GERMAN NAVYHANDBOOK

1939-1945

SUTTON I' BLiSHING

First published in 1999 bySUllon Publishing Limited· Phoenix MillThrupp . Stroud· Gloucestershire . GL5 2BU

This paperback edition first published in 2002

Copyright © Jak P. Mallmann Showell, 1999

All dghlS reserycd. No pan of this publication may be reproduced, slored in a retrieval system,or transrnilled, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordingor olherwise, witholillhe prior permission of the publisher and copyright holder.

Jak P. Mallmann Showell has asserted the moral righlLO be identified as the author of this

work.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 7509 3205 8

Typeset in I0/13pt Baskerville.Typescuing and origination bySulton Publishing Limited.Prillled in Great Britain by].H. Haynes & Co. Ltd, Sparkford.

CONTENTS

Acknow/.edgementsChronology

After the First World War - New BeginningsTreaties, Agreements, Ultimatums and PlansThe Organisation of the Kriegsmarine, November 1938Operation OrdersThe Fleet Command and Large Surface Ships at WarIncidents and OperationsThe FleetWhat the Names MeanU-boatsMidget WeaponsThe Naval Air ArmNaval WeaponryDisguise, Camouflage and Colour SchemesNaval Terra FirmaThe Supreme Naval CommandRanks and InsigniaUniforms

Appendix: MapsGlossaryBibliographyIndex

11\

IV

v

I101920254451

139141161171180189195219226237

253256263270

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CHRONOLOGY

process of scuttling them had started. TheBritish fleet was at sea. but a few tugs andpickel boats managed to LOw some ships intoshallow waters before the majority of themsank.28 June. Germany agreed to the ultimatumfrom the Allies and signed the Diktat ofVersailles, although ha,;ng to pay such heavywaf reparations meant there would be stillmorc famine throughout Gennany.19207 April. A french army of occupationmarched into the industrial heartland ofGermany because waf reparations had sloweddown. Much of what was being produced inGermany had lO be handed over to the Allies,and the workers, suffering from severeshortages of food and other essentials,couldn't see the point of working as slaves forforeigners.8 August. foundation ofule National Socialists'Workers Party (Nalional.sozialislische DeutscheArbeiter Partei- NSDAP). At ulis time socialisLSwere nicknamed 'Sozis' hence the new parrybecame 'Nazis'.30 Augusl. Admiral Paul Behncke becameSupreme Commander-in-ehief of the Navy.1921I Jalluary. The Imperial Navy (KaiserlicluMarine) was renamed Reichsmarine.II April. The new flag of the Reichsmarinewas hoisted for the first time.21 Jul)'. Senior officers of the nited StatesNavy were shocked when in a demonstrationthe ex-German ballieship Ostfriesland wassunk b)' ix bombs dropped from aircrafl. Sofar the navies of the world had maintainedthat battleships could onl)' be sunk by heavy

1870France declared war on Pnlssia, the largest ofthe German-speaking kingdoms, hoping theCatholic south would help suppress theProtestants in the North.1871The German-speaking countries unitedunder the King of Prussia and defeatedFrance. The German nation was founded inthe palace at Versailles and the King ofPrussia became emperor. The Imperial Navywas founded.

1914Qlllbreak of the First World War.191811 November. The firsl World War ended withGermany's defeat and the abdication of theEmperor (Kaiser). The guns officially fellsilent at 1100 hr on ule 11th day of the 11thmonul. The Kaiser had left Germany ule daybefore.2 J November. The remains of the Germanfleet surrendered.

1919/2 January', A communist uprising in Berlinwas cnlshed.9 Februar)\ The first non-sLop air servicebetween London and Paris came inLO being.

Civil flying was still prohibited, so onlymilitary pa sengers could be carried. flyingtime was three and a half hours.31 Maldl. Admiral Adolf "on Trotha becamethe Supreme Commander-in-Chief of theNavy.21 June. Seventy ships of the German fleetinterned at Scapa Flow in the Orknc}'s andwith only skeleton crews on board hoistedtheir war ensigns as an indication that the

The Gennan naval ensign nuuering in a light

breeze. The Gennans used the Beaufort scale,

invented by the English admiral who died in 1857,

for measuring wind strength. The nag would

suggest that this is a force 2 or 3.

Albert Nitzschke and the DeuLScherMarinebund; Military History Deparunent ofthe National Defence College in Tokyo; IanMillar; Hennann and Elsa PalZke; Paul Preuss;Ray Priddey; Admiral Bernhard Rogge;Richard Russon (United States Coast GuardAuxiliary of florida); the Walter SchoppeCollection in U-Boot-ARCHIV, Cuxhaven;Franz Selinger; Knul Sh"crtsen and theTrondheim Defence Museum; Roger Suiters;Heinz Tischer from Tho~; Irm)' \·Vcnnekerwhose husband was captain of Deutschland andlalcr naval 3tlache in Tokyo; Gordon

Williamson and Dave Wooley.

IIIII I

I

If this book needs a dedication, then let itremember those historians who ha\'csearched for the truth and the people whohave helped by prO\;ding infonnation. Sadly,a good number of these charaClcrs are nolonger around to enrich Ollr li,'c .

This projcCl has been ongoing for overthirty years and it would be difficult to list allthe people who ha,'e helped. Therefore Ithank everybody and hope that this book willdo their efforts justice.

The follO\,;ng have been especially helpfuland I am grateful for their assistance in

supplying help, materials, information orphotographs: Professor Heinfried Ahl ofKonnoran; Ivar Berntsen; Heinrich B6hm and

Maria;Jan Bas; Horst Breda\\' and the German

U-boat Archive in Cuxhaven; Professor GusBrillon, MBE; the staff of the Military Sectionin the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg; Cdr RichardCompton-Hall, MBE, RN (Retd), and theRo)ral Navy Submarine Museum; Trevor Cox;Kpl.z.S. Hans Dehnert; Kurt Fritz Dennin;Ralph Erskine; Ursula Kahler von friedebllrg;'Jumbo' Gerke; Cpt Quo Giese who sen'edaboard Columbus, Anneli£se EsslJew'r"and se"eralU-boats; Hans Karl Hemmer of Pinguin,Adjutanl and Komel; Wolfgang Hirschfeld;Peter Huckstepp from New Zealand; GeoffJones; friedrich Kiemle of Koln; Dr JoachimKindler of Widd,,; fritz Kohl; Kpl.z.S. Quoand Dr Erika Kohler; David Lees of theGerman Naval Imerest Group of the WorldShip Society; Ke,;n Mathews; Dr Ulrich Mohrof Atlantis; Heinrich Mueller; Eva 'Ieiselwhose husband was captain of Admiral Hip/Je1;Gerd I eubacher; Axel Niesue; fregkpl. Karl­Heinz Nitschke and his wife lise; Fregkpt.

IV v

CHRONOLOCY CIIRONOLOGY

A minesweeper noulla alsea. The photograph was taken from Mil).

This shows the second naval ensign after the end ofthe Firsl World War. The stripes were black, while and

red at the bottom. Earlier flags also had a small black, red and gold sU"iped jack in the LOp left hand comer.

26 AIJril. General Paul \'on Hindenburg(1847-1934) who defeated the Russians atTannenberg in 1914 and later became theSupreme Commander-in-Chief of the GeneralArmy Staff. was elected as President ofGennany. He wanted to restore the Germanmonarchy. The large number of ,'otes fromwomen had been crucial in his success. InBI;tain women \,'ere still not allowed to '"ate.April. Admiral Konrad ~\'Iommsen wasappointed to the position of FleetCommander. Such a post had not existedsince the end of the First World War. Thesun'ey ship i\le/eor, under the command ofFregkpt. Fritz Spiess, left for the famousAtlantic Expedition. She surveyed the

outh Atlantic and did nOt return untilMay 1927.

1924jlln tlO f)'. The light cruiser Berlin. undercommand of Paul ""iilling ,'on Dillen, leftKiel for a two month tour to the Azores,Canaries, Madeira and Spain. Apart fromcruises to countries around the Baltic, thiswas the first postwar cadet u-aining cnlise.October. Admiral Hans Zenker succeeded PaulBehncke as upreme Gommander-in-Chief ofthe avy.A squadron of battleships ,'isited Spain andBerlin embarked on her second cruise toforeign waters.19257 January. The light cruiser Emden, the firstmajor warship built in Genl'1any after the First""arId "Varj was launched in Wilhelmshaven.27 February. The 'SDAP was refounded.

Reichsmarine - was hoisted for the first timeby naval units.192322 June. The German economy and itscurrency collapsed when the Mark had beendevalued to the rate of more than 600,000Marks to the British Pound. Passive resistancehad further slowed industrial and agriculturaloutput because the workers were living inpoverty while the results of their labours hadto be paid as war reparations. Britain and theUnited States were also suffering fromindustrial unrest wiLh widespread poverty andunemployment.8-9 November. The SDAP attempted tooverthrow the Bavarian government by force.23 November. The NSDAP was banned.

anillcl-y. This success against a substantialtarget brought about new naval thinking.3 August. The SDAP founded its ownprivate army, the Slunn Abteilungor SA, whichwas also known as the Brownshins.13 December. The Washington Treaty wassigned.31 D«ember. The ensign of the Imperial avywa officially lowered for the last time bynaval units. However, it was hoisted again on31 May of each year in remembrance of themen who had died during the First WorldWar.1922The black, white and red flag with a largeiron cross in the middle and a small black,red and gold jack inset - the ensign of the

yi '01

CHRONOLOGY CHRONOLOGY

The liglll cr-uiser Karlsl'ldleOn a pre-war training cruise for officer cadets. The ship aroused a greal deal of

illleresl wherevCI" il called as can be seen here by the numerous cars and the crowds on lhe qua)'. The flag

flying on lhe bO\,'s is lhe naval ensign of lhe old \\'eimar Republic.

August. The light cruiser Hamburg, underFregkpL Groos, left Wilhelmshaven for thefirst German postwar naval circumnavigationofLhe Eanh.September. The light cruiser Berlin, underKpl.z.S. ErnstJunkermann. embarked upon amore ambitious cadet training voyage aroundSouth America.9 November. The SchUlz Stoffel or SS wasfounded by the NSDAP.19265 A1ta)1. Beginning of the First General Strikein BI-itain.

14 November. The new light cruiser Emden,under KpLZ.S. Richard Foerster, left for aworld LOur for cadet training.1927December. The light cruiser Berlin, underKpLZ.S. Carl Kolbe, left for a training cruiseto the Far East and Australia.192829 Nlarch. ""omen in Britain were given thevote.1 October. Admiral Erich Raeder becameCommander-ill-Chief of the '£Ivy. Majornaval administrative reshufnes andreorganisation usually LOok place in Octoberand coincided with the publication of a newRnngliste (Rank list).December. The light cruiser Emden departedfor a world cruise under the command ofLothar von Arnauld de la Penere, a holder ofthe POlt1·/e Merite from the First World War.192913 May. The light cruiser Emden returnedfrom a training cruise to the West Indies andthe entire contingent of cadets stepped overto the newly commissioned cnliser Karlsruhe,

under Kpt.z.S. Eugen Lindau, for ashakedown cruise through the Mediterraneanand around Southern Africa.1930The NSDAP increased their seats In thegovernment from 12 to 107, making themthe second largest party after the Socialists -

\~ii

whence Germany was dominated by Sozisand Nazis.December. The light cruiser Emden sailed toAfrica and the Far East under command ofFregkpt. Robert 'Vitthoeft-Emden, who laterbecame naval attache in ""ashington. All themen who served aboard the legendary lightcruiser Emden duling the First ''''orld ""ar wereawarded that name as part of their surname byt.he Kaiser in recognition of their exu'dordinarysen~ce. This happened around t.he time of theabdication, when the Kaiser was no longer in aposition to bestow military awards.193119 May. Pocket battleship Deutschla.nd waslaunched.November. The light cruiser Karlsruhe, undercommand of Kpt.z.S. Erwin ""assner,embarked upon a cadet training cruise toSouth America and AJaska.193225 February. Adolf Hitler becarne a Germancitizen. He was born in Ausu·ia.Ma1'ch and April. President Hindenburgdefeated Hitler in two stages of what becametight-run presidential elections. At firstHindenburg dismissed Hitler as 'a Bavariancorporal', but during the humiliating secondelections between the two, Hiller's vote wasincreased by almost 40 per cent, making hima powerful force in German politics.30 October. Battles were fought in Londonbetween the police and unemployed hungermarchers demanding a beuer deal for thestarving poor.6 November. The NSDAP lost thirty-four seatsin the governmental elections. Shortly beforethis Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler aschancellor.1933

Jmuw'r)l. The German embassies in""ashington, London and Paris openedoffices for naval attaches. This is the first timesince before the First ""orld ''''ar that therehad been such positions.

30 Jan'llw)l. Hindenburg appoinled Hitler aschancellor.5 iV/arch. The last multi-party governmentalelections. The NSDAP gained abouL 40 percent of the votes.14 March. The black, red and gold striped

jack inset in the naval flag was removed byorder of the Reich's president, Paul vonHindenburg.1 April. Jewish shops were boycotted by theNSDAP.2 i\lla)l. TI'dde unions were banned by the NSDAP.19343 June. Pocket battleship Admiral CrafSpee waslaunched.24 October. The National Labour Front wasintroduced by the NSDAP.

IX

193516 March. Hitler repudiated the Diktat ofVersailles and re-introduced nationalconscription.21 /Vla)l. The Reichsmarine was renamedKriegs11lwlne.18June. The German-Anglo Naval Agreementwas signed.29June. Vi, the first new submarine since theFirst ""orld ""ar, was commissioned.27 September. Karl Donitz was appointedChief of the first U-boat Flotilla, named afterthe Firsl '''Torld "Var commander QuoWeddigen.7 November. The new naval ensign withswastika was officially hoisted for the firsttime.

CHRONOLOGY

Cross of the Second World War, its highestmilitary decoration for bravery, toCpt Bernard Warburton-Lee of the destroyerHMSHardy.

10 June. Italy declared war on France andBritain. The last remnants of British forces inNonvay were withdrawn.17June. The first U-boats refuelled in FrenchAtlan tic ports.22 fune. An armistice was signed by Frenchand German leaders in the same railwaycarriage in Compiegne where the Armisticehad been signed ending the First World War.27 June. The British government announceda blockade of the European continent.30 June. A German aircraft landed nearSt Peter Port to mark the beginning of theGerman occupation of the Channel Islands.17 August. Germany announced a totalblockade of the British Isles and allowedV-boalS to conduct unrestricted sea \varfare,where tlley could sink ships without warning.24 August. Battleship Bismarck was comm­issioned.30 August. Plans for an invasion of GreatBlitain were postponed.31 August. The War Badge for Minesweepers,

\~'\-~~:-~I.' ~ )'.,~,- ( i

'.l. ~ ;.'.\i, , \. \ "

I ,.

l~--J "-'~~

The naval ensign drawn by the author's father

aboard UJ77.

CHRONOLOGY

1 September. German troops reoccupiedterritories which had been taken away fromGermany after the First World War tobecome the Polish Republic.3 September. Britain sent an ultimatum toGermany saying that a state of war wouldexist between the two countries unless troopswere withdrawn from Poland. SubsequentlyBritain and France declared war.13 September. The U-boat War Badge wasre-introduced with a modern design incor­porating a swastika instead of the imperialcrown. U47 penetrated into the Britishanchorage at Scapa Flow and torpedoed thebattleship Royal Oak.17 September. The Russians invaded theeastern regions of Poland, but Britain did notseem to objectLO the Russian attack.23 November. The auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi

was sunk by Schamhorst.13-17 December. The Battle of the RiverPlate and the scuttling of pocket battleshipAdmiral OrafSpee.

194031 J\!1.arch. The first auxiliary cruiser, Atlantis,under Kpt.z.S. Bernhard Rogge, left Germanwaters for what was to become the longestcruise (622 days) of the Second World War.6 April. The second auxiliary cruiser, Orion,

under Kpt.z.S. Kurt Weyher, left Germanwaters.9 April. Germany invaded Denmark andNorway. The heavy cruiser Bliicherwas sunk inOslo Fjord.10 ApriL The light cruiser Kjjnigsbergwas sunkby bombs in Bergen harbour (Nonvay).10 May. Germany invaded Holland, Belgium,Luxembourg and France.15 May. Dutch forces capitulated.27 May-4 June. The British ExpeditionaryForce on the continent was evacuated fromthe beaches at Dunkirk.4 June. The War Badge for Destroyers wasintroduced.7 June. Britain awarded the first Victoria

21 May. Battleship Gneisenau was launched.22 August. The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was

launched.September. The 'z..Plan' was formulated.29 September. The Munich Agreement wassigned. The British prime minister returnedhome waving a piece of paper and saying,'Peace in our Time'.8 December. The aircraft carrier Oraf Zeppelin

was launched.193927 January. Hitler officially approved the'Z-Plan'.9 February. The British government preparedfor war by distributing bomb shelters topeople living in likely target areas.14 February'. Battleship Bismarck was launched.J5 March. German troops marched intoBohemia and Moravia (both districls ofCzechoslovakia) .1 April. Battleship Tirpitz was launchedand the head of the Navy, Erich Raeder,was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet(Grand Admiral), a position which hadnot existed since the end of the FirstWorld War.28 April. Hitler renounced the Anglo-German

Naval Agreement.22 May. A military agreement for mutualsupport was signed between Germany andItaly.18 August. The German Naval HighCommand ordered the emergency WarProgramme to come into force.19 August. The first U-boats left Germanpons to take up waiting positions in theNorth Atlantic.21 August. Pocket battleship Oraf Spee leftGermany to take up a waiting position in theSouth Atlantic.22 August. A non-aggression pact was signedby Germany and the Soviet Union.24 August. Pocket battleship Deutschland leftGermany to take up a waiting position in theNorth Atlantic.

IMorl1n,dto lO.'o""",r 19n.

.De:- ~'IlSU "brl.rube- bat _ }I).lov••be

I9}1 ,.In• •~UO'OnaUI. leh. in d.•• Alleland. aUlltrehn.

•• 11•••• 1 ~nhn • .,••Undhll, ••• tlrtUh ."on lori-lind

!UdaMr1U, O,n'tl.n, von SUd_ IUld :Il'or4...r1.b. S~nten.

:D-r ••1obsp:r"1dent.

ht.l.

DID II1.. p1-.n thllt der Chet der 1u'1_1t1tWll all!.

19367 March. The Rhineland, which had beendemilitarised by the Versailles Diktat, was re­occupied by German forces.30 May. The first phase of the NavalMemorial at Laboe near Kiel was officiallyopened and Hitler laid the first wreath in theHall of Commemoration.18July. The Spanish Civil War began.3 October. Battleship Schamlwrst was launched.19376 February. The heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper

was launched.8June. The heavy cruiser Bliicherwas launched.

19384 February. Hitler appointed himself SupremeCommander-in-Chief of all Germany's armedforces and servicemen swore an oath ofallegiance to him personally.13 March. Austria ,vas made part of Germany.28 March. The Spanish Civil War ended.

The official written order from Reichspresident

Paul von Hindenburg, authorising a twelve-month­

long vOYdge along America's west coast.

x xi

CHIlONOLOGY

\

CI11l0NOLOGY

4 November. End of the Battle of EI Alameinand the beginning of tl1e German retreat inNortl1 Africa.194314 january. The Allied leaders met for theCasablanca Conference.january'. Hitler made his famous proposal toscrap the surface neet.30 janllar)'. Grand Admiral Erich Raederresigned. He was succeeded by Karl Donill asSupreme Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.2 February. Field Marshal Friedrich Paulussurrendered, marking the end of the Battlefor Stalingrad which had lasted since aRussian counter-attack on 19 November1942. Thi German defeat is often taken asthe turning point of the war.iWlITCh. The sixth consecutive montl'} in whichGermany had over a hundred U-boats in theNorth Atlantic, but thus far it had not cometo a large-scale convoy battle.16-19 March. U-boat attacked a mass ofmerchant ships just after the fast convoyHX229 of 40 ships caught up with 54 ships ofthe slower SC122, making this the biggestconvoy battle of the war.23 MOIrh--8 Ap,;L Convoy HX231 succeeded incrossing from Canada \\;thoutloss after tllI'OI\mgofT every attacking U-boa~ although ti,e 'Air Gap'in tl,e Atlantic was still almostSOO kin wide.Ma)'. Over 40 -boats were lost which haprompted many historians to label this as theturning point of the U-boat war. However,Donitz ne"er recognised it as such and said itwas onl)' a temporary setback.25 jllly. The end of Mussolini's reign ofpower in Italy.3 September. Allied forces landed in Italy.8 September. Italy surrendered and changedsides to fight against Germany.22 September. British X-craft attackedbattleship Tirpitz in Non"ay.17 October. Miche~ the last operational auxiliarycnliser. was sunk by S Submaline Tarpon thusending cruiser warfare on the high seas.

29 November. Auxiliary cruiser Konnoran(Kpl.z.S. Theodor Detmers) was sunk on its350th day at sea, following a battle Witll theAustralian cruiser SJdtli!)l.30 November. Auxiliary cruiser Komel(Konteradmiral Robert Eyssen) arrived inHam burg after a \'oyage of 516 da)'S.7 December. Japanese forces attacked theUnited States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.JJ December. Germany declared war againstthe nited States ofAmerica.194214 january. Auxiliary cruiser Thor sails fromthe Gironde Estuary in France for her secondoperational voyage.12//3 Februar)'. The Channel Dash - whenSclwmhorsl, Gneisenau and Prinz, Eugen plus anescort of smaller ships. all under command ofthe Fleet Commander Admiral Otto Cilliax,dashed from France to Nortl1elll Europe.26/27 February. Gneisenau was put out ofaction as a result of bomb hits receivedduring a raid on )(jet13/14 March. Auxiliary cruiser Michelsuccessfully broke through the EnglishChannel for the start of her first voyage.2i Nlarch. A British commando raid onSt Nazaire (France) among other things putout of action the only dr), dock largeenough to accommodate the big Germanballieships.20 April. Motor Torpedo Boats were giventheir own autonomous command underKpu.S. Rudolf Petersen.9 Ma)'. Auxiliary cruiser Stier left Germany./2 Seplember. The Laconia Incident - whenU156 (KptiL Wemer Hartenstein) sank thepassenger liner and afterwards mounted are cue operation because it was discoveredthat there were Italian prisoners of war onboard. (Italy was fighting the war onGermany's side at this time.)27 September. Auxilia'I' cruiser Stier had to bescuttled following damage by the Americanauxiliary cruiser Stephen Hopkins.

24 April. The War Badge for AuxiliaryCruisers was introduced.30 April. The Fleet War Badge wasintroduced. Auxiliary cruiser Thor (Kpl.z.S.Otto Kahler) made fast in Hamburg after asuccessful myage lasting 329 da)'S.8 MaJ', Pinguin (Kpl.z.S. Ernst-Felix Krt'der),the auxiliary cruiser which had sunk orcaptured most shipping, was sunk by thecruiser HMS ConzwaJl.9 MaJ'. U110 (Kptll. Fritz:!ulius Lemp) wascaptured by British forces without GermanSllf\~\'ors having been aware that their boathad fallen into British hands. The bootyincluded an Engima code writer, set up withthe code of the day and a book \\1th details onhow to operate it during the next few weeks.

18 May. Battleship Bismarck and the heavycruiser Prinz Eugen left Gotenhafen.

24 May. The British battlecruiser Hood was

Slink by Bismarck.27 JWa)'. Bismarck was sunk following extensiveattacks by British forces.30 Ma)'. The Motor Torpedo Boat War Badgewas introduced.4 june. Emperor Wilhelm 1\ and ex-King ofPrussia died in Holland where he had beenliving since leaving Germany at the end ofthe First World War.22June. Germany invaded the Soviet Union.24 june. The War Badge for Naval Artillerywas inu·oduced.23 August. Auxiliary cruiser Orion (Kpl.z.S.Kurt ""eyer) arrived in French watersfollowing a successful \'o),age of 511 da)'S.28 August. U570 (Kptll. Hans Rahmlow)surrendered to an aircraft in mid-Atlantic.15 November. U459, the first purpose-builtsupply -boat, was commissioned by Korvkpl.Georg von \oVilamowitz-Mollendorf, one oftlle oldest submarine commanders.22 November. Auxiliary cruiser f\llanlis(Kpl.z.S. Bernhard Rogge) was scuttled after622 days at sea while under attack from theBritish cruiser Devonshire.

Security Forces and Submarine Hunters wasintroduced.August. Britain swapped bases for fift)' oldAmerican ships, many of them small warshipssuitable for cOl1voy escorts.16-20 October. The most successful U-boatgroup attack took place against convoys SC7

and HX79.194125 February. Battleship Tirpitz was

commissioned.17 Marr:h. U99 (Kptll. OltO Kretschmer) andUloo (Kptll. Joachim Schepke) were sunk bydestroyers after they had been detected byType 286 radar. This was the fir t sinkingwhere radar played a vital role.I April. The War Badge for BlockadeBreakers was introduced.

The stern of U53 or U52 with the naval ensign of

the Thi,-d Reich.

xii XIII

CHRONOLOGY

AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WARNEW BEGINNINGS

26 December. The Battle of North Cape andthe sinking of Scharnhorst by British forces.19445 ApriL British forces moullled a large-scaleattack against battleship Ti1f1itz in orwa)'.13 May. The Clasp for lhe RoH of Honour ofthe Gennan avy was instituted.15 May. The -boat Clasp was instituted.May. Schnorkels, enabling -boats to runtheir diesel engines withOUl surfacing. cameinto widespread use.6June. The Allied invasion of France at Nonnandy.11 June. U490, the last remaining supplyU-boat, was sunk.12June. U2321 (Type XXIlI) the first electro­submarine was commissioned.27 June. U2501 (Type XXI) the first largeelecLr<rsubmarine was commissioned.July. An experimental command was foundedunder Admiral Helmuth Heye to developnew midget craft./2 Nuvember. Tirpilz was sunk in Norway./3 November. The War Badge for MidgetWeapons was introduced in seven grades.194530 January. The passenger liner Wilhelm

xiv

Guslloffwas sunk in the Baltic. Over 5,000refugees were killed.10 February'. The passenger liner General vonSteuben was sunk, killing 2,700 people.13 February. Allied air forces attacked the Cityof Dresden, kiHing more than 130,000people. More civilians were killed during lhisone raid lhan during lhe entire bombing waragainst Britain. The atom bombs droppedlater on Japan also kiHed fewer people.16 ApriL The passenger liner Goya was sunk,killing over 6,000 refugees.30 April. Hitler committed suicide in hiscommand bunker in Berlin and GrandAdmiral Karl Dcmitz became Head of State.3 Ma)'. The passenger liner Cap Arkona wassunk, killing several lhousand people. Olherpassenger liners bombed around this timealso resulted in heavy loss ofHfe.4 May. At 1830 hrs the German delegationsigned lhe 1nstrumelll of Surrender at FieldMarshal Montgomery's headquarters south ofHamburg.5 May. At 0800 hrs cessation of all hostilitieson land, on sea and in the air by Germanforces came into effect.

The first Gemlan a\~', lhe so-called FederalFleet, was founded in 1848 and renamedRoyal Prussian Fleet in 1852. In 1867 itbecame The Fleet of the North GermanFederation. Four years later, shortly after theunification of the German States, EmperorWilhelm I changed this core into theImperial a"y (Kaiserliche Marine). After theFirst World War, the name was changed to

Reichsmarine and in 1935 it became theKriegsmarine. The Federal German avy(Bundesmarine) was founded in 1954 in thewest, while the eastern German DemocraticRepublic founded lhe Volksmarine in 1960.

During the Battle of Jutland in ti,e FirstWorld War, a British destroyer used thecover of darkness to launch two torpedoesagainst the battleship Pommern. Only the twoend sections remained afloat long enoughfor witnesses to gasp as the hean of amassive steel fortress disintegrated, lakingm'er 800 men to tlleir dealhs. PO>n1nern hadbeen laid down during lhe last days of 1905,when underwater warfare was still relegatedto the realms of science fiction andtorpedoes were novel curiosities. Yet, only adecade later, this last event in a chain ofcatastrophic losses made German sailorrealise that the horrors of new technologyhad arrived with a vengeance. ConsequenLlysimilarly vulnerable ships, without armouredprotection below the waterline, werebanished to secondary duties, such asserving as harbour defence batteries oraccommodation ships.

-

About two years later, in 1919, theVersailles Diktat demanded that theseantiquated potential disasters be broughtback for front line service to form thebackbone of Germany's postwar navy. Theincompetence displayed by the war-timemili13.ry command of all nationalities was nowtaken over by politicians. Turning theirhateful propaganda into shon sightedrevenge, ti,e Allies found the audacity to calltheir ultimatum for a peace 'a treaty', despitenegotiations having played no role in itscomposition. Many Germans called it . Veratof Versailles' meaning 'Treachery or Betrayal'instead of Vertrag (Treaty). This ill-eonceiveddocument was no more than a smokescreento cover their own shortcomings among thechaos which still surrounded lhem. Insteadof seriou Iy looking towards peace, thepoliticians not only unwittingly created avehicle for leading Europe into the nextlarge-scale war, but they also provided aladder for allowing lhe unscrupulOUS accessto Germany's power vacuum.

Allied leaders hardly had time to rest ontheir laurels, hoping the immense problemsin Europe would remain hidden under theirthin veneer of harsh jurisdiction, when theworld's auention focused on the Far East.A hive of activity in Japan saw lhe foundationof what could quickly become the mostpowerful navy in the Pacific. America wasmore than perturbed because the economicdepression prevented even a country asmighty as the United States from keeping

GERAI ANN AVY HAN 0 BOO K I 939 -1945 AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAil - NEW BEGINNINGS

,M /45 having been hauled up a slipway for routine maintenance. The photograph \,'as taken in Cuxhavcn

long before the war, showing the Sallftleben Ship}'ard which was later renamed Beckmann Ship}l<lrd.

pace with such an arms racc. The big powershad no alternative other than to 3uCmptsome persuasive intimidation to slow downthe Japanese expansion. This led the majormaritime nations to convene a conference,which concluded with the signing of the so­called Washington Treaty of 1922.

German naval aspirations. left rOlling inthe shallow waters of the continentallowlands. did nOl feature in Washington. YCl,

me agreement had a most pronounced affectupon the small navy struggling for survival inWilhelmshaven. The Washington Treatylimited battleships to 35,000 tons withl6-in guns and cruisers to ]0,000 lons with8-in guns. The vast area between these twotypes became a prohibited zone which could

2

only be encroached by aircraft carders. Theinteresting point, seemingly overlooked bythe politicians and their neet of navaladvisers. was thalthe Versailles Diktat allo\\·edGerman)' to build ballieships up to 10,000tons with II-in guns. This offered theReichsmarine an opportunity of creating a shipwhich would be too fast for the massive Alliedbattleships but powerful enough to blastevery \'Vashington Treaty cruiser out of thewater without even coming within range of itsguns. Thus. in an instant, Gerrnany acquiredthe linchpin for rolling her puny VersaillesDiktat nav)' illlo battle.

However, the building of new shipspresented problems of immense proportionsbecause much of the heavy production plants

had been dismantled. destroyed or takenabroad. This craze of stripping Germanindustl1' went as far as planning the removalof oak panelling in the main hall of the navalofficers' school. It resulted in the liquidationof the naval shipyard in Danzig, and facilitiesin Kiel being downgraded to meremaintenance operations. Only the oldimperial yard in \lVilhelrnshaven remainedunder full military control. but there thefacilities looked like a scrap merchant's depotwhich had had its stock stolen. Not only werethe yards empty and in a deplorablemechanical state, but ti,e skilled labour hadalso vanished, and this dilapidation stretchedfar into the industrial heartland, makingsupplies an unknown quantity. The first stepin the redevelopment plans had to be the re­establishment of industrial and commercialfacilities. Once this was under way, the lightcruiser Emden became the first ship to be laiddown in Wilhelmshaven as a test to seewhether the postwar system could stillproduce goods of the required quality.

This period of time saw some astonishinghappenings. many of which have beenburied under a cloak of misleadingconcepts. Visions of economic depression,mass unemployment, uncertainties withinGermany's leadership and miserable livingconditions have helped in derailinghisLOdans' thinking. The years immediatelyafter the First World ""ar witnessed some ofthe most astounding technical innovationsof the century. making the world recoilunder the pressure of new contrivances.This point cannot be overemphasised,because these years saw the beginning of aprocess in which world leaders should haveresponded to fantastic opportunities offeredb), new technology. Instead they led themasses down a slipper)' path of selfdestruction to incredible suffering, whereno-one, not even the winners, gained anybenefit.

3

To give just two examples of the enormouscontribution made by technology towards thebuilding of ships. Krupp, the steel giant,invented new types of steel. Known as 'A'oranHard and Wotan Soft, the metal could begiven two distinctively different properties.The hard variety was ideal for areas whereprojectiles needed to be deflected while theother could absorb impacts without patchesshearing off. An additional bonus came whenKrupp found a way of welding the steelstogether, without losing their uniqueproperties. This opened up completely newopportunities, making it unnecessary toattach armour to the outside of a ship.Instead the entire hull could be constructedfrom a gigantic armoured box. Anothermajor advance, of possibly even greaterpotential, was in the field of propulsion. Themajority of blind avenues. such as sodiumhydroxide engines. had been abandonedearly in the First ,",'arid \IVaI' and productionhad focused on refining conventionalprinciples. Mter the war, Genl"lan firmslooked illlo ti,e possibility of enlarging RudolfDiesel's internal combustion engine to fit inlolarge ships. The first diesel endurance runfrom Kiel to Wilhelmshaven via Skagen,the northern tip of Denmark, had takenplace only a few years before the war,illustrating that this powerplant was stillvery much in its infancy. Despite itssimplicity and development potential, therewere considerable problems when enlargingthe principle for huge marine engines.Eventually, the most promising design,developed by MAN of Augsburg, was tested inthe artillery training ship Bremse and latersimilar engines were installed in the lightcruiser Leipzig as supplementary cruisingpower. ('Bremse' is usually translated asmeaning 'brake'. but it is also a 'horsefly' - atiny insect with a vicious bite.)

The early MAN diesel engines not onlyproduced satisfactory power, but, as a side

GE Il ~I ANN AI' Y fI AND BOO K 1939 - I 945 AFTEIl TIlE FIIlST 1I0llLO WAil - NEW BEGINNINGS

A minesweeper flotilla at speed, with M /45 on the left and M98 on the righl. Keeping such light

formation required considerable concentrmion and some of the minesweeping manoeuvres involved

considerable risk.

1\1133a1 sea. The flotilla leader's pennant flies from the lOp of the main mast.

4

effect, provided an incredibly long range.Consuming fuel in such small quantitiesmade it possible to de,·e\op ships foroperations in the South Atlantic withouttanker SUppOrL. This unexpected turn ofe\'enLS ga\'C rise LO 1WO contrasting opinionswithin the naval high command. ThecOl1vcnLional side had followed the idea ofde,·eloping a neet of small monitor type ofbauJeships for harbour defence duties. Now,the new diesel engines made the morcambitious (tllll l.heir auenLion to far-off seasand to a new strategy - commerce raiding.

Powerful nal.ions possessed the means ofmounting close blockades of enemy harboursto bring the now of commercial l.raffic to ahall. \\'eaker nations, on ule oUler hand, hadto adopt a sl.rategy of sinking merchant shipswhere lhey could not be caught by morepowerful warships. Such hit-and-runcommerce raiding or guerre de cou.rse hadalready been perfected by the French dtllingthe era of sailing ships, and when theGermans adopted the idea during the FirstWorld War they called it Kreuu,;a;eg, meaning'C1"uiser war'. The naval command never hadany illusions of winning a war with commerceraiders, but the ability to mount such acampaign posed a significant threat to theincreasing quantities of imports no\\;ng intoEurope. These goods were no longer IWHlries,but essential raw materials for feedingindustrial giants. The German admiralsargued that the threat of cUlting these supplyroutes would almost certainl)' result in theAllies wanting to discuss different tenns thanthose imposed by the Versailles Diktat.

The main problems of commerce raidingwere outlined b)' Erich Raeder (who laterbecame Supreme Commander-in-Chief ofthe Navy) in an official account of the war atsea (Der Kreuurkrieg in den ausliindischenGewiissern. Fol.1). for which he was awardedan honorary doctorate by the Universit)' ofKiel. whence the letters 'h.c: in his title.

5

}'Iodern trends in sea traffic and the de\'clopment

of efficient communications systems are making

the conduct of cruiser war more difficult.

LCaming along the shortest routc betwccn two

ports makes it easier for raidcrs to locate their

qual"I)', but it also enablcs thc enemy to protcci

those well-defined sea lanes. The inncasing use of

radio ,,;11 also make raider operations more

arduous because the enemy can insiantly

broadcast positions and deploy resources

accordingly. Therefore large scale raider acti\;t)'

will force the enemy to sail its merchant men in

COI1\"O)"'5 with warship support. meaning raiders

,,;11 also ha\-e to hum in packs and sooner or later

two cmiser squadrons ,,;11 meet on the high seas.

The outcome of such an eventuality hadalready been voiced before the First WorldWar by Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,who said, 'The nation with the strongestbattle neet in suppon will win l.he day.'

In 1927, Admiral Hans Zenker (Commandel~

in-Chief of the 'avy) spelt out the advantagesin a letter to Admiral Erich Raeder saying,

We could build either small hea\~ly armoured

battleships for harbour defences or we can think

further about the tasks we might have to face in

the future. Monitors cannot operate outside our

own coasml waters and we need more modem

concepts to challenge tIle might of the French

navy and. at the same time. be powerful enough to

cope ,,;th Washington Treaty cruisers. None of

our existing ships could tackle eitIler of these t,,·o

tasks. So what choice ha\-e we?

The Zenker administraLion chose commerceraiding in far distant waters and in\'ented anew variety of ship known as Panzerschijf orpocket battleship. Deutschland, the firs, of thistype, was admired b)' foreign navies.Although Blitish admirals did not gel undulynUSlered, the French responded by designingfaster and better armoured ships (such as

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR - NEW BEGINNINGS

Pocket bauleship Deutschlandwi.th a red, white and black identification suipe over the fom'ard turret,

uggesting this photograph was taken around the time of the Spanish Ci.\il War. The position of the main

optical rangefinder at the top of the main control tower shows just how huge Lhese de\ices were. ThequaliL), of the lenses was superb.

A minesweeper at sea.

Dunkerque and Strasbourg). The advantages ofcommerce raiding seemed to haveoutweighed the negative views expressedearlier by Erich Raeder, becausc when hebecame Commander-in-Chief of the avy in1928, he further directed naval policytowards the southern oceans. The 'OverseasCruiser' listed in the famous Z-Plan, forexam pic, was conceived with commerceraiding in mind, while the loPlan batLleshipwas intcndcd to protcct such raiders in fardistant waters.

One of the major snags with commerceraiding in southern waters was the crossing ofthe relatively narrow Tonh Atlantic. Therewas no way Gel111an ships could avoid coming

uncomfortably close to their old enell1Y ­France. And Great Britain L11reatened to bean even bigger L1lOrtl in the flesh, capable ofpresenting significant intimidation especiallyto damaged, homeward-bound ships. So, toovercome this problem, Gennany required afleet of escort batLleships specially for thesepotentially dangerous waters. These did notrequire terribly long ranges and L11US couldbe built along more conventional lines.Therefore the ships listed in L1,e Z-Plan weredivided into (wo distinct types. One futuristicversion for commerce raiding, and a set ofconventional ships for operations in onhAtlantic and European waters. Commerceraiding battleships were never built, but

Bismarck and Thpitz were exan1ples of the

escort £)'pc.

Hitler's coming LO power and the rise ofNational Socialism is usually cited as beingthe main trigger of Germany's re-armamenlplan. Vet Hiller's highly negati\·e influenceon the navy and on naval research has hardlybeen recognised. The first point to consideris that Hitler has often been called a dictaLOr,but he was hardly in a position to dictate. Bythe time he came to power. the NationalSocialists had already created two privatearmies: the SA and the SS, and thisincredible fragmenlation, with powerfulcommanders running their own shows.penetrated inLO man}' aspects of the Gennanwar machine. Just to give one example,dUI;ng the first few months of the war Hiller

ordered an increase in submarineconstruction, but the system did not supplythe necessary steel because it was siphonedofT for other uses.

Hitler's rise to power and the German­Anglo aval Agreement of 1935 had aconsiderable negative effect on navalde\'elopll'lent inasmuch as the combinationbrought innovation to a standstill. WhenHitler became chancellor, he was supportedb), less L1lan a quarter of the LOtal vote. TheNational SocialisLS (the ISDAP) knew theyurgently needed LO consolidate their shak)'foundations. So they looked for prestige andchose qualllity rather than quality.Consequelllly they turned LOwards the massproduction of First World War technologyinstead of continuing the Reichsmarine's

6 7

GEllMAN NAI'Y HANDBOOK 1939-1945

MIS, one of the more modern mines\\·cepers. Although some photographs of minesweepers cruising past

the selling sun look rather id)'lIic, lire was 110l always quite that comfonable, as the following sequence

shows. Life on board could gel pretty rough and rmhcr damp.

AFTEIl THE FIIlST WOIlLD \VAIl - NEW BEGINNINGS

MIS, struggling through the North Sea.

AI18, soaking the lookouts on the open deck.

8

effons in the field of inno\'ation. Forexample, the deadly technology which puttogether electro-submarines of Type XXItowards the end of the war, was available in1935 but then there was no incenti,'c tode\'e)op such rC\'olulionary weapons systems.Germany chose cheaper hardware whichcould be quickly assembled with less effonand without innovation.

Naval de\'elopnlent under Hitler was sorapid and chaotic that the entire S)'Stellltoppled the moment Britain and Francedeclared war. This is best illustrated by themassi\'e reorganisation programme carriedOUl shortly after the beginning of theconnicl. I ot only was it necessary for thenavy to change its admini uative s)'Stem, butthe entire method of working and supplying

9

ships had to be changed as well. This shouldnot be taken as criticism of the navalleadership because higher commandersfrequently worked witl10ut definite direction.Howe\'er, it is important to bear in mind thatmuch of the naval hardware was JUSt asunsuitable for fighting a war against Bdtainand France as the administration system hadbeen, but changing the machinery wasconsiderably more difficult than modifying abureaucratic system.

"'hen Britain and France declared war,German naval leadership was ne\'er underthe illusion that the)' could win a war at sea.On hearing the declaration, Admiral Raeder,the upreme Commander-in-Chief, spurredhis staff into action by saying, ""'e can onlyshow the world how to die with dignity.'

T REA TIE S. AGRE HI EN T S. ULTIM AT U~I SAN 0 P LAN S

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS,ULTIMATUMS AND PLANS

A quick-firing gun on the bows of T15i. These weapons were filled for training purposes and were often

shared by passing 1Jlem from one boat 10 another.

THE DIKTAT OF VERSAILLES

This ultimatum of 440 clauses was imposedon Germany by the victoriolls Allies as acondition for ending the First \o\'odd \o\'ar. Inrnany history books it is still disguised underthe name of 'Treaty of Versailles' althoughnegotiations played no part in itscomposition. Even David Lloyd George. theBritish prime minister from] 916 to 1922, wasdismayed by the severity of the terms and saidthal they could only lead to another warhaving to be fought at ulree times the cost ofthe lasl. The Amci-ican Senate voted againstits ratification. but despite widespreadopposition to the concentration of hate andinjustices in the 200 pages, the diktat was stillforced upon the defeated German nation.

The signing of the document createdconsiderable unrest and turmoil inside thecountry, making it plain that the majority ofpeople despised their leaders for havingagreed to tlle harsh conditions. The generalclause whereby they had to recognise thatGermany and Germany alone was responsiblefor starting the war caused widespreadresentment.

The following main clauses affected thepost-First World \IVaI' navy:

• The entire navy, including shore-based personnel, will consist of not morethan 15,000 men. Not more than 1,500 of

10

these may be officers and Germany may notmaintain a naval reserve. The armed forceswill consist of only volunteers, with officerscommitting themselves to serve for aminimum of 25 years and other ranks for aminimum of 12 years. People leaving thenavy may not undertake military training norserve in any other branch of the armedforces. Officers who were in the navy duringthe war and remain in the armed forces mustcommit themselves to serve until they are45 years old unless there is some acceptablereason for early retirement, such as medicalgrounds.

• The size of Germany's post-war navywill be limited to 6 battleships of theLothringen or Deutschland classes, 6 smallcruisers, ] 2 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats.Germany must also maintain and keepoperational minesweepers as specified by theAllies.

• All ships not in German ports willcease to be German property and ships inneutral pons will be handed over to theAllies.

• Eight specified battleships, 42 modemdestroyers and 50 modern torpedo boats willbe disanlled, but their artillery must remainon board and these vessels must be deliveredto ports specified by the Allies.

• All warships under construction atthe end of the war will be destroyed andmaterials scrapped.

• All U-boats, salvage vessels andmobile docks, including submarine pressuredocks, will be handed over to the Allies anddelivered at Germany's expense to specifiedports.

• All objecLS, machines and materialswhich are decommissioned as a result of theabove clauses may be used only forcommercial or trade purposes.

• Germany may not build or acquirewarships, except to replaces losses. The sizesof sllch replacements shall be limited to:10,000 tons for battleships; 6,000 tons forsmall cruisers; 800 tons for destroyers and200 tons for torpedo boats. Battleships andcruisers must be at least 20 years old, anddestroyers and torpedo boats need to be15 years old before new ones may be built,unless they are replacing a lost ship.

\I

• Germany may not build or ownsubmarines, including submarines forcommercial uses and all military aircraft areprohibited as well. Existing aircraft musteither be handed over to the Allies orscrapped.

• All ammunition, including torpedoesand mines, is to be handed over to the Alliesand warships may only carry quantities ofammunition specified by the Allies. Germanymay not produce munitions for export.

• Germany will be responsible forclearing mines in specified areas along thecontinental coasts.

• Germany must provide free access to

the Baltic and may not erect guns orfortifications in coastal areas. Fortificationsstill in place mllst be desu·oyed. In additionto this Germany must hand over charts and

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE,\ TIE S. ,\ GREHI EN T S. ULTIM ,\ T U;\1 SAN D PLAN S

other navigational information aboutshipping channels in her waters.

• Powerful radio stations such as theU-allsmillcrs in Berlin, ncar Hannover and at

Nallen [near Berlin] rna)' not transmitmilitary or political information and theexact naLUre of their transmission is LO be

controlled by the Allies. New transmittersmay not be buill in Germany nor by Germanyin foreign countries.

• All information about ships andtheir equipment, as well as port facilities,is to be made available to the AlliedControl Commission. This includes plans.specifications. munitions details and Lrainingmanuals.

In addition to the above mentioned points,there was a detailed list of war reparations.which amounted to a large labour force

seeing itself working as slaves for the Allies.The resulting poveny and famine created anideal climate for germinating the extremepolicies presented by the NSDAP, and afterten years of starvation and unemployment,people were morc t.han happy to take their

. chances with the prospects offered by Hitler'sprovocative proclamations. The patheticpoint abollt this Il'lassive core of discontentwas that the limitation of radio and

Battleship G"e;sellau's main arlille'l' (280 mm) in

action.

12

newspapers made the majority of Germansunaware that the rest of Europe, and indeedalso the United States, [ound itself in asimilar social predicament. Therefore the

people following Hitler were hardly aware ofthe fan that a large proportion of theirpoveny did not stem directly from theimposition of the Versailles Diktat, but fromthe general economic climate within theworld. The victorious Allies went toextraordinary lengths to suppress suchdepressing news, making the problems evenworse. \-\lhen looking at Europe's socialhistory with that wonderful illuminator called'hindsight', one wonders whether Britain'sdecision to declare war on Gel-many in 1939

was a desperate attempt at using 'fright of theenemy without' as a means of controlling therebellious working classes within its own

flagging economy.

THE WASHINGTON TREATY

The United States president, "VanenHarding, opened a naval disarmamentconference in vVashington on 12 November1921 which eventually led to the signing of a

treaty early in 1922. At first only Japan,France and Britain had been invited, butlater they were joined by China, Italy,Holland, Belgium and Portugal. The main

aim had been an attempt to slow down themassive naval development gripping Japan,and consequently Japan came out as themajor loser. The size of Oeets was laid downin the following proportions: Britain and theUSA: Japan: France and Il<lly with a ratio of20 : 12 : 7. In addition to these ratios, thetreaty specified the maximum size of shipsand armaments as follows: battleships 35,000tons with 406-mm guns; aircraft carriers27,000 tons with 10 guns of up to 203-mm;cruisers 10,000 LOns \\~th 203 mm guns.

The conference also decided that infuture, ship displacement was going to be

3i·mm quick-firing guns in anion against aircraft. In this case barrels had to be loaded manually, blllthe

ami-aircraft gun version of this calibre had a hopper for holding a number of shells for more rapid fire.

13

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

A quick-firing gun aboard U123, although it looks as if the ship in the distance has been hit by a torpedo.

Generally there were two large calibres on U-boats: the wide deck here indicates that UJ23 was a Type IX,

which was usually filled with a lO5-l11m gun while the smaller Type VII had an 8S-mm weapon.

to face the British Royal Navy in ballie.However, he emphasised ulat this would notbe until 1948 at the earliest. This was indeeda drastic change of mind because just a fewmonths earlier Raeder had been assured thatthere were no possibilities of having to go to

war against Britain.Following initial discllssions, the Naval

High Command decided to build a fleet oflong-range ships based on the pocketbattleship concept, with a view to using themto intercept merchant convoys on the highseas of far distant waters. Such warfare wouldforce Britain to escort ships with powerfulwarships and thus tie up the Royal Navy'sresources. At the same time, Germany wouldattack shipping nearer home with moreconventional battleship types such as Bismarckand Tirpilz. The job of committing thesethoughts to paper was given to Kpl.z.S.'Verner Fuchs, who soon discovered that therequirements burst the system far beyond theagreed limitations imposed by variousinternational agreements. Calling his initiallist 'Plan X', for the lack ofa better name, heand his fellow officers whittled the demandsdown to a manageable size before presentingthe result to the Supreme Naval Command as'Plan V'. The third modification, thenidentified as 'Plan Z', was laid before Hitlerfor authorisation. The exact details of whatwas included in the document are somewhatirrelevant because it was approved early in1939 and scrapped a few weeks after theoutbreak of the war. Thus it hardlyinfluenced the ship building programme.The important point was that the 'Z-Plan'reflected the thinking within the SupremeNaval Command of a powerful fleet ofsurface ships. \rVhen the war started Germanyslowly adopted a navy centred on submarinesand other small craft. However, this was notan inslantaneous switch and it was 1943before Hitler announced that the surfaceneet should be thrown into the dustbin.

The Z-Plan was the name of the navaldevelopment programme formulated in 1938for the following ten years. It came about as aresult of Hitler revising his opinions andtelling Grand Admiral Erich Raeder that thenavy should consider the possibility of having

Regulations which specified stop and searchprocedures for enemy merchant ships.

Germany gained more than Britain, so thisshould really be called the German-AngloAgreement. It was signed on 18 Mal' 1935, afew months after Hitler had repudiated theVersailles Diktat and made his famousproclamation about the reintroduction ofnational conscription together with newarmaments laws. By signing the agreement,Germany volunteered to restrict the size ofher fleet to 35 per cent of the Royal Navy,except submarines which were allowed to bebuilt up to 45 per cent. It even permilledmore U-boats to be built in future, but thenGermany would have to give due notice andsacrifice tonnage in other categories. Theselimitations applied to the total size of thefleet and to the number of ships within eachclass.

Britain was happy with this arrangementbecause she still did not have an effectivearmaments agreement with Japan and it wasthought that this treal)' would at least preventan arms race in Europe. Admiral ErichRaeder told his staff that the day Hitlersigned it was the happiest of his life becauseGermany could not have hoped for betternaval conditions during the coming years.Later he went as far as prohibiting war gameswhere Britain was the enemy. The agreementwas cancelled by Hitler in April 1939.

THE 'Z-PLAN'

TREATIES. AGREEMENTS. ULTIMATUMS AND PLANS

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVALAGREEMENT

THE LONDON SUBMARINEAGREEMENT OF 1930

Germany signed this agreement in 1936,shortly after Hitler's renunciation of theVersailles Diktat and his reintroduction ofnational conscription. The aim of theagreement had been to prevent surpriseattacks against merchant ships by forcingsubmarines to stop their quarry and inspectit. The ship was only allowed to be sunk if itwas carrying war supplies and then only afterthe submarine had seen to the safety of thecrew. How this was to be done was notspecified, yet ulis agreement was ratified bythe German government and became thebasis of the navy's new Prize Ordinance

measured with l..he United States ton ratherthan the metric lon, benefiting Germanybecause this also affected the Diktat ofVersailles. A metric ton is 1,000 kg while theUS ton is 1,016 kg, meaning Germany couldslightly increase the size of her ships.

This was an aLtcmpt at supplernenLing theshortcomings of Ole "Vashington Naval Treat)'and to conciliate the dissatisfactiongenerated by the conference. However,France and Italy could not agree with thepoints brought up in London and Japanresigned from the protocol in 1934.

THE LONDON NAVAL AGREEMENT OF1922

14 15

GE H~I AN .v H Y HAS 0 BOO K I 939 - I 945 THEA TIE S. ,I G REE ~I EN T S. V LT I .11 AT U!II SAN 0 PLAN S

Wilhelmshavcn after an air raid in 1944.

16

Then the U-boat Chief, Karl Donitz, who hadbeen promoted LO Grand Admiral, advisedhim against such a move because vast enemyresources would be unleashed against theGerman homeland once the Allies realisedthe fleet ",<as no longer a lhreal. The decisionto build a powerful submarine neet was madeso late after the beginning of the war thaL thevast m~orily of U-boats never came withinshooLing distance of the enemy.

THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

American and British leaders met atCasablanca (in Morocco, North Africa)during January 1943, where they agreed togi\'c the war against U-boats LOp priority andalso to make the lOLal destruClion ofGermany and the German people their mainaim. Although the Russian leader, JosephStalin, did not attend due to the ferocity ofthe war on his home front, he did laterconsent that the Allies must insist on theunconditional surrender of Germany andthat no other end of the war in Europeshould be considered. As several influentialBritish and American leaders said, 'thisclosed the door against negotiations tighterthan Napoleon had done at the height of hisreign of terror throughout Europe.'

This dreadful imposition seems to havebeen conveniently forgollen by severalinfluential postwar historians, ret it played a\'ital role in prolonging the war in Europe.German leaders understood the demands of'Unconditional Surrender' to mean that thewar would continue until there was nothingleft in Germany. It was no longer a war againstHitler or against the Nazi Party, but againstthe ordinaq' German people. It meant thatGerman industry would be LOtally desu'oyedand the country reduced to farmland. Theonly certain result of such action was thatmillions of Germans would starve to death. Atthe same time Russia would claim millions of

men to work as slaves in the Soviet Unionwhile German women filled its brothels. Inaddition to this, what was left in the areawhich had been Germany was to pay a heavydebt of war reparations. There would be noGerman government and no one to speak forthe people because all internal affairs wouldbe regulated by the victors.

This Allied demand made it not onlyimpractical but also impossible for militaryleaders to dispose of Hitler or to call for anearly end to the war, and gave them noalternative other than to fight on until thebiller encl. Although the exact meaning ofthe term 'Unconditional Surrender' is leftopen to interpretation and after the warAllied leaders auempted to dilute these\terity of its significance, the view expressedabove is how Grand Adnliral Karl DoniLZ and

Kicl. Air raids became increasingly dismpti\'e as the

war progressed and direct hit'S like this cUl1.ailed a

number of naval operations; consequentJy essential

senices were placed under concrete.

17

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

The Scharnhorst bunker in Kid accommodated the headqmuters of the 5th U·boat FlOlilla. lllis notilla was

impoltanl because it specialised in pro\~ding essential stores for all new submarines Ie-.wing for their first missions.

other German leaders saw the situation atthe time, which explains why none of themcould agree to an early surrender. As D6niLZsaid, 'had any of the leaders given up, thenthey would have been branded the U-aiLOfS ofthe people whom they were serving.' Thisview was further strengthened by the massslaughter of millions of German civilians,mainly women, children and old people.who died horrific deaths at the hands of the

18

Allied air forces, while their homes werereduced to rubble. There were severalattacks where the German losses during asingle night were greater than the totalBritish bombing losses of the whole war.After the war, this opinion was furthersupported by the continued massdestruction of port facilities, dry docks,cranes, industrial plants and water defences

protecting the lowlands.

THE ORGANISATION OF THEKRIEGSMARINE, NOVEMBER 1938

Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ForcesAdolf Hitler

Supreme Commander-in-Chiefof the NavyGeneral Admiral Dr h.c. Erich Raeder

Supreme Naval Command or Naval High CommandOberkommando del' Marine (OKM)

Chief of Naval Command Office and Chief ofStaITKontcradmiral Ouo Schniewlnd

Naval Station for the BalticMarinestaLion del" Ostsee

Naval Station for the North SeaMarinestation der Nordsee

The FleetFleet Commander:

Admiral Hemlann Boehm

Pocket BattleshipsKonteradmiral Wilhelm Marschall

Headquarters: Wilhelmshaven

Reconnaissance ForcesAufkJantngsstrei tknifte

Vizeadmiral Hermann DenschHeadquarters: Kiel

Torpedo boatsKonteradmiral Gunther Luyens

Headquaners: Swinemunde

MinesweepersFregkpc Friedrich RugeHeadquarters: Cuxhaven

V-boatsKpcz.S. and Kommodore

Karl D6nitzHeadquarters: Kiel

19

OPERATION ORDERS

The following is a generalised synopsis of thetype of instructions issued to commanders ofsurface raiders towards the end of 1940.

MAIN OBJECTIVES

Your main objectives arc to conduct cruiserwar in foreign waters, to lay mines and LO

assist V-boat operations. The 1l10St importantaim of these activities will be to tie·up enemyshipping and naval forces in distant waters to

relieve pressure in Europe. Therefore it ismore imponant to remain at sea for thelongest possible period than to run up highsinking figures. It is far morc vital to damagethe enemy in the following '","dYS than run therisk of being sunk: force the enemy to delaysailing schedules; force the enemy lO redirectshipping along the longest possible routes;force the enemy La adopt the convoy systemin as many areas as possible and force theenemy to employ warships to guard thesegroups of merchant ships; discourage neutralcountries from helping Britain and thusmake the acquisition of war materials

difficult.

