconomic transformation as much as economic relief. The TennesseeValley Authority (TVA), another product of the Hundred Days, built aseries of dams to prevent floods and deforestation along the TennesseeRiver and to provide cheap electric power for homes and factories in aseven-state region where many families still lived in isolated log cabins.The TVA put the federal government, for the first time, in the business ofselling electricity in competition with private companies. It was a previewof the program of regional planning that spurred the economic develop-ment of the West.

T H E N E W D E A L A N D A G R I C U L T U R E

Another policy initiative of the Hundred Days addressed the disastrousplight of American farmers. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) author-ized the federal government to try to raise farm prices by setting productionquotas for major crops and paying farmers not to plant more. Many cropsalready in the field were destroyed. In 1933, the government ordered morethan 6 million pigs slaughtered as part of the policy, a step critics foundstrange at a time of widespread hunger.

The AAA succeeded in significantly raising farm prices and incomes. Butnot all farmers benefited. Benefits flowed to property-owning farmers,

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 6 7

A map published by the Public WorksAdministration in 1935 depicts some ofthe numerous infrastructure projectsfunded by the New Deal. Among the mostfamous public-works projects are theTriborough Bridge in New York City, theKey West Highway in Florida, and theGrand Coulee Dam in Washington.Overall, the New Deal spent $250 billion(in today’s money) to construct, amongother things, 40,000 public buildings,72,000 schools, 80,000 bridges, and 8,000parks.

8 6 8 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

DenverTopeka

Oklahoma City

Austin

Santa Fe

COLORADO

WYOMING

UTAH

AZ

NEW MEXICO

TEXAS

OKLAHOMA

KANSAS

IOWA

MISSOURI

ARKANSAS

LA

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Gulf ofMexico

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200 miles200 kilometers

Severe wind erosion in 1935–1936Severe wind erosion in 1938Severe wind erosion in 1940Most severe wind erosion in 1935–1938

T H E D U S T B O W L , 1 9 3 5 – 1 9 4 0

ignoring the large number who worked on land owned by others. The AAApolicy of paying landowning farmers not to grow crops encouraged theeviction of thousands of poor tenants and sharecroppers. Many joined therural exodus to cities or to the farms of the West Coast.

The onset in 1930 of a period of unusually dry weather in the nation’s heart-land worsened the Depression’s impact onrural America. By mid-decade, the regionsuffered from the century’s most severedrought. Mechanized agriculture in thissemiarid region had pulverized the topsoiland killed native grasses that preventederosion. Winds now blew much of the soilaway, creating the Dust Bowl, as the affect-ed areas of Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, andColorado were called. A local newspaperdescribed the situation in CimarronCounty, Oklahoma: “Not a blade of wheat;cattle dying on the range, ninety percentof the poultry dead because of the sandstorms, milk cows gone dry.” One storm in1934 carried dust as far as Washington,

A giant dust storm engulfs a town inwestern Kansas on April 14, 1935, knownas Black Sunday in the American West.

D.C. The drought and dust storms displaced more than 1 million farmers.John Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath (1939) and a popular film based onthe book captured their plight, tracing a dispossessed family’s trek fromOklahoma to California.

T H E N E W D E A L A N D H O U S I N G

Owning one’s home had long been a widely shared American ambition.“A man is not a whole and complete man,” Walt Whitman had written inthe 1850s, “unless he owns a house and the ground it stands on.” For manymembers of the middle class, home ownership had become a mark ofrespectability. For workers, it offered economic security at a time of lowwages, erratic employment, and limited occupational mobility. On the eveof World War I, a considerably higher percentage of immigrant workersthan the native-born middle class owned their homes.

The Depression devastated the American housing industry. The con-struction of new residences all but ceased, and banks and savings and loanassociations that had financed home ownership collapsed or, to remainafloat, foreclosed on many homes (a quarter of a million in 1932 alone). In1931, President Hoover convened a Conference on Home Building andHome Ownership to review the housing crisis. The president called own-ing a home an American “birthright,” the embodiment of the spirit of“enterprise, of independence, and of . . . freedom.” Rented apartments, hepointed out, did not inspire “immortal ballads” like Home, Sweet Home orThe Little Gray Home in the West. Papers presented at the conference revealedthat millions of Americans lived in overcrowded, unhealthy urban slumsor in ramshackle rural dwellings. Private enterprise alone, it seemed clear,was unlikely to solve the nation’s housing crisis.

Hoover’s administration established a federally sponsored bank toissue home loans. Not until the New Deal, however, did the governmentsystematically enter the housing market. Roosevelt spoke of “the securityof the home” as a fundamental right akin to “the security of livelihood, andthe security of social insurance.” In 1933 and 1934, his administration

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 6 9

Sharecroppers evicted from the farms onwhich they had been working in NewMadrid County, Missouri, as a result ofgovernment subsidies to farm owners toreduce crop production.

As it did in other sectors of the economy,the Great Depression led to a collapse inthe construction industry.

moved energetically to protect home owners from foreclosure and to stim-ulate new construction. The Home Owners Loan Corporation and FederalHousing Administration (FHA) insured millions of long-term mortgagesissued by private banks. At the same time, the federal government itselfbuilt thousands of units of low-rent housing. New Deal housing policyrepresented a remarkable departure from previous government practice.Thanks to the FHA and, later, the Veterans’ Administration, home owner-ship came within the reach of tens of millions of families. It becamecheaper for most Americans to buy single-family homes than to rentapartments.

Other important measures of Roosevelt’s first two years in office includedthe ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution, whichrepealed Prohibition; the establishment of the Federal CommunicationsCommission to oversee the nation’s broadcast airwaves and telephone com-munications; and the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commissionto regulate the stock and bond markets. Taken together, the First New Dealwas a series of experiments, some of which succeeded and some of whichdid not. They transformed the role of the federal government, constructednumerous public facilities, and provided relief to millions of needy persons.But they did not end the Depression. Some 10 million Americans—morethan 20 percent of the workforce—remained unemployed when 1934 cameto an end.

T H E C O U R T A N D T H E N E W D E A L

In 1935, the Supreme Court, still controlled by conservative Republicanjudges who held to the nineteenth-century understanding of freedom asliberty of contract, began to invalidate key New Deal laws. First came theNRA, declared unconstitutional in May in a case brought by the SchechterPoultry Company of Brooklyn, which had been charged with violating thecode adopted by the chicken industry. In a unanimous decision, the Courtdeclared the NRA unlawful because in its codes and other regulations itdelegated legislative powers to the president and attempted to regulatelocal businesses that did not engage in interstate commerce. In January

8 7 0 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E F I R S T N E W D E A L

Russell Lee’s 1939 photograph of amigrant family saying grace before eatingby the side of the road near Fort Gibson,Oklahoma, shows how, even in the mostdifficult circumstances, families struggledto maintain elements of their normal lives.

