getting to the table in oslo: driving forces and channel factors

In Theory

Getting to the Table in Oslo:Driving Forces and Channel Factors

Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg

Using the secret Middle East peace talks in Oslo, Norway as a case example,the authors develop a conceptual framework for analyzing prenegotiationprocesses in negotiation. The framework focuses on understanding changesin the balance of geopolitical, internal, political, and group psychologicalforces that lead parties to negotiate. The framework also highlights theimportance of "channel factors," such as the use of unofficial representa-tives, small-state sponsorship, co-mediation, secret diplomacy, and stagedagreements. Although developed with reference to the Oslo peace process,the authors believe this framework has broader applicability to the analy-sis of prenegotiation processes in international and ethnic disputes andother situations of protracted conflict. They conclude with a series of ques-tions for future prenegotiation research.

A he world watched in wonder on September 13, 1993, as Israelis andPalestinians stood together on the White House lawn to sign the Oslo peaceaccords. Formal negotiations between representatives of the Palestine Libera-tion Organization (PLO) and the Israeli Government had commenced inNorway on June 11, 1993. But the move to "go to the table" was precededby months of unofficial dialogue between the two sides, and internal soulsearching about the wisdom of proceeding down the path to peace. Thedecision to make the transition to formal negotiations was a wrenching one,

Michael Watkins is associate professor of management at the Harvard Business School, 139 MorganHall, Soldiers Field, Boston, Mass. 02163. Kirsten Lundberg is senior case writer at Harvard Univer-sity's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 150Taubman, 79 JFK St. Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

0748-4526/98/0400-0115$15.00/0 © 1998 Plenum Publishing Corporation Negotiation Journal April 1998 115

particularly for the Israelis, who had struggled to retain a "band of deniabil-ity" around the informal talks in Norway, and who knew that participation inofficial negotiations constituted de facto recognition of the PLO.

The Oslo experience raises some important questions about processesof international dispute resolution. Why did these avowed enemies decide toenter into negotiations in 1993? How did the path to the negotiating table —the process of prenegotiation — unfold? More generally, what implicationsdoes the Oslo experience have for the theory and practice of internationaldispute resolution?

Our analysis of the Oslo experience is grounded in research for a casehistory of the prenegotiation process. In developing this case history (seeLundberg 1996), we conducted interviews with many of the key partici-pants, reviewed the published accounts of several others, and drewsupplementary materials from secondary sources.1 The case history tracesthe "Norway Channel" process from early decisions to explore the potentialfor a negotiated settlement to the Israeli government decision to send an offi-cial delegation to Oslo.

Equilibrium and Change in Sustained ConflictsTo provide a structure for analyzing the prenegotiation process, we employ aconceptual framework inspired by a model of social change developed byKurt Lewin (1951), a pioneer in the field of group dynamics. One of Lewin'sfundamental insights is that human collectives — including groups, organiza-tions, and nations — are social systems that exist in a state of tensionbetween forces pressing for change and forces resisting change:

[The behavior of a social system is]. . .the result of a multitude offorces. Some forces support each other, some oppose each other.Some are driving forces, others restraining forces. Like the veloc-ity of a river, the actual conduct of a group depends upon thelevel ... at which these conflicting forces reach an equilibrium.(Lewin 1951: 173)

According to Lewin, social systems remain in equilibrium when there isa rough balance between driving forces and restraining forces. In this state,the system may fluctuate within some set of narrow limits, but attempts (i.e.driving forces) to move beyond these limits trigger rapid increases inrestraining forces. As the forces driving for change mount, so too do theforces acting to resist the change. If the pressure becomes great enough, thesystem may become ripe for "revolution," leading to the establishment of anew equilibrium. If not, then it will tend to return to the status quo.

Lewin noted that a powerful balance of forces in favor of change is nec-essary but not sufficient to guarantee that change will actually occur. Asdriving forces increase or restraining forces weaken, pressure in the systemmounts. At this crucial point, the presence or absence of what Lewin callschannel factors becomes important. Channel factors are "small but critical

116 Watkins and Lundberg Getting to the Table in Oslo

facilitators" of change (Ross and Nisbett 1991: 10). They are pivotal eventsthat often seem small and insignificant in prospect, until one understandsthe forces they unleash. In his study of the genesis of European revolutions,for example, Tilly (1993) notes the timely acts of a single rebel — a goodexample of a channel factor — may signal the possibility of successful rebel-lion to others, leading to the coalescence of latent opposition:

The unpunished defection of one visible member [of a rulingcoalition] sends a whole barrage of signals: the very possibility ofdefection, the decreasing capacity of the central executive tomaintain its commitments and keep others in line, the opportu-nity to seize assets formerly under central control, the chance forcooperation with other defectors, and the probable increasedcosts of loyalty to the center. (Tilly 1993:13)

More generally, channel factors are people or processes that act as cata-lysts for new behavior. They "tunnel through" residual barriers to change,initiating chain reactions that progressively build, leading to seemingly dis-proportionate results.

Our model of equilibrium and change in sustained conflicts is foundedon Lewin's insights. In our terms, sustained conflicts are social systemswhich tend to remain stuck in states of "cold war"— low-level contentionand friction that is neither all-out war nor a durable peace. This cold warequilibrium is the result of a balance of forces driving the system toward vio-lence and forces restraining violence and seeking conciliation. Resolution ofsuch conflicts (when and if it occurs) comes about though some combina-tion of: (1) changes in the balance of driving and restraining forces in thesystem; and (2) the actions of facilitating channel factors to overcome resid-ual barriers.