ADVICE

The disguise of your ship and your methodof attack should be changed frequentl), sothat the enemy cannot get a clear picture ofyour appearance and cannot determineexactly how many raiders there are operatingon the high seas. Create the maximumdisruption with a sudden appearance and tryto prevent your quarry from using its radio;by so doing you will make it difficult for the

enemy to determine your position. Make itimpossible for the enemy to anticipate yournext rnove. Leave the operations area as soonas you suspect that your position has becomeknown. Under no circumstances move to anew area and start offensive action the1l10men[ you arrive. It will be far moreeffective to withdraw from the scenecompletely. That way enemy forces are left to

search your known operations area and theywill not be diverted to follow you.

Elusiveness is the most important weaponof any raider. Avoid connict with warships,even if their armament appears to beinferior, and under no circumstances run therisk of being damaged. Should it becomeimpossible to avoid warships, then use yourdisguise until the last possible moment andengage every weapon at your disposal. Such adesperate course of action might still resultin a favourable conclusion, but use this onlyas a means of last defence after all else hasfailed. Great attention must be paid to smalldetails of disguise, including the behaviour ofpeople on deck. It would help to give theimpression of having women and children on

board.Should it prove impossible to continue

with your operations, then return home.Should that option also be impossible thenconsider the following points. You are free todecide what you do with your ship, with yourweapons and your crew. You may opt to makefor Italian bases and offer assistance; use theship to inOict maximum damage on theenemy. As a last resort rnake for a neutralpon and sink u1e ship in deep water outsidethe territorial limits.

20

OPEHATION OHDEHS

Shooting the midday sun aboard auxiliary cruiser Thor. Getting the navigation correct was "ilt...l. Most

measurements were taken by a number of men so that they could compare resuhs and possibly eliminate

mistakes. The long shadows suggest that the boat is a considerable way fmm the equator.

21

p

GE H~1 AX XAI' Y 11.\ i\' 0 BOO K 1939 - I 945

A na\'al radio rool11. The typewriter in the ballom len corner, by the man's hand, is a naval ,"ersion of the

famous Enigma code writer. Originally these held three wheels above I..he keyboard, as can be seen here,

22

OPEHATION OHOEH

but. later the discs were made thinner so that [our could be filled into the same slot. Radio rooms usually

also had at least haifa dozen different wheels to choose from. Inset: Enigma code writel-.

23

?

GEHM,IN NAI'Y HANDBOOK 1939-1945

TIle lightship EJbe 2. EIht Jwas the lightship furthest Ollt and Elbt 3 the one nearest to land. TI1CSC guides were

essential for finding the deep water channel funnelling into the approaches to Cuxha\-en and Hamburg.

THE FLEET COMMAND AND LARGESURFACE SHIPS AT WAR

SUPPLIES

Supplies wiH be pro\'ided on request, butc\'cry crfon must be made to use cargoesfrom captured ships. Should you requirespecial items, please remember it will take awhile before the)' reach yOll and deliver)'

cannot be guaranteed.

USE OF RADIO

Obsen'e radio silence at sea. Should }'ourposition become known to the enemy as aresult of an engagement, then make everyerrort to u-allsmit at least the following: yourposition, brief report regarding yoursuccesses, your plans for the future, your fuelsiwalion, the state of your supplies and anynews which might help other raiders. YOli arcfree lO transmit short signals whenever yOll

feel it necessary. (The Germans were underthe impression thal Britain could notdetermine the positions of shon signalswhich were made up of a code of very few

Morse letters.)

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

You should keep up to date with politicaldevelopments by listening to GCI111an, neutraland enemy broadcasts, but you must treatforeign news with caution because this willobviously portray Germany in a negative IighLLies and half·trulhs are COll1mon [eaLUres ofenemy propaganda. There could well be adanger of you getting the wrong impre ion,especially as you will be on your own for along lime. It is important for you toremcillber the justice of the German causeand LO keep your faith in your weapons, in theFllhrer and in Genl'lany's ultimate \~Clory.

The following countries arc to be treatedas hostile: Great Britain and all her colonies,

Australia, Canada, SouLh Africa, New Zealand,Egypt and Iraq, all Belgian colonies and allFrench colonies. The United tales ofAmerica, Spain, the SO"iet nion and theRepublic of Ireland are to be treated asneutral. E"ery efTon must be made to avoidincidents with these neutral nations, sincesome of them are seeking an excuse to join

the war against Gennany.Onl), Japan and Italy are to be treated as

friendly nations. The latter's territories in theeast are of no use as raider bases becausethey lack modern facilities, but they couldturn out to be suitable as places of refuge.There is a friendship pact between Japan andGerman)', meaning that there are severalports which could be approached in times of

difficulties_

THE GENERAL SIT ATIOI REGARDINGTHE ENEMY

Britain cannot protect all her ships, nor hasshe the resources to run all of then) inconvo),s. Therefore it should be possible to

find unprotected merchant ships on the highseas. Coastal waters, including thosebelonging to neutral countries, are oftenpatrolled by reconnaissance aircraft andgreat care must be exercised in such

locations,

COOPERATION WITH -BOAT

You will have loaded sufficient resources toact as supply ship for two -boats. The idea isthat submarines should fighl their way intosouthern waters to meet you and then toreturn to France. Once you have madecontact with these submarines, you will ceaseall raider acti\ity and concentrate on keepingthe -boats operational for as long as

possible,

OPENI G MOVES

In the event of war, Germany expected theRoyal Navy to establish a blockade of herports and therefore prepared to move largerships out to sea before their escape could beprevented. Such action was consideredimportant because the two large blockade­buster battleships, Bismarck and TirjJitz., werestill under construction and Genllany had no"'a}' of breaking such a siege. Although thenaval adn1inistration classed Scharnhorst andCneisenau as battleships. both of them were

technically battlecruisers with a mainannament of nine 28Q-mm gUlls. Bismarck andTirpitz had eight much more powerful3 Q-mm guns. The difference in perfollnancecan be better illustrated with the secondaryarmament: all four ships were fitted with150-mm weapons, The older guns on thebattlecfuisers had a maximum range of 12 killwhile Bismarck and TiPpitz could reach targetsslightly more than 20 km away.

Ironically, the Royal Navy was in no positionto impose such a blockade and when thewar started German)' had only three ship

24 25

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEET COMMAND AND LARGE SURFACE SIIIPS AT WAR

Pocket battleship Deutschland passing the swing bridge in Wilhelmshaven hal-bour with men in parade

position on deck.

Pocket battleship Admiral GrafSpet dUI;ng 1937 with a radar aerial already filled on the turret of the main

optical rangefindcr. GrafSpee looked vcl}' similar LO Admiral Scheer. The fOUf rectangular windows of the

admiral's bridge arc a good distinguishing feature: there arc fOUf of them, onc for eve I)' leuer of the

word 'Spee'. Admiral Scheer had three windows on the admiral's bridge, and the large recrangular name

plate with 'Coronel' was also missing. (Coronel was the name of a major battle won by Admiral Graf Spec

in 1914 off Chile in 50mh America.) JUSllO confuse the issue, Scheer later had this typical triangular box­

like command tower replaced by a smaller, tubular slruCllIre. and the single searchlight seen here allhe

front of the LOwer was later replaced by two plalforms, one on each side of the LOwer.

for operations in far-off waters. One ofthese, pocket battleship Admiral Scheer (Kpt.z.S.Hans-Heinrich ""urmbach), was lying off\Vilhelmshaven with much of her internalmachinery dismantled for a refit. Consequentlyshe remained out of action for some time. Theother twO pocket battleships, Admiml GmJ S!Jee(KpLZ.S. Hans Langsdorff) and Dellischland(KpLZ.S. Paul Wenneker), were also due indock for routine maintenance, but this waspostponed and both of them left Germanwaters on 21 and 24 August respectively, to lakeup pre-planned waiting positions at designatedlocations in lonely parts of tlle Atlantic. GmJSpee made for the south while Deutschlandremained closer to home in the nonh.

Deutschlanl{s supply ship, H'esll!lwald (Fregkpt.Peter Grau) J left German}' at about the sametime and Alllllark (Korvkpt. Heinrich Dau), theother purpose-built fleet supply ship, wasrefuelled in Texas before joining GraJSpee.

On hearing the British and Frenchdeclaration of war on 3 September 1939 theSupreme Naval Command of the Kriegsmadnesent a signal to all units at sea telling them to

start aggressive action, but emphasised thatPrize Ordinance Regulations had to beobeyed. This meant that merchant shipscould not be sunk by surprise. They had tobe stopped, perhaps even searched, andthen they were allowed to be sunk only if tlleywere can1'ing contrdband. At the same time

26 27

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 TilE FLEET COMMAND AND LARGE SURFACE SHIPS AT WAR

the attackers had LO see to the safety of thecrew. Hitler still belic,'ed that peace would beresumed after the Polish campaign had beenbrought to a salisfacLOI)I conclusion and didnot want La jeopardise this aim by aggravatingthe British government. On 5 September, as

TIle scltuling of Admiral GraIS/Jet! (aoove and opposite).

The funnel shows the two main djesel exhaust pipes.While the design was still on the drawing board, it

was thought that diesel engines would make it

possible to dispense with funnels and build a vessel

with a flat superstniClure resembling a modem

aircraft CalTIer. However, low diesel exhausts would

have presented quite a problem because the heavy

oil bUl11t in huge marine engines produces a brown,

oily residue which colleclS on !.he first cool surface it

meets. Thus a funnel·less supersu-l.lCture would have

become coated in black glime. Note that the all

important, and at that lime highly secret, radar

aelial has been left on the superstntctllre. This was

salvaged by Brilish agents and gave the Royal Na\')'

an insight into the perfOnllanCe of Genllan radar.

funher concession to this strategy, Deutschland

and Graf SjJee were ordered to cease alloffensive action and La withdraw from theiroperations areas. That day also saw one othersignificant event: the US President, FranklinD. Roosevelt, forestalled any attempt atdrawing forces of combatant nations inLa thewestern Atlantic, by declaring the so-called'Pan-Amel;can Neuu-ality Zone', which was Labe patrolled by US warships. This move waspossibly more detrimental to the Royal I avythan the Kriegsmarine, because Germany hadonly few ships capable of operating so farfrom home. Hitler was anxious that theUnited States should not side against himand, as negotiations were in progress betweenthe twO countries, German forces were notonly under strict instructions La obey PrizeOrdinance Regulations but also told La avoidconflict with the nited States at all cost.

The twO pocket battleships reached theirwaiting areas undetected, with the Royal Navyhaving no idea of their whereabouts. Thisprocess had not been uneventful. Graf Spee,

for example, had narrowly escaped beingsighted by the cruiser Cumberland, on passagefrom Rio de Janeiro to Freetown. Graf Spec's

reconnaissance aircraft spotted theapproaching cruiser and signalled the pocketbattleship and Alt'ma'rk to aiter course.Deutschland and Gmf Spec were evellluallygiven permission to start their raidingactivities during the night 25/26 September,by which time each ship had used onequarter of its fuel and provisions, and theneed to complete the postponed overhaulshad become more pressing. The Royal Navyhad guessed that there was at least one raiderat sea, but did not get confirmation until lateOctober when sun~vors from Oraf Spee's firstvictim, the British freighter Clement, reachedSouth America. The presence of a secondraider was not definitely established untilmuch later, on evidence of sunrivors from theNonvegian freighter Lorentz W Hansen.

28

The British and French Navies respondedby forming hunting groups with which to

bring the raiders to battle. These were: Force'F' (the cruisers Bennick and York), coveringthe waters between orth America and the\,\reSl Indies; Force 'G' (the cruisers Exeter,

29

Cumberland, Ajax and Achilles), along theeast coast of South A..Illerica; Force 'H' (thecruisers Sussex and ShmpskiTe), around theCape of Good Hope; Force 'I' (the cruisersCornwall, Dorsetshire and the aircraft carrierEagle), in the southem Indian Ocean; Force 'K'

•..•

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-19'15 TilE FL E£ TeO ~DI A.\' DAN D LA RGE SUR FA CE SHIP S AT WAR

This should be SchamllOrsl, although having identified it as such probably means that it is the sister ship

Gne;senau because they wer-e so alike. The flims)' extension to the na'~gation blidge, which can be seen on

the pon (right hand in the photograph) side suggests that the ship is close to pon, because these

structures were removed at sea. The rectangular box abo,-c ule IO-meLre-)ong optical rangefinder is of

special interest because a radar aeriaJ has been fitted on ule right hand side.

(the batLleship Renown and the aircraft carrierArk Ro)'al), off the north-east coast of Brazil;Force 'L' (the battleship DUllkerque, theaircraft carrier Beam and the cnlisers GeorgesLe)'gtus, Gloireand MOlllcalm), operating in theAtlantic from Brest; Force 'M' (the cruisersDltpleix and Fock), in "Vest African walers,from Dakar; and Force 'N' (the aircraftcarrier Hermes, the cruiser Neptune and thebattleship Stmsbourg), in the West Indies. Theestablishment of these forces shows thalGermany had successfully achieved itsobjecti\'e of tying up enemy forces.

It is hardly surprising that the initial effon.of tllese groups brought little reward. Theonly success was the liglll cruiser Caradoc'ssinking of the 4,327 ton supply ship Emm)'Friedrichs, while she was on her way to meetGraf Spee. There was hardly an)' hope of theraiders being found in such a vast area. TheRoyal avy desperately needed some clues,and such information could only be gleanedfrom radio 1l1cssages transmitted by viClims.

The composition of distress calls waschanged from the standard SOS to morespecific codes that identified the type ofattacker. 'RRR' was introduced first forurface raiders, followed later by ,QQQ' ,

meaning disguised merchant ship and 'SS5'was used to signify attack by submarine.Initially the letters were transmitted threetimes, but later in tlle war they were repeatedfour times. sing such distress message,Commodore Han,'ood was able to prediClthat Gmf Spee was heading towards SouthAmerica, and it was there lhat he intended tointercept her with his Force 'C'. Harwood'sbrilliant piece of deduction led to the famousbattle in the estuary of the River Plate (LaPlata) and to the scuttling of Admiral GmfSpee near Montevideo on 17 December 1939.

Meanwhile Deutschland was recalled aftersinking just twO ships. She had been inGotenhafen for about four weeks before theRoyal Navy disco\'ered her whereabouts. The

30

two elusi\'c sisters, tlle battleships Scharnhorst(KpLZ.S. Kurt Caesar Hoffmann) andGlleisenau (KpLZ. . Harald Netzbandt),slipped out of Cermany at the same time asDeutschland was making for home, with theintention of testing the Royal Na\y's \igilanceby striking at blockading British cruisers. TheCermans were unaware that such forces didnot exist and the mere success of reaching theopen waters of the North AlianLic was alreadyregarded as a victory in itself. AdmiralWilhelm Marschall (Heet Commander aboardGneisenau) had order" not to take any risks. Sohe sailed into mid-Al1antic before feigning abreak<)llt souulwards, but in reality he turnednorth to head back into home waters. Hisauempt to mislead the enemy was wasted onthis occasion bccau e Britain was not aware ofthe squadron's movements. In fact, whenScharnhorst was spolled by the armedmerchant cruiser Rawalpindi, she was wronglyidentified as the pocket battleship Deutsch/lIlld,whose presence had been reponed earlier.

B)' the end of 1939, all German surfaceraiders were back in pon and the yearclosed with a definite lull. The success of thebig ships in terms of tonnage sunk appearsmeagre when compared with the resultsachieved by a handful of tin)' -boats, minesor aircraft, but sinking ships wa not theprimary objective. It was considered farmore important that the large ships shoulddisrupt and stretch disproponionally largeelements of the enemy's shipping. Whenevaluating tonnage sunk, it must also beremembered that German capital ships wereconstantly plagued by orders to sink as manyships as possible but to avoid taking anyrisks.

Successful operations in the Atlanticwithout interference from the Royal Na\]'were made possible b)' the B-Dienst(FullkbeobachlulIgsdiellSt) under tlle leadershipof Heinz Bonatz. A radio monitoring andintelligence sen;ce had been established as

earl)' as May 1915 to survey enem)' radiotraffic and evaluate the informationcollected. In 1939 the Royal Navy \Va stillusing an outdated cipher s)'stem, whichhelped the Germans to break into Britishnetworks. The B-Dienst had ilS shortcomings,and some admirals complained thal itsinformation came too late to act upon, butthe sen~ce was small and could not evaluateall the radio traffic. The strength of thesystem lay in its ability to keep tabs on tlleenemy once an operation was in progress.During the Norwegian campaign in April1940, for example, the B-Dienst often

31

determined convoy ailing times, althoughtracking them was impossible because shipsmaintained radio silence once they wereunder way. The B-Dienst wa also keptinformed of British neet dispositions bysending reconnaissance aircraft over themain anchorages, thus enabling officers tobuild up an accurate picture of which enemyships were likely to be confronted. Duringthe first two years of war, Gel-many had theupper hand in respect of naval intelligence.By comparison, British naval forces had no orfew clues as to the whereabouts of Germanships.

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE FL EETC 0 )1)1 AND A.\' D LA RGE St:ll FA CE SHIP S AT IfA II

The supply ship Ta'l»~iftls.

DISGUISED MERCHANT SHIPS BREAKOUT

The first auxiliall' cruisers were ready to lea,'cGenrtany in March 1940, just a few weeksbefore the invasion of Norway. The

commanders of these ships were free todecide which of the twO practical routes the)'should follow into the southern oceans. The)'could either sail around the Faeroe I landsand then head sOllth-west to pass betweenBritain and Iceland, or they could go farthernorth to try their luck through the DenmarkStrait between Iceland and Greenland.(From the first wave, only Komel look a

different route. She reached the Pacific b)'heading east along the iberian Sea Passage.The second wave was bold enough to sailthrough the English Channel.) TheDenmark Strait was difficult on account oficebergs. btU it did offer two distinctadvantages. First, fog tended to collect in the

area and could be used to conceal the111Qvement of raiders; and, secondly, it was

easier to find suitable hiding places in thereJ1'lote waters north of Iceland, whereraiders could wail for suitable conditions"ithout excessive fear of being detected. The

fact that apan from Bismarck e"ery one of theGerman warships got through without

trouble shows how well the natural elementsshielded ships in the da),s before radar.

The pocket battleship Deutschlalld had beenrenamed Lii/low and had completed heroverhaul ready to sail with this first wave of

disguised merchant ships, but the Naval HighCommand ordered her to remain in Europe

until after u'le invasion of Norway. Her days asmerchant raider ended abnlptly on 11 Aplil1940 when she was hit b)' a torpedo from theBritish submarine Spearfl.Sh. Liilzow (Kpl.z.S.August Thiele) was due to ha\'e rendeZ\'ollSCdwith her supply ship J ordmark, whosecommander, Fregkpt. Peter Grau, was

32

omewhat frustrated b}' the delay and

requested permi sion to raid merchantshipping on his 0"11. -"orr/mark's three 15~mm

quick-firing guns were adequate armamentand her speed sufficient for the task, btll ti,e:\'a\'al High Command refused on the groundsthat her large cargo of fuel was too valuable to

risk in ballie. In addition to this, it was

thouglu that she would become a sitting targetonce her description had been circulatedbecause her t)1)ical tanker silhouette couldnot be disguised. Uust to complicate ti,e issue,Xordmark had also been renamed. A fewmonths earlier, at u'le beginning of the warshe was called lI~ten"ald.)

FIR T ACTIONS AGAINST RAIDER

The fi, t atLxilial)' (or 'ghost") cmisers operatedfor some four months witholll the Btiush beingaware of their presence, and it was mid:July1940 before definite news of the ships' existencereached the Admiralt)'. The Ro)'al Nav)'

immediately cancelled independent sailings andre-rotlled shipping, bUL the chances of bringingthe raiders to battle were slim. There were tOOfew of them, Britain had no idea of theirwhereabouts and the forces which had beenassembled earlier to hunt Graf Spee and

Deutschland were now engaged in other duties.Despite the odds of finding auxiliary cmisers

being slim, the British aimed merchant cnliser(AJIC) Alcantara ran into Thor, the secondechelon of the first wa"e of ghost cnlisers. Thebattle that ensued was quick and decisive, witl1

Thor damaging Alcanlllm so severely that theBritish ship was forced to withdraw. This brieraction made it clear that not only wereraiders present, but that the)' could alsomount an impressive punch. Two Britishcruisers (Cumberland from SimonsLOwn andDorselshire from Freetown) were dispatched

from Africa to hunt Thor, but their mission wasfutile as ti,e action had taken place a long wa),away, on the other side of u1e Atlantic.

33

The confirmation that raiders were atlarge prompted the Operational IntelligenceCentre at the Admirall)' to set up a specialsub-section to deal exclusively with ghOStcruisers. The initial measures and resourcesnecessary to deal effectively with the problem

were limited to the point of being useless.However, the men appointed for this workcollected data in an attempt to build lip apicture of the enem), and to deplo)' the shipsat uleir disposal as effectively as possible.

Auxiliary cruiser Thorstill "ith her pn~·warname

displayed on the bows. Tlwrwas commanded b}'

Kpt.z.S. Otto Kahler for her firsl cruise and by

Kpt.z.S. Gunther Cumprich for her second. Ursula

"on Friedeburg, the "ife of Admiral Hans-Georg

von Friedeburg, married Ouo Kahler after her firsthusband committed suicide at the end of the war.

GERMAN ;qyy IIA:XOBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEE TeO )1)1 A.'i 0 A:X 0 LA Il GE 5 J: RFA CE 5 II IPS AT IfAR

at critical periods and had a IllcUor bearing onthe outcome of several battles.

The year 1941 started well ror Germany,with Admiral Scheer and fh'c auxiliary cruisersin sOllthern water. and KormoTQIl (Fregkpt.Theodor Detmers) ready LO stan her offensh"c.Schomhorst (Kpl.z.S. Kun Caesar Hoffmann)and Cueisellon (Kpl.z.S. Ouo Fein) appearedbriefly on the scene, only to be rorced backinto the dockyard by SLOnn damage. The twobauleships and Hipper subsequently hadsuccessful cruises in the southern reaches ofthe North At.lantic, despite the heavy cruiser'sunreliable engines proving a far greaterhandicap than the Royal Navy.

The end or March 1941 saw another lullin raider activit)' in northern waters withall regular warships back in porl. TheKJiegsmarine had good reason to be satisfied\\~lh its efforts, especiall)' when one considers

that the successes were at the expense of theworld's most powerrul navy. Hipper had provedthat ule limited range or Ule heavy cruiser didnot prevent it from being an effective weapon

against merchant shipping, while Thor hadshown that auxiliary cruisers could successfully

combat their Royal 3\'}' counterparts. Butraider activity had reached its peak and ulelong-term situation looked bleak. Germanshipyards were working La capacit), and there

was no hope of additional auxiliary cruisersbeing convened ror the remainder or 1941because U-boat production had priOlity. Thetell-tale sign or defeat were hidden amid theHill nourishing campaign, and it was hoped

U"t 1942 would bring runher successes.

The Raider Section or the Admiralty'sOperational Intelligence Centre compiled adetailed dossier on each Gelman ghost cluiser,and by ule end or May 1941 their reports werebeing supplemented by regular newsletters. Toget over stubborn ship-masters or those who

BACKSTAGE 0 RING THE PEAK

CRUI ER WAR AT ITS PEAK

Ghost cruisers enjoyed an active and highlysuccessful hunting season throughout thesummer of 1940, \'inually unhindered byinterference from enemy warships. The longhours orda),light and Ule seasonal good weaulerof the summer months were unfa\·ourable formounting further break-out auempts fromGel1llany. In addition to this, a number of shipsready for action were kept in pon in readinessfor the planned invasion or ule Blitish Isles, andwere not released for autOnomous navaloperations until the final postponement ofOperation 'Scalion' in the autumn.

The instructions given to the next majorw£we of purpose-built warships differed fromthose that had been issued a rear earlier. TheGerman High Command had learned thatalthough lone merchantmen were cas)'targets, their distress calls resulted in all othercommercial u-affic scattering and tllUS makingthe raidcr's task more difficult. In future theprimary target for purpose-built raiders wasgoing LO be badl)' protected COIWO)~, selectedby the imelligence service. It was thought thatsuccess in this new area of operations wouldbe far more damaging to tile enemy tllan thesporadic one-off sinkings achicved so far.

Admi,."l Schee,. (Kpl.z.S. Theodor Krancke)was the first purpose-built raider to sail duringthe autumn or 1940 and Ule first LO adopt thenew policy. The Royal Navy was unaware ofSclzee(s movements until she attacked a com'o)'guarded b)' the AJ"IC Jerois 80)'. The heavycruiser Admiral Hipper (Kpl.z.S. WilhelmMeisel) rollowed Scheer imo the Nonh Auanticduring December, but her thirsty turbines,\\;th tlleir limited range, prc\fented the heavycruiser rrom pursuing the pocket bauleshipinto thc southenl oceans. Instead Hipper ranout (rom tile North Sea and then became thefirst large German ship to enter a FrenchAuantic porl. Hip/x!,. was funher handicappedb)' persistent engine trouble, which recurred

Li hl cmiser KOln. Manning the upper posts was quite an aft during rough weather and climbing up to such

p~itions demanded considerable acrobatic skills. Perhaps it is no wonder thallhe Navy was so ke.en to

promOlc gymnastics and keeping fit. The lenses of a rangefinder call just be seen above the protective wall.

Light cmiser Kiihl behaving badly in moderate seas. These ships wer~ thought t~ ha."c had exceptionally

good sea-keeping qualities, so one wonders what it must have been like on Dthel shIps.

"

34 35

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945THE FLEET COMMAND AND LARGE SURFACE SHIPS AT WAR

The bridge of the submarine CSCOI-t ship Otto Wiinschewith the usual spider's web of radio anials in

the background.

could not digest so much new information, meAdmiralty changed tack and made theinformation available to all the crew. \'\'hence

tllcre came a growing awareness of the threatswhich men had LO face on the high seas.

At rirst the Royal Navy was hampered inits efforts to check the identities of merchan­tmen because lOa many failed to follow the

official guidelines and did not respondcorrectly when requested to do so. The lime­consuming process of boarding each ship to

check credentials was replaced by theiou'oduction of a secret identification system

for all merchant ships under British control.The new process was supported by a facilityknown as the 'Checkmate System' whichcould speedily provide warships with up-lO­date information on the whereabouts of anyAllied ship, making it almost impossible foran enemy masquerading under a falseidentity to maintain its pretence for long

once it had been challenged.

Initially many masters of merchant shipswere loath to broadcast distress calls whenthey ,vere approached by a suspicious ship incase the transmission was detected by Germanradio monitors. The Admiralty continuallypressed upon them the fact that the enemydid not possess such facilities, and that theRoyal Navy desperately needed all informationwhich might help in pinpointing the positionsof raiders. A system was introduced whereby asighting report was transmiued as soon as adubious-looking ship came into sight, but noaction was taken if this was later cancelledbecause it turned out to be a false alarm. TheGermans captured documents containingdetails of this procedure and on occasionswere able to use the victim's own transmitterto cancel such distress calls themselves.

Radar also started making a significantcontribution to raider warfare. The firsteffective equipment was filled in Britishoperational ships early in 1941, ata time when

German development in this field wasbeginning to lose its advantages and lagbehind as a consequence of Hitler's decisionto halt research. German radar aerials werehuge. bedstead-like frames mounted on a highpart of the ship and, to maintain secrecy, they,,'ere dismantled once the ship approachedcoastal waters. Hipper used radar to trackconvoy SLS64, which she subsequentlyattacked on 12 February 1941. The convoyhad first been detected by the radar theprevious night, but the heavy cruiser did notclose-in until after the strength of the escortshad been ascertained. Then, at first light,seven ships were quickly sunk and two moredamaged. Both Cneisenau and Scha17llwrst hadused radar a month earlier to avoid the Blitishfleet during the break-out for Operation'Berlin'. The pocket batueship Admiral Scheer

\\'as also equ.ipped WiUl such apparatus for hercruise into the Indian Ocean. She used it inthe Nonh Atlantic to avoid lone merchantships while waiting for her designated target,the convoy escorted byJemis Bay.

BRITAIN HITS BACK

The sinking of the battleship Bismarck

(Kpl.z.S. Ernst Lindemann with the entireFleet Command under Admiral GuntherLll1jens on board) marked the turning pointin the Royal Navy's battle against raiders, andwas the first occasion on which a largeGerman ship was caught while attempting to

break out into the Atlantic. ''''hat is more,radar played an important pan in the hunt.In May] 941, Bismarck set out in company withthe heavy cruiser Prim Eugen (Kpl.z.S.Helmuth Brinkmann) for her first and onlyraiding operation. Around this time the RoyalNavy capitalised on its success by severing thevital link without which raiders could notoperate at all - the supply system. Raiderslook food and provisions from their '~CLims,

but ammunition could not be acquired in this

way_ An efficient supply network was thereforeessential, especially as it was becoming moredifficult to capture ships in conditionsfavourable LO the allacking raider. Manymerchant ships were now more alert topossible danger and no longer carried fullbunkers of useful fuel, being issued '\~th onlysufficient to reach the next pon of call.

For many years after the war, it was uloughtthat ule supply ships were caught fOIUlitously inthe net drawn for Bismarr:k, but ulis was not Ulecase. Later released 'Enigma' documents haverevealed that the operation against the supplynetwork was a well-planned, independentexercise. May and June 1941 were indeed blackmonths for the Kriegsmarine, which lost ablockade breaker (EIhe, sunk off the Azores byaircraft from ule canier Eagle) and nine supplyships, all as a result of a well-executed hunt.These losses had a catastrophic effect on theraiders in the southern waters, especially On'on(FregkpL Kurt Weyher) whose engines were alsogi,~ng trouble. and whose bunkers were almostempty and ammunition too low for furtherprolonged action. In ule end Olion had to berefuelled by the am<iliary cruiser Atlantis (KpLZ.S.Bernhard Rogge), which could ill-afford tosacrifice the preciolls oil, though it was essentialfor Orion's desperate dash to the French Atlanticcoast. Incidentally. P,inz Eugen's refuellingpositions were also known and ule heavy cruiserwould have been another sitting target hadengine u·ouble not forced Prinz to make for porL

The Following Supply Ships were Sunkduring June 1941Alstertor, scuttled on 23 June in 41 0 12'N13°1O'W during an attack by Royal Navy forces.Babitonga, scuttled on 21 June in Olo05'N27°42'W when HMS London approached.Egerland, sunk on 5 June in 07°N 31°W byHMS London and HMS Brilliant.

Esso f-{amblllg, supply tanker for Bismm<k, HimEugen and V-boats, scutued 4 June in 7"35'N31°25'W when HMS London approached.

36 37

GERMAN NAI'Y HANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEET COMMAND AND LAIlGE SUIlFACE SHIPS AT \VAil

I

Boat drill aboard the blockade breaker and suppl), ship Anneli~f.ssbugrr. Nthough a nuisance, this '~'aS a

,ital part OftJ1C slII,,\;val rOUline. Not only was it necessary in case ~le ~hiP.had to be aband.oned, bUlIt

was also vitally important to fool a British warship. To keep up their dlsgtu5e when a warship approached,

part of the crew might have LO imitate a panic 10 gel off.

38

Friedrich Breme, supply tanker for Bismarck andPrill: Eugen, Slink on 12 June in 44°48'24°00'W by HMS Sheffielti,

Gtdania, supply lanker for Bismarck, PrintEugell and U-boats, captured by HMS /llarsdak

on 4June in 43°38'N 28°15'W.eo1Junheim, supply ship for Bismarck and PrinzEugell, scuttled on 4June in 43°29'N 24°04'Wwhen several British warships appeared.LOlhringen, supply lanker for Bismarck, Prinz.Eugell and U-boats, intercepted by HMS DUlledill

and aircraft from the carrier Eagle on 15 Junein 19°49'N 38°30W.Spichern (ex-Krossjolln) was the onl)' supplyship at sea to slip through the net and returnLO her home base at St Nazaire.

T1-IE END OF' HIE CRUISER WAR

During the Sllll'lll'ler of 1941 the generalprogress of the war at sea may have lookedrelaLively promising for the Germans,especially when one considers in retrospecLthe terrific successes still to come inAmerican waters during the first months of1942, The underlying trend though was grim.After the loss of Bismarck, only two pocketball..Ieships and two heavy cruisers remainedoperational. Lii,tz.ow (ex-De-utschland underFregkpl. Bodo Heinrich Knoke) was almostready ror action arter lengthy repairs whenraiding plans were frustrated by a singletorpedo dropped rrom a British aircrart ino 10 Fjord, Admiral Scheer was undergoing aroutine refit in readiness for a foray into theArctic in early autumn. Engine trouble stillkept Hipper Olll or action; and PrillZ ElIgen,

Gneisenau and Schamhorst were undergoingrepairs in France. This damage was the resultor bombing b)' ti,e Ro)'al Air Force and therewas no prospect of these \'essels becomingoperational until ti,e rollowing )'ear, Auxiliarycruisers fared a lillie better; only one(Pillgui" under Kpl.z.S, Ernst-Felix Knider)had been sunk by enemy action. The others

39

had either returned to pan or were still atlarge, but their successes had dwindledconsiderably in the face of anti-raidermeasures introduced by their opposition.

Mter the destruction of the Original supplynetwork in June 1941, the Kriegsmarinerailed to re-establish another European-basedprm'isioning system. Instead Germany lookedto the Far East to obtain supplies rrom Japan,ailings from Europe did not come to a

complete halt, as has often been imagined,but only a few ships managed to run in andout of France,

By the end or 1941, Britain could alreadydecode a substantial proportion of Germanradio traffic, and by the end or the rollo\\;ngyear this intelligence had been considerablyincreased. Atlan.tis, the first auxiliary cruiserLO have sailed, was sunk in November 1941as a direct result of the code breakers atBletchley Park having read her radioinstructions to UJ 26 (Kptll. Ernst Bauer),with details of their meeting place. TheZ-ship (supply ship ror -boats) Python

suITered a sill'lilar fate a shan time after shehad picked up sun'ivors rrom Atlantis, Shehad been ordered to the scene after theGermans had intercepted tJle raider's Englishlanguage distress call in correct British code.Incidentally, the auxiliary cruiser code wasne\'er broken and Bletchley Park obtained ti,eraider's positions through U-boat ciphers,

In February 1942, Prinz ElIgell (Kpl.z. ,Helmlllh Brinkmann), Scharnhorst (Kpl.z.S,Kun Caesar Hoffmann) and Gnei.se>lIllL (Kpl.z.S.OttO Fein) scored a ps),chological \;Ct0'1' O\-erthe Ro}-al Na\)' by passing through ti,e EnglishChannel from Bresl. The so-called 'ChannelDash' came about as a direct result of Hiller'shunch that Britain would in\'ade orway;consequentl}' he ordered Grand Admiral ErichRaeder to send these tluee major units intononhern waters. Raeder was opposed to themO\'e, but Hitler argued tI,at ti,e ships wouldbe beller employed in Non,,,y and suggested a

GER~I ANN til' Y HAN DBOO K 1939 - I 945TilE FLEET COMMAND AND LARGE SURFACE SHIPS AT WAR

Prim. Eugen's signal nest during the Channel Dash.

Flags were still favoured for close-range

communications when it was pmdent to maintain

radio silence.

potentially great. However. Hitler refusedon the grounds that he anticipated an Alliedinvasion of Europe and he thought that airsupport was not su'ong enough to give Scheerthe help she needed for such a venture.

After this meeting. the general situationregarding the \'elr at sea declined rapidly andthe prospeclS of sending auxiliaI1' cnlisers outof Europe receded exceedingl)' quickl),. InDecember 1942 Raeder announced thecancellation of cOI1\'ersion work on the lastraider (Schiff 49, pre,-iousl)' known asAmerskerk). This 7,900 gn (gross registeredLOn) vessel had been commandeered in

quick dash through the Channel. Raederprotested abollt the choice of route, butwas o\'erruled and the three ships leftunder command of Admiral Otto Ciliax(Commander-in-Chief for Battleships). Thisdaring venture was executed \\;thoul too muchdifficulty, but iL spun'cd the British imo makinga strong effon to prc\'cnt similar feats frombeing perfonllcd in me future. British \igilanccincreased, 1l1aking the Channel route adangerolls proposition for the second wave of

raiders leaving German)'. Thor (Kpl.z.S.Gunther Gumprich) managed to pass through\\ilholiL too much trouble during November194 I, but Michefs (Kpl.z.S. Hellmuth vonRuckteschell) attempt almost came to grief.Stier (Kpl.z.S. Horst Gerlach) was the last toget through, in Ma)' 1942. Komel (Kpl.z.S.Ulrich Brocksien) was sunk in the Channelduring October and Coronel (Kpl.z.S. ErnstThicncmann) was recalled to prevent hercenain destruction. The few ships which didbreak out into the southern waters werereasonably successful, although none of themachieved the high sinking figures of theirpredecessors. However, they created a greatdeal of commotion, dela)'ed sailing schedules,forced merchant ships to make lengthydelours, kept the Ro)"tl Na,y from other dutiesand, on the whole, produced favourable results.

The last plans to emplo), large regularwar hips in the Atlantic were formulated on26 August 1942 when. at a meeting withHitler, Raeder and Vizeadmiral TheodorKrancke (Permanent Representati,·e of the~avy's Supreme Commander-in-Chief atHitler' Headquarters and earlier captain ofAdmiral Scheer) and Kpt.z.S. Karl:lesko \'onPuttkammer (Hitler's a,·al Adjutant)discussed the possibilities of sending thepocket battleship Admiral Scheer to the SouthAtlantic. Raeder was convinced that Scheerhad a good chance of slipping through theAllied nel, and thal the political andpsychological rewards of such a \'oyage were

An escorting destroyer seen from the hea\")' cmiser

Pllnz. Eugen during the Channel Dash.

Prinz Eugtm dllling the Channel Dash (11-13 Febl1.lary 1942) when a squadron o~hea\'Y ships ran into northem

waters from Brest (above and below), The entire operation so close to the English coast made the men tens~,

Every position on board fully occupied them and all guns were con~tantly ready~for <lcUon. ~1any men h~d~l t

expected 1.0 live tlll'ough tlle reckless venture and seeing the sun nse over tllC Elbe estual) was a great lehef.

40 41

G EH~I ANN AVY II AND BOO K 1939 - I 945 TilE FLEET COMMAND AND LAHGE S HFACE SHIPS AT WAH

The German war nag nying aboard auxiliary cruisel- Widder, with the rear gun uncovered for aClion.

When not in lise this was made to look like a deck cabin, hence a bullseye has been painted on the side.

Prinz E!lgtm during the Channel Dash.

42

Holland in April 1940 and handed over to:-Ionh German L1o)'d. She would have beencalled Coburg. had the commissioning takenplace. Ship /4, ColVne~ was almost read)' to sailand an 3uempt was made to get her out duringearly January, 1943. However, by this limeBlitish ships operated freel)' along the Frenchcoast without fear of hindrance from theKriegsmatine, even dllling daylight. Coronel'schances of making it were slim. Yet l..he sailingorders were issued and progress carefully

43

monitored until it became clear that the RoyalNavy was LOO powerful, at which time the shipwas recalled. Auxiliary cnliser l\11ichel was tillat sea, ofT Japan, but without a single suppl),ship to suppon her. Consequentl), heroperations were restriCled, but this hardl)'mane red since raiders had ceased to be aneffeClive force and success could now bemeasured onl)' in terms of the length of Limeships succeeded in staying afloat. The surfacewar on far distant seas had ground to a hall.

INCIDENTS AND OPERATIONS

AUlumn manoeuvres, 1937. The laying of smoke screens is being praclised.

INCIDENTS AND OPERATIONS

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON

POLAND

The war at sea was opened at 0445 hI's on1 September 1939 by the old, and obsolete,bauleship Schleswig-Holstein, under Kpt.z.S.Gustav KJeikamp, with a bombardment ofthe Polish-held Westerplatte, a spit of landin the estuary outside Danzig (East Prussia).The four 280-mm and six 105-mm gunswere ideally suited for such a close-range

auack which would weaken the defencesbefore landings by several naval assaultgroups. However, the concrete bunkers didnot succumb and it was a shonage ofammunition and food that evenLUally forcedthe Polish garrison there LO surrender four

days later.This event, and indeed the entire German

invasion of Poland, is today often regarded asthe unwarranted anack of a powerful forceagainst a small nation but in those days manyGermans saw this in a different light. Modern

hislory books frequently fail to explain thatlhe Polish people had maintained theirlanguage, culture and nationality for severalcenturies without a government because a,'ariety of nations had laid claim to theterritory in which they lived. In 1919, afterthe First ''''orld ''''aI', the \~ctoriousAllies usedthis Polish determination as a tool for furtherweakening Germany, Austria and Russia.Large areas of their countries were hived offfor the founding of a new nation, the PolishRepublic. Twenty years later, when theSecond ""orld '-Val' started, many men whomarched into Poland had already been bornwhen their homeland had been taken awayand they had grown up during a time whenthe education system had further ingrainedthis resentment.

One cannot condone ule military attack onPoland or even hope to understand thebarbarism wiul which ule Poles were treated.Even regular soldiers of the German Armywere appalled by the brulalil)' activated by theNazis. Yet it is also important to rememberthat the majority of soldiers who marchedinto Poland did not look upon their move asan invasion of a foreign country, but rather asa reoccupation of their homeland. A goodnumber of them had been forced out of theirhomes and the little compensation whichthey had received was lost as a result of thedevaluation of the German Mark during thedramatic inflation of the 1920s. Theirancestors had settled in the sparsely inhabitedregions of the east 150 years earlier, longbefore the area had come under the militaryrule of a French army of occupation underNapoleon. Therefore some of these Germansoldiers had long-established roots in thefertile plains which are now Poland.

AtTMJlRK INCIDENT

After having run the blockade from theSouth Atlantic, Admiral GnifSpee's supply ship

Altmark under Kpt. Heinrich Dau wasintercepted by neutral Norwegian warships.The subsequent radio traffic gave away theposition to the Royal Navy and when thedestroyer HMS Cossack (Cdr P.L. Vian)appeared, Dau sought shelter in NorwegianterritOl-ial waters. There he was attacked by aboarding party on 16 Februa,,' 1940 who shota number of unarmed German sailors andreleased the prisoners aboard Allmark. Thefact that nearby Nonvegian warships did notmake an effon to prevent this armedintrusion of their waters made the Genllansrealise that the country was supporting theAllied side rather than remaining neutral.This action, together with a similar incidentinvolving the United States freighter Cit)! 0/Flint, contributed towards Germany makingplans for the invasion of orway.

A1'llENIJl INCIDENT

On the first day of the war Kptlt. Fritz:JlIlillsLemp in U30 disobeyed standing orders andtorpedoed the 13,581 gn passenger linerAthenia without warning. Since he also failedto report the incident, the Germanpropaganda system accused Ule British SecretService and the Prime Minister, ''''instonChurchill, of deliberate sabotage for thepurpose of casting Germany in a bad light.Some weeks later, when U30 returned homeand the truth came out, Hitler ordered therelevalll pages of the boat's log to beremoved and to obliterate all reference tothe sinking. At the same time, the crew wassworn to secrecy and the prohibition ofattacks against passenger ships, even thosesailing in convoys under milital1' escort, wasfurther emphasised. This order remained inforce until ule summer of the following year.This rather unfortunate incident led Britainto conclude that Germany had issued ordersfor unrestricted sea warfare, although theexact opposite was true.

44 45

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945I.\'CIDENTS AND OPEIlATIONS

open display of aggression by a GermanU-boat and ordered na''lIJ forces to attack Axisships on sighl. Hitler, wishing to keep Americaout of the "'lIr, agreed that Fraatz's action hadbeen correct, but he gave striCt in tructions toavoid conflict with American ships, saying thateven when au.acked, -boats must not defendtllemselves by taking offen ive action.

KEARNY I CWENT

The United States destroyer Kearn)'participated in the defence of convoy SC48 inOctober 1941 at a time when ti,e United Stateswas still supposed to have been a neutral

UJ23. The large T,~ IX V-boats \ 'ere al fi d 'm 3- .. ~ r- \ so me WI a I-mm qUICk-firing gun on the upper deck, aft of

the COl1l~lllg .LOwer. The ship in the background appears to have several ani lieI')' hits in the side, but it

I~~ as If ~hls ~1I1 has not been used on this occasion. The gun had to be loaded by insening each

cal tnd=-e sll1gly ~n~o the bl-eech. The watertight tampon for sealing the barrel can clearly be seen. Thelater 3/·mm anti-aircraft gun varied by firing smaller canridges from a semi-automatic hopper.

GREER f CIDE T

On 7 September 1941, before the nitedStates joined in the "'lIr, the position of U652

(Obll.z.S. Georg Werner Fraatz) was passedfrom a British aircraft to the United Statesdestroyer Greer (Lt Cdr Frost). The boatdived but was still hunted with Asdic by theneutral ship and aircraft were direCled tothe SpOt for a depth charge assaull. Thinkinghe was under attack from the destroyer, Fraatzfired two LOrpedoes but missed and U652 waslucky to have escaped the subsequent depthcharges from the destroyer. The UnitedStates president took this to have been an

The code-name for the Allied operation tosCLIttle V-boats after the war. Boats still at seawhen the war ended were ordered tosurface, hoist a black nag and awaitinstructions to make for a specified Alliedpan. Boats in German-held pons weredisarmed and later taken to isolatedassembl)' points mainly at Loch Eriboll (onthe west side of Scotland's north coast),Loch Ryan (west of Dumfries, Scotland) andto Lisahally (often also called Lisnahilly) inLoch Foyle (near Londonderry, NorthernIreland). From there they were moved insmall groups to be sunk in deep water. A fewdidn't make it and went down where theycould be reached by di,·ers. The first wa,'eleft towards tlle end of November J945 andthe last wa,·es were sunk in January of thefollowing year. A survey conducted duringthe I980s of known -boats in shallow watersrevealed that every one had been raided byrelic hunters.

GIBRALTAR (OPERATION 'FELIX')

'DEADLIGHT', OPERATION

Pre-war plans for capturing Gibraltar werefurther evaluated during August 1940 underthe code name of Operation 'Felix'. Themain objectives were to cut off Britishdominance in the western Mediterraneanand to make it more difficult for the Alliesto run convoys along the African coasts. Atthe same time, German possession ofGibraltar would have provided an ideal basefor V-boat operations in the Atlantic.However, the plan would have involvedconsiderable assistance from Spain andGeneral Franco felt his country had beentoo decimated by its civil war, and thereforeresisted all efforts to become involved in aconnict against Britain. Consequently theGerman plans for attacking Gibraltar wereabandoned.

CITY OF BENARE INCIDENT

The passenger liner Cit), OJ Bellares wastorpedoed during the first minutes of18 September 1940, just a few weeks after theNa\Oal High Command had allowed thiscategory of ship to be a legitimate target.Although she was sailing in an esconedconvoy without liglllS, the passengerson board had hardly practised lifeboat drilland a large number of children were killed bythe sinking. Mter the war, the -boatcommander, Kptll. Heinrich Bleichrodt ofU48, was accused of knowing that the shipcarried children and a concerted attempt wasmade to force hi.m into making a confessionthat he deliberately singled them out to bekilled. This accusation was absurd inaslllllchas Bleichl'oeil neither knew which ship he wasattacking nor whaL it was carrying. In thedarkness of night, it was a legitimate target.Despite considerable pressure brought by theBJilish authorities, levelling the accusation forthe rest of his life, Bleichrodt had thestrength of character to resist making sucha confession and the case collapsed due to alack of e\~dence. It is interesting to add thata number of sea-going Royal Navy officersalso regarded this unwarranted attack onBleichrodt to have been unjust and helped bywarning him that tlle authorities were makinga concerted attempt to get him hanged.

CITY OF FLINT INCIDENT

A United States merchant ship captured on9 October 1939 by the pocket battleshipDeutschland at the beginning of the war whichbecame the centre of a diplomatic row andindicated that orway was not going tomaintain its neutrality. Thinking that shewould side with the Allies against Germanyresulted in plans being made to invade thecountry before it became a British base. Seealso the section on Deutschland.

4647

GERMAN NArY HANDBOOJ.; 1939-1945 INCIDENTS AND OPEIUTIO,\'

officers the)' should know their duty.Consequentl)' the order °Regenbogen' wastransmitted by word of mouth because thelise of radio codes had already beenprohibited by the Allies. The distance to ti,eNorth Sea base at \'Vilhelmsha,"en was too far,but the senior officer there (Korvkpt.Heinrich Bleichrodl) ordered boats lO besunk" Later, when he was reprimanded by theRoyal I a,y, he told the admirals that as anaval officer he did not need orders tosCLIttle. The faCl that yOll don't surrenderyour ship had already been learned at school.

ST NAZAIIIE (RAID ON)

A French pon used as a Gennan submarinebase. Attacked by British forces in March

murdered U-boat men in life-rafts ha'"e ne\'erfaced court martial.

-REGEl BOGEN" OPERATION

German code-word ordering the scuttlingof V-boats at ti,e end of ti,e war before theycould be reached by Allied forces. As a termof surrender, Grand Admiral Karl Donitzagreed to hand o"er all na'"al forces intactand e"en appointed two liaison officers,Fregkpt. Heinrich Liebe and ObILZ,S.Martin Duppel, to ensure that the code,,·ord "Regen bogen' should not be issued.HO\\'c"er, neither of them believed ulis andcalled on Donitz's Headquarters for"erificaLion, but his adjutant (Kor'Vkpt. ',ValterLlidde-Neurath) told them that as n3'"al

St Nazaire, showing the large lock thai could also scp..e as dry dock for huge battleships and which

became the main larget for a daring commando raid on the pon"

P£LW INCIDENT

including 4 battleships were sunk, almost200 aircldft destroyed, over 150 damaged andalmost 2,500 men lost their li"es, while Japanlost only 29 aircraft, I submarine and 5 midgetsubmalines, The raid came about as a result ofsecret papers caplllred by auxilial1' cruiserA/lan/is being passed over to the Japanese,telling them about British milimry dispositionsin the Far East. As a result of this attack,Germany declared war on the United Su'ues.

After the sinking of the 4,695 gn Greekfreighter Peleus by U852 in the SOUtll Atlanticoff Africa, KptlL Heinz-Wilhelm Eck orderednoating debris to be sunk by gunfire toprevent it giving away his position to passingaircraft. A number of survivors were killedduring this somewhat reckless anion. Almosttwo months later an air induClion pipe wasdamaged by aircraft and consequently U852was beached on the Somali coast, some80 km south of Cape Guardafui. The crewmanaged to get ashore before blowing uptheir boat, but the wreck was found byHMS Falmol//il and a boarding panyexamined the remain. At the same time theGermans were rounded up and taken prisoner.The 29-year-old Eck, Lu.S. August Hoffmann(1111'0) and the boat's medical officer, Walter\Yeisspfennig, were later forced into makingconfessions about the shooting of survivorsand sentenced to deaul, despite the last twoclaiming that they were obeying orders. Allthree were executed by firing squad to thesouth of Hamburg on 30 November 1945.

These were the only U-boat men to besentenced to death for war Climes, althoughthe Allies also tried forcing false confessionsout of other men. This case is still a bone ofcontention among some submarinersbecause they consider it not to have been afair trial. There was hardly a case made forthe defence and Allied officers who

PEARL HAHBOR

LACONIA INCIDENT

(aUllu-y. Following her identification as aB,'itish destroyer, U568 (KptlL Georg Preuss)attacked "itll torpedoes. killing about a dozenof her crew. As a result Gennan)' imposed stilllighter resu;Clions on U·boats in the weslenlAtlantic, while America llsed this as anotherexample of murderous U-boat aggression.

An American naval base and anchorage inHawaii, attacked by Japanese forces on7 December 1941. In the attack 19 "arships

Follm,ing ti,e sinking of the troop uansportLaconia on 12 September 1942, KptlL WernerHartenstein (U156) discovered that therewere some 1,500-2,000 Italian prisonersamong the survi\'ors. His immediate rescueoperation was supponed by the -boatCommand, who ordered other U-boats in thearea to assist. At the same time Hartensteinbroadcast a plain language appeal for helpand covered his gUlls with Red Cross flags.Diplomatic negotiations with Frenchauthorities in ""cst Africa resulted in warshipsbeing dispatched to pick up survivors.However a Liberator from the United StatesArmy Air Force made five attacks on the life­boats. As a result Admiral Karl Donitz, the

-boat Chief, told his commanders to a'"oidsuch rescue operations in the future, Mterthe war, this so-called 'Laconia Order'featured strongly at the Intel·national MilitaryTribunal in uremberg where it was claimedthat Donitz's decision amounted to an orderfor k.illing sun~vors" Although the court k.newabout ule aircraft atlack, it was assumed thatthis had been a spur-of-ule-moment decisionby the pilot who had been unaware of therescue operation. The court was not told thatthis attack on survivors had been plannedand ordered by Allied authorities.

4849

•

GE R)\ AiX NAn II AiX DBOO K 1939 - I 9" 5

THE FLEET

1942 with a view to destroying the lockleading to the inner pon basin. The reasonbeing that this was large enough to sen'e asdry dock for the ballleship Tirpilz. Althoughthe lock was put out of action by rammingthe destroyer Cambelltown inLO the gates anddetonating explosives inside her, tidal accessto the U-boat pens remained. However thisallack emphasised the vulnerability of thenearby U-boat Headquaners and shonlyafterwards the sLaff was moved to Paris,

'SEALION' OPERATION

The code name for planned landings inEngland. Much of ulis operation progressedwith a definite half-hearted atmosphere,giving the impression that il was a means ofappl)'ing pressure to the British governmentfor agreeing to cease-fire negotiationsrather than a serious attempt LO invade.Local commanders were given orders tomobilise considerable resources, but much

of the support they needed from homeremained lacking. The plan began duringthe early summer of 1940 and wasabandoned in October. During this period.naval support units as well as barges forcarrying tfOOPS were assembled in thefollowing places: Flushing, Hook of Hollandand ROllcrdalll, Zeebrugge, Antwerp,Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre

and Cherbourg.Landings were planned as follows:

Coast between Folkeslone and Dungeness(Vizeadnliral Hermann "on Fischel) withunits from Rotterdam, OSlcnd and Dunkirk.Coast between Dungeness and \·Vinchelsea(Kpl.z.S. Gustav Kleikamp) with units from

Calais and Antwerp.Coast between Eastboume Head and Bexhill(KpLZ.S. \,Verner Lindenau or EugenLindau) witll uniLS from Boulognc.Coast between Brighton and Selsc)' Bill(Kpl.z.S. Ernst Scheurlen) with units from Le

Havre.

50

L = Launched; C = Commissioned; S =Sunk;OoA = Out of Action

BATTLESHIPS

BismarckL: 14 February 1939 at Blohm und Vo s inHamburg; C: 24 August 1940; S: 27 lay 1941.

TirpitzL: 1 April 1939 at the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmshaven; C: 25 January 1941; OoAafter X-eraft attack on 22 September 1943; S:12 November 1944.

G"e;senauL: 8 December 1936 at Deutsche Werke inKiel; C: 21 May 1938; OoA during Ule nightof 26-7 February 1942 as a result of an airraid on Kiel. The ship remained non­operational until 4 April when it was mo\'edto Gotenhafen for decommissioning. Finallyscuttled there towards the end of the war andscrapped between 1946 and 1952.

Scharnhorst

L: 3 October 1936 at the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmshaven; C: 7 January 1939; S: in theArclic seas on 26 December 1943.

Schlesien

L 28 May 1906 at F. Schichau in Danzig; C: 5 May1908; S: by a mine on 3 May 1945 and beached.

Schleswig-Holstein

L: 7 December 1906 at Germania Werft inKiel; C: 7July 1908; OoA: 20 December 1944.

51

BismarckThe Admiralty in London watched thebuilding, launching, commissioning andsubsequent work-up of the world's mostpowerful battleship with great anxiety untilthe giant moved to Gotenhafen for filtingout, where it was well out of range of eventhe longest ranging reconnaissance aircraft.When Hitler inspected the batueship Ulere,he voiced his concern about the forth­coming foray into the Atlantic. but wasassured by Admiral Gemther Lugens (FleetCommander) that Bismarck had nothing to

fear. Such an optimistic view was not sharedby the entire Naval Command. Kpl.z.S. KarlTopp, captain of ballleship Tilpilz, hadconducted a lengthy wargame with hisofficers to determine the odds of reachingforeign waters, Their grim conclusion wasthat once the Royal Navy knew that the shipwas underway, its chance of survival was nil.There was no wa)' that Britain could afford toallow such a powerful ship to wreak havoc inthe vaSUless of the Atlantic. and the best wayLO prevent such potential disaster was to sLOpit getling there in the first place.

Shortly afterwards, on 18 May 1941,Bismarck (Kpl.z.S. Ernst Lindemann) and herconsort, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen(Kpt.z.S. Helmuth Brinkmann), slipped outof the Baltic to embark on Bismarck's one andonly war cruise. Although luck played a rolein early reconnaissance reaching London,the Royal I avy was prepared to throweverything against the two giants. This, iniLSelf was not as easy as might be imagined. Aknowledge of the exact saHing time was vital,othen\1Se British ships might be sent to sea

GE Il ~I ANN AVY fI AN I) BOO K I 939 - I 94 5 Til E FLEET

Tirpi/:zTirpilz, the lonell' Queen of the Nonh,achie\'ed more nOLOl'iety by doing nothingthan many smaller units which sankconsiderably more ships. Her mere presencewas such a threat to the Allies that at onestage COI1\"O)'5 to nortllen1 Russia were haltedjust because she might emerge from herhiding place deep in the Nom-egian fjords.Describing the British attacks against herwould fill an entire \'olume in itself, )'et thedecision to conceal her in the maze ofjagged

battleship in Norway, where Prinz Eugen hadbeen topped up, and this now gave theGermans no alternath'e other than to makefor the safel), of the French coasl.

Running engines at fast speeds meant it wasnecessary to refuel Prin: Eugen once more.Therefore the heav}' cnliser was dismissed torendez\'ous with a supply tanker beforeraiding merchant shipping in the NorthAtlantic. Bismarck headed towards Brest,thinking she had thrown off the pursuers.Howe\'er, during the morning of 26 May 1941BislIlQlck was sigilled b)' a Catalina nying-boalfrom Coastal Comilland. That evening awordfish aircraft was able to score a torpedo

hit on Bismarck's steering gear, rendering itinoperable. Bismarck held off a destroyerattack from the 4th Flotilla dlll;ng tl1e comingniglll, blll the hea\')' guns of the ballieshipKi"g George Vand ROll,,"), C1ippled lhe doomedship during the following da)'. Eventually,unable to manoeuvre and almost out ofammunition, the pl'ide of the German nationwas scutlled. Both Lindemann and the FleetCommander went down with the ship on27 Mal', lWO dars afler Liitjens' 52nd birlhdal"In addition to the ships mentioned above,Bismarck was hunted by 2 aircraft carriers,12 cnlisers, 21 desu'o)'ers and about 50 aircraftfrom Coast.:....l Command, and in the final one­and-a-half hour bau.le illook some 3,000 hem)'shells and se\'eralLOrpedoes lO cripple her_

on a collision course with these two powerfulopponents.

