In a Different VoicePsychological Theory and Women's Development

Carol Gilligan

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp . 24-39 .

In 1914, with his essay "On Narcissism," Freud swallows his distaste at the thought o f"abandoning observation for barren theoretical controversy" and extends his map of thepsychological domain . Tracing the development of the capacity to love, which he equates wit hmaturity and psychic health, he locates its origins in the contrast between love for the mother andlove for the self. But in thus dividing the world of love into narcissism and "object" relationships ,he finds that while men's development becomes clearer, women's becomes increasingly opaque .The problem arises because the contrast between mother and self yields two different images o frelationships . Relying on the imagery of men's lives in charting the course of human growth ,Freud is unable to trace in women the development of relationships, morality, or a clear sense o fself. This difficulty in fitting the logic of his theory to women's experience leads him in the end t oset women apart, marking their relationships, like their sexual life, as "a `dark continent' fo rpsychology" (1926, p . 212) . .

Thus the problem of interpretation that shadows the understanding of women' sdevelopment arises from the differences observed in their experience of relationships . To Freud,though living surrounded by women and otherwise seeing so much and so well, women' srelationships seemed increasingly mysterious, difficult to discern, and hard to describe . While thi smystery indicates how theory can blind observation, it also suggests that development in women i smasked by a particular conception of human relationships . Since the imagery of relationship sshapes the narrative of human development, the inclusion of women, by changing that imagery,implies a change in the entire account .

The shift in imagery that creates the problem in interpreting women's development i selucidated by the moral judgments of two eleven-year-old children, a boy and a girl, who see, in th esame dilemma, two very different moral problems . While current theory brightly illuminates theline and the logic of the boy's thought, it casts scant light on that of the girl . The choice of a girlwhose moral judgments elude existing categories of developmental assessment is meant t ohighlight the issue of interpretation rather than to exemplify sex differences per se . Adding a newline of interpretation, based on the imagery of the girl's thought, makes it possible not only to se edevelopment where previously development was not discerned but also to consider differences inthe understanding of relationships without scaling these differences from better to worse .

The two children were in the same sixth-grade class at school and were participants in th erights and responsibilities study, designed to explore different conceptions of morality and self . Thesample selected for this study was chosen to focus the variables of gender and age whil emaximizing developmental potential by holding constant, at a high level, the factors of intelligence ,education, and social class that have been associated with moral development, at least as measuredby existing scales . The two children in question, Amy and Jake, were both bright and articulate and ,at least in their eleven-year-old aspirations, resisted easy categories of sex-role stereotyping, since

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Amy aspired to become a scientist while Jake preferred English to math . Yet their moral judgmentsseem initially to confirm familiar notions about differences between the sexes, suggesting that theedge girls have on moral development during the early school years gives way at puberty with th eascendance-of formal logical thoughtin boys .

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The dilemma that these eleven-year-olds were asked to resolve was one in the series devise dby Kohlberg to measure moral development in adolescence by presenting a conflict between mora lnorms and exploring the logic of its resolution . In this particular dilemma, a man named Heinzconsiders whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot afford to buy in order to save the life ofhis wife. In the standard format of Kohlberg's interviewing procedure, the description of thedilemma itself Heinz's predicament, the wife's disease, the druggist's refusal to lower his price is followed by the question, "Should Heinz steal the drug?" The reasons for and against stealingare then explored through a series of questions that vary and extend the parameters of the dilemmain a way designed to reveal the underlying structure of moral thought .

Jake, at eleven, is clear from the outset that Heinz should steal the drug . Constructing thedilemma, as Kohlberg did, as a conflict between the values of property and life, he discerns th elogical priority of life and uses that logic to justify his choice :

For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if th edruggist only makes $1,000, he is still going to live, but if Heinzdoesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die . (Why is life worthmore than money?) Because the druggist can get a thousand dollarslater from rich people with cancer, but Heinz can't get his wife again .(Why not?) Because people are all different and so you couldn't getHeinz's wife again .

