germany and mitteleuropa by katzenstein

8/12/2019 Germany and Mitteleuropa by Katzenstein

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markets and political instabilities in <ussia and the -ommon'ealth of (ndependent tates9-(: help make this shift self&evident to most leaders and mass publics in central Europe.

+ith the end of the -old +ar the central European states are seeking to engage Europe and)erman on man levels. !erlin!onn lie on the road leading to !russels? 'ithout )erman$sactive support, membership in the European 2nion 9E2: 'ill be slo' in coming. And !russelsis a kind of reassurance against e1cessive reliance on !erlin&!onn? the central European statesseek to shelter their bilateral dependence on )erman in multilateral European arrangements.(n brief, the central European states are emulating in the *778s a strateg that other smallerEuropean states had deploed 'ith great success in earlier times. @ -entral European politics isthus defined b its )erman and European relationships rather than b its traditional positionbet'een East and +est.

Central Europe: A Geopolitical Terrain

and an Ideoloical Con!truct

ur map of Europe and the 'orld 'as devised b )erardus ercator in )erman in *>@7. (tdates back to a historical era 'hen Europe discovered, dominated, and e1ploited the 'orld.

And at the center of that Eurocentric map 'as central Europe and )erman. B

+ithin this cartographic perspective the hperbolic assertion am deutschen Wesen soll dieWelt genesen 9)erman 3ualities 'ill cure the 'orld: appeared to make sense. )erman andEurope looked like the center of the 'orld based, as 'e no' kno', on inaccuraterepresentations of size as 'ell as une3ual a1es and positions. (n contrast to ercator, themaps of the )erman historian Arno Peters sho' all areas&&countries, continents, and oceans&&according to their actual size. The map$s north&south lines run vertical, permitting us to seegeographic points in their precise directional relationship. And its east&'est lines run parallel,permitting us to determine easil the relationship of an point on the map to its distance fromthe e3uator. Peters$s ne' and more accurate map corrects the striking visual over&representation of the northern hemisphere over the south, 'hich makes Europe$s 5.C millions3uare miles loom large over outh America$s @.7 million, and the oviet 2nion$s C.B million

s3uare miles d'arf Africa$s **.@ million. ore important for the purpose of this chapter andbook, Peters$s map removes central Europe and )erman from the center of the 'orld.(nstead, these geographic areas are no' located at the 'orld$s northern rim. This induces analtogether salutar shift in political perspective. The premise of this book is to avoid 'hat onecould call Delson$s perspective, reversing the telescope and putting it on the blind ee. Thenorthern rim of the 'orld has been of great importance in recent times. (t is not marginal. !utit is not central either.

Ackno'ledging that central Europe e1ists, there is no agreement about 'here it startsprecisel, and 'here it ends. (s its center in !erlin, Prague, "ienna or further east0 Are the!altic states part of central Europe0 +hat about erbia, -roatia, lovenia, <omania, and!ulgaria0 There are no precise or uncontestable ans'ers to these 3uestions. !ut this much iscertain 'hile the coordinates of 'orld politics are shifting a'a from Europe, central Europeremains politicall important because it evokes po'erful memories of some of the maFor

disasters of the t'entieth centur fascism, t'o 'orld 'ars, and the holocaust. ;urthermore,central Europe 'as the staging area of the -old +ar and the most likel flashpoint 'here that'ar might have turned hot. C

Europe is a geopolitical terrain of considerable importance. !oth before and after the -old+ar, the north )erman plains and the eastern states of united )erman are central to past,and possibl future, conflagrations. The positioning and plans of DAT and +arsa' pacttroops until the end of the *7C8s, and the political controversies about DAT enlargement inthe *778s, illustrate the importance of geographical space in central Europe. (ntent oncreating a zone of stabilit to its east, )erman is particularl concerned 'ith the enlargement

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of DAT. ;acing severe problems to their south, ;rance and pain have no particular interestin the rapid e1pansion of the E2. )erman does. And )erman has been helped b the 2nitedtates. 4riven b electoral concerns and the liberal impetus of the foreign polic of the -lintonadministration, 2.. polic in *77@ has accelerated movement to'ard DAT enlargement,thus reinforcing )erman preferences.

The border that is separating )erman and central Europe has been transformed since *7C7.A Fournalistic account of various stops along )erman$s C88 mile&long eastern borderunderlines the importance of economic ine3ualit, political indifference, ethnic stereotpes,and historical amnesia. This is a border patrolled b police, not militar forces. muggling,illegal immigration, prostitution, and automobile theft constitute the ne' securit threats. 7

Territorial spaces and their borders are material as 'ell as social facts. (n the *7C8sintellectuals in particular sought to recreate the political space that a central Europe, shorn ofall )erman, liberal imperialist connotations, might create for a regional cultural identit thatcould further the process of political reform. *8 Like Europe$s other subregions, central Europeis a specific ideological construct that is open to varied and contested political interpretations.** ;or man decades candinavia and southern Europe retained specific collective identitiesthat overlapped in part 'ith European and national ones. nl 'ith the acceleration of theEuropean integration process and the end of the -old +ar have these subregional identities

'eakened significantl.

A corresponding process is apparentl under'a in central Europe. As "alerie !unce illustratesin chapter @, since *775 Europe, not central Europe, has become the maFor focus of thesecurit and economic policies of Poland, #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and, possibl,lovakia. Europe smbolizes democratic 'elfare states that are at peace 'ith themselves andtheir neighbors. eeting the re3uirements that the E2 has set forth for membership is notmerel an instrumental goal for the central European states, it is also a 'a of enacting anidentit that, 'ith the collapse of socialism, has no international rival. %(solationists% 'hooppose the %cosmopolitans% in domestic politics&&to adopt the terminolog of +todek Aniot,Timoth !rnes, and Elena (ankova in chapter /&&invoke different issues, such as religion andnationalism. To date, ho'ever, these isolationists have not succeeded in articulating politicalla collective identit for central Europe that rivals that of Europe.

(f Europe is a positive pole of attraction that affirms the central European %self,% <ussia, (verDeumann argues, is its constituting %other.% */ <egional identities are based not onl oninclusive affirmations but on e1clusive demarcations. pecificall 'hat is at stake for centralEuropean identit politics are the underlining principles of political and social pluralism,political democrac and capitalist efficienc that contradict the political homogenization, as'ell as authoritarianism and state socialism of past oviet and potential future <ussianpolicies. 4ifferentiated from the oviet 2nion and <ussia, central Europe is thus a 'a stationin a Europeanization process that marks the transformation of these four states in different,though broadl comparable, 'as.

This 'ish to differentiate is also noticeable in )erman. (t tpicall refers directl or obli3uel,to a civilizational divide bet'een <oman -atholicism and Eastern rthodo1. +hat divided the#absburg onarch historicall remains important in )erman$s contemporar public

discourse, even though that division does not fit ver neatl the geographic facts either of the!altic states or of the 'estern 2kraine. *5 (n the *7C8s central Europe re&emerged as apolitical categor in +est )erman$s public debate, primaril on the Left. ocial 4emocratslike Peter )lotz sought to undermine the divisive effects of the (ron -urtain b looking tocentral Europe as one bridge among several that might help to reintegrate Europe and)erman. *=

!ecause <ussia is the state from 'hich central European states, 'ith the possible e1ception oflovakia, 'ish to differentiate themselves, does this open central Europe to the increasingcultural influence of )erman0 #nek JeGHbek and ;rantiIek ich, document in chapter = the






















e1tent to 'hich )erman o'nership of the regional press in the -zech <epublic has created apotential opening for 'hat might turn out to be an illegitimate foreign influence. *> !utbecause the influence of regional print media is countered b an international electronic mediathat is mostl dominated b American interests, the -zech government has not regarded the)erman takeover of the regional press as threatening.

The relation bet'een the )erman and English languages among secondar and universitstudents in central Europe amplifies the same point. Although there are significant variationsb countr, English is ever'here the preferred first foreign language. And American massculture enFos in central Europe, as in )erman, an un3uestioned hegemonic position.4emand for )erman language for business is at record levels? )erman$s official and privatecultural presence in central Europe is on a marked ups'ing? and )erman cultural diplomac istoing 'ith a more assertivel political approach to presenting )erman abroad. 6etembedded in the global hegemon of the man products of American mass culture, )ermancultural influence, though strong and rising in central Europe, 'ill not be able to emerge froma position of Funior partner even as )erman$s economic influence increases. *@

;urthermore, the multilateral bent in )erman$s cultural diplomac runs deep. +orking onmaFor proFects 'ith other +est European states, and 'ith several local organizations, isstandard operating procedure for parapublic )erman institutions such as the )oethe (nstitute

and the -enter for Advanced tud, !erlin.*B

-entral Europe$s cultural orientation 'ill be to the +est, including )erman, rather than on)erman e1clusivel. (n brief, central Europe is e1periencing simultaneous processes ofinternationalization and Europeanization that contain a strong )erman component.

Ger"an# and Central Europe in $i!tor#

This is a surprising development. ;or there e1ists an alternative historical vision of a middle'a, of an in&bet'een Europe or Zwischeneuropa, of small, sovereign, and democratic statesthat constitute the core of European culture and thus help to anchor +estern Europe againstundue Americanization and an overbearing <ussia. *C TomHs asark$s definition of central

Europe, for e1ample, articulated during +orld +ar (, included man different national groupsfrom northern, eastern, and southern Europe? but it e1cluded )ermans and Austrians. ;or;riedrich Daumann, b contrast, central Europe 'as, in the 'ords of Timoth )arton Ash, %allabout the )ermans and Austrians, 'ith the others included onl insofar as the 'ere subFectsof the )erman and Austro&#ungarian empires.% *7

(n a broader historical perspective central and eastern Europe are marked b belatedprocesses of industrialization, nation&building, and modernization processes that left thesesocieties 'ith both deep social and economic ine3ualities and a concentration of economic andpolitical resources that provided a fertile basis for state socialism. /8 This legac reinforced amosaic pattern of various nationalit groups that lived in close pro1imit to one another in'hat Karl 4eutsch called a %polka&dot% pattern that is arguabl different from the %patch'ork&3uilt% pattern characteristic of +estern Europe. /* The polka&dot pattern 'as the result of aflo' of 'est&to&east migration in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Although the

migrants did not think of themselves as )erman, the similarit, for e1ample, in the legal codesthat the brought 'ith them earned them the name %)erman% in the ees of local populations.The territories in east&central Europe thus settled 'ere united under the rder of TeutonicKnights and e1isted under the protectorate of the Emperor and the Pope, in contrast to thosein the eastern part of )erman 'hich 'ere part of the #ol <oman Empire.