1919

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Figure 21.1 THE BUILDING BOOMAND ITS COLLAPSE, 1919–1939

Value of newbuilding permits

(1930 = 100)

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1936, the AAA fell in United States v. Butler, which declared it an unconsti-tutional exercise of congressional power over local economic activities. InJune, by a 5–4 vote, the justices ruled that New York could not establish aminimum wage for women and children.

Having failed to end the Depression or win judicial approval, the FirstNew Deal ground to a halt. Meanwhile, pressures were mounting outsideWashington that propelled the administration toward more radical depar-tures in policy.

T H E G R A S S R O O T S R E V O LT

L A B O R ’ S G R E A T U P H E A V A L

The most striking development of the mid-1930s was the mobilization of mil-lions of workers in mass-production industries that had successfully resistedunionization. “Labor’s great upheaval,” as this era of unprecedented militancywas called, came as a great surprise. Unlike in the past, however, the federalgovernment now seemed to be on the side of labor, a commitment embodiedin the National Industrial Recovery Act and in the Wagner Act (discussedlater) of 1935, which granted workers the legal right to form unions. With thesevere reduction of European immigration, ethnic differences among workershad diminished in importance. American-born children of the new immi-grants now dominated the industrial labor force, and organizers no longerhad to distribute materials in numerous languages as the IWW had done. Anda cadre of militant labor leaders, many of them socialists and communistswith long experience in organization, had survived the repression of the1920s. They provided leadership to the labor upsurge.

American factories at the outset of the New Deal were miniature dicta-torships in which unions were rare, workers could be beaten by supervi-sors and fired at will, and management determined the length of the work-day and speed of the assembly line. In industrial communities scatteredacross the country, local government firmly supported the companies. “JesusChrist couldn’t speak in Duquesne for the union,” declared the mayor of thatPennsylvania steel town. Workers’ demands during the 1930s went beyondbetter wages. They included an end to employers’ arbitrary power in theworkplace, and basic civil liberties for workers, including the right to picket,distribute literature, and meet to discuss their grievances. All these goalsrequired union recognition.

Roosevelt’s election as president did much to rekindle hope among thosewho called themselves, in the words of a worker writing to Secretary ofLabor Frances Perkins, “slaves of the depression.” His inaugurationunleashed a flood of poignant letters to the federal government describingwhat a Louisiana sugar laborer called the “terrible and inhuman condition”of many workers. Labor organizers spread the message that the “politicalliberty for which our forefathers fought” had been “made meaningless byeconomic inequality” and “industrial despotism.” “We are free Americans,”declared the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. “We shall exercise ourinalienable rights to organize into a great industrial union.”

Labor’s great upheaval exploded in 1934, a year that witnessed nofewer than 2,000 strikes. Many produced violent confrontations between

What were the major po l i cy in i t ia t ive s o f the New Dea l in the Hundred Days? 8 7 1

The Illegal Act, a cartoon critical ofthe Supreme Court’s decision declaringthe NRA unconstitutional. FDR tells adrowning Uncle Sam, “I’m sorry, butthe Supreme Court says I must chuckyou back in.”

Pennsylvania Steelworkers outsidethe Local Headquarters of the SteelWorkers Organizing Committee, a1938 photograph by Arnold Rothstein.

workers and the local police. In Toledo, Ohio, 10,000 striking auto workerssurrounded the Electric Auto-Lite factory, where managers had broughtstrikebreakers to take their jobs, leading to a seven-hour fight withpolice and the National Guard. In Minneapolis, where an organization ofbusinessmen known as the Citizens Alliance controlled the city govern-ment, a four-month strike by truck drivers led to pitched battles in thestreets and the governor declaring martial law. San Francisco experi-enced the country’s first general strike since 1919. It began with a walk-out of dockworkers led by the fiery communist Harry Bridges. Workersdemanded recognition of the International Longshoremen’s Associationand an end to the hated “shape up” system in which they had to gatheren masse each day to wait for work assignments. The year 1934 also wit-nessed a strike of 400,000 textile workers in states from New England tothe Deep South, demanding recognition of the United Textile Workers.Many of these walkouts, including those in Toledo, Minneapolis, andSan Francisco, won at least some of the workers’ demands. But the textilestrike failed.

T H E R I S E O F T H E C I O

The labor upheaval posed a challenge to the American Federation of Labor’straditional policy of organizing workers by craft—welders or machinerepairers, for example—rather than seeking to mobilize all the workers in agiven industry, such as steel manufacturing. In 1934, thirty AFL leaderscalled for the creation of unions of industrial workers. When the AFL con-vention of 1935 refused, the head of the United Mine Workers, John L. Lewis,led a walkout that produced a new labor organization, the Congress ofIndustrial Organizations (CIO). It set out to create unions in the main

8 7 2 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E G R A S S R O O T S R E V O L T

Signs carried by striking cotton millworkers in Lumberton, North Carolina,in 1937 illustrate how the labor movementrevived the nineteenth-century language of“wage slavery” to demand unionrecognition.

bastions of the American economy. It aimed, said Lewis, at nothing lessthan to secure “economic freedom and industrial democracy” for Americanworkers—a fair share in the wealth produced by their labor, and a voice indetermining the conditions under which they worked.

In December 1936, the United Auto Workers (UAW), a fledgling CIOunion, unveiled the sit-down, a strikingly effective tactic that the IWW hadpioneered three decades earlier. Rather than walking out of a plant, thusenabling management to bring in strikebreakers, workers halted produc-tion but remained inside. In the UAW’s first sit-down strike, 7,000 GeneralMotors workers seized control of the Fisher Body Plant in Cleveland. Sit-downs soon spread to GM plants in Flint, Michigan, the nerve center ofautomobile production. When local police tried to storm the Flint plants,workers fought them off. Democratic governor Frank Murphy, who hadbeen elected with strong support from the CIO, declared his unwillingnessto use force to dislodge the strikers. The strikers demonstrated a remark-able spirit of unity. They cleaned the plant, oiled the idle machinery, settleddisputes among themselves, prepared meals, and held concerts of laborsongs. Workers’ wives shuttled food into the plant. “They made a palace outof what had been their prison,” wrote one reporter. On February 11, GeneralMotors agreed to negotiate with the UAW. Not until 1941 would the bitterlyanti-union Henry Ford sign a labor contract. But by the end of 1937, theUAW claimed 400,000 members.