Asked whether Heinz should steal the drug if he does not love his wife, Jake replies that h eshould, saying that not only is there "a difference between hating and killing," but also, if Heinzwere caught, "the judge would probably think it was the right thing to do ." Asked about the factthat, in stealing, Heinz would be breaking the law, he says that "the laws have mistakes, and youcan't go writing up a law for everything that you can imagine . "

Thus, while taking the law into account and recognizing its function in maintaining socia lorder (the judge, Jake says, "should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence"), he also sees the lawas man-made and therefore subject to error and change . Yet his judgment that Heinz should stealthe drug, like his view of the law as having mistakes, rests on the assumption of agreement, asocietal consensus around moral values that allows one to know and expect others to recognizewhat is "the right thing to do . "

Fascinated by the power of logic, this eleven-year-old boy locates truth in math, which, h esays, is "the only thing that is totally logical ." Considering the moral dilemma to be "sort of like amath problem with humans," he sets it up as an equation and proceeds to work out the solution .Since his solution is rationally derived, he assumes that anyone following reason would arrive a tthe same conclusion and thus that a judge would also consider stealing to be the right thing fo rHeinz to do . Yet he is also aware of the limits of logic . Asked whether there is a right answer tomoral problems, Jake replies that "there can only be right and wrong in judgment," since th eparameters of action are variable and complex. Illustrating how actions undertaken with the best ofintentions can eventuate in the most disastrous of consequences, he says, "like if you give an ol d

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lady your seat on the trolley, if you are in a trolley crash and that seat goes through the window, i tmight be that reason that the old lady dies."

Theories of developmental psychology illuminate well the position of this child, standing a tthe juncture' of childhood and . adoleescence,' at what Piaget describes as. the pinnacle of childhoo dintelligence, and beginning through thought to discover a wider universe of possibility . Themoment of preadolescence is caught by the conjunction of formal operational thought with adescription of self still anchored in the factual parameters of his childhood world -- his age, hi stown, his father's occupation, the substance of his likes, dislikes, and beliefs . Yet as his self-description radiates the self-confidence of a child who has arrived, in Erikson's terms, at a favorabl ebalance of industry over inferiority -- competent, sure of himself; and knowing well the rules of thegame -- so his emergent capacity for formal thought, his ability to think about thinking and t oreason things out in a logical way, frees him from dependence on authority and allows him to findsolutions to problems by himself.

This emergent autonomy follows the trajectory that Kohlberg's six stages of moraldevelopment trace, a three-level progression from an egocentric understanding of fairness based o nindividual need (stages one and two), to a conception of fairness anchored in the share dconventions of societal agreement (stages three and four), and finally to a principled understandin gof fairness that rests on the free-standing logic of equality and reciprocity (stages five and six) .While this boy's judgments at eleven are scored as conventional on Kohlberg's scale, a mixture o fstages three and four, his ability to bring deductive logic to bear on the solution of moral dilemmas ,to differentiate morality from law, and to see how laws can be considered to have mistakes point stoward the principled conception of justice that Kohlberg equates with moral maturity .

In contrast, Amy's response to the dilemma conveys a very different impression, an imag eof development stunted by a failure of logic, an inability to think for herself . Asked if Heinz shouldsteal the drug, she replies in a way that seems evasive and unsure :

Well, I don't think so . I think there might be other ways beside sstealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan o rsomething, but he really shouldn't steal the drug -- but his wifeshouldn't die either.

Asked why he should not steal the drug, she considers neither property nor law but rather the effectthat theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife :

If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, hemight have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, an dhe couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good . So, theyshould really just talk it out and find some other way to make th emoney .