Europe$s religious 'ars and the modernization policies of Peter the )reat and -atherine (( ledto a second 'ave of migration that dispersed ethnic )ermans into the inner reaches of <ussia.A net'ork of commercial, financial, and political privileges stretched unevenl across
























countrside and cit throughout eastern&central Europe, subFect to local variations that 'eremagnified b the absence of an imperial center.

(n the nineteenth and t'entieth centuries this comple1 pattern of central&eastern Europeanand )erman relations 'as simplified into the bifurcation bet'een the Kleindeutsche 9small)erman: and the Grossdeutsche 9large )erman: solutions to )erman$s national 3uestion.Prussia stood for the former, the #absburg monarch for the latter solution. The politicaldefeat of Austrian plans for a central European federation at the hands of Prussia, and )ermanunification under Prussian leadership in *CB* in the 'ake of three 'ars, provided a temporarans'er to )erman$s national 3uestion. )erman and Prussia adopted a polic of forcedassimilation that engendered deep hostilities, especiall among members of the Polishpopulation residing in the eastern parts of (mperial )erman.

Published during +orld +ar ( ;riedrich Daumann$s book Mitteleuropa popularized plans thathad circulated especiall in Austria&#ungar in the late nineteenth centur. Daumann dre' upa plan for a federal union of central Europe that aimed at incorporating the 'estern parts of<ussia, Poland, and the !altic states. ther plans 'ere geographicall more e1pansive andsought to consolidate southeast Europe under )erman leadership. These plans 'ere spurredb the conviction that rivalr 'ith the 2nited tates, !ritain, and <ussia re3uired )erman toenlarge the territorial and demographic base of this potential fourth %'orld state% through the

establishment of close links 'ith central and eastern Europe.//

(n the vie' of its )erman andAustrian proponents such plans 'ould create a fle1ible international political order, marked ba spirit of political compromise, in 'hich various nationalities and states 'ould be able tocoe1ist peacefull? in the vie' of its foreign critics this 'as crass imperialism designed tocement )erman po'er on the continent. ;rom either perspective such plans 'ere embeddedin the process of capitalist development that increasingl came to penetrate central andeastern Europe.

)erman$s defeat in +orld +ar ( and the breakup of Austria#ungar created a cordonsanitaire of states in central and eastern Europe increasingl referred to as east&centralEurope or Zwischeneuropa. (t restored Poland$s sovereignt and gave independence to a rumpAustria, #ungar, and -zechoslavakia as 'ell as to the !alkan states. The +ilsonian principleof national self&determination 'as violated in numerous instances&&for e1ample, in the case ofAustria, in 'estern Poland, #ungar, and in !ohemia and oravia. Ethnic )ermans thus found

themselves living under non)erman governments. The revision of the "ersailles treatregarding )erman$s eastern border became an important polic obFective for both thegovernments of +eimar )erman and Dazi )erman.

-entral Europe thus became part of a revisionist political agenda that, 'ithout relin3uishing itseconomic&imperialist character, ac3uired radical nationalist overtones. !ased on its outrightreFection of the "ersailles and t. )ermain treaties, )erman and Austrian political revisionismaccorded )erman the role as central Europe$s undisputed political and economic leader and,eventuall, sanctioned militar aggression and political anne1ation. /5 Liberals advocated animperialism of free trade that put )erman at the center of an informall organized zone ofeconomic influence intimatel linked to an open international econom. Proponents ofautarchic economic development put )erman at the center of an economic bloc that 'asprotectionist in its e1ternal orientation and hierarchical in its internal organization. /=

After *755 Dazi )erman opted une3uivocall for the second option. (t instituted bilateraltrade and monetar clearing arrangements designed to cement a sstem of asmmetricvulnerabilities bet'een )erman and its smaller neighbors to the east. /> )erman dominationover central Europe and further east 'as an act of destructive colonization that brought about'ars of ethnic cleansing, resettlements of vast tracts of land, outright anne1ation of 'esternPoland, and the creation of a vicious apartheid regime in central Poland. And the )erman ,militar, police, and courts closel cooperated in conducting a genocidal 'ar and the runningof the death camps in 'hich )ermans murdered millions of Je's and members of otherminorit groups.















Elena (ankova$s analsis of the social partnership evident in 'hat she calls a %transformativecorporatism% in !ulgaria and Poland points in the same direction. /C #er surve of post&socialist, central and eastern European politics points to pervasive indications of a tripartitecorporatist politics that has varing political effects. #ungar$s version, for e1ample, 'asrelativel 'eak. The tripartite Dational -ouncil for <econciliation of (nterests, established in*7CC, focuses on consensual 'age bargaining and the negotiation of a host of social issues.<evived in *778 in the interest of buffering the shock of market competition, it is comprised of

representatives of si1 unions and emploer organizations. -zechoslovakia$s federal tripartite-ouncil of ocial and Economic Accord 'as constituted in *778 and, after the countr$s split&up, 'as succeeded in *775 b -zech and lovak successor organizations. (n Poland tripartitenegotiations accelerated after the signing of the Enterprise pact of ;ebruar *775 and theformation of the Dational -ommission on ocial&Economic (ssues in ;ebruar *77=. (t bringsaround one table representatives of the government, the confederation of Polish emploers,D&olidarit, the All&Polish Trade 2nion Alliance, and seven other national unions. (n!ulgaria, <omania, and the successor states to the oviet 2nion similar corporatistarrangements have also sprung up.

(ankova, furthermore, sho's in her detailed research in !ulgaria and Poland that thesecouncils are not merel empt institutional shells at the national level. The are replicated atregional levels, in different industrial branches and 'ithin particular enterprises. The net'orkstructure of the political economies of central Europe that tark and !ruszt uncovered andinterpreted in their stud of privatization, (ankova finds to be ver prominent on issues ofmacroeconomic polic and 'age bargaining. (n her vie', beond all national, regional, local,and sectoral variations 9marked, for e1ample, b a more adversarial form of social dialogue inPoland than in #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and lovakia: tripartite corporatism in centraland eastern Europe has developed a similar transformative design.

The rapid and almost simultaneous emergence of transformative corporatism, (ankova argues,is due to the convergence of three factors that, in a different historical conte1t, had broughtforth a different kind of corporatism in Austria and 'itzerland. /7 ;irst, one legac of socialism'as a collectivist culture that is reflected in the emergence of ne', centralized unions and,more slo'l, of ne' emploer associations. econd, in all central European states the openingto +estern markets and high levels of international indebtedness created strong pressures fordomestic concertation policies. ;inall, in an era of great uncertaint corporatism facilitates

the signing of social pacts and agreements that are vitall important in the absence ofconsolidated norms of conduct. (n brief, under great political and economic pressure and in anenvironment of high uncertaint both unions and emploers agreed 'ith the post&-ommunistgovernments that, in radicall ne' circumstances, centralized decision making is a virtue.

(t is too earl to Fudge confidentl 'hether the central European e1perience 'ill generate indue course political mechanisms sufficientl strong to sustain corporatist structures andpractices. !ut 'ith !ulgaria and Poland as e1emplars, (ankova$s research on transformativecorporatism generates a novel perspective that points to some important similarities 'ithAustria and 'itzerland.

Their democratic corporatism has three defining traits. 58 ;irst, business and labor subscribe toan ideolog of social partnership that subordinates the natural antagonism of differentproducer groups to an overarching consensus on a peaceful and stable politics. Politicalconflict, 'hile not eliminated, occurs 'ithin a frame'ork that, ho'ever vaguel, is designedaround a shared notion of the public good. econd, the maFor interest groups are vercentralized. (ndeed, the ver concept of %peak association%&in 'hich associations, notindividuals are organized&&is a central European institutional innovation that dates back to thenineteenth centur. (nterest group leaders tpicall enFo ver strong po'ers and control overa membership that rarel challenges its political prerogatives. And these groups tpicallorganize broad segments of the relevant social sectors. 6et the image of order that thisinstitutional order conves is misleading. Political struggle is intense, but man of theseconflicts occur 'ithin organizations in private rather than bet'een them in public, thuspreventing a cluttering of the public agenda 'ith fights, for e1ample, bet'een various












segments of labor or business. This tpe of corporatist structure remains democratic. Periodicelectoral competition interrupts a potentiall dangerous consensus among the elites runningthese organizations. ;inall, democratic corporatism features a particular stle of politicalbargaining that is informal, voluntar, and uninterrupted. This bargaining process facilitatesconsensus b permitting trade&offs across different polic sectors.

(n their man differences 'itzerland and Austria e1emplif a liberal and social variant ofdemocratic corporatism. (n 'itzerland international business and finance dominate nationalbusiness, the unions, and the political Left. (n Austria, conversel, a large union and a verlarge public sector prevail over internationall oriented business interests b diminishingmargins. Thus 'itzerland chooses liberal foreign trade, large direct investments abroad, andthe reliance on a large number of foreign 'orkers 'hile Austria prefers a cautious pursuit offree trade, subsidization of domestic investment, and an active labor market polic. And'itzerland favors a relativel privatized social polic sstem and limited public e1penditures,'hereas Austria chooses large public e1penditures, publicl funded social policies, and anincomes polic supported b both emploers and unions. !ut these differences bet'eeninternational and national adaptation to change, and bet'een private and public compensationfor change, reflect onl one&half of a picture that differentiates bet'een liberal and a socialvariants of corporatism.