The victory in the auto industry reverberated throughout industrialAmerica. Steelworkers had suffered memorable defeats in the struggle forunionization, notably at Homestead in 1892 and in the Great Steel Strike of1919. U.S. Steel, the country’s single most important business firm, ownerof an industrial empire that stretched across several states and employedmore than 200,000 workers, had been among the strongest opponents ofunionization. But in March 1937, fearing a sit-down campaign and awarethat it could no longer count on the aid of state and federal authorities,the company agreed to recognize the Steel Workers Organizing Committee(forerunner of the United Steelworkers of America). Smaller steel firms, how-ever, refused to follow suit. On MemorialDay, 1937, company guards and Chicagopolice fired on a picnic of strikingRepublic Steel workers, killing ten per-sons. Not until 1942 would Republic signa labor contract.

Union membership nonethelessreached 9 million by 1940, more thandouble the number in 1930. The comingof the union, said a member of New YorkCity’s transit workers’ organization,enabled workers “to go to our bosses andtalk to them like men, instead of . . . likeslaves.” Unions frequently demandedand won a say in workplace manage-ment, including the right to contest theamount and pace of work and the intro-duction of new technology. They gainednew grievance procedures and seniority

Who were the main proponents o f e conomic jus t i c e in the 1930s , andwhat measures d id they advocat e ? 8 7 3

Sit-down strike at a General Motorsfactory in Flint, Michigan, 1937.

systems governing hiring, firing, and promotions. The CIO unions helpedto stabilize a chaotic employment situation and offered members a sense ofdignity and freedom.

L A B O R A N D P O L I T I C S

Throughout the industrial heartland, the labor upsurge altered the balanceof economic power and propelled to the forefront of politics labor’s goal ofa fairer, freer, more equal America. Unlike the AFL, traditionally hostile togovernment intervention in labor-management relations, the CIO put for-ward an ambitious program for federal action to shield Americans fromeconomic and social insecurity, including public housing, universal healthcare, and unemployment and old age insurance.

Building on the idea, so prominent in the 1920s, that the key to prosper-ity lay in an American standard of living based on mass consumption, CIOleaders explained the Depression as the result of an imbalance of wealthand income. The role of unions, in cooperation with the government, theyargued, was to “create a consumer’s demand” by raising wages and redis-tributing wealth. Only in this way could society absorb the products thatrolled off modern assembly lines. The pathbreaking 1937 agreementbetween the UAW and General Motors spoke of a “rate of pay commensu-rate with an American standard of living.” By mid-decade, many NewDealers accepted the “underconsumptionist” explanation of theDepression, which saw lack of sufficient consumer demand as its underly-ing cause. They concluded that the government must act to raise dramati-cally wage earners’ share of the national income.

V O I C E S O F P R O T E S T

Other popular movements of the mid-1930s also placed the question of eco-nomic justice on the political agenda. In California, the novelist UptonSinclair won the Democratic nomination for governor in 1934 as the head ofthe End Poverty in California movement. Sinclair called for the state to useidle factories and land in cooperative ventures that would provide jobs forthe unemployed. He lost the election after being subjected to one of the firstmodern “negative” media campaigns. Sinclair’s opponents circulated falsenewsreels showing armies of unemployed men marching to California tosupport his candidacy and a fake endorsement from the Communist Party.

The rise to national prominence of Huey Long offered another sign ofpopular dissatisfaction with the slow pace of economic recovery. Long’scareer embodied both Louisiana’s Populist and Socialist traditions (WinnParish, his home, had voted for both of these third parties) and the state’sheritage of undemocratic politics. Driven by intense ambition and thedesire to help uplift the state’s “common people,” Long won election as gov-ernor in 1928 and in 1930 took a seat in the U.S. Senate. From Washington,he dominated every branch of state government. He used his dictatorialpower to build roads, schools, and hospitals and to increase the tax burdenon Louisiana’s oil companies.

One of the most colorful characters in twentieth-century American pol-itics, Long was referred to by both admirers and critics as the “Kingfish.” In1934, he launched the Share Our Wealth movement, with the slogan

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“Every Man a King.” He called for theconfiscation of most of the wealth of therichest Americans in order to finance animmediate grant of $5,000 and a guaran-teed job and annual income for all citi-zens. In his inimitable style, Longexplained his goal: “Let’s pull down thesehuge piles of gold until there shall be areal job, not a little old sow-belly, black-eyed pea job but a real spending money,beefsteak and gravy . . . Ford in thegarage . . . red, white, and blue job forevery man.” Long claimed a following of5 million. He was on the verge ofannouncing a run for president whenthe son of a defeated political rival assas-sinated him in 1935.

Also in the mid-1930s, the “radio priest,”Father Charles E. Coughlin, attracted mil-lions of listeners with weekly broadcastsattacking Wall Street bankers and greedy capitalists, and calling for govern-ment ownership of key industries as a way of combating the Depression.Initially a strong supporter of FDR, Coughlin became increasingly criticalof the president for what he considered the failure of the New Deal to pro-mote social justice. His crusade would later shift to anti-Semitism and sup-port for European fascism. Dr. Francis Townsend, a California physician,meanwhile won wide support for a plan by which the government wouldmake a monthly payment of $200 to older Americans, with the require-ment that they spend it immediately. This, he argued, would boost theeconomy. By the end of 1934, Townsend Clubs claimed more than 2 millionmembers. Along with the rise of the CIO, these signs of popular discontenthelped to spark the Second New Deal.

T H E S E C O N D N E W D E A L

Spurred by the failure of his initial policies to pull the country out of theDepression and the growing popular clamor for greater economic equality,and buoyed by Democratic gains in the midterm elections of 1934,Roosevelt in 1935 launched the Second New Deal. The First had focused oneconomic recovery. The emphasis of the Second was economic security—a guarantee that Americans would be protected against unemploymentand poverty. “Boys,” Roosevelt’s relief administrator, Harry Hopkins, told hisstaff, “this is our hour. We’ve got to get everything we want—a [public] worksprogram, social security, wages and hours, everything—now or never.”

The idea that lack of consumer demand caused the Depression had beenpopularized by Huey Long, Francis Townsend, and the CIO. By 1935, moreand more New Dealers had concluded that the government should nolonger try to plan business recovery but should try to redistribute thenational income so as to sustain mass purchasing power in the consumereconomy. A series of measures in 1935 attacked head-on the problem of

Who were the main proponents o f e conomic jus t i c e in the 1930s , andwhat measures d id they advocat e ? 8 7 5

A portrait of Huey Long, the “Kingfish”of Louisiana politics, towers over theinauguration of his supporter, RichardLeche, as governor in 1936.

weak demand and economic inequality. Congress levied a highly publi-cized tax on large fortunes and corporate profits—a direct response to thepopularity of Huey Long’s Share Our Wealth campaign. It created the RuralElectrification Agency (REA) to bring electric power to homes that lackedit—80 percent of farms were still without electricity in 1934—in part toenable more Americans to purchase household appliances.