Seeing in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships tha textends over time, Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and the husband' scontinuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's need in a way that wouldsustain rather than sever connection . Just as she ties the wife's survival to the preservation ofrelationships, so she considers the value of the wife's life in a context of relationships, saying that i twould be wrong to let her die because, "if she died, it hurts a lot of people and it hurts her ." Since

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Amy's moral judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if somebody has something that would kee psomebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers the problem in the dilemmato arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response .

As the-interviewer proceeds . with-the-series-of questions-that follow from-Kohlberg' sconstruction of the dilemma, Amy's answers remain essentially unchanged, the various probe sserving neither to elucidate nor to modify her initial response . Whether or not Heinz loves his wife ,he still shouldn't steal or let her die; if it were a stranger dying instead, Amy says that "if thestranger didn't have anybody near or anyone she knew," then Heinz should try to save her life, buthe should not steal the drug . But as the interviewer conveys through the repetition of questions tha tthe answers she gave were not heard or not right, Amy's confidence begins to diminish, and he rreplies become more constrained and unsure . Asked again why Heinz should not steal the drug ,she simply repeats, "Because it's not right ." Asked again to explain why, she states again that theftwould not be a good solution, adding lamely, "if he took it, he might not know how to give it to hi swife, and so his wife might still die ." Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem i nmoral logic, she does not discern the internal structure of its resolution ; as she constructs theproblem differently herself, Kohlberg's conception completely evades her.

Instead, seeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone, aworld that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of rules, she finds th epuzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife . Saying that "it i snot right for someone to die when their life could be saved," she assumes that if the druggist wereto see the consequences of his refusal to lower his price, he would realize that "he should just giv eit to the wife and then have the husband pay back the money later ." Thus she considers the solutionto the dilemma to lie in making the wife's condition more salient to the druggist or, that failing, i nappealing to others who are in a position to help .

Just as Jake is confident the judge would agree that stealing is the right thing for Heinz t odo, so Amy is confident that, "if Heinz and the druggest had talked it out long enough, they coul dreach something besides stealing ." As he considers the law to "have mistakes," so she sees thi sdrama as a mistake, believing that "the world should just share things more and then peopl ewouldn't have to steal ." Both children thus recognize the need for agreement but see it as mediate din different ways he impersonally through systems of logic and law, she personally throughcommunication in relationship . Just as he relies on the conventions of logic to deduce the solutio nto this dilemma, assuming these conventions to be shared, so she relies on a process ofcommunication, assuming connection and believing that her voice will be heard . Yet while hi sassumptions about agreement are confirmed by the convergence in logic between his answers an dthe questions posed, her assumptions are belied by the failure of communication, the interviewer' sinability to understand her response .

Although the frustration of the interview with Amy is apparent in the repetition of question sand its ultimate circularity, the problem of interpretation is focused by the assessment of herresponse. When considered in the light of Kohlberg's definition of the stages and sequence o fmoral development, her moral judgments appear to be a full stage lower in maturity than those ofthe boy. Scored as a mixture of stages two and three, her responses seem to reveal a feeling o fpowerlessness in the world, an inability to think systematically about the concepts of morality o rlaw, a reluctance to challenge authority or to examine the logic of received moral truths, a failur eeven to conceive of acting directly to save a life or to consider that such action, if taken, coul dpossibly have an effect . As her reliance on relationships seems to reveal a continuing dependenc e

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and vulnerability, so her belief in communication as the mode through which to resolve moraldilemmas appears naive and cognitively immature .