It is important to understand that conflicts stuck in cold war equilibriaare stable but not static. Periodically, something (a driving force) will triggera bout of escalation. Usually, however, the escalation does not result in full-scale violence because such restraining forces as mutual deterrence oroutside intervention act to moderate the dispute. In family disputes, periodicfights flare and then die out. In adversarial union-management relationships,strikes are followed by less contentious times. In international border con-flicts, skirmishes and bellicose rhetoric are interspersed with periods ofrelative quiet.

Likewise, efforts to make peace (another type of driving force) runafoul of powerful barriers to negotiated settlement. Attempts to reconcilefeuding family members fail; seemingly promising initiatives to redefineworkplace relations fade from view; efforts at international mediation pro-duce meaningless statements of intent. As a result, sustained conflicts canremain locked in states of cold war for extended periods of time, punctuatedby occasional escalatory episodes and failed efforts at peacemaking.

Negotiation Journal April 1998 117

The resulting uneasy equilibrium can be understood as resulting fromtensions between, on one hand, forces pushing for escalation and forcesresisting escalation, and, on the other hand, between forces pushing for reso-lution and forces opposing negotiated settlement. These forces arerepresented in the conflict system model shown in Figure 1 which repre-sents the forces that make disputes self-sustaining in physical terms. The"valleys" represent stable states that the conflict can be in — peace, coldwar, and war. The "hills" represent forces that resist change in one directionor the other. The black ball at the bottom of the valley labeled "cold war"represents the equilibrium state of a sustained conflict.

Figure 1Conflict System Model


Driving and Restraining ForcesEvents or people that move the conflict out of the cold war valley in thedirection of war or peace are driving forces. Escalatory actions may push theconflict "up the hill" to the right, toward all-out violence. Conciliatoryactions push the ball up the hill to the left, toward a state of peaceful co-exis-tence. But sustained conflicts have internal regulatory mechanisms thatresist change in either direction. As driving forces push the system towardwar or peace, they are met by restraining forces that act to maintain the coldwar equilibrium. These forces are represented in Figure 1 by the slopes sur-rounding the cold war valley. Escalatory forces driving the system towardwar are restrained by forces that act to moderate the conflict. Likewise,efforts at peacemaking are opposed by forces that undermine efforts toresolve the dispute. As a result, conflicts tend to be resistant both to escala-tory efforts that could lead to all-out violence and conciliatory efforts tomake peace.

This is not to say that change cannot take place. As the forces driving aconflict system toward war or peace increase, so do the restraining forces —at least at first. As the tension in the system rises, however, the conflictcould reach a tipping point, beyond which a small additional push causes itto move rapidly into a new state. Tipping points are represented by the topsof the hills in Figure 1. So long as escalatory forces remain below somethreshold level, restraining forces will tend to return the system to its coldwar equilibrium. But beyond that threshold, a small incremental impetus canresult in accelerating a slide down the slippery slope to full-scale violence.

The dynamics of a particular conflict depend on the relative balance ofdriving and restraining forces. If the forces acting to limit escalation are rela-tively weak, then the hill to the right is low and violence is easily ignited. Forexample, if there is no effective regime of mutual deterrence, or no outsideparties with sufficient power to intervene in the dispute, we would expectthe conflict to flare more frequently and often escalate to violence.

Likewise, if the forces resisting settlement are relatively weak, then thehill to the left is low and peace is easier to achieve. The parties could, forexample, realize that they are in a hurting stalemate in which continued con-tention is causing unacceptable damage to everyone (see Touval andZartman 1985). Alternatively, a powerful outside party could intervene toalter the balance of forces in the conflict as, for example, when NATObombed the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 (for a discussion of modes of interventionin conflicts, see Watkins and Winters 1997)

Channel FactorsEven if the balance of forces shifts strongly in the direction of making peace,however, channel factors still play a crucial role in overcoming residual barri-ers to negotiated settlement. In the context of dispute resolution, weidentify two main classes of channel factors: leadership and momentum-building processes. Leaders within the contending parties may play crucial


roles in tunneling through the remaining barriers, as may external mediatorsand facilitators. Leaders who have built their credibility as "guardians" oftheir groups during times of struggle may, for example, be able to developthe internal political consensus necessary to make peace. In addition,processes such as secret diplomacy, mutual confidence building, and stagedagreements may play an indispensable role in helping the parties to over-come residual barriers by building momentum toward agreement.

The "Why" and "How" of OsloTogether, the ideas of a shifting balance of forces, and of facilitating channelfactors provide a powerful lens through which to view the events that led toofficial negotiations between Israel and the PLO — and prenegotiationprocesses more generally. To understand why the PLO and Israel decided topursue a negotiated settlement, one must focus on the changing balance ofdriving and restraining forces in the Middle East conflict system, and analyzethe impact of the demise of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Iraq, the rise ofHamas, and the election of a Labor Government in Israel. To understand howit was that formal negotiations began in Oslo, Norway on June 11 of 1993,one must focus on the dynamics of channel factors and explore the rolesplayed by, among others, unofficial representatives, co-mediators, and third-party facilitators, as well as such momentum-building processes as secrettalks, confidence-building measures, and staged agreements.

One must also recognize that there was nothing inevitable in the waythat the Oslo process unfolded. Other paths might have led to the signing ofa Declaration of Principles by the contending parties. It is also conceivablethat the Oslo talks could have been exposed prematurely, triggering internalstrife within Israel and the PLO, and renewed conflict between them. That isnot to say, however, that the Oslo peace process was either random or par-ticular. Rather, we argue that regularities must be sought in the changingbalance of driving and restraining forces that altered parties' perceptions ofthe desirability of seeking a negotiated settlement, and in the types of chan-nel factors that helped them to get to the table. It is by focusing attention onboth of these levels of analysis, the larger social forces, and the particularacts of individuals, that we hope to contribute to a general theory of prene-gotiation dynamics.