The other half is conveed b the fact that in both countries business and labor accommodatetheir divergent interests, on different terms, in centralized institutions. (n both countriesproducer groups, state bureaucracies and, at times, political parties are linked throughmultiple institutional channels that often make it virtuall impossible to distinguish the publicfrom the private sector. (n both countries producer groups are 'ell&organized in tpicallcentralized and all&encompassing peak associations. <eaching a consensus bet'een thedivergent vie'points e1pressed 'ithin these organizations is a ke to the institutional stabilitof the national polic net'ork and the predictabilit of the polic process. 6et some differencesin institutional form remain apparent. The state bureaucrac, for e1ample, is larger and morecentralized in Austria than in 'itzerland. And the degree of centralization tends to besome'hat larger in the dominant social sector&&business in 'itzerland and the unions inAustria&&than in the subordinate sectors. !ut both 'itzerland and Austria seek to link theirinstitutions, including political parties, to polic net'orks that reliabl shield the polic processfrom e1ogenous shocks and unpredictabilities.

The consensual and democratic political arrangements that emerged in Austria after +orld+ar (( and that 'ere reinforced b a series of far&reaching constitutional amendmentsadopted b 'itzerland soon after *7=> resulted from the traumatic convulsions of the *758sand *7=8s. The )reat 4epression, fascism, 'ar, and occupation convinced Austrian and 'issvoters and leaders that moderation in the e1ercise of po'er 'as a marriage of virtue 'ithnecessit.

(n Austria a strong political consensus emerged after the 'ar 'hich vie'ed that countr asoccupied bet'een *75C and *7>>, first b the Dazis and later b the Allied Po'ers. (t matterslittle that the empirical evidence does not support this historical mth about the ears *75C&=>. 5* nl in the *7C8s did the +aldheim affair put seriousl into 3uestion this instance ofcollective historical re&interpretation. The Austrians learned an important lesson specificallfrom the brief civil 'ar of *75= and more generall from the events of the *758s and *7=8s.Left and <ight agreed that it 'as dangerous and undesirable to push political conflicts too far.4omestic tran3uillit and prosperit as 'ell as international neutralit became the obFect ofAustrian policies and politics. 4emocratic corporatism became the anchor.

Although it 'as spared Austria$s difficult e1periences, 'itzerland$s e1perience of the perilous*758s and *7=8s, the depression, and the threat of 'ar nonetheless left a deep imprint.Lacking a broad political consensus, rule b emergenc decree became almost normal in theabnormal *758s. !ut the victor of reformism over radicalism on the political Left and thetrade union movement encouraged the political incorporation and pacification of all maFor






social sectors b the mid&*7=8s. This broadened the political base of 'iss liberalism andeventuall transformed it into a liberal version of democratic corporatism.

(n the evolution of democratic corporatism it is difficult to overestimate the role 'hich theliberal international econom has plaed since *7=>. 5/ As is true of other small industrialstates, the economies of 'itzerland and Austria are remarkabl open to the internationaleconom. (ncreasing international liberalization provided ample opportunities in gro'inge1port markets, but it also greatl increased the competitive pressures that 'ere placed on allof the maFor producer groups and political actors. (n their dail lives everone in 'itzerlandand Austria 'as constantl reminded of ho' open and vulnerable their economies reall are.-orporatist practices thus became valued as tools that are essential for the consensualfashioning of national strategies in an international econom that is tpicall perceived as arigorous taskmaster that leaves little room for self&indulgence or self&pit. Economiccompetitiveness and social 'elfare 'ere vie'ed as being ine1tricabl linked. PoliticaladFustment to the changes imposed b developments in the international econom have beenmade easier b the fact that corporatist institutions 'ere the conduits b 'hich the 'elfarepolicies of compensation 'ere e1panded during the post'ar period&&some in response to thepressures of the international econom, others as the result of the internal dnamics ofdemocratic corporatism.

(n the *7C8s and *778s this pattern has undergone important changes, especiall in Austria.The Austrian decision to Foin the E2 in *77> has increased international competition. And apartial destabilization of the Austrian part sstem is apparent in the gro'th of a number ofsmall parties. 55 ore specificall, in the case of Austria democratic corporatism in the *778s isno' seriousl challenged b a populist right&'ing part that packages its 1enophobia andfurtive support of the Dazi past in a heav dose of anti&European rhetoric. (n 'itzerland, b'a of contrast, it is uncertaint about the course the countr should navigate in anintegrating Europe that is increasing numerous political cleavages. These challenges to itshegemon not'ithstanding, democratic corporatism continues to define Austrian and 'isspolitics more accuratel than does an other label.

In!titutional A&&initie! o& Ger"an# 'it(

Corporati!")erman politics arguabl has a greater similarit 'ith democratic corporatism than do thepolitics of an other larger capitalist states. )erman$s semi&sovereign state helps bring aboutthis convergence in politics and polic. 5= )overnment and state bureaucrac are closelconnected to the political process of consultation, b 'a of an ideological frame'ork of socialpartnership that links parapublic institutions 'ith broadl based, centralized producer groupsand 'ith political parties that are decidedl centrist in outlook. The e1treme <ight has beendelegitimated b the horrors of the Dazi past. The e1treme Left never overcame the liabilit ofespousing a socialist ideal that to most +est )ermans 'as hidden behind a cement 'all andbarbed 'ire. The sharpl narro'ed spectrum of partisan preferences that has dominated)erman politics since *7=7 has reinforced an ideolog of social partnership that eventuallsuperseded the language of class conflict.

The organization of )erman politics is 3uite decentralized. This can be traced to severalfactors historical legacies of a decentralized )erman polit, American political precepts, suchas federalism and Fudicial revie', and emerging political characteristics, such as the gro'ingsignificance of the Bundesrat and the increasing role of the Fudiciar in polic making duringthe last fort ears. )erman politics, to be sure, features some countervailing centralizingtendencies, most important among 'hich are legal norms that help to shape a comple1sstem of intergovernmental relations and general political practices.












an other )erman institutions are, b contrast, 3uite centralized in their structure and highlencompassing in their membership. This is especiall true of the maFor producerorganizations.

)erman business had begun organizing in the form of peak associations as earl as the *CB8s.And after *7=> +est )erman unions also decided on a more centralized organizationalstructure along industr lines. And although )erman$s banking sstem is no longer vie'edade3uatel as a contemporar version of #ilferding$s finance capitalism, its organization andthe legal rules under 'hich it is permitted to operate still give it a position of great importancein the )erman polit.

)erman$s similarit to democratic and other forms of corporatism is underlined b parapublicinstitutions that are open to centralized interest groups as 'ell as part leaders and senior civilservants. E1amples include -hambers of (ndustr, -ommerce, and Agriculture, professionalassociations, public radio and television stations, and a variet of research institutes anduniversities. Parapublic institutions are both political actors and polic arenas. ome of theseinstitutions, such as the social 'elfare funds, date back to the nineteenth centur. thers,such as the !undesbank, 'ere created b the Allies after *7=>. Especiall on economic andsocial 3uestions these institutions have acted like political shock absorbers. The tend to limitthe scope for innovation in the formulation of policies, and the limit political controversies in

the process of polic implementation.

)erman politics shares characteristic traits 'ith both social and liberal variants of corporatism.As is true of 'itzerland, )erman business is po'erful and has an international cast. And astrong federalism introduces an element of decentralization into electoral politics andintergovernmental relations. oreover, as in Austria political parties pla a prominent role,and the position of the labor movement is ver significant. ;inall, )erman politics shares 'ithboth 'itzerland and Austria a penchant for organizing politics along stable institutional linesthat encourage incremental changes in polic.

At the same time there e1ist significant differences. ;or e1ample, institutional net'orks linkingpolitical actors in the ;ederal <epublic are less centralized and less tight than those in'itzerland and Austria. Political bargaining across issue areas is less fre3uent and moredifficult. This is due to the normative and political importance of the state in )erman politicsand is not characteristic of 'itzerland and Austria. The )erman state provides a normativereference point that in 'itzerland is confined to the institution of direct democrac. (n'itzerland onl in times of crisis is the federal government granted emergenc po'ers thathelp it to define and implement polic. Austria$s political parties, on the other hand, havepenetrated the state bureaucrac so totall as to have robbed the state of almost all vestigesof autonom. (f an one Austrian institution is singled out 'hich could claim to provide anormative order for politics, it 'ould be the social and economic partnership bet'een themaFor producer groups as opposed to the state. Thus neither the 'iss emasculation of thestate in normal times, and its enhancement in times of crisis, nor the Austrian neutralization ofthe state resemble the role the state plas in )erman. (f one considers 'itzerland andAustria as e1emplars of liberal and social variants, )erman could be called a third,attenuated e1ample of democratic corporatism.

After *7=> )erman had little choice but to ackno'ledge its profound vulnerabilit. 4efeatedand divided, it 'as the staging area for the -old +ar that threatened to annihilate )ermanshould that 'ar ever turn hot. )erman 'as a medium&sized po'er 'ith resources inade3uateto bring about national unification. A 3uiet agreement kept the Allied po'ers unitedthroughout the -old +ar. (t 'as summarized b the flippant, though accurate, aperçu %if oukeep do'n our )ermans, 'e 'ill keep do'n ours.% ;urthermore, as in Austria and'itzerland, international economic pressures have had a comparable though 'eaker effect.The concept of vulnerabilit describes ver 'ell the situation of +est )erman after *7=>.Totall defeated in 'ar, the countr 'as made much smaller b its division. The traditionalbreadbasket in the eastern territories ceded to Poland and in the )4< 'ere no longer



available. +est )erman 'as thus condemned to e1port in order to pa for the foodstuff itno' had to import as 'ell as the ra' materials necessar to fuel its manufacturing sector.Eventuall its four maFor manufacturing sectors&&automobiles, chemicals, electrical e3uipment,and machiner&&all e1ported more than half of their total production to foreign markets.)erman became the 'orld$s leading e1porter in the late *7C8s. !ut its e1port&led gro'thstrateg induced a structural dependence on the international econom over 'hich it had, 'ithfe' e1ceptions, precious little control.