Yet Amy's description of herself conveys a markedly different impression. Once again, thehallmarks-of-the preadolescent -child' depict 'a-child-secure-in-her-sense-of herself ;' confident in thesubstance of her beliefs, and sure of her ability to do something of value in the world . Describingherself at eleven as "growing and changing," she says that she "sees some things differently now ,just because I know myself really well now, and I know a lot more about the world ." Yet the worldshe knows is a different world from that refracted by Kohlberg's construction of Heinz's dilemma .Her world is a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awaremenss of theconnection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, aperception of the need for response . Seen in this light, her understanding of morality as arisingfrom the recognition of relationship, her belief in communication as the mode of conflict resolution ,and her conviction that the solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling representatio nseem far from naive or cognitively immature . Instead, Amy's judgments contain the insightscentral to an ethic of care, just as Jake's judgments reflect the logic of the justice approach. Herincipient awareness of the "method of truth," the central tenet of nonviolent conflict resolution, an dher belief in the restorative activity of care, lead her to see the actors in the dilemma arrayed not a sopponents in a contest of rights but as members of a network of relationships on whos econtinuation they all depend . Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating th enetwork by communication, securing the inclustion of the wife by strengthening rather thansevering connections .

But the different logic of Amy's response calls attention to the interpretation of theinterview itself. Conceived as an interrogation, it appears instead as a dialogue, which takes o nmoral dimensions of its own, pertaining to the interviewer's uses of power and to th emanifestations of respect . With the shift in the conception of the interview, it immediatelybecomes clear that the interviewer's problem in understanding Amy's response stems from the factthat Amy is answering a different question from the one the interviewer thought had been posed .Amy is considering not whether Heinz should act in this situation ("should Heinz steal the drug?" )but rather how Heinz should act in response to his awareness of his wife's need ("Should Heinzsteal the drug?") . The interviewer takes the mode of action for granted, presuming it to be a matterof fact; Amy assumes the necessity for action and considers what form it should take . In theinterviewer's failure to imagine a response not dreamt of in Kohlberg's moral philosophy lies th efailure to hear Amy's question and to see the logic in her response, to discern that what appears ,from one perspective, to be an evasion of the dilemma signifies in other terms a recognition of th eproblem and a search for a more adequate solution .

Thus in Heinz's dilemma these two children see two very different moral problems Jake aconflict between life and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture ofhuman relationship that must be mended with its own thread . Asking different questions that aris efrom different conceptions of the moral domain, the children arrive at answers that fundamentallydiverge, and the arrangement of these answers as successive stages on a scale of increasing mora lmaturity calibrated by the logic of the boy's response misses the different truth revealed in th ejudgment of the girl. To the question, "What does he see that she does not?" Kohlberg's theoryprovides a ready response, manifest in the scoring of Jake's judgments a full stage higher tha nAmy' s in moral maturity ; to the question, "What does she see that he does not?" Kohlberg's theor yhas nothing to say . Since most of her responses fall through the sieve of Kohlberg's scorin gsystem, her responses appear from his perspective to lie outside the moral domain .

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Yet just as Jake reveals a sophisticated understanding of the logic of justification, so Am yis equally sophisticated in her understanding of the nature of choice . Recognizing that "if both theroads went in totally separate ways, if you pick one, you'll never know what would happen if yo uwent the other way,ZZ she explains that "that's-the-chance you-have-to take, and like I said, it's jus treally a guess ." To illustrate her point "in a simple way," she describes her choice to spend th esummer at camp :

I will never know what would have happened if I had stayed here,and if something goes wrong at camp, I'll never know if I stayed her eif it would have been better . There's really no way around it becausethere's no way you can do both at once, so you've got to decide, bu tyou'll never know .

In this way, these two eleven-year-old children, both highly intelligent and perceptive abou tlife, though in different ways, display different modes of moral understanding, different ways o fthinking about conflict and choice . In resolving Heinz's dilemma, Jake relies on theft to avoidconfrontation and turns to the law to mediate the dispute . Transposing a hierarchy of power into ahierarchy of values, he defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people by casting it as animpersonal conflict of claims . In this way, he abstracts the moral problem from the interpersonalsituation, finding in the logic of fairness an objective way to decide who will win the dispute. Butthis hierarchical ordering, with its imagery of winning and losing and the potential for violenc ewhich it contains, gives way in Amy's construction of the dilemma to a network of connection, aweb of relationships that is sustained by a process of communication . With this shift, the moralproblem changes from one of unfair domination, the imposition of property over life, to one ofunnecessary exclusion, the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife .

This shift in the formulation of the moral problem and the concomitant change in theimagery of relationships appear in the responses of two eight-year-old children Jeffrey and Karen ,asked to describe a situation in which they were not sure what was the right thing to do :

Jeffrey

When I really want to go to my friends andmy mother is cleaning the cellar, I think aboutmy friends, and then I think about my mother,and then I think about the right thing to do .(But how do you know it's the right thing t odo?) Because some things go before otherthings .

Karen

I have a lot of friends, and I can't always playwith all of them, so everybody's going t ohave to take a turn, because they're all m yfriends. But like if someone's all alone, I'llplay with them . (What kinds of things do yo uthink about when you are trying to make thatdecision?) Urn, someone all alone ,loneliness .

While Jeffrey sets up a hierarchical ordering to resolve a conflict between desire and duty, Karendescribes a network of relationships that includes all of her friends . Both children deal with theissues of exclusion and priority created by choice, but while Jeffrey thinks about what goes first ,Karen focuses on who is left out.

The contrasting images of hierarchy and network in children's thinking about moral conflic tand choice illuminate two views of morality which are complementary rather than sequential or

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opposed. But this construction of differences goes against the bias of developmental theory towar dordering differences in a hierarchical mode. The correspondence between the order o fdevelopmental theory and the structure of the boys' thought contrasts with the disparity betwee nexisting theory and'the`structure'manifest`in"the thought of the"girls Yet'in neitheryc'omparison doe sone child's judgment appear as a precursor of the other's position . Thus, questions arise concerningthe relation between these perspectives : what is the significance of this difference, and how dothese two modes of thinking connect? These questions are elucidated by considering th erelationship between the eleven-year-old children's understanding of morality and theirdescriptions of themselves :

Jake

Amy(How would you describe yourself to yourself? )

Perfect . That's my conceited side . What do

You mean my character? (What do youyou want anyway that I choose to describe

think?) Well, I don't know. I'd describemyself?

myself as, well, what do you mean ?

(If you had to describe the person you are in a way that you yourselfwould know it was you, what would you say? )

Well, I'd say that I was someone who like sschool and studying, and that's what I want todo with my life . I want to be some kind of ascientist or something, and I want to d othings, and I want to help people. And I thinkthat's what kind of person I am, or what kin dof person I try to be . And that's probablyhow I'd describe myself. And I want to dosomething to help other people . (Why isthat?) Well, because I think that this worl dhas a lot of problems, and I think thateverybody should try to help somebody els ein some way, and the way I'm choosing i sthrough science .

I'd start off with eleven years old . Jake [lastname] . I'd have to add that I live in [town] ,because that is a big part of me, and also tha tmy father is a doctor, because I think thatdoes change me a little bit, and that I don' tbelieve in crime, except for when your nam eis Heinz; that I think school is boring ,because I think that kind of changes yourcharacter a little bit. I don't sort of know howto describe myself, because I don't know ho wto read my personality . (If you had todescribe the way you actually would describ eyourself, what would you say?) I like corn yjokes. I don't really like to get down to work ,but I can do all the stuff in school . Everysingle problem that I have seen in school Ihave been able to do, except for ones that tak eknowledge, and after I do the reading, I havebeen able to do them, but sometimes I don'twant to waste my time on easy homework .And also I'm crazy about sports . I think,unlike a lot of people, that the world still ha shope . . . Most people that I know I like, and Ihave the good life, pretty much as good a sany I have seen, and I am tall for my age .