The Changing Balance of ForcesTo analyze the forces acting on the Israelis and the PLO, we draw on thework of Ross and Ward (1995) who identify three main types of barriers tothe resolution of protracted conflict between groups — strategic barriers,institutional barriers, and psychological barriers (see also Arrow, Mnookin,Ross, Tversky and Wilson 1995). For our purposes, we will recast these astypes of forces that may either drive or restrain moves toward negotiations.We will use these categories to explore changes in balance of forces in theMiddle East in the years between 1988 and 1992.


Strategic ForcesIn deciding whether to enter into negotiations, contending parties makestrategic assessments about the prospects for reaching a mutually acceptableagreement. If any of the parties believe that others' aspirations are unrealis-tic, or view their "best alternative" — which may be the status quo — aspreferable to negotiation, then a move to the table is unlikely. Changes instrategic assessments occur when parties reevaluate their interests, recali-brate their aspirations, or find that their alternatives to negotiation have (orwill) become less attractive. Recognition that the conflict has become a hurt-ing stalemate and is likely to remain so, may, for example, push the partiestoward the table.

On the Israeli side, the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq madea land-for-peace deal a less risky undertaking. At the same time, forcesopposed to dealing with the PLO were weakened due to the rise of Hamas,the public commitments by the PLO to negotiate a land-for-peace compro-mise, and the failure of efforts to build an alternative Palestinian leadershipin the Occupied Territories.

On the PLO side, the cutoff of financial support by moderate Arab statesfollowing the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the increasing challenge posed byHamas, and concerns that the Palestinians would be bypassed by independentnegotiations between moderate Arab states and Israel made the future appearincreasingly bleak, and a negotiated settlement more attractive. The keychanges in the balance of strategic forces are summarized in Table 1.

Institutional ForcesInstitutional forces are organizational and political factors that either supportor hinder moves toward negotiations. Important examples include the pres-ence or absence of channels for communication between the sides, internalpolitical constraints on leaders, and the involvement of external players withstakes in the outcome.

As conflicts between groups escalate, channels for communicationbetween them tend to break down. The result may be a vicious cycle inwhich contending parties come to view any communication as a concession,constituting unwarranted recognition of the legitimacy of the other side.Without channels for communication, however, the parties cannot begin toexplore opportunities for a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, suc-cess in reestablishing communication may result in a virtuous cycle. As theparties begin to communicate, a progressive breakdown of stereotypes andfalse assumptions may create new opportunities for agreement.

Internal political forces within the sides also may support or impedeefforts to initiate negotiations. As Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) noted, forexample, groups in conflict tend to go through characteristic transforma-tions in leadership. As conflicts escalate, moderate leaders tend to bereplaced by militants, who are perceived as better able to protect the inter-ests of the threatened group. As the time comes to make peace, however,


Table 1Changes in Strategic Forces

Strengthening of Forces Weakening of ForcesSupporting Negotiations Resisting Negotiations

• the PLO, stuck in Tunis, feared thatan alternative Palestinian leader-ship, either Hamas or moderatesfrom the occupied territories,would undermine its authority

• the decision to back SaddamHussein in the Persian Gulf conflictproved disastrous, with the Gulf

PLO states cutting off financial supportfor the PLO, and the organizationfacing bankruptcy

• concern increased that Israel mightenter into direct bilateral negotia-tions with Jordan or Syria,bypassing and potentially marginal-izing the PLO

• the rise of Hamas and its rejectionist, •Islamicist policies threatened toundermine the authority of the PLOin the occupied territories, raisingthe specter of further radicalizationof the Palestinians

•

•

Israel

•

•

moderates in the PLO took steps,beginning in 1988, to signal that theywere ready to acknowledge Israel'sright to exist, and enter intonegotiations to trade land for peace

efforts to build a moderate alternativePalestinian leadership in the OccupiedTerritories were acknowledged to havefailedIraq was defeated decisively in the GulfWar, and its capabilities to buildweapons of mass destruction were cur-tailedthe demise of the Soviet Uniondeprived Israel's Arab adversaries oftheir superpower sponsor andimproved the security situation, whileat the same time raising concernsabout the future of U.S. support andthe post-cold war Israeli economyefforts to bypass the Palestinians andnegotiate peace treaties with Jordanand Syria did not make progress

122 Watkins and Lundberg Getting to the Table In Oslo

leaders whose reputations and constituencies are grounded in their combat-iveness may find themselves ill-equipped to make conciliatory gestures.

Internal coalitional dynamics within each of the sides are anotherimportant internal institutional factor. As conflicts escalate, strongly polar-ized subgroups may develop within each of the sides. The groups may beable, through their zeal and organizational capabilities, to exert a dispropor-tionate influence over internal politics, either in support of negotiations, orin opposition to them.

Finally, external parties may strongly influence the conflict. Powerfuloutside groups with interests in the outcome of the conflict may use theirinfluence either to stoke the fires, or to push the parties toward settlement.

On the Israeli side, the Labor victory in the 1992 elections representeda profound institutional shift, a shift that led to the repeal of legal restrictionson communication between Israelis and members of the PLO, the weaken-ing of right-wing and religious political groups opposed to trading land forpeace, and concerted efforts by the new leadership to pursue peace.

On the PLO side, the most significant institutional shifts were the 1988decision to recognize, at least implicitly, Israel's right to exist and to acceptU.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the subsequent loss inthe late 1980s and early 1990s of superpower sponsorship and support frommoderate Arab states.

The key changes in institutional forces that moved the PLO and Israeltowards negotiations are summarized in Table 2.