The knot was first tied when the cruiserH~IS SuJJoik sigh led the German squadronsteaming on a south-westerl}' course north ofIceland. This made it clear where the)' \\'eregoing and Suffolk cOl1\"eniently found a mistbank for cO\'ering her presence. Using radar,she kept contact, reporting details of positionand course. The B-Dienst aboard the Germanships intercepted these signals and fogpatches were used to shake off tlle pursuer.Ho\\'e\'er, each time the \'isibilit), impro\'ed,the Germans found the cruiser still on theirtail. The other method of throwing off thefollower didn't work either, Turning round infog and then auacking the pursuer didn'thave much effect because the cruiser rana\\£I}' before tl)C hea\')' guns could be broughtto bear, Baron Burkhard von Mullheim­Rechberg, one of Bismarck's suni\~ng officers,has written: '\oVe concluded the British musthave an efficient long-range radar system,which threw the whole concept of surfacewarfare into a disturbing new dimension.'

On the morning of 24 Mal' 1941, lheGerman squadron was engaged by thebattlecruiser /-food and the battleship Prince ofII ales_ This brief exchange ended wilh Hoodsinking as a result of a direct hit in one ormore of her magazines and Prince of "'alesbeing dri\'en away to nurse damage. PrinzEugt!n came through unscathed, but Bismarckhad su tained three hits, two of them hem)',the effects of which would now playa majorrole in the course of battle. A direct hit inone of Bismarck's tanks in her forecastleisolated about a thousand tons of fuel.pre\'enting all access to il. In addition to tllis,a considerable leak left a noticeable trail ofoil in her wake for any reconnaissance planeto see. Bismarck had also suffered damage toher machinery, and a hole in her bows hadsJigllll)' reduced her LOp speed_ The GenTIansLafT had thought it unnecessary to refuel the

out of luck. London knew that the ships wereon the mo,-e and the skilful pluck of a lonepilot, Michael uckling, confirmed u1at theywere on their way. The Gelll1an IntelligenceSen-ice (B-Diensl) failed lO eXlraCl an)'relevant news from the ether, and at onecritical pel;od of time informed Lu~ens thatthe RO)'31 Navy was still at Scapa Flow when infaCl HMS Hood and HM P,;"ce oj 1I'0ies werejust oyer his horizon and Bismarck was already

tOO early and run out of fuel just at the

cnlCial time of coming to batue.sing the co\'er of bad weather, Admiral

Gllllther Llujens (Fleet Commander aboardBismarck) slipped out of his anchorage inNorway when low clouds and appallingweather prevented the usual enemyreconnaissance flights. But despite u1e poorvisibility and the experience gained earlierwith Scharnhorst and GneisenQ.u, he was now

A model of battleship Bi.smllrck in the Naval Memorial at Laboe (Kid). The magnificent colleClio~l of

models makes a significant contribution to the value of the memorial because lhe)~ help to explall1 the .

\'cry reason for its existence. Il is a pity thal not more silclll and cold stone memonals make Sl~c1~ an effOll

and provide an informative display. To the tight of the crane are t,,·o 15D-mlll turrelS ohlle shl: S

secondary armament. The turrets of the smaller I05-mm guns can also be seen. Th~ dome, pel,ched on

the lOp of a circular tower just forward of the twO launches and a lillie below the bndge. contall1ed a .

gyroscopically stabilised platform housing rangefindcl"'S and gunnery control,for ~he. second~I)'and anll..aircraft amlament. To the left of the crnne,just below the LOp of the funnel, IS a slImlar-looklng structllle.

This is the folded"own cover ofa searchlight and has a ribbed appearance.

52 53

GEllMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-19'15

Thpilz.'s smallest fixed armaments: a quadruple 2Q-mm allli-aircraft gun.

Til E FLEET

The W31Talll officers' mess aboard battleship TilPi/z..

rocks was not made by the German NavalCommand. The aval War talT had planneda raiding sortie into the North Atlantictogether with the pocket battleship Admiral

Scheer. It was Hitler who intervenedpersonaHy. Having watched Ti,pitz's (Kpl.Z.S.Karl Topp) trials in the Baltic while Bismarckwas being hunted to death, he ordered theNaval Command to cancel their plannedoperation. Hitler decided she should bemoved to Trondheim, where she remainedfor about six months before venturing outfor her first war cruise. This was a quick hitand fun mission against convoys PQ8 andQPI2 ('PQ' - signified Britain to NorthRussia, while QP signified Russia to Britain)which achieved VCI)' little, allhough one ofTirpitz's escorting destroyers managed to sinka smaH, empty Russian freighter.

The first significant attack against Tirpitz.came to an abrupt end in October 1942

when, just a few miles from its goal, a coupleof human torpedoes (Chariots - torpedo-likesubmarines that carded tWO operators sittingpiggy-back style on tOp) broke away from thefishing boat carrying them across the NorthSea. This boat had left the Shetlands on26 October under Leif Larsen. Despite thedisappointment, the target was LOO powerfulto be abandoned and the Royal Na\1' triedagain "itl, X-naft. In September 1943, thesemidget submarines succeeded in droppingspecially designed mines under Tirpilz's hull.The detonation caused all three propellershafts to be bent, tI,e rudder to be damaged,and cracks below the water-line which allowedsignificant quantities of water into the ship.Several LUrbines were also unseated and evenone of the heavy 3SG-mm tll.Tets was lifted outof its foundations. Almost half a year wasrequired for repairs and trials were still underway when Britain mounted another massive

54

atLack on 5 Aplil 1944. This time the aircraftcarriers Furious and Vicloriolls, the escortcarriers Emperor, Fencer, Pursuer and Searcher,together with an escort of battleship, cruisersand destroyers brought 41 Barracuda carrierbombers, protected by 41 fighters, to thetarget. Their 14 hits resulted in 122 aboardTirpilz being killed and a further 316 beingwounded, while the attackers suffered the lossof only 4 aircraft. Consequently the Queen ofthe North was put out of action for anotherthree months. This action makes one wonderabout the efficiency of German anti-aircraftdefences. If a stable battleship with po"'erfulguns couldn't cope against an attack byrelatively flimsy and small aircraft, thenV-boats. with considerably less fire-power anda rocking gun-base, stood vel)' little chance

55

against the much larger and beller al1110uredaircraft from the Royal Air Force's CoastalCommand.

A most astonishing attack came a fortnightlater, when a bomb penetrated the al1110ureddeck, but failed to explode. Germany'smasquerading was effective enough La keepdrawing atLacks ontO the Tirpilz, altllOugh shewas hardly fit for action. Finally. in mid­August 1944. another air attack put hertotally out of action, bUl again Germany keptup the pretence and mO\'ed her out of hernorthern hideout by disguising the tugs asescorts. The trick worked. Britain mountedfurther attacks and Ti1jJilz. was finall)' sunk byLancaster bombers in No\'ember 1944. Anaction which also killed m'er 900 of her crew.leavingjust880 battered sun~vors.

GER ~I A~ i" AI" Y II A ~ 0 BOO K I 939 - 1945

OfT-dut)' sailors laking advantage of Til1Jitz.'s band rehearsing on the open deck. The two 15O-mm gun

turrets can be seen in t..he background. Both Tilpil:. and Bismarck had a pair of these turrets on each side

oCthe hull pointing forwards and a single set pointing aft.

THE FLEET

The bridge an~ c~rnmand tower of the batlJeship GnLisnUlu, photographed in Brest in 1941. The basic

fe~tu~es were Similar to t.hose seen on the model of Bismarr:k, only Lhere wasjust one J5O-mm gun tlllTet

~Olmll1~ forwards. The main mast, attached to the rear ofule funnel is a valuable identifica60n feaLurc. The

SIsLer ship SchamJwrsl had her main mast further aft, between the aircraft catapult and Ule rear rallgefinder.

Gne;senau and SchanlhorstThese two ships were classed as baLllecnlisersby foreign navies, although the Germanadministration system tended to refer to

lhem as ballJeships.Towards the middle of Allgusl 1939, when

emergency war plans came into CrreCl,G1Je1.senOll (Kpt.z.S. Elich Forslc) continued inher role as fleet training ship, meaning shewas not fully operational until latcr in theautumn. Her first war cruise LOok her into theNonh Sea wilh the liglll cruiser Kalil (Kpl.z.S.Theodor Burchardi) and se,·en.1 deslro)"ers.Both Gneisenau and her siSLer ship SdlllmllOrslwere back in pon LOwards the end of OCLOberto be killed Ollt for a strike against Britishblockading cruisers. The id~.... was to test the

56

opposition's \;gilance and LO make life easierfor German merchant ships running theblockade lhrollgh the Nonh Allanlic. In lheend the venture had to be wrillen off as amagnificent shakedown cruise because theRoyal Nav)' was unaware of the Germanpresence and, of course, the anticipatedcruiser blockade didn't exist. In faCt, Britain'knowledge of Genllan ship movements was sosketchy that when SchamJwrsl (Kpl.z.S. KurtCaesar Hoffmann) was sighted b)' the auxiliarycruiser RawaljJindi, she was identified aspocket battleship Deul.schland~ whose presencehad been reponed earlier. The sinking ofRawalpilldi (Capl R.C. Kennedy) on23 November 1939 was the onl)' noteworthybrush with the Ro)'al Na\·y and Gneisenau

Pocket battleship Admiral GrajSjJ«on the left and battleship GTlLismau on the right. Both GlI~~UlU andScharnhorst had cwo Lriple gun llllTets .. r d d .".. . polllLlIlg 10n\'3.r s an one tnple turret on tlle stem, while Bismarr:k

and 7"Pliz. had LWO double turrets fore and aft.. The main artillery comrol posiLion was located on the LOp

o~ the command LOwer,jusL below the lo-meLre-long opLical rangefinder. A further aniller)' conLrol centre\\lLh Io-melrc-Iong rangefinder can be seen fon\'3.rd of the bridge.

57

a

GERMAN NAYY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEET

59

The man is carrying a bill)'can usually used for collecting food from the galle)', but on this occasion thereis a race to see who can get it the fastest around the ship. There is a fair amount of water in it to make

sure the carrier cannOl go too fast. The Navy had a \'aSl number of such challenges and orten they were

taken far morc seriousl)' than official competitions. Another one of these games in\"oh-ed rolling an eggaround the deck with one's nose.

Lt.z.. Westip) had to be scuttled when theywere approached by the Royal Na\)'. Successcontinued for the Germans. The day afterthe capture, twelve further ships were sunk,but an abundance of smoke also attracted thebattleship HMS RadII/!)" surprising Gneisellauwhile picking up sun;vors from the blazingfreighter a,ileall RPeJer. The Ge,mans answeredthe signal 'What ship?' with 'HMS Emerald'before making ofT at fast speed.

Once again the Brilish neet enlpted intoactivity, with a desperate effon to cut theGermans off before they reached homewaters, but there was no need for AdmiralLllljens to run the gauntlet. Instead, thesquadron was refueJled at sea and their luck

force 7-9 raged with temperatures of 18°Cbelow zero. In addition to this, the Ro)",1 Navy"'as forced back to pon by a shortage of fuel.However. the Admiralty in London was notgoing LO send ships out too soon and makethe same mistake again. The next ship totorment the Royal Navy was Bismarr:k.

To return to Lhe cold SlOlm in March 1941;when the weather abated Gneisenau andScharnhorst encountered six uncsconed ships.Three ships were sunk but the other three, allfully laden tankers, were captured andrerollled to France. One of them (Polycarpcommanded by Lez.S. Klemp) reached theGironde Estuary. The other two (San Casimirounder Ll.z.S. Alfons Grenz and Bianca under

the second time. Il was thought that had theB-DiensL not been aware of an increase inradio traffic, both ships might have endedtheir days at the mercy of a powerful huntingforce sent out LO sink ulem. Admiral GlllllherLllljens, aboard Gneisenau, was warned, androuted his ships awa)' from the danger. Inretrospect it seems likel)1 that both shipswould have reached the open Atlanticwithout interference, but at the time it wasthought to be better to have the ships doingnothing than risking a tiff with Britishwarships. Eventually, when uley did break out,an encounter with the Royal Navy was still onthe cards and supply ships were positionedboth to the north and south of Iceland. TheGermans refuelled north-east of Jan MayenIsland from the tanker Ad,;a, after which theweather played into German hands. A gale

58

Battleship GlIeismau.

suffered far more from storm damage thanfrom bruising inflicted by BI;tain.

Following ulis, both the elusive sisters weredeployed on a variety of shan sonies beforeparticipating in the invasion of orway. Plansto send them raiding into ule North Atlantic inmid~une 1940 were frustrated by Lt Cdr Oa\;dIngram in HM ubmarine ClJde, who scoredseveral good torpedo hits against Glleiselloll.

Ironically, Sdwmlwrst \\'as also limping back toGermany, having been torpedoed by thedesu·oyer Acasla (Cdr Glasford).

Following repairs, the ships' natural enemy,the wcaulcr, prevented progress. Facilities inStavanger did not allow the storm damageaboard Gnei.senau to be repaired, so Ule giantwas forced to retulll to Gotenhafen in the fareastern Baltic and it was the end of January1941 before the tWO warships ventured oul for

G E R~IA:-' N AI" Y II AND BOO K 1939 - 1945 TilE FLEET

relegated them to instant retiremelll untilafter the defeat, when the Allies dictated thattl,e)' should fo"" lhe backbone of the posn,.rneel. Despite their shortcomings, both ofthem were designed at a time before theVersailles Diktat placed limitations on thecalibre of guns, and in consequence Schleswig­Holstein's artillery was used to open theSecond World War by bombarding theWesterplaue in Danzig. Strangely enoughboth the old ladies saw limited operationalsen;ce throughout the war. Schleswig-Holsteinwas sunk on 18 December 1944 and Sdllesienwas not put out of action until JUSt a couple ofda)5 before tl,e cea efire in 1945.

POCKET BATTLESHIPS

Pockct Battleships were rcclassed as hea,,}'cruisers in FebruaJ1' 1940.

Deutschland Renamed Liilzow in ovember 1939

L: 19 ~Ia)' 1931 at Deutsche Werke in Kiel; C:I April 1933; : in shallow water while I);ng atanchor near winelllllJ1de on 16 April 1945.Guns remained in action against land forcesuntil 28 April 1945. The wreck wasdemolished by German forces after a heav}'fire had destroyed much on board.

Admiral GrafSpeeL: 30 june 1934 at tl,e Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmsha\'en; C: 6 january 1936; S: scuttledduring the early e,-ening of 17 December1939 in the estua.)' of La Plata.

Admiral Scheer

L: I April 1933 at lhe Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmshaven; C: 12 NO\·ember 1934; S:capsized on 10 Ap,il 1945 during an air raid011 Riel while lying at anchor at Deutsche\oferke. Pan of the wreck was buried under

Taking a brcather on deck. The man at the back is reading Gegen Ellgeland, a German newspaper

produced in France.

held. A faulty radio pre\·ented an approachingaircraft from Ark Ro)'al from transmitting asigilling. and by the time it had returned to

the carrier, the weather had intervened,keeping funher nights firmly under deck.Consequently Gneisenall and Sclwnlhorsl putinto Brest on 22 March, bringing OperationBerlin to a most successful conclusion.

British air reconnaissance had improvedconsiderably since Admiral Hippe,. paid her first\;sitto France on 27 December 1940 and Brestwas uncomfortably dose LO BI;tish bases. It wasnot long before bombers a'TI\'ed to plaster thetwo elusi\'c sisters. British bomb aiming hadalso improved since the first attacks on Hipper.GneisellllU was hit by sc,"eral bombs and by atleast one aerial torpedo, launched by FlyingOfficer Kenneth Campbell, ,,·ho lost his life in

60

the altcmpl. Scharnhorst was also damaged,meaning both ships could look forward to anenforced SlaY in pan. either of them wereused for raiding again. Instead they partici­pated in the famous Channel Dash duringFebmary 1942, follO\,"ng which Gneisenall wasused as training ship for most of the remainingwar years. Schanlho'fst participated in severalmore operations, mainly in the Arctic, whereshe was sunk during the Batlle of Nonh Cape

on 26 December 1943.

Schlesier. and Schleswig'HolsteinBoth these old bauleships were classed astraining ships. Ha\~ng been launched in 1906,they lacked underwater protection. Hea\l'losses sustained \\;th this type of ship duringthe Battle of jutland in the First World War Accommodation deck for the 2nd Di\ision aOOa,-d the old battleship ScMl!S;#!'I.

61

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945THE FLEET

nibble when the basin was filled in after the

war.

DelluchlalldDeutschland saw her first mortal actionduring the Spanish Civil War, on 29 May1937, when she was attacked by aircraft in theRoads of Ibiza. At least two bombs exploded,killing more than thirty of her crew.Dflltschland's lhird larget of the SecondWorld War became a political football ofconsiderable proportions. The nited Statesfreighter City ofHint (CptJoseph H. Gainard)was found to be carrying contraband,meaning she could be sunk, bUl Kpt.z.S. Paul\.\'enneker knew it was also necessary nOt La

Admiral Paul \\'ennecker who was commandcl- of

!.he pocket battleship Deutschland at the beginning

of the war and t.hen became Naval Attache in Tokyo.

offend the Americans. He transferredprisoners captured earlier to the freighterand then sent her LO Germany with a prizecrew commanded by Lez.S. Hans pussbach.Pursuing a northerly route to a\'oid t.he RoyalNavy, City of Flint first made for the fl;endlypon of Murmansk (in Northern Russia)for refuelling. Then Pussbach sailedsouthwards through coastal waters, butdiplomatic relations with Nor'way were not asgood as the German High Command hadanticipated when DeutschlO1Uis officers hadbeen briefed during mid-August. TheNorwegians considered the presence of anAmerican ship with a German commander to

be a violation of their neutrality and a warshipwas sent to intercept. As a result the Germanswere interned. the prisoners released, theship eventually handed back to S authoritiesand Gernlany lost the propaganda war.

Following this first war voyage, Delltsch/alld

went into dock for an overhaul which hadalready been scheduled for the previousAugust. She was renamed LiUzollJ and thenmade ready for another raiding mission. Atthe same time there was a change incommander because KpLZ.S, Paul \o\'ennekerhad pre\'iously served successfully as Na\'alAttache in Japan and it was thought best lhathe should return to this challenging post.Augu t Thiele was waiting to take commandof an auxiliary cnliser when he was posted toLulzow. othing major developed from thispoint because the general raiding plans wereinterrupted by the invasion of NOt"way, andthe world's first pockel battleshipaccompanied the newly commissioned heavycruiser BLUcher and the light cruiser Emden toOslo. Again the German High Commandlook toO much for granted; Bli.icher was sunkand /..t·ilzol.l) damaged. Air reconnaissance hadshown the Baltic to be clear of enemy forcesand, ha,;ng failed lO detect the presence ofBritish submarines, the Naval HighCommand ordered Thiele to proceed to

62

Pocket battleship Deutschland under \\'a}'. The three main rangefinders can dead}' be seen as large 'T'­

shaped structures art of the funnel, on top of the main control tower and on top of the bridge. There

were also numerous smaller rangefinders on board.

Deutschland after her return to Gennany from the Spanish Chil War, where a number of the crew were

killed during an air raid 011 the ship, This shows the coffins being ceremonially brought ashore.

63

G E 11I1A:X '.\ r Y II.\;X DBOO J' I 9 39- I 94 5 Til E FLEET

AJlhough man}' men serving in larger ships had bunks, lhne was Slill a considerable proportion who slept

in hammocks and lived in inC1"cdibly cramped quarters. Some authors ha\"c claimed that alcohol was

alwa)'s prohibited on ooal-d ships. which is nOl quite supponed by the bottles seen on lhi lable. This

photograph \\-as taken long before the waf and the man <llthe front miglll be Quo Schuhan, the famous

-boat commander who sunk the aircraft carrier HivlS Courageous in the Western Approaches.

Guards of Honour aboard the pocket balLieship DttltseJilandafter her l-etUI"Il from the Spanish Chil War

where several oftile crew had been killed.

64

Germany ";thout escort. Lt Cdr John ForbesIn !-1M ubmarine Spearfish took rulladvantage by scoring a direct hit on Liitz.ow'sstern, pUlling her Olll of anion. Boats fromthe 17th Submarine Chaser Flotilla,con'lposed of convened trawlers, to\,'ed thepride of the nation back to Kiel, where shemade rast on 13 April 1941.

Never again was the pocket battleship usedfor the purpose for which she had beendesigned - that of raiding merchant ships onfar distant seas, In June 1941, she was on herway back to Norway for another break-outinto the Atlantic when a single aircraft fooledthe dut), watch into belie\~ng it was German,

65

The subsequent torpedo hit was not toomuch or a problem, but shortl), arter theconfusion Liilww scraped the rockyNorwegian bOllom and a large tear forcedher return to Kiel. The pocket battleship wasback in Norway for the autumn andparticipated in se\-ela.) sanies into the Arcticseas, but vef)' lillie was achie\'ed ande\'entually, in autumn 1943, she returned to

the eastern Baltic where she was used fortraining cadets. On 16 April 1945 Liilww wassunk in shallow water, which allowed herdecks to remain abo\'e the surface and herheav}' guns to be used against the advancingRussian armies,

GERMAN NAI'Y HANDBOOK 1939-1945 TilE FLEET

cruiser out of the water \dthout going wiLhinrange of the enemy's guns, So what wentwrong at La Plata?

\\'hen the three British cruisers, £.uler,

Ajax and Achilles were first spotted at 0600 hrson 13 December 1939 at a range of about18 km, they were identified as onc lightcruiser with two desu-oyers_ GrafSpee's officerstook them to be COIH'OY escorts andLangsdorfT ordered full speed, action stationsand headed towards them, expectingmerchantmen to appear an)' minute. Exeler,inSlantly identifying Graf Spee as a pocketbattleship, turned to challenge her whileAjax and Achilles mo\-ed over to the othernank for a well-rehearsed pocket battleshipmanoeuvre. Exeler and Gra! S/Jee wereapproaching each other at a combined speedof aboUl 50 klS. AltllOugh Exeter took the fullbrunt of Gmf Spees first salvoes, she closed inso quickly that her guns could be brought to

bear on the German ship, thus eliminatingthe pocket battleShip's supreme advantage.Ajax and Achilles advanced to about 8 km fortorpedo attacks, Frequently changing course,lhe)' avoided Graf Spee's salvoes and in doingso got too close for the 280-mm guns to beaccurately brought to bear on them, It is alsoimportant to remember thal pockelbattleships had only two large turrelS, eachwith three barrels, making the division offire-power into different directions quite aproblem.

Graf Spee recei"ed fifteen hilS, pUlling tl,emiddle gun of the forward turret out ofaction and damaging otl'ler \ital equipment,including the central fire control position,Thirt)'-six of tl'le crew were killed, more thanfifty injured and, more importantl)'.insufficient ammunition was left for anotherlengthy action. At this stage it is necessary totake Langsdorff's character into account. Hehas been described as a humane man ofgreat reputation, who had a deep concernfor the well-being of otller people, especially

THE BATTLE OF TIlE RIVER PLATE

Following tllis, Greif Spee was disguised as aBritish warship by co\'ering the large opticalrangefinder. forward of the bridge, with awooden gun and adding large patches ofdark-gre), pailll over the ship's light-gre),peacetime colour, Bow w'a\'es were painted onthe hull to complete the picture. Under thisguise, GrafSjJeeheaded for the Indian Ocean,where Langsdodr intended to sink a numberof ships so as to n'lake his presence knownbefore crossing m'er to the other side of theAtlantic. He was thinking of returning homeand thought the dedation would gi\'e theimpression that he was going around CapeHorn. The sinking of a number of ships onthe way made it fairly eas), for the Ro)'al a,yto estimate Graf Spee's heading, andCommodore Henry Harwood guessedcorrectly that she would put in anappearance in the shipping lanes of the LaPlata Estuary. On 13 Decem ber 1939 Graf

Spee ran into larwood's three cruisers to startthe famous Baule of the River Plate, whichended with Graf Spee being scuttled offMontevideo and Langsdorff committingsuicide in Buenos Aires, Oraf Spee had sunknine ships totalling just over 50,000 gnduring her one and only war cruise, withoutthe loss of a single life on eitller side. Kpt.z.S.Langsdorff was con idered to have been amost humane officer by his British prisoners.who e\'en sent a representati\'e to his funeral(Cpt Pottinger of SS Ash/ea) \\ith a wrealh,paid for b)' subscriptions from themseh'es,

So much has been written about Graf Speeand this famous sevent)'·fh·e-minute battlethat it would be superfluous to describe thedetails here. Howe\'er, one importantquestion must be answered: \Vh)' did ithappen at all? Pocket ballieships weresupposed to ha\'e been able to outrun anybattleship, and to ha\'e been able to blast any

came on board they noticed the name•Admiral Sched shimmering tllrough a thincoat of paint on the side of the ship. Someof these prisoners were later handed over toa neutral ship, ensuring that the news ofScheer's presence spread very quickly. At firstglance it might be difficult to see the reasonfor such masquerading because e\'en expertshad problems distinguishing between thetwo ships, while performance as well as firepower was more or less identical. However,the object of the exercise was to give theimpression that there were two raiders in

southern waters,

Admiral OrafSpeeAdmiral eraf Spee, under Kpt.z.S. HansLangsdorff, sailed from Wilhelmshaven on2\ August 1939 to take up a waiting positionin the south Atlantic, some 1,500 km east ofthe Brazilian city of Sahrador, On receivingpermission to start offensh'e aClion, duringthe night of 25/26 September, some threeweeks after the start of the war, Graf Spee

immediately moved into the busy shippinglanes between Cape Town and Freetown onthe African side of the Atlantic. Her firstvictim, the 5,000 ton freighter Clement wasbagged on the 30th. I~~len the rescued crew

A side view of Admiral GraJSjJeeaftcr the BalLle of the River Plate, bUl before the ship was sClIlLled. It looks

as if people are still busy dealing lip in the hope of auempting a nlll to Gcrma~y.An a~ti-aircraft COI.~lrOIcentre with rangefinder is visible on the left, looking like a circular tank. Below It and sllghLly to the l1ghl

arc the main cOllu'ols for the crane. The airentft has obviously seen beller days. It could well have been

that there was fuel in the tanks when the battle slartcd, which would explain why so much has ~urnedaway. A\~alion fuel was Slored in a safe place, deep inside the hull and was brought tip ,by pl~mpl1lg.ant ,

inert gas like nitrogen or carbon dioxide illlo the tank, thus forcin~ fU~1 O~l of the filling pipe. ThiS \\3}

there would never have been inflammable gas near the highly volaule hqUld,

66 67

GEIlM.~~ ~ HI" HA~OBOOK 1939-1945TIlE FLEET

good (i.e., foul) weather. She cleared thenarro',' Denmark trait be(ween Iceland andGreenland on 31 October. during a se\'erestorm which washed twO men o\'erboard,despite exu-a precautions ha\'ing been takento pre,'ent such an occurrence.

Follo"'ing this, se\'eral promising lonetargets were avoided. Krancke had learnedfrom his predecessors that attacking a shipresulted in the ocean being swept clear of allother targets. So once mast heads came intosight, radar was used to determine whetherthey were a lone ship or convoy. Thisequipment had initially been developed as aradio rangefinder. to be used after a targethad been visually sighted. It did not sweepthrough a complete circle nor was itcontinuously rated. Instead a comparati\'elynarrow beam was directed towards the targetfor short periods to determine the range. or.as in this case, to keep the enemy undersurveillance while remaining out of view.

Krancke did not have to wait long for hisfirst convoy. The B-Dienst had alreadyinformed him that it was on its way. so it wasonly a case of finding the ships. This wasdone by using the ship's reconnaissanceplane, whose pilot (Obll.z.S. Irich Pietsch)had instructions not to use his radio and toreturn unseen. KJ-ancke was fairl)" certain thatthe Royal Na\l' did not know of hiswhereabouts and he wanted to exploit theelement of surprise to its fullest. Hm,'e\'e1',fate decided otherwise. It was beginning to

get dark by the time the aircraft was back onthe ship, and Krancke had the ship ready foran attack because he did not want to risklosing the targets during the coming night.

At about the same time as Pietsch was beingfished Out of the water, on that fateful5 Nm'ember 1940, the fast banana boat J\lopanm'ertook the much slo\\'er Com'oy HX84 andsoon afterwards ran into the guns of thepocket battleship. Thinking tI,e lone ship wasan auxiliary cruiser running ahead of the

Admiral ScheerAdmiral Scheer's big guns ,,'ere used for thefirst time in earnest during the Spanish Civil\\'£11' to bombard the town of Almeria inretaliation for an attack on Deuischiand, butthe)' were out of action at the beginning oftI,e Second 1I'0rid lI'ar. When the emergencywar programme was ordered. Scheer (KpLZ.S.Hans-Heinrich \\'urmbach) was lying in theSchillig Roads outside \\'ilhehllsha\'en with agreat deal of machinery already dismantledfor a major refit. The work went ahead asscheduled and consequently the ship was outof action for the next twelve months.However, keeping the anti-aircraft arn1amentoperational paid dividends when a Vickers\\'ellington bomber was shot down duringthe first BI;tish air raid on the city. After therefit, Admiral Scheer (Kpl.z.S. TheodorKrancke) was not released for raidingoperations until tl1e projected ilwasion of the

nited Kingdom had finally been cancelled.Then, in October 1940. KJ'ancke receivedinstructions to continue with Gmf Spee's rolein southern oceans. His confinement inGerman waters while the first raiders wereenjoying their initial successes had enabledhim to glean useful information from themand to plan improved techniques of attack.

Admiral Sdu!f!r1eft Gotenhafen on 23 October1940. passed through the gigantic locks ofthe Kiel Canal at Brunsbflltel four days laterand then nosed cautiously out of the ElbeEstuary behind Spenvrech,r XlI (ex-P,lropolis)to dash north into the Atlantic, hoping for

de,·ices. TOIlJedoes, for example, were hungfrom deck heads ·nose down· to blo\,' theintedor to pieces once the supporting ropesburned through. Ne\'enheless, despite theseefforts, many important pieces of equipmentremained in good order and British agentssucceeded in remo\'ing Graf SjJee's secretradar, gi\~ng the Ro)'al Navy a valuable insightinto its performance.

day of action and Berlin quickly sent a signalof approval. The events subsequent to l~le

baltle arc also well known and hardly reqUIreelaboration. Thinking himself cut off bysupel;or forces, LangsdorfT decided to scu~lle

his ship rather than risk further loss of life.Again he communicated with the admirals ~f

the upreme Naval Conunand, who ga\'e their

permi sion. The men aboard Graf SI'" hadplenty of time to think about the deSU1-lCt.lOnand rigged some unusual delayed-aCllon

the 1l1Cn under him. Until this ballle, he hadnot lost a single life, and now suddenly hewas faced with the bloody, harsh reality ofwar. L:'\ngsdorff certainly considered his menduring the decision-making of the next fewdays more than many other commanders

might have done. .His decision LO run into Montendeo for

repairs has been criticised as ha"ing beenwfong. but he radioed his intention to theSupreme Naval Command at 1937 hrs on the

He doesn'l seem terribly happy. Action was usually vcry brief compared with the long periods of inaClh;t~

when men were just standing around. wailing for things LO happen.

68 69

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945HIE FLEET

Pocket banleship Admiral Scheer after the cOlwersion in which the large, u-iangular command tower was

replaced by the slimmer, tubular strucltire seen in this photograph.

Admiral Sc"eernyillg the old ensign made up of red, while and black Slripes behind an iron cross. The nag

in the foreground is the ~'Ierchanl Marine nag.

70

convoy, Krancke chose to sink her instead ofconcentrating on the mass of ships a shondistance behind. After having lost moredaylight by picking up survivors, fateintervened once more. The thirty-seven shipswere indeed being escorted by an auxiliarycruiser, HMS Jervis Ha)l, under command ofCpt E.S.F. 'Fogarty' Fegen, who at first did notexpect the warship on the horizon to beGerman. When he did identify it as anadversal1', Fegen ordered the merchant shipsto disperse while he faced certain death bychallenging the giant. He was posthulllouslyawarded Britain's highest reward for bravell"the VictOlia Cross, for this action. Fegen's halfhour battle did more than just give the shipsin his charge a few precious minutes to scatLel~

it also forced Scheer to consume half of theammunition for its main artillery and a thirdof ule shells for the smaller guns. Many rnore

71

merchant ships would have been sunk had it

not been for the fast banana bom }\i/o/Jan andfor the bravery of the men in HMS jervis Ba)'.

Admiral Scheer's action had far-reachingconsequences. Other convoys under waywere immediately recalled and kept in portuntil battleship escOrL could be providedand, at the same lime, heavy warshipsquadrons were sent to sea with the objcCliveof blocking Scheer's fell'eat to northernGermany or La the French coast. None of thisaffected Krancke because he set a course of190· bound for the South Atlantic to berefuelled from the supply ship £ttroJeld

(Kpt. Blessin) on 12 November 1940.Krancke now used every opportunity to

exploit the advantages of cruiser war, by usingprovisions from his victims to keep Admiral

Scheer as well as auxiliary cruisers andsubmarines supplied with food. Once his

G E Inl A.\' .\' AI' Y II A.\' I) BOO K I 939 - I 945 Til E FLEET

A stunning close-up of Admiral Schtt!T. Roth the aft and cenu-al fire control rangefinders are clearly

\'isible. The other main fealUres are: the single-barrelled 15O-mm guns ohhe secondary armament. Just

aft of the bridge but fon\'3.rd of the boat hanging over the side is a twin lO5-mm ami·aircrafL gUll. There

is also a twin 37.mm <lnti-aircraft gun in front of the real- optical rangefinder, but this blends rather well

into the background. Just in [mnt of the funnel and also visible 011 the far side arc the anli-aircnlfl

control centres with smaller optical rangefinders. In later years these were partl), covered \\"jlh dome·

shaped roofs. The mall standing by the side of the searchlights near the funnel's rim gives some

indication of size. The renectors had a diameter of about 1.2 m. The captain's or main na\igation bridge

with chanroom has \"ings on both sides and is situated just forward of the I05-mm gun and below the

hook of the crane. The windows abo\'e it, but below the searchlighl. belong to the so-called admirars

bridge. This searchlight was situated on the signal platform from where llags could be hoisted or

messages sent b}' a huge ~Iorse lamp.

• • • • • • • • • • • •

72 73

GE R)I AN XAI' r IfA.\' 0 BOO K I 939 - I 945THE FLEET

position in one area became kI10\\1l, he 1ll00-ed

off to create havoc somewhere else. Thisprocess took the pocket battleship far into tl,eIndian Ocean. Meetings with other Germanships, especiall)' auxiliary cruisers, played animportant role in U1C initiath·c. Imitations for

.KaJJeetrillken' (afternoon coffee) ,,-ere morethan a desire to see new faces; they wereintended as an aid to exchange news,experiences. library books, cinema films,magazines and anything else which could beswapped to make life morc endurable.

By January 1941 Krancke had learnedenough about the behaviour of enemywarships for Admiral Scheer to impersonate a

British cruiser, tllllS making it possible to gel

close to unsuspecting merchant ships Wilholllthem sending distress calls. Although themajodly of ships were sunk, some were keptas supply ships and others were sent back to

Europe with prize crews. The Norwegiantanker Sandefjord. for example. caplUred on17 January 1941, became a pl-ison ship for241 people and successfully arrived in theGironde Estuary on 27 February undercommand of Ll.s.S.(S} Erwin Goetsch.

A week earlier, Admiral Scheer's luck hadalmost run OUL A reconnaissance plane fromthe cruiser HMS Glnsguw caught a glimpse ofthe raider. giving an accurate fix for theaircraft carrier Hermes and the cruisersCanberra, Capetown, Enterprise. Hawkins andShmpshire. On the British command chan itcertainly looked as if the days of themarauding Scheer were numbered. Yet luckwas once more on the German side. Thecrucial factor was a deterioration in theweather. causing Glasgow's aircraft to losecontact and Scheer to slip out of the noose.Another. almost deadly siwation occurred afew days later when the pocket battleship wassteaming tOwards (\,'0 enemy ships. A Britishmerchantman stumbling upon them first sentan 'RRR' distress call. Scheer intercepted it andturned away before the ships came intO sighl.

74

At this point in time the Naval Commandin Germany was also gelling nen·ous.thinking the Scheer in mortal danger.ConsequenLly Krancke was ordered to set acourse of 370°. (Home!) Howe,"er, beforeheading north there was another majormeeting with a Ilun'lber of ships and with thetiny Ul24 (Kptll. Wilhelm Schultze), one ofthe first long-range U-boats to operate in

southern waters. Scheer eventually crossed Ll'leequator on ]5 March, passed through theDenmark Strait and arrived in Bergen on the30th. Bringing his ship safely home mUSlhave been Krancke's best birthday present;he was forty-eight years old on thal day. Thetension of 161 days at sea began to ease oncethe ship made fast in Kiel during the latehours of the following day. Some 85,000 kmhad been covered. 15 ships sunk and 2 morecaplured bringing the complete bag to

113,000 grt, making this the most successfulcruise of any German purpose-built surfacewarship.

Admiral Scheer went into dock for a well­earned overhaul and then saw some actionin Baltic under the command of Kpl.z.S.Wilhelm Meendsen-Bohlken. Very little hasbeen written about Scheer's next majorvoyage, probably because hardly anythingwas sunk and there were no brushes withthe Royal Na'1'. Yet Operation '\I'underland'must rank as one of the most dramaticvoyages of the Second World lI'ar. Thisstaned during the late spring of 1942 whenJapanese intelligence notified u'le Germansof a Russian convoy leaving Vladi"ostok tomake passage through the Siberian Sea.This involved a treacherous. ice·boundvoyage of almost 12.000 km without anysignificant pons en route. The GermanSupreme Laval Command was only able todraw on the experiences of auxiliary cruiserKomet (Adm. Robert Eyssen) and thereforereacted by ordering Group CommandNorth to prepare a memorandum about

SailOl""S in sm~1I ~alS li'"ed in considcr-able discomfort bUI larger ships olTered almostluxuriollsaccolllmodatlon, 111 some cases beller (han what men would have had al hOllle l"',-,S shom . . , ws a wan•.tnto IceI' on l~le nghl wilh his gas mask cOlllaincr by his hand" Atlolher bunk could ha'"c been folded downon lOp of hiS and he seems to have had (he comforts ora small cooker and a fan.

AILhough oflen bus)'. sailors still found time for hobbies and clubs. These piclures WCI"C probabl)' takenaboard the hea\")' cnliser Prinz. £1l~1l.

75

IIIIIIIII

GE II ~LI.\" .\" AI" Y ILl.\" DBOO 1\ 1939 - I 9 ~ 5 Til E FLEET

sending warships into the Siberian Sea. Theresuhs were quick in coming and mostl),negati\'e: LOO lillie was known about the ice;there had been 110 regular weather paucl-nsduring the past Len }'cars; there was no hopeof sending reconnaissance planes: and theIntelligence Service had not included theregion in its studies. These deliberationswere still under discussion when Japanprovided details of yet another (Oll\'oy

having sailed. The German High Commandbil the bullel and ordered Admiral Scheer(Kpl.z.. Wilhelm ~1eendsen-Bohlken) tointercept them in the K..:'1ra Sea.

There was a meeling with U601 (Kptll.Peler Oltmar Grau) on 18 August 1942 tocollecl repons of a dCl3.iled reconnaissanceof the pack ice and another meeting withU252 (Kptll. Heil1l·ich Timm). The inform­ation provided by the two U-boats wassupplemented with reconnaissance fromScheers plane, which eventually e\'en sightednine ships bauling their way westwards.Howe\'er me nanll-al elemenLS played againstthe pocket baltleship and none of them camewithin range of the guns. Later the aircraftfound ten more ships in the \Vilkiuki Strait,but this time the raider did not ha\'e accurateenough chans to penetrate into thosedangerous waters.

Two aStonishing incidents came a fewdays later. during a skirmish with the1,384GRT icebreaker Sibirikow which wassunk on 25 Augusl 1942. Surprisingl), thislillie ship, in the lonely vastness of an icywilderness had been full)' prepared for warand fought back with unexpecteddetermination. Afterwards the Germansfound a similar reaction while attacking theisolated OUtpOSt at Pon Dixon. Plans to landa demolition squad had to be abandonedbecause two coastal balleries were so wellhidden that German obsen'ers had nOtnOticed them until they initiated their ownvigorous retaliation.

76

HEAVY CRUISERS

Admiral HipperL: 6 Februar)' 1937 at Blohm und Voss inHamburg; C: 29 April 1939; S: cullied on3 Ma)' 1945 while I);ng in Kiel. The ".,.eck waslater moved to the Heikendorfer Bay andscrapped.

Hli;cherL: 8 June 1937 al Deutsche \Yerke in Kiel;C: 20 September 1939; S: 9 April 1940 inOslo Fjord.

Prinz Euge"L: 22 August 1938 at Gemlania Werfl in Kiel;C: I Augusl 1940. S: 13 Januar), 1946 as targelfor American atom bomb tests at Kwajalein ALOII.

Although pocket battleships were reclassed asheavy cruisers, there were some significantoperational differences between these twoclasses. Technical data suggests that heavycruisers had onl)' a slightl), shoneI' rangethan the other class but their incrediblythirsty turbines could not be shut ofT at sea.This meant that their time at sea was alwayslimited to JUSt o\'er a fortnight, unless tankersupport could be provided. Diesel engines inpockel battleships, on ti,e otller hand, couldbe slowed down to consume very lillie fuel oreven turned off to lise none at all.

Admiral HipperSea trials during the summer of 1939suggested it would be wise to carry out anUIl'lber of modifications rather than sendAdmiral Hipper (Kpl.z.S. Hellmuth Here) to

baltle. Although she had been commissionedonl)' four months before the beginning ofthe war, some parLS of the ship had to becompletel)' redesigned. Probabl)' the mostob\~ous of these alterations was the adding ofso·called 'clipper bows' to prevent theforepan from being submerged during

Heavy cruiser I~lm. EUfP!lI. CaI1")ing ammunition to the I05-mm guns and feeding it manuall}' into the

breeches was hard work and onen had to be carried out in appalling weather on slippery decks.

77

GE R)!A" ~ AI" Y HAN I) BOO 1\ 1939 - 1945 TilE FLEET

An escon coming alongside the heavy cruiser P,;nz.

EUgt!n.

rough weather. This was rather importantbecause waler washing Q\·er the deck noodedthe foremost gun 1lI1-rel. Consequcntlr Hipperwas not released until the Norwegiancampaign of April 1940. The famousramming by the British destroyer Glowworm

on 8 April resulled in a fairly large holebeing lorn in the heavy cruiser's side,meaning it was June before HijJjJer couldreappear. The following months were filledwith morc ill fonune. Scharnhorst and

C"eisenau were damaged in separateincidents by LOrpedoes, lea\ing Hipl",r alonein the Polar seas. Only one small steamer, the1,940 grt Esler Thorsen. was Slink beforeKpl.z.S. Hellmuth Hcyc recch'cd orders to

The bell from Admiral HijJperon display at the

Naval Memorial al Laboe (Kiel). The appmaches

to the solemn l-I,all of Commemoration have been

lastefully decordted with a number of relics which

create a stimulating maritime atmosphere in this

austere building.

bring his ship back to porl, where the cruiserthen lay idle, but in constant readiness, untilafter the postponement of the plannedinvasion of the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile a drastic change in thescenario had made it possible to send thefuel-thirsty ship south into the Atlantic andthen to France for refuelling. By this time,OCLOber 1940, Hellmulh Heye had beenpromoled LO Chief of Slaff of the SecurilYForces for the Ballic. He was replaced byKpt.z.S. ',Vilhelm Meisel. who also receh·edmore than his share of bad luck. First, thesupply ship Uckermark (Kor\'kpt. JosefAmfaldern) was mined and the SupremeNaval Command could not organise another

78

lanker. meaning lhal Hipper had lO berecalled. Then. when the supply ship FriedrichBrtme was ready, and Group Command "·estput their tanker Thorn at Hipper'S disposal,the hea,y cruiser suffered a breakdown of"ital pumping gear. AfLer this had beenrepaired, another section of the pumpingsystem failed. Following further repairs.Hipper had just left Kristiansand in Norwaywhen a large pipe bUI'St, squining a jet of oilonLO a hot boiler. The resulting fire dictatedanother return to the dockyard in Kie!.

The only consolation for this chain ofdisaslers was lhal the delay made il possibleto fit out another fast substitute forUckennark. The suppl)' ship Dithmarsch",

(Korvkpt. "'alter von Zatorski) followedHipper into the Atlantic to act first as rnobilefilling station and then as independentraider in her own right. Earlier suggestionslO use lhese purpose-buill supply ships asraiders were rejected on the grounds thatthe typical tanker silhouette could not bedisguised. However, by this time theSupreme Naval Command realised thatthe opposition was not as sharp as hadbeen anticipated and it was well worthlaking lhe risk. After all, wilh lhree 150-mmguns, the tanker was well equipped to dealwith the majority of !11erchant ships. Onceagain, well-made plans were laid to rest.Dithmarsclu!1l's engine played up, forcingher back to pon and this necessitatedsending OUl lhe lanker Adria LO refuel Hippernorth-east of Iceland.

In mid-December 1940 Hipper proceedednorth without great incident, was refuelled inBergen b)' the lanker Wollin, and passedlhrough lhe Denmark Slrail LO be refuelledby Friedrich Breme before bad luck pIared itstnlmp card again. This time the entire set ofsu"uboard engines broke down. They werejust about repaired when a con\'oyapproached with powerful escorts, meaningil was beSl amided. On 22 December, Hipper's

79

aircraft disappeared. ne"er to be heard ofagain. ~Iore bad luck followed on ChristmasE,·e when cOlwoy \\'S5A was located by radar.but also found to be esconed by too powerfula force. This lime Hipper gOl close enough lOthe heav)' cruiser HMS Berwick for anexchange of gunfire. \'\~len Hippe,'s LOrpedoofficer was given permission to shoot, hisorders were answered by a loud hiss ofcompressed air but without the torpedoesbeing ejecled. Allhough some arLiller)' hitswere obseryed on Ber'll/ick, no serious damagewas done to either side and Hi/Jper made fastin Brest during the late afternoon of27 December 1940 \\ilh man)' people aboardmore frustrated than elated.

Il LOok jusl se\'en days for lhe Royal AirForce to find the cruiser and to aim ninet)'lons of high explosives at her. Luckil)' for lheGermans. the bomb aiming was not up tomuch and no serious damage resulted,although the surrounding town receivedquite a battering. British propaganda of thetime has recorded how pleased the Frenchwere with these attacks. It appears that thosewho lost their property or were injuredrushed out into the streets in joy toencouragingly wa"e British nags at thepassing aircraft.

On I February Hipl",r ,,"as read)' again. Aconsiderable proportion of the crew hadbeen replaced, and lhis made itself fell a fewdays laler when the filling of the bunkersfrom tanker Spichern took an exceptionallylong time, but the new hands also brought achange of luck. \tVhile making for a convoybeing shadowed by U37 (KpLit. NicolaiClausen) HiP/Jer ran inlo a differem group ofships heading north from Freetown in 'A'estAfrica. Seven of them were sunk and twomore damaged with radar ranged guns, butonce again Hipper's buill-in handicap lookcontrol. Being at sea for twelve days rneantthe bunkers were running dry, making itimpossible to pursue the other targets.

G ER)1.\\ \ II" \ 11·1:\ 0 BOO 1\ I 939 -1945 TilE FLEET

Fritz Kiemle as Obennaschinisl by his desk aboard the light cruiser Kaln. The cylinder on the lablc is a gas

mask container and a lorch is Iring b)' its basco The hal was known as 'SchifJdum' (Small Ship) and was

favoured because it could be folded flat.

Fritz Kiemlc demonstrating the versatility of the Obermaschinist's desk Suctl sl,a ·d derk f< r h' . _. .. . .,ce was not pro\'1 e as a

p . 0 .Ighel I~n~. T~lC papcl war had become so Important that a great deal of time had 10 be spentdeallllg With admlllisuauve matters.

BliicherBliir"ds (Kpu.S. Heinrich Woldag) one andonly war cruise ended rather abruptly shortlyafter first light on 9 April 1940. Sailing lipOslo Fjord with a view to landing troops in

from \\'!Jilin in Bergen, Hipper arrived back inKiel at 1430 hrs on 2 March 1941. Follo\\1ngthis the heavy cruiser was laid up and ne,·eragain lIsed for raiding in the Atlantic. Britainwas probably aware of this because the shipremained untroubled from 1l1ililaryopposition for much of the war and wasfinally blown up by Gennan forces just a fewdays before the instrument of surrender \\-assigned on 5 May 1945.

This time BI;lish air reconnaissance was alittle quicker off the mark and the first w,weof aircraft arrived the day after Hipper hadput in La Brest, but bomb aiming had not

impro\"cd. Although more houses weredevastated, HiJ)per did not sustain anysignificant damage. It was the temperamentalengine s)'ndrome. not the bombing whichkept the cruiser in porl. Following a selectionof words not lIsuall)' found in dictionaries,the Naval Command ordered the ship backto German)' for repairs. The subsequentvoyage was uneventful because theopposition did not notice the sailing until itwas too late. After twice refuelling, first fromtanker Thonl before the Denmark Strait and

80 81

GE R)1 A:'I ~.\ n ILl ~ DII 0 0" I 939 - I 94 5 THE FLEET

J

The heavy cmiser Prinz Eugen.

Old crafts, such as sail-making. were still in demand, even aboard the modem wal-ships of the Second

World War.

the capital for the invasion of Norway, thehea\'}' cruiser "-dS hit by t,,'O lO'1)ccloes firedfrom a land bauel)' at the Drobak Narrowsand sank. The wreck is still lying there in

exceptionally deep water.

Prinz EllgenPrinz Eugen's maiden voyage under KpLZ.S.Helmuth Brinkmann was delayed by severalbomb hiLS recei\'cd during an air raid on Kie)in April 1941 and Lhen, shonly 'IfLeI' Lhisdamage had been repaired. the Prinz ran onLO a mine. Damage was again slight and a fewweeks later the ship accompanied bauleshipBismarck intO the North Atlantic. There thehea\)' crui er missed being sunk by the \dSt

numbers dispatched from Britain becauseLhe ship had slipped away for a solo raiding

mission at a time when the opposition hadlost cOntaCl. It was the hea,-y cruisersyndrome - engine trouble - whiche,-entually forced BI-inkmann to make forFrance. Repairs were well in hand when theship became a LargeL for Lhe Royal Air Force.The First Officer, Fregkpt. OLLO Swoss, andsixty men were killed, and the ship had to belaid up until the end of the rear. In February1942, Prinz E11gen participated in the famousChannel Dash to finish up in Norwegianwaters, where I-IM Submarine Trident (Lt CdrGeorge Gregor}') SCOred'lL least one well­placed torpedo hiL on 23 February 1942.Blowing ofT pan of the stern meant there wasno prospect of engaging the ship in the nearfuture. Instead a temporary rudder wasligged for a slow crawl to Trondheim where

82

Prim. Eugm - clearing up after exercises. The men are handling shells from the main 203-.mm guns.

83

GERMAN NArY HANDBOOK 1939-1945Til E FLEET

emergency repairs were carried out beforecontinuing with the dangerous passage to the

dockyard in Kiel.P1inz Eugen was laid lip there until the end

of the year, but plans for further raiding nevermaterialised. The Prinz. ended its days as atarget at Bikini Atoll for Amcl;can atom bomblCSlS. One of the propellers has since found ilS

way back to Germany and rests as a monumentat tJ,e Naval Memo';a! in Laboe (Kiel).

AUXILIARY CRUISERS

The use of merchant ships as men-of-war, orprivateers as they were called in olden days.helped in a1le\1adng the expensive and lengtJ1Yproblem of building warships. This system ofwaging war went out of business during themiddle of the nineteenth cenLUry when theoperating authority. the so-called 'Lcucr ofMarque', was abolished at the Pads Congressof 1856. Prussia planned to engage armedmerchant ships against France during thefranco-Prussian conflict of 1870-1, but bothBritain and the United States were so muchagainst the practice that it was abandoned. It

was not until the autumn manoeuvres of 1895

that the German High Command tried anexperiment of converting the merchant shipNormania into a cruiser. Ten years latcr, dUlinga war against Russia, Japan's accidental auackon a British merchant ship resulted in aconference being called at The Hague (inHolland) to consider some basic regulations

for warfare with merchant ships.This conference agreed on the following

main points. A convened merchant ship orauxiliary cruiser must fly a flag identifying it asa warship and it must belong to the nationrepresented by that flag. The commandermust be a bona fide officer of that nation'snavy and must obey milital)' law. The aim ofthis was to prevent civilian ships from fightingunder merchant ship masters. Disguises wereallowed, as long as this was cast off and the o-ueidentity made known before an engagementstarted. So, since the beginning of this centUll'auxilia11' cnlisers were regarded as bona fidemen-of-war and were subject to different lawswhich regulated the conduct of merchantships with defensive armament. Merchantships could be armed and the guns used in

The breech end of what looks rk . 3- .This common calibre has been Id:dall::~1 fr~~:~1~~:~:::~-~\~:~:un. Shells were fed singl}' into each barrel.

Auxilial)' Cruisers, left. Kulmerloml, centre. Triona and, right, Kamel.

84

self-defence, but merchant seamen would ha\teput themselves outside the law and madethemselves pirates, had the)' used theirweapo~~ to start a fight \\~th another ship.

Auxlha!1' warships presented an ato-activeproposition for the German High Commandand such projects were eagerly discllssed \\~th

private shipping firms while the trials withNormania were still fresh in the Na\'Y's memory.Gen~rous subsidies and a litlle arm-twistingprOVIded some agreement on the basicfa~ilities.which needed to be incorporated inship deSIgns, but these details had hardly beenCIrculated when the First ''''arid 'tVar broke out.Grabbing the initiative, Germany set abOtHarming a. number of ships and sending themout to r.ud merchant shipping on far distant

85

oceans. A number of them had highlysuccessful careers, taking enormous pressureoff .Europ~an waters b), keeping w'al'Ships tiedup 111 foreign pans. Later, the inu'oduction ofreliable oil-fired engines made the propositionof convening auxiliary cruisers even moreattractive at the outset of the Second ''''orldWar. The handful of these 'ghost' cruisel'S infar-off waters had highly successful operationsand achie~'ed more than the majority ofpurpose~bUlltwarships., Auxiliary cruisers were originally called/-Iandelssclt'ulJ.krt!la.et (Trade Protection Cruiser)

and later became known as 'Handelsstiirkreuze,}but their abbreviation of HSK remained th~same. These ships were first identified byan administration number from 1-8 and

GE R)I ,\ N N A\' Y HAN DBOO K 1939 - 1945 THE FLEET

prefixed with the lellers 'HSK'. Later, foroperational purposes, they received anotheradministration number which wa alwaysprefixed with the name 'Schiff (Ship).Commanders had the p'i\ilege of also givingtheir ships a traditional nall1C, while theAdmirahy in London identified them with alelLer in sequence order in which the raiderswere discovered. \\1lence Pinguin, HSK5, Schiff

33 and Rnider Fall refer to the same ship.

At/an/isOriginally Goldenfels from DDG Hansa Lineof Bremen; Schiff 16; HSK2, Raider C. LeftKiel on 11 March 1940 under command of

Komel-admiral Bemhard Rogge wearing the

uniform of the Federal Gennan Na\)'. He himself

used to joke that his career ranged from pirate to

admiral, although his arduous lime as commander

of the raider Atlantis gained him deep respect

fr0111 his colleagues, opponents and historians.

Kpl.z.S. Benlhard Rogge and remained at seafor a period of 622 days withollt pUlling intoa porl. S: 22 ! ovember 1941 by the cruiser

HMS Devonshire.Although many authors have added spice LO

their ad\"enture stories by claiming that somesmall action resulted in a dramatic change inworld history, the "ast majority of suchassertions must be treated \\;th a large pinchof salt. However, Allan/is's capmre of the 7,52

gn freighter Aulomedon resulted in theJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Americaofficially joining in the war, so this one singleaction did indeed make a major cOl1uibution

LO world hislOl-y. Automedon was carrying anumber of highly secret documents fromBritain to Far Eastern military commanderswhen she was intercepted by auxiliary cruiser

Atlantis. The papers were so sensitive that theywere not locked in the ship's safe wilh theusual valuables. Instead, the heavily weightedbundles were kept on the b'idge so that theycould be thrown overboard in the unlikelyevent of the ship falling into enemy hands.Rogge's shot across the bows on the morningof 11 November 1940 resulted in Automedonincreasing speed and sending distress calls.Consequently the alLxiliary cnliser opened fireand the next sal\'O hit both the b'idge and radioroorn, instantly killing all the officers whoknew about the sensitive mail in their care.

Rogge and his adjutant (Dr Ulrich Mohr)recognised the importance of the papers, butthought they were of such value to thejapanese that they would probably be taken tobe fakes. The information gave details oftroop strengths in the Far East as weB asouLiines of Britain's policies in the e\'ent of anoutbreak of hostilities there. Less than a weeklater, the captured tanker Ole Jacob, alreadyunder command of Kptll.(S) Kamenz (thepre-war master of Atlantis) was dispatched wiLila couple of crates of captured documems forAdmiral Paul \"'enneker, the German NavalAttache in Tok)'o. This LOp secret information

86

provided the Japanese with the necessaryintelligence and confidence to bring theminto the war.

Bletchle)' I'ark, the secret decryptingcentre in Britain, intercepted a radio signalfrom Tokyo to Berlin on 12 December, butcouldn't do anything to pre\'ent theconsequent chain of e\'ents leading toJapan'sdramatic entry into the war by attacking theUnited States fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor.Rogge became one of onl)1 tllfee Germans tobe awarded the high honour of beingpresented with the Sword of the Samurai.Although perhaps insignific31ll to theoutcome of the war, it might be interesting toadd that Kamenz made his way back to Berlinalong the iberian Railway. From there hetravelled to France and then a submarineLOok him LO a supply ship in the SouthAtlantic and from there he eventuallyrellirned to join his old ship, Atlantis.

Coburg

Originall)' the Dutch Amerskerk, allocated thenumber Schiff 49, but not convened into anauxiliary cruiser.