The REA proved to be one of the Second New Deal’s most successful pro-grams. By 1950, 90 percent of the nation’s farms had been wired for electric-ity, and almost all now possessed radios, electric stoves, refrigerators, andmechanical equipment to milk cows. In addition, the federal governmentunder the Second New Deal tried to promote soil conservation and familyfarming. This effort resulted from the belief that the country would neverachieve prosperity so long as farmers’ standard of living lagged well behindthat of city dwellers, and that rural poverty resulted mainly from the pooruse of natural resources. Thus, farmers received federal assistance in reduc-ing soil loss in their fields. The federal government also purchased signifi-cant amounts of marginal and eroded land and converted these areas fromfarms into national grasslands and parks. It encouraged more environmen-tally conscious agricultural techniques. These measures (like those of theAAA) mainly benefited landowners, not sharecroppers, tenants, or migrantworkers. In the long run, the Second New Deal failed to arrest the trendtoward larger farms and fewer farmers.

T H E W P A A N D T H E W A G N E R A C T

In 1934, Roosevelt had severely curtailed federal employment for those inneed. Now, he approved the establishment of the Works ProgressAdministration (WPA), which hired some 3 million Americans, in virtuallyevery walk of life, each year until it ended in 1943. Under Harry Hopkins’sdirection, the WPA changed the physical face of the United States. It con-structed thousands of public buildings and bridges, more than 500,000miles of roads, and 600 airports. It built stadiums, swimming pools, andsewage treatment plants. Unlike previous work relief programs, the WPAemployed many out-of-work white-collar workers and professionals, evendoctors and dentists.

Perhaps the most famous WPA projects were in the arts. The WPA sethundreds of artists to work decorating public buildings with murals. Ithired writers to produce local histories and guidebooks to the forty-eightstates and to record the recollections of ordinary Americans, includinghundreds of former slaves. Its Federal Theater Project put on plays, includ-ing an all-black production of Macbeth and Sinclair Lewis’s drama It Can’tHappen Here, about fascism coming to the United States. The Federal MusicProject established orchestras and choral groups, and the Federal DanceProject sponsored ballet and modern dance programs. Thanks to the WPA,audiences across the country enjoyed their first glimpse of live musical andtheatrical performances and their first opportunity to view exhibitions ofAmerican art. Also in 1935, Congress created the National YouthAdministration to provide relief to American teenagers and young adults.

Another major initiative of the Second New Deal, the Wagner Act,was known at the time as “Labor’s Magna Carta” (a reference to an earlylandmark in the history of freedom). This brought democracy into the

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A poster by the artist Vera Bock for theFederal Art Project of the Works ProgressAdministration depicts farmers andlaborers joining hands to produceprosperity.

American workplace by empowering the National Labor Relations Board tosupervise elections in which employees voted on union representation. Italso outlawed “unfair labor practices,” including the firing and blacklistingof union organizers. The bill’s main sponsor, Robert Wagner of New York,told the Senate that the ability of workers to pool their strength throughcollective bargaining represented the “next step” in “the evolution ofAmerican freedom.” He also promised that unionization and higher wageswould aid economic recovery by boosting the purchasing power of ordi-nary Americans.

T H E A M E R I C A N W E L F A R E S T A T E

The centerpiece of the Second New Deal was the Social Security Act of1935. It embodied Roosevelt’s conviction that the national government hada responsibility to ensure the material well-being of ordinary Americans. Itcreated a system of unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and aid tothe disabled, the elderly poor, and families with dependent children.

None of these were original ideas. The Progressive platform of 1912 hadcalled for old age pensions. Assistance to poor families with dependentchildren descended from the mothers’ pensions promoted by maternalistreformers. Many European countries had already adopted national unem-ployment insurance plans. What was new, however, was that in the nameof economic security, the American government would now supervise notsimply temporary relief but a permanent system of social insurance.

The Social Security Act launched the American version of the welfarestate—a term that originated in Britain during World War II to refer to asystem of income assistance, health coverage, and social services for allcitizens. The act illustrated both the extent and the limits of the changes

What were the major in i t ia t ive s o f the Second New Dea l , and how did they d i f f e rf rom the F i r s t New Dea l ? 8 7 7

An art exhibit in a New York City alley in1938. The Works Progress Administrationtried to broaden the audience for art bydisplaying it in unusual venues.

ushered in by the Second New Deal. The American welfare state marked aradical departure from previous government policies, but compared withsimilar programs in Europe, it has always been far more decentralized,involved lower levels of public spending, and covered fewer citizens. Theoriginal Social Security bill, for example, envisioned a national system ofhealth insurance. But Congress dropped this after ferocious oppositionfrom the American Medical Association, which feared government regula-tion of doctors’ activities and incomes.

T H E S O C I A L S E C U R I T Y S Y S T E M

Some New Dealers desired a program funded by the federal government’sgeneral tax revenues, and with a single set of eligibility standards adminis-tered by national officials. But Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, alongwith powerful members of Congress, wished to keep relief in the hands ofstate and local authorities and believed that workers should contributedirectly to the cost of their own benefits. Roosevelt himself preferred to fundSocial Security by taxes on employers and workers, rather than out of gen-eral government revenues. He believed that paying such taxes gave contrib-utors “a legal, moral, and political right” to collect their old age pensions andunemployment benefits, which no future Congress could rescind.

As a result, Social Security emerged as a hybrid of national and localfunding, control, and eligibility standards. Old age pensions were adminis-tered nationally but paid for by taxes on employers and employees. Suchtaxes also paid for payments to the unemployed, but this program washighly decentralized, with the states retaining considerable control overthe level of benefits. The states paid most of the cost of direct poor relief,under the program called Aid to Dependent Children, and eligibility andthe level of payments varied enormously from place to place. As will be dis-cussed later, the combination of local administration and the fact thatdomestic and agricultural workers were not covered by unemploymentand old age benefits meant that Social Security at first excluded large num-bers of Americans, especially unmarried women and non-whites.