The direct effects of )erman unification have made remarkabl little difference to thecountr$s institutional net'orks, thus keeping the similarit 'ith other tpes of centralEuropean corporatism in place. This 'as largel due to the constitutional provision under'hich )erman united. (n choosing Article /5 rather than Article *=@ the )erman governmentmade sure that +estern institutions 'ould remain unaltered rather than open to renegotiationb the governments of the ;<) and )4<. -onse3uentl, +est )erman institutions in allspheres of state and societ have spread to the five ne' Länder &&including the Fudiciar, thelocal and state bureaucrac, the armed forces and police, the federal sstem of government,political parties, interest groups, social 'elfare funds, vocational training, labor market boards,universities, and research and development sstems. ;rom this perspective )erman unificationis a stor of transferring institutions from 'est to east. 5>

!ut institutions that are transferred to ne' settings remain open to eventual transformation.The e1tent of change that is no' concealed can be measured indirectl b the e1plosivegro'th of )erman$s national debt. )erman bought political tran3uillit at an economic pricethat is sustainable in the longer term onl if important aspects of the )erman politicaleconom are greatl modified. As +est )erman$s capacit and 'illingness to subsidize theeconomic and social changes in the east diminishes, institutional and political discontinuitiesma become apparent in political practices matching the division of the countr in theircollective consciousness.

This does not mean, as a small group of neo&conservatives 'riting on )erman foreign affairsargues, that the !erlin <epublic 'ill have no commonalities 'ith the !onn <epublic. +ith anumber of ministries, most importantl defense, staing put in !onn and 'ith man federaloffices moving from !erlin to !onn, the capital of the ne' )erman 'ill be hphenated. !ut itis 3uite plausible to e1pect that some polic domains 'ill be opened to market processes as

the fiscal capacities of the )erman social market econom are strained under the triple impactof unification, European integration, and increasing global competition? that the traditionalsectoralization of polic making tpifing )erman 'ill go hand in hand 'ith morecentralization? and that a harsher public climate 'ill coe1ist 'ith or pervade informal net'orksof cooperation that have been a hallmark of )erman politics since the *7@8s. This 'ouldherald the coming of a Third )erman <epublic under auspices 3uite different from thoseforeseen in the late *7C8s. 5@ (t is unlikel, though possible, that such changes 'ouldfundamentall undercut the institutional similarities bet'een )erman, 'iss, and Austrianversions of corporatism.

Central Europe )et'een Ger"an#* t(e

European Union* and NATO Enlare"entThe central European states are strongl oriented 'est'ards through overlapping relationshipsthat link them to )erman, the E2 and DAT. After *7C7 most e1perts e1pected that)erman 'ould come to prevail economicall in its o'n backard b recreating throughpolitics and markets a contemporar analog to the economic hegemon that it had enFoed incentral and eastern Europe before +orld +ar ((. The picture 'hich is beginning to emerge afe' ears after the end of the -old +ar is more complicated. )ro'ing bilateral ties 'ith)erman, especiall in the economic sphere, are mitigated b different national strategies that









seek to anchor central Europe in a Europe encompassing )erman and, on securit issues, a+estern alliance that ties Europe to the 2nited tates.

Central Europe and Ger"an#

!efore unification the )4< 'as, after the oviet 2nion, the largest partner in the -ouncil forutual Economic Assistance 9-EA:. And 'hile foreign trade 'as relativel unimportant instate socialist economies follo'ing policies of import substitution, the ;<) 'as centralEurope$s most important +estern trade partner. As arkovits and <eich 'rite, %it is e1tremeldifficult to identif any categor of commerce and trade in 'hich the ;ederal <epublic has notconsistentl been the most important +estern presence in Eastern Europe.% 5B <anking behindonl the oviet 2nion, the ;<) and the )4< in *7C7 accounted for a total of *=.7 percent of-zechoslovak trade, *B.= percent of #ungarian trade, and *7 percent of Polish trade. 5C Thecollapse of trade relations in the oviet bloc and central Europe in *778 and *77* set thestage for a breathtakingl 3uick economic reorientation of the central European economiesto'ards )erman and European markets. !et'een *7C7 and *77/, for e1ample, +est )ermanimports increased b *@@ percent 9 -zechoslovakia:, *8C percent 9 Poland:, and @@ percent9 #ungar: 'hile e1ports increased b *B5 percent 9 -zechoslovakia:, B/ percent 9 Poland:and /5 percent 9 #ungar:. ! contrast, in *77/ central European trade 'ith the former )4<,no' part of united )erman, reached onl /8 percent of its *7C7 level. 57 !et'een *775 and*77> )erman$s foreign trade 'ith central and Eastern Europe increased b a further 58percent, a figure that 'as larger than for an other region of the 'orld. ! *77> )ermane1ports to central and eastern Europe e1ceeded e1ports to the 2nited tates b a slightmargin and imports b a substantial one. =8 ! contrast, the importance of the <ussian marketin the foreign trade of central Europe had shrunk to about > percent of total trade? onl in#ungar 'as the proportion slightl larger 9C percent:. =*

)erman is also the most important source of foreign direct investment and technologimports. (n Poland and -zechoslovakia, for e1ample, )erman firms moved 'ith great speedand accounted for 58 to =8 percent of all Foint ventures in the earl months of *778. =/ (t isnot surprising that, in light of historical memories, the Polish and -zech governments havetried to counterbalance )erman investments 'ith those from other states. (n #ungar suchcompensating policies do not e1ist even though )erman and Austrian firms account for more

than one&third of the total number of Foint ventures.=5

Trailing onl the 2nited tates,)erman is the region$s second largest investor 'ith more than B billion in cumulativeinvestments in central and eastern Europe. This figure reflects not onl big proFects like "+$sinvestment in koda, discussed in chapter = belo', of )erman Telekom$s and Audi$sinvestments in #ungar. (t is, rather, medium&sized firms that are driving )erman$sinvestment push in central Europe. (n the -zech <epublic )erman companies had, b *77=,invested in more than >,888 Foint ventures, compared to onl @88 for the 2nited tates. ==

+ith much larger 'age than productivit differentials, investment opportunities are verenticing for smaller )erman firms. And these firms do not carr the heav historical baggagethat accompanies large )erman investment proFects like "+$s Foint venture 'ith koda. Theseeconomic statistics should be interpreted in the conte1t of the size of )erman$s totalinvestment of about 4B88 billion in *775. The total foreign investment of all E-4 states incentral Europe, to 'hich )erman contributes about one&third, accounted for onl about *percent of )erman$s total domestic investment. =>

)erman seeks to stabilize the social and political conditions to its east b assisting theprocess of economic transformation and liberalization through various aid programs. (n thisrespect )erman$s position in central Europe and further east is unrivaled. ! Januar *77>)erman had provided 4=>.= billion to the central and eastern European states, in additionto the 4*88 billion allocated to assist the successor states of the oviet 2nion? most of thesefunds 'ere provided in the form of tied loans, granted at concessionar interest rates. =@

)erman influence is spread not onl directl through aid but also indirectl throughinstitutions. )erman foreign polic operates in a dual mode. The government$s traditional
































foreign polic is complemented b )erman$s societal foreign polic 9gesellschatliche !ussenpoliti" :. ost of the maFor )erman institutions conduct their o'n foreign relations.Tpicall, the engage partner institutions in other countries thus creating or reinforcing apattern of transnational relations. This gives )erman political actors ample opportunities tointervene obli3uel in the domestic affairs of the central European states, 'ithout thro'ingtheir 'eight around undul. This is a distinctive stle of foreign polic that, 'rites Jeremiah<iemer, %has been institutionalized and internalized.% =B The creation of electoral sstems in

central Europe, for e1ample, 'as assisted b man European parties, %especiall the )erman-42 and P4, but also !ritish conservatives and American 4emocratic and <epublicanstrategists.% =C And like their 2.. colleagues, )erman la'ers 'ere being busil consulted ascentral and eastern European states drafted ne' constitutional provisions.

)oing beond electoral and constitutional affairs 'here )erman$s part foundations havebeen ver active in central Europe, institutional effects are also readil apparent in the field ofbusiness. The corporate and banking sstems in central Europe, for e1ample, are developingalong the lines of )erman$s universal banks 'hich not onl take deposits and make loans butalso trade and sell securities and other financial products. According to ark Delson, )ermanspent heavil bet'een *778 and *77= on programs seeking to draft the la's and regulationsb 'hich capitalism evolves in central and eastern Europe. =7 (n the monetar realm,specificall, )erman influence is relativel uncontested. And the !undesbank served as aninstitutional model for several national banks in central Europe, including #ungar as PMter)edeon discusses in chapter 5. ;ollo'ing in the footsteps of other )erman institutions, it hasoffered e1tensive training to about >88 central bankers from central and eastern Europe. Eachof the central European states floats against a trade&'eighted average of foreign currencies in'hich the 4 or E-2 account for about t'o&thirds. >8

trong as the )erman position has rapidl become in central Europe during the *778s, it is notuncontested. An alternative institutional model is offered b the more free&'heelingAngloAmerican banking model 'hich the 2nited tates promoted at considerable cost. >* Anddespite its phenomenal gro'th since *778, )erman trade accounts for onl about one&third ofthe total e1ternal trade and investment figures of the central European economies. >/ Thisfigure is, broadl speaking, in line 'ith )erman$s economic 'eight in the E2. >5 (t remains tobe seen 'hether central Europe$s economic dependence on )erman 'ill further increase inthe coming ears or 'hether it 'ill taper off at levels that are roughl comparable to those of

other +estern European economies. Earl E2 enlargement and the lo'ering of E2 tariffbarriers 'ould facilitate such a development.

Central Europe and t(e EU

+ith the political and economic revolutions of *7C7, the collapse of the -EA, and thedisintegration of the oviet 2nion, central European trade has shifted 'ith remarkable speedto the E2. +hile domestic )4P in central Europe declined b about one&fifth bet'een *7C7and *77/, from a ver lo' base -zechoslovakia$s imports from the E2 rose b 7@ percent,Poland$s b @/ percent, and #ungar$s b =8 percent. 4espite these strong increases thecentral European economies accounted for less than *.> percent of the E2$s total e1ternaltrade in *77/ and this figure has increased onl slightl since then. >= ince the start of the*778s +estern corporations have invested about /> billion in the four "isegrad countries. >>

f similar importance are the institutional links that the central European states have forged'ith the E2. >@ ovement a'a from the -ommunist sstem 'as complemented b movementto'ards the European model. %The most po'erful force e1erted both on the political sstemsand the peoples of East Europe,% 'rites <on Linden, %'as the pull of the idea of Europe itself.As the revolutions of *7C7 spread, the sentiment 'as increasingl voiced b those making thechanges that the 'anted their countr to be $European,$ to Foin or reFoin a political continentfrom 'hich the had been forcibl cut off.% >B The E- foreign ministers, in turn, issued in4ecember *77* a declaration 'hich specified the conditions for diplomatic recognition of the




































central and eastern European states and the successor states to the oviet 2nion respect forthe rule of la'? for democrac and human rights as laid do'n in the provisions of the 2D-harter, the ;inal Act of #elsinki setting up the --E, and that organization$s -harter of Parisadopted in Dovember *778? and for guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groupsand minorities as specified in the general frame'ork of the --E.