Psychological ForcesFinally, a move to the negotiating table may result from changes in the bal-ance of psychological forces acting on the members of contending groups.On the one hand, most people desire a secure and peaceful existence, andtire of living in a state of siege. On the other hand, there are powerful psy-chological forces, beyond the simple need for security, that impede movestoward settlement in protracted conflicts.

The most influential of these are what Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994)termed "residues," and Ross and Ward (1995) called "dissonance with thepast." Simply put, having experienced decades of contention, the parties findit difficult to put aside their cumulative grievances in favor of concentratingon current realities, and future possibilities. This may be exacerbated by therealization — on one or both sides — that equivalent or better terms couldhave been reached earlier.

Members of contending groups also undergo characteristic transforma-tions in their perceptions of themselves and the other side (for a goodsummary of the factors that contribute to partisan perceptions, see Robin-son 1997a and 1997b). As conflicts escalate, internal cohesion grows, andthe need for solidarity in the face of external threats results in the suppres-sion of internal differences. A bifurcated world view develops in which "we"represent truth and justice; desire only security and self-respect; and respondas any reasonable person would to provocation. "They," on the other hand,


Table 2Changes in Institutional Forces

Strengthening of ForcesSupporting Negotiations

• the 1992 election in Israel replaced the •hard-line Likud, and its strategy of drag-ging out negotiations, with a Laborgovernment committed to negotiationof a land-for-peace settlement — a shift •that was itself a reflection of a changing

Isreal balance of public opinion in Israel• Shimon Peres took the position of For-

eign Minister with the explicitobjective of advancing the peaceprocess •

•

• the Palestine National Council (PNC) •decided in 1988 to agree to the 1947

PLO U.N. partition plan, and to endorse U.N.Security Council Resolutions 242 and •338, and its "land for peace" formula

• the PLO's soured relations with moder-ate Arab states in the aftermath of theGulf War

Weakening of ForcesResisting Negotiations

the demise of the Soviet Union left theU.S. as sole superpower, strong ally,and forceful advocate for a comprehen-sive settlementthe Labor's Party's election victoryweakened the religious right and settlergroups in Israel who viewed the Occu-pied Territories as the biblical lands ofJudea and Samaria promised to Jewishpeople by Godlegal restrictions on communicationsbetween Israelis and members of thePLO were repealedthe Labor government acknowledgedthat the formal Madrid-Washingtontalks' were not going to be a produc-tive forum for negotiation

the PLO suffered effective loss of super-power sponsorship with the fall of theSoviet Unionmoderates in the PLO moved toestablish multiple channels ofcommunications with Israelis

become depersonalized and vilified, their aggressive conduct the result offlawed and evil dispositions. Leaders on each side become important sym-bols of this perceptual bifurcation, simultaneously lauded as heroes andreviled as monsters.

In the conflict between the PLO and Israel, important psychologicaltransformations took place among moderate "publics" on both sides. On thePLO side, the psychological shift led, in 1988, to the implicit decision toacknowledge Israel's right to exist and to seek a land-for-peace compromise.This shift accelerated as the Intifada settled into a grinding stalemate, andthe PLO suffered important setbacks following the defeat of Iraq, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the rise of Hamas.

In Israel, the psychological shift among centrists in the Israeli public ledto the Labor victory in the 1992 elections. This shift was partially a productof cumulative fatigue as Israelis confronted the prospect of continuing to

124 Watklns and Lundbere Getting to the Table in Oslo

fight a war every decade. At the same time, efforts to suppress the Intifadahad met with limited success, and were taking an increasing toll on Israelisecurity forces and their families, and tarnishing Israel's image abroad. TheU.S. victories in the Gulf and Cold Wars also contributed to an increasingsense of security.

Channel FactorsIn the aftermath of the 1992 Israeli elections, the top leadership of the PLOwas ready to begin formal talks, but the Labor government of Yitzak Rabinfaced some potent residual barriers to initiating official talks. The timeseemed ripe to conduct serious negotiations with the Palestinians. KeyIsraeli decision makers had concluded that they could not negotiate withmoderate Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and did not want to seethe PLO usurped by a more militant Hamas. At the same time, the govern-ment was not prepared to recognize the PLO, and any knowledge of theofficial negotiations would have led to serious internal political problems,because talks would have implicitly constituted recognition.

More deeply, the Israelis confronted a classic dilemma of learning andbargaining. They did not want to enter into formal talks with the PLO unlessthey were reasonably certain they could get an agreement that could be"sold" inside Israel. But how could they know whether such an agreementwas possible without first negotiating with the Palestinians? Also if theydidn't talk directly to the PLO, how would they know that the people towhom they were talking had the necessary political backing? The Israeliswanted to be sure that they would be dealing with authorized representa-tives of the PLO, while at the same time maintaining complete secrecy, andwhat then Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin described as a "belt of denia-bility" around the talks by refusing to have government officials deal directlywith the PLO. For their part, the PLO wanted to sit down with Israeli nego-tiators who had the authority to make commitments on behalf of thegovernment. They were justifiably concerned that the Israelis were seekingto maintain an escape hatch, or were simply not serious.

The resulting need to learn without premature exposure constituted apotent residual barrier to negotiated agreement. It is here that channel fac-tors became important. How did the parties get to the point where theywere willing to enter into official negotiations? They got to the table throughthe combined actions of:(1) leaders who played a diverse set of roles, both inside the contending

parties and outside; and

(2) the use of momentum-building processes to accelerate the movementtoward settlement.


LeadershipAt various points in the process, leaders acted as co-mediators, guardians,unofficial representatives, legitimizing sponsors, and neutral facilitators.