Nonetheless, Social Security represented a dramatic departure from thetraditional functions of government. The Second New Deal transformed therelationship between the federal government and American citizens. Beforethe 1930s, national political debate often revolved around the question ofwhether the federal government should intervene in the economy. After theNew Deal, debate rested on how it should intervene. In addition, the govern-ment assumed a responsibility, which it has never wholly relinquished, forguaranteeing Americans a living wage and protecting them against eco-nomic and personal misfortune. “Laissez-faire is dead,” wrote WalterLippmann, “and the modern state has become responsible for the moderneconomy [and] the task of insuring . . . the standard of life for its people.”

A R E C K O N I N G W I T H L I B E R T Y

The Depression made inevitable, in the words of one writer, a “reckoningwith liberty.” For too many Americans, Roosevelt proclaimed, “life was no

8 7 8 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 A R E C K O N I N G W I T H L I B E R T Y

A 1935 poster promoting the new SocialSecurity system.

longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuitof happiness.” The 1930s produced an outpouring of books and essays onfreedom. The large majority took for granted the need for a new definition.In a volume entitled Land of the Free (1938), the poet Archibald MacLeishused photographs of impoverished migrants and sharecroppers to questionthe reality of freedom in desperate times. “We told ourselves we were free,”he wrote. Now, “we wonder if the liberty is done . . . or if there’s somethingdifferent men can mean by Liberty.”

Like the Civil War, the New Deal recast the idea of freedom by linking itto the expanding power of the national state. “Our democracy,” wroteFather John A. Ryan, a prominent Catholic social critic, “finds itself . . . in anew age where not political freedom but social and industrial freedom isthe most insistent cry.” Influenced by Ryan, the National Catholic WelfareConference in 1935 declared that “social justice” required a governmentguarantee of continuous employment and a “decent livelihood and ade-quate security” for all Americans. A 1935 survey by Fortune magazine foundthat among poor respondents, 90 percent believed that the governmentshould guarantee that “every man who wants work has a job.”

F D R A N D T H E I D E A O F F R E E D O M

Along with being a superb politician, Roosevelt was a master of politicalcommunication. At a time when his political opponents controlled mostnewspapers, he harnessed radio’s power to bring his message directly intoAmerican homes. By the mid-1930s, more than two-thirds of Americanfamilies owned radios. They listened avidly to Roosevelt’s radio addresses,known as “fireside chats.”

Roosevelt adeptly appealed to traditional values in support of new poli-cies. He gave the term “liberalism” its modern meaning. In the nineteenthcentury, liberalism had been a shorthand for limited government and free-market economics. Roosevelt consciously chose to employ it to describe alarge, active, socially conscious state. He reclaimed the word “freedom”from conservatives and made it a rallying cry for the New Deal. In his sec-ond fireside chat, Roosevelt juxtaposed his own definition of liberty as“greater security for the average man” to the older notion of liberty of con-tract, which served the interests of “the privileged few.” Henceforth, hewould consistently link freedom with economic security and identifyentrenched economic inequality as its greatest enemy. “The liberty of ademocracy,” he declared in 1938, was not safe if citizens could not “sustainan acceptable standard of living.”

Even as Roosevelt invoked the word to uphold the New Deal, “liberty”—in the sense of freedom from powerful government—became the fightingslogan of his opponents. Their principal critique of the New Deal was thatits “reckless spending” undermined fiscal responsibility and its new gov-ernment regulations restricted American freedom. When conservativebusinessmen and politicians in 1934 formed an organization to mobilizeopposition to Roosevelt’s policies, they called it the American LibertyLeague. Robert Taft of Ohio, leader of the Republicans in Congress, accusedRoosevelt of sacrificing “individual freedom” in a misguided effort to“improve the conditions of the poor.”

How did the New Dea l re cas t the mean ing o f Amer i can f r e edom? 8 7 9

FDR delivering one of his “fireside chats”in 1938. Roosevelt was the first presidentto make effective use of the radio topromote his policies.

In our efforts for recovery we have avoided, onthe one hand, the theory that business should andmust be taken over into an all-embracingGovernment. We have avoided, on the other hand,the equally untenable theory that it is aninterference with liberty to offer reasonable helpwhen private enterprise is in need of help. Thecourse we have followed fits the Americanpractice of Government, a practice of taking actionstep by step, of regulating only to meet concreteneeds, a practice of courageous recognition ofchange. I believe with Abraham Lincoln, that “thelegitimate object of Government is to do for acommunity of people whatever they need to havedone but cannot do at all or cannot do so well forthemselves in their separate and individualcapacities.”

I am not for a return to that definition of libertyunder which for many years a free people werebeing gradually regimented into the service of theprivileged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer thatbroader definition of liberty under which we aremoving forward to greater freedom, to greatersecurity for the average man than he has everknown before in the history of America.

President Roosevelt pioneered the use of the

newmass medium of radio to speak directly

to Americans in their homes. He used his

“fireside chats” to mobilize support for New

Deal programs, link themwith American

traditions, and outline his definition of

freedom.

To those who say that our expenditures for publicworks and other means for recovery are a waste thatwe cannot afford, I answer that no country, howeverrich, can afford the waste of its human resources.Demoralization caused by vast unemployment isour greatest extravagance. Morally, it is the greatestmenace to our social order. Some people try to tellme that we must make up our minds that in thefuture we shall permanently have millions ofunemployed just as other countries have had themfor over a decade. What may be necessary for thosecountries is not my responsibility to determine. Butas for this country, I stand or fall by my refusal toaccept as a necessary condition of our future apermanent army of unemployed. . . .

FR O M FR A N K L I N D. RO O S E V E LT,

“Fireside Chat” (1934)

8 8 0!

V O I C E S O F F R E E D O M

John Steinbeck’s popular novel The Grapes of

Wrath (1939), and the film version that followed

shortly thereafter, focused national attention on

the plight of homelessmigrants displaced from

their farms as a result of the Great Depression.

Before that book appeared, Steinbeck had pub-

lished a series of newspaper articles based on eye-

witness accounts of themigrants, which became

the basis for his novel.

In California, we find a curious attitude toward agroup that makes our agriculture successful. Themigrants are needed, and they are hated. . . . Themigrants are hated for the following reasons, that theyare ignorant and dirty people, that they are carriers ofdisease, that they increase the necessity for police andthe tax bill for schooling in a community, and that ifthey are allowed to organize they can, simply by refus-ing to work, wipe out the season’s crops. . . .

Let us see what kind of people they are, where theycome from, and the routes of their wanderings. In thepast they have been of several races, encouraged tocome and often imported as cheap labor. Chinese inthe early period, then Filipinos, Japanese and Mexicans.These were foreigners, and as such they were ostra-cized and segregated and herded about. . . . But inrecent years the foreign migrants have begun to organ-ize, and at this danger they have been deported in greatnumbers, for there was a new reservoir from which agreat quantity of cheap labor could be obtained.