(n Jul *7C7 the E- took over the coordination of the aid programs of the )&/= for central andeastern Europe. (t signed bilateral trade agreements 'ith the central European states in *778&7*. (n *778 the E2 initiated a special assistance program for Poland and #ungar? in Januar*77* it granted the central European states )eneralized stem of Preferences 9)P: statusnormall reserved for developing economies? subse3uentl, in *77*, it eliminated some3uantitative restrictions on steel and iron and increased the 3uotas for the import of te1tilesand garments? and after eighteen months of negotiations the E2 signed AssociationAgreements 9the so&called %Europe Agreements%: in 4ecember *77* 'hich also sought toinstitutionalize a regular polic dialogue 'hile specifing conditions on 3uestions of economicand political reforms and guarantees of human rights. ! the end of *77* central Europeanfirms enFoed E2 tariff preferences over non&European firms. !ut because the E2 e1emptedsensitive sectors such as agriculture, te1tiles, and steel from trade liberalization, sectors in'hich the enFo the largest comparative advantage, the central European states have had amore restricted access to the E2 market than do some of the associate editerraneanmembers of the E2.

(n the summer of *775, at its -openhagen summit, the E2 made additional polic concessions'hile specifing a catalogue of conditions that the central European states had to meet priorto becoming full E2 members. ubse3uentl, in a *77=, the E2 offered its central andeastern European associate members an %associate partnership% in the +est European 2nion9+E2:, the E2$s securit and defense organizations.

The applications that Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic subse3uentl filed for fullmembership have met stiff resistance from several members of the E2. (mports in sensitivesectors, such as agriculture, steel, chemicals, and garments, are meeting stiff protectionistresistance in the E2. After sharp increases in central European e1ports in these sectorsbet'een *7C7 and *77/, the European Association Agreements of *77* brought e1portgro'th to a halt. Thus imports from central Europe in sensitive sectors barel topped /

percent of the E2$s total imports in *77/. >C ;inall, for strategic and economic reasons ;ranceand the southern European states do not see the E2$s eastern enlargement as a high&prioritissue. trategicall, the 'orr about a possible destabilization of Dorth African politicsthrough (slam. And on economic grounds ;rance fears that Polish membership could 'reck thesstem of the -ommon Agricultural Polic 9-AP:, 'hile pain, Portugal, and )reece are fearfulof diminishing subsidies from the E2$s structural and cohesion funds. >7 n a per capita basis#ungar$s income 'as /,B/8 in *77* as compared to /,=B8 for -zechoslovakia and *,B78for Poland? these figures amounted, respectivel, to =>, =*, and 58 percent of Portugal$s percapita income, 'hich itself is onl half of pain$s. #aving greatl benefited from E2membership, the southern European states, together 'ith ;rance, are not eager to help createthe unavoidable political pressures for redistribution favoring central Europe in an enlarged E2.@8 )erman polic 'ill thus be crucial in determining the pace of the E2$s incorporation ofcentral Europe.

Central Europe and NATO

+ith the end of the -old +ar, for a brief moment in *778 the debate about the future securitstructure of Europe 'as genuinel open. @* DAT, the -onference for ecurit and -ooperationin Europe 9--E:, and the +E2 9as the foreign polic arm of the E-: all offered differentinstitutional possibilities. Among these the 2nited tates preferred redefining and broadeningDAT$s mission, beond the collective defense provisions of Article ", to act as guarantor ofEuropean securit? )erman favored upgrading the importance of the --E, an institution















that it had helped found in *7B>, into the center of a ne' pan&European securit structureembedding East and +est? and ;rance hoped to enhance the importance of the E- and +E2 inproviding for European securit. Political reactions to the initial crises of the post&-old +ar erain *77* 9the )ulf +ar, the beginning of the 'ar in 6ugoslavia, and the failed coup in theoviet 2nion: all helped bring about a DAT&centered securit structure.

6et in the fall of *7C7 this outcome 'as not preordained. Adopted in Dovember *778, the--E -harter of Paris 'as based on the assumption that states 'ould be 'illing to compl'ith the procedures, rules, and norms laid do'n b --E mechanisms and institutions. mallorganizational head3uarters dealing 'ith securit, dispute and conflict resolution, andelections and democrac 'ere set up, respectivel, in Prague, "ienna, and +arsa', soon to bemarginalized b the crises in the post&-old +ar era. The --E #elsinki ummit 4eclarationemphasized human and democratic rights and, seeking a global affiliation, in effect made the--E a regional organization of the 2D. @/

(n an initial move designed to facilitate contacts 'ith central Europe, DAT$s London ummitset up liaison officers bet'een central Europe and DAT in June *778. DAT created the DorthAtlantic -ooperation -ouncil 9DA--: in late *77* as the main forum for dialogue andcooperation on securit issues affecting DAT and the former member states of the +T. !fall *77/, at its slo summit, DAT agreed that it should act on behalf of the --E. This 'as a

precursor for DAT$s Partnership for Peace 9P;P:. The Partnership offered a vehicle forconcrete militar cooperation bet'een DAT and the former members of the +T, includingoperational cooperation in defense budgeting, Foint planning and e1ercises, peacekeepingoperations, disaster relief and crisis management. This is also a possible, though not anautomatic, path'a to'ard eventual DAT membership for states that have successfullconsolidated their transitions to marketoriented, democraticall organized political sstemsand that have refurbished their militaries and ac3uired the capabilities necessar to operateunder Foint DAT command. The chief tasks for the central European states are establishing aclear civilian control over the militar? fundamental changes in strategic doctrine andoperational planning? and significant changes in procurement and logistics. @5

4uring his trip to Europe in Jul *77=, President -linton stated that it is %no longer a 3uestionof 'hether, but 'hen and ho'.% The 2.. Presidential election in *77@ fi1ed the date 'ithenator 4ole and the President both agreeing that enlargement should happen before the ear

/888. Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic have e1pressed a strong interest in beingadmitted to DAT at an earl date. ecurit concerns, especiall about the stabilit of <ussiandemocrac and the peacefulness of <ussian foreign polic, have mattered greatl. o does astrong sense that to be part of the +est means to be part not onl of the E2 but also of DAT.;or reasons that chapter > discusses in some detail, alone among the central European stateslovakia ma not be included in the initial group to be admitted to full DAT membership.

;or the same reasons that the central European states 'ish to Foin DAT at an earl date,government and opposition in <ussia are strongl opposed. @= DAT$s Eastern enlargement'ould tilt the balance of po'er further against a much 'eakened <ussian militar? and,barring a fi1ed timetable for <ussian DAT membership, it 'ould smbolize that even acapitalist and democratic <ussia 'as not part of the +est. ;or this reason the )ermangovernment has not taken a uniform position on this issue. +hile 4efense inister <Nhe hasbeen a strong advocate of earl DAT enlargement, -hancellor Kohl and ;oreign inisterKinkel have adopted a more cautious line 'hich leaves open the interpretation that the favorenlargement as a long&term process that eventuall 'ould also include <ussia and thus mighttransform DAT from a collective defense to a collective securit institution. @> To date,)erman$s Eastern polic is thus predicated on an un'illingness to choose bet'een DATenlargement 'ith or 'ithout <ussia. +hether earlier or later, 'ith the 2nited tates and)erman both committed to their Foining DAT, the central European states, 'ith the possiblee1ception of lovakia, are 'ell on their 'a to becoming DAT members.















Pre+ie'

-hapters /&> cover a total of fourteen cases dealing 'ith man of the economic, social, andethnic problems that the central European states are facing in the *778s. The concludingchapter @ argues that, for a number of reasons, the dnamics of central European integratione1isted onl before *775? since then the central European states have been po'erfullaffected b European and international rather than subregional factors.

+Oodek AnioO, Timoth !rnes, and Elena (ankova argue in chapter / that Poland$s return toEurope is marked b the strong cross&currents bet'een Polish nationalists, organized aroundthe trade union and the -atholic -hurch, 'hich helped bring the -ommunist sstem do'n andcosmopolitans, man of 'hom are voters of post&-ommunist parties, 'ho are deepl attractedb the model of a secular 'elfare state and a capitalist democrac. Poland$s +esternorientation is reflected in the affinit bet'een its transformative corporatism that helps governits political econom, its embracing of European norms and conventions dealing, for e1ample,'ith issues of identit 9the )erman ethnic minorit: @@ and securit 9migration:. <eturning toEurope can mean importing liberal norms, as in the case of ethnic minorities, or adoptingrestrictive policies, as in the case of migration. !ut in all instances it means choosing amultilateral over a bilateral approach. Poland$s -atholic -hurch mean'hile has in mind not

merel adFusting to European norms but civilizing of +estern Europe, multilaterall if possibleand unilaterall if necessar, through the revitalization of a religious faith and moralit longlost in a secular and commercial 'orld.

PMter )edeon argues in chapter 5 that, compared to Poland, the role of the -hurch in #ungaris much 'eaker as is the legac of fearing )erman. (n the case of privatization and the inflo'of foreign investment, for e1ample, )erman influence is no source of political debate orconcern. (n the area of social polic the )erman model sho's a certain amount of influencebut this effect is undermined b the contradictor constraints of democratic politics andeconomic efficienc. !oth constraints limit #ungar$s emulation of the )erman 'elfare state.The crucial international actors affecting #ungar$s social polic are the (; and the +orld!ank. The are ver active in helping develop the formation of a ne' social polic regime in#ungar. The situation differs in the case of #ungar$s Dational !ank 9D!#:. #ere the )ermaninstitutional model is po'erful, although democratic politics has mediated this influence. As a

result of legal regulations the autonom of the D!# does not match that of the !undesbank,and the government made efforts to circumvent the legal restrictions under 'hich it operates.!ut under circumstances of economic crisis a hardening of e1ternal constraints in internationalmarkets ma counterbalance the effect of democratic politics and pressure the government toobserve more strictl the institutionalized autonom of the Dational !ank.