Entrepreneurial Co-MediatorsThroughout the 1980s and early 1990s, leading Palestinians and Israelisundertook what Fisher (1991) termed co-mediation initiatives. In co-media-tion, moderate partisans seek to advance the process by buildingrelationships with moderates on the other side, and by developing "center-ing" proposals that have the effect of pulling the sides together. These effortsare important because they help to break down the accumulated misconcep-tions and distorted images that the parties have of each other, providing abasis for moves towards negotiations. However, because co-mediators tendto be viewed as "dovish" within their own groups, they rarely can act alone.Instead, as discussed below, they often act in concert with more conserva-tive "guardians."

There were several notable examples of co-mediation that contributedto the success of the Oslo process. Beginning in the early 1980s, ShimonPeres began to develop the idea of "Gaza First" as a basis for a comprehen-sive settlement. Peres attempted to sell the idea to Anwar Sadat at that time,but failed. Subsequently, an expanded proposal of Gaza-plus-Jericho was pre-sented to Yitzak Rabin by Yassar Arafat through Egyptian President HosniMubarak. Gaza-plus-Jericho First was eventually enshrined in the Oslo Decla-ration of Principles as the basis for the first stage of Palestinian self-rule.

Other Israelis — mostly from the Labor Party — made sustained effortsto build relationships with West Bank Palestinian leaders whom they hopedcould become an alternative to the PLO. In the early 1980s, while he wasdirector general of the Foreign Ministry, Yossi Beilin had established contactwith leading Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, including academicHanan Ashrawi, and Faisal Husseini, a prominent leader from East Jerusalemand one of the founding members of the PLO. In spite of subsequent legalrestrictions on contacts with the PLO, Beilin and Husseini continued to meetthroughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. These connections between Beilin,Husseini, and Ashrawi were crucial in creation of the Norway Channel.

Similar efforts were undertaken by moderates in the PLO. Most impor-tantly, Mohammed Abbas, the director of the PLO's Department for Nationaland International Relations, and a trusted lieutenant of Yassar Arafat, workedthrough the Egyptians to establish contact with Peres and Rabin followingthe 1992 elections. Abbas had begun studying Israeli politics in the early1970s, a project undertaken with no small amount of personal risk, giventhat many in the PLO were vehemently, and sometimes violently, opposed toany contacts with Israelis.


GuardiansWhile the work of entrepreneurial co-mediators such as Peres and Abbas wasimportant, the crucial roles played by "guardians" on each side should notbe overlooked. Guardians are top leaders who have established their credi-bility as protectors of their respective groups during crucial periods ofdanger and struggle. The resulting credibility becomes a resource whenthese leaders decide that the time has come to make peace.

Consider the role played by Yitzak Rabin in the Oslo process. Rabin, aformer general and war hero had a reputation for being somewhat remotebut strong and judicious. As a leader, he had personified caution and beenconservative in protecting Israel's security. As a result, when Rabin decidedthe time had come to make peace, he could carry many others with him.Likewise Yassar Arafat played the role of guardian within the PLO.

The relationship between guardians and entrepreneurial co-mediatorsplayed an important role in shaping the Oslo process. On the Israeli side, Shi-mon Peres could push the envelope, developing options and floatingproposals, while Yitzak Rabin could play the role of conservative protectorof Israeli security. Rabin was trusted by a large portion of the Israeli popula-tion, but Peres was not. So, as subsequent events revealed, Peres could notplay the role of guardian and "sell" the agreement after Rabin's death. At thesame time, Peres could do things that Rabin could not to move the processforward. A similar guardian-entrepreneur relationship existed between Arafatand Abbas. Such relationships, we hypothesize, arise in many peaceprocesses.

Unofficial RepresentativesCo-mediators and guardians are official representatives of their sides. Butunofficial representatives also played central roles in setting up the Oslochannel. On the Israeli side, academics Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundikbecame de facto representatives of the government in the prenegotiationtalks. Hirschfeld and Pundik embodied a critical combination of connectionsto important officials and unofficial status. Hirschfeld was a long-time associ-ate of Yossi Beilin, who was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister followingthe Labor victory in 1992. Beilin was a favorite of Shimon Peres, and a strongadvocate for a negotiated settlement. He had been instrumental in establish-ing links between members of the Labor government and leadingPalestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank, including Faisal Husseini andHanan Ashrawi. Beilin had also actively been working to establish a directchannel for negotiations with the PLO.

While Beilin could not afford to engage in direct discussions with thePLO, Hirschfeld and Pundik had the necessary "cover" to participate inprenegotiations. They were academics who, with Beilin, had established theEconomic Cooperation Foundation (ECF), a think-tank devoted to promotingregional economic development and integration. As such, they could legiti-


mately travel outside Israel to participate in conferences and seminars with-out attracting much attention.

On the Norwegian side, Terje Larsen became the critical unofficial linkbetween the Israelis, the Palestinian negotiating team led by Abu Ala (AhmadQrei'), and the Norwegian Government. Larsen's assets included unofficialstatus, institutional backing, connections with all sides, and strong ideasabout resolving the conflict.

Larsen was the head of a Norwegian research institute called FAFO —Forskningsstiftelsen for Studier au Arbeidsliv, Fagbevegelse og OffentligPolitik, or Institute for Applied Social Sciences. A sociologist with a longinterest in the theory of organizations and conflict resolution, Larsen hadmoved to Cairo with his wife, Norwegian diplomat Mona Juul, when she wasposted to Egypt in 1988.

As their familiarity with the Palestinian situation grew, Larsen resolvedto undertake a survey of living conditions in Gaza, the West Bank andJerusalem, and spent a year negotiating an agreement with the Israeli govern-ment and the PLO. The resulting contacts with both sides and his growingcommitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict led Larsen to seek outYossi Beilin prior to the elections in April of 1992, and offer to facilitatenegotiations with the Palestinians. Following the Labor victory, their discus-sions resulted in a meeting between Larsen, Juul, Beilin, Hirschfeld, and JanEgeland, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway in September of 1992.