CoronelO,iginally Togo belonging to Woermann LineAG in Hamburg; Schiff 14; HSK number notallocated; Raider K Shortly after setting out injanuar), 1943 under Kpl.z.S. ErnstThienemann, opposition turned out to be tOOstrong and the raider was recalled to preventher annihilation. he revened to the nameTogo and later became ti,e Norwegian Svalbard.

RausaThe name Hallsa was not adopted until plansto employ the ship as an auxiliary cruiser hadbeen scrapped. Originally the Glengm'r)'

belonging to the Glen Line in London; thenMursburg belonging to the Hamburg­America Line; Schiff 5; HSK number notallocated. After the war she became Em/Jire

87

Humber and then Glengany again, both underBriti h nag.

merBelonged to North German Lloyd and wasconsidered for con\'ersion, but work neverwent ahead.

Komet

Originall)' ElliS belonging LO Nortll GermanL1o)'d in Bremen; Schiff 45; HSK7; Raider B.

Left Germany in july 1940 under Kpl.z.S.(later Admiral) Robert E)'ssen, travelledalong the Siberian Sea Passage and ellleredthe Pacific through the Bering Strail.Returned LO France in October 1941 andthen sailed through the English Channelback to Germany, arriving in Hamburg on31 November 1941.

Komel II, although sometimes written in sucha way that it could be a different ship, ule namerefers to the second voyage, which staned inOCLOber 1942, tllis time under Kpl.z.S. UlrichBrocksien. S: in the English Channel by theBritish MTB 236 while breaking out illlo theAtlantic. There were no survivors.

Kormoran

Originally Steiel'lllark belonging to theHamburg-America Line in Hamburg; Schiff

41; HSK8; Raider G. Left Gotenhafen on3 December 1940 under Fregkpl. TheodorDeuners. S: after combat with the Australiancruiser HiVlAS SJdlll!)' 29 November 1941.

Detmer's earlier experience withtemperamental high pressure steam turbinesin the destroyer Hermann Schoemanll stoodhim in good stead when it came to dealingwith Kormoran's chain of disastrous enginebreakdowns. By the time she was sunk, theengineering officer (Kptll.(Ing.) Stehr) hadsupervised 350 bearing replacements! Theend came quickl)" but brought with it a lllasS

of intrigue which has lasted to the presentda)' and is rekindled e\'ery time a historian is

GE R)I.\:\" :\".H Y H A:\" 0 BOO K 1939 - 1945THE FLEET

~ 1 ~ cdm ( 0.79 inch) A.A.guns, during actiono s e up on both masts and on foxle deck

1 - 3.7 cm ( 1.46 inch) double A.A.gun aft1 - 6 cm ( 2.36 inch) gun for warning shipson the foxle deck6 - 15 ?m ( 5.91 inch) guns, of which 4could f1re to either side Bimulaneously guns4 surface and 2 underwater torpedo tubes2 fire control positions1 range finder, during action raisedNot shown, 1 Arado-seaplane and 1 light s eed­boat, especially constructed for mine layingpurposes.

0 =

-+ =

0 =

• =

@ =

• =

""1r =

I FOUND THIS IN MY LOO. SCMEHGI. I HAD BEEN ABLE TO Jar IT DGINBASED ON MY GIN OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS. HGIEVER. I CANNar'GUARANTEE. THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. PERSONALLY. I BELIEVE YESIT IS. IN EYSSENS BOOK "KCMET". I DO Nar SEE ANY SUCH SKETCH.

Auxlhary Crtllser Koml!I drawn by Qno Giese.

by the German disguise. Consequently itapproached tOO close and positioned itselfsideways-on, making it an ideal target forthe auxiliary cruiser's inferior, hiddenarmament. Kormoran fired se\'eral effectivebroadsides from incredible short rangebefore the Australians realised what washappening, and they were hardly able torecover from the onslaught. However, oneretaliatory shell detonated inside the ghostcruiser's engine room, giving Kpt.z.S.Oeuners no alternath'e other than to scutueon his 350th day at sea. Eight)' men werekilled during the brief action on that hot

searching for mrslcrious drama. Kormomnwas Slink as a result of a duel with the farsuperior Australian cruiser S)ldney, whichwenl down with all hands. The unbalancednature of the duel, fueHed by a mass oferroneous information, gave rise to allmanner of stories involving everything fromJapanese submarines to German nyingsaucers having been responsible for sinkingthe S)'dnt)'. As a result the straigillforwardaccount by men from Konlloran, who reachedAustralia, has often been discounted.

Being in home waters, the Australiancruiser was lured into a false sense of security

German)"s smallest raider Komel. under Kpl-z.S. Robert Eysscn, while meeting with Anneliese Essberj,reY.

Komel reached the Pacific Ocean b}! travelling eastwards along the Sibedan Sea Passage. he was probably

the first non-Russian ship to ha\"c attempted the vcnwre and, what is more, lllcre had only been a few

ships before her thal had proved the feat was possible during one summer's season. Her accompan}ing

Russian icebreaker did nOll1lake ill It gOl sltlck in the ice and was forced to spend a winter frozen in

before it reached the Bering Strail.

8889

GER)I AN X AI" Y HAN 0 BOO K 1939 - I 9·15 THE FLEET

afternoon of 29 Nm·ember 1941, but a goodnumber of sun"jvors later reached theAustralian mainland to become prisoners ofwar. h is difficult to explain wh)" there wereno sun;\,ors from the SJllnl!)1, but it must be

remembered that her decks were heavilyraked with gunfire and tl,C anion look placein shark-infested waters.

The subsequent argument about thisengagement also illustrates how hislory caneasily be disLOrted. ~\~lile learning English asa prisoner of war, one of Konnoran's engineerstranslated a newspaper article of what areporter had imagined might have happened.This translation exercise was then seized byauthorities and taken to be an eye-witnessaccount, although the author had been in theengine room all the time and had notwitnessed what was going on olltside. Inaddition LO this, several hisLOdans have madeup their own ,oersions of the sinking, sayingKomwran's records are inaccurale because noone can even agree on ule time when S)'d1U!)'

was first sighted. E,-en auxilial)' cruisers, \\~th

their somewhat primilive facilities, did notrelay messages by shouting them across thedeck! Instead telephones were used. The firstperson to have spotted the Australian cruiserwould have been the lookout in the craw'snest and none of the other lookouts wouldhave been aware of his sighting report.Therefore the next person, located half wayup the mast, would have made his own reporta few minutes later and deck lookouts wouldhave been the last to relay their news.Consequentl)', if the reports are accurate,there must be a time lapse when differentpeople sighted the same objecL

MichelOriginally Bielsko belonging LO the Gdynia­America Line in Gdingen (in Poland); thenBOllll under the German nag; Schiff 28; HSK9,Raider H. Left Kiel on 9 March 1942 underKpLz.S. Hellmuth von Ruckteschell and

90

passed through the English Channel to FarEastern waters. A return "oyage to Europe wasthought to involve too much risk and lvlichelran into Kobe Uapan) on 2 March 1943. Forher second voyage she left Japan on 21 May1943 under the command of KpLZ.S. GlllltherGumprich. S: b)' S Submarine Tarpoll on17 OCLOber 1943.

Michefs cruise did not get ofT LO a good stan!DlII;ng the night, while the majority of thecrew were enjoying a last run ashore inCuxhaven, the ship tore free from hermoorings. The most senior officer on board,KptlL Konrad Hoppe (the ship's aircraftpilot) LOok the sensible option of allOl"ng theship to drift out inLO the Elbe Estuary andawait daylight before redocking. A few dayslater, near Ostend, the opposite happened,Michel ran aground. The voyage ended a yearlater in Kobe (in Japan) because the retururun into Europe had been considered tOOdangerous. III-health forced the commander,KpLz.S. Hellmuth von Ruckteschell, to seekmedical attention and he was replaced byKpLZ.S. Gunther Gumprich for a secondcruise. Sailing from Yokohama in May 1943,J\tlichel accidenu.1.lIy ran into an Ailied convoyand sailed '\~th it for some time until a spellof bad \;sibility allowed Gumprich to LUrnaway. After the war, von Ruckteschell wasaccused of war crimes and sentenced to tenyears in jail for having allowed i\llicheL to attacktoo aggreSSively. This seems rather strange,especially since many Allied forces allacked\\~th considerably more se"erity than J\lichel,but Ruckteschell had already singed Britain'sbeard as a U-boat commander during theFirst World War and it seems highly likely thathis prison sentence was revenge for thisearlier defacing of British pride.

OrionOriginally Kurlllark belonging to theHamburg-America Line; Schiff 36, HSKI;

Auxiliary cmiser Michel seen from Stit'Tduring one of Lheir rare meeLings on sotllhern oceans.

The radio mom aboard auxiliary cruiser- MicheL

91

GE R~LI -'" -'" An II A-'" DBOO K 1939 - I 945 THE FLEET

The officers of the raider Pinguif/ with Kpl.z.S. Ernst-Felix Krtider in the middle and the youngesl officer

aboard auxiliary cmisers, Hans Karl Hemmer, on the extreme I'ighl. Il is a tradition thal the most

important member of the ship's company alw3)'s sits on the floor.

One of auxiliary cruiser 77tors lookouLS half way

up the masl. A canvas sCl"een has been put up lO

give sOme pmlection from the weather.

Reederei; Schiff /0, HSK4; Haider E. Left Kielon 6 July 1940 under Kpl.z.S. Otto Kahlerand relllmed to Hamburg on 30 April 1941.Following a refit the ship, under command ofKpl.z.S. Glllllher Gumprich, left /(jel on30 November 1941 for Bordeaux in France.Several problems frustrated the first two

departures from there and it was 14 January1942 before the T1lOrsailed from the GirondeEstuary with plans to operate in the Antarcticseas. Destro)'ed on 30 November 1942 inYokohama (in Japan) while moored next tothe suppl), ship Uckermark. A fire, whichstarted in the tanker, gUlled both ships.During the first vo),age, 71101' fought threeduels with British auxiliary cruisers:Alcantara. Carnaroon Castle and \/oltaire.

Widder

Originally Neumark of the Hamburg-America

Line; SchiiJ 2/; HSK3; Rnider D. After the war

The rear guns ofauxiliary Cl"uiser 11'idderin action.

17lOr

Originall)' Sallla Cruz belonging to theOlderburg-Ponugiesische Dam pfschiffahns

German)' in June 1940 under Kpl.z.S. Ernst­Felix Krllder LO become the most successfulsurface raider in tenns of tonnage sunk. S: bythe Blitish cmiser HMS Caml/xIII on 8 Mal' 1941.

StierOriginally Cairo belonging to the Atlas­Levame Line of Bremen; SchiiJ23; HSKG, Rni,!£r£ Left Kiel on 9 ~Ia)' 1942 under Kpl.z.S. HorstGerlach and sunk on 27 September 1942 as aresult of combat with the nited Statesauxiliary cruiser SlelJhen Hopkins. Survivorsarrived in Royan on 2 November 1942

aboard the suppl)' ship Ta/llllmfeis.

Pingll;nOliginally Kalldelfels belonging to DOG Hansaof Bremen; Schiff 33; HSK5; Raider F. Left

Raider A; later renamed Hektor. Left Kie) on

30 March 1940 under Fregkpl. Kurt Weyherand returned to the Gironde Estuary on23 August 1941. Follo\l'ing this the ship wasL1sed for training purposes.

Being fitted with high-pressure steaml.lIrbines meant the engines could not beswitched off LO conseryc fuel. Consequentl),Orion co\'cred the longest distance of all theghost cruisers, a sUlggering 235,600 km. Shedropped anchor off Royan (in France) inAugust 1941 after having been at sea for 511days. Following this she was renamed Heklo"and used as a gunncI11 training ship.

9293

GE R)I A:X :X.H Y II A:X DBOO K 1939 - I 94;TilE FLEET

became UI)'sses (British) and then Fechenheim(German). Left the Elbe Estuary on 5 Mal'1940 under Kpt.z.S. Hellmuth vonRuckteschell and returned to Brest (inFrance) on 31 OClOber 1940. The ship wascanstanLly plagued with unreliable engineswhich made a second voyage ill'lpracticaJ.

\Vidderwas cOIl\'ened into a noating workshop

and employed in Norwegian waters.

LIGHT CRUISERS

Emde"L: 7 January 1925 at the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmsha\·en; C: 15 November 1925; OoA:during an air raid on Kiel in April 1945.beached at Heikendorfer Bay and latcr

crapped.

KarlsruheL: 20 Augusl 1927 al DeUtsChe Werke in Kie!; C:6 November] 929; S: 9 April 1940 afler ha\1ngbeen hit by torpedoes from HM Submarine

Tnlant.

KalilL: 23 Mal' 1928 al the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmsha\·en; c: ]5 January 1940; S:31 March 1945 as a result of an air raid on

Wilhelmshaven.

KOlligsbergL: 26 March 1927 al the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmshaven; c: 17 April 1929; S: inBergen (in Norway) as a result of an airauack on 10 April 1940.

LeipzigL: 18 OClOber ]929 al the Naval Dock Yard inWilhelmshaven; c: 8 OClober 1931; OoA: on15 OClOber 1944 as a resull of having beenrammed by PriIlZ Eugell. S: by the Allies in lheNonh Sea on 16 December 1946 afler havingloaded the ship with canisters containing

poisonous gases.

NiirnbergL: 8 December 1934 at Deul che \\'erke inKiel; c: 2 NO\'ember 1935; after the warbecame Admiral AIakaruw under the $o\;et nag.

Allhough the appearance of some lighlcruisers was modified as time went on, atleast the designers were helpful to historiansseeking to identify this class by fitting eachone with a set of torpedo LUbes in a shallowwell by the side or slightl)" ahead of lheforemost funnel. Ha\;ng been conceived at atime before radar, and when effective radiostill had some way to go, light cruisers werethought of as the eyes and ears of battleships.The idea was that they should be powerfulenough to cope with light opposition and fastenough to fun away from supel;or fire-power.

By the early 1920s technology hadadvanced sufficiently to add considerable,'ersatility to this concept, and cruisers foundthemselves becoming the wonder ships of thefuture, Turbines for high speeds weresupplemented with diesel engines to provideexceptionally long ranges, and theimprovement in armament made theiranillery eITecuve enough lo suggest thal tlleymight also serve as lone surface raiders andminelayers. The possibilities seemed vast; andit was not only the Germans who werelhinking aboul lhis. The people whoimposed the limitations of the VersaillesDiktat did nOl pick a maximum of 6,000 lOnsfor light cruisers out of thin air. They knewfull well thal the modem role for such a shipcould ne\'er be squeezed into such a tiny size.So, when the Reichsmatine staned buildingits new generation of cruisers, something hadto give, and it is not difficult to see where thedesigners saved ,,·eight. A quick glance at thearmament of the first new cruiser (Emden)reveals the main target for the economies.Sea-going officers, who might one day haveto take the ship to war, were not terriblyimpressed at the lack of firepower. but at the

94

Karuruheentering New York harbour \\ith the crew assembled on deck for a traditional welcolne,

95

GE R)I.D" ~ AI" Y II.D" DBOO K 1939 - I 94; THE FLEET

Karlsruhe's main artillery control centre with Io-metre-Iong oplical rangefindn situated at the top of a

high tower which also supponed a spider's web of radio aerials.

cracks appeared in the hull while battling upAmerica's west coast during a pre-war lrainingand flag-showing cruise. The damage wassufficient for water LO leak in, forcing the

cnoiser into dry dock at San Diego, CaIifomia.Leip:.ig, Kiibl and Nii,-nberg participated in

the Spanish Ci\il War, where they pro-'ed to beadmirable ships. ~'11en the Second World Warbegan none of the light cruisers were actuallypUt LO the ultimate teSt of ha\ing to defendthemselves in uicky sea battles. Konigsberg wasput out of action by coastal baueries nearBergen and sunk the follo\\ing day in port by

naval dive bombers. Karlsruhe was wrpedoedby HM Submarine 7'1<11111 (Lt Cdr C.H.Hutchinson) and the wreck later sunk by twoLOrpedoes fired from the German torpedo

time there was nothing to ShOOl at anyway, soit was not deemed important.

The next type, based on the design ofKonigsberg. was far more impressive. Theamlament looked good, the perfoJlnance wasalmost exciting and the sea-keeping qualitiesexcellent. In all the ship perfol1l1ed well, but­and this was rather a big but - it achievedcompliance ,,~th the limitations imposed by theVersailles Diktat by being rather thin on thesides. New techniques of welding sleel made it

possible to lise thinner plates than thosenecessary when bolting them together withri\"ets and the nary quickly discO\"ered that thesu-ess frolll hea\)' seas was too much for someparts. Stol111 damage became an embanassingfeature at times, especially in Karlsruhe. where

A good "icw of the rear turrets of what is probably the light cmiser K6/n. Although the majolity of men

are wearing the white summer or tropical unifonn, this was by no means compu1sol1' for everybody

because there is one man on the left with ..I different combination.

//

£ "..... 1,,'

--.....~

, .,,-*, -

,"

\

96 97

GER)IA.\" ;qrr IU.\"DBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEET

Karlsruhe killed out for an

official reception. This time

identification can be quite

positive because a nameplate

has been anached 10 the

outside of the ship.

---The K-Class cmisers ,,'ere

slighlly thin on the sides to

comply ,,;th the limitations

imposed by the Versailles

Diktat and KarlsruhesufTercd

some seriolls SLOml damagewhile bauling along America"s

west coast. Consequently she

h.ad to go into dry dock in San

Diego. The quantil)' of washing

hanging up suggests the men

inside her ha"e had rather a

rough time.

Light cruiser Xiim!Jerg.

Gennan designers have

helped historians b)'

including a well for

torpedo lUbes somewhere

near the forward funnel. In

this case the black box·like

feature can be seen

between funnel and

blidge.

The light cmiser Karlsruhe

before the war at the Kicl

Naval Week. It was 1101jusl

a case of hanging such

decorations an)'where. The

Navy supplied quite a

substantial book with

regulations aboullhe

correct order in which the

nags should be displayed.

The light cmiser Karlsrohl!.

Karlsroht. In their traditional

role, cmisers would have to

spend more time drawing

superior forces towards

battleships rather than

atL:1. king smaller ships,

therefore two turrelS of the

main armament pointed

backwards. These were

smggered to gi,-e [hem a

grealer arc of forward fire, as

can clearly be seen here.

98 99

GE H~I ANi\' AI' Y HA i\' 0 BOO K 1939 - 1945 THE FLEET

boat Creif The initial atmck inniCled only onemortal casualty and the rest of the crew weretaken off. Kiit'll was also bombed just beforethe end of the war and sank on even keel inshallow water with her decks still clear of thewater. Emden also almost saw the end of thewar, being bombed in 1945 and then beachednear Kie!. After the war LeilJz.ig served as anaccommodation ship in ''''ilhelmshavcnbefore being sunk in the North Sea during1946 as a dustbin containing unwantedgas bombs. (Gosh, the military do think ofsome productive uses for good quality steeland unwanted poisons.) Nii'rnberg was inCopenhagen when the war ended and thensailed under the Soviet nag until she wasscrapped between 1959 and 1960.

DESTROYERS ANDTORPEDO BOATS

1st Destroyer FlotillaFounded during the autumn of 1938 byamalgamating the 1st and 3rd DestroyerDivision and disbanded in April 1940 afterheavy losses dU1;ng the Norwegian campaign.Survi\~ng vessels then joined the 5th Flotilla.Units: RieilOnl Beitzell, F,;ed,;ch &kholdl, F,;ed,;ch11m, Erich Sleillb,;nck, Max Schullz and GeorgThiele. Flotilla Chief: KpLZ.S. Wilhelm Meisel

until October 1939, then Fregkpl. Fritz Berger.

2nd Destroyer FlotillaFounded during the autun'"!n of ] 938 fromthe 2nd Destro)'er Di\~sion and disbanded inApril 1940 after the Norwegian campaign.Remaining ships joined the 6th Flotilla. Units:Bl1mo Heinemann, Paul Jacobi, Leberecht J\llaass.Theodor Riedel and Hemwnn ScJwemann. FlotillaChief: Kpl.z.S. F,-iedrich Bonte until October1939 then Fregkpl. Rudolf von Pufendorf.

3rd Destroyer FlotillaFounded during December 1939 from the5th Destroyer Division and disbanded in Apl-il

1940 after the Norwegian campaign. Units:Karl Galster, Hennann Kiinne, Hans L'iidemann.Diether von Roeder and Anton Schmidt. FlotillaChief: Fregkpl. Hans:)oachim Gadow.

4th Destroyer FlotillaFounded during April 1939 and disbanded inApril 1940. The one surviving destroyer wastaken over by the 6th Flotilla. In 1942 the4th Flotilla was re-founded wid'"! new bOals.

niLS: Bernd von Arnim. Erich Giese, Hans Lod)',E,;ch Koellller and Wolfgang lellker. After 1942:

231, Z32, Z33, Z34, Z37, Z38and Z39. FlotillaChief: FregkpL Erich Bey ulllil 1940.KorvkpL Georg Langheld ulllil April 1943,then Kpl.z.S. Rolf Johannesson ulllilDecember 1944 and Kpl.z.S. FreiheIT Hubert

von \oVangenheim until the end of the war.

5th Destroyer FlotillaFounded during May 1940 with survivorsfrom the 1st Flotilla. Units: Richard Beitzen,Friedrich Eckholdt, Friedrich Ihll, Erich Sleinb';lIckand ZH J. Flotilla Chief: FregkpL AlfredSchemmel until August 1940, then Kpl.z.S.Fritz Berger until July 1942, Kpl.z.S.Schemmel again until December 1942,Kpl.z.S. Max-Eckhart Wolff until February

1944 and then KpLZ.S. Georg Langheld until

the end of the war.

6th Destroyer FlotillaFounded in May] 940 with survivors fromthe Norwegian campaign. UniLS: Karl Galster,Bruno Heinemann, Paul Jacobi, Hans Lody,Theodor Riedel, Hermann Schoemann, 235, Z36and Z43. Flotilla Chief: KpLZ.S. Erich Bey (atthe same time Flag Officer for Destroyers)until November 1940, KpLZ.S. Schulte­Hinrichs ulllil April 1943, then KpLZ.S.

Friedrich Kothe until December \944 andKpLZ.S. Heinz Peters for the rest of the war.

7th Destroyer Flotilla

Not operational.

100

The destroyer ZlO (Hans Lod)') in a iorwegian Gord near Skjeberg. This remarkable radio-comrolled

model was buill al a scale of I:32 by Ivar BerntSen.

Another view of Ivar Bernsten's magnificent model pholographed in a Norwegian Gord, where so many

destro)'ns saw heavy anion.

101

GERMAN run HANDBOOK 1939-1945

,

THE FLEET

A destroyer in the Kiel Canal.

102 103

GER ~I AN i'\ AI" Y HAN 0 BOO K 1939 - 1945TIlE FLEET

r-.'r,~

The loq~oboat T/8. Once again a remarkable model by the Norw(.brian I\'ar Bemtsen. TIle para\'a.ne.I)~l1gon

tJ1C deckJust fo ..ward of the blidge, was pa.11. of the bow protection gear for dealing mines from tile !x:Jat's palh.

A dose up of T/8's bridge. One really has to look exceptionally hard to realise that this is nOllhe real

vessel but a model made by I"ar Berntsen.

Z4, Richard Beitum25, PaulJacobiZ6, Theodor RiedelZ7, Hennann SchoemannZ8, Bnmo Heinem.annZ9, Wolfgang ZenkerZIO, Hans Lad)'

ZI J. Bernd von AnlimZ12, Erich GieseZ13, Erich KoellnerZI4, Friedrich /hnZ/5, Erich SteinbrinckZ/6, F>..idrich £CkoldtZ/7, Diether von RoederZ/8, Hans LiidemannZ/9, Hermann Kt'inl1t

Z20, Karl GalsterZ2/, Wilhelm Heidkamp

,

List of Destroyers (Z = Zerstorer)

ZI, Lebmcht Maass

Z2, GeOlg ThieleZ3, Max Schl/lIz

8th Destroyer flotilla (The Narvi!< flotilla)Founded in December 1940 and disbandedin Augus, 1944 af,er heavy losses. Re-founded

in November 1944.nits: Z23, Z24, Z2.5, Z26, Z27, Z28, Z29, Z30.

Flo,iIIa Chief: Kpl.z.S. Gottfried PonilZ untilMarch 1943, Kpl.z.S. Hans Erdmenger untilDecember 1943, Fregkpl. Georg Langhelduntil April 1944, Freiherr Theodor "onMauchenheim until June 1944 and Fregkpl.Georg RilleI' und Edler Herr \'On Berger untilAugust 1944. Follm"ng the re-founding Kp1.7_S.Heilllich Gerlach until the end of the war.

Ivar Bernslcn's model of Hans Lod)'.

104 105

C En ~I AN iX AV Y HAN DBOO K 1939 - I 945THE FLEET

BernLSen's model of T18. showing the positions of the torpedo lUbes and a quadruple 2o-mm anti-aircraft

gUll.

5th Torpedo Boat FlotillaEmployed in the Nonh Sea and later inDutch and French waters until the entireOotilla was annihilated. Towards the end ofthe war the Ootilla was re-established in theBaltic with new boats.

6th Torpedo Boat FlotillaOperational in the North Sea, participated inthe invasion of Norway and disbanded inFebruary 1941.

7th Torpedo Boat FlotillaEngaged for a variety of dlilies, but mainly asescons in both North Sea and Baltic. Usedfor training from June 1940 and disbandedin December 1940.

8th Torpedo Boat FlotillaNot operational.

9th Torpedo Boat FlotillaFounded in September 1943 in the AegeanSea and disbanded in October 1944. Then re·established shortly before the end of the warand employed in the Adriatic.

The engine 1'00111 ofa torpedo boat. Ifthe men's

hat bands are to be belie\'ed then this could be

Seeadler, one of the earl)' boats launched in 1926.

Z221

Anton SchmidtZ23 - Z39, names not allocatedZ43, name not allocated

ZC3, HennesZH J, name not allocated

TORPEDO BOATS

1st Torpedo Boat FlotillaEmployed in the North Sea for laying offensiveand defensive mine barrages until spJing 1941.Moved to the Baltic and then disbanded.

2nd Torpedo Boat FlotillaActive in the North Sea on a variety ofoperations including minelaying until thespring of 1941, then moved into the Baltic.Used in northern areas for convoy escorts

during the Sllll1mer of 1942 and then withthe Torpedo School for training. Employedin the Baltic until the end of the war.

3rd Torpedo Boat FlotillaEngaged in the North Sea and western areasfrom early 1942 until the spring of 1943, atthe same lime other boats from the flotillawere moved into nonhern areas. Employedin Danish waters during the summer of 1943and then for training. Operated in the Balticand its Nonh Sea approaches until the end

of the war.

4th Torpedo Boat FlotillaEstablished during the aUllimn of 1943 inFrench waters for escort duties and the laying

of defensive mine barrages.

106

10th Torpedo Boat FlotillaFounded in January J944 for employment inthe Mediterranean to the north of Corsica.

.-

;zo~:_~~- ~~ :--~~-3{~~Torpedo boat Albatross, which looked like a small deslro)'er.

107

GE R~U -'" -'" AI' r ILU DBOO K 1939 - I H;;THE FLEET

The development of German desLro}'crs calleasily be compared \dlh the inu'oduClion ofthe Ferguson agricultural tractor. When thesefirst appeared, the majority of peoplepreferred La slick with older provenworkhorses, bUllater, when a variety of usefulaccessories were added, the ,"chicles becanlcan indispensable LOOI. After the First \VorId

War, destroyer de"e!opment foHm,'ed slightlydifferent lines of thinking in Britain, in theUnited States and in Germany because eachcountry had different uses for them. Britainneeded cOllvoy escorts, capable of dealingwith submarines, while Germany was stillshrouded in Grand Admiral Alfred vonTirpiLZ's vision of a LOrpedo carrier. Hence

the first de tfoyer-type vessels were called'Torpedo BoaLS'. Germany's lack of interestin deslfoyers was illustrated by the fact thatthe first post-First ""orld ",rar destroyer was

A minesweeper or M-boat at sea.

108

nOt commissioned until 1937, and then thisclass came under the jurisdiClion of the FlagOfficer for Torpedo BOalS. It was not untilthe outbreak of the Second World War t1,at

people realised that these larger "essels ofabout 1,500 tons offered incredible di\'ersity.Their torpedoes made them capable of

attacking large warships; depth charges madethem ideal as submarine chasers; theirartillery could cope with aircraft and themajority of fast moving boats; and the abilityto lay mines ga,'e them a fourth "ital role, Itwas not long before destroyers became themOSt important workhorse for the fleet andsaw action in every theatre of war where the

Navy operated.The office of Flag Officer for Torpedo

Boats, established in SwinemllOde on theBaltic coast in Septenlber 1933, was renamedFlag Officer for Destroyers in November

TJ5i during the earl)' da)'s of the Reichsmarine.

This is an example of a First World War torpedo boat which was not scrapped b)' the Diktat ofVersaiJlesand formed part of the backbone for the new fleet.

109

GERMAN NArY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 Til E FLEET

The aftennath ofOperation '\\bertwung: the imasion of Non\'3.Y and Denmark. This 5hO\\

1939. At the same time a new administrativenetwork for torpedo and motor torpedo boatswas created. Both the FdZ (Fiihrer der Zerslorer_ Flag Officer for Destro)"ers) and FdT (Fillirerder Torpedoboote - Flag Officer for TorpedoBoats) came under ule direct jurisdiction ofthe Commander-in-Chief of Reconnaissance

Forces. For much of U1C time these had onlyadministrative responsibility because theboats came under the operational commandof other local officers. Some of the vesselswere never even attached to a flotilla because

they were always sening with other units. Theposition of Flag Officer for Torpedo Boats wasevemuall)" abolished in April 1942 and theremaining units passed over to the FlagOfficer for Desu·o)'crs. However, as before, for

1lluch of the time operational controlremained '\~lh other local commanders.

Shonly after the beginning of the war, themajority of LOrpedo boats and destroyersoperated in Ule Baltic and only a few in uleNonh Sea. ~'1any of them were employed forthe laying of defensi\'e mine barrages untilthe coming of long winter nights andseasonal bad weather gave them theopportunity of approaching Britain's eastcoast for offensive mining operations.In spring 1940 destro)'ers and torpedo boatswere employed during the invasion ofNorway and Denmark, where theyfunClioned as autonomous flotillas assistingtask force commanders. The FdZ (Kpl.z.S.and Kommodore Friedrich Bome) was killedwhile leading the assault on Narvik aboardWilhelm Heidkamp while the FdT (Kpl.z.S.Hans Butow) led the attack on Kristiansandin torpedo boat Ltlchs. Following heav)' losses

in Norway, the entire torpedo boat anddestroyer arm was reorganised, althoughmuch of this was only for administrativepurposes and the boats continued operatingunder local commanders.

Following the invasion of the LowCountries, destroyers and torpedo boatsfollowed the Anny westwards, using places inHolland such as Den Helder, Sche\"eningenand Rotterdam as bases; and continuing thechain of re·fuelling stations ulrough Ostend inBelgium to Boulogne, Cherbourg and on asfar as the Biscay ports of France. B)" this timedestroyers had become such indispensableworkhorses that the Navy looked around forsupplementing its meagre fleet with foreignacquisitions. The first additional boats werecommandeered from the Royal NorwegianNavy. Some of these new names fitted so wellinLO the existing Gennan naming pauern Ulatone could easil)' mistake them for the home­produced articles. For example Lowe (ex·G)'Uer) , Leo/Jard (ex-Balder), Ponther (ex-Odin)and Tiger (ex-Tar) could well be mistaken for,·essels of the Raublier (Beasts of Pre)') Class.The origin of other boats is more easilydetermined because the letter 'A' (meaningAt/sland - Foreign) was added to theirnumber, for instance, as TAg was the ex-ItalianFR2, which had earlier been the FrenchBombarrle. A similar identification was used forforeign de troyers, but instead of the 'A', aletter of ule counuy of origin was added, suchas ZG3 (Destro)'er from Greece) and ZHl(Destro)'er from Holland). The first Germanpurpose-built desu'oyers were also known by aname in addition to the official 'Z' number(Z meaning Zerstorer). These were not just petnames given to the boat by the crew, butofficially recognised means of identification.

MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS

The MTB or Motor Torpedo Boat wascalled E-boat (Enem)' boat) in England and

S-bool or ScI",ellbool (Fast Boat) in German.The)' differed from torpedo boats b)"having a much smaller displacement and aver)" high speed. All of them definitel)"looked like MTBs rather than smalldestroyers.

1st S-boat FlotillaOperational in ule Baltic, then in the NortllSea for ule invasion of Nonvay, and along theDutch and French coasts. Returned to theBaltic in 1941 and moved to the Black Seaduring the spring of 1942 where it remaineduntil October 1944.

2nd S-boat FlotillaOperational in the North Sea, participated inthe invasion of Norway and then returned tothe North Sea before being moved into theEnglish Channel. In 1941, for period of fivemonths, the flotilla was operational in theBaltic, but for most of the time it remained inFrench waters.

3rd S-boat FlotillaFounded in Ma)" 1940 and operated alongthe Dutch coast and in the English Channel.For a time based in Boulogne and 0 tend.Then moved into the Ballic before beingtransported overland to ltal), and from thereto Tunisia. Remained in the Mediterraneanuntil ule end of the war.

4th S-boat FlotillaOperational in the English Channel and thearea between Brilain and Belgium from 1940

until 1944.

5th S-boat FlotillaFounded during the summer of 194 I in thefar eastern Baltic and then engaged in theEnglish Channel until June 1944, b), whichtime the majority of boats had been sunk.Reformed with new boats and employed inthe Baltic.

110 III

GE R)I A:\" :\" AI" Y II A:\" DBOO K 1939 - I 94;THE FLEET

1\2

were incorporated in the next sets of boats.The results were so promising that Gennan)'soon reached a stage where the basic dieseldesign was improved with superChargers.The)' then had to find ways of preventingboats from drowning in their own bow waves.Consequently, the general shape of the hullwas improved to prO\;de better sea-keepingqualities. 538 became the basis for this newfast, supercharged type, which saw effectiveseryice towards the end of the war.

The basic anti-aircraft armament wasimproved as soon as aircraft became asignificant threat during the war, but theproblem was difficult to solve because a fastboat, bobbing about on top of wa\'es, alwaysprovided an unstable gun platform.Furthermore, it was found that the majoJit)'of aircraft could turn lighter circles Ulan Ule

i.-....

113

Two notilla commander pennan15 and a long. thin commander's pennant.

seems that only France and hair saw a futurefor such small fast torpedo caniers; probabl}'because the r-.leditenanean offered ideal areasfor their employment. German)' was alsofascinated by the possibilities of engaging fastcraft and a saga of amazing clandestinede,·elopment Gill be uncO\·ered before this t)peof boat reappeared from under the Versaillescloak. The Reichsmarine's First 5-boats werepowered by petrol engines, which made themsomewhat undesirable for combat because tl'lemajOl-ity of people did not fancy the idea ofsitting on LOp of such volatile fuel while beingshot at. However, these designs proved to bebetter than expected and modifications soongave lise to five more peLrol~ngine.>ooa15.

Se,·eral engine manufacturers attemptedto find a solution by squeezing more powerom of the diesel ptinciple, and such engines

After the First \Yodd 'Var the majority ofmaIilime nations neglected MTB dc\'clopmenl.Britain seemed to continue building them onlyfor expon, and tJ,e limitations imposed by theVersailles Diktat made it impractical forGermany to contemplate this type of craft. It

24th S-boat FlotillaOperational in the Mediterranean, mainly

from Greek waters.

22nd S-boat FlotillaFounded in December 1943 in the Baltic and

disbanded in October 1944.

21 st S-boat FlotillaFounded in the Baltic and then mo\'cd into

the Mediterranean.

11 th S-boat FlotillaOperational for nine months from Febl-uary1943 in the Baltic and possibly in French waters.

59 (left) and S/1, both examples of the early types of motor torpedo boats with a notilla of small U-boalS

in the background.

9th S-boat FlotillaFounded in April 1943 for employmelll in

the English Channel.

10th S-boat FlotillaFounded in March 1944 for employmelll in

the English Channel.

8th S-boat FlotillaFounded in ovember 1941 for employmentin Norwegian and northern waters.

Disbanded in July 1942.

7th S-boat FlotillaFounded in October 1941 in the Baltic andtllen moved to the Mediterranean.

6th S-boat FlotillaFounded 1941 and operated mainly in theNorth Sea and English Channel, although atone stage the Oatil!a was 1110ved into the

Baltic for a bJief period.

G E H ~I A X N A I'Y II AND Il 0 0 K 1939 - I 945THE FLEET

A phOlograph of the 'man o,"erboard" procedure on small ,"essels. It was customary for one man to

balance over the water at the end of a long ladder to retrie\'e whatever needed picking up, Usuall>' a

lifebeh was thrown overboard for the purpose of practising the manoeuvre.

boaLS, although a number failed LO regainheight in the process and ended up going fora s\\im. Howc\'cr. the aircraft tineal nOI onlypersisted, but worsened because aircraft werebeing filled with morc powerful guns andcannon. The protecli,'c steel cladding whichwas added to LOrpedo boats resulted in thembecoll"ling sliglll.ly more unstable, and lossesLO aircraft continued at an alarming rate.Eventually the entire bridge became anarmoured box. Yet, despite the threat fromthe air. S-boaLS continued to be successfullyemployed unlil the end of the war and sawaction in a vast diversity of areas.

At first S-boalS came under the jurisdictionof the Flag Officer for Torpedo Boats andImer under the Flag Officer for Destroyers. It

was not lin Lil April of 1943 that theywere gi,"cn their own autonomous commandand the first Fuhrer der Selmellboole (FdS ­Flag Officer for S-boats). Kpl.z.S. andKomlTIodore Rudolf Petersen, remained inoffice until the end of the war. Much of theFdS's work involved administrative dutiesbecause operational command was held bylocal commanders. Unlike torpedo boats anddestroyers. S-boats tended to operate moreoften as autOnomous Ootillas without havingLO fit in directly "ith other forces. The mainreason for this was that there were not thatIllany other forces in the areas where theywere fighting. S-boats also achievedincredible successes at times when thesinking figures of other forces, such as

A wreath ma~e fmm a simple cross. \\ith a hat band frolll the 2nd .\Iinesweeping I-lotilla at the top, Theboat was passlIlg a spot where comrades had been killed during the First World lI'a,· Ti,e Illa· .

d " ' n IS weanngstan ard worklllg ng with official woollen hat, tight.kniljurnper and denim trousers,

114115

GEllMAN NAVY IIANDBOOK 1939-1945TilE FLEET

Quo Giese. A""eli~ Essbngds second ofTicer, on

the open bridge. Quo Giesejoined the ~lncha11l

~a\)' as an officer candidate long before the

beginning ohhe war. One of the fil IthinWi he

purchased \\;th his acculllulated salal1' was a Leica

call1era, which then accompanied him until he

sllITendered in the Far East in 1945. Consequently

he has the mOSI exciting collection of photographs

documenting Gemlany's turbulent past.

Burgelllalld

Blockade breaker and designated supplv shipfor Michel. '

Charlotte SchliemOllll

Blockade breaker and designated supply shipfor Stier and Michel.

Babitollga

Ultled on 21 June 1941 when H~IS LOl/donapproached.

Belchell

Supply tanker for -boats, Bismarck and Prin:.Eugen. S: 3 June 1941 by HMS A III....a andHMS Ken)'a.

Coburg

V-Ship. Commandeered in Holland in Ma,'1940. It was first planned to engage th~

vessel as a raider, but she was later used as asupply ship. Scuttled on 4 Y1arch 1941when the cruisers Leander and Canberraapproached.

An,~el~i~£S~suppl~;ngprm·isions and about iOO tons of fuel Lhrough fire hoses to the smallestaUXI lal"}' cnuser (Komet undn Kpt z S R be' E·)' .1941 . ~ .. '''' 0 It )ssen .At this stage. Sometime beth·een 15and22July

,Annebese Essbergerwas sull disguised as aJapanese ship.

chain of embarrassing mechanical failuresand their torpedoes were found to be hardlypowerful enough to Stop merchant ships, retthey fooled some people into stoppingbecause it was thought that the attack hadcome from a submarine. Kpt.z.S. Hellmuthvon Ruckteschell (Commander of theauxiliary cruisers l\1ichel and H'iddf1·) told theHigh Command that e"ery raider should beequipped with two such craft, but withreliable engines. The torpedoes carried byLS-boats were small aerial wrpedoes. not thestandard type carried by 5-boalS and U-boalS.

AlsteriorV-ship, scuttled on 23 June 1941 whenHMS Mm,daleappeared.

The rollowing supply ships and tankers ha"ebeen included because the)' operated inareas where they came into contact withenemy forces and they frequently fealUre inhistories of the war.

SUPPLY SHIPS

AdriaYlotor lanker used as supply ship. Taken m'erby Britain after the war and renamed Em/JireTageos. Later she became the Russian Kazbekand then the Polish Karpal)'.

AlsteruJerV-ship and blockade breaker. S: by aircraft on27 December 1943.

AltmarkPurpose-built naval supply ship. RenamedUckenl/mk shortly after tl,e beginning or the war.

Alllleliese EssbergerBlockade breaker and later V-ship, scuttledon 21 NO"ember 1942 when SS Milwaukeeappeared.

U-boats, had dwindled considerably. Forexample, a single operation in April 1944killed more~ soldiers than all thecombined German forces on D-Day. Thishappened when a handful of boats from the9th 5-Flotilla under the leadership of GOtzFreiherr von Mirbach penetrated intoLyme Bay on the south coast of Devon.Following an anal)'sis of radio signals it wasfairly obvious that there was considerablemo\'cmenl of Allied shipping in the area andwhen the 9th Flotilla struck, it hit a number

of ships carrying soldiers practising landingsfor D-Day. The official figures state that abouta thousand ALffld ervicemen were killed,although locals living along the coast haveslIspicions that the real number, hushed lipat the lime, was considerably larger.

LIGHT S-BOATS

The concept of LS-boalS or Leichte Schnel/boote(Light SpeedboalS) had been formulatedbefore the turn of the cenlUll'- As early as1895 the experimental auxiliary cruiserNonnania had been equipped willl two Slcam­dri\"cn mOlor torpedo boats. The mainslllmbling block in the crart's developmentwas the lack of reliable engines which couldbe started quickly and which would not bearfeCled by the damp conditions they werelikely to meet at sea. Even after the First'·\'orld \\'ar, when diesel engines made theconcept possible, it was found that the weightof normal tOI-pedo tubes made the craft toounstable at speed and the idea was more orless abandoned. It was only because of thepersistence of one visionary. Heinz Docter,who experimented in his spare time, thatsmall motor torpedo boats becameoperational during the Second World War.

A few LS-boats saw sen;ce in the AegeanSea, and a number were can;ed by auxiliarycruisers. The majority were troubled with a

116117

G E R~I A;\" NAI' Y 1-1 ANIl BOO K I 939 - I 94 5 TilE fLEET

Kelty BrovigCaptured by Atlantis on 2 February 1941 andscuttled on 4 March 194] when the cruisersCanberra and Leanderapproached.

KonigsbergSupply ship for Widder. Scuttled on 16 june1940 when French warships approached.

KroSSJOIIIICaptured by Widder, renamed Spichern andused as supply ship.

Kulmerland

Supply ship for several raiders. Damagedbeyond repair on 23 September 1943 duringan air raid 011 Nantes.

Kola NopanCaptured by Komet and sent to France. Laterused as bloekade breaker. For her last cruiseshe left Singapore on 4 Februa,,' 1943 andwas scuttled off Cape FinistelTe after havingbeen stopped b)1 the mine-eruiser Adventure.

Lothrirrgerr

Supply tanker for Bismarck and Prim Engen.Surrendered to aircraft carrier Eagle on15 june 1941. Earlier known as Popendrecht.Became Empire Salvage, then Dunedin andlater Papendrecht again.

MOIlSIlIl

Captured on 18 january 1941 by AdmiralScheer as SandeJjord and sCUltled in Nantes on11 August 1944.

MUllsterlalld

Supply ship for auxiliary cruisers. Sunk nearCalais on 20 january 1944.

Nordmark

Purpose-built supply ship. Earlier known asH'esterwald and after the war commis iOlled inthe Royal Na\)' as Northmark and after that asBulawaJo.

Friedrich Breme

Supply ship for Admiral Hipper, Scharnhorstand Gneisenoll. ScuuJed on 12 june 1941when HM Sheffield approached.

uso Hamburg

Suppl}' tanker for Gneisenau, AdmimlScheerandP"1lZ Engell. Scullied on 4 june 1941 whenHMS London and HMS BIllliantapproaehed.

Emrlalld

Blockade breaker. The ship was in thePhilippine capital Manila when the warstarted and from there put into neutralFOImosa. She left there on 28july 1940 to befilled out in japan for running the bloekadeback to Europe. Sailing on 29 December1940, she picked up prisoners from 011011 andKomet before arri\~ng in the Gironde ESlllaryon 4 April 1941. Following this she wasengaged as a supply ship.

Elsa EssbergerDesignated supply ship for Orion. Scuttled inthe Gironde Estuary during August 1944.

Emm)' Friederich

Supply ship for Admiral GraJ Spee. Scuttled inthe Caribbean on 23 Oetober 1939 whenH~IS Caradoc appeared.

GOllumheim

Supply ship and reconnaissance vessel forBismarck and Prinz. Eugell. Sunk on 4 June1941 by HM Nelson and HMS EsperanCl! Ba)'.Earlier known as Kongsfjord and also asSperrbrecher 15.

mMotor tanker which was used as supply shipfor raiders. Known as Turicum before the warand became Fnnta Aspra (lmlian) afterwards.

Kerlosono

Captured by Thor and sent to France as prize.

DuquesaRefrigerated ship carrying food which wascaptured by Admiral Scheer on 18 December1940 and later scuttled on 20 February 1941,because there was no more fuel to keeprefrigerators or engines running. Used assupply ship and unofficially known as SupplyDepot Wilhelmsha,·en - Soum.

DresdellSupply ship for Atlantis. Scuttled in the CirondeEstuary on 25 August 1944. Raised by the Frenchand renamed Doba. Stranded at Ras Hafonn inSomalia on 21 july 1950. Also kn0\\11 as Schiff 171.

DoggerballkCaptured on 31 january 1941 by auxiliarycruiser Atlantis as SpeJbank and dispatched toEurope as prize. Later used as an auxiliaryminelayer, blockade breaker and V-ship.

DitlrmarsclrelJPlII-pose-built OCCl supply ship which becameBritish-nagged Sout.lmwrk after the war andlater Coneeuh (USA).

A,,,,elim Essbergtf's Chief Mate Koch and we

signalman from Komel. One problem with such

meetings was that the crews from merchant ships

often did nOl have trained men for the vast variel)'

of skills required b)' a warship.

The bridge of Ihl1leliese £Ssbergerwhile supplying Komel with fuel through fire hoses. Silting high up is a

signalman from the auxiliary cruiser.

118 119

GE R)!A 'i .'i AI" Y HA.'i 0 Il 0 0" I 939 - I 94 ;;THE FLEET

Blockade breaker Rio GrtllldealTi\"ing in Bordeaux, France, April 1942.

. r I /' / I Although oil-fired enmnes were more com'cnienl and made a goodThe englllc room 0 llC ~nn am. - . O' ',' bdeal1ess mess, working in the engine room was suit a hot and (lin) JO .

120

Nordstern

Captured by Admiral Scheer on 20 February 1941when the ship was known as British Advocate.

unk in French waters on 24July 1944.

Nordvord

Captured bl' Pinguill on 15 September 1940and sunk in Oslo Fjord on 29 December 1944.

OleJocobCaptured by A/lantis on 10 November 1940and used as supply tanker and blockadebreaker. Sunk ofJSpain on 24 December 1941.

OsonlODesignated supply ship for Michel and alsoused as blockade breaker.

121

Portlalld

Supply ship for Admiral Scheer. Scuttled on13 April 1943 when the French cruiserGeorges Le)'ques approached.

PrairieThe ship with this name seen in photos ofse"eral books is the German purpose-builtsupply ship Nordmark disguised as anAmerican tanker.

Pylholl

l-ship, supply ship for -boalS. Sent to rescuesun1\'Ors from Alumlis. Scuttled on I December1941 while under attack from the Britishcruiser Dorse/shire.

G EInl A:X :x AI" r II A \" D II 0 0 K 1939 - 1945 THE FLEET

The suppl)' ship Tamumjeis in the Gironde Estuary.

-~ -.... - ....: ~

armament of at least three ISO-mm guns.The original design concept allowed forthem to be also employable as merchantraiders afler thei .. ca..go had been off-loaded.Auxiliary neel supply ships were basicallysimilar, but these ships had neither beenbuilt as men-of-\,-ar nor had they beenpermanently employed by the Na\l' beforethe Start of the conflict. Howe\-er, after theoutbreak of the war they were staffed by navalpersonnel and sailed under the samecommand as regular warships. In pon, supplyships came under different administrati\'eauthorities for loading. Both categoriescarried the majority of items which warshipsmight need, such as fuel, \-alious types of oil,ammunition, food, general cargo and sparepans for machinery. Since they were oftensent OUt to supply specific raiders, they alsodelivered mail and personal items.

Escort tankers were similarly employed, buttheir sole objective was to refuel other ships atsea. The majority of these were tankersrunning undcr charter from their privateowners and they carried only a small militarysection in addition to a civilian crew. Thenaval contingent would have helped withmanning the defensive annament, signallingand advising the master on military matters.

V-ships operatcd in a similar fashion tonee< supply ships, but usuall)' ca....ied onlygeneral supplies with liltle 0 .. no liquid fuel.The main objecti,·e of Z-ships was to take fueland supplies to -boats. Speciall)' convertedmerchant ships were used for lhis purpose_Pon supply ships and port tankers wereoriginally conceived as a means of gettingprovisions from one port to another, bUlsome of these ships were large ocean-goingvessels which could also be used forprO\~sioningvessels far offshore.

Although an ocean-going supply networkhad al ..ead)' been considered "tal long befo..ethe beginning of the First "\Torld \.\Tar, this wasone of the last branches to be developed by

Weslerwald

Purpose-buill supply ship. RenamedNordmark shortly after the stan of the war.

Wollill

Supply tanker used in European coastalwaters to refuel raiders in Norway.

Weser

Captured as l'ancouver Islaml on 25 September1940 and late.. used as supply ship fo.. 0';011.Sunk accidentally on 15 Octobe .. 1941 byU558 (Kptll. Cunther Krech).

Thor"Supply ship for Admiral Hipper. Sunk on 2 April1941 by H~IS Tigris. Earlier kJ,o"" as Rulh.

UchermarhPurpose-built supply ship which \,'as earlierknown as AlJmark. Desu-ored on 30 No\-ember1942 in Yokohama du..ing a fi ..e, which alsoput auxilial} cnd er Thorout of action.

W;lIneloli

Supply ship for OriOI1. Sunk on 12 August1944 by US Subma..ine Puffer.

By the beginning of 1942 Cermany hadestablished s,,·en categories of supply ship.These were: neet supply ships (TrosschiJJe);auxilia..y nee< supply ships (HilfslrosschiJJe);escon lanke ..s (BegleiIlGllker); supply shipkJ,o"" as V-ships (V·Schiffe 0" 1'erso'lf"lIgsschiffe);submarine supply ships known as Z-ships(Ubaals-ZuJulmchiJJe or Ubaalsversorger); ponsupply ships (£lappell l'-Schiffi); and pon supplytank.. (Elappelllallker). Me..chant ships withcivilian crews, known as blockade breakers,we..e also used to supply raiders at sea and, ofcourse, many raiders extrdCled prmisions fromtheir \ictims before sinking them.

Fleet supply ships, such as Altlllark andNordmark, were purpose built with trainedmilitary crews and a fairly impressive

Ta""enfelsBlockade b ..eake.. and supply ship. cllttledin the Cironde ESlllal1' during August 1944.

Spichern .Captu ..ed by lI'idde.. as KrossJOIw. Supply sillpfor hean1 cruisers and Thor. Scuttled in Brestduring August 1944. Raised and then knowna Rigsfjell and late.. as Rillgsacker.

SchleltstadlEa ..lier known as Cory·da. Supply tanke.. forScharnhorst and Cneisenau. Taken Q,"er byBritain after the war.

RudolfAlbrechtSupply ship for Kormoran. Taken o,"er byBritain after the ,,"ar and renamed EmpireTllgilldll. then Basing Steam, then Oil Steamand finally· I',issi (unde.. the C..eek nag).

Rio GraudeBlockade breake.. which se,,·ed as supply shipfor several auxiliary cruisers. Scuuled on4 January 1944 near Ascension Island whenUSS Omaha app..oached.

MakotisLefl Japan as blockade breaker to supplyMichel. Scuttled on 1 January 1943 afle ..being challenged by the light cruise ..

Sc),lla.

RekumSllpp1r ranker Slink near Boulogne on 21 ~Iarch

1944.

RegellsburgSupply ship for auxiliary cruisers. Scuttled on30 ~Iarch 1943 \,"hen the British cruiser

Glasgow approached.

122 123

GE R)I A X N AI" r H A X D BOO K 1939 - 1945 THE FLEET

Once at sea, supply ships came under thejurisdiction of the same authority whichcontrolled the warships, but the administrativework of acquiring stores was carlied out by aspecial supply deparunent within the SupremeNaval Command and loading became theheadache of the Naval Ship Yards. In Ma)'1940, ti,e decision LO pass the responsibility forloading the ships over to the two NavalCommands for the Baltic and North Sea,produced such wild groans from over­worked officials that it was decided to create aspecial neet supply arm. Known as theTrossehiJJverbal1d (TSV), this was founded inWilhelmshaven under Fregkpl. Alfred Stiller

Stiller started with the four purpose-builtsupply ships already in commission, but hisauthority was quickly enlarged with the9,323 grt Norwegian tanker Kross/ann, whichhad been capulred by auxiliary cruiser \'Vidder.The men for the new ships were recruitedfrom the merchant navy, where a considerableproportion of well-experienced personnel waslying idle due to the war. The volunteersunderwent a peliod of eight to ten weeks ofmilitary training at a special supply ship schoolin \'Vilhelmshaven. Since a number of theseships kept their civilian crews, beingtechnically under charter from their originalowners, their commanding officers had the

Crow's nestlookoUl, Doggerballk.

the Kriegsmarine. During the 19205 lhere ,,"asno Ileed for such \"cssels and in any case noone knew how goods could be transferred onthe high seas. The absence of fast fleet supplyships became quite a problem as early as1928, when the light cruiser Emdell (Kpl.z.S.Richard Foerster) embarked on a cadettraining cruise which was also one of the firstlong-distance, oil-fired voyages. The voyagewas made possible by chanering the tankerHansa from Atlamik Tank Reederei. She hadbeen specially built with a cruiser stern forrefuelling experiments and later even becamethe property of the Reichsmaline. Such closecooperation was possible, without excessiveincentives, because [\,'0 directors of theshipping firm were ex-navy officers,

Tlials with the 6,000 gn Hansa el'elllually ledto the de\'elopl11ent of the next stage in thesupply ship design process. Two ships of thismodified type (A,";a and Rudolf Alb"e"') latersaw service with raiders in the Atlantic. Thefirst specially designed (leet suppl)' ships werenot laid down until 1937 and only two(l'Vesterwald and Altmark) were operational atthe stan of the Second World War.Ditlwwrschen and Ermlandwere still undergoingu;als, Franken was under consul.lction and thesixth, Havelland, was launched in Kiel during1940, but was ne\"er completed. A side view ofthese ships resembled modern rankers of thepel;od. Only when f1)~ng direclly overhead wasit possible LO see the slim, curved lines of awarship, rather than the rectangular box shapeof a tanker. This streamlined shape was evenmore pronounced at the waterline and helpedto make the ships econon1ical in theconsumption of fuel and gave them a tOPspeed of 22 kl. The designs also incorporatedother typical warship features such as havingtwo sets of engines, two independentlyoperating rudders and the internal layoutcompartmentalised so that a hit in one sectionwould not easily put another out of action aswell.

The quartermaster's SLores. The diary for 1942 on display helps to name and dale this picture, bUllake

away the uniforms and this could have been in any navy, any place on earth. Stores like this were such a

vital necessity that ships could not have operated without them.

The Merchant Marine nag nying aboard AIl1U>f;ese Essberger in 1941 after her arrival in Bordeaux.

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GER~IA:'I ~ A\ \ 1IA:'II) BOO" 1939 - I 9~ 5 Til E FLEET

title of' Kapili;'" withollt the military ':ur See'suffix. Naval ranks "ith the letters 'Self or' '.meaning Sonderfii/ll~r ( pecial Leader) oftenindicated thal the mall had been promotedfrom the merchant navy.

Fining Olll stlppl}' ships in home waterswas only pan of the slory. The majority ofraiding operations look place in southernwaters, where it was not necessary LO sailships from Europe. Quite a number ofGerman freighters were sC3ucred aroundthe globe in ncuu-al pOfts, unable La 1ll0\'C

because of the war. The basic difficulty inengaging them lay with neutrality

regulations which prohibited the fitling outof warships in neutral pOfts, and suppl), shipscounted as men-of-war. So c\'cl)11hing had bedone under a great cloak of secrecy. Thegeneral decline in world trade, as a result ofthe war, meant il was not LOO difficult to findsuppliers in foreign waters, but accumulatingand loading vast stocks was a majorundenaking. The silUation was not helpedb)J a strong presence of British interestswhich kept watchful eyes on Gennan ships in

neuu-al ports.Since the sheer effort of loading a single

ship was well beyond the capabilities of anindividual, the Navy established a specialsupply system, called the Special 1 avalService (J.Vlarineso71derdiens/). The foundationsfor this organisation had already been laidlong before 1939, although the Sen;ce itselfwas not founded until after the start of theconnicl. One could visualise this set-up as anornlal shipping office. working underexceptionally difficult conditions. In Japan,where most of the acti\'it)' LOok place. the

en'ice came under the control of the50-year-old Kpl.z.S. \Vel-ner Vennehren, whohad been born in £1 Paso in Texas. Hisimmediate superior was the German NavalAttache in Tokyo, Admiral Paul Wenneker,who had earlier been captain of the pocketbattleship Deutscilland,

MI ESWEEPERS

Although minesweepers were one of the lasttypes of ship to be developed by the oldImperial Na\1" their high seas design pro\'edso successful that it continued in sen;ce ,\;thonly minor modifications until well after theSecond World "'ar, Known as T)'pe 35 orM35, the design formed the basis for newminesweepers built for the Reichsmarine,and in 1939 it was e\'en simplified for warproduction to be known as Type "10 or 1\'140.Later in the war it was further modified andenlarged to become Type 43 or M43, Boatsbelonging to these three types became theworkhorses for the majority of mine weepingduties. Howe\'er, they were too big for thevast stretches of the shallow coastal waters ortidal rivers, which required special shallowdraught \'essels known as Riiumbool or R-boat(Motor :'Ilines\\"eepers), The R-boat typesbuilt by the old Imperial Na\1' had beenrather disastrous inasmuch as they did notmanoeuvre well and their poor sea-keepingqualities made them unsuitable for use inrough water. Consequently the Reichsmarinecompletely redesigned tllis type to produce ahighly successful craft. The third major"ariet}' of mine clearance \'e sels, known asSperrbrerher (Barrier Breakers), were oldmerchant ships rilled with cork, sealed air­filled tins or other notation aids, intendedfor sailing in front of other, more valuable\'essels to detonate mines in their path.