(n chapter = #nek JeGHbek and ;rantiIek ich argue that "+$s ac3uisition of kodailluminates the gro'ing international links that tie the -zech econom to )erman, European,and 'orld markets. !oth koda and the -zech government badl 'anted an infusion of+estern capital and kno'&ho' in order to secure the future of a corporation occuping astrategic position inside the -zech econom. #o'ever, "+$s takeover has e1posed koda toeconomic dependence. This opens the -zech econom to international influences fe'envisaged 'hen the initial deal 'as signed. #ard times in +olfsburg sharpl reduced thegro'th and technological potential of this crucial -zech compan. -zech media haveinternationalized even more rapidl than the automobile industr. )erman influence 'asvirtuall unchecked in the regional press, 'ith one !avarian publishing compan 3uicklac3uiring monopol control over the regional press in !ohemia. (n electronic media, on theother hand, the issuance of a license to the first private national television station in *775opened the -zech market not to )erman but to American investors 'ho provided t'othirds ofthe capital of -ET /*.

;inall, the historicall laden issue of -zech&)erman relations in the -zech borderlands andthe position of the udeten )ermans illustrates ho' progress to'ard -zech membership in the






E2 is complicated b a political issue that has bedeviled central European politics for mandecades. Euroregions as a concrete counter have none of the political salience that theudeten )ermans evoke 'ith their political demands for official recognition as a dialoguepartner for the -zech government. The difficulties in official )erman&-zech relations e1plain'h b arch *77@ half of the -zech public vie'ed )erman as a danger for the -zecheconom, a slight increase as compared to *77/. The proportion of those vie'ing )erman asa source of political danger Fumped b ten points to 57 percent. @B A Foint declaration agreed to

in 4ecember *77@ and signed in Januar *77B b Prime inister Klaus and -hancellor Kohltrades )erman apologies for its invasion and anne1ation of -zechoslovakia in *75C&57 for-zech apologies for the e1pulsion of three million udeten )ermans at the end of +orld +ar((. @C Do' ratified, this declaration ma help to graduall improve bilateral relations as bothgovernments have no' agreed not to burden their future relationship 'ith the burdens of thepast.

4aneI !rzica, uzana PolHkovH, and (vo amson argue in chapter > that, beond the doubletransformation of moving to democrac and capitalism, lovakia is e1perimenting, for the firsttime in a thousand ears, 'ith sovereign statehood. Thus the fight for po'er in lovakia$sdomestic politics is intense and the reluctance of the government to embrace an integrationstrateg is palatable. ;or reasons of national identit lovakia is interested in charting its o'n'a, separate from the -zech <epublic. (t sees itself as a bridge bet'een East and +est. (nsome polic areas, such as the conversion of its armaments industr, the lovak governmenthas moved 'ith dramatic speed to shut do'n most of its production facilities in record time,thus creating enormous unemploment problems in several regions of the countr. <atherthan follo'ing through 'ith the voucher privatization that -zechoslovakia had started, thedecision of the government to maintain national control over privatized firms has been thesource of intense domestic conflict and some nervousness in international capital markets.!ecause it fits current political needs lovakia, more than the other central European states, isintent on institutionalizing a bank&led )erman rather than a market&led Anglo&Americansstem. lovak polic regarding the #ungarian ethnic minorit is not firml committed toEuropean norms and practices. lovakia has permitted the issue of minorit rights to be at thecenter of the political agenda since the countr gained its independence in *775. ;inall, in itssecurit polic the lovak government, more than the Polish government, stresses traditionalmilitar concerns and has chosen to maintain cordial relations 'ith <ussia 'hile vie'ing DAT'ith some suspicion. n most counts then lovakia is less strongl oriented to'ard 'esternEurope than are Poland, #ungar, and the -zech <epublic.

The international relations of central Europe, "alerie !unce argues in chapter @, have seen asubstantial change in a ver short time. eeking to revive historical memories and consolidatethe gains of the revolution of *7C7, the central European states undertook numerous attemptsat institution building in the region bet'een *778 and *77/. (n Dovember *7C7 Austria,-zechoslovakia, #ungar, (tal, and the former 6ugoslavia signed the Pentagonale Agreement'hich Poland Foined in *77* and the 2kraine in *77/? !elarus, !ulgaria, <omania, and)erman$s !avaria have asked to participate in specific proFects. Poland, #ungar and-zechoslovakia signed in ;ebruar *778 the so&called Trilateral -ooperation Agreement.Evoking the historical memor of the *55> meeting bet'een their three kings, the "isegradsummit of ;ebruar *77* codified the trilateral cooperation bet'een these three centralEuropean states, specificall a strengthening of economic and defense ties as 'ell as thedevelopment of a common approach to DAT and the E2. (n *77/ this organization 'as

renamed the -entral European (nitiative 9-E(:, even though the four central European statesand the 2kraine signed in ;ebruar *775 an agreement covering broader cooperation. "ariouscooperative ventures are covering a 'ide arra of polic sectors dealing 'ith, among otherthings, energ, migration, the environment, research and development, culture, tourism,transport, telecommunications, information, and small enterprises. ;inall, the establishmentof the -entral European ;ree Trade Area 9-E;TA: in *77/ prepared the ground for a decisionto abolish tariffs in the region b *77C.

!ut as chapter @ argues, since *775 these attempts have flagged as central Europe became inthe ees of the -zech government in particular a hindrance for rapid integration 'ith +estern









Europe. !ecause the -zechs, in their o'n self&perceptions, are Europeans, not centralEuropeans, European, not central European multilateralism is for the -zech government thepreferred 'a of linking up 3uickl to )erman and Europe. This contrasts sharpl 'ith thepolic the 2krainian government has adopted in its relations 'ith <ussia and the -(. 4espiteits apparent 'eakness it has opted for bilateralism. Even though it receives the lion$s share of2.. aid in central&eastern Europe, the 2krainian government reFects the notion thatmultilateralism 'ill someho' constrain <ussia as the stronger po'er. (t fears that

multilateralism 'ill become a vehicle through 'hich <ussian po'er in the -( 'ill bemagnified. -entral European governments have no similar fears in their relations 'ith the E2and )erman. -entral European integration 'as also hindered b the constant irritation thatthe minorit issue has generated in the relations bet'een #ungar and lovakia since *775.(n short, as has been true of candinavia in recent ears, central European cooperation 'asstmied b the dnamic of European integration 'hich has eaten a'a at integrationprocesses in all of Europe$s subregions.

The case studies in this book illustrate t'o broad sets of factors that are affecting the politicalchoices of the central European states. (nternational factors are shaping the definition ofinterests of Poland and the -zech <epublic. (n the case studies presented in chapters / and =Polish interests are shaped b the primac of international norms, -zech interests b theprimac of economic internationalization. !ecause the seven case studies are onl illustrative,'e cannot be sure that this reflects a more general difference bet'een the t'o countries. Theanaltical difference bet'een international norms and economic internationalization is,ho'ever, significant since, to varing degrees, these t'o factors are affecting all four centralEuropean states.

(n contrast, chapter 5 argues for the relativel greater importance of domestic factors in#ungar$s policies of economic and social e1perimentation. imilarl, chapter > illustrates theimportance of domestic politics in the lovak <epublic 'hich, on issues such as privatizationand minorit rights, appears to be motivated substantiall b a domestic politics of regimeconsolidation. Although the #ungarian and lovak case studies are onl illustrative, the pointto the range of conditions under 'hich domestic politics greatl matter in all four centralEuropean states.

;inall, these chapters illustrate the different 'eight of the memories of past )erman policies,

less po'erful in Poland than in the -zech <epublic, and virtuall absent in #ungar and thelovak <epublic. @7 The effects that the policies and developments of recent ears are havingon the reconstruction of the relationships bet'een )erman and the central European statesremain unclear toda. !ut because the are occurring in a Europe, and 'ith a )erman, thatis much more internationalized than 'as true before *7=>, the evidence of this book suggeststhat the developments and policies of the *778s are cutting against a deep historical grain.

;riedrich Daumann$s vision of central Europe %sought a comprehensive political solution for thenational and social problems of his era ... a post'ar )erman societ interrelated 'ith othernations of iddle Europe and living 'ith them in a ne' conte1t of social and culturalrelationships.% B8 ( have argued here that central Europe is no longer a political program. (tma 'ell be in the process of becoming a set of distinctive domestic structures that 'e cananalze as tpes of corporatist politics that differ but are related to the tpes that haveevolved in Austria, 'itzerland, and )erman. The effect of international politics on this'estern&central European corporatism has been profound as a liberal international economhas contributed to the consolidation and perpetuation of democratic corporatism in the casesof )erman, Austria, and 'itzerland. The E2 and international markets more generall areprobabl having an analogous effect on Poland, #ungar, the -zech <epublic, and lovakia inthe *778s and beond.

(n the post'ar era central Europe shrank to )erman, 'ith Austria and 'itzerland as littlenoticed appendages. A transatlantic historical consensus measured the )erman problem interms of its deviation from the +estern path to modernit. The peaceful citizen revolutions









'hich helped bring about the end of the -old +ar, the liberation of central Europe, and)erman unification open up the possibilit, indeed the necessit, of rethinking afresh %the)erman 3uestion,% and other )erman 3uestions in central Europe and in Europe at large. B*

Daumann$s conception of central Europe entailed the vie' of politics as a zero&sum game. %+ekno' that 'hen 'e 'in, others must lose. 6et this fact should not keep us from 'anting to'in.% B/ )erman nationalism and imperialism, its dnamic societ and its Dietzschean lust forpo'er, no longer preoccup and threaten the 'orld as the once did. B5 And central Europeanaffairs have moved to the margins of 'orld politics. This development is remarkable in light ofthe profound upheavals and horrors 'hich )erman has caused in the past and 'hich centraland eastern Europe have suffered. ultilateral regimes are inhibiting unilateral )ermaninitiatives along the lines of traditional po'er politics. This is also occurring in the 'a po'eris organized in )erman domestic politics. Po'er and 'ealth in central Europe are beginning tobe thought of not onl in relative but also in absolute terms. 6et if this 'a of thinking is tobecome firml institutionalized, the convergence of central Europe 'ith +estern Europe as'ell as their integration 'ill have to be taken to a ne' and higher level.