Egeland and Mona Juul had previously met Abu Ala when a PLO delega-tion visited Oslo in February of 1992. Following that meeting, Juulencouraged Larsen to meet Abu Ala. The two crossed paths again at 1992meetings of the Working Group on Refugees, one of the multilateral negotia-tions set up as part of the Madrid peace talks, where both men representedtheir respective governments. These contacts led to an invitation from AbuAla to Larsen to visit Tunis, and a meeting, brokered by Larsen, between YairHirshfeld and Abu Ala in London in early December of 1992. Following thatmeeting, Larsen agreed to go to Tunis, where Abu Ala formally requestedthat he set up a secret channel. Larsen contacted Mona Juul in Norway, whosecured political backing from Jan Egeland and the Norwegian Foreign Min-istry. Beilin, encouraged by Egeland's willingness to support the talks andimpose no preconditions, agreed, and the Norway Channel was born.

Legitimizing SponsorsThe resulting prenegotiation discussions were organized as "seminars" underthe auspices of FAFO, but were funded and supported by the NorwegianGovernment. As Beilin later noted, Norway distinguished itself from otherpotential small-state sponsors by its willingness to commit resources to sucha risky venture:


The most important role of the Norwegians was that they wereready to take part in such an effort knowing it was only mebehind it. I tried to convince two other governments to do this,and they failed. Later they regret it so much, but then they wereafraid.

As a small state, Norway had three significant advantages over theUnited States for sponsoring the talks — Norway was perceived as neutral byboth sides; it had the flexibility to fund prenegotiation discussions quicklyand discreetly; and it could provide a secure environment for secret talks.

Unlike the U.S., Norway had few (if any) strategic interests in the Mid-dle East. The Norwegian Labor party, in power in Norway for 40 of theprevious 50 years, was able to take a long view, and had sought to beeven-handed in the conflict between Israel and the PLO. On one hand,Norway had supported the state of Israel since its inception, and close tieshad developed between the Israeli and Norwegian Labor parties. On theother hand, the Norwegian government sought to improve its contactswith the PLO following the Six-Day War of 1967. Norwegian Foreign Minis-ter Knut Frydenlund, for example, supported a demand by Yassar Arafat toaddress the U.S., met Arafat personally, and allowed the PLO to open anoffice in Oslo.

Norway also earned the PLO's trust by helping to fund the peace-keeping operations in Lebanon, and through its efforts to arrange secret con-tacts between the Israeli Labor Party and PLO moderates. As part of itsgenerous long-term effort to promote peace, democracy, and the develop-ment of human rights in the Middle East, the Norwegian Foreign Ministryhad contributed to FAFO's study of living conditions in Gaza.

Throughout the Oslo process, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry pro-vided the money to pay for critical resources, including meeting places,airplane tickets, accommodations, and security. Deputy Foreign Minister Ege-land said he was able to fund these efforts from open budget categories ofpromoting peace, promoting democracy, or promoting refugee welfare, tap-ping sources of funds much more flexibly and discreetly than would havebeen possible in the U.S. The small size and coherence of the administration,and a national consensus about the importance of promoting peace, con-tributed to Norway's ability to support the talks.

Norway was also able to keep the talks secret in a way that would nothave been possible had the U.S. been the sponsor. In part, the negotiationsremained secret because no one was looking for them, and Norway's placein the international system had rendered Oslo a media backwater. Beyondthat, however, the country's close-knit administration, flexible funding mech-anisms, and history of working through nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) contributed to its ability to maintain the necessary secrecy.

The Norwegians not only provided resources to support the talks, butactively worked to legitimize them. Legitimization was important because


the playing field was not level. The PLO was represented by official repre-sentatives, while the Israelis were academics with uncertain connections.Larsen later recalled that Abu Ala objected to the Israeli representatives say-ing, ". . .they are not authorized, they are not serious, I want Beilin." Larsensaid he responded, "Look Abu Ala, I know they are authorized, they need tohave deniability. They are reporting directly to Beilin." Likewise, as RonPundik noted, Jan Egeland's appearance at the first meeting was critical:

It put the whole session at the ministerial level. It told the Pales-tinians that the Norwegians are taking the Israelis very seriously.After all, the PLO [representatives] were ministerial level. Wewere no level. They were officials, we were nonofficials. It wasimportant for the Norwegians to play this kind of a role, saying"We are taking it seriously."

The Norwegians were also concerned about power imbalancesbetween the two sides, and took great care to treat the Israeli and PLO repre-sentatives identically.

FacilitatorsOnce the informal talks commenced, Terje Roed-Larsen played an indispens-able role as facilitator. Larsen, trained as he was in conflict resolution theory,explicitly sought to break down the perceptual barriers between the partiesby isolating them in close contact with each other:

I was convinced that the image of the enemy was completely dis-torted by myths and preconceptions, and that much of the basisof the conflict and the stalemate in the negotiations were that theimages and the reality were completely different. . .What Iwanted was a pre-negotiating phase, because I thought there hadto be confidence established on an emotional basis. . .I thought ifthey were to get to know each other, they had to be in a remoteplace and should be together round the clock.

Larsen also made the decision not to attempt to act as a mediator,believing that the parties themselves must "own" the conflict:

I knew that if I was there, I would be a gallery and they wouldtalk to me and turn to me and say you are the international wit-ness. . .It would put me into impossible situations. [I realizedthat] if you would stay outside the room you would stay neutral.