By the end of the Second "'orld War,European waters had been filled with SOll1e600,000 mines plus probably another50,000-100,000 types of other explosivebarriers. Germany alone employed about3,000 \'essels and o\'er 100,000 men to helpclear them from areas where they were notwanted. Of this, some 500 minesweepers and25,000 men were stationed in the Channelpons of occupied Fr-ance. Such \£lS1 numbersmake it ob\-ious that all types of ships from

126

After the First World War the majority of minesweepers were converted to burn oil instead of coal, but

shortages J1leantthe~'were changed back again for the cond World War. This shows coal &1.cks being

brought aboard a mll1cs"'eeper.

The German Navy still follows in the old tradition of celebrating e\'el)' possible event in history, and when

ther-e. is nothing to celebrale, lher simpl" celebrale lhe facl thallhere is nOlhing lO celebrale. I-Ia\ing

empued a coal barge was as good a reason as an" for lelling rour hair down.

127

G ER)I A:I" .\ A\ Y II A~ I) BOO K I 939 - I 945

Coaling was a filthy job, but it was no worse than the work done by thousands of people in facLOries. This

shows men aboard M /33.

The coal-burning furnaces aboard one of the minesweepers. This filthy work was essential because

withoUl ilthere "-dS 110 power for an)'lhing else.

128

TilE FLEET

r\ minesweeper at sea. The nag flying on the stern suggests that this phOlo was taken before theautumn of 1935 when Hitler introduced the new ensign with swastika.

129

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GE R)I ASS.H Y II AS D BOO K 1939 - I H 5 TilE FLEET

Minesweeper M133. Quite a number or other small boalS with three digit numbers were in fact identified

only by the lastt',·o digilS, the first one sometimes being the number or the boat's flotilla.

10TOR MI ESIVEEPERS

A close up or 1H145's hull showing the multitude

or ri"eLS holding Lhe iron plates togelher.

small craft, especially U-boats. Armouredshields were intended as temporary protectionfrom ice while passing through coastal walersand along the Kiel Canal.

The Reichsmarine de\'eloped small mine­sweepers under the guise of tugs. They werealso called Fleet Escort Vessels or F-boats(Fangboole - Catching or Retrieving BoalS) bysome people because they were frequentlyengaged for catching torpedoes duringexercises. However the 'F' seems to stem fromFlachgelumdeboole, meaning Shallow Draught

was to simplify the speciJicaLions so that boalScould be built in small shipyards, which hadpreviously not been involved with suchcomplicated craft. The third variation of thebasic design, Type 43, came aboul as a desire toimprO\Te the general perfOlmance by increasingrange and armaments. Minesweepers wereidentified by a number prefixed with the letter'M'. As \\1th other small ships, during pre-waryears the first digit of many three·figurenumbers indicated the boat's flotilla. Thedifferent lypes of minesweeper mentionedabove were identified by the year when theyfirst went into produClion. During the warmany minesweepers were modified to burncoal instead of oil and they carried a widevariety of artillery. In fact the basic Type 35design was equipped with such powerful gunthat it was nicknarned 'The ChannelDestroyer'. Before the war some of the boalSwere also used for training and even hadtorpedo tubes fitted for practice purposes.

By the end of the war minesweepers wereequipped with more than twelve different typesof mechanical apparatus for clearing standardmoored mines. Although, of course, not alltwelve types were found on the same ship atthe same time. In addition to this, Germanyhad developed more than eight different selSof apparatus for dealing with acoustic minesand there were ten different sets of gear forcoping with magnetic varieties. Mine clearinghad indeed become an exacting art, althoughthe danger of the boat being destroyed in theclearing process always remained high. Inaddition to the various types of sweepingapparatus, ships were also protected by so­called Bow Protection Gear which wassupposed lO push moored mines away fromU1C ship's hull. This equipment was somewhatunsuitable for large ships and it could not beused for speeds m'er 16 kt, though it had beenfitted to gianlS such as Bis1tlllrck. It consisted ofa set of wires and paravanes and should not beconfused with an alllloured shield placed over

As has already been mentioned, there werethree basic types of minesweeper developedwith very little modification from a successfulFirst World War design. One of the mainreasons for changing from Type 35 to Type 40

M-BOAT

fishing boats and lugS to unwanted ferrieswere commandeered for mincswcepingduties. They certainly formed an incrediblylarge proportion of the German flecL.

Before the beginning of the war, theposition of Flag Officer for Minesweepers hadalready become somewhat impractical, andthe control of port protection flotillas hadpassed to the Naval Commands for the Balticand North Sea. The conUicl latcr made coastalprotection much more of a priOl'it)' than ithad been, and special coastal protcClion unitswere establi hed in Germany and along thecoasts of the occupied countries. As with otherships, operational control was often handedover to other naval commanders who wereresponsible for big ships in the particular area.

The so-called 'whisper bag' or megaphone,

consisting of funnel-shaped trumpet, featured

frequently throughollt the war, and even Loday

men still prefer to shout orders rather than use

mOI-e sophisticated personal radios.

130 131

GERMAN NAVY IIANDBOOK 1939-1945 THE FLEET

•

/1",

/'"

A mOLOr minesweeper being used as escort for submarines and made fast nextLO U48, the most succcssfulU-boat of thc Sccond ''''orld War.

A Sperrbrecheror barrier breaker lying at anchor. These ships were filled with flotation aids so that Lhey

could sail in from of others to detonate mines. Life aboard them must havc been somcwhat

uncomfortable, dcspite living quaners having been provided with extra insulation.

M2 were also equipped with this type ofpropeller and although their commandingofficers lIsed the system to much effect, it wasnever universally adopted for larger vessels.The Reichsmarine's R-boats were such asuccess that after the war they were used for avariety of other purposes and many sawsterling service as cuuers, pilot vessels orlaunches where small, fast and stable craftwere required. They could be engaged withtheir clearing gear in winds up to Force 6-7.

R-boats, originally with a displacement ofabout 65 tons and later increased up to175 lons, were still too big for use in theconfined waters of Norwegian fjords, andKpllt. Hans Bartels took it upon himself to

build his own tiny minesweepers by adaptinga Nonvegian fishing boat design and buyingthe engines in Sweden. He invited theSupreme Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to

the commissioning ceremony of his 'Dwwfs'before sending him the bill for the project.But this form of independence was notappreciated and Bartels found himself being'promoted' to become first officer aboard thedestroyer 234. Yel, the tiny Dwarfs providedan excellent service by 'de-lousing' thenarrow confines of the fjords.

Referring to these craft as minesweepers is alittle misleading inasmuch as they were notemployed in the role of fishing for mines.Instead they sailed in front of warships,escorting them in and out of ports andproviding good anti-aircraft cover at the sametime. They were fitted with powerful electro­magnets and a means of detonating acousticmines. The idea was that unsavoury objects intheir path would be disposed of. To copewith such explosions, crew accommodationwas specially insulated to absorb shocks andexcessive noise. Despite this, serving aboard

SPERRBRECHER (BARRIER BREAKERSOR AUXILIARY MINESWEEPERS)

A small motor minesweeper flying an admiral's

flag. In this case it is bringing Admiral Carls

alongside U40Bfor an inspection of the assembled

crew. The photo was taken in Norway at about the

time of tile halLie for the famous convoy PQJ8.

This could well be at Bergen with the submarine

pens under conslruClion in the background.

Boats. The vast majority of this type were calledR-boats, short for Riiumhoot (Clearance Boat).

Many of the R-boats were fitted with Voith­Schneider or cycloidal propellers. Thesemake rudders obsolete because Lhey can drivethe boat in any direction. WhaL is more, it ispossible to change directly from fast ahead tofast astern withollt SLOpping the engines andreversing them. This makes for supermanoeuvrability, but has the disadvantageinasmuch as the system seems to lose about10 per cent of power over similar hulls with

conventional propellers. Incidentally, M I and

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GE R~I ANN AVY II AND BOO K 1939 - I 945 TilE FLEET

Men aboard the minesweeper MiSdoing what comes natumlly. Second from the right is the commander,

Kptll. Otto Kohler.

Adjutant

Whale hunter Pol IX was captured by auxiliarycruiser Pinguin in the Antarctic and comm­issioned on the high seas in February 194] as anofficial unit of the K1iegsm01ine under commandof Obll.z.S. Hans Karl Hemmer, ule youngestofficer aboard auxiliary cnlisers. The removal ofd,e harpoon and catwalk made her look like afishing boat, suitable for reconnaissance and forlaying mines. However, Pingl.lin was sunkbefore much of this plan could be put into

voyage to France. Following dlis, Starstad wasused as a supply ship until she was damaged inNantes during August 1944.

KpUL Ouo Kohler ,\'riting in his personal

'Observations Book' while an Obermaat holding a

box camera is enjoying a moment of peace. BOUlof them are wearing 'SchifJchen' (Small Ship). The

man on the left is wearing a white denim working

jacket while Kohler is dressed in naval leathers.

before the operation could be put intopractice.

KptlL Ouo Kohler having his hair cut aboard Mi8.

Passat

A name given to the 8,998 gn Norwegianfreighter Starstad after she had been capturedby auxiliary cruiser Pinguin in October 1940and converted into a minelayer undercommand of Kpdl.(S) Erich Warning. She wasused for laying thirty mines in the Banks Suaitbetween north·east Tasmania and Barren [slanddUling d,e night of 29/30 October, each \\idlfour-day delayed action fuses. Another fortywere depoSited on the eastel" side of the BassStrait during the following night and thenanother fort)' in the approaches to POll. PhillipBay for catching traffic nmning in and Ollt ofMelbourne. Following this, Passed reverted toher original name and was used as areconnaissance vessel under Oblcz,S. WalterLewil, Eventually the ship made a successful

even minesweepers. M-boaLS could cany somethiny standard mines and the larger, Type 43,even managed to store forty-four. Since these

boaLS were fast and reasonably well armed, theyfound themselves being employed for a varietyof offensive mining operations. Cruisers alsocarded mines, although approaching close toshallow enemy shipping lanes was more thanin"lpractical. Several auxiliary cruisers laidmines in far distant ports where intrusionswould not be anticipated while Pinguin wentone better by converting a captured ship,Starstad, into a minelayer on the high seas andthen sending it along its original route intoAustralian waters. Pinguin also used a capturedwhale hunter (renamed Adjutant by theGelmans) for mining Lyuleton and Wellingtonin New Zealand, but Pinguin was herself sunk

MINELAYERS

Sperrbrechers was somewhat nerve-rackingbecause the force of exploding mines brokemany ships in half. The only consolation wasthaloften there were ships behind who couldSLOp and pick up survivors. Since a vastvariety of old and obsolete vessels were lIsedfor conversion to barrier breakers, there were

no special designs for this type of ship.

Although Germany designed a number ofpurpose-built rninelayers. these large shipswere only suitable for laying defensive banicrs.They would have attracted too much attentionhad they approached too close to foreignharbours. So offensive mines were laid bysmaller ships such as destroyers, submarines or

134 135

GERMAN NAVY IIANDBOOK 1939-1945 TilE FLEET

Adjutant, under Hans Karl Hemmer, being refuelled. This was captured as a whaler, but once the harpoon

and u1.twalk had been removed it resembled a nondescript fishing boat, suitable for laying mines close to

enemy harbours.

Adjutallt coming alongside auxiliary cruiser PinK'lin.

Hans Karl Hemmer, the youngest officer aboard

auxiliary cruisers, as commander of the captured

whale hunter Adjutant.

practice and Hemmer sailed dramatically acrossthe Pacific. Being first refuelled from KnmlOran,

he cvenLUally joined auxiliary cruiser KameL

under Admiral Roben E)'SSCn. lllis cooperationwas not a happy affair because Hemmerrecei,-ed a SC\'ere backlash from an earlier bitterdisagreement between Eyssen and Pinguin'scommander. Hemmer was relieved of hicommand and replaced by Oblt.z.S. WilfredKarsten, who mined LytLlclon and ""eUingtonin New Zealand. The mines were probablydefective because noming was sunk with themand the Royal Navy did not discover theirwhereabouts until reading Ge,man log booksafter the war. The 350-ton Adjutallt had beenbuilt in Middlesbrough (in England) during1937 and Mts scuuJed offChalham Island in thePacific.

MasHOp lookoUL of the auxiliary minelayer and

blockade breaker Doggerballk.

Doggerballk

Odginally SpeJlxlllk, belonging to Andrew Weirand Company, captured by auxiliary cruiserAtlantis and brought to France as a prize undercommand of Kptlt. Paul Schneide\\1nd. AfterrefitLing and renaming, she left France inDecember 1941 to lay mines off Cape Town(SoUtil Aftica) and to act as a submarine supplyship. The mining operation was successful, butthere were no V-boats in me area, so Doggpbankcontinued to Japan and returned to Europe asa blockade breaker. On 3 March 1943, she wassunk by U43 (Kptlt. Hans-Joachim Schwantke),who had been lOld there were no Gennan shipsin the area. A small group of men, includingthe commander, remained alive in a lifeboatfor twenty-five days. Being without food andwater, Schneidewind then shot himself, and

136 137

GEHMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

other survivors, except Fritz Kucn. followedsuit. Kuen was finally picked up by a US ship,Laken to America and rClUrned to Germany

dUling the pl;soner swap.

SAIL TRAINING SHIPS

end to what was considered to be anoutdated extravaganza. However, the navalcommand won the argument and set aboutdesigning better and safer sailing ships. Thefact that this generation of vessels not onlysurvived the war, but thal the designs are stillin service loday shows the high standardswhich were achieved.

WHAT THE NAMES MEAN

The Imperial Navy abandoned sail trainingfour years before the beginning of the First""orld ""ar because it was considered to be anoutdated method of educating futureofficers. Instead of wind, the cadets werepresented with the power of steam andgunpowder. A few years later, it becameapparent that sailors' worst enemies wouldalways remain the restless sea and theunpredictable weather. Consequently theReichsn1arine reintroduced sail training as anessential pan of its officer educationprograrnme. The first new ship, the fourmasted gaff-sail schooner JHarten Jensen,acquired from Denmark, received athorough refit before being commissionedunder the name of Niobe in 1923. A top-heavytendency remained and, less than ten yearslater, she capsized during a sudden andfierce summer storm off the Island ofFehmarn in the Baltic. Sixty-nine men werekilled, including almost the entire intake ofofficer cadets for 1932. Following this, apolitical storm brewed for some time withnumerous influential people calling for an

138

NiobeThe regular crew consisted of 7 officers andabout 27 men, who looked after a maximumof about 65 cadets. C: 19 December 1923;S: by capsizing during a sudden summerstorm on 26 July 1932. Raised and later sunkas a target for testing torpedoes.

Corel. FockThe regular crew was made up of 9 officersand about 58 men, plus a maximum of198 cadets. C: 27 June 1933; survived the warto become Towarischtsch (Soviet).

Horst WesselC: 17 September 1936; survived the war tobecome Eagle (USA).

Albert Leo SchlageterC: 12 February 1938; survived the war tobecome Cuanabara (Brazilian) and in 1961Sagres (Portuguese). Both ti,e last two had apermanent crew of 9 officers and about69 men plus room for 220 cadets.

Bismarck

Quo, Count and later Prince von Bismarck(1815-98) took this name from his homeLOwn, which lies just over 100 km west ofBerlin. He was a powerful force in theunification of the German Nation. AsChancellor and Minister President, his aimwas to stabilise the Germanic states as onenation, to make them powerful enough LO

stand up against the French and otherEuropean nations. Differences with the newEmperor, Wilhelm II, forced his retirementfrom political life in 1890.

BlUcherGebhard Leberecht von Blucher, PrinceBlikher von Wahlstadt (1742-1819) becamea famous field marshal in the Prussian Army,who fought on the British side against theFrench at vVaterloo. One of the greatachievements of this conflict was gettinghis forces across the Rhine during the hoursof darkness and in deepest winter. Amemorial still stands near Kaub (betweenSt Goarshausen and Bingen in the RhineGorge) to mark the event. His army was thesubject of a famous remark by the EnglishDuke of Wellington during the Ballie ofWaterloo, 'I wish it were night and thePrussians were here.'

PriliZ EugellPrince Eugen von Savoyen (1663-1736) wasan Austrian field marshal who fought in thewars of liberation from domination by theFrench.

139

Glleisellau

August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, born in1760, was made a count in 1814. He was ageneral on Bliicher's staff and worked forsome time with Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Hedied of cholera in 1831.

CrafSpeeMaximilian Reichsgraf von Spee, born 1861in Copenhagen and killed during the Battleof the Falklands in 1914. As Chief of ti,e EastAsia Cruiser Squadron, he attempted ahomeward run shortly after the outbreak ofthe First \"'orld \"far, but was cut off by Britishwarships, which annihilated most of theGermans, including Admiral von Spee andboth his sons.

HipperFranz, Riller von Hipper, born in 1863 andjoined the Navy in 1881. Devoted many of hisyounger years to the development oftorpedoes. As Commander-in-Chief forCruisers he led the German onslaught for theBattle of Jutland during the First World Warand died in Hamburg-Altona in 1932.

Lii(zow

Adolf, Freiherr von LUlZOW (1782-1834) wasa cavalry officer during the earl)' wars ofliberation when he was severely defeated bysuperior French forces, but succeeded in re­establishing the decimated units.

SchamhorstGerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) was asocial reformer and Prussian general,

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

U-BOATS

responsible for the inlfoduClion of nationalconscription. Among other things. heabolished degrading and demoralisingpunishments, and brought about a system ofpromotion according to ability rather thansocial standing. He died from his woundswhile serving on Bliicher's staff during thecampaign against the French.

Scheer

Admiral Reinhard Scheer (1863-1928) was afamous advocate for the use of cruisers andChief of the High Seas Fleet. When hebecame Fleet Commander he made it plainthat he wanted to engage the ships underhis command to the limits of theircapabilities.

Seydlil% (incompleted cruiser)Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz (1721-73) ageneral of cavalry.

140

Tirpil%Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930) started his careeras an ordinary naval officer of average ability.but his enthusiasm for torpedoes broughthim early promotion to Korveuenkapiliin.Later he became State Secretary for the NavalOffice and Grand Admiral. He "as the dri,;ngforce behind the development of the ImperialNavy. He has often been described as anannaments fanatic. His clever and most balancedproposals never resulted in a parliamentarydefeat until a difference about unrestrictedsubmarine warfare forced his retirement on8 March 1916. He died in Ebenhausen in1930 and lies buried in a cemetery nearFurstenried to the south of Munich.

GrafZeppelin (incompleted aircraft carrier)Ferdinand, Craf von Zeppelin (1838-1917)inventor, designer and developer of Cennany'slarge airships.

The terms of the Versailles Diktat prohibitedthe Reichsmarine from building or owningU·boats, but today it is well known thatGermany kept pace with submarinedevelopment by opening a constructionbureau in Holland. Soon after coming to

power in 1933, Hitler boosted thisclandestine development by telling the Arm)'and Navy chiefs to plan for expansionbecause the shackles of the impossiblerestrictions would be thrown off as soon aspossible. Two years later the unexpectedhappened. The Reichsmarine was secretl),collecting pans for assembling a smallnumber of tiny coastal submarines when thegovernment stumbled upon what must havebeen the political opportunity of the century.The National Socialists were still balancingon politically weak foundations, whensomeone struck upon the idea ofconsolidating their standing by repudiatingthe Versailles Diktat. The situation had arisenbecause although Hitler had the highestnumber of votes, he still did not haveunanimous support and his governmentcould easily have been toppled b)1 turbulencewithin the country.

The reason this must have been such agreat political opportunity was that whateverhappened, the National Socialists could notlose. Whatever the outcome, Hitler wouldend up holding the winning hand. A fewyears before the NSDAP came to power, t11eFrench had sent an army of occupation intothe industdal heartland of the Ruhr becauseGerman war reparations were slowing down.Quite probably the National Socialists wereexpecting something similar on this

141

occasion. Such an invasion would have givenHitler the unique opportunity of uniting themasses behind him while he appeared to

stand firm in face of obvious oppression. Butsuch a stance was not necessary. Instead, theAllies allowed the Versailles Diktat to bethrown out by the very people who weresupposed to be suppressed by it. Inreu-ospecl it seems absurd and one wonderswhy Germany had been forced into signingthe humiliating document in the first place.Following Hitler's famous proclamation, tlleGermans found t..hat not only were the AlliesSitting idl), by while the Diktat "as discarded,but influential foreign politicians wereactually congratulating Hitler for the positionhe had taken. The National Socialists hadwon a terrific battle and, at the same time,spineless Allied politicians had allowedEurope on to the first step down the slideinto anarchy and unimaginable suffering.

The repudiation of the Versailles Diktatand the reintroduction of nationalconscription were followed by changing thename of the Navy from Reichsmarine toKriegsmarine. A few weeks later Hitler wasrewarded with the so-called Anglo-GermanNaval Agreement, although Germany gainedthe most and it should therefore really havebeen called the German-Anglo Agreement.Hitler's achievemenlS with these negotiationswent so far beyond the admirals' wildestdreams t1,at they presented the Naval HighCommand with several unforeseen problems.Earlier, when the first U~boat parts startedarriving secretly in Kiel, Admiral Raeder(Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Navy)had visions of perhaps being allowed to

...GE R~I ANN AVY II ANJ) BOO K 1939 - I 945 V-BOATS

U307 under Oblt.z.S. Friedrich-Georg Herrle showing how ami-aircraft guns dominated conning towers

tOwards the end of the war. In this case there appears to be one double 2Q-mm on the upper platform,

and a 37-mm quick-firing gun on the lower winlagarlen. Many boats were filled with a quadmple 2Q-mm

weapon on the lower platform and two 2Q-mm twins on the upper.The semi-amomatic 37-mm quick-Ii ring anti­

aircraft gun aboard U181 under the command of

Kpt.z.S. Kun Freiwald. It appears that the weapon

is being cleaned because there are no cartridges

in the clip above the breech.

assemble a few small submarines. Thesewould have been attached to some existingsurface ship flotilla, but the unexpectedboost from the Naval Agreement meant tl1erewould soon be too many submarines for suchplans and an autonomous unit had to beestablished.

Creating a new submarine Ootillapresented a few tricky problems because themajority of men who had served insubmarines during tl1e First ""orld \-Var werenow too old, somewhat out of touch or dead,and Germany's new generation ofsubmariners was still too inexperienced tolead a flotilla. Men were being secretlytrained under the guise of the Anti­Submarine School in Kiet and a few of them,

142

mainly engineers. had also participated intrials with boats built by German businessesin foreign countries. So, there was a tiny coreof men capable of coping with the three­dimensional thinking necessary forcontrolling submarines, but the Naval HighCommand didn't have anyone in the runningfor leading such a group of specialists.

At this stage fate played a hand. Just at thiscritical moment, when the Supreme NavalCommand was looking for a likely candidateto push inLO what the majority considered tobe a hideous position, the light cruiser Emden

rculrned from a flag-showing Lour aroundthe world. Her commander, Karl Donitz, hadalready been nick-named 'Star' as cadet; he

had commissioned two brand-new units; hepreferred to make lip his own rules ratherthan follow those wriuen by others; and,most impormnt of all, he was one of the fewlikely officers who had actually commanded asubmarine during the First \"'orld \"'ar.

Dcmitz guessed that he would leave Emden

for one of the bigger, more prestigious shipsand after that probably become a cruisersquadron commander or an officer withinthe Naval High Command. The idea ofreturning to a small flotilla of stinkingsubmarines didn't appeal at all, but he wasassured that it was only a temporary measurefor a couple of years while a new commanderwas being brought up for the role. Donitztook command of the first U-Flotilla in 1935.However, the war started before such planscould be put into operation and Donitz waspromoted from Flotilla Commander to FlagOfficer in Janual)' 1936 and later, in October1939, to Commander-in-Chief for U-boats.Many historians have fallen into the trap oftaking this to have been a process of plannedprogression and made Oonitz responsible forpre-war submarine development, which is along way from the truth. His brief wasseverely limited to welding the U-boat flotillainto a fighting force. Training new personnel

was not pan of his duty. In fact the schoolflotilla came under the jurisdiction of theTorpedo Inspectorate while other submarinematters were decided by the U-boat Office atthe Supreme Naval Command with whomDonitz had lillie or no contact.

Being without definite directives for thenew submarine flotilla, 06nitz startedcreating the foundations of his future vision,which was based on the concept that one daythere would be aboUl 300 U-boats. Thedeclaration of war, just four years after lakingup his appointment, made these plansredundant and Donitz's entire administrativesystem had to be modified to meet the newdemands put upon it. At first no one was surehow the conflict would develop and it wasnOt until the beginning of 1940 that theU-boat ann took on tl1e shape it would keeptl1roughout the ensuing years.

At first the admirals of the Naval HighCommand thought U-boats should be used fora variety of unproductive tasks such as acting asmeteorological stations or escorting surfaceships. Since the weather provided far betterprotection than tiny submarines, the majorityof surface ships broke out of the dangerousEuropean waters dUling StOI1l1S. when U-boarshad problems remaining on the surface andcould never have engaged their weapons. Yet itwas the summer of 1940 before Donitzsucceeded in bringing his supel-iors round to

thinking that submarines would be betteremployed if they were pitched as anautonomous force against Allied convoys. Inaddition to this, U-boats were tied by PrizeOrdinance Regulations prohibiting surpriseattacks against merchant ships, unless they weresailing in convoy or were being escorted bywarships. These lules were imposed so strongly

143

GERMAN XA\'Y HANDBOOK 1939-1945 -BOATS

Top of the conning lower aboard U5/0.

Side view ora T)pe VII V-boat, Ui56, with an open hatch.

144

that the war was almo t a rear old beforeU-boats were free to attack all merchant shippingin the \-\'estern Approaches to British ports.

B)' that time, August 1940, control of themajority of submarines at sea had passedto what became known simply as the 'U-boatCommand' under the leadership ofAdmiral Karl Donitz and the head of itsOperations Department, KpL.z.S. EberhardGodL. Everything else came under tJ,e conu'olof KpL.z.S. Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, whowas in charge of the Organisation Deparunent.

U-boat flotillas, although plentiful in number,acted as a means of provisioning boats andlooking after the welfare of the men in pon.In IllOSt cases, as soon as boats were clear ofcoastal waters the}/ came under the directjlllisdiction of the U-boat Command.

Radio communications were so good thalDonitz's small staff could broadcast to boatssubmerged off America's east coast. The entireequipment occupied a small van andaccompanied the U-boat Command towherever it was located. At times, of course,messages would be boosted b)' big stations sllchas Coliah near Magdeburg, where some twenl)'masts supported a spider's web of high \'oltageantennas some 150-200 m up in the air.Efficient wireless communications had alreadybeen e tablished before tJ,e First World Warbecause the only telephone lines to GenTIancolonies and bases in Africa and the Far Easthad to go through British<ontrolled cables.

OPERATION AREAS

U-boats found their way into the Atlantic, theMediterranean, the Black Sea and into theCaribbean. They operated in Polar water, inthe Indian Ocean and in the far easternPacific. In fact, if one believes a printingerror in Dr Jurgen Rohwer's Axis SubmarineSuuesses tJ,en VI] (KL Karl Daublebsk)' \'onEichhain) penetrated up the Avon Canal tosink the freighter MagdapuT on the

145

racecourse at Stratford-upon-Avon in thehean of England. (The position is given as52·II'N 01 ·43'W, bUl the 'W' should be 'E'.)

THE BALTIC

Even before the first shots, marking theGerman reoccupation of her formerterritories, were fired, the lack of oppositionmade it clear that there would be no Upboatactivity in the eastern Baltic. So, ineptember 1939 as Britain declared "'ar, the

majOlity of submarines were already on theirway west, lea,~ng the Baltic free for training.This was ideal because most of the Baltic wasout of reach of tJ,e Ro)"'1 Air Force, meaningthe education process could go aheadwithout serious interference. There was alittle U-boat activit)' in tJ,e 'Finnish BatJ1tub'of the far eastern Baltic, but generall)' thebitter war ofvengcance didn't arrive until theRussian armies started advancing westwards.Then, late in 1944, German)' mounted amassive operation for helping refugeesfleeing the horrors of bitter war. Everyavailable ship and boat ",as engaged to helpthe stead)' stream of ragged humanil)' acrossthe ice-bound "'ater. The losses innicted onGennan civilians, many of them childrcn andold people, make the figures for the BattJe ofthe Atlantic or the British evacuation atDunkirk drop into insignificance. Forexample Guya went down ",ith 6,500 refugees,Wilhelm GuslloJ! with over 5,000 and Generalvon Steuben with almost 3,000. Yet despitesllch large numbers being killed, onl)' about2 per cent of the total lost their lives,indicating the vast volume of humanity whichfled westwards in front of tJ,e Red Arm)'. As

comparison it might be interesting to addthat the losses suffered b), the Germansduring the three brief naval actions,mentioned above, were more than a quarterof the total number of British civilians killedduring Lhe entire war.

...-

GERll.n N AI" Y HA:\ DBOO K 1939 - I 945 U-BOATS

A norj!Ja or training boaLS in the Baltic.

UJ21 in Pillau, eastern Baltic.

146

THE BLACK SEA

The sixty smallish ships sunk during a pe,iodof almost two rears makes one wonderwhether the effort of bringing U-boaLS intothe Black Sea was wonh it, and whether thesesuccesses might not have been achievedmore easily by, perhaps, aircraft. The 30thU-boat Flotilla, known as the Black SeaFlotilla, was based at Constanta (Romania)and also had a provisioning port at Feodosia

on the Crimean Peninsula. It was founded byKptlt. Helmut Rosenbaum in October 1942and disbanded in OCLOher 1944 while under

cOIl'lI11and of Kptlt. Clemens Scholer. During

lhe ummer of 1944 the notilla came undercOIlllnand of KpLlt. Klaus Petersen. The boatswere all of the small coastal Type JIB andconsisted of: U9, U18, U19, U20, U23 andU24. U9 was destroyed during an air raid onConstanta and the olhers were scuttled nearTurkey when the German positions becameuntenable due to the pressure of thesurrounding Russian rorces. Originally lheboats were brought into the Black Sea bybeing dismanlled and lhen carried onponLOons along the River Elbe. From near

147

Clemens ScholeJ~ Ch ier of the 30th (Black Sea)

U-boat Flotilla being escorted to the railway station

in Constanta (Romania) at the end of his tour of

dut), (above and below). It was common for officers

to be given a ;high class' send off. Note that the

como)' is fl)ing the pennant of a flotilla commander.

G E IOI.H ~ AI" r IU x0 BOO J( 1939 -1945 l]·BO.\TS

Although household and luxury goods continued to be made for'l much longer period of tile war than in

Brimin, there were consideidble shol1ages in Genn3ny. However, men based in France could continue 1.0 buy

a vast quantity of goods no longer available at home, making \\;ndow shopping most attractive. Although

these 1"·0 could be mistaken for soldiel fmm the Aflik.akol1)s, they a1·e U-boat men onlea,·e in Bordeaux.

Dresden the}' tra\·elled b}' o\·erland

transporter to Regensburg on the Danube.There the)' were placed back on the samepurpose-bui It pon loons and carrieddownstream to be reassembled near theBlack Sea. To do this, the hulls were ClIt intosections and engines. propellers, ballcriesand other hea\)' gear carried separately.

THE MEDITERRA JEAN

Before the beginning of the war, Donitz hadalready discounted the Mediterranean as asuitable hunting-ground for U·boats. The sea is

too calm, the water tOO clear and the weaulcrgenerally tOO good for submal;ne aClhit}'. Hisdislike for the area was strengthened in 1939b}' Korvkpt. Klaus Ewenh (U26), following areconnaissance of the Gibraltar area. However,later the Supreme Naval Command orderedDonilZ to send boats inLO the Mediterranean.thus founding a new submarine di,"ision in

Italy under a newly created Flag Officer,Kor\'kpL. ViClor Oehl11. After a while this postbecame known as Flag Officer for theMediterranean. For most of the time therewere twO notillas: the 23rd based chieny inSalamis (Greece) and the 29th first in

Going home on leave fmm France. The spare hand was required for· can)'ing the parcels lying on the floor.

There were virtually no resuictions on whalmen could take home ,md those lea,;ng France took full advantage

of the many luxury goods which could be purchased thne. The circular cylinder is a gas mask container.

148 149

GE R~I ANi\' AI' Y HAN 0 BOO K I 939 - 1945 U-BOAT

Officers and crewmen aboard VI7Bafter her first cruise into the South AtJantic and Indian Ocean. Left,

Admiral Menche, cemre, Kon'kpl. Klaus Scholtz and, right, the commander, Kpt_z.S Hans Ibbeken.

La Spezia (Italy), then Toulon and later also inPola (Pula, former Yugosla,ia) and Marseille.When the position of nag officer was abolishedin September 1944 the three survi\-ing boatswere ITIm'cd east. under the command of the

Admiral for the Aegean.

THE CARIBBEAN

Once opposition along the eastern seaboard ofthe nitcd States became too determined,DOnia moved long-ra.nge boats southwards until

e\'ennmlly they roamed through the Caribbeanand on as fur south as the delta of the Amazon.Although ule -boats enjoyed some initialsuccesses. the enemy was quick to bite and formany it became a case of nUfluring badlydamaged machinery for a long trek back toFrance. Being surrounded by American radiodirection finders made it easy for the enemy to

tnlck U-boats that were sending out disu'ess calls.To ulis day ule Caribbean still holds one of

the big secrets of the war. This is themysterious disappearance of the world'slargesL submarine, ule 2,880/4,304 ton FrenchS'lI.rcouf Much has been wriucn abollt itsenigmatic end, but no one seems ever to have

pursued the research by the Americanhistorian Edward R. Rumpf, who hassuggested it could well have been a target forU502under KptlLJurgen \'on Rosenstiel. Afterthe war it was easy to identify the ships whichRosenstiel claims to have sunk, but oneparticular 2,500 ton tanker in ule Caribbeanhas eluded Rumpf and other historians.Rosenstiel's log dearly describes ule sinking inome detail, saying that U502 aimed at a

tanker showing dim na\igation lights. "Vhenthe tOrpedo struck amidships, ule target bUl tinto a dramatic ba.H of fire and went downimmediately. This description appears to betoo vivid for anyone's imagination and it ipretty certain that U502 hit someuling, butwhat? So far the nited States has failed to

match this reponed sinking with the n3ll1e of

a lost merchant ship and it seems highI)' likelythat the men aboard U502 would not ha"eidentified such a uniquely huge boat as SIIYCOII!

to be a submal;ne, unless, of course, they wereexpecting her. Mter all Swr:oufwas three timeslarger than the usual submarines they wereused to seeing. So it could well be that therleft the area thinking they had hit a tanker.The position. in about 50 fathoms of water, issome 32 nautical miles south-west of Aruba(West Indies) and 5 nautical miles off thelighthouse on the Peninsula de Paraguana, sothe matter could be clarified by a di,·er.

THE FAR EAST

During March 1944, Fregkpt. WilhelmDommes founded tlle first Far Eastern U-boatbase in Penallg (Malaya) and later expandedhis activities by spreading refuelling andrepair facilities to otller ports. Known as Chiefof the Southern Area, he was supported withprO\isions supplied through the Special NavalService via the Naval Attache in Tokyo,Admiral Paul Wenneker. This Service hadoriginally been set up for the benefit ofsurface raiders and blockade breakers. Theproblems of working wilh Japanese cultureand the immense distances made things mostdifficult, ret despite these problems a numberof boats made highly successful voyages to theFar East. They remained under theoperational control of the -boat Commandand usually fought tlleir way out. refitted inthe Far East and then returned as cargocarriers with vital raw materials. At times,while there were still surface raiders at sea,boats refuelled from them or from theirsupply ships, but Ule very long-range U-boatscould reach the Far East without support,although thcy did not can1' sufficient fuel fora retunl journey. Some quite ambitious refitswere carried out under makeshift conditionsand much of the labour was prO\ided by Ulecrews. A number of commanders went \\~t..h a

one-way ticket and then stared in the Far Eastfor other naval duties while a different manbrought the boat home. In some cases thiswas planncd and in others such decisionswere made on the spur of the moment. O"erthe ycars many stories emerged about ~boats

carrying vast "olumes of mercury in theirballast tanks. ~1ercur)' is a highl), expensi"emetal and during the war it was usedsparingl)' for making bomb fuses. Smallquantities were carded from the Far East, butit was usually stored inside earthenwarebottles Slacked in wooden crates insidc thepressure hull. The idea of such a heavy andexpensh·c commodity being poured intodi'ing tanks appears to be a little far-fetched.The following bases were established in theFar East:

Shonan-Singapore (Malaya) (Korvkpt.Wolfgang Erhardt)Penang (Malara) (Kptlt. WaldemarGri:ltzmacher)Djakana Ua\'a) (Kor\'kpt. Dr HermannKandeler)Soerabaja Ua\'a) (Kput. Konrad Hoppe)Kobe Uapan) (Kon'kpL Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat)

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The original plans for submarine aClh~ties intlle South Atlantic were for a couple of boatsto raid the shipping lanes while supported bya surface ship stationed in an out--of-thc-waylocation. Howevcr, Blitain could understanda fair proportion of the radio code by thetime the German forces moved into deep

150 151

..GERMAi\' i\'HY HAi\'DIlOOK 1939-1945 lJ-1l0AT

This is nQl a case of -boatS being supponed by aircraft, but the other way round. The Blohm und Voss

flying boat was carrying out a reconnaissance of the Arctic and U255 under Kptlt. Reinhart Reche was

acting as a floating fuel station.

sOllthern waters and Allied cnliscrs smashedthe operations or rendered them vinuallyimpos ible. There ,,"ere great individualsuccesses, acts of ingenuity, bravery andsurvival, but U~boal operations aimedspecifically at the deep South Atlantic did notachic\'c worthwhile sinking figures.

THE POLAR EAS

U~boalS were sent into the Arnie Seas asfloating wcather stations, for reconnaissance,to establish land-based automatic weatherstations, LO help set up manned weatherstations, to plant automatic weather buo)'sand to harass coovoys running to and fromNorth Russian ports. At first ordinary boatswith hardly any modifications were sent

nonh. later some additional heaters wereprm-ided. For many it was a case of fightingthe elements in ordinal1' unmodified boats,rtuher than being engaged against militaryopposition. SLOries about the weather stationscould easily fill a most exciting ad\'enlUrebook on their own, yet so lillie has beenpublished_ In addition to U-boats, theLuftwaffe also operated a \'ast number ofweather data collecLing flights. A "el1' muchneglected field of history which will hopefullyone day be wlitten down. Even if the resultswere not terribly significant within thecontext of world history, these theatres ofoperation generated a nun'lber of highlyingenious characters, many of whomunfortunately were not given an opportunityof enriching postwar life.

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

The Battle of the Atlantic was fought largel)­by U-boats pitched against merchant ships LOpre"ent supplies being brought to Britain.This bloody conflict started \\ithin hours ofBritain and France declaring war on3 ptember 1939 and continued for se,-eraldays after the cease-firc came into force on5 ~Iay 1945. At the beginning of the warC-boats were allocated patrol areas and therethe)' were obliged to SLOp merchant ships,establish whether or not they were CaIT}~ng

contraband and, lheorelically, they shouldha"e seen to the safety of the crew beforesinking the ship_ The impraClicability ofthese orders, together with a series ofcatastrophic torpedo failures, a shortage oftorpedoes and a plentiful supply of toq,edomines encouraged the U~boat Command tomount an intensive mining offensive ofBritish harbour during the first winter ofwar. This gave the Germans the advantage ofusing the small coastal boats of Type II LOmuch greater benefit. Although u'lese boatshad three loaded bow torpedo tubes, theycould carry only two spare torpedoes,meaning their employment was somewhatlimited. The total of five torpedoes, howevcr,could be replaced '\~th up to eighteen mincsmaking them far more practical in this role.

The spring of 1940 saw -boats employed ina \"Lu;ety of pointless tasks connected ,\;th theimasion of Denmark and Norway, which meantit was summer before the U-boat Commandcould re-employ them against merchantshipping in the North Atlantic. The follo\\ingautumn saw the so-called 'Happy lime' whenC\"ery one of the dozen or so U-boats at sea wassinking more than an average of 5.5 ships permonth. This was achie,'ed by boats attackingon the surface at night and lIsing their radiosto ad"enise con\'oy positions.

This incredible massacre ended abruptlyin the early spring of 1941 at the time when

'Silcnt Otto', Ouo Kretschmcr of U23and U99

wearing the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross with

Oakleaves around the neck and the ribbon for the

Irol1 Cross 2nd Class through the top button hole.

The national eagle with swastika on the light

breast was worn by all ranks. The golden scalloped

edge orthe hat indicated his rank group.

the three aces Joachim Schepke, CllnterPrien and Quo Kretschmer were sunk. Fromthen on, sinking figures of merchantmendwindled and ne,'er again were U-boats in aposition of strength in the battles in theAtlantic. The declaration of war against theUnited Slates brought a brief respite becausethe Americans made very little effort inhunting -boats. Indeed many convoyscarrying highly flammable petroleumcontinued sailing, often with coastal

152 153

GER)I A~ ~ AI" r II AND BOO K I 939 - I 945 l'-BOATS

illuminations revealing their positions towaiting U-boats further out at sea.

In the summer of 1942 opposition inAmerican waters had become too intenseand U-boats returned to the so-called Air Gapof the mid-Atlantic, which could nOt bereached by land-based aircrafL, in incrediblylarge numbers. Two years earlier, during the'Happy Time' of 1940, the average numberof V-boats at sea each day never exceeded adozen or so. By September 1942 this averagehad reached 100 boats at sea for every day,but sinkings had fallen dramatically. Insteadof each -boat sinking almost six ships permonth, statistically the success rate haddropped to more than twO V-boaLS beingrequired to sink a single merchant ship.

A fact, often overlooked br historians, isthat this incredibly high a,·erage of over 100V-boats at sea had been mainlained for morcthan half a year before a major cOl1voy battleLOok place. This happened in March 1943when the fast convoy HX229 ran into theslow convoy SCI22 and almost a hundredIl'lerchant ships met a massive 'wolf pack' - agroup of -boats. Anyone claiming that thiswas the peak of the -boat offensive shouldalso explain why such a vast number of~boalS had been at sea for so long without a

large-scale COl1\"0Y battle having taken place.After all, avoiding such vast numbers of

-boats had been a terrific achie,'emenLB)' March 1943, German)' had realised that

the Allies were gaining the upper hand andstarted preparing for some desperate butfirm countermeasures. First, the surface fleetwas scaled down, though without making themove too obvious so as noL LO encourage theenemy to unleash its forces against morevaluable targets. Secondly, existing U-boatswere modified to meet the new threats,mainly from the air. Thirdly, plans were madefor the produClion of a new generation of so-­called electro-submarine of T)'pes XXI and

XXIII.

Mal' 1943, when a large number of U-boatswere sunk, has often been described as theturning point in the Battle of the Atlantic,although the Gelman High Command ne,·errecognised this and claimed it was a temporarysetback. Grand Admiral Donia did withdrawU-boats from the danger area, but almostimmediately made plans to send them back.The return to the Atlantic convoy routes tookplace in September, when boalS were due toattack with new improved weapons. For thefirst time they had su'engthened anti-aircraftguns, new direction-finding anti-convoytorpedoes and acoustic torpedoes for useagainst fast-mO\;ng warships. llle idea was thatthe boats would attack at night on the surface,At the time, -boat Command thought thatLeuthen's efforts were a great turning point inthe war, but this eupholia was short. ]iYed. Theweather was in the convoys' favour and theescort screen had not been destroyed asimagined. This was due to submerged U-boatsbelieving that the detonations they heard hadsunk their targets. Most of the escorts hadescaped, however, and tlle next COI1\"0Y attacksturned out worse for the U-boats.

TIle struggle in the Atlantic continued untilthe summer of 1944 when the majority of

.boats were employed against the D-Dayinvasion forces. The Allied Operation 'Cork' toblock off the Western Approaches of theChannel though was highl)' successful. It wouldseem ,'ery likely that U~boat losses herewould have been considerably worse, hadAdmiral Eberhard Godt (Chief of the -boatCommand) obeyed Donitz's instruClions tosend every available boat into the EnglishChannel. However, when the crucial order,'SEND ALL BOATS TO EA' came, he sent theboats ,,~thout schnorkels (which were more atrisk) into the Atlantic, where they wererelatively safe because they were some way fromthe enemy.

As a footnote, it might be interesling toadd thal comparing German and Allied

154

stati tics for the Battle of the Atlantic is nOtstraightforward because Germany tendedto include figures from the western Northea and British waters as being pan of the

Atlantic, In Britain, howe\'er, these areaswere classed as 'Home 'Vaters' and theAtlantic started a little way further \,·est.

THE BOATS

At the beginning of the war, all boats werebased on modified First World War designs,meaning they wcre propelled by dieselengines on the surface, and then powered b)'elecu;c drive when the air supply was shut offfor diving. Although the limited bauerypower made them extremely slow once underthe water and the U-boat Ann concentratedon practising submerged attacks until thesummer of 1940, ani)' very few people appearto have been interested in producing vesselscapable of higher underwater speeds. It wasas late as 1943, when defeat was staring theGermans in the face, that they stumbled uponthe idea of adding extra batteries anddeveloped the so-called electro-submarine.About a dozen of these new boats saw briefoperational sen;ce before the end of the wal~

but their main contribution came much lalerwhen the Allies elaborated the principlefurther to produce the silent 'patrolsubmarine' of the Cold \\'30 1' era.

The speeds of submarines can besl beillustrated by the Type VIIC, which was thelargest V-boat class ever to have been builtand Germany's main weapon in the Battle ofthe Atlantic, The top surface speed of 17 kt isabout 30 km/h or just over 20 mph and themost economical cruising speed was 10 kt or18 km/h or II mph. The difference in rangewas quite considerable: 3,250 nm or 6,000 kmat fast speed and 9,500 nm or 17,500 km atthe economical speed. Once submerged, thetop speed was reduced to 7.5 kt or almost14 km/h or 9 mph. This is slower than an

155

a,·erage cycling speed and could only bemaintained for a couple of hour'S before thebatteries ,,'ere exhausted. Generally boatswould proceed at 2-4 kt (4 km/h or almost2.3 mph - 7 km/h orjust O\·er 4.6 mph). Thisis wa.lking speed or, at best, a brisk marchingpace. The large Type XXI electro-boats couldreach 10 kl submerged and maintain thisspeed for over 100 nm. At half that speedthey could cover three times the distance.

At the beginning of the war, Gennany hadthree main sizes of submarine: small coa Lalboats (Type II) of most limited use, sea-goingvarieties (Type VII and I) and a long-rangeclass (Type IX). Of these, Type VII offered agood performance, making it suitable foroperations as far as the Canadian coast, and alittle further if it could be refuelled at sea.The larger ocean-going "ersion was laterde,·eloped for long-distance "·ork for ,·oyagesto the Far East. The ,;sion of supplying 'wolfpacks' at sea from submarines convcned intosupply tankers was a nO"el idea in the 1930sbut hardly materialised because no one camelip with a practical solution for transferringheavy goods on the high seas. The mainproblems were the \"eather, rough seas andfinding ways of safel)' opening hatches inmid-ocean. sually only the conning towerhatch was used, but u-ansferring goodsthrough this 'main door' was "ery difficult.By the time these replenishment experimentsstarted, Britain could already understand alarge proportion of the -boats' secret radiotraffic and consequently the vulnerablesupply submarines had rather shon lives.

One strange pan of U-boat developmentwas thaL the German Na,')' never developedthem as an integrated fighting force, andaircraft which are so vital for finding targeLS,played only a minor role. On top of this, theNav)' ne"er had a really efTeCli\'e weapon for

-boats. The torpedoes of ti,e Second World"'ar were in many ways inferior to their First"'orld 'o\'ar predecessors. There were three

GE R)I A.\ .\ AI" r II AI\' DBOO K 1939 - 1945

Before the war the majority of U-boats had their numbers painted on conning towers, and usually there

wCI-e also bronze number plates on the 00\\ ,which can be seen in this picture as a black rectangle below

the net CUller. The wire nlllning from the net cuuer to the lOp of the conning tower was originally intended

to prevent boats being caught in nelS. Although nets hardly played a significant role dUling the Second

Wodd War, the wires remained because Lhey were used to anchor safety hamesses when men were wOI-king

on the upper deck, and they also ser'\'cd as radio aCI;a!s. This shows U30, one of tile early Type VIlA boats.

The bows of U49wllh net culler clearly visible.

156

l:-BOATS

Atlantic boats had four bow torpedo lubeS. The outside doors of these fitled nush with the casing, making

them difficult to spot in photographs, even when the hull is out of the water. Large, long·range boalS also

had two stern tubes while the smaller Type VII boats had onl)' one tube at the back. However, there were

about a dozen or so Type VIICs built without rear tubes while a few more had them welded shut because

damage allowed water to seep in. This boat is lying on the stocks. Technically it still belongs to the

shipyard and the merchant flag can be seen flying on the bows. The large ensign with swastika would be

hoisted for the first time during the commissioning ceremon)'.

157

GERMAN "AI'\' HANDBOOK 1939-1945 U-BOATS

major faults with the torpedoes and the lastone to occur, a defect in acoustic torpedoes,seen1S to have been recognised by BJitain longbefore Gennany became aware of it. After thewar, it was calculated that only about one inlen acollstic torpedoes actually sank its target.

The general situation with artillery waseven worse. Before the war, commanderscame to the conclusion that the large (88 or105 mm) deck guns sen/cd no useful functionand officers were loam LO lise them, except inexceptionally calm seas which were hardlyever encountered in the Atlantic. Gunnersand men bringing lip ammunition werefrequently washed off the decks or injured,making the lise of the big gun somewhatimpracticable. E\'en in calm weather, aimingthe gun from a rocking deck was not terriblyeasy. Yet, despite this, some boats foughtincredibly long duels, in one instanceexpending over a hundred shells in an attack.

At times one gets ule impression that anti­aircraft guns were added to the rear ofconning LOwers because no one could thinkof anything beller to mount in the space.The resulting designs, based on a single20-mm gun, weren't telTibly effective againstfast, armoured aircraft of the Second \,Vorld\'Var, and it was only when air attacks beganto pose a serious threat that Germanyresponded by modifying the conning LOwers.A variety of different designs were tried out,but generally the combination of two 20-mmtwins on an enlarged upper platform and a20-mm quadruple or a single 37 mm on anadditional lower platform came intowidespread use. Yet even this improved fire­power was not terribly effective. Again, themain problem arose from shooting from anunstable base. The gunners also found therange of their weapons inadequate and theammunition tended to be consumed faster

An Arado seaplane being made ready for night. Wings were removed for storage below decks and the

aircraft was hoisted on to the water for take ofT. This looks \'ery much like a cargo hatch, which would

suggest the photograph was taken aboard an auxiliary cmiser. A purpose-built warship would havelaunched the aircraft from a catapult.

UA was originall)' built for Turke)', but the war staned before it could be handed over and t.he boat was

commissioned into the Kriegsmarine. Being a large, long-distance type, it was often used as a supply boat..

This was the only German U·boat of the Second World War with that typicall), large projection at the frolll

of the conning tower.

158

than men could bring it up from below.Furthermore, the additional bulk on theupper deck further reduced the slowunderwater speeds of the boats.

Germany quickly discovered that itsU-boats did not have a weapon against thelarge, well-armoured long-range planesemployed by the Royal Air Force and that allthey could do was to escape by diving; butthis also had its drawbacks. Aircraft werefaster than U-boats and many boats receivedfat..'ll damage at the moment of disappearingbelow the waves, thus making di\~ng speedscritical. This part of the operations becameknown as the Battle of Seconds and probablycontributed more LO U-boat losses than haspreviously been assumed. Yet Ulere were also

159

a number of incredibly narrow and dramaticescapes where the resilience of the crewhelped in bringing seriously damaged boatsback to pon, illustrating the high quality ofGerman ship building.

The majority of U-boat operations had LObe conducted without much-needed airsupport. This aspect of history has hardlybeen examined and one wonders who. hadaCllially failed the U-boat men. After all, ofthe almost 1,200 U·boats commissioned,about 800 never gOt within shooting range ofthe enemy. This means that only one third ofthe neet attacked and at least damaged ships.\"'hat is more, half of this small fractionattacked fewer than five and mOSt of thedamage was done by 131 U-boats. It therefore

-GERMAN Ntl\'\' HANDBOOK 1939-1945

MIDGET WEAPONS

becomes apparent that Germany had itspriorities in the '\Tong place and should haveprovided more suppon rather thanconcenll-ate on building such vast numbersof subn'larines.

Instead of allacking the threat fromaircraft, Germany responded by making iteasier for U-boats LO avoid the danger. Thiswas done by providing a schnorkel orbreathing pipe so that boats could remainsubmerged for longer pCI-iods. Howe,'cr, thishardly helped in making wem more efTeCli\'cbecause the underwater speed was limited toa maximum of about 5 kt.

The idea of the schnorkel was by no Il"lcansnew. Breathing masts had first beendeveloped during the 1930s b)' Kptlt. J.J.W'ichers of the Royal Netherlands Navy with aview to allo\\~ng submarines in the Far East to

escape the gruelling tropical heat b)'rernaining under the surface. Modifiedversions of this equipment, fined to

021-023 (the Dutch submarines), fell intoGerman hands during] 940, but then it was

discarded because the Kriegsmarine couldnot see a use for it.

The first Genllan schnorkels consisted of ahinged pipe bringing air into the submalinewhile exhaust gases were carried back outthrough a separate duct inside the larger tube.A variety of different head vah-es were fiued toprevent water running down when waveswashed Q\'er the top. \'''hen not in use, hingedschnorkels were lowered into the casingbetween the pressure hull and upper deck.The)' could be raised from the inside of thesubmerged boat and, once in this position,clipped into a bracket at the top of theconning tower. The new electro--submarines,designed from 1943 onwards, were fitted ,,;th

a different design which could be raised andlowered in a similar manner to the periscopes.In fact a number of them had all three heads,that is the schnorkel, na'~gation periscope andattack periscope attached to a special collarthat kept them ligid. However, the periscopescould be raised independentl)' of the

schnorkel.

Today it is easy to see GClTnan midget weaponsas a desperatc last attempt to prolong the war,although at thc time men were hoping thatthese drastic measures would help to bringabout a negotiated peace rather than thchorrendous alternative, the unconditionalsurrender demanded b)' the Allies. ThegCnllination of numerous but isolated ideas ofcmploying small sea-going \'essels as majorweapons of war took place while theincredible results of twO British X-craftinspired people's thinking. In September1943, the might)' battleship Tirpilz had beenput out of action by eight men, two Londonbus engines and the son of technology whichan enterprising cnthusiast could knock up in agarden shed. The salvaged X-craft, probabl)'X-6 (Lt Cameron) and X-7 (Lt Plaice), weretaken to a strctch of proteCled water atHeiligenhafen (East of Kiel, near the island ofFehmarn), to be restored and put through aseries of trials. At the same time, Italianmidget submarine activitics came underscnltiny. From these foundations, a few dozenmen, recruited from the Nav}', Air Force, Annyand 55, started training for what could becalled sabotage operations.

Grand Admiral Donitz (the -boat Chief,

who had been promoted to SupremcCOlllmander-in-Chief of the Nav}' in January1943) was more than sccptical whcn hechaired one of the first mcctings to discussmidget weapons. A shon prcsentation byRichard Mohr, a ci\'ilian designer from theTorpedo Trials Centre at EckernfOrde (Torpedol'eJ:wchsanslall- TVA), sounded too simplisticand too impossible LO be of any use. Mohr'sanswcr to the Italian human torpedoes was to

sil a man inside onel He thought that incolder waters this would be preferable to theItaHan model whcre men rode piggyback ontop. The idea was to replace the wadlead "~th

a cabin and to attach another torpedo.complete with explosives, underneath theoperator. Realising u,at the Torpedo TrialsCentre had already built such a craft, Donirzturned to Oblt.z.S. 'Han no' Krieg and toldhim to go up there and try it out.

The 25-)'ear-old Oblt.z.S., Johann OuoKrieg, had joined t.he Navy in 1937 to becomeFirst Watch Officer of UBI, which had sunkthe aircraft carrie)" Ark RO)lal in theMediterranean while under command ofKptlt. Friedrich Guggenberger. Followingthis, Krieg commanded UJ42 and then wentback to his old UBI for an incredibl)' difficultpe,iod during u,e turbulent )'ear of 1943. Theboat onlyjust sUf\~ved those twelve months. Itwas destroyed during an air raid on Pola (inthe Adriatic) in Janua,)' 1944, leaving Krieg,,~thout a command. Returning to Germany,Krieg expected to eventually continue hisjoume)' as far as the Baltic where he would be

gi"en a brand new U-boat. Instead, he endedup on his own. sitting insidc a torpedo. Theonly compensation was that the controls weresimple. There was thc steering mechanismand a lever for lUnling the eJectric motor onand ofT. The craft was not e"cn fitted \\~th away of varying thc speed or a means formaking it dive. Pressing the handle, while thecraft pointed out to sca, made it dash ofT atabout 50 kmh (30 mph). Astonishingl)', itdidn't sink! Krieg brought it back, and thebatteries were rc\\~red, but even at half speedit still went far LOO fast. In thc end, the men

160 161

p

GE R)L\ -'" -'" Ar r II A-'" 0 BOO K 1939 - I 94 5 )11 0 GET II E ~ PO-,"

Grand Admiral Dr h.c. Erich R..'leder wearing regulation coat with open comno\\'er-blue lapels. The other

admiral with open lapels is Guo Schniewind, who was Fleet Commander. Ranks !o,,'er than admirals wore

their coats buuoned up to the top. as can be seen in this picture.

A midget weapon ofTrpe Negerat the OClllsches Museum in Munich (above and below). Although a long

way from the coast, the museum has an interesting naval section which includes the VI boat from before

the First World War, a See/LUnd and a number of surface craft. The tubular window is a postwar addition.