The drought in the middle west has driven theagricultural populations of Oklahoma, Nebraska and

parts of Kansas and Texas westward. . . . Thousandsof them are crossing the borders in ancient rattlingautomobiles, destitute and hungry and homeless,ready to accept any pay so that they may eat and feedtheir children. . . .

The earlier foreign migrants have invariably beendrawn from a peon class. This is not the case with thenew migrants. They are small farmers who have losttheir farms, or farm hands who have lived with thefamily in the old American way. . . . They have comefrom the little farm districts where democracy was notonly possible but inevitable, where popular govern-ment, whether practiced in the Grange, in churchorganization or in local government, was the responsi-bility of every man. And they have come into the coun-try where, because of the movement necessary to makea living, they are not allowed any vote whatever, butare rather considered a properly unprivileged class. . . .

As one little boy in a squatter’s camp said, “Whenthey need us they call us migrants, and when we’vepicked their crop, we’re bums and we got to get out.”

Q U E S T I O N S

1. What does Roosevelt mean by the differencebetween the definition of liberty that has existedin the past and his own “broader definition ofliberty”?

2. According to Steinbeck, how do Depression-eramigrant workers differ from those in earlier periods?

3. Do the migrant workers described by Steinbeckenjoy liberty as Roosevelt understands it?

FR O M JO H N ST E I N B E C K, The Har vest Gypsies:

On the Road to the Grapes of Wrath (1938)

8 8 1

As the 1930s progressed, opponents of the New Deal invoked the lan-guage of liberty with greater and greater passion. The U.S. Chamber ofCommerce charged FDR with attempting to “Sovietize” America. Eventhough his own administration had abandoned laissez-faire in the face ofeconomic disaster, former president Hoover launched strident attacks onhis successor for endangering “fundamental American liberties.” In TheChallenge to Liberty (1934), Hoover called the New Deal “the most stupen-dous invasion of the whole spirit of liberty” the nation had ever seen.

T H E E L E C T I O N O F 1 9 3 6

By 1936, with working-class voters providing massive majorities for theDemocratic Party and businesses large and small bitterly estranged fromthe New Deal, politics reflected class divisions more completely than at anyother time in American history. Conceptions of freedom divided sharply aswell. Americans, wrote George Soule, editor of The New Republic, confront-ed “two opposing systems of concepts about liberty,” reflecting “the needsand purposes of two opposing [parts] of the population.” One was the ideaof “freedom for private enterprise,” the other “socialized liberty” based on“an equitably shared abundance.”

A fight for the possession of “the ideal of freedom,” reported the New YorkTimes, emerged as the central issue of the presidential campaign of 1936.The Democratic platform insisted that in a modern economy the govern-ment has an obligation to establish a “democracy of opportunity for all thepeople.” In his speech accepting renomination, Roosevelt launched a blis-tering attack against “economic royalists” who, he charged, sought to estab-lish a new tyranny over the “average man.” Economic rights, he went on,

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This 1935 cartoon by William Gropperportrays Uncle Sam as Gulliver tied downby Lilliputians in the famous eighteenth-century novel Gulliver’s Travels byJonathan Swift. In this case, the bonds arethe numerous agencies and laws createdby the New Deal, which, Groppersuggests, are inhibiting the country fromgetting back on its feet during the GreatDepression.

were the precondition of liberty—poor men “are not free men.”Throughout the campaign, FDR would insist that the threat posed to eco-nomic freedom by the “new despotism” of large corporations was the mainissue of the election.

As Roosevelt’s opponent, Republicans chose Kansas governor AlfredLandon, a former Theodore Roosevelt Progressive. Landon denounced SocialSecurity and other measures as threats to individual liberty. Opposition tothe New Deal planted the seeds for the later flowering of an antigovern-ment conservatism bent on upholding the free market and dismantling thewelfare state. But in 1936 Roosevelt won a landslide reelection, with morethan 60 percent of the popular vote. He carried every state except Maineand Vermont. Roosevelt’s victory was all the more remarkable in view ofthe heavy support most of the nation’s newspapers and nearly the entirebusiness community gave to the Republicans. His success stemmed fromstrong backing from organized labor and his ability to unite southernwhite and northern black voters, Protestant farmers and urban Catholicand Jewish ethnics, industrial workers and middle-class home owners.These groups made up the so-called New Deal coalition, which would dom-inate American politics for nearly half a century.

T H E C O U R T F I G H T

Roosevelt’s second inaugural address was the first to be delivered onJanuary 20. In order to lessen a newly elected president’s wait before takingoffice, the recently ratified Twentieth Amendment had moved inaugura-tion day from March 4. FDR called on the nation to redouble its efforts toaid those “who have too little.” The Depression, he admitted, had not beenconquered: “I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished.”Emboldened by his electoral triumph, Roosevelt now made what many con-sidered a serious political miscalculation. On the pretense that severalmembers of the Supreme Court were too old to perform their functions, heproposed that the president be allowed to appoint a new justice for eachone who remained on the Court past age seventy (an age that six of the ninehad already surpassed). FDR’s aim, of course, was to change the balance ofpower on a Court that, he feared, might well invalidate Social Security, theWagner Act, and other measures of the Second New Deal.

The plan aroused cries that the president was an aspiring dictator.Congress rejected it. But Roosevelt accomplished his underlying purpose.The Supreme Court, it is sometimes said, follows the election returns.Coming soon after Roosevelt’s landslide victory of 1936, the threat of“court packing” inspired an astonishing about-face on the part of key jus-tices. Beginning in March 1937, the Court suddenly revealed a new will-ingness to support economic regulation by both the federal governmentand the states. It upheld a minimum wage law of the state of Washingtonsimilar to the New York measure it had declared unconstitutional a yearearlier. It turned aside challenges to Social Security and the Wagner Act. Insubsequent cases, the Court affirmed federal power to regulate wages,hours, child labor, agricultural production, and numerous other aspects ofeconomic life.

Announcing a new judicial definition of freedom, Chief Justice CharlesEvans Hughes pointed out that the words “freedom of contract” did not

How did the New Dea l re cas t the mean ing o f Amer i can f r e edom? 8 8 3

Fall In!, a cartoon commenting onRoosevelt’s proposal to “pack” theSupreme Court, from the RichmondTimes-Dispatch, January 8, 1937.

appear in the Constitution. “Liberty,” however, did, and this, Hughes con-tinued, required “the protection of law against the evils which menace thehealth, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.” The Court’s new willing-ness to accept the New Deal marked a permanent change in judicial policy.Having declared dozens of economic laws unconstitutional in the decadesleading up to 1937, the justices have rarely done so since.