He did, however, work with the parties during breaks between negotia-tion sessions, fostering the development of a shared set of experiences thathelped to buffer the process during difficult times. As he put it:

Common language. . .is very important. Because what you createis a tribe, and you have to create a tribal language. How do you dothis?. . .Slang is often established, like when you build a corpora-tion, you have to build corporate myths. Shared values. This was


very much by cracking jokes, or making jokes about things youexperienced in the channel together and reporting them. . .Youhave to make history in the channel and make things which youcan joke about but also respect, which you can romanticize aboutbut also feel nostalgic about. All this is terribly difficult. You haveto have a strategy for doing this, but it cannot appear as a strategy.

Larsen also facilitated and shaped communications between rounds onnegotiations, when the parties returned to consult with their respective leaders.

In summary, leaders playing diverse roles formed crucial links in thefragile chain of dialogue that enabled the parties to learn and negotiate priorto committing themselves to formal talks. Guardians such as Rabin and Arafatoversaw (and were influenced by) the work of entrepreneurial co-mediatorssuch Peres and Abbas, yet were able to distance themselves in the event thatthings did not work out. Likewise, the entrepreneurs were able to workthrough (and be influenced by) unofficial representatives such as Hirschfeldand Pundik, while also being able to maintain some measure of deniability.The small state sponsorship of Norway legitimized the conversationsbetween the unofficial representatives of the sides, while Larsen's skilledfacilitation helped to move the negotiations in productive directions.

Momentum-Building ProcessesBeyond the impact of leadership in its various forms, the construction or"architecture" of the process helped the parties to overcome residual barri-ers, effectively bootstrapping the proceedings. Key momentum-buildingprocesses included secret diplomacy, confidence-building measures, andstaged agreements.

Secret DiplomacyBy setting up a secret channel, the parties were able to conclude an agree-ment that could then be presented as a fait accompli to constituencies oneach side for ratification. Secrecy effectively transforms a multilevel negotia-tion process into a simpler bilateral one, delaying the internal negotiationsand marginalizing opponents. Secrecy permitted Rabin and Arafat to negoti-ate without triggering "how-can-you-talk-to-those-criminals" internalopposition that would have killed the discussions. As Peres put it: "If itwould be exposed ahead of time, it would expire the very same day."Secrecy also permitted the parties to concentrate on the substantive issues,and avoid the posturing and media dynamics that had plagued the too-publicMadrid-Washington talks. In addition, an initialed agreement constituted apublic commitment on the part of the leadership of the PLO and the Israeligovernment that was difficult to undo.

Mutual Confidence BuildingThe parties also built confidence through mutual testing. In late April of1993, for example, Israel pressed for a resumption of the Washington talks asa test of the authority of the PLO representatives in Oslo. The Washington


negotiations had been stalled since the December 1992 expulsion by Israelof 400 Hamas activists from the West Bank. Before Yitzak Rabin and ShimonPeres would sanction an April meeting in Norway, they demanded a con-crete display of influence by the PLO representatives. As Avi Gil, chief ofstaff for Shimon Peres, put it:

With the consent of the prime minister here in Israel, wedesigned a test through [the Oslo negotiators] to see whetherthey could assure that the Palestinian delegation would show up.

In response, Abu Ala engineered a return by the Palestinians to thebilateral negotiations in Washington. Abu Ala also effected, again at therequest of the Israelis, the removal of a PLO member from a delegation tothe multilateral talks. For Shimon Peres, these events were a turning point inhis estimation of Abu Ala. "I formed the distinct impression that Abu Ala wasa man of his word, a man with whom we could do business," Peres recalled.

Testing also occurred between the Norwegians and the disputants. Inhis first meeting with Terje Roed-Larsen, for example, Yossi Beilin askedwhether Larsen could engineer a meeting with Faisal Husseini. Beilin madethis request even though Yair Hirschfeld had been meeting with Husseinialmost weekly for four years. Beilin himself saw the Palestinian every fewmonths, and Peres had met him eight-to-ten times.

Staged AgreementsA third approach to building momentum involved the use of staged agree-ments. The structure of the Oslo process allowed the parties to makeprogressively bigger and more difficult commitments. The initial price ofadmission was low — agreement to participate in one exploratory, deniablemeeting in Oslo at the expense of the Norwegian government. Only whenthe meetings in Oslo began to bear fruit did the Israelis need to make thedecision to send official representatives. The still more difficult commitmentto mutual recognition was deferred until after the Declaration of Principleswas initialed.

At the first meeting in Oslo, the parties agreed that they would work ona Declaration of Principles — essentially a framework agreement — whichitself defined a multi-stage negotiation process. In the resulting Declarationof Principles, limited self-rule in Gaza and Jericho would be followed bynegotiations on expanded Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Territories.The most difficult issues, such as borders, Jerusalem, and settlements weredeferred to "permanent status" negotiations.

Looking to the Future: Questions for ResearchersOur analysis of the Oslo experience through the lens of driving forces andchannel factors leaves us with many questions. One set concerns how andwhy changes in the balance of forces take place within conflict systems.These changes may occur, as they did in the Oslo peace process, endoge-


nously within the systems, leading to a classic "ripening." But in other cases,powerful outside parties may intervene and alter the balance of forces, usingtheir resources to push contending parties toward the negotiating table (fora discussion see Watkins and Winters 1997). In Bosnia, for example, coercivediplomacy by the U.S. and its NATO allies succeeded in bringing the warringparties to the table and producing a peace agreement (see Rosegrant 1996).On the other hand, U.S. efforts to strong-arm Yitzak Shamir's Likud govern-ment into participating in the Madrid negotiations ultimately provedcounter-productive — the Israelis could be led to water, but they could notbe made to drink. So what is it about the characteristics of the contendingparties and the circumstances of the conflict that makes external coercionmore or less effective in advancing the cause of peace?