Ol"iginally it would ha\'c been fitted with a Plexiglas dome.

reduced lhe speed to less man 4 kl by merelywiring batleries in parallel rather than inseries. This had the advantage of gi\;ng mema \'cry slow speed and an incredibly long,-unning lime of Len or more hours.

Thus, ,\ith ,-cry little effon, a new weapon,named Neger ('Negro'), was born. \\'hat wasmore. the Navy already had a use for thecuriosity. By this lime Allied forces hadestablished a firm foothold in Italy's deepSOllth. Donitz realised thal such simple one­

man torpedoes would have been handy forstriking at the suPPOrt ships bringing insupplies, Recognising that small, specialweapons might ha"e a significant role for thefuture, the Nan,) High Command appointedVizeadmiral Eberhard Weichold to lookinto the possibilities and to coordinatedevelopmenL. Howevcr, he was not givcn any

special organisational suPPOrt or manyadditional resources for lackling the problemsahead. Despite this lack of i!westment, it

quickly became ob,;ous that traditional chainsof command would have to be abandonedbecause future success was going to depend onthe abilities of uncolwentional men creatingunorthodox conceplS. As a result, early in thesummer of 1944, when Konteradmiral

Hellmuth Here LOok over command of\ \"eichold's groups. they were amalgamated intoan autonomous force, known as the ~lidgel

\I'capons Unit (Kleillkampfve7fxl/ltior K-I'nfxl/ld).Here staned by looking around for

characters LOO slrong for moulding into theconventional Kriegsmarine form, One of the

first pcoplc LO spring LO mind was KorvkpL.Hans Bartels, who had already built his own

minesweepers in Norway dliling 1940 and wasconsequently promoted to the role of firstofficer in the destroyer Z34 so lhat, as GrandAdmiral Raeder put it. 'he could re-Iearn somebasic naval discipline,' Bartels was joined byFritz Frauenheim, a U-boat commanderextid,ordinary, and by Michael Obladen fromthe Army, who had been a businessman inHamburg before the war, Since the Midget

\\'eapons Unit came under the direct conu'olof the Supreme ~a"al Command. withoutinterference from the complicated na"aladministrath'e system, it was thought best forHeye to control everything except the actual

162 163

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 MIDGET WEAPONS

A one-man submarine ofT)'pe Biberallhe DeuLSches Museum in Munich, showing the conning lower and

one of the two torpedoes.

operational mISSIOns. This meant thatindi\~dllal groups from the Midget v"eaponsUnit would be self-sufficient, so that they didnot have to rely on olhers for any stage of theiroperations. Theoretically an operationalcommander in the field would only have togive them the location of a target plus thenecessary intelligence details and the Midget""capons detachmenLS would do the rest forthemselves. To this end, Heye collected anumber of ships, rrucks and even a few U-boatsfor u-ansporting individuals to within strikingdistance of wherever they were needed.

The amazing point about the Midget""capons Unit was that it started as just acollection of quick-thinking, unconventionalmen without weapons and in 3. few months itwas organised and had a variety of ingeniollsde\~ces. Some of these designs were modifiedfrom whatever could be found, while otherswere specially built from bits and pieces easilyavailable during that period. For example, theNegcr mentioned earlier, was constructed froma standard torpedo. Bartels, who had neverbeen a submariner, even came up with aunique one-man U-boat called Biber. Completewith petrol engine and electric motor, it coulddive and remain at sea for a little over a daybefore running out of fuel. nfortunately anumber of engines leaked exhaust slightly,poisoning their operators, and at least onesuch craft was recovered by the Royal Navynear to Dover after the occupant had beengassed. This boat is now in the Impel;al "VarMuseum in London. Many years ago, themuseum's exhibits department gave the authorpermission to photograph the boat, butunfortunately this attempt was frustrated bytlle gentleman responsible for the area aroundtlle midget submarine. The images could notbe procured because permission had beengiven to photograph the Biber, but not to stopwith a camera in hand and stand on the floorsurrounding it. Alas, I am still lacking thecourage to apply for this pennission.

Not only was the Midget Weapons Unithighly imaginative when it came to designingvehicles, but it was equally versatile wheneffective uses were found for them. Forexample, it was planned to carry two Bibm ontop of a large submarine within strikingdistance of MUlmansk with a view to sinkingthe battleship Archangelsk (ex-British RoyalSOlJereign). The undertaking was onI)' defeatedby faulty engines, although had the Bibers gotunder way, the cold water might well havefrozen the operators. The Midget WeaponsUnit also prepared a long-range Blohm undVoss flying boat to carry a Biber to Egypt. Theidea was to launch it in a remote region of theSuez CanaJ so that ule submarine could makeits way to a narrow section and possibly sink aship in such a way that it blocked thewaten\1aY. One wonders whether such a boldattempt could have worked.

THE MAIN MIDGET WEAPONS

SUBMARINES

Seehlllld (Seal- V-boat Type XXVllB)Developed from Type Hecht by making thehull some three tons heavier, adding a dieselengine and some more sophisticatedequipment such as a small periscope andsound detection gear, this became quite astable boat in seas up to about Force 4. (Themajority of operational boats were probablynever fitted with the sound detector.) Theadditional size allowed two torpedoes to becarried, although these usually had only halfto three-quarters of the normal battery load.The diesel engine improved the performance,enabling the craft to remain at sea for almostthree full days and giving it a maximum rangeof 500 kill. However, under battle conditions,it was more practicaJ to calculate a total rangeof about 250 kill. Several successful hits wereachieved by boats stationed in the EnglishChannel. When British forces entered Kiel

they found considerable numbers underconstruction at the Howaldtswerke. Otherboats were in the process of being built atSchichau in Elbing (near Danzig in EastPrussia) and at KJockner in Ulm (SouthGermany). After the war, a number of thistype turned up during dredging operations inseveral European ports, suggesting that theyhad been positioned at likely places where sea­borne forces might ha\'e landed.

Biber (Beaver)This one-man submarine was conceived byKorvkpt. Hans Bartels and developed byFlender \'Vorks in Lubeck. As has beenmentioned, its m~or drawback had not beenin the design but in the construction of thepeu"ol engine, which had a tendency to leak,poisoning the operator Witll carbon monoxidefumes. The other major drawback lay in theincredible simplicity of tlle design. Altllough it

was capable of remaining at sea for almost afull day, the cold, dampness and the levels ofconcentration needed to pilot the boatdefeated the majol;ty of men. Again, as withType See/wnd, the Biber calTied twO torpedoes,but ,,~th half to three-quarters tlle usual batteryload to S<:1.ve weight. Towards tlle end of J944 anumber of Bibels were engaged in the seasaround Le Havre and in the approaches toAntweqJ. From there the Channel tides can"ieda nlllnber of thern back and forth, resulting inconsiderable losses from natural causes,alulough many also fell foul ofaircraft.

Despite all the drawbacks, it becameapparent that a two-man crew would offerconsiderably better perfOl-mance because themen could recover some strength by sleeping,but the war ended before this slightly largerversion (Biber If) went into production. Therehad also been a prototype called Adam, whichdid not go into mass production.

164 165

p ....---------------

GE R)LI.\ \" AI" Y ILl \" DBOO K I 939 - 1945 )1 I DG ET In.1 P 0 ~ s

The controls of the one-man U-boat of Trpe Biber.

VESSELS WITHOUT I 'TERNALCOMBUSTION E GI 'E

Heclrt (Pike - V-boat Type XXVllA)

These were conceh'ed and designed by the~boal Office within the Supreme Na\'al

Command, which was responsible for thebuilding of submarines, and a Ilumber ofconLracLS were issued to Germania \'Vorks in

Kiel, Simmering in Craz (Austria) andPauker in Vienna. Some sources state thatabout fifty units were completed, while othelsuggest thal a number nearer three is morclikely LO be correct. It seems certain thal themajority were nc\'cr completed becauseproduClion was switched to the superior TypeXXVIIB (Seehlllld).

The initial idea for the Hecht design camefrom It.alian midget submarines and from theearly development plans for the all-electricJWolch type. TIle crew of t,,·o carJied either oncstandard torpedo slung undemeath the hull ora detachable frolll seClion containing aspecially made mine with time-delay fuse. Thisbasic design gave the craft some interestingpotential because the mine section could alsoaccommodate additional baucries LO increaselhe perfonnance by almost 50 per cen4 or itcould be made inw an accommodation areafor two frogmen. The drawback \\;th all thiswas I..hat there were considerable differences inemplo}~ng midget craft in the Mediterraneanand trying the same idea in cold, cloudynonhern waters. There was no means of

166

charging bauel;es unless the)' were connectedto an extenlal power source, which meant thate"en during trials, the eleClricit~' supplyfrequently started sagging'"OfJ just when it wasrequired. Once back by its mother ship. it \\"35

not a case of quickl}" paUling some fuel into atank. but waiting for se"eral hours beforepower could be restored. Although it waspossible to keep running forjust O"er 12 hoursat about 4 kt, covering ome 100-120 km,under battle conditions this would frequentlyha"e been reduced to an operating time ofabout 6 hours and 70 km.

Neger and Marder (Negro and Marten)Although often classified as a submarine, it isquestionable whether this is correct, sinceSeger had no way of diving. Howe"er, onceunder way at its fixed speed of JUSt under3 kt, waleI' washed o,'er the dome abo"e theoperator's head, obscuring his view andhiding the craft, though not the teJl-mle bol\'wave. Although the German Navy usuallyclaimed that none of these midget "'eaponshad been concei"ed as suicide craft, thehatch with window dome could only beopened from the outside, meaning theoperator wa trapped until he returned toa friendl}' base. Since he had no war ofcommunicating with the outside world, hecould not announce his arrival anywhere norsurrender. The Neger's range during its10-15-hom-long operating period wouldha"e been somewhere between 60 and 70km. For armament it carried anothertorpedo with half bauery load underneaththe hull. About 200 were built with a view to

attacking ships bringing supplies into Anzio(in Italy) and to the Normandy beachheadsafter D-Day. but their incredibly high lossesmeant that operations were curtailed LO\\-ardsthe late autumn of 1944. Yet, despite thecasualties, a number of these craft were keptin readiness in case suitable opportunities fortheir engagement presented themselves.

Type J\"eger \\'35 funher modified into theType J\!arde,. and /-ltd. Hoi was originally apure suicide weapon, which did nOt progressfar beyond an early expelimental stage, TheMarder difTered from Type Xege,. by ha\·ing adi\ing cell for going dO\\1l to depths of aboutlOin for brief peliods, but it was necessary to

return to lhe surface to release iLS tOrpedo.On photographs the twO similar-lookinglypes can be distinguished because the frontof the J\!llrder hull was noticeably longer Illanthe torpedo slung underneath, while boththe front of the weapon and the upper hullof the Ntger are rough Iy the same length.

Moleh (Newt/Salamander)The Molch was also developed by the TorpedoTrials Centre at Eckernf6rde and built on theshores of the Rh"er \,"eser near Bremerha\'en.It consisted of a tubular hull. almost 12 In

long with room for one operator near theback. Two standard torpedoes with reducedbattery capacity could be auached to thesides, and at about II tons, these craft couldreach allllOst 5 kt. It was thought that theycould maintain this speed better than theXeger Type because the boat could di\·e, thuseliminating the problems of turbulencecaused by bow wa"es washing o"er the hull.Although almost 400 were completed, the}'turned out to be somewhat troublesome dueto several design faults. T}'pe Molch appearedin Italy and along the Belgian coast, but itseems highly likely that they did nOt inflict agreat deal of dama e on the enemy.

S RFACE CRAFT

Although the NIger was not filled with divingtanks, this type of human torpedo craft wasdesigned to tra"el through the water ratherthan on top of it. In contrast, the followinggroup consisted of designs based on themotor torpedo boat concept, which triedlifting much of the craft clear of the W"dter.

167

GEHMAX XAI'I' HA~DBOOK 1939-1945 MIDGET WEAPON

A rear view of the aU·elcClric Type Nlolch, also at OClIlsches ~hlseum in Munich.

Linse (Lentil or Lens)Linse or S/Jrengboot ('Explosive B03l') wasdeveloped from a concept advanced duringthe First \Vorld \Var. The idea was that lheoperator would ram the entire speedboatinLO the side of the Largel, u;ggering a minorexplosion which would break off the front ofthe boal. The main explosh'c package in therear section would sink and a lime-delay fusewould then set off the main dCLOnation. Thescheme was that these boats would hunl inpacks of three, with one of the trio being acontrol and rescue boat without explo ivcs.

This would pick up the operators after the)'had ejected before the final fun-in. Thisthird boat would also carry two radiooperators who would take o\'er remotecontrol of the two explosi\'e-carrying crafL.

Type Linse could carry 300-400kg ofexplosives at speeds of up to 35 kt, while the

168

cruising speed of 15 kt could be maintained forabout 5 hours, covering some 150 km,However. altJlough this speed was ideal at ulemoment of attack, the bow wa\'es were anob\'ious gi\'e-awa)' in calm waters meaningprogress was often \"ery much slower, TIle craftwere toO fragile for operations in roughconditions, which limited uleir emplO)1llent to

the English Channel. Yet, despite this, planswent ahead for an even faster cammaran, whichwas thought to be able to achic\'c o\'er 45 kt.Linsen (plural of Linse) were employed aroundAnzio in Iml)' and from Ule Le Ha\Te region inFrance. but it seems likely that they did notinflict a great deal ofdamage on the enemy.

It is rather interesting to add that thesespeedboats were not a naval creation at all. buta concept developed by the Army for theBrandenburg Regin1ent. Also. the youngestperson to ha\"e been awarded a Knight'S Cross

of the Iron Cross was the 21-year-Qld LLZ.S.Alfred Vetter, a commander of a Linsen Group,,,'ho recei\'ed ule award on 25 August 1944.

Hydra

This experimental type of LOrpedo boatfunctioned on a similar principle to the Linse,but it was about twO tons heavier and camed acouple of operators with two aerial tOlpedoesas weapons. Although basically experimental,about fony were produced for employment inthe approaches to Antwerp in Belgium.

EXPERIMENTAL CHAFT

Conu·olling midget craft during the hours ofdarkness was onl)' part of the precariollsoperating procedure. Transporting themsecretly to an embarkation port, hoisting theminto the water or launching them down alipway, charging the balleries and actually

gelling the operator inside were JUSt as bigproblems. All this was only possible withHiller's personal intervention because noother individual possessed the authorit)' formobilising so man)' supporting services. Takethe earl)' Neger operations at Anzio forexample. The craft and their torpedoes weremoved to Rome by rail. From there, An,},l)' low­loading tank carriers had to be requisitionedfor carrying them to the launching point,where cranes were required, One advantage"itl, thi type of vessel was that tI,e moving ofmanned torpedoes would not have arousedexcessi\'e interest in intelligence circles, as longas the operator's cabin could be kept hidden.The Midget Weapons Unit was also in theprocess of building special overlandtransporters. but in many cases development ofthe craft was so fast that the)' becameoperational before all the refinements couldbe added. Operations in 'onnandy were evenmore complicated. A convoy of about 100lorries, made up of at least half-a-dozendifferent makes, carried the midget craft over a

169

period of several days to their launching area.The variation in the types of 101'1')' wassignificant because repair facilities en roulewereso limited that it was thought best to carryspare parts, Obviously this meant carr)'ingquite a store of duplicate essentials and it mustbe borne in mind thal the lorries were nolonger in prime condition, During thisjoumeytI,ey had to fend off air attacks and cope \\1thtI,e appalling state ofwartime European roads.(A good comparison is that it now takes eighthOllrs to tra\'el by car from Calais LO tI,e U-boatArchive in Cuxhaven. In 1962 beforemotorways, the jOLUlley took almost 20 hours.)Once al their destination, man)' operationswere made more difficult because attacks onpol1S meant Ulat the means of launching u1ecraft had been made more difficult, while tI,ecold winter weather did not make for idealconditions once in the choppy seas,

Elefalll or Seetellfel (Elephant or Sea Devil)Of course, many operators were frustrated bytoo great a distance between their launchingpoint and the target areas. Ideally the midgetweapons had to be brought closer, butlaunching was always determined by portfacilities. This problem was overcome by theproduction of the Elefant or See/eufel, whichwas also known as Project Lodige. The craftconsisted of a combination of submarine withtank tracks. It is not difficult to guess wherethe first mentioned name came froll,} becausethi unstable-looking craft rolled slowly downany firm beach, waddled into the water andthen dived to amid detection. Although mostclumsy on land with tracks far tOO narrowand a prototype engine a lillie on the weakside, the craft behaved exceptionall), well inwater, and once modified it would probablyhave been quite an asset for fending offinvasions. However onl)' a few experimentalcraft were completed before the end of thewar and these were destroyed before theAllies reached them.

G E IDI.I:\" :\".1 I" I" II \:\" D Il 0 0 K I 939 - I 9n

THE NAVAL AIR ARM

Schwerlwal (SwordfISh)This tinr torpedo-looking craft with a twO­

man crew was concei"ed to fulfil a similar roleto fighter aircraft. It was planned to carry asnlall radar set. a sound detector and one orperhaps e,-en two of the new hrdrogen­peroxide-fuelled torpedoes. lIS OIm hydrogenperoxide turbine would ha,-c dl;"en it up to amaximum of juSt o\'er 30 kt. although thegeneral cruising speed was nearer 10 kt. Trialswere still under war when the war ended andbecause the experimental "ersions werethought to be too futuristic for destruction,the)' ,,"ere scuuled in the larger of the lakes atPion in Schleswig-Holstein ,,~th drm,;ngs andother essential documents SlOwed inside.

nfortunately the craft are no longer there.They were reco\'ered b)' British forces afterthe war and then vanished into obscurity.

Delphiu (Dolphin)This was also an experimelllal high-speedsubmarine powered by a hydrogen peroxideturbine and designed to carry a torpedounderneath the hull or to tow a torpedo­shaped mine. Another possibility would ha\'ebeen for the operator to aim the entire craft atthe target and then throw himself om, hopinga support craft \\'ould pick him up. The trialscame to a premature end when a prototypecollided \\~th its tender. The few existing craftwere destroyed shonly before British troops

170

an;\'ed at the test site by the massi\'e lagoon ofthe Tra\'e Estuary near Lubeck.

KAJ/PF CHlf'IJIJIER (BATTLE:lCO)IBAT\rDI~IERS OR FROG~IE:\')

By the middle of 1944, some three dOlenmen, many of them famous athlete, hadcompleted training for a number ofspecialised missions. Originally such units.with each man carrying some 8 kg ofexplosi\'es, \\'ere engaged against the Alllhemand Orne Bridges (the latter now known asPegasus Bridge, which was made famous byMajor Howard and the British glider troopswho made the first landing on D-Day).Towards the end of the war Frogmen hatcheda most ingeniolls plan to prc\'ent FieldMarshal Montgomery's forces from crossingthe Ri"er Elbe near Hamburg. Lying hiddenupstream with torpedoes painted brown to

make them look like logs and filted with light­sensiti\'e detonators, the)' would haveexploded them underneath a pontoon blidge.Howe\'cr, when it became clear that Hamburgwas capitulating and that the British Arm)' wascrossing the main Elbe bridges, the unitpacked its bags and brought their weaponsback to Kiel. Both the Elbe road and railbl;dges werc too strong for the weapons andlOO high to makc an appreciable difference inlight for the photo-sensiti\'e u;ggers.

Earl}' attempts at using aircraft at sea appearto have been hindered by the euphoriacreated around the massh'e airships built byferdinand, Graf "on Zeppelin. Thisenthusiastic wave Oowed so strongly throughGerrnany that the count was sa\'ed frombankruptcy b}' voluntary subscriptionsdonated by a supportive public. Even twOearl}' disasters with the Navy's Ll and L2 (L =

LuJ/schiff - airship) did nOl dilllle theexcitement generated by these massivehydrogen-filled gas bags. Somehow airshipsinspired imaginations to such an extent thateven the loss of seventeen of them during theFirst \"'orld \·Var did nOt diminish theirpopularity. The fact that this resulted inaircraft development being sidelined to theextent that it lagged behind progress in othercountries hardly mattered, because theVersailles Diktat decreed that all Germanflying machines had to be scrapped,Consequently some 2,500 aeroplanes taxiedto the breakers' yards and the nextgeneration had to Start from scratch,

The Allies' lack of interest in thede truction of the basic aviation infra­structure meant that the well-equippedair stations at I-Ioltenau (Kiel), near\\'ilhelmsha\'en and at se\'eral other locationsalong the coasts remained intac~ and navalaircraft presented themsel\'es as practicaltools for beating the restrictions imposed byVersailles, As a result a number of 'ci\'il'flying clubs quickly occupied some of theempty military premises to excite the nation'simagination, This mystique created b}' thestill embryonic concept of naval aviationmust also have stirred in the minds of the

171

British go\'ernment because one of the firstmajor bombing raids of the Second World\.var was against the naval air station on theIsland of Syll. Rather embarrassingly, thebombers missed their targel and hitDenmark instead.

Although aircraft were prohibited by theDiktat of Versailles, the young Reichsmarinecertainly did not lag behind with its thinkingwhen it came to planning a naval air anTI, Asmall core of lIyers, headed hy a number ofenthusiastic admirals, made forcefulsuggestions for the Navy's likely requirementsonce the restricting shackles could be thrownofr. The Naval High Con1mand was firmlyagainst the foundation of an autonomous airforce, saying that a third branch of the armedforces should only be created once the needsof the Navy and Army had been satisfied.I-Iowe\'er, this option was hardly consideredby Hitler's inner circle, where the First ,""orld\·Var flying ace, Hermann Goring, heldpowel-ful and inOuential positions. In fact, itis quite likely that such forceful navaluggestions helped in distancing his mind

from tl1e sea,Although maritime a\;ation made a terrific

effon, it never de"eloped far beyond theinitial stages because the nedgling Luftwaffe,founded in 1935, kept pulling more andl1''IOre aspects of naval nring under its wing.This became so deplorable that after acouple of years no one in the Na\~' wasactuall)' sure of what exactly came undertheir jurisdiction. Earl)' in 1939, after Hitlerhad been asked to clarifY the mauer, thingsturned out to be even \\'orse than expected.He decreed lhal vinually all a peets of

GE R.\1 A.\ .\ Ar Y II A'; DIl 0 0 K 1939 - 1945

An Ar3do 196 \\;tl1 ci\ilian registration Icltcrs. pilOted b}' Heinfried Ahl ofLhe 1936 Olympia Crew,

auempting lO land by the side of a \\arship. The ship. moving at considerable speed, was dragging a hem)'

rubber mat m'er the surface of the water with a ,'jew to calming the waves. It was found lhal it was far

172

THE NAI'AL ,IIR ARM

easier to create a 'duck pond' of smooth water b>' sailing in a light circle and the mat idea was later

abandoned in favour of this technique.

173

G ER)I Ai\' XAI' Y Iltl j\' DBOO K I 939 - 1945

A reconnaissance plane checking on the idcmit)' of U48. Operations with such Oims)' aircraft were

confined to good weather days.:---:....--_-----------------,

An earl)' Heinkel 114A \\iLholil weapons. TIle Germans realised some time before Britain that double­

decker wings \\"ere not necessary and b)' the beginning of the Second World War they had produced some

vcry good aircraft. nfortunatel)r research was curtailed and it did not take long for them to be

outperformed h)' superior British and American designs.

174

THE X.HA L A I R A R,II

A Heinkel floatplane at sea.

A rare sight of a Heinkel floatplane far out in the Adamic, haling (Jown Out to escort the blockade

breaker Anneliae Essbergerinlo Bordeaux. The aircraft acted primarily as a lookoUl to prevent the valuable

cargo f!"Om running into enem)' guns.

175

-GER)L\:\' :\' AI" Y IU:\, 0 II 0 0 K I 939 - I 94 5 THE :\'.I\"AL ~IR ·\1111

The front of Prillz. [lIgen"s airer-an c31apuh with a crane on the deck belo\\'. The black roof of the

superstructure between the CJ<:lI1C ,md funnel was used 10 store one of tile ship's launches.

P,7nz. £IIge"'S Arado reconnaissance plane on the catapult, read)' for Lake-off.

The Arddo reconnaissance aircraft from the heav}' cruiser Pri,u £ugt!". Although aircrafL could be

launched relativel), (Iuickl}'. retrieving them was another problem. TIle)' had to land on water, to be

hoistcd back on board b}' the nearby crdne and this time<onsllming procedlll-c could onl,. be eanied om

in relativcl)' calm wcather.

Another strange abnormality was thatalthough Germany was building an aircraftcarrier (the ne\"er-eompleted Craf Zeppelill) ,

there was hardly an)' research into the typesof planes suitable for such a ,·esse!. While toSOllle this was most frustrating, other pointswere far n'lore detrimental. For example,after the beginning of the war the Luftwaffepresented BI;tain \\~th one of the Navy's mostclosely guarded secrets: the magnetic mine.Naval commanders were under the strictestorders not to place these highly effectiveweapons where they might w'ash ashore or bediscovered, but an aircraft dropped one intoshallow water in front of observers nearSouthend in the Thames Estuary.

The fan thm Hennann Goring (SupremeCommander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe) was

military aviation were to come under thejurisdiClion of the Luftwaffe and that theKriegsmarine would be left in charge of onlytwo facets: marine reconnaissance nightsand aircraft based aboard warships.

Ever)'thing else was to belong to theLuftwaffe, including the administration ofthese twO naval branches. The Luftwaffe was

to be responsible for aerial auacks againstships at sea, bombing raids on naval bases,supponing naval operations and aerial mine­laying.

Not onl)' did the Luftwaffe take control ofnaval n)'ing, but it also failed to keep theNavy informed aboul changes in newdc\"clopmcnLS. For example, work on long­range marine reconnaissance bombers wascurtailed witholll the Na\1' being informed.

176 177

GERMA.\' NAVY IIA.\'DBOOK 1939-19'15 THE NAVAL AIH AHM

As the W3r progl-essed, women started playing increasingly important roles. This sI10\\'5 a group of

Marillehelferillnen tracking approaching enemy aircraft._

tHarinehelJerillnell, Gel-many's equivalent of the WRENs, in the ail-craft tracking room at Wilhe1msha\'cn.

The board above l..he door is illuminating the various outlying dislricLS under alarm for possible air anacks.

178

'playing' with the Navy without seriollsintention of cooperating for the good ofthe nation, is funher supported by hisincredible aClion of ordering marine aircraftdivisions to create and to lise a differenlchart system LO ships at sea. Their radio codesand procedures were different as well,making liaison and cooperation incrediblydifficult. In addition to this, the Luftwaffeconcentrated on dropping bombs. despitethe Navy having made the point that aerialtorpedocs were far marc likely to sink ships.In fact, aerial torpedoes were hardlydeveloped and those which were built wereoften not powerful enough to bring amerchant ship to a halt. even when theexplosion was right on target. Early failuresand misjudgements were made worse byErich Raeder's (Supreme Commander-in­Chief of the 'avy) and Hermann Goring'shighly contrasting characters. The sad pointabout this squabbling was that Germany hada number of excellent maritime aircraft atthe beginning of the war. but even the

179

promising types such as the Dornier 18 andHeinkel 59 and 60 were not improved.meaning they quickly became obsoletesimply because they were overtaken byprogress.

Later in the war, when U-boats were inurgent need of air support, it became morethan a joke that they were given a type ofengineless kite, or autogyro, which was keptairborne by being towed. This ingeniousdevice was indeed a novel little toy and onewonders why they have not yet appeared onmodern holiday beaches. Combining theFocke Achgelis (FA300) with a speedboatwould offer far beller possibilities thanparagliding because the device could besteered and made to go up and downwithout the boat altering speed. Theoperator usually carried a parachute so thathe could descend rather quickly byjettisoning the rotors, but even this LOok toolong if aircraft approached and theBachstelze or Focke Achgelis was used onlyin out of the \V""d)' locations.

~AI'AL "'EAPO~RY

NAVAL WEAPONRY

One of the administration blocks at the TOJl)cdo Trials Centre (TorfJedo \-n:mchslln,sllllJ) at Ed.ernfOl"de.

Much of the site was demolished after the war and it is quite likely thai the glass waS blown out of the

windows during this process rather than as a result of bombs during an air raid.

The G7a had the disadvantage that it left atrail or bubbles and oil on the surface, makingit easy to spot and to take evasive action. TheG7e did not leave such tell-tale trails, but hadthe disadvantage that it required moremaintenance. Part of the torpedo had to bewithdrawn from the tube e,·ery three to fourda)'S for the batte,;es to be recharged.

During the war, these two basic torpedodesigns were further modified to give rise toti,e T5, 'ZaunkOnig (Wren), the FAT and ti,eL T. The first mentioned had a sounddetector in the head so that it could home-inon propeller noises and was intended as ameans of defence against fast warships. Theidea that such torpedoes could be distractedby the target towing a loud sound·maker hadoccurred to the Germans and therefore the

Cadets aboard the liglll cruiser Karlsruhl' practising. Praclice torpedoes had a red and white sU-iped head,

often with a lamp in the top so that progress could be observed aL night.

powered by electric propulsion. The G7uappeared towards the end of the war as auniversal identification for a variety ofdifferent experimental torpedoes withclosed-eircuiL hydrogen peroxide turbines.

Although the size or the warhead of 300 kgand external dimensions were identical, theG7a offered slightl)' better performance thanthe electric vel ion. At 30 kt it had a range ofabout 13 km, at 40 kt just over 7 km and at44 kt 4-5 km. There were twO ways ofdetonating the explosives inside the torpedo;either with a contact pistol hitting the target or\\ith a magnetic detonator passing underneathit. The last mentioned had me advantage matit could literally break the average n'lerchantship in half. A torpedo exploding on ti,e sidevery often failed to sink ti,e ship.

Rcichsmarinc capitalised on the lessons bydeveloping tWO basic torpedoes inside analmost identical shell.

The l"'O LOrpedo l:)"pes were known as G7a

and G7e. 'G' stood for the diameter of53.3cm; '7' for the length of 7 m; 'a' for thefirst design of this type. G7a was powered b)'an internal combustion engine wi.th the fuelbeing injected by compressed air. G7e was

~'~len Fregkpt. Blasius Luppis first suggestedbuilding torpedoes in IS60 the proposalswere LUrned down. The importance of thisnew underwater wcapon was not brouglHhome until half a century later when thebitter connict of the First World War dearl)'demonstrated its devastaLing results. The new

TORPEDOES

180 lSI

GERMAN NAVY IIANDBOOK 1939-1945 NAVAL WEAPONRY

A torpedo being launched" Up to the end of the Finil World War, the Gennan Na\)' had experimented

with a varielY of underwater launching systems, bUI none of these could cope salisfaCIO'"ily with ships

moving at fast speeds. However, a few of these antiqualed systems wCI"e installed in auxiliary cruisersdtll;ng the econd World Vlar.

aircraft de\'elopmenl had progressed too far.By the tin'le the war started, the majority ofaircraft were already LOO fasl for droppingLOrpedoes. The basic aerial torpedo. wiLh adial11eLer of 45 cm and lenglh of 5 m was alsotoo small for inflicting significant damage onthin-skinned merchanl ships and quite

hopeless against annoured warships. In fact,although some of them exploded on target,they oflen failed LO bring merchanl ships to ahalt. Their range of just o\·er 3 km at about

30 kt was also somewhat on the meagre side.

TilE TORPEDO CRI IS

The tellll 'Torpedo CI;sis' usually refers LO aseries of diabolical Lorpedo failures towardsthe beginning of the war. During the

Non"egian Campaign of spring 1940, thirt),

torpedo failures, Germany conducted asaturation of tcsts with LUTs duringNovember 1943. U970 (Kptll. Hans-HeinrichKetels) fired about 100 of them during thehours of darkness. The reason for this was

that a powerful lamp in the nose made il easyto observe progress. It was the middle of thefollowing mon lh before the torpedo wasgh'en the go-ahead for operational use, but itwas another quarter of a year before Lheyappeared at the fronl. Then the)" wereplagued with the same problem as the FAT,damaging rather tha.n sinking tlleir targets.

The de\'elopment of aerial torpedoe wassomewhat neglected for a variety of reasons,the biggest being the almost total absence ofa naval air arm. Then, when Lhe Luftwa.ffesLruck upon the idea of flying against navaltargets, the)' were surprised to find thaL

warship, then sooner or later lhe nose wouldpoint towards the real propellers and at tJ13t

stage the torpedo would change direClionand head for the new sound source to repeatthe procedure. Such acollstic torpedoes werelISed for the first lime during the autumn of1943. Unfortunatel)' for the Germans, the)'

had a mechanical fault and onl)' about 10 percent of them actually slink their target. Sincemany of these torpedoes were shot bysubmerged -boats or boats which divedimmediatel)' after having shot one, Genl1anydid not gel to know about this disastrousSlate of affairs until after the war.

FAT stood official I)' for Federapperat-Torpedo,although man)' people also used the wrongname of Fliiclumabsuch-Torpedo. It was a sort ofassurance attachment in an ordinary G7a for

people who missed their targel. The idea wasthat the torpedo could be aimed in the &'lJ1lC

way as existing types, but it would not continuerunning in a str.light line past the targel. At apre-set range the FAT would start zigzagging,hopefull)' hitting a ship in a convo),. The firstsuccesses were reponed towards the end of1942 when U406 (Kptll. Horst Dieterichs)auacked convoy ONS154. However, thesinkings were not observed and the targets did

not go dO\\11. The first observed hit took placein February of the following ),ear when U92(Kptll. Adolf Oelrich) used FATs againstCOl1vo)' ON 166 and damaged the 'ol-wegianfreighter N.T. Nielsen Alonso. One feature ofthis anti-col1\'0Y torpedo was that it frequentlyonl)' stopped the ship ,,;thout sinking it, andN.1: Nielsen Alonso was later sem to the bottomb)' an esconing Polish destroyer aftcr survivorshad been taken off.

LUT or Lagenullabiliillgigen-Torpedo was amodification of the FAT principle inside aG7e body. This could be fired from depths of

up to 50 m and then the torpedo wouldmake it more difficult for observers in the

target by running in loops rather tllan in theusual straiglu line. \OVith a history of so many

design incorporated a clever anli-foxerde\;ce. Once close to the target, the torpedowould abandon its slraighl run and lUrn totravel in a large circle around the soundsource. At this moment the sound detector,at the end of a funnel-shaped depression inthe nose, could not 'hear' the sound source.The torpedo's circle was too small for goingaround a ship and sooner or laler it wouldpass under the hull, where a magnetic pistoldetonated tlle explosives. (Unless, of course,the -boat had selected the contact pistoL)However. if the Lorpedo was going around asound-making device towed behind the

It was common for men to lake a souvenir when

being drafted from one ship to another. Teddy

Suhren (First Walch Office I") didn'l mess aOOm in

this respecl and took U48's torpedo calculator

together with a lisl of lhe ships he had sunk. The

Fi1"S1 Watch Officer was responsible for shooling

IOI-pedoes on the surface and b}' the time he left

U48, Teddy Suhren had sunk more ships than

an)'one else in the Na\)'-

182 183

GER.IIAN NArY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 NA\'AL \\'E.HONIlY

auacks Ollt of a total of fony·two failed due tofaulty LOrpedoes. showing quite clearly thalGermany did not have an effective weaponfor its subnlarine arm. \\'hile many of thesebreakdo""lS were deeply disappointing, theyalso led to the unnecessar)' loss of several

·boals. The first twO boats wenl down,withOllt damaging their targeLS, as a directresult of faulty LOrpedoes alerting escorts.(U39 under Kput. Gerhard Glaues and U27under KptlL Hans Franz.) Comemporaryrcpons are somewhat contradictory and manypostwar authors ha\·e not fully understood theproblems, thus adding even morc confusionto the subjecL The major problem was thatthe torpedoes were affiicted not by just one,but by three different and variable majorfaults. To make matters worse, not all of theseapplied aH the time, hence it took aconsiderable time for them to recognised.

One of the first faults to be isolated wascaused by a pressure sensitive depth-keeper,which could be adjusted while the torpedo waslying inside the tube ready for filing. Duringpre-war trials, torpedoes were shot either fromtubes inside a building at EckernfOrde or fronla ship shortly after they had been loaded.During these tests, no one seerns to have takeninto account the factlhal compressed air, usedto eject torpedoes in submarines, is venledinlo the boal LO pre\'ent the bubbles fromrising to the surface. This, of course, increasesthe pressure inside the U-boat. Torpedoesloaded under water started off with thepressure sensor alread)' adjusted by thisadditional force acting upon it. \·Vhence,additional settings made the depth conu·ol goe\'ell deeper. Consequelllly many torpedoespassed hannlessly undemeaul uleir targets.

Another problem was that tOO little wasknown about variations in the Earth'smagnetic field and the type of magneticforces created by ships, especially after ulesehad been degaussed or demagnetised. Thislack of knowledge was to have a detrimental

184

effect upon the sellings of the magneticpisLOis. The idea was that the LOI·pedo shouldrun under the target to be deLOnated by themass of iron on top of it. By the middle ofthe war il was thought that this problem hadbeen overcome. but it cropped up againduring the later Il'lonths, when acoustictorpedoes were being used against fast­moving warships. Any fault in this magneticsystem could, uleoreticall)', be easily isolatedby switching it off and using the contactpistol instead. This minor adjustment couldalso be carried out while the torpedo waslying in the tube with the outer door alreadyopen for ejection.

However, even this primitive contacttrigger had an unrecognised fault. This wascaused by a small propeller at the front whichwas rotated by the torpedo travelling throughthe water. It screwed two terminals inside thepistol LOgelher. enabling one side to touchlhe olher and thus make the electricalcontacl LO creale the detonation. This safetymechanism prevented the torpedo fromaccidentally exploding at the wrong moment.The blades of ulis small propeller, which alsoacted as a trigger, could easily be unscrewedand they make ideal souvenirs, so they areoften missing from museum displayswhere visilors can touch the exhibit.The mechanical fault lay in the fact that theblades were shorter lhan the radius ofthe torpedo. This meant the triggers wereforced back once they hit a wall, uch as uleside of a deep-lying merchant ship or metalplates suspended in watcr as trial targels.Howc\"cr, when colliding with a curved hullof a sillall. shallow-draught warship, such as adestroyer, it was possible for ule front of thetorpedo to make conlaCl without the u·iggerbeing touched. Ob,;ously this had a similarresult to two billiard balls hitting each other,and since the torpedo was vel)' much lighterthan the warship. it nlerely bounced underthe target and continued its run.

Earl}' in the war, the torpedo crisis appearsto have been resoh'ed, but one fault afteranother later hit back with powerfulvengcance. cspecially when U-boals werelIsing acoustic torpedoes against small fast­moving warships. Normally the submarinewould ha\'c dh'ed for a brief period or cut itsengines to pre\"ent the sound·sensiti\·e headturning in a circle and then homing in onlhe boat which had fired it. The magneticdeLOnaLOr had the built-in fault of going ofTbefore it reached the target.. At times it blewofT ships'propellers, but frequenuy failed LOsink the target. The British propagandasrstell1 was intenl on exploiting lhis weaknessto its fullest, but the Admiralty objected onthe grounds that it would be better for theGermans not to correCl the fault.Consequently Gcrmany did not becomeaware of the scverity of the situation untilafler the war.

PutLing a price on the financial COSl of waris always difficult because exact figures werekept secret, and over the last fifty years therehave been considerable changes in the valueof money. However, in 1939 one torpedo costabout £4,000. which would also havepurchased about a dozen houses in London.So me torpedoes shot during the atLack onule batueship RO)'al Oak in Scapa Flow by U47(Kptll. Glullcr Prien) cost about the same asabout 120 London homes.

MI ES

The basic mines were the EMA and EMB(Eillhe;lsm;lle - Standard Mine Type A andB), which were further de,·eloped toproduce ule EMC and EMD. In addition LOthese, Germany produced an FM seriesmeaning FlujJmine or Ri\'er Mine for inlandwaterways and also developed a \"ariety forcarrying in free nooding shafts aboardsubmarines. Thcse had to be pressureresislant to cope with deep di\'ing depths.

185

Mines carried inside the pressure hull ofU-boats were ejected through speciallymodified lorpedo tubes and prefixed withthe lellers TM (Torpedo Mine). Thecommon typcs used dlll;ng lhe war were thcT~1B and TMC. The first mentioned had alength of 2.31 m and ule oUler a lengul of3.39 m. There was another, rarer variety. theSchachtmine (Shaft mine). also for carrying inubmarine minelayers.

Shortly after the beginning of the war,Britain was troubled by a number ofunexpected and violent explosions in whatwas lllought to be mine-free shipping lanes,making it obvious that Germany hadintroduced a new mechanism which couldnot be cleared by conventional sweepinglechniqucs. Consequenlly this variety ofmagnetic mine created considerable havoculllil the end of November 1939 when theLuftwaffe dropped one on the mudnats ofule Thames Estuary. Not only did this aircraftdeliver a most valuable present, but it alsodeposited it close LO military workshops. Ashon time lalcr when the lidc had gone OUl,Lt Cdr J-G.D. Ouvry walked out to the Spot,LOok rubbings of ule various screws and bolts,and then rewrned the following day with aset of tools for dissecting the prize. Soonafter this, ule Royal Na\Y de,·eloped a meansof detonating magnetic mines, rendering thismost valuable weapon \;rtually useless.

Thc inside of ulis magnetic mine was quitesophisticated. It did not respond LO just anyold metal passing overhead. The magneticmine was sct off onl}' by ships built in thenonhern hemisphere with a • Tonh Pole'aCling downwards. and then it worked in a\'crtical, ralher than horizontal plane. Theidea was to change ule polarity once Britainwas suspected of having discovered this.However, by lhat time offensivc mining inBritish waters had become too tisky and ulesupreme advantage of closing down harbourshad been lost.

Csually it was far s.'lfer to stand well back and detonate old,

unwanted mines.

187

X.HAl IIEAPOi\"RY

It has been difficult to determine whether this is a smoke

buoy (as seen on p. 44), a smoke marker or an old mine

which is ha\~ng some difficulty at going ofT the way iL

should.

186

TIlcre wa.s ob\iously something ofilllcrest with lhis mine,

otherwise il would not ha\-c been bl"OughL on board. The

abundance of seaweed and barnacles indicates lhal the

mine had been in the water for some Lime.

After bolh world wars a vast number of mines continued

to tum lip in the Illost uncxpeClcd places, oftcn tom

from lhcir anchors b)' sc\-ere lonns. These pholographs

were taken in about 1933, which suggests lhat this is a

specimen from the First World War.

GE R)!A X X.H Y II AXDBOO K 1939 - I 945

GE H.II A,\' SA I'Y II At\' DBOOK 1939 - I 94 5

DISGUISE, CAMOUFLAGE ANDCOLOUR SCHEMES

ROCKETS

Although there was some experimentation\\~lh naval rockets, only a few isolated models

were employed against the enemy. Thedevelopment, based on an Ann)' smoke­making rocket, started in about 1944, with aview to supplementing anti-aircraft gUlls. Anumber of these rockets were shot from fixedlubes to detonate at heights of about300-400 m. There were also a number ofreasonably successful experiments with solidfuel rockets being fired from a submerged

-boal. These tests were carried out by U51 J

under KpllL. Friedrich Steinhoff, whose

brother worked at the rocket researchestablishment at Peenemllllde. There werealso plans for lowing a container holding a

188

\12 rocket LO wiu1in range of New York. The

idea was that it would then float upright,allo\\"ing the rocket to be launched. Themajor problems were maintaining depthwhile in LOW and pre\'enting \\'ater washinginto the container at the moment oflaunching. !'lone of this highly specialisedmachinery e\'er went into production. butone wonders whal might have happened ifthe densely populated areas of New York hadbeen bombed.

As a postscript it may be interesting to addthat the general historical opinion has beenthat these rocket containers ne\'er progressedbeyond the initial design stage. Yet recentlysome photos unearthed in the U-boat Archiveshow a U~boat towing a large cylindrical tankabout the same size as a V2 rocket.

The Reichsmarine used twO basic colour

schemes: mall boalS were usually painted blackwhile large ships had a dark grey hull \\;th lightgrey superstrucwre. However, on black andwhite photographs, light reflecting off shipsfrequently made light grey appear almost white.The first uials with alternative colours were notconducted until the late 1920s, when se\'eralLOq:>edo boats received a bouJe green coat. Bythe time the war started the Navy had created

sOll'lething of a record inasmuch as the nilesregarding colours for warships were almost insingle digilS. They could certainly have beentyped on a couple sheets of paper, and it wasnot until 1942 tl,at the Naval High CommandfOl-nlulated some cenu-a.lised thoughlS on thesubject of camouflage. This came about as aresult of a memorandurn by Korvkpt. '>\7altherDechend, from tl,e heal)' cruiser Hipper, who

had been seconded to the Naval HighCommand as consultant on the subject. That isnot to sa)' lhat camouflage schemes had notbeen in use, but tho e which were had beencreated as the result of improvisation byindividuals who looked for some ways ofmisleading the enemy. The designs were basedon First World War conceplS, and a number ofthem were so elUde tl,at they emphasised thebows and stern, making ships sland out evenbetter than if tlley had been left in their pre-wargre}~. Other camouflage designs were based onone-off observations and in relrospect one\\'onders about their degree of effectivenc s.Follo\\;ng KorvkpL Dechend's memorandum,the Naval High Command set up a series of

189

expeliments where models were paintcd \\ith avaricty of different pattellls to be ,~cwed andphotographed under a variety of differentlighting conditions. These results lhen gave riseto an abundance of designs. The merchantna\)' had made a considerable headstan on theKriegsmarine and man)' freighters were alreadyunder most ingenious painting schemes.

Although lhere havc not been any inter­national laws about lhc use of camouHage, the

applicalion of disguise is a diffcrent matter.This aspect of naval warfare was clarificd at aconference in The Hague during 1907, whichdecreed that warships couJd sail under any Hagand disguisc as long as these were cast offbefore they started any aggressive action. Ofcourse, the majority of genuinc merchant shipswere never in a posilion to start fights andallxmary cnlisers found ways of changing lheir

disgui e in a matter of seconds. The Gennanwar flag, for example, was pulled out of alUbe on the mastllead while tlle false one wasstill being hauled down. At the same timefalse names were covered up by droppingscreens over them while concealed gun wereuncovered for action. The whole processcould be perfonlled in a matter of scconds.

Some of the disguise worked exceptionally

well by confusing the opposition during thewar as well as naval historians after it. For

example, photographs have been published ofa boarding party from an unidentified British

cruiser investigating a merchant ship at thebeginning of lhe war. Closer cxamination of

the Royal avy ship shows it to be U1C pocket

DIS Gel SE. CHloe FLAG E A.\' D COL 0 ells C HD! ES

insignificant point often gave the Germansaway. For example Pingllin.'s (Kpl.z.S. Ernst­Felix Kruder) disguise was rumbled becausethere were no coloured sailors waving at apassing reconnaissance plane. A rather ironicpoint because KJ·flder had several hundredmen of various races in his prison roomsbut he had ordered them to their quartersthe moment the plane was first spotted.

Paiming has probabl), been the scourge of all

na,ies ever since iron replaced wood, but Gennan

raiders had the additional problem of having to

disguise their ship in the colours of different

shipping lines. TIl is shows the final touches of

disguise being added 1.0 Anne/i~ ~\\'hile

north of the Falkland Islands, close 1.0 the area

where Admiral Grnf Spee lost his life. At this stage

it was necessary to change from a Japanese disguise

to resemble the Nom·cgian Hersle;'l, belonging to

Herlofson, Sigurd and Co. AS of Oslo.

baltleship Admiral GrafSpee \\;lh a dummy gunturret built on top of the fon"ard opticalrangefinder. The illusion was enhanced b)'painting on eXlfa large bow "'a,'es, ghing theimpression t.he ship was u'a\'clling at fast speed.and mere was a makeshift camouflage pallenlon LOp of the peace-time grey. PiClures ha\'calso been published sho\\;ng ti,e United talestanker Prairie refuelling U-boats on the highseas. Again, this is 110t a case of t11C fullcl;cans

helping the wTong side, but the ship in questionbeing the German supply ship Nurdmllrk.

The establishmenl of a disguise for alLxiliarycruisers "£IS a long-\,inded and J"al.her complicatedbusiness. First, men had 1.0 scour books to findships wilh similar hulls because lhis wasincredibly difficull to aller on the high seas.TIlen lhey had to find infolmation about colourschemes and the fillings required to conSU"llctsuch alterations. This frequently involvedstOring quite large quantities of matelials forbuilding addilional funnels, changing lhesuperstructure and for adding the all-importanlliny details. \~'hal's more, flimsy stage propswere unsuitable because these addilionalfeatures had to withsmnd ocean SLOlms as wellas sclutiny by aircraft passing close overhead.

NOl all features of deception were createdb)" ti,e crew al sea. The Naval High Commandhad a dossier of confidential informationabout special de,;ces to be incorporated inlothe design of amdliary cruisers. In addition tothe obvious, such as armaments, some shipswere filled with a means of jacking theirfunnels and masts up and down. In addilion lOthis, many auxiliary cruiser masts could raise,and quickly lower, a crow's nest to the mast tipand, perhaps most cunning of all, a number ofcarefully positioned lighlS could be dimmed orbrightened with a rheostat. The idea was to

make the darkened ship resemble a warship'Ssupelior speed by increasing the intensity oflight as il approached ilS quarry at night.

The amount of altention paid to details wasimmense, bUl despite lhis some apparently

GE II ~I A.\' .\' AI' r HA.\' DBOO K 1939 - I 945

Painting was one of the main occupations in the Na\T. where men had to leam 1""0 lotally differem types

of brushslrokes. TIle most important was the slow, leisurelr up and down movement and the other a Illore

erratic, faster action used only when supenisory eyes were in the ,;cinity.

190 191

GER.\\.O" "" AI" r HA"" DBOO K I 939 - I 9" 5 DIS Gt: I5 E. CA ~I 0 t: FL\ GE .~ "" D COL 0 t: R 5 CHEll E5

A Nom"cgian flag has been laid on the deck of A'Hleli~Essbergertocomplete the disguise for the benefit

or passing aircraft.

192

An incident berween the men of iHichel(Kpt.z.S. Hellmuth mn Ruckteschell) and theIO,307-10n British turbine ship A'lenelaDSprovides another excellent example of howaucnlion to detail made the differenceben,-een success and failure. Unable to calchilS qualT)'. mn Ruckteschell dispatched i\Iichefs

light motor torpedo boat to bring the enemyto a halt. Flying the "~lite Ensign and \\;tI, thecrew weal-ing ROFtl Na'l' c1ume-eoats withgenuine British Iife-jackelS over the LOp. theyfailed in their taSk because their advcr&."lnes had

already been alerted by a signal where the word

'pau'ol' had been spell with tWO 't's. all seeing

the launch, people realised it was LOO \\I31ll1 forduffle-coars and the lifejackclS ,,"ere of a \'aJieLy

issued to the merchant navy father than theRopl Na,y. Being alert to a possible atUlck. ti,ecrew of j\/tmelaos kept an extra keen lookout,making it possible to amid ti,e two torpedoesfired frorn lhe light J1'lotor torpedo boat in alast auemptto halt the merchant ship.

The na\"al scourge - painting auxiliary cruiser Thor.

193

One of 11LOrs guns hidden in what looked like a

huge cable drum.

NAVAL TERRA FIRMA

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

Evading superior forces was the German Navy's strongest weapon and keeping vigilalll JOOkOUl was an

essential part of the continuously boring routine. This shows lookoulS aboard the blockade breaker

Anneliese Essberger. Some auxiliary cnlisers went one stage further and had a specially buill crow's nest with

seat which could be lowered and hidden after ships had been sighted.

194

BASES AND THE KIEL CANAL

A war between Prussia, the largest of theGerman speaking kingdoms, and DenmarkdUling the middle of the nineteenth century,helped to focus altenlion on the Baltic coast.During lhis conflicl the blockading Danishfleet was driven away from the Kiel approachesby the launching of Pnlssia's first subn131-inc,

the Brandlauc!leI; designed by Wilhelm Bauer, aBavarian artillery officer. The Navy, or ratherPrussia's collection of warships, was at that timeunder Anny control and severely hampered bynot being able to reach the North Sea withoutsailing all way around Skagen, the northern tipof Denmark. This made it clear that Prussianeeded a base on the North Sea coast and alsoa means of mO\~ng sea-going ships over land.The concept of a sea connection between theBaltic and the North Sea during lhose earl)'years was not as absurd as it may sound today.There were already a number ofcanalised riversections through the low North German plain,but many of these waterways were narrowenough lO be jumped by an alhlele and lheirwinding courses did not take direct routes. Theboats using these waterways were usuallynarrow punts, pushed along ,,~th poles.

The Grand Duke of Oldenburg, the rulerresponsible for what is now the southern part ofthe German North Sea coast, could see theadvantages of selling land to the Prussians forestablishing a naval base because that wouldhelp put an end LO the lawlessness in theshallow wadden sea. It seems that many smallfishing communities supplemented theirincome "~Ul part-time piracy and wrecking, andon top of this there were constant intrusions

195

from foreign sea robbers. The main problem,,~th establishing a naval base on ule North Seawas that the majorit), of officials could notdetelmine exactly where the coast was acrualJylocated. This is not intended as a sarcasticremark, but as a reminder mat ule land mere is"elJ' Oat and the isolated marsh communitieswere indeed a long way from film ground, withsome completely inaccessible from thelandward side for large pans of the year. EvenLOday, where the coast is prolected by highdykes, low tide still reveals up lO aboul 10 kin ofsand Oats. This vast Oat area, interlaced ,,~th amyriad of deep, fast-[lo,,~ngwater channels, isnot only Europe's last ,,~Id frontier but is stillmaking ship access incredibly difficult. Apartfrom the Elbe, Weser, Ems, Eider and a fewother liver estualies, there are only two placesalong me entire wadden sea coast where deepwater touches fiml mainland, and one of mese,at Bllsum, is too small for big ships. ThereforePrussia really had little choice when it cameto selecting a location for its North Seaoperations. A few small and extremely isolatedfishing communities were amalgamated to

form a new town, named \"'ilhelmshaven inhonour of the Plussian King.

Around the same time as foundingvVilhelmshaven, Plussia moved its main navalbase from Danzig to Kie!. The Baltic coast wasfar more hospitable to accommodatingwarships because ulere are a number of deepestuary shaped coastal indentations which havesome similality \'~Ul Norwegian fiords. Kiel waschosen for the same reason as \>\riJhelmshavenbecause deep water reached over 15 km inland,well out of artillelJl range of ships at sea. Thebuilding of \"'ilhelmshaven was by far a greater

GE R)!A:\ :\.H Y 10 XJ) BOO K I 939- 19 I:;

A reception pany assembled on the lock·side at the s.:,ILic end of the Kiel c....nal. The N"a\1' usually

referred to this quay as the main railway station platform.

A wanime or pre-war ,iew of Kiel. The locks of the Kiel Canal. LOgclhcr Wilh road bridge can clearly be

seen. The rectangular building pauem as well as the variollsjcllics of the naval dockr..trd arc also ,isible.

The famous Tirpilz ~Iole is the somewhat wider pier. with its two corners which stretch downwards in the

bottom right-hand corner.

196

XArAL TERRA fiRMA

('123\';l.h Kptlt. Karl-Heinz ~loehle sitting on the right. The magnetic sighting compass can be seen in

Lhe foreground and the signal (m,'er in the backgl"Ound is of special interest. nul it was demolished, it

provided the vantage poilU for numerous photographs of ships made fast at the Blucher Pier.

The main l1a'~dl command offices at Quiberon in France. All)' suitable building was commandeered and it was

usually onl)' the Gennan signposts and guards that suggested there was some connection ,\;th the military.

197

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945

Cuxha"en bcfol-e the war when it was sull a major minesweeping base.

NAVAL T ERR A FIR AI A

U48 in Kie! with onc of the bigger ships in the background. Identification is not eas)' at the beSt of times

and can become quite difficult, especiall)' when nets have been added to break up the outlines. There is

an interesting album ofphoLOgraphs in the Imperial War Museum in London with the original ship

idcntification crossed out and corrected. This, in turn, has then been crossed out and corrected, and

later someone has added a third correction. Afterwards a fourth handwritten comment was added,'Does

itmauer? The)' ha'·e all been sunk anyway!'

problem than developing Kiel because, apartfrom the narrow deep water channel, there was

nothing there for ships to float on at low tide.So a massive artificial or 'Ooating' harbour ,,~th

ea locks had to be built by teams of menwielding shovels and pushing wheelbarrows.Over the years the facilities were graduallyimproved. and the wartime sea locks were lhc

fourth set to sen'e the portDuring the Second World War, Wilhelms­

haven had the great disadvantage that navalactivities were concentrated around anartiricial harbour with a relatively narrowtidal approach. Kiel had vast stretches ofsheltered water, meaning shipping couldbe dispersed to make it a more difficulttarget for enemy bombers. At the same timethere was enough shallow water to hidesubmarines, and many of them spent daylighthours resting on the ea bed with only askeleLOn crew on board. Problems with the

narrow North Sea channels were drivenhome in March 1940 when U31 (KptiLJohannes Habekost) was bombed and sunkb)1 an aircrafl. A Friesian island ferry keptwell clear of the trouble spot and it was aprivate individual, a soldier going honlc onleave, who reponed the attack on an area ofseemingly empty water. U31 had its periscopemarked with a nag for diving trials andanother passing ship thought that the tinybow wave around it was caused by thesubmarine travelling under the water. So thehelmsman gave it a wide berth, nOt realisingthe bow wave was caused by the current.Nobody aboard the ship realised that theU-boat was lying on the bOllom, with mengasping for their last breaths. Only when U31failed to return did the naval authoritiesmake sense of the isolated repons anddispatch a search party. Everybody had diedby the time divers reached the wreck.

198

Since the existing Eider \OVaterway betweenthe Baltic and the North Sea was unsuitablefor sea-going ships, work started on theKiel Canal in 1887, around t.he same time as\oVilhelmshaven and Kiel were beingdeveloped as naval bases. When it wasfinished, some eight years later, it tOO wasnamed after Kaiser ''''i1helm. Today it is knownunder the more modest name of ord-ostseeKanal or intemationally as Kiel Canal. It hadhardl)' been completed when Germanyresponded to the de\'elopment of the BritishD'<adllought battleship by increasing tlle size of

199

another, newer type of warship. This newgeneration was too big for the canal, meaningtl,e watenvay had to be enlarged. This lengthyproject was completed shortly before thebeginning of the First World War. The newspecifications gave it the same length ofalmost 99 km as before, but the narrowest,\~dth on t.he bed was increased from 22 to 44 mwhile the overall water-surface width wasextended from 66 to 102 m with a goodnumber of wider passing places. At the sametime the water depth was increased from 9 to

II m. Locks were necessary at botll ends not

GE R~I ANN AVY II AND BOO K 1939 - I 945

......

only to compensate for the tide in the NorthSea and the changing water levels in theBaltic, but also to allow the Weller in the canalto be raised a little above normal. Incidentallythere is no tide as such in the Baltic, butchanging winds 111ake for a difference of ametre or so in waler levels.