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In the voice of the eleven-year-old boy, a familiar form . of self-definition appears ,resonating to the inscription of the young Stephen Daedalus in his geography book : "himself, hi sname and where he was," and echoing the descriptions that appear in Our Town, laying out acrossthe coordinatesof'time-and-space ahierarchical order in which-to-define one's'place . Describinghimself as distinct by locating his particular position in the world, Jake sets himself apart from thatworld by his abilities, his beliefs, and his height . Although Amy also enumerates her likes, herwants, and her beliefs, she locates herself in relation to the world, describing herself throughactions that bring her into connection with others, elaborating ties through her ability to provid ehelp . To Jake's ideal of perfection, against which he measures the worth of himself, Am ycounterposes an ideal of care, against which she measures the worth of her activity . While sh eplaces herself in relation to the world and chooses to help others through science, he places theworld in relation to himself as it defines his character, his position, and the quality of his life .

The contrast between a self defined through separation and a self delineated throughconnection, between a self measured against an abstract ideal of perfection and a self assesse dthrough particular activities of care, becomes clearer and the implications of this contrast extend b yconsidering the different ways these children resolve a conflict between responsibility to others an dresponsibility to self. The question about responsibility followed a dilemma posed by a woman' sconflict between her commitments to work and to family relationships . While the details of thi sconflict color the text of Amy's response, Jake abstracts the problem of responsibility from thecontext in which it appears, replacing the themes of intimate relationship with his own imagery o fexplosive connection :

Jake

Amy(When responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others conflict ,

how should one choose?)You go about one-fourth to the others and

Well, it really depends on the situation. Ifthree-fourths to yourself you have a responsibility with somebody else,

then you should keep it to a certain extent, butto the extent that it is really going to hurt youor stop you from doing something that yo ureally, really want, then I think maybe yo ushould put yourself first. But if it is yourresponsibility to somebody really close toyou, you've just got to decide in that situatio nwhich is more important, yourself or thatperson, and like I said, it really depends onwhat kind of person you are and how you feelabout the other person or persons involved .

(MT?)

Because the most important thing in yourdecision should be yourself; don't let yourselfbe guided totally by other people, but yo uhave to take them into consideration. So, ifwhat you want to do is blow yourself up withan atom bomb, you should maybe blow

Well, like some people put themselves an dthings for themselves before they put othe rpeople, and some people really care abou tother people. Like, I don't think your job isas important as somebody that you reall ylove, like your husband or your parents or a

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Jake (cont)

Amy (cont)yourself up with a hand grenade because you

very close friend . Somebody that you reall yare thinking about your neighbors who would

care for or if it's just your responsibility todie also .

your-job -or somebody that , you barely know,then maybe you go first but if it' ssomebody that you really love and love a smuch or even more than you love yourself,you've got to decide what you really lov emore, that person, or that thing, or yourself.(And how do you do that?) Well, you've gotto think about it, and you've got to thinkabout both sides, and you've got to thinkwhich would be better for everybody or bette rfor yourself, which is more important, andwhich will make everybody happier . Like ifthe other people can get somebody else to d oit, whatever it is, or don't really need youspecifically, maybe it's better to do what youwant, because the other people will be jus tfine with somebody else so they'll still behappy, and then you'll be happy too becaus eyou'll do what you want .

(What does responsibility mean?)It means pretty much thinking of others when

That other people are counting on you to d oI do something, and like if I want to throw a

something, and you can't just decide, "Well ,rock, not throwing it at a window, because I

I'd rather do this or that ." (Are there otherthought of the people who would have to pay

kinds of responsibility?) Well, to yourself.' Iffor that window, not doing it just for yourself;

something looks really fun but you might hurtbecause you have to live with other people

yourself doing it because you don't reallyand live with your community, and if you do

know how to do it and your friends say ,something that hurts them all, a lot of people

"Well, come on, you can do it, don't worry, "will end up suffering, and that is sort of the

if you're really scared to do it, it's you rwrong thing to do .

responsibility to yourself that if you think youmight hurt yourself; you shouldn't do it ,because you have to take care of yourself andthat's your responsibility to yourself.