;or their helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter ('ould like to thank "alerie !unce, Timoth !rnes, arc Ellingstad, PMter )edeon, Elena(ankova, and Andrei arkovits.

* Timoth )arton Ash, %4oes -entral Europe E1ist0% in )eorge chQpflin and Danc +oods,eds., (n earch of -entral Europe 9 London Polit Press, *7C7:, p. *7*.

/ +alter <ussell ead, %The nce and ;uture <eich,% +orld Polic Journal B 9 *778: @85.ee also James Kurth, %)erman and the <eemergence of itteleuropa,% -urrent #istor 7=,>7> 9 Dovember *77>:5C*&C@, and %2nited )erman in Eastern Europe The De' EasternRuestion,% Problems of Post&-ommunism =/, * 9 Januar&;ebruar *77>: >*&>>.

5 Elizabeth Pond and 4avid choenbaum, The )erman Ruestion and ther )erman Ruestions9 De' 6ork t. artin$s, *77@:.

= ichael KumpfmNller, %KQnigsberg und andere Kleinigkeiten,% 4ie eit 9 C April *77=: *5.

> Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Po'er )erman in Europe 9 (thaca -ornell 2niversitPress, *77B:.

@ (bid.

B According to Timoth )arton Ash, ;rench geographers determined a place north of "ilniusto be the center of Europe. (t is marked b a black granite slab engraved 'ith the longitude9/>S *7$: and latitude 9>=S >=$: and the 'ords Europos centras. As Ash reports, %( stand on it'ith 'hat eighteenth&centur travelers used to call sublime emotion, and nearl fall off. (t$sslipper out there, on the center of Europe.% Timoth )arton Ash, %Journe to the Post&

-ommunist East,% The De' 6ork <evie' of !ooks 9 /5 June *77=: *C.

C Andrei . arkovits and imon <eich, The )erman Predicament emor and Po'er in theDe' Europe 9 (thaca -ornell 2niversit Press, *77B:.

*8 (mportant contributions to that debate are translated and interpreted in chQpflin and+ood, (n earch of -entral Europe.












** ;or an application of a similar analtical perspective to Europe and Asia, see Peter J.Katzenstein, %(ntroduction Asian <egionalism in -omparative Perspective,% in Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi hiraishi, eds., Det'ork Po'er Japan and Asia 9 (thaca -ornell2niversit Press, *77B:, pp. B&*/.

7 %)renze ohne chatten,% 4er piegel=* *77@ *5=&@5, and =/ *77@ *=/&@5.

*/ (ver !. Deumann, %<ussia as -entral Europe$s -onstituting ther,% East European Politicsand ocieties B, / 9 pring *775: 5=7&@7, and Deumann, <ussia and the (dea of Europe9 London <outledge, *77@:. ee also atthias immer, %<eturn of the ittellage0 The4iscourse of the -entre in )erman ;oreign Polic,% )erman Politics @, * 9 April *77B: /5&5C.

*5 amuel P. #untington, %The -lash of -ivilizations0% ;oreign Affairs B/, 5 9ummer *775://&=7.

*= Peter )lotz, %4eutsch&bQhmische Kleinigkeiten oder Abgerissene )edanken Nberitteleuropa%,% 4ie Deue )esellschaft;rankfurter #efte 55 9 *7C@: >C=&C>.

*> The Polish data are comparable. A parliamentar debate in ;ebruar *77> revealed that

>@ percent of all national publications and >8 percent of all regional ones, 'ith about B8percent of the total print run in both instances, 'ere foreigno'ned. The Passauer Deue Pressehas ac3uired almost a monopol position in the regional press of the -zech <epublic and isalso ver prominent in Poland. +odek Anio, personal communication, *5 June *77>.

*@ Andrei . arkovits and -aroln #Qfig, %)erman as a !ridge )erman ;oreign -ulturalPolic in a -hanging Europe,% paper presented as part of the seminar series of the American(nstitute for -ontemporar )erman tudies on %)erman$s <ole in haping the De' EuropeArchitect, odel, !ridge,% +ashington 4.-., 7 Januar *77@, pp. 5>&=@. ee also arkovitsand <eich, The )erman Predicament, pp. *C5&/8/, 'hich are Fointl authored 'ith #Qfig.

*B ( gathered the information on the )oethe (nstitute$s approach in intervie's conducted in+arsa', !udapest, and Prague bet'een *77/ and *77=. The e1perience of the -enter forAdvanced tud is reported in +olf Lepenies, %+ie stUrkt man lokale +issenskulturen0 4rei

;allbeispiele aus !udapest, +arschau und !ukarest,% paper prepared for a meeting of the'orking group %+issenschaften und +iedervereinigung,% !erlin&!randenburgische Akademieder +issenschaften, !erlin, >&@ ctober *77>.

*C chQpflin and +oods, (n earch of -entral Europe. Peter tirk, ed., itteleuropa #istorand Prospects 9 Edinburgh Edinburgh 2niversit Press, *77=:. #enr -ord eer ,itteleuropa in )erman Thought and Action *C*>&*7=> 9 The #ague . DiFhoff, *7>>:.

*7 Ash, %Post&-ommunist East,% p. *@.

/8 +erner -onze, stmitteleuropa 9 unich -.#. !eck, *77/:.

/* Karl +. 4eutsch, Dationalism and (ts Alternatives 9 De' 6ork Knopf, *7@7:, pp. 5B&@@.

// <ainer Eisfeld, %itteleuropa in #istorical and -ontemporar Perspective%,% )erman Politicsand ociet/C 9 pring *775: 57.

/5 Konrad #. Jarausch. %;rom econd to Third <eich The Problem of -ontinuit in )erman;oreign Polic,% -entral European #istor */, * 9 arch *7B7: @C&C/. Peter J. Katzensteinand Takashi hiraishi, %-onclusion <egions in +orld Politics. Japan and Asia&)erman inEurope,% in Katzenstein and hiraishi, Det'ork Po'er, pp. 5B>&BC.



/= "olker !erghahn, %)erman !ig !usiness and the Ruest for a European Economic Empire inthe T'entieth -entur,% in "olker !erghahn, <einhard Deebe, and Jeffre J. Anderson,)erman !ig !usiness and Europe in the T'entieth -entur 9 Providence, <.(. !ro'n2niversit, *775:, pp. *&5C.

/> Peter . <. tirk, %(deas of Economic (ntegration in (nter'ar itteleuropa,% in tirk,itteleuropa, pp. C@&***. Anthon cElligott, %<eforging itteleuropa in the -rucible of +arThe Economic (mpact of (ntegration under )erman #egemon,% ibid., pp. */7 & >C. <obertark paulding Jr., %)erman Trade Polic in Eastern Europe, *C78&*778 Preconditions forAppling (nternational Trade Leverage,% (nternational rganization =>, 5 9 ummer *77*:5=5&@C. (dem, sthandel and stpolitik )erman ;oreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europefrom !ismarck to Adenauer 9 Providence, <( !erghahn !ooks, *77B:.

/@ Peter J. Katzenstein, -orporatism and -hange Austria, 'itzerland and the Politics of(ndustr 9 (thaca -ornell 2niversit Press, *7C=:. Andreas !usch, %The Politics of Pricetabilit +h the )erman&peaking Dations are 4ifferent,% in ;rancis ). -astles , ed.,;amilies of Dations Patterns of Public Polic in +estern 4emocracies 9 Aldershot 4artmouth,*775:, pp. 5>&7*. Andrei . arkovits, %Austrian&)erman <elations in the De' EuropePredicaments of Political and Dational (dentit ;ormation,% )erman tudies <evie' *7, *9 ;ebruar *77@: 7*&***. arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, pp. *8*&8C.

/B Postsocialist Path'as Transforming Politics and Propert in East -entral Europe 9 De'6ork -ambridge 2niversit Press, forthcoming:. ;or a useful schematic description of centralEuropean privatization schemes, see also -atherine ann, tefanie Len'a, and 4erek 2tter,%Political and Economic -onse3uences of Alternative Privatization chemes,% 2niversit of-alifornia, -enter for )erman and European tudies, +orking Paper >.*= 9 June *775:.

/C Elena Atanassova (ankova, %The Transformative -orporatism of Eastern Europe,% paperpresented at the conference %The Politics of <egional <estructuring,% -ornell 2niversit, -enterfor (nternational tudies, *C&*7 ctober *77@, and %ocial Partnership after the -old +ar TheTransformative -orporatism of Eastern Europe,% Ph.4. dissertation, chool for (ndustrial andLabor <elations, -ornell 2niversit, *77B.

/7 (ankova, %Transformative -orporatism,% pp. @&*=.

58 Peter J. Katzenstein, mall tates in +orld arkets (ndustrial Polic in Europe 9 (thaca-ornell 2niversit Press, *7C>:. Katzenstein, -orporatism and -hange.

5* Peter J. Katzenstein, 4isFoined Partners Austria and )erman since *C*> 9 !erkele2niversit of -alifornia Press, *7B@:, pp. *@5&*B@.

5/ Katzenstein, mall tates in +orld arkets.

55 #ans&)eorg !etz, %-ontinuit and -hange in Austria, 'itzerland and )erman,%unpublished paper, Paul #. Ditze chool of Advanced (nternational tudies, Johns #opkins2niversit, n.d.

5= Peter J. Katzenstein, Polic and Politics in +est )erman The )ro'th of a emisovereigntate 9 Philadelphia Temple 2niversit Press, *7CB:.

5> cott )issendanner, %4ie dritte <epublik or the ame ld ;ederal <epublic0 +hat the)erman ocial cience Literature has to a about )erman 2nification and (ts stemicEffects,% a1&Planck ociet, Arbeitsgruppe Transformationsprozesse in den neuen!undeslUndern, #umboldt 2niversit, !erlin, eptember *77@. Klaus von !eme, %The ;ailureof a uccess tor )erman <eunification in Light of Polic Evaluation,% -enter for )erman andEuropean tudies, )eorgeto'n 2niversit, ctober *77=.