This pre-First ''''orld War waterway servedGermany until further modifications weremade in 1966. It was rather interesting thatthe large set of locks. completed in 1907. hadnever been completely drained until theywere shut down for repairs in 1984. Then, aswaleI' was pumped OUl of the massive basinsat the Kiel end, the concrete base threatenedto disintegrate because groundwater belowwas forcing the foundations upwards. Theproblem was Iinally solved by Iilling theempty lock basins with heavy concrete blockswhile the repairs were in hand.

During the Second World War, the canalwas protected by barrage balloons, land-basedanti-aircraft guns, at least one special Air Forcefighter squadron, and anti-aircraft ships whichwould accompany convoys and othervulnerable targets. The passage was conu'olledfrom two stations, one at each end, andusually different pilots were required for thethree stages, although a good number or navalcommanders had the necessal]' qualificationsfor making the passage on their own.

Another frequently mentioned naval base,Gotenhafen, can hardly be found in atlases.The reason is that this German name forGd)l1ia was only used duling the war years. Ithad been a tiny fishing \;Ilage until the end ofthe First ""orld \'Val: Then, when that area wastaken away from Germany to become part ofPoland, it was developed into a seaport for bothnaval and merchant traffic. In 1939, GenTIanyused ule newly established naval facilities t11ereror the benefit of ule Kriegsmaline. Almost allof the facilities as well as the town weredesu'oyed towards the end of ule Second WorldWar and have since been rebuilt.

Hamburg and Bremen have hardly beenused as naval bases because both towns arelocated far inland with access alongtemperamental rivers where tides, currents,treacherous shallows and sandbanks playhavoc with shipping. In wartime such passagescould be made more difficult or even closedby block ships, mines and aerial attacks.

SHIPYARDS

Until not all that long ago ule southern shoresof the River Elbe in Hamburg were hiddenbehind a vast batter)' or noating drydocks.while the skyline was dominated by massi\'eiron structures supporting a milliard of ,\~res

on which bogeys ran back and forth, feedingule constantly hungry slipways. The economicboom of the postwar years meant that thesecable dominated cranes were replaced bymodern, hydraulically operated equipmentjust a shan time before the decline ofEuropean shipbuilding rorced many of thedockyards to close. Although some cornershave now been partly redeveloped, thereremain some noticeable pockets of dereliction,some of which are filled with the mostremarkable evidence of our turbulent paseBecause the contrast between the old andmodern is so ob\~ous, the step back in hisLOI1'can be made with nothing more than a fewphotos rrom the abundance of books available.

Hamburg makes a good starting point forsuch a historic search because it is easilyaccessible and ule remains of ule old yards arenot too difficult to locate. The last remaininglarge shipyard there, Blohm und Voss, lies onthe souulenl shore, beside u,e old nlllnelunderu,e Elbe. At u,e lUln of the twentieth centUll',the yard built up an excelJent reputation for u,eCOnSlI1.1ction of large merchant ships, especiallyfast liners, and u,ese facilities were later tappedby the German government for building theheav)' cruiser Admiral Hip/Jer and baltleship

200

.\'AI'AL TERRA FIR.II"

The HOVl )'ard in 1998. The scale is difficuillo perceive, e\'en when one stands immediately next to lhis

massive crane. Butlhal lrolley atlhe LOp, holding the cables, is as high as a lhrce-sLOrey house.

This shows the sJipways of the old Krupp Gennania Works, which were alone lime covered by huge

glasshouses. This hisLOric site has now been lOlally transformed to fonn a marvellous new fen]' tenninaL

201

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 NAI'AL TEHHA FlIOIA

Hamburg wiLh a noating ell")' dock belonging to Blohm und Voss in the foreground and the bogey cr'anc over

Stiilkcn Werft's slipwa)'s, photographed dl1l;ng the latc 196005. That mass of wires stretching over the slipways

was the last of the massive cable-operalcd crane S}'Slcms. The decline in European ship-building resulted in

these structures being demolished and smaller (mnes being replaced by hydraulicall)' controlled systems.

The skyline of the Blohm und Voss yard in Hamburg with an array of morc modern cranes.

Bismarck. Strangely enough, Blohm lind Vossdid not become invoh'ed ,,~th the constructionof submarines until comparati\'ely late in thewar, but then, when a production line for theassembly of the large electro-Type XXI wasintroduced, the yard quickly became the mostefficient builder in terms of man-hours for eachboat.

The slipways in the "Verfthafen, where thehub of this aeti\~t}' took place, can still be seenfrom the launches taking visitors around theport, and a multitude of excellent photos existsho,,~ng Blitish soldiers exploring this hive ofacti\~ty in 1945. At the end of the war, whenthe army of occupation n10ved into thepremises, much of the workings were stillintact, but there are also photos of the sameV-boats with considerable damage, and theofficial captions state that the devastation hadbeen caused by Allied bombing during the war.This is clearly false because bombing hadceased by the time British soldiers mm'ed intothe area. So one wonders why it was necessaryfor the annies of occupation to destroy cranes,water defences and other installations after thewar, and then make out this ,,~lful destructionhad been caused before the cease-fire. It is alsointeresting to note that during the mid-1970s,when Blohm und Voss was approached forinfOl-mation about their participation in thebuilding of U·boats, their public relationsofficer told the author that the yard had neverbuilt submarines. On being shown photos ofsuch vessels lying on the firm's slipways, hedeclared u1em to be fakes.

Just a few hundred metres to u1e south ofBlohm und Voss lies the site of theHowaldtswerke. The name of the basin,'Vulkanhafen', is a fascinating throwback toearlier times when this yard was owned by theVulcanwerke of Stettin. The Baltic pon couldno longer cope with the masses of ordersflooding in, so Vulcan moved some of itsproduction to Hamburg. In 1930, the workswere taken over by Howaldl. After the war

the concern was amalgamated with theHowaldtswerke in Kiel and with Deutsche''''eft, but even this strong combination couldnot cope with the cheaper competition fromfar off countries and the site was abandonedin the mid-1990s for redevelopment, and theconsu-uction of new flood defences.

The V-boat building industry has left aninteresting legacy in the corner of theVulkanhafen in the fOll11 of a small fitting-outshelter. Three filU1S went bankrupt duting u1eprocess of demolishing it, but the mass ofconcrete \,~thstood all efforts to level it to u1eground. Although a large part of the roof hasbeen brought down, pan of u1e centre supportand the west wall have stood film. The other,larger V-boat shelter in Hamburg wassuccessfully destroyed with left-<)ver sLOcks ofold Luftwaffe bombs, but the army ofoccupation had nm out of such vast quantitiesof explosives by U1e time it turned its attentionto the smaller Elbe II bunker. In any case,surrounding buildings there would have beendamaged had such a huge detonation takenplace inside it. The remains of U1e bunker stillstand, dominating the con1er of u1e Europakai.

During the last days of the war, V-boatsinside the western basin of the bunker werescutued just a shon while before the BritishArmy arrived, and u1ey are still lying there tothis day and until recently they surfaced atevery low tide. This somewhat unusualsurvival was largely due to the site havingbeen inside the free pan, which meant it wasnecessary to pass through customs to reachthe area. In addition to this, the ruins werewell hidden inside the shipyard's securityarea. This was so strict that visitors to the sitehad to leave identity cards or passports withthe security staff at the main gate. Now,unfortunately, there is much easier access andthe authorities have covered the submarineswith sand to keep out the curious.

The sad point about this story is that u1eseboats survived as late as the mid-1960s and it

202 203

GEIDI.I N XAI'Y II AND BOO K 1939 - I 94 5 S .H \ L TEll ILl F I H~I.I

Hamburg with the high K6hlbrand suspension bridge in the background, during the late 1980s. The quay

on the right, where the floating crane has been made fast, was then occupied by 1-Ia1'ms Ships Salvage and

the area to the left was still occupied by HDW's ship repair yard. The ruins "ith crooked roof in the

middle are the remains of Elbe II V-boat bunker, Inside it are still three Type XXI U~boalS, which could

be seen iH low tide, Apparently these have now been co"ered "'ith sand,

was a demolition firm's despermc allClllpl atfending ofT banknlplc), which resulLed in twoconning LOwers being remo\·cd. These weremade from an expensi,·c non-magneticphosphor-bronze alloy. The engines were alsosalvaged, but the front sections of the twowesterly boars and the entire hull of the ulirdubmal;nc remained intacl. The snag was that

the concrete roof was partly squashing thethird boat. The boats ha\'c been identified as:U3506, I),ng "rtually intact, although ralhersquashed by me roof, while the Olher 1\,'0 boatsare U3004 and U2505; all of lhem are largeeleclr<:>-boats of Type XXl. Il seems a pilY malthese survivors of an incredible technologyshould be hidden away father than serve asreminders of almost unbelic\'ablc innovation.

It could \\'cll be that a multitude of otherrelics are also still lying in the Il'luci at thebOllom of the dock basin. A Ro)",1 Na\Y repon,compiled a few weeks after the end of the war,catalogues an abundance of gear all around thearea, from large pieces such as engines andperiscopes to smaller crates of supplies, Sincevinually nothing was found close to the edge,one could assume that evel1'thing there wastossed into the water before the British forcesalnved, DlIIing the early 19905 there were still alarge number of cumbersome relics, Concreteblocks to protect the oULSide of basementwindows from bomb blasts were used as roadmarkers, (These are about 40 cm square incross section and a Il'letre or so long,) Therewas also quite a collection of ponablearmoured sentr), boxes made of steel andconcrete \\ith tin)' observation slits, One of theoffice blocks quite clearly has a wanimeconcrete extension and there is a circularpersonnel bunker with each door leadingdirecuy up lO a differelll 1",·eJ. Il "<IS also quiteamusing to spot a modenl portable cabin beingsupported \\it..h what looked like an old anchorintended for a U-boat and no doubt anyonecombing ule area moroughly ",II be rewardedwith 1l'10re e,idence ofan explosh'e history,

U-boat slipwa)'s belonging to the$liilkenwerfl lie to the eaSl of the old Elbetunnel, just across the canal by the side of thesouthern entrance, )Iuch of the machinerywas demolished and remo"ed while thebuildings lay derelict for a considerable time,In me lale 1980. funher demolition look place',ith a ,iew to rede,'eloping the land for use asa massh'e shopping centre, but the schemeseems to ha"e foundered, The StiHkenwerft isof special interest because it specialised in thebuilding of small ships and fishing boats, andin 1935 de"eloped the high I)' successfulminesweeper of Type 35, a design which waslaler copied by se"eral oUler finm.

DeuLSche \Verft in Finkenwerder, whichshould nOt be confused ',~th Deutsche \Yerkeof Kiel, suffered considerabl)' from bombing,from deliberate postwar desu'uction and later,in the early I960s, it became one of the firstvictims of economic collapse, The U-boatbunker there, named Fink 2, was destroyed bydetonating tllousands of tons of old Luftwaffebombs inside it. The remains were thenlevelled with the shoreline and tons of sanddumped on tOP' Since the postwar collapse ofthe shipyard, many installations have beendemolished and mllch of the land has re"enedto nalllre, Yet a few buildings remain andderelict railway lines \\~th imposing but nLStinggates point to the spot where the concrete U­boat bunker used to stand, Anyone 'isiting tllissite might like to acquire a wartime mapbecause the filling-in of some dock basins hasgi"en lise to a different shore line to the onewhich can be seen in old wartime photos,

After the war numerous ship and U-boatwrecks from the Hamburg dock basins ,,'erecleared and dumped to the west ofFinkenwerder, in an area where tlle NonhernElbe used lO meel me Old Olilhern Elbe.The river there, just a uiOe under 3 km wide,was dominated by a number of shallows \\~th

massi"e firm sandbanks exposed at low tide,During the early 1960s, a storm accompanied

with rare tidal conditions resulted in theentire docks and the lower pans of the citybeing nooded, As a result the Finkenwerderwaler defences were strengthened and theri"er courses changed to prc"ent such abuild-up of ""ter in this area, This ,,'esterntributary of the ollthern Elbe has now beenblocked off lO become the Old Elbe and lhecurrenLS have been di"erted to now underthe huge suspension bridge in the port. Itcould well be that these changes haveco"ered the wrecks, or the majoritr mightha"e been sall'aged at low tide to feed thee,'er-hungry blast furnaces in Hamburg longbefore the nooding disaster struck, Theremains were ,~sible at low tide until the late1950s, but now there is no trace of them,

Like Hamburg, ship construction in Kiel wasC3Ined out exclusively on one side of the watel~

aJlo\\ing sighlseers eas}' access to the other shorefor watching the hi"e of acti"ity. Fen1'boaLS\\ill take passengers e,'en closel-. Despite thewarume bombing and although much of theproduction has been drastically changed inrecent years, there are a large number ofrecognisable and rewarding relics stiU to be seen.

The furtllest inland yard, now occupied b)fHDW, was the sile of the famous KruppCenllania "·orks, Before the war, the slipwa)there were covered by a massh'e, four-gabledglasshouse. Most of the windows were blownout by bombing, but the huge lettering of·Krupp' remained defiantly dominating therusting \\Teckage, Krupp, lhe steel giant, which

204 205

GEIDI ANN A\'Y II AND BOO K I 939 - 1945 NAVAL TERRA FIRMA

LighL cmiser Koln's artillery in action.

I9205, The economic collapse u,en left u,e finnWitll no altenlaU,"e oUler than to scrap many ofthe facilities it had just acquired. At u,e heightof its production in 194 I, Deschimag AG Weseremployed o\'er 17,000 people "iu, about 1,000employees being located at the -boat repairb.:"lSC in Brest on the French coast.

Deschimag was a major cenrre for assemblingthe large electro-boats of Type XXI. Thesections for these were built in a variety ofinland locations and then transported onpontoons for assembly at a major riversidelocation. Since this final stage was rathervulnerable, in 1943 it was decided to placethe entire process under concrete. The largebunker Valentin, on the banks of the "Vesel'near Farge, was big enough to accommodatethe entire assembly line for this newgeneration of U-boats. The idea was that thesections could be brought in through thicksteel doors on one side, and completed boatsdispatched u'rDugh a lock on the other.

Gneise71ou, hea,'y cruiser Bliicher and pocketbatueship Deutschland.

The dockyard in \'\'ilhclmshaven was theonly naval building )",rd to be allowed its fullfacilities after the First \,\Torld \o\'ar, althoughthe Allies tried rendering it inoperati,'e byconfiscating much of the modern machinery.Known originally as the Kaiserlichewerft,then Reichsmarinewerft and later asKriegsmarinewerft, this concern witnessedthe consumption of an incredible amount ofsteel for warship construction" BatLleshipsTirpitz and Scharnhorst, pocket bauleshipsAdmiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee, lightcruisers Emden, Konigsberg, KOla, Leipzig andnumerous smaller ships were built there.

The biggest German construction yard,Deschimag AG Weser, from Deutsche Schiffund Maschinenbau Aktiengesellschaft, waslocated on the banks of the River Weserbetween Bremen and Bremerhaven. Shortlyafter the First \tVorld \tVar it consu-ucted somemost innovative ships, including the artillerytraining vessel and minelayer Brummer, withits set of prototype engines planned forinstallation in destro)/ers. Later the yardbecanle a hub for submarine construction andjust before the end of u,e Second World Waralmost 400 midget submarines of Type Mold,were built there. A costly administrati,-e mistakeduring the immediate post-First \t"orld \tVarpeliod could well have cost the finll a numberof larger contracts, although Deschimag didbuild the heavy cruisers Liilzowand Se),dlitz.(This Liitww should not be confused "ith u,erenamed pocket battleship Deutschland. Thecruiser built b)' Deschimag was sold to Russiafor completion there. The other cruiser wascOIl\"erted into an aircraft cartier, but nevermade operationaL) Deschirnag's administrati,'eproblems came about as a result of itsambitions to become the most influentialconstruction finn in Gennany. A large numberof older and less efficiem )",rds were purchasedshortly before orders dwindled during the

na\·al authorities were plea cd when it wastaken O\'er by Ho\\'aldtswerke of Hamburg.

Not long ago di\'ers found a -boat inreasonable condition entoll'lbed under therubble of the submarine bunker and thesubsequent hunt for information madepeople think the town council might beinterested in consideting a salvage operation.Howe,"er, it transpired that the officials'curiosity focused on whether or not there wasany ammunition on board. It appears thathad there been, then the Federal Germangovernment would have been obliged to payfor the removal of the eyesore, but ,,~thout

explosh'es presenting a danger, the expensiveclearing of the ruins would ha,"e to be paidfor by the city council. The high cost of suchan undertaking has ensured that the ruins,,~11 remain a semi-pennanent feature of theKiel waterline for some time to come.

The U-boat inside the ruins appears to beU4708 (ObILz.S. Dietrich Schultz), a smallcoastal electro-boat of Type XXIII, which wassunk during an air raid on Kiel when a seriesof large bombs exploding in the water on thefar shore caused a series of waves to washthrough the open hatches.

Anyone ,~ewing these I-uins from the Kielside of the water will probably also notice anumber of cube-like concrete blocks by thewestern shore. The fact that these were thefoundations for the famous Bliicherbrucke isnot hard to discover because the modernpier still displays this old name, although it isno longer the home pier for the sail training,'esse I Gorch Fock, which has been pushedfunher away into the naval dockyard.

Also located in Kiel was the Deutsche\Verke, which was founded in the mid-1920sb)1 combining the Reichsmarinewerft withu,e Kiel Torpedo Works, After u,e First WorldWar the facilit)' was down-graded by u,e Alliesto a mere repair base, but the old expertisewas quickl}' re-established to build a chain oflarge warships, including bauleship

should not be confused with the elecuical fiml

of Krupps, took O\'er the Cennania Works longbefore the beginning of the war. Theglasshouses \\;lh their fittings were demolished,but the slips remained hidden until quiterecently under a mixwre of industrialdereliction, untidy heaps of scrnp metal, and a

tangle of wild plants. Today they ha"e beencovered with a modern ferry terminal. Theshipbuilding pans of this site are still home tohigh technology, employing an al1J1Y of steadyhanded Turkish workers for welding the most

complicated secrets behind strategically placedscreens. Since before the war, this area hasbeen the hub of the -boat industry, ha,ingbeen responsible for numerous innovations.

The fact thaL this expertise is still being appliedto modenl submarines can easily be seen fromacross the water. I-Iowaldlswerke look over the

Krupp Yard after the Second World War andthis, in LUrn, was recently amalgamated withDeulSChe Werftto become HOW,

The area adjacelll to the present-day HOWis now occupied by the Naval Arsenal. Pan ofthis land was created by filling in old dockbasins and burying several sunken ships,induding the pocket batueship Admiral &heer.A couple of kilometres northwards one cannotmiss a tangle of concrete by the water's edge.These last remains of the old Kiel submarinebunker also mark the site of the wanimeHowaldlswerke, where numerous U-boalS werebuilt. In facl, this is the site where GClmany"sfirst submarine, the Brandtaucher was pulledinLO the water in 1850, at an iron foundrybelonging to Schweffel and Howaldl. Theworks there also hold the record for havingcast the first large German ship propellerbefore the rum of me cenLUry. and it was thefirst Gennan yard to build a salvage vessel wiu,turlx>-elecuic propulsion. The enure shipyardwas old to the Kriegsmarine just before the

beginning of the war, but the subsequentmanagement was not as efficient as the civiladministration had been and three years later

206 207

GE R" .\, '.\ \) II n DBOO K 1939 - I 9 ~:;

Pan of the engine control rOOI11 aboard the light cruiser Kohl.

.\HAL TEIlIlA FIIl.IIA

The U-boat bunkers in Bordeaux under construction. Although propaganda often states that these

monstrosities were pUI up by slave labour, man}' of the workers were Spaniards and the p,"isoners of war

\\'ho \\'orked on the sites were also \'olullleers enjoying beller living conditions than man}' of their

counterparts in other camps.

Although this massi,"c bunker was nc\"crcompleted, it seemed to ha\"c posed aconsiderable threat. The British Army wasalready within a shon distance of Bremenwhen the House of Commons in London wasLOld thallhis incomplete site could soon posea mLtior threat for COIl\'ors in the Atlantic andan intensh"c bombing raid ,,-as reCOllllll­

ended. Consequently l..he Royal Air Force wasghocn the gcrahead for a major offensive withnewly de\"eloped, hea\~' bombs. These appearnot to ha\"c infliCled lOa Illuch damage onI.he concrete structure, although many of the~boals on Deschimag"s slipways and the

}'ard's infrastruClure and workshops weredestroyed beyond repair.

208

The efficiently run Seebeck \\'erft ,,'astaken o,"er by Deschinlag AG \\'eser after thedeath of the founder. Dietrich GeorgSeebeck. This smallish yard at Geestemlllldein Bremerha\'en was of special interest to thebigger giant because many of the lOols andprocesses de\'eloped there were incrediblymodern and organised along the II10stefficient production lines. Seebeck hadstarted by building fishing boats and thenwent on to produce mines\,"eepers for theImperial :-la,,'. The post-First \I'orld Warboom then induced the management toenlarge facilities for the construction oflarger merchant ships. These facilities wereemployed first for repairing U-boats, and

later about six Type IXC and IXC42 boatswere built from scratch each rear.

The Rivcr \\'eser was also the homc ofBremer Vulkan in Vegesack, "'hich couldeasily be confused with the Vu1canwerke inSteuin. Facilities in Steuin and other yards inthe eastern Baltic found themseh'es in adeplorable state after the First \I'orld \I'ar

and the Depression of the 19205 was madeeven worse by the \,ast agriculturalhinterland, which could not deliver theindustrial support which kept the Ri\'er\\'eser ali\'e, Schichau \\'orks in Elbing,Danzig and Konigsberg virtually ceased toexist and it was onl), an intel'Yention by thestale and city authorities which kept the

209

facilities ali\'e to cope "~lh future orders. Thisstate of deep depression was short-livedbecause the area became a prime target forNational Socialists' reju\'enation schemes,and bl' 193 the three l'ards employed wellover 10,000 people. Immediately after thebeginning of the war, these facilities weretapped to supply the increasing demand for

-boats. The)' also prm'ided repair facilitiesand built engines and other essentials forother firms. At the same time many smalleryards along the Baltic \,"ere drawn into warproduction and e\'en factories such as theengineering works of KlockeI' in 1m, 10caLcdfar away from the coasts, was pulled into thesubmarine production sphere.

X AI'AL T ERR A FIR ~1 A

remembrance was required for his deadcolleagues. He was thinking about a focalpoint where people could meet and exchangeideas about facing the future, rather thancreating a centre for joint mourning.AltllOugh this suggestion received favourablesuppOrt from a wide spectrum of interest, theeconomic depression at Lhe time meant therewas no way that anyone could expectcontributions from the Navy or from thetaxpayer. Yet, the idea had hardly circulatedwhen Franz Heil1lich added to the proposalby suggesting that such a place could be buillon a lonely spit of land o\·erlooking the Baltic,close lO where he lived in Laboe (Kiell.Lammertz, howe\'er, preferred V{ilhelmsha\'enbecause that was the traditional home of the

The I aval Memorial in April 1998.

211

There are three major naval memorials inGermany: the Naval Memolial at Laboe, theU-boat Memorial al M61lenon, bolh near Kiel,and the U-boat Archh'c in Cuxhavcn. The first1.\\'0 are conventional types of memorials.although there is also a small, but fascinatingmuseum display at Laboe. The -boat Archivecontains filed infofll'lation, museum-typedisplays, a photo library and film archive, andis by far the biggest and most significalllcollection of U-boal infonllation.

The proposal to build a naval memorial was\·oiced shortly after the First World War by\\'i1helm Lammenz, a petl)' officer in theImperial Navy, who felt that some place of

MAJOR NAVAL MEMORIALS

The Naval Memorial in August 1935,just a fewmonths after Hitler had made his famous militaryproclamation to repudiate the Diktat of Versaillesand reintroduce national conscription.

210

GE R)!A S SAl" Y HAS I) BOO K 1939 - 1945

T)-pe XXIII, a small electro-boat, towards the end of the war. The inside was so cramped that torpedoes

had to be loaded imo the tubes from the olltside and there was no mom to calTY spal-es.

One of the new large electro-boats of Type XXI in Danzig towards the end of tile war. It was planned that

these should replace Type VII .IS the mainstay in l..he Ballie of the Allantic, but onl)' a handful were ready

by the Lime the war started.

GE R)I A.\' .\' AI" r HAXDBOO K 1939 - I 94;; .\' ,\ \ \ L T ERR ,\ FIR \I \

In Gel"many it is cuslomary on wreaths to aLLach ribbons with personal messages. These ribbons are on

display at the Naval Memol"ial at Laboe (Kid). The fOllrth from the left is fmm the East Pnlssian L1.dies

Group and the one nexl to il states, '1000 ships came. 33082 died. 2401367 survi,"ors thank the biggest

rescue oper-mion in marine histol")·.· These poignant reminders not only indicate thai the two world wars

were the worst episodes of European history bUl also warn the next generations of what could happen iflhey follow the same paths as their predecessors.

old Imperial '3\)1, ~1any other locations werealso put forward, but the ruins of ademolished gun turret at Laboe were chosen,because the site was donated free of charge bythe town council. The other advantages werethat Laboe was easier to reach than places onthe North Sea coast and the Kiel Canal wasnOt too far away. meaning a good number of

ships would pass it each da),.Following the decision to take U1C project one

sr:age further, a number of eminent architectswere asked La provide some IRISic designs dllJingthe autumn of 1926. The \\inner of this smaUinfonnal competition, Gustav Munzel~ had ,;sited

the ruined gun ballery shortly after Chrisunasand calllC up with the simple design whichstands there today. TI,e organisers' stipulationhad been that the memOlial should sel'YC as afocal point overlooking ti,e sea and tI,at it shOllldbe able LO accommodate a large number ofpeople. f\!lunzer met these requiren1ents bymaking a mIl tower the dominating attraction"Thi was to give visiLOrs an opportunity of seeingthe sea as it appeared from a ship and, atthe same time, to serve as a distinct landmarkfor passing sailors. The all-round view wasemphasised with a circular assembly area at ilSbase, Since there was already a large holewhere the gun bauery had been, the solemncommemoration hall was placed undergroundand an open space created on top of ilS roof.Later a third phase, ti,e historic hall, was addedon the opposite side of the circle to the towel:

Although it was known that the projecthad received favourable suppon, theorganisers found themselves ovenvhelmed bythe amount of popular interest. Over 5,000people turned up on 8 August 1927 for thelaying of the foundation SLOne by AdmiralReinhard cheer. Special trains had to be laidon, ferries ran continuously from Kiel toLaboe and e,"erybody present was rewardedwith a splendid sunny summer's day. Thisenthusiastic support made it possible to st.artbuilding the first phase, the 85 m high tower,

212

in June 1929. This in itself \,'as no cas)'maller. because drilling ,,-as necessary to seewhether the sandy ground could supponsuch a tall building. The constructiontechnique was also quite re,"olutionaryinasmuch as the tower ,,-as cast from concretewith the lower part being pumped into placeby a newly inveilled cement pump. Followingthis, the drab grey colour \\',lS hidden behinda cladding of red bricks and natural stones.

One interesting point about this column isthat it later helped in the design of conningtowers for submarines. This came about becausethe tOP of the tower lies in a "ind-free eddy,e,'en dudng gales when there is a strong ,,;ndon the lower platform. A young submarinedesigner, Christoph Aschmoneit, capitalised onthis phenomenon by incorporating theresponsible features onto submarines, and thisgave rise to the two deflectors seen on theoUlside of\'Vorid \o\'ar Two conning towers.

The I aval Memorial complex was officiallyinaugurated on 30 May 1936, Although Hitlerattended, he did not make a speech, but hedid lay the first wreath in the Hall ofCommemoration. Following this emotionalbeginning, the na''31 memorial sun"i,-ed thewar \,;th hardly any damage by enemy action,although much was de troyed by angryGennans just before ti,e collapse of ti,e ThirdReich and later some items of value wereapparently looted by Bt;tish forces, who alsoproposed the demolition of the memorial.These reverberations of hate and revengeresounded as far as the House of Lords inLondon, who considered the proposalsomewhat preposterous. In the end, senseprevailed and the laval Memorial was closedlO visitors instead of being totally desu·ol'ed,

On 30 Mal' 1954, it was officially handedback to the German Naval Federation(DeuLScher Marinebund), which is nowresponsible for its upkeep, It ,,-as receh'ed bythe Na'"al Federation's President. DuoKretschmer (the econd World War U-boat

ace) and Hellmuth Heye (ex-COmmander-in­Chief of ti,e ~Iidget Weapons Unit), Both ofthem made the strong point of &"l);ng, 'Fromnow on this unique naval memorial is going tobe dedicated to all people who lost their li"esat sea - including the lives of our earlieradversaJies.' The thoughts behind this wordingwere probably lost on m;:lllY who auended andit might be of interest to emphasise that dllJingthe war the majorit}' of -boat men consideredu1e OU1er side to ha'"e been their ad"ers;:uies oropponents. but not lheir enemies.

No doubt today man)' visitors make theeffon of going to the Naval Memorial for the

213

VolkslJundDeufsche

.:Krie!lSgraber­fUrsorge

- 1'lIrimrll.UArlllu,

magnificent "iews from the top of the to""er,but it is difficult not be caught up in thesolemn atmosphere of remembrance createdin the underground hall. \Valking quietlythrough the dimly-lit room, one can brushshoulders with the famous whose namesappear so frequently in history books. Thosewho have the time to relax can feel a multitudeof emotions from Europe's honific and totallyunnecessary turbulent past. On emerging atu1e far side of the room, it is easy to realise howbadl" the famous national leaders had sen'edtheir people, The Duke of "'ellington wasCOITen when he said that u1e most miserable

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-1945 NAVAL TERRA FIRMA

War losses have been engraved in a grey concrete wall at the Naval Memorial and painted black, as can be

seen by this small section showing some of Lhose lost in heavy cruisers.

- -.:._.:~....

TIle U~boat Memorial at M61tenon (Kiel) as seen from the water. The large bronze plates with names of the

dead are slink below ground level and much of the memorial can only be seen by entering the complex.

214

experience is losing a battle and the secondmost miserable experience is winning one.

Since 1954, there have been a number ofmodifications to the Naval Memorial. One ofPrinz Eugen's propellers lies ncaf the entrance

and as a result of u1is mere is also a memOlialfor American sailors. Since official approva.l wasdifficult at the time, the propeller from Prinztugen was 'myste,;ously' lifted and deposited ona quay near the Panama Canal where it wascollected by a merchant ship and delivered to

the Na\'al Arsenal in Kiel. From there it had to

be moved at the dead of night because the low­loader caJl)ri.ng it would not fit undenlcath the

elecu;c cables for the trams. These had to beswitched off and propped up \\ith poles whilethe lorry transported the bronze colouredblades to their present resting place.

U995 has also been set up as a technicalmuseulll close to the base of the NavalMemorial's lower. Mtef the war, the boat wascommissioned in the Royal NOJ'1\icgian Navy asKa.ura and retunlcd La Kiel when its practical

life came to an end. Mtef restoration, a channel

was dredged from the Baltic, allowing twomassive floating cranes access to the beach closeto the road, where the submarine has been laid

on concrete foundations. Although U1C interiorhas ule feel of a real U-boat, many of Ule fittingsarc modern because the OIiginals have beenstolen since the museum was opened. It wasthought that the dredged channel wouldquickly silt up again, but the experts were wrongand it has remained open, providing a pool ofcalm water for a small paddle-boat hire business.

TIle U·boat MemoIial at M61tenon lies some4 km (2.5 miles) inland from the NavalMemorial and can also be reached by passengerferry from Kiel. These boats travel from therailway station quay past ule Naval Arsenal, uleNaval Dockyard and Holtenau to M6ltenon,Laboe and then on as far as the OlympiaMal;na at Schilksee. The U-boat MemOI;al hadoriginally also been a gun battery for an oldmuzzle-loader guarding a narrow section in the

215

approaches to Kiel harbour. Much of thememorial has been constructed of red bdckand the names of U-boat men lost during bothwars are recorded on bronze plaques attachedto Ule walls. v%en Ule peace is not disturbed byscreaming children or by graffiti of theignorant, the memorial stands guard over aunique atmosphere of silence and reverence,and it has formed a focal point for many U-boatreunions. Both here and in the Naval Memorialone will usually find an abundance of wreathsfrom and for the famous.

THE V-BOAT ARCHIVE

Being shot up at sea meant that Lt.z.S. HorstBredow was admitted to hospital while hisboat, U288 under OL Willi Meyer, sailedwithout him. Just a few days later an aircraftauacked. There were no survivors. Shalleredby fonune, Horst Bredow made it his duty tofind out what had happened and thencirculate the details to the next of kin of hisdead comrades. This led to him being askedfor news about someone else who had gonemissing in a submarine. Collectinginformation during those turbulent postwardays was no easy matter because most of theGerman documents had been captured bythe Allies and classified as secret. Obtainingeven the simplest of facts was difficult.Researchers had to rely on people's memOl;esor on a few scanty papers in ptivate hands. Aslate as the] 970s, Britain continued with itsdetermined efforts to suppress informationabout the war. Vlhile things had improved inthe United States, people in England wereprevented from gaining access to documentswhich were freely available in America. In thisatlllosphere of severe restrictions, HorstBredow continued collecting information as ahobby for those who approached him forhelp. Slowly his efforts started snowbaJling.

During ule early 1980s a unique opportunitypresented itself to prevent Horst's collection

GE R II n \" I II I\" DBOO K I 939 - I 9n XAI'A L T E HR,I Fill ~I A

I-Iorst and Annemie Bredo\\' in the ·boal Archi\'e before their move to Cu..xhaven.

The U-bO<\l Archive shanl)" after moving inLO this house in Altenbmch near Cuxha\'cn.

A displa} case in the t..:-ooal Archive before it Illm"cd to Cuxha\'cn. In the middle is the naval ensign of

the Third Reich and a C-ooat 'tonnage sunk' pennam \\;th the Ilumber 'SOOO' aithe bottom. The box 011

the shelflowards the right is an Enigma code writer.

from mking O\'er his entire flat in Berlin. Theheating S) lem at the Naval Air School 011 the

Island of 5ylt was modernised to runaUlomalically on oil, making the offices andIhing rOOlllS of the heating engineer obsolete!HorsL. who already had a Sillall holiday flat onthe island, was able to mo\'C his papers andgi,"C them more space. At the same time therewas enough room for accommodating theoccasional visitor. Although it was located in arestricted military area, far away from the rest

of Gennanr, it was not long before ex·U~boat

Illen and researchers trod a path to Germany'sIllost northerly Friesian island. At the sametime the archive grew until every availablespace was filled with something of interest.

And this is not an exaggeration! People whoknew the old Sylt Archive \\~11 know that everynook and cranny was filled \\~th something.

The day came when a routine fire checkconcluded it was rather dangerous to have sucl1 amass of paper slacked in the offices above huge

boilers, and Horst was encouraged to lookaround for alternati\'e accommodation.

SU'1)risingly Ihis was quickly found and, afler acolossal effort, a neet of lorries carried thearchi\'e to CLLxhaven, where lhe toWll council put

a twelll),-eight-roomed house al Horst's disposaland free of renL The incredible point aboul thismassh'e Ix>at archive is mat it has been createdby one man supponed by a small number of pa11­time \·olunteers. Anyone tempted to ask thequestion 'whal is in the archive', should rephraselhe request and ask 'what's missing'. It is the

only place where I have always found answers toall my questions. The most significant thingmissing is money! It is still run by Horst Bredowand supplemented \\~th his pension, and hecopes \\~th well over 3,000 enquiries each year.111is means answering hundreds of letters eachweek, in addition to dealing \\~th the mass ofnew material nooding in.

For much of the year the archive is openfor a few days each week to casual callers,

216 217

J

GEHMAN NAry IIANDBOOK 1939-1945

Adolf Hiller followed b)' General Admiral Dr h.c. Erich Raeder, the Supreme Commander-in-Chiefof the

Na\)'. at the funeral of the \ictims from the air raid on Dtut,sclila"d during the Spanish Ci\il War.

his plaJlS would not last long. Just a few monthslater the Navy bauled for its "ery survival topre\'elll ships from passing into Anll)' conu·ol.TI,e twO admirals, Maximilian Rogge and EmstRitter \'on Mann und Edler Herr von Tiechler.

maintained a grip on the reins ofleadership untilearly in 1919 when Admiral Adolfmn Trotha was

appointed to head the small surviving corethrough the political chaos. nfortunately thisstrong cornerstone of support for the Na\)' wasunseated as a result of riots aJld Admiral WilliamMichaelis took his place while things settled

Just a few montllS before tlle nun of the cennuy.the Emperor (Kaiser Wilhelm II) appointedhimself to the position ofSupreme Commander­in'(;hief of the Navy and thereb}' took ultimatecontrol of the Admiralstab (Admiralty).

Allhough this presented numerous admin­iso-ati'e problems during the ~I,.st \lurid War, itwas not until just a few months before tlle endthat Admiral Reinhard Scheer succeeded increating an autonomous Naval Connnand Officeto be responsible for planning and conducting

tlle war on the high seas. Howe\'el~ illooked as if

THE SUPREME NAVAL COMMAND

Il'lany viewing hours for an individual tocomprehend or look al. \,Vhat is more lherearc facilities for examining a \'a t variety ofdifferent film formats. In 1990, the mainlibrary consisted of well m'er 50,000 publishedbooks and there must now be something inthe region of 150,000 photographs. Virtuallyevery U-boat log from the Second World Waris there, as well as thick and comprehensivefiles on every Gennan -boat from UI in 1906

to the present day. All this is supported by awealth of additional matct;al such as letters,certificates, documents and other artefacts.

Unlike many archives, Horst Breda\\' acntally

allows visiting researchers access to cvcl1'lhing inhis care - but they ,,~II find only photocopies.This way. there is nothing \d1uablc to steal andanyone who wants lhc infonnation can pressme bulton on the photocopier. It is ramer sadthat many items [rom museums' reserve

collections have been decimated by researchersstealing items. Horst's approach makes a \~sit

exceptionally interesting because nothing ishidden away. The archive really doe make

histol1' come alive. Another reason for fillingthe accessible pan of the archive \\~tll copies isthat much of the material was borrowed,processed and then returned to the owners.That is not say the archive contains only copies.TIlere is also a mass ofguaranteed odginal relicssafel}' locked awa}' in display cases. In recent

years this museum collection has become anC\'er increasing pan of tlle Archive and has nowresulted in the building ofan extension.

TI,e U-boat Archive is cenainly an incredibleplace. Professor Michael Hadley, the prominentCanadian historian, said that any work about thewar at sea which does nOt acknowledge theU-boat Archh'e is not worth consideling. The

place is certainly unique. Anyone wantinginfonllation should consider joining the FTU(Friends of Traditionsarchiv nterseeboote), U­Boot-Arch iv, Bahnhofstrasse 57, 0-27478Cuxha'·en-Altenbruch. Please enclose sorneimenlational postal reply coupons when \\'Jiting.

Horst Bredow, founder and director of U-Bool­

Archiv in Cuxha\'en. Behind him is the ensign of the

old Imperial Navy. Although officially hauled down

for the last time shonly after the First World Wal~ it

remained in use throughout me period of the ll1ird

Reich. A few ships were commissioned "iUl it in

preference to the ensign \\iLh swastika and this old

nag new officially LO commemorate a number of First

Wodd War e\·ents. such as lhe Battle ofJutland. TIle

jack in the LOp left hand comer was coloured black

at the lOp. white and red at the bottom. The large

cross was black on a while background.

except during the cold \\inter months when it

is LOtan)' shut fOI" e\'eryone. Howe\'er. aoronewishing to undertake serious research is bestad,;sed to make an appointment and to ha\'eplenty of time. The ground noor roomscontain a museum display of relics. There is amedia room with too many films and lOO

218 219

GE B.llA K .\' AI' Y II AS 0 BOO K 1939 - 19~ 5 TilE 5 U P B £.11 E .\' AI' AL C0 ~1.11 A .\' 0

The number plate indicmcs Lhat lllis cal- belongs to the navy: W for Wehrm3cht (AImed Forces) and~" stood

fOI- Maline. TIle Luftwaffe L1sed the IClter L and the Ann)' 1-1 for Heel'. The symbol pail1lcd on the mudguard is

a command flag, indicating thmme car is being llsed by an admiral. TIlcre are two admirals in the background

\,ith the LOpS of their coats open to reveal comflowcr-bluc lapels. Other ranks usually \,'ore their coats butLoncd

light lip to tJle neck. NOle the officer \\ith the '~llonke)"sShillg' which indicdtes that he is an adjumnL

d0\\11. Then, towards the end of 1920, AdmiralPaul Behncke became Supreme Commander..in..Chief for a stabilising period of four rears.Nlhough the Na\)' h'aS not LOtally disb.:'mded, theidea of re-creating an autonOIllOus navalcOlllmand for planning and conducting battleson the high seas did not materialise again untilten years later when the name Seekriegsleilung- SKL (Naval Command Office or Naval \t\'arStaff) resurfaced. The concept was thenfurther developed by Admiral Erich Raeder,who decreed that the SKL should becomeresponsible for the planning of naval warfare onthe high seas. At the same time operationalcono'ol of ships in coastal waters passed to two s<r

called 'Group Commands', one for the Balticand the other for the North Sea. Latel~ dUlingule \\ral~ the Group Commands were enlarged toinclude coastal waters of occupied countries,while the U-boat Command was added totake charge of all submarine operations.

In 1922, the German Navy was made up ofthe following two commands:

Baltic CommandBattleship Hannover, small cruisers J'vIedusaand Thetis, lhe ISl Torpedo Boal Flolilla ofeleven boats, and two tenders.

North Sea Command

Battleship BrO'lII1.Schweig, small cruisersHamburg and Arcona, the 2nd Torpedo BoatFlotilla of seven boaLS, and two tenders.Set aside for officer training: Small cruiserBerlin and sail training ship Niobe.Also available, but temporarily out ofcommission were: Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein,Lot.hringen, Preussen, l\~lml)he and not morethan half a dozen torpedo boats.

THE NEW KRIEGSMARINEAFTER 1935

AltJlOUgh Hiller held the position of SupremeCommander-in-Chief of all the armed forces,

Admiral K...'lrJ DCH1itz, the V-boal Chief andlaler

Grand Admiral.

he very rarely interfered directly with navaloperations. Howevel~ after ule war ule holding ofthis rank did result in him being blamed forunpalatable decisions made by othercommanders. \oVhat is more, the power one wouldexpect to be accompanied by such a grandstanding was frequently missing and the pr~ected

image of Hitler as a dictator and ultimateCommander-in-Chief is somewhat misleading.The ramifications \\~thin the lower commandchains meant that many of his wishes werefrustrated by officials enu"enched in powerful,closed-shop empires they ulemselves had created.

On 7 Seplember 1939, four days aner lheBritish and French declaration of war, theexchange of information between Hitler andule Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Navytook on a formal nallire in the form of aconference. Minutes of these meetings werehardly ever taken, but shortly after eachdiscussion both Raeder and Donia wrote downthe main points. These have been preserved inthe book Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairsrecently published by Greenhill Books. Hitler's

220 221

GERMA~ NAn IIAXDBOOK 1939-1945 TilE 5 UPRE AI E NAI'ALe 0 AI AI AND

ber

mad) bern 6/anbe UOll1l. mouernber 1936

By the time First World War started, Raederhad already held a number of challengingpositions which led him to becoming theChief of SLafT for the famous cnliser pundit,Admiral Franz Ritter \·on Hipper. By the timehe succeeded Admiral Hans Zenker asCommander-in-Chief of the Na\y in October1928, his exceptionally broad experience ofcommanding at sea was supported by a solidacademic understanding of what was required.

nfon-unately rnuch of this was based on theimpractical powerful battleship concept, andhis strong religious character frequentlyclashed \\;th the coarseness and nambo)'3nceof the people around Hitler. Although Raederrespected Hitler, he despised the vulgarityof the high commanders he met in the

period of Raeder's life. The glamour in hischildhood adventure books hadn't mentionedthe hard training. Not only did he hate thehard physical effon but also the coarselanguage and rough lreaunent from the non·commissioned officers who served asinstructors. Had it not been for the strongsense of duty instilled in him b)· parents andschool, roung Raeder would ha\·e cheerfull)'walked away from Ulat harsh uaining arena. Afew weeks later, this crude environmentchanged dramatically and Raeder foundhimself confronted by insLnlctors aboard a sailtraining ship who led their charges not bywatching them nm around the barrack block,but b)' leading ule way lip the mast with thewords, 'try' and follow me,'

Grand Admiral Dr h.c. Erich Raeder, Supreme Commandcr..in-Chief ofLhe Na\y \isiong ·boat

headquarters near Lorient. It seems highly likely that this was nOt Raeder's official car, but one borro\,·ed

in France, since the grand admiral's emblem with crossed batons is missing from the car. Note that the

man with the leather coat in the background is wearing an adjutalll's lan),ard. nlis is Kpt.z.S. Kurt Freiwald

who sen·ed as adjutant to both grand admirals.

I

J'll" lin

~eutfd)en~rie9smarine

The Rarlgfistewith the eagle of the NSDAP,l.he

emblem lIsed from 1935-45.

c:BtGf~tlttt

1111 9ltl~Ufit9'lIllalflulu.

(£)bUfOlallllltlbo bu Jtrht'.trl.,)

T

9\anglifte

arguments by discussing the far-reachingimplications each course ofaction might bring.

Erich Raeder was quite an extraordinarycharacter and he had made quite aremarkable stan in the Na\y. During his lastyear at school, his family assumed that hewould follow his parents 10 unh·ersity beforeembarking lIpon an academic career, possiblyin medicine. It was already well after theclosing day for the 1884 intake of naval officercadets, when he suddenly asked his father towrite to ule Naval Command to ask for his sonto join the Navy. In those days, youngsters wereconsidered too ilTesponsible to make such anapplication ulemseh·es. Less than two monthslater a perplexed sc\·enteen-rear-old was beingchased through ule initial training course WiUla naval infanu} unit, \\;shing he had chosensome less SlrenuOlIS career. This was the worst

~eutfd)en~riegsmarine

be<

mad) bern etanbe uorn I. ffio\>ernber 1935

cac.rbtitrt -

1111 9ltl~.rrit9'1ninltttrtllUl

(Obtrbtft~('~Gbtr b.t lhicl'.orine)

9\anglifte

The first page of the Na\fs rank list sho\\~ng the

old ,-ersion of the naval eagle, the emblem lIsed

before 1935.

main directives have been released by ProfessorH.R. Trevor-Roper with the title Hitler's H/ar

Directives (see Bibliography). Although thesegive an insight into the upper echelons of thenaval command they hardly illustrate Hitler'sincredible ability of amassing \£lSt quantities oftechnical data. He carded details about theperfOnllanCe of major battleships in his headand often snmned expcl1S dUling com'crsationsby casually ulrO\\ing out sud1 ,ita! information.Yet, this storehouse of fucts lacked the ability ofcoordinating and analysing the affects suchtechnology might ha\'c on the outcome ofplanned evenlS. This was a field where GrandAdmiral Erich Raeder, the upremeCommander..in-Chief of the Nm)I, won Hitler'searly admiration. Not only did he often comeup \\;th se\'eral altenlati\·es for possible solutionsto problems, but he always presented his

222 223

G E R)I.\.\' .\.1 I \ ILl.\' 0 BOO K 1939 - I 945 T II E S L" PRE \I E SA \.H C0 .\1 \1.1 S 0

Fi:'lhrerhauptquartier. Consequcnlly he calledthere only on official business and left thegathering of \ital infonn3tion for the day·to­day running to other men.

TIle name most (onuTIonly associated 'lith thisdifficult LaSk is lhat of the ex-destroyercommander. KpLZ.S. Karl::Jesko \"011 PUllkall'lmer.who was appointed Hitler's Na\lll Adjutant andremained in that position until the end of theThird Reich. Another name frequentlymentioned in I..he history I:x>oks is that ofllleodorKrancke, the PCI1l1anent Representau,"c of theN3\Y'S Supreme Commander-in-Chief, at Hitler"sHeadquaners. He \\'3.') in office dUling I.hat (Iitiealperiod towards the end of 1942 when Hitler's

furious rages over \\dming to Lhrow the surfacefleet into the dustbin resulted in Gr.md AdmiralRaeder's resignation and I..he appoinU1lcm of LheU-boat Chief, Karl DonilZ, as his successor.

Many hisLOI)' books I..ell us that when he \\~~lS

asked 1..0 name a successor, Raeder suggestedAdmiral Carls, or Donitz, bUl very little is

Grand Admiral Karl DOnitz in his old age, He became

highly frusU<ued at nm being able 10 hear properly

and had to rely on a heaJing aid for the I'LSI years of

his life. \'Ct. despite lhis handicap, he continued 10

make a considerable effon 1.0 suppon his old

colleagues, as well as hisloJians and researchers,

224

known aboul the robustly quiel charaCler whowas rejected by Hitler. Rolf Carls had joined the~a,;: in 1903,jusl se,'en years before DonilZ, Healso had been a L:'-boaL commander during theFirst Il"orid War and during the mid-1930sbecame Fleel Commander. From that positionhe wem on lO command the Gcnllan forces offSpain during I..he ci,;l war. Once I..he Second\\'orld \\'ar staned he held se\'eral posil..ionswhich were considered more importam Ulan asea-going command. He ,,'as killed in aClionjusl 1.'\'0 weeks before Lhe end of the war,

In Januar), 1943. ule 51-year-old Karl DonilZbroughl.. \,;th him a fresh approach LO Lhe navalleadership, He was already well known forleading from the from and being ,,;I..h his men,TIle faCl tllaL tlli policy worked i~ demonsu"Luedby the high efficiency of the small U-boat forceaL me beginning of tlle wal: He had welded tllesubmalines inw such an efficiem fighting unitthat I..he Allies considered his efforts LO ha,'ebeen climinal and established a new law underwhich he was convicted at. the Nurernberg Trials,111 is staLed that soldiers should not prepare menfor a war of aggression, Being unable to definetlle exaCL meaning of tllis harsh jlll;sdiction, tllelaws appear LO have been abolished againimmediately after the trials because no otherleaders ha,"e e\'er been tlied under ulem,

In January 1943, when he was appointed tothe highesl posL in tlle N<.l\)', DonilZ consideredil mosL important LO keep a pulse on Hitler'sHeadquaners and for thaL reason delegatedhis routine dUl..ies in running I..he U-boaLOperaLions Room La his long-establisheddepuLy, Kpl.z.S, Eberhard Codl. In a way it. isstrange thaL these (\,'0 highly contrastingcharacters should ha,-e worked so well togetller.Donitz ah\'a} exploited drama and exciLement.to dl;,-e his pallly lutlliess ambitions. while GOdLwas alwa}'s quieL and calm. Code words useddllling tlle -boat war such as 'Suike Dead' or'Robber Count' almost cenainly originaledwhen Donitz was on dULy while 'Violel' and'Daffodil' ,,'ere probably conceh'ed by Godl.

Admiral K..:"1r1 OoniLz, the U~boaL Chief and later Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is siLting in

his car \\'hile the Flag Officer for U~boalS in the WesL, Kpl.l.S, Hans or 'f-Ian-o' Rosing is slanding behind

him, ,,-earing a leather coal. NOle Lhallhe blurred image of an officer wilh <!cljULalll's lanrard can be

made oul in the background and the rank (J\laat- pen)' officer) of the man nexlto Rosing can be

recognised by the collar p.uch on hisjackcl.

225

RANKS AND INSIGNIA

Stabsobennaschinist

Siabsober!"nkmeislerStabsobersleuennannStabsobersignal11leiste,.

Stabsobertorpedomechaniker

The two golden stlipes on the blue collar patch show

thaL FlilZ Kiemle now holds the rank of Obennaat or

Chief Pelt)' Officer. The anchor with cogwheel is a

combination trade and rank badge for petty officers

and the chevron shows that this is a Chief Petty

Officer. TIle trade of engineer is shown by the cog

superimposed over the anchor. Low down on his left

breast is the National Sports Badge, which could also

be gained by civilians. Il was difficullto get early

promotion in the Navy withollt this award.

colour for commissioned officers and silverfor warrant officers.

ObermaschinislOberfil1lkmeisterObersteuermannObersignalmeisterSani/iilsoberJeldwebelObeifeue"verkerOberlO1pedomechaniker

Ullteroffiziere olme Portepee Ounior NCOs ­Petty Officers) *There were two ranks:

-lIlaal Petly OfficerOber-maal Chief Petty OfficerThe dash should be replaced with the man'strade:

Boolsmannsmaat. Funklllaat. NJaschinenmaatObersteuermannslllaat. Obermaschinistenmaat

NlaschinistFU'1lkmeisterSleuermannSignalmeislerSanilii/sfeldwebelFeuen.verkerTOlpedomechaniker

Un/erofftz;ere II/it Portepee (Senior NCO. ­Warrant Officers) *Initially there were two ranks:

Bootsmann BoatswainOberbootsmanll Chief Boatswain

During the war a more senior rank ofStabsoberbootsm011'n was added.

Again. the term Bootsmann applied only toseamen and the men's trades were used togive:

one word. but that makes the titles ratherlong and more difficult for non-Germanreaders. Later. during the war, a moresenior version of each rank was introducedand identified by the prefix 'Slabs', whenceranks like Slabsgefreiler appeared. At the

same time, some older naval languageremained in use throughout the Second"'''orld \'Var and it was not uncommon for al\1at.rose to be referred to by his tradesuffixing the word 'gas!' to give Signa/gast. orFunkgast.

* The Pottepee was a small lanyard 01' swordknot with an acorn shaped end worn aroundthe handle of the sword or dagger. Cold in

-Hau/Jlge/reifer Leading Seaman after 4Xyears service

The dash prefix should be replaced by theman's trade. Hence the full title would havebeen Nlatrosen-Cefreitel~ Nlaschinen-Obergefreiter,elC. Usually these ranks were \HiLLen as

The cornflower-blue collar patch has one golden

bar (0 indicate the rank of Maar or petty officer.

The national eagle with swastika was introduced in

1935.

SeamenMen who had just joined the Navy held therank of N/alrose or Heizer (Sailor or Stoker).The ranks following this were:-Gefreiter Able Seaman

-Obergefreiter Leading Seaman

RANKS AND INSIGNIA

Friedrich Kiemle, the author's godfather, wcaring a

jacket over his shin. The sll;pes of the large Nelson

collar canjusl be seen. The cornflower-blue patch

on the collar indicates the rank of MallTJseor

seaman. Note that this photograph was taken

before the introduction of the eagle and swastika.

226 227

G E 101.1.\' :0 rY fLl S D BOO K I 939 - I 9 ~ 5 RANKS AND INSIGNIA

Thc Leulllfwt wrSeeon Ihe left has a 'piston ring' on thc slecvc of his coat, which indicates that he is

wcal;ng the official frock coaL, not a grcalcoaL.Judging b)' the men's exprcssions, the}' arc participating insome light-heancd "enlltrc.

[rna and Fritz Kicmle, the author's godparents. This shows Fritz wearing the uniform ofa warranl anicer.

Both trade and I.mk were indicated on the shoulder 5ll<\PS. On the left breast is the Fleet War Badge and

the ribbon of the Iron Cross Second ChlSS Gill be seen threaded through the lOp bullon hole. The

complete medal was lIsually onl}' worn on lhe dar of issue or for formal functions.

, I •I

Commissioned OfficersCommissioned officers were dh"ided into thefollowing groups:(The column on the right indicates thenumber of slcc\'e rings: s = standard width,n = narrow width, b = broad width.)11ulnanl ::.u,. See (LT) Lieutcnant Uunior)

IsOIJep!rolnanl :u,. See (OL) Lieutenant ( enio,.)

2s

Nothing(Ing) = Ingenieur(V) = Imroltungso.fJlZier(W) = lI'a.fJenoffuier

Equi\"alcntLO LTEqui\'alentto OLEqui\'alentLO KLEqui\'alentLO KKEqui\'alent to FKEqui\'alentto KSEquivalent to KAEquivalent to VA

Commissioned officer ranks were suffixedwith the following:Sea/Deck Officer:Engineering Officer:Adminismtt:ion Officer:

''''eapons Omcer:

The ranks for dOClors were: (in the sameorder as abo\'e)Alan'neassisstenarztAIa,.;neoberassistena rtf:

AI{Irineslabarzt:JIIarineoberstabant.GesdlllJOdna,.ztFlottenarzt:Admiralarzt:Admiralslabant

(KL) LieutenantConunande,. 2s, I n

(KK) Commander 3s(FK) Captain Ounior) 4s(KS) Captain (Senior) 4s(KA) Rear Admiral Ib, Is(VA) Vice Admiral Ib, 2s

Admiral I b, 3sNo comparati\'eB,itish/US Rank (seebelow)-GrandAdmiral!Admiral ofthe Fleet 1b, 4sCommodore (aKpl.z.S. in anadmiral's position,)

Gmssadmiral

KorvellenkapitanFrega/lenkllpitiinKapitan tur SeeKontnadmirall';.uadmiralAdmiralGennaladmiral

Kommodo,-e

KapiliinleUlnantSeaman (OfficerCandidate)Cadet/MidshipmanSeniorCadet/MidshipmanSub-Lieutenant

Kadel!Fiihnrich Iur See

Officer CandidatesAlalrose (Offuiersa/lluiirler)

OberJiihmich tUT See

MJ8's Schmartingor senior boats\\.. in showing thai

a '"ariel}' of official naval gear could be worn.

228 229

GE II \1 \ '( \"\ \ Y 11.1 NOB 0 0 K 1939 - I 9 ~ 5 IIA.'IKS A.'IO INSIG.'IIA

* "'hen Raeder held this rank as SupremeCOlllmander-ill-Chief of the Na\'y he woreone broad and four standard rings. Later.other people with this rank wore the widestripe with three standard rings.

The rank of Gellemladmiral was introducedin 1936 as an equivalent to Genera/obersl

Obennaat Padsun who laterjoined the L:-boal

Ann. The peajackct \\;tl1 the gold braid around

the outside of the collar i.s of the later, more

elaborate \<tI;Cl)' for peu~' officers. The libbon of

the Iron Cross can be seen through the 101'

bultonhole and on the left breast are the Fleet War

Badge and the National SportS Badge. The 0\'a1

badge with anchor and cogwheel is a combination

rank and u-ade badge for Maschine,wuwl. Below i.s

an Electro-machinist special qualification. The fact

thal he held this qualification for mOI'e than three

years is indicated by the chevwns.