Again Jake constructs the dilemma as a mathematical equation, deriving a formula thatguides the solution : one-fourth to others, three-fourths to yourself. Beginning with hi sresponsibility to himself; a responsibility that he takes for granted, he then considers the extent t owhich he is responsible to others as well . Proceeding from a premise of separation but recognizing .that "you have to live with other people," he seeks rules to limit interference and thus to minimiz ehurt . Responsibility in his construction pertains to a limitation of action, a restraint of aggression ,guided by the recognition that his actions can have effects on others, just as theirs can interfere withhim. Thus rules, by limiting interference, make life in community safe, protecting autonom ythrough reciprocity, extending the same consideration to others and self.

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To the question about conflicting responsibilities, Amy again responds contextually rathe rthan categorically, saying "it depends" and indicating how choice would be affected by variation sin character and circumstance . Proceeding from a premise of connection, that "if you have aresponsibility with'somebody-else,-you-shouldkeep it," .she then consider s , the-extent to which shehas a responsibility to herself Exploring the parameters of separation, she imagines situation swhere, by doing what you want, you would avoid hurting yourself or where, in doing so, you wouldnot thereby diminish the happiness of others . To her, responsibility signifies response, an extensionrather than a limitation of action . Thus it connotes an act of care rather than the restraint o faggression. Again seeking the solution that would be most inclusive of everyone's needs, sh estrives to resolve the dilemma in a way that "will make everybody happier ." Since Jake i sconcerned with limiting interference, while Amy focuses on the need for response, for him th elimiting condition is, "Don't let yourself be guided totally by others," but for her it arises when"other people are counting on you," in which case "you can't just decide, 'Well, I'd rather do this o rthat.' " The interplay between these responses is clear in that she, assuming connection, begins t oexplore the parameters of separation, while he, assuming separation, begins to explore th eparameters of connection. But the primacy of separation or connection leads to different images o fself and of relationships .

Most striking among these differences is the imagery of violence in the boy's response,depicting a world of dangerous confrontation and explosive connection, where she sees a world ofcare and protection, a life lived with others whom "you may love as much or even more than youlove yourself" Since the conception of morality reflects the understanding of social relationships ,this difference in the imagery of relationships gives rise to a change in the moral injunction itself .To Jake, responsibility means not doing what he wants because he is thinking of others ; to Amy, itmeans doing what others are counting on her to do regardless of what she herself wants . Bothchildren are concerned with avoiding hurt but construe the problem in different ways -- he seeinghurt to arise from the expression of aggression, she from a failure of response .

If the trajectory of development were drawn through either of these childrens' responses, i twould trace a correspondingly different path . For Jake, development would entail coming to see th eother as equal to the self and the discovery that equality provides a way of making connection safe .For Amy, development would follow the inclusion of herself in an expanding network ofconnection and the discovery that separation can be protective and need not entail isolation . Inview of these different paths of development and particularly of the different ways in which theexperiences of separation and connection are aligned with the voice of the self, the representatio nof the boy's development as the single line of adolescent growth for both sexes creates a continua lproblem when it comes to interpreting the development of the girl .

Since development has been premised on separation and told as a narrative of failedrelationships -- of pre-Oedipal attachments, Oedipal fantasies, 'preadolescent chumships, an dadolescent loves -- relationships that stand out against a background of separation, onl ysuccessively to erupt and give way to an increasingly emphatic individuation, the development o fgirls appears problematic because of the continuity of relationships in their lives . Freud attributesthe turning inward of girls at puberty to an intensification of primary narcissism, signifying afailure of love or "object" relationships . But if this turning inward is construed against abackground of continuing connection, it signals a new responsiveness to the self, an expansion o fcare rather than a failure of relationship . In this way girls, seen not to fit the categories ofrelationships derived from male experience, call attention to the assumptions about relationship s

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that have informed the account of human development by replacing the imagery of explosiv econnection with images of dangerous separation .

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