T H E E N D O F T H E S E C O N D N E W D E A L

Even as the Court made its peace with Roosevelt’s policies, the momentumof the Second New Deal slowed. The landmark United States Housing Actdid pass in 1937, initiating the first major national effort to build homes forthe poorest Americans. But the Fair Labor Standards bill failed to reach thefloor for over a year. When it finally passed in 1938, it banned goods pro-duced by child labor from interstate commerce, set forty cents as the mini-mum hourly wage, and required overtime pay for hours of work exceedingforty per week. This last major piece of New Deal legislation established thepractice of federal regulation of wages and working conditions, anotherradical departure from pre-Depression policies.

The year 1937 also witnessed a sharp downturn of the economy. Witheconomic conditions improving in 1936, Roosevelt had reduced federalfunding for farm subsidies and WPA work relief. The result was disastrous.As government spending fell, so did business investment, industrial produc-tion, and the stock market. Unemployment, still 14 percent at the beginningof 1937, rose to nearly 20 percent by year’s end.

In 1936, in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, JohnMaynard Keynes had challenged economists’ traditional belief in the sanctityof balanced budgets. Large-scale government spending, he insisted, was neces-sary to sustain purchasing power and stimulate economic activity duringdownturns. Such spending should be enacted even at the cost of a budgetdeficit (a situation in which the government spends more money than it takesin). By 1938, Roosevelt was ready to follow this prescription, which wouldlater be known as Keynesian economics. In April, he asked Congress for bil-lions more for work relief and farm aid. By the end of the year, the immediatecrisis had passed. But the events of 1937–1938 marked a major shift in NewDeal philosophy. Rather than economic planning, as in 1933–1934, or eco-nomic redistribution, as in 1935–1936, public spending would now be thegovernment’s major tool for combating unemployment and stimulatingeconomic growth. The Second New Deal had come to an end.

T H E L I M I T S O F C H A N G E

Roosevelt conceived of the Second New Deal, and especially Social Security,as expanding the meaning of freedom by extending assistance to broadgroups of needy Americans—the unemployed, elderly, and dependent—asa right of citizenship, not charity or special privilege. But political realities,especially the power of inherited ideas about gender and black disenfran-chisement in the South, powerfully affected the drafting of legislation.Different groups of Americans experienced the New Deal in radically dif-ferent ways.

8 8 4 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E L I M I T S O F C H A N G EPe

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The New Deal did not really solve theproblem of unemployment, which fellbelow 10 percent only in 1941, as theUnited States prepared to enter WorldWar II.

T H E N E W D E A L A N D A M E R I C A N W O M E N

The New Deal brought more women into government than ever before inAmerican history. A number of talented women, including Secretary ofLabor Frances Perkins, advised the president and shaped public policy.Most prominent of all was Eleanor Roosevelt, FDR’s distant cousin whomhe had married in 1905. She transformed the role of First Lady, turning aposition with no formal responsibilities into a base for political action. Shetraveled widely, spoke out on public issues, wrote a regular newspaper col-umn that sometimes disagreed openly with her husband’s policies, andworked to enlarge the scope of the New Deal in areas like civil rights, laborlegislation, and work relief.

But even as the New Deal increased women’s visibility in national poli-tics, organized feminism, already in disarray during the 1920s, disappearedas a political force. Indeed, the Depression inspired widespread demandsfor women to remove themselves from the labor market to make room forunemployed men. Because the Depression hit industrial employmentharder than low-wage clerical and service jobs where women predominated,the proportion of the workforce made up of women rose. The governmenttried to reverse this trend. The Economy Act of 1932 prohibited both mem-bers of a married couple from holding federal jobs. Until its repeal in 1937,it led to the dismissal of numerous female civil service employees whosehusbands worked for the government. Many states and localities prohibitedthe hiring of women whose husbands earned a “living wage,” and employ-ers from banks to public school systems barred married women from jobs.Although the CIO organized female workers, it, too, adhered to the ideathat women should be supported by men. “The working wife whose hus-band is employed,” said a vice president of the United Auto Workers,“should be barred from industry.”

How did New Dea l bene f i t s app ly to women and minor i t i e s ? 8 8 5

Eleanor Roosevelt transformed the role ofFirst Lady by taking an active and visiblepart in public life. Here she visits a WestVirginia coal mine in 1933.

Most New Deal programs did not exclude women from benefits (althoughthe CCC restricted its camps to men). But the ideal of the male-headed house-hold powerfully shaped social policy. Since paying taxes on one’s wages madeone eligible for the most generous Social Security programs—old age pen-sions and unemployment insurance—they left most women uncovered, sincethey did not work outside the home. The program excluded the 3 million most-ly female domestic workers altogether. “Those who need protection most arecompletely overlooked,” the sister of a household worker complained toSecretary of Labor Perkins. “What about the poor domestics, both in privatehomes and private institutions. What have you done for them? Nothing.”

T H E S O U T H E R N V E T O

Roosevelt made the federal government the symbolic representative of allthe people, including racial and ethnic groups generally ignored by previ-ous administrations. Yet the power of the Solid South helped to mold theNew Deal welfare state into an entitlement of white Americans. After theSouth’s blacks lost the right to vote around the turn of the century,Democrats enjoyed a political monopoly in the region. Democratic mem-bers of Congress were elected again and again. With results predetermined,many whites did not bother to vote (only about 20 percent of eligiblesouthern voters cast ballots in the election of 1920). But this tiny electoratehad an enormous impact on national policy. Committee chairmanships inCongress rest on seniority—how many years a member has served inoffice. Beginning in 1933, when Democrats took control of Congress,southerners took the key leadership positions. Despite his personal popu-larity, Roosevelt felt he could not challenge the power of southernDemocrats if he wished legislation to pass. At their insistence, the SocialSecurity law excluded agricultural and domestic workers, the largest cate-gories of black employment.

Roosevelt spoke of Social Security’s universality, but the demand fortruly comprehensive coverage came from the political left and black organ-izations. Congressman Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota in 1935 introduced abill establishing a federally controlled system of old age, unemployment,and health benefits for all wage workers, plus support for female heads ofhouseholds with dependents. Black organizations like the Urban Leagueand the NAACP supported the Lundeen bill and lobbied strenuously for asystem that enabled agricultural and domestic workers to receive unem-ployment and old age benefits and that established national relief stan-dards. The Social Security Act, however, not Lundeen’s proposal, becamelaw. Its limitations, complained the Pittsburgh Courier, a black newspaper,reflected the power of “reactionary elements in the South who cannot bearthe thought of Negroes getting pensions and compensations” and whofeared that the inclusion of black workers would disrupt the region’s low-wage, racially divided labor system.