A second set of questions concerns the various channel factors thatcontributed to the Oslo process. How prevalent and important, for example,are co-mediation efforts? Such efforts were an indispensable part of the pathto the negotiating table at Oslo, providing the foundation for mutual confi-dence-building and third-party intervention. But what are the essentialdynamics of co-mediation? Do the people who undertake co-mediation initia-tives tend to have similar characteristics? Do co-mediators often work inconceit with guardians? With unofficial representatives? With external inter-venors?

The use of unofficial representatives in Oslo leads to additional ques-tions about the selection of such people. What characteristics do "good"unofficial representatives have? Can such people be identified and encour-aged by third parties, or must they be selected, organically andopportunistically, by the leaders of the contending parties?

Then there are questions about the strengths and limitations of small-state sponsorship of dispute resolution efforts. The Norwegian governmentplayed an important role in helping to bootstrap the Oslo process. But wassuch involvement an essential element of the process, or would the contend-ing parties have found other ways to initiate secret talks? What are theadvantages and disadvantages of the small state-NGO collaboration? Couldthe process have been managed by an independent NGO or academic orga-nization? Were the circumstances that led to Norway's involvement unique, aproduct of that nation's peculiar history and place in the international sys-tem? (For a discussion, see Lieberfeld 1995.)

The experience of Oslo since the signing of the Declaration of Princi-ples raises difficult questions about use of secret diplomacy and stagedagreements to build momentum. While the use of secrecy appears to havebeen essential in reaching the initial agreement, for example, it also appearsto have legitimated violent forms of opposition by groups within Israel andamong the Palestinians, violence that eventually resulted in the assassinationof Yitzak Rabin. Would it have been possible to move forward without mar-ginalizing such groups? Are there better ways to "sell" agreements concludedin secret? To neutralize extremists?


Likewise, staged agreements have proved to have their drawbacks. Bysettling the "easy" issues first the contending parties were able to buildmomentum toward agreement. But this left the "hard" issues — Jerusalem,settlements, refuges, borders — to be worked out at the end. The logic wasthat increasing confidence would make these issues easier to manage, butthis has not proved to be the case. So how do those who seek to buildmomentum in dispute resolution processes avoid this trap?

Finally, the Oslo experience highlights the central importance of indi-vidual leadership in international dispute resolution. Leaders in the PLO,Israel, and Norway took significant personal risks to initiate and concludethe negotiations, driving others to undertake what Heifetz (1994) hastermed the "adaptive work" necessary to embrace peace. The individual per-sonalities of the key actors — Abu Ala, Yassar Arafat, Yossi Beilin, JanEgeland, Avi Gil, Yair Hirschfeld, Terje Larsen, Abu Mazen, Shimon Peres,Ron Pundik, and Yitzak Rabin — their histories, needs, drives, and abilities,must figure prominently in any balanced account of the Oslo process. Therole of the individual as channel factor is often lost in theories of conflict res-olution that focus on structure and process, and deemphasize leadership andpersonality.

NOTE

1. Key participants, including Yossi Beilin, Jan Egeland, Avi Gil, Terje Larsen, Shimon Peres.andRon Pundik were interviewed by Michael Watkins during the spring and summer of 1995 in Cam-bridge, Mass., Gaza, Israel, and Norway. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are taken from thoseinterviews.

Important published accounts of the Oslo peace process include Through Secret Channelsby Mohammed Abbas; This Side of Peace by Hanan Ashrawi; The Norway Channel by JaneCorbin; Making Peace with the PLO by David Mokovsky; and Battling for Peace by Shimon Peres.See references for more information.

2. The Madrid conference, an event jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union(just before its dissolution) took place in October 1991. It was the starting point for parallel sets offormal bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Following the Madrid meeting, these talks largely took place in Washington.The Madrid-Washington talks were not particularly productive but continued even as Oslo becamethe "real" process.

REFERENCES

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New York: Norton.Ashrawi, H. 1995. This side of peace. New York: Simon & Schuster.Corbin, J. 1994. The Norway channel. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press.Fisher, R. 1991. Negotiating inside out: What are the best ways to relate internal negotiations with

external ones. Negotiation Journal 5(1): 33-41.Heifetz, R. 1994. Leadership without easy answers. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap/Harvard University

Press.Lewin, K. 1951. Field theory in social science. New York: Harper.Lieberfeld, D. 1995. Small is credible: Norway's niche in international dispute settlement. Negotia-

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Lundberg, K. 1996. The Oslo channel: Getting to the negotiating table. Case No. C113-96-1333.0,John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Mokovsky, D. 1995. Making peace with the PLO. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.Peres, S. 1995. Battling for peace. New York: Random House.Robinson, R. J. 1997a. Errors in social judgment: Implications for negotiation and conflict resolu-

tion. Part 1: Biased assimilation of information. Case No. 9-897-103. Boston: HarvardBusiness School Publishing.

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Rosegrant, S. 1996. Getting to Dayton: Negotiating an end to the war in Bosnia. Case No. C125-96-1356.0, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Ross, L. and R.E. Nisbett. 1991. The person and the situation: Perspectives on social psychology.New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Ross, L. and A. Ward. 1995. Psychological barriers to dispute resolution. Advances in Experimen-tal Social Psychology 27: 255-304.

Rubin, J.Z., D.G. Pruitt, and S.H. Kim. 1994. Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement.2nd. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tilly, C. 1993- European revolutions, 1492-1992. Oxford: Blackwell.Touval, S. and I.W. Zartman. 1985. International mediation in theory and practice. Boulder,

Colo.: Westview Press.Watkins, M., and K. Winters. 1997. Intevenors with interests and power. Negotiation Journal

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