5@ Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., (ndustr and Politics in +est )erman To'ard the Third<epublic 9 (thaca -ornell 2niversit Press, *7C7:.

5B arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B/.

5C AndrHs (notai, %The Economic (mpact of )erman <eunification on -entral and Eastern

Europe,% A(-) eminar Paper * 9 June *77/:, pp. / & 5 and table *. ;or a variet of datacovering the ears *7C7 78&*77/75, see also <elations bet'een )erman and East -entralEurope until /888 Prospects and Polic ptions Proceedings of an (nternational -onference9 !udapest (nstitute for +orld Economics of the #ungarian Academ of ciences, *77=:, pp.@>&@B, C8&C=, 78&75, 7C&77. e also Patricia 4avis and Peter 4ombros'ki, %Appetite of the+olf )erman ;oreign Assistance for -entral and Eastern Europe,% )erman Politics @, * 9 April*77B: *&//.

57 Klaus&4ieter chmidt and Petra DauFoks, %+estern Enterprises on Eastern arkets The)erman Perspective,% Kiel +orking Paper Do. @8B 9 Kiel Kiel (nstitute of +orld Economics,4ecember *775:, pp. *8&**.

=8 4ie eit 5* 9 /@ Jul *77@: *C. arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B=. arcEllingstad, %)erman 4omination in -entral Europe <oom for Potential -oncern,% JATE

ociolog 4epartment, zeged, #ungar, p. >.

=* Trade among the central European economies has declined in all four countries after *7C7and remains ver limited, despite the political efforts of organizing a free trade area. nl thetrade bet'een the -zech <epublic and lovakia is an e1ception? it is almost t'ice as large asthe total trade in the rest of the region.

=/ arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *B@. Ellingstad, %)erman 4omination,% p. >.

=5 arkovits and <eich, )erman Predicament, p. *BB.

== AnFana hrivastava, %maller ;irms Lead )erman Push to East,% The +all treet Journal9 *= June *77>: A*>.

=> %Dur 'enige fliehen,% 4er piegel @ *77> 7=&7>. chmidt and DauFoks, %+esternEnterprises on Eastern arkets,% p. *5.

=@ <einhard +olf, %The 4oubtful over )erman and DAT E1pansion,% in 4avid #aglund,ed., +ill DAT )o East0 The 4ebate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance 9forthcoming?currentl, unpublished paper, 2niversit of #alle, ;ebruar *77@:, p. =, footnote 5. arkovitsand <eich, )erman Predicament, pp. *BB, *C8.

=B Jeremiah <iemer, %+est )erman and the Transition in Eastern Europe,% paper preparedfor the Annual eeting of the American Political cience Association, an ;rancisco,eptember *778, p. /8. ee also, Peter J. Katzenstein, %The maller European tates,)erman, and Europe,% in Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Po'er, chapter C, pp. /8&// 9manuscript:.

=C <onald #. Linden, %The De' (nternational Political Econom of East Europe,% tudies in-omparative -ommunism />, * 9 arch *77/: B.

=7 ark . Delson, %T'o tles of !usiness "ie in East Europe Americans, )ermans have aotive in Tring to old La's,% The +all treet Journal 9 5 April *77>: A*8. Delson reportsan implausibl high figure of >.@C billion



>8 The Polish zlot has since a *77> fluctuated 'ithin a band of VB percent against abasket of five currencies 9=> percent dollar? 5> percent 4? /8 percent other:. The #ungarianforint has been on a cra'ling peg since *77> 'ith a band of V/./> percent around a 'eightedcurrenc basket 9B8 percent E-2 and 58 percent dollar:. ;or the -zech koruna the band isVB.> percent and the trade 'eights are @> percent E-2 and 5> percent dollar. +ith identicaltrade 'eights, for the lovak koruna the band is onl V5 percent.

>* Delson, %T'o tles of !usiness "ie in East Europe.% Delson mentions an unrealisticallhigh figure of four billion dollars 'hich the 2nited tates supposedl spent bet'een *775 and*77>.

>/ <aimo "Urnen, %Post&#egemonic and Post&ocialist <egionalism A -omparison of -entralEurope and East Asia,% paper prepared for the (A&JA(< Joint -onvention in akuhari, Japan,/8&// eptember *77@, p. /*.

>5 Joseph . )rieco, %"ariation in <egional Economic (nstitutions in +estern Europe, EastAsia and the Americas agnitude and ources% 9 4uke 2niversit, Political cience4epartment, *77=:, pp. /8&/=, 58&5@, and tables /, 5, B&7. Alan iaroff , %(nterdependenceversus Asmmetr0 A -omparison of the European and Asia&Pacific Economic <egions,% paperpresented at the (A&+est eetings, eattle, *=&*> ctober *77=.

>= Ale1is )alinos, %-entral Europe and the E2 Prospects for -loser (ntegration,% <;E<L<esearch <eport 5, /7 9 // Jul *77=: /*. ee also AndrHs (notai, %-entral and EasternEurope,% in -. <andall #enning, Eduard #ochreiter, and )ar -lde #ufbauer , eds., <evivingthe European 2nion 9 +ashington 4.-. (nstitute for (nternational Economics, April *77=:, pp.*57&@=, and !arr P. !os'orth and )ur fer , <eforming Planned Economies in an (ntegrating+orld Econom 9 +ashington 4.-. The !rookings (nstitution, *77>:, pp. **7&=@. John Pinder,The European -ommunit and Eastern Europe 9 De' 6ork -ouncil of ;oreign <elations Press,*77*:.

>> Ellingstad, %)erman 4omination in -entral Europe,% p. =.

>@ Thomas A. !alis, The +est and Eastern Europe Economic tatecraft and Political -hange

9 +estport, -onn. Praeger, *77=:. +olfgang #. <einicke, !uilding a De' Europe The-hallenge of stem Transformation and stemic <eform 9 +ashington 4.-. !rookings(nstitution, *77/:. %After -ommunism +hat0% 4$dalus */5, 5 9 ummer *77=:.

>B Linden, %De' (nternational Political Econom,% p. B.

>C )alinos, %-entral Europe and the E2,% pp. /8&/*.

>7 AndrHs (notai estimates that the total transfer of E2 funds to the central Europeaneconomies 'ould amount to about si1t to 78 percent 9or ten to si1teen billion E-2: of thecurrent subsidies paid to the southern European states. The longer the dela before thecentral European states become full&fledged members, the smaller the needed transferpaments. ee his paper, %;rom the Association Agreements to ;ull embership0 The

4namics of <elations bet'een the -entral and Eastern European -ountries and the European2nion,% paper presented at the ;ourth !iennial (nternational -onference of European-ommunit tudies Association, **&*= a *77>, -harleston, outh -arolina, p. *5.

@8 -hristian 4eubner, #einz Kramer, Elke Thiel, %4ie Er'eiterung der EuropUischen 2nionnach ittel& und steuropa,% +P&AP /C*C 9tiftung +issenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen,Dovember *775:, p. /=.

@* Allen ens, The ecurit of mall tates in Post&-old +ar Europe A De' <esearchAgenda0, +orking Paper Do. *, 2niversit of !ritish -olumbia, (nstitute of (nternational



<elations, Januar *77=. ee also the debate bet'een -harles A. Kupchan and -lifford A.Kupchan, %-oncerts, -ollective ecurit, and the ;uture of Europe,% (nternational ecurit *@,* 9 ummer *77*: **=&@*, and <ichard K. !etts, %stems for Peace or -auses of +ar0%(nternational ecurit *B, * 9 ummer *77/: >=5.

@/ Lecture delivered b artin Palous, former foreign minister of -zechoslovakia, %ecurit(ssues in Eastern and -entral Europe,% -ornell 2niversit, (nstitute for European tudies, *CApril *77=.

@5 Thomas . zana and E tephen Larrabee, East European ilitar <eform after the -old+ar (mplications for the 2nited tates 9 anta onica <AD4, Dational 4efense <esearch(nstitute, *77>:. -onversion of the ilitar Production -omparative Approach 9 !ratislava?;riedrich&Ebert ;oundation, *775:. zemlMr, <elations bet'een )erman and East -entralEurope, pp. B&>5. oltan !aran, %The ilitar and Political Transitions in Eastern Europe,%unpublished manuscript, 4epartment of )overnment, 2niversit of Te1as at Austin, n.d.

@= Though less vocal, the 2krainian government also fears being left out of an emergingEuropean securit architecture and thus having to cope 'ith <ussia on its o'n.

@> +olf, %The 4oubtful over.%

@@ ee also )rzegorz Ekiert, %The <eturn of the )erman inorit to Poland,% )erman Politicsand ociet /@ 9 ummer *77/: 78&*8C.

@B ;rankfurter Allgemeine eitung 9 *8 April *77@: *.

@C -raig <. +hitne, %)ermans and -zechs Tr to #eal #atreds of the Dazi Era,% The De'6ork Times 9 // Januar *77B: A5.

@7 arkovits and <eich, The )erman Predicament, pp. *87&*7. Petr Prἰhoda, %+enn dieErinnerung die ukunft blockiert,% 4ie eit 9 *8 a *77@: C.

B8 #enr -ord eer, %Daumann and <athenau Their Paths to the +eimar <epublic,% inLeonard Krieger and ;ritz tern, eds., The <esponsibilit of Po'er #istorical Essas in #onorof #aFo #olborn 9 )arden -it 4oubleda, *7@B:, pp. 58/, 58@.

B* ichael )eer and Konrad #. Jarausch, %The ;uture of the )erman Past Transatlantic<eflections for the *778s,% -entral European #istor //, 5= 9 eptember 4ecember *7C7://7&>7. ;or an earl attempt that seeks to place )erman 3uestions in a ne' light after *7C7,see Pond and choenbaum, The $)erman Ruestion$ and other )erman Ruestions.

B/ eer, %Daumann and <athenau,% pp. 58=&>.

B5 4avid -alleo, The )erman Problem <econsidered )erman and the +orld rder, *CB8 tothe Present 9 -ambridge -ambridge 2niversit Press, *7BC:.

germany and mitteleuropa by katzenstein

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