T H E S T I G M A O F W E L F A R E

Because of the “southern veto,” the majority of black workers found them-selves confined to the least generous and most vulnerable wing of the newwelfare state. The public assistance programs established by Social Security,

8 8 6 C h . 2 1 T h e N e w D e a l , 1 9 3 2– 1 9 4 0 T H E L I M I T S O F C H A N G E

notably aid to dependent children and to the poor elderly, were open to allAmericans who could demonstrate financial need. But they set benefits atextremely low levels and authorized the states to determine eligibility stan-dards, including “moral” behavior as defined by local authorities. As a result,public assistance programs allowed for widespread discrimination in thedistribution of benefits. Because recipients did not pay Social Security taxes,they soon came to bear the humiliating stigma of dependency on govern-ment handouts, which would soon come to be known as “welfare.”

In 1942, the National Resources Planning Board noted that because oftheir exclusion from programs “which give aid under relatively favorableconditions,” blacks were becoming disproportionately dependent on wel-fare, a program widely viewed with popular disfavor. The situation, thereport concluded, seemed certain to stigmatize blacks as recipients ofunearned government assistance, and welfare as a program for minorities,thus dooming it forever to inadequate “standards of aid.” Over time, this isprecisely what happened, until the federal government abolished itsresponsibility for welfare in 1996, during the presidency of Bill Clinton.

T H E I N D I A N N E W D E A L

Overall, the Depression and New Deal had a contradictory impact onAmerica’s racial minorities. Under Commissioner of Indian Affairs JohnCollier, the administration launched an “Indian New Deal.” Collier endedthe policy of forced assimilation and allowed Indians unprecedentedcultural autonomy. He replaced boarding schools meant to eradicate thetribal heritage of Indian children with schools on reservations, and dramat-ically increased spending on Indian health. He secured passage of theIndian Reorganization Act of 1934, ending the policy, dating back to theDawes Act of 1887, of dividing Indian lands into small plots for individualfamilies and selling off the rest. Federal authorities once again recognizedIndians’ right to govern their own affairs, except where specifically limitedby national laws. Such limitations, however, could weigh heavily on Indiantribes. The Navajos, the nation’s largest tribe, refused to cooperate with theReorganization Act as a protest against a federal soil conservation programthat required them to reduce their herds of livestock.

The New Deal marked the most radical shift in Indian policy in thenation’s history. But living conditions on the desperately poor reservationsdid not significantly improve, and New Deal programs often ignoredIndians’ interests. The building of the Grand Coulee Dam on the ColumbiaRiver flooded thousands of acres where Indians had hunted and fished forcenturies. But the government did not make any of the irrigation wateravailable to the region’s reservations.

T H E N E W D E A L A N D M E X I C A N - A M E R I C A N S

For Mexican-Americans, the Depression was a wrenching experience. Withdemand for their labor plummeting, more than 400,000 (one-fifth of thepopulation of Mexican origin) returned to Mexico, some voluntarily, oth-ers at the strong urging of local authorities in the Southwest. A majority ofthose “encouraged” to leave the country were recent immigrants, but theyincluded perhaps 200,000 Mexican-American children who had been born

How did New Dea l bene f i t s app ly to women and minor i t i e s ? 8 8 7

in the United States and were thereforecitizens. Those who remained mostlyworked in grim conditions inCalifornia’s vegetable and fruit fields,whose corporate farms benefited enor-mously from New Deal dam construc-tion that provided them with cheap elec-tricity and water for irrigation. TheWagner and Social Security Acts did notapply to agricultural laborers. When theworkers tried to organize a union as partof the decade’s labor upsurge, they werebrutally suppressed. In his 1939 bookFactories in the Field, the writer CareyMcWilliams exposed the low wages,inadequate housing, and political repres-sion under which the migrant laborerssuffered, which the New Deal did noth-ing to alleviate.

Mexican-American leaders struggled todevelop a consistent strategy for their peo-

ple. They sought greater rights by claiming to be white Americans—in orderto not suffer the same discrimination as African-Americans—but also soughtthe backing of the Mexican government and promoted a mystical sense ofpride and identification with Mexican heritage later given the name la raza.

L A S T H I R E D , F I R S T F I R E D

As the “last hired and first fired,” African-Americans were hit hardest by theDepression. Even those who retained their jobs now faced competition fromunemployed whites who had previously considered positions like waiterand porter beneath them. With an unemployment rate double that ofwhites, blacks benefited disproportionately from direct government reliefand, especially in northern cities, jobs on New Deal public-works projects.Half of the families in Harlem received public assistance during the 1930s.

The Depression propelled economic survival to the top of the blackagenda. Demonstrations in Harlem demanded jobs in the neighborhood’swhite-owned stores, with the slogan “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work.”W. E. B. Du Bois abandoned his earlier goal of racial integration as unrealis-tic for the foreseeable future. Blacks, he wrote, must recognize themselvesas “a nation within a nation.” He called on blacks to organize for economicsurvival by building an independent, cooperative economy within theirsegregated communities, and to gain control of their own separate schools(a position reminiscent of that of Booker T. Washington, whom he had ear-lier condemned).

A N E W D E A L F O R B L A C K S

Although Roosevelt seems to have had little personal interest in race rela-tions or civil rights, he appointed Mary McLeod Bethune, a prominent blackeducator, as a special adviser on minority affairs and a number of other

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A large crowd of Mexican-Americanswaiting to leave Los Angeles in 1932as part of the repatriation campaign.

blacks to important federal positions. Key members of his administration,including his wife, Eleanor, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a for-mer president of the Chicago chapter of the NAACP, directed national atten-tion to the injustices of segregation, disenfranchisement, and lynching. In1939, Eleanor Roosevelt resigned from the Daughters of the AmericanRevolution when the organization refused to allow the black singer MarianAnderson to present a concert at Constitution Hall in Washington. The pres-ident’s wife arranged for Anderson to sing on the steps of the LincolnMemorial and for the concert to be broadcast nationally on the radio.

Thanks to the New Deal, Bethune proclaimed, a “new day” had dawnedwhen blacks would finally reach “the promised land of liberty.” The decadewitnessed a historic shift in black voting patterns. In the North and West,where they enjoyed the right to vote, blacks in 1934 and 1936 abandonedtheir allegiance to the party of Lincoln and emancipation in favor ofDemocrats and the New Deal. But their hopes for broad cha