230

(Colonel General), "'hich was then the highestrank in the Anny, because the Commander-in­Chief of ule N",y (Dr Erich Raeder) did not\\~sh to ha\-e a higher position than his Armycounterpan. At that time the Navy was not bigenough to warrant a higher rank.

RUK BADGES

SeamenSean1cn's rank badges consisted of chevronsworn on me left sleeve. A trade badge wasworn immediately abo\'e the Che\l·on, givingthe impression that it fanned part of therank insignia. The cl1e\TOnS, all gold incolour, varied throughout the ten rears of theThird Reich. but generally a Gejreifer wore asingle plain chevron, an Obergejreitera doublechevron and a Haufpgejreifer a triple chevron.Later Slabsgefi~ilerand StabsobelgeJreiter worechevrons made from planed gold stripsrather than plain gold braid and there was apip inside the 'V' to make it look moreelaborate. In addition to this, plaincornOower blue collar patches on pea jacketsindicated the rank of seamen.

Ullieroffiziere ohlle Portepee

The rank of Pen)' and Chief Pen)' Officerwas indicated b)' an oval badge, worn onthe left sleeve. The basic design for 800/s­

mannsmallf (Petty Officer of the SeamenTrade) consisted of a plain anchor, but fore\·ery other profession a trade badge wassuperimposed on the tOp. Obermaafe weredistinguished by also having a Che\TOnunderneath the anchor. In addition to thi ,the cornnower blue patch on the collar ofthe pea jacket had a single gold suipe forPen)' Officers and two stripes for Chief PettyOfficers. Before the war these patches were3uached to plain collars, but towards theend of 1939 a gold braid ",IS added to theoutside edge to make the jacket moreelaborate.

~'laschinen-obergerreiterRichard Klie of l:379\\'ho \\~dS killed on 9 August 1942. A marksman's lanprd

can be seen on his right shoulder. The acorn at the end indicates that proficiency had been achie\'ed with

a rifle. On the left bre~lSl are the U-boat Badge and below it the National Sports Badge.

231

C ER)I.U NAI' Y II AXDBOO K I 939 - 1945 RAXKS AXD IXSICNIA

UII/erafftziere lIIi/ Portepee\\'arrant officers were identified by gold­coloured shoulder straps with a sel ofaluminium pips to denote rank and anadditional emblem to indicalc the man'strade. They also wore plain peaked capsinstead of the traditional sailor's hats.

Commissioned OfficersIn addition to the rings on their slee"cs,commissioned officer ranks could beidentified by their shoulder suaps while theirrank group was indicated by gold braid on thepeaks of their caps. A scalloped edge for ranksup to Kapitiillleutnant, a single row of oakJea\'csfor Korvi!tlenkapitiin to Kapiliin :u,. See and adouble row of oakJeaYcs for admirals.

The Main TradesBootsmann Seaman/deck ratingFemschreiber Telex operatorFellerwerker ArtificerFun/rer Radio operatorKraftfalLrer DdverNlarineartillerist GunnerA'laschinist MachinistJ\ilinenmecJwniker ~'line mechanicJ\4usikmeister Musician/bandsmanSaniJiiler Medical orderlySchreiber Yeoman/secretarySiI5'1lI1Illeis/e,. SignalmanSleuermann Navigator/helmsmanTorpedomechaIJiker Torpedo mechanic\'mualtung AdministratorZimmennllIJIl. CarpenterLater a badge was added for men workingwith an admiral's staff and in 1944 the tradeof radar mechanic was inu-oduced.

TRADE BADGES

Seamen wore circular na\)/ blue trade badgeswith an en'lblem in gold-coloured machineembroidery abo\'e their rank chevrons.Similar emblems \,'ere used for petty officers

and chief pell)' officers, but here the emblemwas superimposed over the anchor of therank badge and the one badge sen'ed for t,,·ofunctions. Petty officer badges can bedistinguished from seamen's because theywere 0\"31 in shape. \,'arrant officers' tradeswere indicated on their shoulder straps andcommissioned officers wore a small badgeabo\'e the 'piston rings' on their slee\'es.

SPECIAL Q ALIFICATIONS

In addition to trade badges, there were alsobadges for special qualifications. These weremachine embroidered \\~th red thread on anavy blue background, oval in shape and alsoworn on the left slee\'e. The badges em'eredthe following special qualincations:Light anti-aircraft gunnerLight anli-aireraflleaderHeavy anti-aircraft gunnerGunnerGunner with 3 years experienceGunner with 6 years experienceGunner specialising in shooting torpedoesGunner specialising in shooting torpedoes\\~th 3 years experienceGunner specialising in shooting torpedoeswith 6 years experienceGunner for coastal artilleryRange finderRange finder for anti-aircraft guns

DiverTorpedo di,·er~Iine foremanTorpedo teacherTorpedo comrol leaderSpons teacherElectro mechanic in three gradesEngine mechanic in three grades

NAVAL WAR BADGES

A number of badges were re-created during thewar years with the \iew that e\-el}' man should

232

Stcel;ng the ship, Below the man's hands are buttons

for controlling lhe dectdc mOlor which moves the

mdder. In front of him is a speaking tube, a rudder

position indiallor and g)nlCompass, 11le hood \\;th

porthole houses a magnetic compass. 11le chevron on

lhe Inan's sleeve indiau,es his rank of Matrnsengrjreiter

and the star shows lhat he is a seaman by u<lde.

Two naval artiller), mech'lIlics adjusting the sighlS

ofa 3i·mll1 AA gun. The man on lhe I;ght is a

Maat or pett)' officer \\;th a distincti"e combincd

I.m k and lntde badge on the lefl slec\·c.

A naval driver with rank and tnlde badge on the

left sleeve. Note that he is also weal-ing a pistol,

despitc a number of books having Slated that

ordinary sailors did not can)' such side arms.

11le SJe1tenllmlU, which is often '\Tongl)' u-anslated as

helmsman, was responsible for na';gauon not for

sleel;ng the ship. The two crossed anchors on the

sleeve indicale that the man is a seaman by trade and

Maat (Pett), Officer) by rank. In the background is a

sailor working the engine tclegnph.

233

GE R~I AN:\' A I' Y HAN DBOO K 1939 -1945 RAXKS AND ISSIGNIA

These varied from elaborate works of art totyping on poor war-quality paper, and thisfield has probably seen more convincingforgeries than the reproduction medalmarket. Son1e of these imitations have beengood enough to deceive some high I)'respected authorities, sometimes making u1ecolleClion of such items a real headache.

The majolity of badges were oval in shape\\"ith the longest diameter lying ,·ertically. Theexceptions \,·ere the U-boat Badge, which wasoval with the longest diameter lyinghorizontally, and the Blockade BreakersBadge which was round. The Midget ""caponsBadges were also different and variable inshape, with a swordfish incorporated in the

stomach, especially when ha,~ng to frequentlywork in cramped conditions. In addition to thevariable quality, there was also considerablediversity in the detail of the generalappearance as well as size, This was largely dueto an e,rer-increasing number manufacturersbeing used as suppliers. Howe\'el~ generally,those badges produced in foreign countriestowards the end of the war were of betterquality than the home-produced efforts.

As ,,·ith the majority of other things,German)' kept tabs on the propert), it handedout to its servicemen, and being awarded anybadge was recorded in his Pa), Book. Inaddition to this, award certificates were oftenpresented as additional documentation.

Part of the display in one of the rooms at the German U-boat Archi\'e. The large rectangular emblems are

reproductions of na\<ll war badges. It is against the law to display swastikas in Gennany, except for

educational purposes. therefore the national emblem at the lOp has been replaced by a modern Iron

Cross. The badges are: 101' left, Badge for Blockade Breakers; bOllom left, Destro)'ers; centre, E-boats or

5-boats; bOllom right, ~\'Iines\,·eepers; lOp right, the Fleet War Badge.

Cross, but finally a rwo-stage award system wasi'lU"oduced. To u1is end the U-boat Badge hada bronze<oloured clasp introduced and later asilver \'ersion was added. Similarly a naval claspwas also introduced in 1944.

Originally u1ese badges were made from agood t)'pe of bronze, but later the qualit),deteriorated and some incredibly crudeversions, looking almost like home-madereproduClions, appeared LOw'ards the end ofthe war. The introduction of a cloth versionwas not so much for economic reasons, butbecause in cenain situations men preferredsomething softer in the tender region of their

be eligible for some type of combat award. Themajotity of these were worn on the left breastbelow the Iron Cross First Class (if awarded),but as with so many tl1ings. the Navy seems tohave incorporated a good many exceptions. Inthis case the Midget Weapons badges nOt onl),differed b), being awarded in seven grades, butwere also worn on the sleeve. As with othermedals, the supply of possible rewards wasexhausted long before the war ended and tllC

naval administration was forced LO come upwith solutions to keep up morale. First, theofficials considered easing the requirements formore prestigious awards, such as the Knight

Both thcse photOgraphs, taken aboard the auxiliary cruiser Oriol1, show stages in the production of iron

crosscs. Men somctimes rcceived ship-made medals long before they were handed the official awards, and

often valued the originals more than the factOry produced items.

234 235

GE 101 ~ \ 'iA r Y H -\.\ Illl 0 0 K I 939 - I 9 ~ ;

UNIFORMS

The wearing of naval unifonn was obligatory,even during free time when sailors wentashore_ Each man carried a Soldbuch (PayBook) which included a passport-typcphotograph and personal details, including acomplete printed list of all the gear whichcould be issued. Items were ticked off andsign cd by Ihc issuing authority_ In 1935,following new defence laws, the KJiegsmatinepublished its first set of unifolln regulations.These were officially modified in 1937 andthe niles changed again throughout the war.One significant feature of tllese rules was thatthere were probably more exceptions to therules than niles then'lselves, making any clear..cut statements about uniforms somewhatdifficult. To list all of these exceptions nowwould probably produce a more complicatedchaptcr than the original and the followingshould only be takcn as a rough guidc.

In addition to the personal clothing listedabo,-e, men could be issued ",ith lherollowing:Clogs for wearing in boiler roomsIccland jackcts and hcad protcctors ror coldweather

Linen bag

Silk scarr'>"oollen scarfWoollcn hcadprOtector

Gold-<:olour­ed buttonsPlimsolls

'>\'ateIlJ!"oofsBoots

""ork trousers

11 Woollen hcad protcctor12 Sideann, dagger and sword13 Portepee (sword knot)

14 Socks15 Frock coat (Jackct ror cadclS)16 Cloak - Spanier DuITcl bag17 Ship's coat Polish box18 Mcss jackct PrO\;sions bag19 Boot bag20 Paradc/brocadc bell21 Bluc glO\-cs22 \'\~lite glovcs23 Black lacc-up boots24 Woollcn veSI25 Sport gear, vest, shons, running shoes,

swimming trunks26 Black Icather gaitcrs27 Waterproo~

28 Knec-Icngth boots29 Hat30 Epaulcttcs31 Dress trousers (usually only worn abroad

or for one's own wedding)32 Gold-<:oloured butlons

33 Plimsolls34 Sport shirt35 Sport belt36 Work jacket37 Blue riding trousers

NOIl-()fjicmBluc capwithout pcak"'~'lite capwithollt peakBlue monkeyjacketPea jacketBlue trousers\\~litc

u·ousersUndellJanLSVest

Shirt collar

2 White cap ,,;th pcak

OfficmBluc cap wilh pcak

3 Blue and white recferjackcL

4 Coat5 Blue u'ousers6 '>\'hite trousers

ITE~IS OF CLOTHING

7 'Vhite shirt8 Stand-up collar9 Black tic

10 Scarr (white or bluc)

replaced with a morc modern-lookingcraft.Air Sea Rescue Badge: a frolll-on ,ie\\' of a boat,\ith smoking funnel and tigging on the mast.This usually had an Air Force eagle abo"e thes\\":lStika on the top, whereas the other badgeshad a naval or national t)1Je of eagle.

The conditions for being awarded one ofthese badges varied considerably. Forexample a U-boat Badge could be gainedafter a couple of operational cruises or forbeing wounded during the first ,·oyage. Forthe Destroyers Badge men had to hm-eparticipated in three operations against theenemy or been wounded or taken pan intweh-e ,-oyages_ Generally war badges ,,'erealso awarded for especially meritoriousconduct and for some of the badges thereare more detailed criteria.

dcsign_ Thc some,,-hal rarc Clasp ror Ihc Rollof Honour of the i':a\} ,,"as also round andconsisted of a large swastika in [rollt of a,"enicallr standing anchor.

The o\'al war badges were designed as [0110,,"5:

Fleet \,Var Badge: a head-on \'iew of abattlcship_Auxilial)' Cruiser Badge: a Viking ship sailingovcr part or the globc_Naval Anillery Badge: side view of a large gun.Destroyer Badge: side view of a destroyerspeeding through water.~linesweeper and Submarine Hunters: aplume of water exploding upwards. Thiscould, no doubt, be taken to be a detonatingdepth charge or mine.Motor Torpcdo Boat Badgc: originally aside view of an earlier lype of MTBspeeding through "'ater, but this was later

236 237

G E 101 A~ ~ AI" Y 1I.H DBOO K 1939 - I 945 t; ~ I FOR)I

\\'aterproof clothing for sentries and Illen

working 011 deckDenim '\'ork clothing for exceptionally dirt)'

workLealher gearI-Iea\'}' coats for non-officer grades

FootwearPlimsolls could be worn ofT duty or on dUly

when specified b}' a senior officer.Black shoes, without fancy decorations,

could be worn by commissioned officers andwarrant officers at limes when the crew was

wearing plin1solls. Brown shoes were alsopermissible.

''''hite shoes could also be worn bycommissioned officers and warrant officers.

Black high dress boots could be wom onboard and on land by commissioned and

warrant officers.Highly polished dress shoes could be '''Om

with Cormal dress uniforms.Rubber boots were allowed on board by all

ranks during bad weather.Rubber over-boots, W0l11 on LOp of ordinary

footwear, could be worn on board duringexceptionally wet or ,"el1' cold weather. Thesecould also be worn on land when going

off-road.

CLOTHING COMBINATIONS

A1lhough the Navy had firm rules aboul lhewearing of uniforms, once the war startednecessity dictated that these should berelaxed. For example. some survh'ors fromthe sinking of the heavy cruiser Blucherarrh'ed back in Kiel alnlost before theirc10lhes had dried and il LOok a while beforequartermasters issued new gear. As a resultmen wore whatever they could borrow or

steal. Shortages during the war meant someitems such as officers' cloaks were

appropriated by wh'es for making intodresses. After the war tablecloths and bed

linen frolll the naval base in "'ilhelmsha,"en

(and probably olher places as "'ell) werethrown out to prevent them from beinglooted by the enemy and also from beingfashioned inLO ladies' wear. The reason thishad not been done during the war was

because such naval items had most distincti"epattenls to make them unattractive. Stealingnaval clothing for ahernath'e uses wasdiscouraged by often branding items with thename 'Kriegsmarine' and an eagle withswastika. In addition to this many na"al

jumpers were trimmed along the edges sothat when they were unravelled one ended

up with numerous short pieces of wool ratherthan one longer piece for re-kniuing.

According to the regulations, the items of

clothing listed abo"e could be worn in thefollm\;ng combination

Full dress uniformThe full dress uniform (consisting of hat,frock coat, trousers with gold bands runningdown the outside seams, golden epaulenes.sland-up collar and white glm"es) wa usuallyworn only to one's own wedding or for

official ,;sits in foreign countdes.

Dress or parade uniformOfficers wore a frock coat, blue trousers,

peaked cap. brocade bell wilh dagger orsword, and grey gloves. Other ranks wore a

monkey jackel, blue shin with Nelson collarand silk scarf, blue trousers, hat and greyglo,·es. This gear came in two "arieties: itcould be worn with full medals or with thesmall medals ribbon bar. The first mentionedwas worn for parades, official functions suchas commissioning and launching ceremonies,court martials, church parades or when

ordered by a senior officer. The less officialgear was worn when dignitaries visited the

ship or for official visits on land or whenattending function in other ships.

This pholOgraph has been included for the benefit of a couple of clever collectors who assured the

alllhor that warrant officers llt'Verwore swords! The medals are commemorative awards made between

1935 and 1939 and the absence of war badges would suggest that this picture was taken between 1938 and

1940. The badge on the lower left breast is the National Spor-ts Badge.

238 239

GE IDLI.\ .\ Ar Y II A-' 0 BOO 1\ I 939 - I 9 15 L\' I FOB)I 5

The h3lbllnd reads' Srhiffsstol11mdivisiol1 de,.

Nordsei. These units were responsible for L..1.king

new recruits through the initial training. The man

here is wearing the blue naval unifonn with

NelsolH)'pe collar.

Small dress uniformThe small dress uniform consisted of a bluejacket. trousers, peaked cap. stand-up orordinary collar, dagger, and grey glo\·es. Thecrew usually wore work rrousers and work shin,,~tll silk scarf and blue cap. This gear was wornwhen off-<lut and for the daily routine, unlessmore rannal clothing had been ordered. '""henengaged in infantry duties a sword could beordered for oflicers instead of the dagger.In tropical regions or between I May and30 September the blue colour was replaced bylhe white \"ersion of the blue na\"alunifolln.

\Valking-out uniformOfficers wore a frock coat, blue trousers, blue

peaked cap. shin with ordinal1' or stand-up

collar, dagger and grey glo\'es "'hile cadets,warrant officers and pelt)' officers wore ajacket instead of the frock coal. There was no

pedal walking-out uniform for the lo\,'errank,

FulJ formal dress uniform

This served as formal evening dress andconsisted of frock coat with brocade belt anddagger, the usual peaked cap and stand-upcollar. A full medals bar and white glovesusually accompanied the outIil. It was wornfor celebrations including family functions

such as weddings. christenings and funerals.HO\\'e\'er full medals were usually not worn to

pt;vate functions.

Formal dress uniformThis "'as \'eI1' similar to the full formal dressuniform, except that ribbons were worn

instead of the medal bar.

Tropical and summer uniformOfficers wore a white jacket with epaulettes,white trousers, white peaked cap or pithhelmet, stand-up collar, dagger, and whitegloves. Other ranks could wear a white jacketor just a white shin \\;th white trousers andwhite cap, This ",hite version of the blue

naval unifonn was worn for dailr work in thetropics or between I Mal' and 30 September.During exceptionally hot weather seniorofficers could allow this light gear to be wornwhen walking out and while off-duty. Tocomplicate matters, there was also a lightkhaki-coloured uniform for the tropics whichwas worn while working on land, Senior

officers could determine whether daggers orswords were to be carried or whether fullmedals or just a ribbon bar was to be worn\\~th the tropical uniform.

Sports uniform-Ill is was similar for all ranks and consisted of a

spons shin "ith military spons badge and either

A warrdllt officcr "'caring thc rOllllal shin with stand-up collar and shO\,;ng the shouldcr strap oranObfntlfl5Ch;ll;sl.

240 241

GE R)LI.\ .\.\ I" I" 11·\ \ DBOO K 1939 - I 94 5 [.\IFOR.IIS

This shows the author's father in 1939 while hewas training 10 become a warrant officer. Thewhite tropical or sum mel' shin is worn with bluenaval trousers.

officers serving as adjutant or by na\'alattaches.

The marksmanship lanyard was worn fromthe right lapel with the other end fastened to

the top button of the jacket. At the lower endthere would have been one or more of thefollowing: an acorn if shooting proficienc}'had been achie\'ed with a handgun, a \\;ngedshell for anti-aircraft guns, a shell for hea\;erartillery or a torpedo, The minimUlllstandards for each award were laid down byregulations and it was a case of scoring acertain number of points on a target in agiven period of time. The fact that one seesrelatively few of these lanyards on photossuggests that the standards were not easy.

\\rhen the lanyard was awarded for the firsttime it was made from blue woollen thread,

but men could also buy a more elaborate\'ersion made from silk. Should the test bepassed on more than one occasion, then ablue aluminium ulread would be added forthe second and third occasions. The rosette

The naval SPOI15' shin with national eagle printed on the front.

questioned aoout this, their commanding officer(Admiral \\'ilhelm Souchon) replied lhal hismajesty had been misinformed by the nunsabout the men's inappropriate attire for

swimming. The sailors in question obeyed theUnifOl1l1 regulations - they didn't have any attire.

LanyardsLanyards were WOl11 for three basic differentfunctions: as a marksman's award, to identify

At first glance this mar look like the tropical or \,'hitesummer unifolm, but the men are wearing workingdenims. TIle star on the man's sl~'e indicates hisLrade: he is a seaman; the chenon indicates his rank

of OI'Am,w/~andthe badge at the bottom sho\\that he has a special qualification as operator of anti·aircraft rangefinders. TIle photograph was taken on

the bridge of a mincs\\·eepcr.

~'Iaschinen-obergefreilel- Slriegl of U351 in

. o\'cmber 1943. "'caring sailors' fonnalunifonll.

On his left breast is the 0\"31 V-boat Badge and

Iron Cross Second Class. His trade is indicated b)'

a cogwheel on the LOp of this sleeve. Belo,," this is

his rank badge and below thal are twO specialisLS'

badges for ElecLromcchanic and Bosun for

handling small boaLS.

blue or white lightweight shortS. Running shoeswere also W0l11 and all thi could be replaced byjust swimming trunks. Swimming in sports

shons was definilely prohibiled.Apropos of nOt being allowed La s,,~m in

spons shOl15 or in olher unifonn clothing, there

was an amusing incident shortly before the First\·Vorld \'Var when some nUlls complained to

Kaiser Wilhelm \I aboul lhe dreadful alure orsailors seen bathing on a secluded beach. \\'hen

242 243

--GERMAN NAYI' IIANDBOOK 1939-1945 UNIFORMS

Wearing field grey naval uniforms at a ,-ine range near Cliicksburg.

/1oom.otll.hmd fr<lih.Ondi~'"

tluMallmann.

W.hou.n,duI"'7.ftu.~./lQ~ .

The inscription on this dne target reads, '100 In

standing freehand, W.haven I i August 1933.'

Heizer Mallmann refers to the author's rathel-just

after he had joined the Navy.

Two naval instructors at an initial training course

before the war and before the introduction of the

swastika. The regulations regarding the wearing of

this naval field grey uniform were ,-ery much

based on Arm)' patterns and it is difficult to

identify the clothing as being naval.

During gatherings where several adjutantsmight be present, only the adjutant of themost senior commanding officer would haveworn the lanyard.

Naval attache's lanyards were much rarer,obviously because there were far fewerpeople holding such posts. It consisted of adouble lanyard made from gold wire threadand was only worn during formal functions.

The field grey naval uniform was worn by navalunits based mainly on land and its appearancewas controlled by Army regulations. Therewere fewer items than for the blue navalunifonn and it generdIly consisted of everyda)'work gear. In photographs one is more likelyto confuse this uniform with Army clothing,although the presence of naval badges givessome indication that the wearers were sailors.There was a basic frock coat or long jacketwhich could be worn with a full length greatcoat; both had a blight red bell. Trade badgesand special qualification badges were not wornand there were no piston rings on the sleevesfor officers.

BayonetsA bayonet formed pan of the man's personalequipment and was accounted for in the

FirearmsRifles and pistols were usually issued only whenordered by a commanding officer, and theywould usually have come from the ship's storesto be handed back after use. Officers and menof other ranks who miglu find themselves onland in particularly dangerous simations wereallowed to carry pistols if pennitted by a seniorofficer. However, personal firealms in generalwere not carried. Yet, despite this rule, anumber of men canied personal weapons.

SIDEARMS

THE FIELD GREY NAVAL UNIFORM

at the shoulder end was also slightly moreelaborate by having a gold-coloured badgeincorporated in the knot. The second awardhad a silver instead of a black-colouredminiature at the lower end. For the thirdaward there would have been a gold-colouredminiature while the founh also had a morcelaborate knot with golden anchor 3llhe LOp.

An adjutant's lanyard looked similar to themarksmanship award, except that it wouldhave been worn by a commissioned officerinstead of a seaman and it was gold in colour.If a commanding officer had more than oneadjutant then this lanyard would have beenworn only by the most senior officer whodealt with commander's personal matters.

The twO lower grades arhat embroidery can be

seen in this photOgraph. On the left is KpLZ.S.

Kurt Freiwald with adjutant's lanyard or

'A/JcllsdulUkel' (Monkey's Swing), who had the

distinction of serving as adjulanl for both Grand

Admirals of the Third Reich.

244 245

GERMAX XArY fUXDBOOK 1939-1945

Initial training ,,;tl1 a naval infaml")' unit neal- \\'i.lhelmsha\-en during the early 1930s. E,-cry recruit went

through one of these introductory courses and man)' men ha\"c S<"lid that the good pre-war grounding they

received conLJibutcd to their survival during the war. The u"aining was roughly I.he same for officers and men. New recruilS were introduced to a \'ariel)' of weapons and skills needed for survival in situations where

the)' had to reaCl quickl), because things happened too fast [01' detailed e\'aluation.

Soldbuch (Pay Book). There were a variety ofbasic Qcsigns, ,,~th men usually being issuedwith black leather frogs and officers withbrO\\11 lealher frogs. The lealher bell holdingthe bayonet usually also contained a numberof pOllches for ammunition.

DaggersThroughoul the lime of the Third Reich,three different naval daggers were in use: U'lCold-fashioned type with an impct;al crown atthe hilt, the Reichsmarine dagger with aname, and the version with eagle andswastika. The reason for this \'ariation wasthat a basic type was issued from naval stores,but men could buy more elaborate versionsthemselves and some of these could beincredibly expensive. Grand Admiral ErichRaeder also introduced a 'Dagger ofHonour' which was only awarded about halfa dozen times. Daggers were worn by warrant

246

officers with Portepee and by commissionedofficers. Cadets wore daggers without a swordknOl.

SwordsNaval swords differed from those issued tolhe Anny and Air Force by the lion's head onthe hilt. The Navy lion always had one redand one green eye, denoting the colours forpon and starboard. It would appear thatswords could be worn b)' the same ranks whowere allowed LO carry dagger, bUl lheoccasions when warrant officers were seenwith swords seem to have been few and farbelween. Allhough the dagger was usuallynot carried in the hand on official functions,there were elaborate rules about when andhow the sword should be carried. One of thereasons for this was that the long strapsholding the scabbard easily lripped up lhewcarer.

\LAI ~~,...

'... I

A naval sword on display at the Imemational V-boat Archive in Gennan}' sho\\ing the method of

au.achment to the bell. To the right is a shield \\;tl1 a naval officer's silver brocade bell.

247

GERMAX N,IVY IIANDBOOK 1939-1945 UNIFORMS

DonilZ's baLOn.

The Grand Admiral's BatonAt the llIrn of the century the GermanEmperor created a tradition of presenting hishigh military officials with a baLOn as symbolof their office. and to ease the burden oflheir having LO sland al a full salule for longperiods. On parades they could acknowledgelhe lroops by merely holding lheir slaff alshoulder heigill. The baton was not a militaryaward 'loaned' to the recipient through thearmed forces, bUl a personal gifl. \I~lilsl lhedifference of this wording may soundacadenlic, it has rather an important bearingbecause lhe baLOn became lhe properly ofthe individual official, it never belonged tothe state. Bearing in mind that some of thesebatons were made from precious metals withembedded diamonds, their melt-down valuewas somewhere in the region of £20,000­£50,000 by modern slandards. So, il waindeed a mOSl valuable gifl.

\-Vhat is morc, it was also a vcry rare giflDr Erich Raeder was only me fourth, perhaps

248

fiflh head of lhe Navy LO have been presellledwith such an honour. The rirst baton waspresented to Hans \'on Koester in 1905, thesecond to Prince Heil1lich of Prussia in 1909,and another to Hennig von HoltzendorfJUStbefore lhe end of lhe war in July 1918. Ilseems highly likel)' lhal lhe greal LOrpedopundil, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpilz,did nOt recei,·e a baton. The presentation ofa baLOn in 1939 and Raeder's promotion toGrand Admiral took place on the same day aslhe launching of lhe baule hip Tirpil, inWilhelmshaven. Raeder had been SupremeCommander-in-Chief of the Nav)1 sinceOCLOber 1928, bUl firsl wilh lhe rank ofAdmiral and lhen General Admiral, aposition specially created at a time when theNavy was LOO small to wanant an Admiral oflhe Fleel.

The production of Raeder's baton wasquite a complicated process, made moredifficult by the fact that its construction andthe materials involved were a c1osely-

guarded secret. The specifications anddrawings of earlier admiral batons had,·anished after the end of the First \Yodd\\'ar and Dr Ottfried Neubecker, who hadbeen entnlsted with the production, had to

research his subjeCl without giving away thereasons for his interesl. In addition to this,he was working to a set of most stringentspecifications as far as size and appearancewenl. In the end he created a magnificentpiece, consisting of a silver rod cO"ered inblue velvet ";th delicate decorations on tOPand with stunning golden ends. Silverembellishment used on Army and Air Forcebatons was thought to oxidise too quickly inthe damp sea air and platinum was used toprovide a contrasting colour. This wasin~portant because some of the decorationswere sitting directly on velvet, making itimpossible LO clean or polish them withoutspoiling lhe backclOlh.

The drama around the creation ofD6nitz's baton started during the summer ofJ942, long before his appoimmenl asCommander-in-Chief was even contemplatedUanuar)' 1943). An ordinar)', low-rankinggunner in a flak regiment received a personaltelegram from Hitler's Headquanersordering him to repon immediately toBerlin. On setling foot inside the firm wherehe had worked before being called up,Helmut Scheuermann was told that hisskills as a jeweller were required for theproduction of a nUlllber of Ann)" batons.Unlil he had been consClipted, Scheuermannhad worked as a goldsmilh wilh lhe well­eSlablished firm of H.J. Wilm, who hadsen·ed Germany's nobilil)' since 1767. In a"ay Scheuennann found himself thrown intoa most ridiculous situation because theGerman High Command not only requireda large number of impressive batons,but wanted them completed in periodof aboul lhree weeks. Having fulfilledthese assignments, Scheuermann was then

249

A close-up of DOlliLZ'S baton.

GEIlMA.Ii .liAr\' I1A.liDBOOK 1939-1945 U.lil FOIlMS

D6nilZ making a speech at Wilhelmsha\'cn. holding the bawn. 1943.

250

entrusted with the design and production ofa baton ror Grand Admiral Karl Danitz.

Both Raeder and Donitz were officiallypresented with t\\"o batons. The grand,golden staff for official parades and a 50­

called Inferimslab for c\'cr}'day funClions.

Raeder's less formal version doubled up as atelescope, with modern precision opticsinside, while Donilz carried a plainer staff,resembling a shon walking Slick with hea\)'silycr head. Photographic evidence suggeststhat he also had a third vcrsion, with asmaller silver head.

When the Red Army approached theoULSkins of Berlin, Raeder set about bUtTinga case cOlllaining valuables near his home inPotsdam-Babelsberg. It appears that aworkman helping with this task was laterforced to reveal the location to the Russians.Following this, Raeder's grand batonvanished into obscurity. Since it had a highscrap metal ntlue, it could well be that it haslong since been melted down. On the otherhand, with the impro\;ng East-\Vest relationsthere is always a remote possibility that itmiglll reappear one day. Raeder's Inlerimslaband his medals were confiscated by RussianLrOOpS when he was arrested. and they ha\'ealso vanished into Obscurity. That is, allexcept his Golden Party Badge. When Raederheard about some of the atrocitiescommitted in the name of the Third Reich,he destroyed the badge by hacking it topieces with an a..xe.

Dcmitz's grand baton and other personalitems were stolen from his luggage shonlyafter the war, when his government wasarrested at the Naval Officers' School inMllrwik. It appears that British soldiers riOcdthrough unattendcd bags while thc mcnwere being questioned. Some Gcrmanofficcrs werc also robbed of personal itcms intheir pockets, and wedding rings werestolen as well. Even buttons were cut offtheir uniforms b)1 soldiers desperate for

251

souvcnirs. Despite a complaint to the Britishauthorities, the Germans recei\'ed onl)'a written apology, but the trea ured itemswere not recovered. The whereabouts ofsome personal items still remain a mystel1',but in 1982 the aUlhor stumbled across thegrand baton at the regimental museum ofthe Shropshire Light Infantry in Shrewsbury(England). It had been presellled byMaj Gen J.B. Churcher, who apparentlyparticipated in the arrest of the Donitzgo\'ernment.

Just a few weeks after this most amazingfind. there appeared a brief article inGerman newspapers saying that the NavalFederation (Deutscher Marinebund) hadstarted legal proceedings against the jeweller\Vj. \\film in Hamburg because the firm wasreputedly in the wrongful possession ofDonitz's baton. Although Donitz had neverascertained what had happened to his batonand he had not seen it since it was stolen in1945, his will and last testament stated that itshould pass on to the i\'lalinebund, so that itmight be displayed at the Na\'al Memo,;alnear Kiel. \-"J. \,Vilm claimed that the balonin the firm's possession ne\'er belonged toGrand Admiral Donitz, but that it was themodel made for Hitler's approval beforework started on the real thing,

The news of another baton in hrewsburybrought the court proceedings to anadjournment while matters were clarified,There was no doubt about the original ownerof the baLOn in Shrewsbury because Donitz'sname is engraved in bold letters on thegolden collar at one end. Disassembling theirbatons, \-Vilm could also show that theirmodel had an aluminium core instead of asilver rod and that the inscription had aspelling mistake. In addilion to this, thedelicale decorations on the model weremade from silver and gold-plated sih'erinstead of gold and platinum, making itnowhere near as valuable.

FEHMARNISLAND

~

•LOBECK

NEUSTADT•

(MEASURED MilES

~ FRIEDRICHSORT

• \ABOEMOLTENORT

KIEl·

.PlON• NEUMONSTER • EUTIN

•FLENSBURG

• HUSUM

ECKERNFORDE •

/

--• HEIDE ,,/u-~l'__

~\,,--

~/

I(

I/

,--_~;::~'-::SRUNSBOTTEl

WESERMONDE H• NOW BUXTEHUDE· .......'cii'::;:;AM~ ~URG

BREMERHAVEN FINKENWERDER

~AMRUM0; ~

o

GO

•VAREl

MAPS

APPENDIX

SYlTISLAND

WESTERLANDII·~"""-=={

SCHARHORN

a 0CUXHAVEN

~ AlTENBRUCH

oHELGOLAND

Heligoland

SCHILLIGHORN·

illustrate German law, when \\film's modelappeared in court and when it wasphotographed b)' the press in 1983 ,,;th the74-year-old Helmut Scheuermann, theswastikas on its decoration had to be hidden

behind slick)' paper becau e it is illegaL todispla)' them in German),. The onl)' exceptionto this law is that swastikas ma), be displayedfor educational purposes.

GERMAN NAVY HANDBOOK 1939-L945

Despite considerable Legal wrangling inGermany and in Britain, the real baton is stillin the regimental museum in ShrewsburyCastle, but instead or lying behind a sheet orordinary window glass it is now resting in adouble armoured glass safe. Somehow itseems strange thal officialdom is allowed tokeep private property stolen from anindividual. Just to add a funher footnote LO

1)."<0: • VEGESACK

'f't,;~<'"-i' ·BREMEN

Gennany: detailed view oflhe Nonh Sea and weSlern Ballic.

252253

DEUTSCH·KRONE

BORNHOLMISLAND

•KOLBERG

~4•

•ROSTOCK

• WAREN

MORITZWISMAR

•ECKERNFORD~" -V.

" • LABOE, KIEL.-

, NEUSTADT.,~UNSBOnELLOBECK •

~• GLOCKSTADT

,WESERMONDE HAMBURG• •(BREMERHAVEN)

SYLT

CUXHAVEN

WILHELMS­HAVEN·

• BREMEN

• BERLIN

Germany: the Norlh Sea and wcslcrn Haltif coaSL'i.

• TllSIT

• KONIGSBERG

KURISCHESHAFF

BROMBERG

• UBAU

KUlM·

~OTENHAFEN·~?1DANZIG- 4

ELBING •

MARIENBURG· • DEUTSCH

EYLAU

I~

•KOLBERG

• DEUTSCHKRONE

STETIIN

~BORNHOLM

ISLAND

RONNE

Gcrrnally·... c;I."!Crn Hallie coast

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Admiralinspektcur

An honon'I")' rank awarded to Grand Admiral

Erich Racdcr after his rctirement inJanuary 1943.

Agru-FrontA name derived from A!lsbi/dllngsgruppe Jiirfronlboolt, a command for testing new U~boats and

their crews before they became full)' operational.

'Alberich Skin'

A code-name for a mbber-like coating applied 10

-boats for absorbing Asdic impulses with a vlew

to making submergcd boats more difficult to

dctcct with Asdic.

AUiesOriglnally the powers of the Tliplc Emente: Great

Britain, France and Russia. Also included other

nations fighting on their side.

'Aphrodite'

A code name for a type of radar [oxer (decoy)

which consisted of a h)'drogen-filled balloon

holding alon a number of metal foils for reflecting

radar impulses. A weight noating on the water

pre\'ented the de\;ce from £lying too high.

Arctic Smoke

A natural fog created when cold winds blow O\'er

wanner water.Asdjc

A name deri\'ed fl-om the initials of Allied

Submarine Detection In\'cstigation Committee

and now known as Sonar. Appar.:llus for dClecting

submerged objects by listening for the echoes

from audible pings sent out b)' its transmitter.

AstoA term derived from AdmiralslllboJfiz.ier meaning

Admiral's staff officer.

Auxiliary cruiser

A merchanl ship which has been fitted with

armaments and eng;:lged as a warship. Also knO\\'ll

as 'ghost' cruiser or raider, although the last

mentioned also applied to purpose-built warships.

Aviso Orille

Aviso was originally a small fast warship, but the

term was later used to describe Hitler's state }'3chlnamcd GI;flp,

Axis Powers

The alliance of Germany, Ital)' and Japan formed

shonl)' before the beginning of the Second 'VoddWar.

Bali

A device fOl' detecting radar impulses used

towards the end of the war.

'-Barbarossa'

Code-name for Germany's attack against the

Soviet Union in June 1941.

BatLlecruiscl"

A warship of battleship size but with smaller

annament and usuall)' faster speed.

B-Die"st

Short for Fllllkbeobachtungsdienst. Germany's radio

monitoring service under command of Heinz

Bonatz.

&fehlshaber

Commander-in-ehief.

Biscay CrossAn impro\tised radar detector used br -boats

mainl)' in the Ba)' of Bisca)' area towards the end

of the war. It consisted of a wooden cross wilh

wires strung around the olltside and plugged into

a recei\'er in the radio room. The device had to be

dismantled before diving. Soon after itS

introduction, it was quickly ,'eplaced b)' more

permanent and retractable acrials on the outside

of the conning tower.

Blockade breaker

A merchant ship with non-mililary crcw running

into Germany or France during the war. Not to be

confused with Sperrbrecher which were merchanl

ships for detonating mines.

Bold

An Asdic foxer.

Bundesmarine

Federal Na\)', a name for the German Na\)t used

before 1852 and after I95~1.

Carna von Kastel

A German misunderstanding, refers to the Britishauxiliary cruiser CanlOvoli CastIL.Checkmate

A British srstem for helping identif}' slispiciousships at sea by calling for information from land­based control centres.

Coastal Command

A Royal Air Force Command which specialised in

nying over sea areas. If translated from theGerman, it could refer to land·based coastalanillery units.

Corvette

Originally a sailing ship. During the Second WorldWar it was used to describe an ocean-goingwarship, slight1r smaller than a frigate and

employed mainlr as ami-submarine cOl1\'or escon.Crew

A German term for the annual ilHake of officercadCLS.Cruiser 'War

The employment of warships against merchaminterests, in areas where the raiders could not

casil)' be caught by superior enemy forces.Dead Man

A German term for a fault)' torpedo.

'Oeadlight', Operation

The code-name for the Allied operation to scuttle

V-boaLS after the war.

Destroyer

A small to medium-sized fast warship. The

Gcnnans tended to refer to all COI1\'O)' escorts as

destfo)'ers, although some commanders insisted

the word 'fast boat' should be used instead to

pre\'ent unnecessary alann among the crew.

OcTe or OfT Apparatus

Officially the abbreviation for Dezim~ur TeteJo"ieAplJorotus but unofficially also called DreMurm

AIJIJam/us meaning 'revolving turret apparatus'.

An early t)'pe of efficient radar for ranging guns

after t..'1.rgcLS had been visually sighted, but could

also be used as a search de\;ce. In 1938 il hclped

ships find Iheir way in and out of harbours in

thick fog b)' indicating the position of buo)'s on

the sides of the deep water channel.Dreod,lOught

Originall)' the name of a new, large British

battleship and later used to describe any

powerful battleship of over 20,000 tons, Britain

had hoped to dominate rival nations wilh this

powerful weapon because it was thought it

would give its na\'}' considerable superiority for

some time, Although the locks at the naval

base in Wilhelmsha\'en and at both ends of the

Kiel Canal were too small for such vessels,

Germany I-esponded to the Dreodllought threat

b)' building equally large ships and byenlal-ging

its walcrwa)'s. At thc same time Dreadnoughtsparked off a eXlensive arms race with othercountl-ies,

Duck Pond (E"'e,,teich)

The introduction of marine aircraft raised the

problem of landing on fairly rough seas. At first, a

huge rubber mat was suspended from a crane over

the side of the ship, and dragged ovcr Llle surface

to smooth the wa\·es. The boffins had just fitted

this in the pocket battleship lnutsch/alld when the

ship wenl into a tight turn at fast speed. It was

quickly realised that the water \\ithin Llle circular

wake was much calmer than Llle surrounding seas,

So the mat was removed and commanders

instl1Jcted to smooth waxes by ttll-ning in a circle

at a fairly fasl spced. This al'ea of calm water wascalled 'Duck Pond'.

E-boat

Enemy boat; a motor tOrpedo boat known asS-8001 in Germany.

Electro-V-boalS

Originall)' Typcs XXI and XXIII designed from

1943 onwards. Fast underwater speeds were

achie\'ed quite simpl)' by enlarging the hu)) and

adding additional batteries. These types later

ga\'e rise to the postwar patrol or hunter-killer

submarines of the Cold War era.

Engelmann Boat

An unsuccessful experimental high speed boatproduced during the war_

Enigma

Enigma, the impenetrable puzzle, was thc namc of

a German code writer which was adopted for usc

by all Ihe armed forces. The naval version was

known as Schliisselmaschi"e M (Code Machine ­

'M': for Marine). Today it is well known that

Britain's success at breaking the codes was a major

contributing factor in \\;nning the war.

Escort Carrier

Small aircraft carrier used main I)' for convoy

escort duties.

b

256

•

257

GLOSSAHY GLOSSAHY

at sea because once away from port, commanderswere gi"en a free hand to follow their basicdirectives. The Fleet Command or itsrepresentatives very often went to sea with the bigships, thus the higher officers issuing orders hadtheir hands directly on the pulse of battle. TheFleet Commanders throughout the war were:Admiral Hermann Boehm; Admiral Wilhelm~larschal1; Admiral Gunter Lihjens, who wemdown with battleship Bismarclt; General Admiralauo Schniewind and Vizeadmiral WilhelmMeendsen-Bohlken.Hilfsknrn=Au.xiliary cruiser.Hollentwiel

Radar equipment used aboard U-boats.Hittle

Could mean hUl, but in a shil:rbuilding comexi itis more likely to mean 'iron foundry'.1IWO and llIWO

2nd and 3rd Watch Officer, see also ""0.Imperial Navy

Translation for Klliserliche l\1lmine, but could alsorefer to the ImpnialJapanese Navy.Ittgenieurbiiro (Engineering Bureau) Gliickauf

Founded in 1943 to dC"e!op the new U-boat types.Ittgettieurskatt/oor voor Scheepsbotlw

The cover name for a German submarinedevelopment bureau in Holland, used to keepabreast with new de\'e1opments at a time when theVersailles Diktat prevented Germany from owningor building submarines.Ingolin

Originally a co\'er name for hydrogen peroxide as

used for fuel in high speed Walter turbines.Named after his son 'Ingo'.International Military Tribunal

See Nuremberg Trials.IWO

1st Watch Officer, pronounced £in$-W-O or One­\1'-0.

KaiserEmperor.Kaiser Wilhelm Canal

The name for the Kiel Canal until the end of theFirst World War.Kaiserliche Marille

Imperial Na\'y. Name used by the German Navyfrom I 71 u11lilthe end ofthe First ''''orld War.

sound. The receiving head could be rotateduntil maximum volume had been achieved andthen the direction of the sound was read off ascale in the radio room. Now often called Passi"eSonar.HalldelsschutzkrerlU!r

Auxiliary cruiser for the protection of merchantships.Ha"delsstiirkrellzer

Auxiliary cruiser for the harassment of merchantships. Also knO\\11 as Hilfskreuur.

'Haullebu'

Haunebu is a code-name for a disc-shaped fl}'ingobject built b), the S during the 1930s. Althougha number of realistic photos exist and there arenumerous reponed sightings from near a testingsite, there is some dispUle as to whethn or not suchdC"ices existed. The story that an experimentalversion met the auxilial")' cruiser Allanlis in theSouth Atlantic seems to be false.h.c. - IIolloris causa (Latin)

An honorary title.HeligolandAn island in the North Sea dominated by redsandstone cliffs. Originally British. Acquired byGermany in 1890 when swapped for the EastAfrican island of Zanzibar. Became a strategicdefence centre for the German Bight withaccommodation for almost twem}' submarinesduring the First World War. The Diktat ofVersailles demanded the I'emo\"al of all militarydefences. but the island was re-fortified from 1935onwards, although b}' the beginning of the SecondWorld War it had lost much of its strategicimportance and was used only as a minor base.After the war, Britain forced the civilianpopulation awa)' and totally destfored all thehouses as well as much of the wildlife, reducingthe island to a balTen, rocky desert. It was handedback to Germany, totally wrecked, on I March1952.

High Seas Fleet

The tel111 'High Seas Fleet' was abolished shortlyafter the First World War and replaced with JUSt'The Fleet' under control of the Fleet Command.Following this there were considerable changes inadministration and names, gi,ing the impressionthat the Navy didn't know how to organise itself.None of this had a great deal of bearing on ships

direct contr3\'ention of the Geneva Conventionwhich prohibited prisoners of war from beingemployed in life-threatening occupations. AI firstthere were two main mine-swecping di"isions. Onein Kiel and the other in Cuxhavcn. L'lter facilitieswere expanded and there were acti"e units inBremedla"en, Holland. Belgium. Denmark and inXor\\"ay. In 1946 the Administration was reducedfrom about 2 .000 men to 15,000 and furtherreductions continued until it was disbanded in1948. However a small number of mine c1eal-ing"essels remained operational and \\'ere later takenO\'er by the Bundesmarine.'Chose cruiserSee auxiliary cmiser.GoldbuttAn experimental type of torpedo with c1osed­circuit Walter turbine.Goldfish

Similar to Goldbutl.GoliaLhA powerful radio transmiucr near ~Iagdcburg

which was capable of reaching submerged U-boatsin the Caribbean. There were some t'\'enty mastscovering an area of over 4 sq km with aerialsconsuming up to 200,000 volts. The installationwas dismantled after the war and moved to theSovict Union.Group attacksUsed by U-boats to attack COI1\"O)'S in groups onthe surface at night, at a time \\'hen there were notenough boats for forming patrol lines. Also called\Volf Pack Attacks.Group CommandsTwo localised commands for the east and west, theBaltic and the North Sea, ranking between theNaval War Staff (Seekriegsleilu1Ig - SKL) in Berlinand the Fleet Command at sea. The Commander­in-Chief of these Group Commands was responsiblefor controlling naval action in his area and thedefence of the appropriate coastal waters.Onllldhai

A submarine lifeboat planned towards the end ofthe war for rescuing men from sunken U-boats. Ithad a di,;ng depth of up to about 1.000 m, but,\-as ne"er buill.Gruppeuhorchgeriil (Group Listening Apparatus)A passi"e listening device which consisted of agroup of unden\<tter microphones for detecting

Escort GrollpA group of small, fast warships llsed for protectingcom"OrS against U~boalS.

ElmalThe distance a ,'essel tra'"clled in twenty-fourhours.E,oAbbrc\;atioll deri,-ed from Electric Torpedo.FalkeForerunner of the German acoustic torpedowhich came into service under the name oflllllnkollig (Wren) or T5.FATAn anti-convo)' torpedo.'Felix', OperationCode·name for the planned invasion of Gibraltar.FinJandIn 1941, following long·slanding border disputeswith Russia, Finland joined the ,,"ar against theSO\;ct nion on the German side ulltil a cease-firewas agreed in September 1944.Fog-making ApparatusMost German warships could generate artificialfog or smoke in three differclll ways. Fog-makingplants could be activated from a variety ofpositions aboard the ship to force out dense whitefog forced by compressed air. Fog buoys orcylindrical drums of about 120 kg in weight andjusl over a metre long, could be thrown overboardto emit white smoke for about tweJ1lY minutes,while non..oiesel ships could produce black smokeb)' adjusting the air now 10 the boilers.FrigateA small to medium-sized warship of moderatespeed used for anti-submarine COIWOY escon duties.FrogmenA group of swimmers officially known asKampfschwimmer (Battle or Combat Swimmers).FuMB and FuMO

Frwkmasbwbachillng and Funk",~sorlllngmeaningradar detection and radio ranging or radar.German Mine-Sweeping Administration (G~I-SA)

Founded after the Second World War because oneof the conditions of the cease-fire stated thatGennan)' should be responsible for clearing minesin the Baltic and parts of the North Sea. AlthoughonI)' volunteers were accepted, \\'ho could li"e asfree men in Gennan)', tlle)' wcre forccd to li"e asprisoners of wal- in other countries. This was a

258 259

b •

GLOSSAHY GLOSS Iny

b

KaleuAlthough included as the name of a L;-boat

commander by some authors, there "as no oflicer\dth stich a surname. It is a corruption of

KlIJJ;tiitileut"a,,' and was usually preceded by thetitle 'Herr' - ~Ir Ka.leu.

KampfgrllppeFigilling or balLle unil.Kampfgrllppe Thie/e

Founded in July 19-14 as a Sl0JFgaP measure "'henthe advancing Red Ann)" was threatening bases inthe far eastcl11 B.."lltic. Remained operational untilApril 1945. ~amed artel" itS commander.

\'izeadmir.ll August TIliele \,'ho had earlier beencommander of the hea\")" cruiser Liilww (ex-pocketbattleship Delll.sdilond). First the unit supported

the Army by directing the fire fmm heal")' shipsagainst land targc15, btU later training groups wereemployed in a \'aSI variet)' of tasks from land-based

aHacks 1O esconing refugee 1I0.nsports.Kampfschwimmer

Frogmen.

Komma"da"tCommanding officer ofa sea-going uniLKommalldeur

Commanding officer ofa land-based uniL

Kriegsmari"eThe name of the German Navy from 1935 until

the end oCthe Second "'"odd War.KTB

KritgSlOgdJuch - War diary.

Kur:.sig"alSee short radio signal.

lAbbre\;ation for Luflschiff{airship).

L.abocOliginallr a small fishing \ilIage on the Baltic nearKiel where the Naval Memorial was built andwhere U995 is now resting as technical museum.

Lerche

An acoustic LOrpedo which could be steered \;a awire connecting it to an operator. Developedtowards the end of the wal- bUl not made

operational.'Lessing'A code name for I-adar apparatus capable ofdetecting aircrafl at ranges of up to about 40 km.

LinseSee LS Boot.

lMAtuft (Air) :\Iine Type A. A mine developed fordropping from aircraft by parachute and filledwith about 500 kg of explosives. Late,- modified

into a more powerful L:\IB (Air :\Iine Type B) anda moored mine known as L:\IF.L.5 Bootl..Lichies-Schnellboot (Light peedboat) employed inthe ~Iediterranean and canied by some auxiliary

cruiscl"'S,

ITLIlJitorpedo (aeriallorpedo).

LuJlschiffAirship.

lUTAnti<om'oy torpedo.

M - MarineNa\')'. The KI-iegsmarine tended to use Iheabbreviation '~I' rather than 'K'.

M-Bootl\lillensuchbool (Minesweeper)

MctoxA device dneloped in France for detecting thepresence of radar signals and used succcssfully byU-boats. The firsl aerial was a rough wooden cross

wilh wires strung around the oUlside, known asthe Biscay Cross. This \\o.s soon replaced b)' more

permanent aerials.MilchJmhNickname for supply U-boats ofT)'pe XIV,

MoltenortOriginally a small fishing \;lIage neal- Kid whcre

the U-boat Memorial is located.

MOlldfischAn experimental torpedo \\;th high speed Walter

turbine which did not go into production,Monsoon BoatsName for long-range U-boats which \'O)'3gc 10 the

Far East.

""OS

A radar detector.

NSDAP

SOlionolso:iolist;sche Deutsche Arbeiler Parte;, the NaziPart)', When it was founded, the ocialists werenicknamed 'Sozis', hence membel'S of the N DAPbecame 'Nazis'.

uremberg TrialsThe first International Mililary Tribunal for mcnaccused of war climes sLaned in No\"ember 1945.

260

•

Thc main counts were: \\C\ging \\C\rs of aggl'essionby preparing men for battle: \iolating lhe laws andcustoms of \\C\rfare and crimes against humanity.

Both Grand Admirals Erich Raeder and KarlD6nitz wcrc found guilt~ of several counts andsentenced 10 jail al Spandau in Bedin. }-fo\\'c\er,

some of the hlWS under which they were foundguih~ had been formulated jusl before the trial

and lher wcre abolished again shortly aftcl"\\o.rds.Xo other leaden ha\'e bccn charged with such'crimes'. h has reccntly become knO\\'n that Alliedcommandcl-s who wanted to support Ihe two

grand admirals were pre\'ented from givinge\idcnce.

Ob.d.M./OberlJefeh/shaber der Mari"e

upremc Commandcr-in-Chief of the Na\l"OKMOberkommando der ,\farine (Supreme ;'\'a\"alCommand).OKW

Oberkommando del' H",Jmllllch! (High Command ofthe Armed Forccs).

POll::.erschiffPocket battleship.

Pauke"schlog

A roll on the keuledrulTIs. the code-name forGennan(s first allack against the Uniled Slateswith fivc U-boats inJanuary 19/12.Pearl Harbor

An American na\"al basc and anchorage in I-Iawaii.

attacked byJapanese forces on 7 December 1941.POllr Ie mente

Pmssia's highest decolo.tion a\\'arded during theFi1'St World War and worn around the neck,Prussia

The largesl of the Germanic kingdoms. In 1871.

following Lhe unification of the German states, theKing of Pnassia became Emperol- of Germany.Radar

A word derived from Radio Detcction andRanging.

Riiumboot or R·boolA small minesweeper.'RegelIbogen', Operation

German code-wor'd ordering the scullling ofV-boats at the end of the \\o.r.Reichsmarine

Name of lhe German Na\'y between 1920 and1935.

261

Samos

~ame for a rndar detector used by tlle Gennan Navy.S<h1illell (Sledge)

A tin~ speed boat designed for the ~Iidget

Weapons L'nit.S</mel/boot (5-Bool)

:\10101' TOIl>cdo Boat or ~ITB_ Also C<'llled 'E-boat'meaning Enemy Boat.

Sch"orkel

(American: Snorkel) The original word,1"lOrdu,r. was invemed by Grand Admiral Karl

06nilL 10 describe a \'cmilation masl for nlllning

diesel engines inside a submer-ged submarine,Schwerlwal

An eXI>crimental midget submarine,'Scalion'

Code-name for lhe planned invasion of GreatBritain.

Seekriegsleitllng/SKLNa\o.l War tarT.

Short signal

The 'shon signal' enabled fairly lengthy messages10 be transmiued b), sending on I)' a few ICllers ofMorse. The source of these signals was thought

nOl 10 be detectable by Allied radio direction­finders, but Britain's new invcntion of High

FrequenC)' Direction-Findel-s proved capable ofdetcrmining the direction of such signals. This

plared a m,tior role in the Battle of the Atlalllicbecause U·boaLS usually told the U-boat Commandwhen they were staning their attack and from this

the con\'o), escorts were able to determine thcdireclion of an impending onslaught. Radar couldthen be used to locate the U~boaton the surface,Sloop

A small. long-range wal-ship used for all1i­submarine escort duties.Spanish Civil War, 1936-8A number of\\C\r'Ships of\o.l;ous nationalities were

slationed off Spain, ostensibly to protect theirnationals, Several German ships came underattack and surTered sollle losses.Sperrbrecher

Barrage breaker or mine clearing ship.Stei"bull

An experimcntal torpedo \\;th high speed Walterturbine,

Stei"jischA forcrunner of Slei"bllll,

GLOSSARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

l

T5 (ZtJlmk6"ig)Acoustic torpedo known as Zaunkiin;g.'Thetis'A code·name for a radar faxer used successfully in

the Bay of Biscay LO fool aircraft.Third Reich(Third Kingdom or Empire) The first ha\;ng beenthe Charlemagne Empire, the Second was

founded in 1871 and headed b)' the GermanEmperor. Hiller then claimed to ha,"c fonned the

Third Empire.Toter Mann

(Dead Man) A lOrpedo that didn't work.

TVATorpedoversuchsanstall - Torpedo Trails Centrebased in Eckernforde.

UAFrom U-Ausland meaning U-Foreign. A largeU-boat buill for Turkey before the war whichwas commissioned illlo the Kriegsmarine on

21 September 1939.

VBGerman identification for HM Submarine Sealwhich was captured early in the war.

ueFormer Norwegian. submarines.

UDFormer DUlch submarines.

UFFonner French submalines.

UITFormer Italian submarines.

Vo/ksmarineThe name of the East Cellllan (Cenllan Democratic

Rcpublic) Na\}' after the Second World War.

Waller PropulsionA high speed turbine using highly \'olatile and

concentratcd hydrogen peroxide as fuel. The ideawas that it could be used in submarines \\ithout air

being rcquired to nlll the engines.

Weseriibu"gThe codc-name for the invasion of Denmark and

Norway in the spring of 1940.

Westwall

Not to be confused with Germany's western land

defences. nlis was a minc barrage in the North Sea.

'Wolf Pack'Translatcd from the German' Rudd meaningtroop, bunch, swarm, herd or pack and used to

refer to a group of U~boats operating together.The tcnll 'sea wolf and 'sea dog' then gave rise to'wolf pack', so ~boats were referred to as wolves

and groups as wolf packs.'Wunder/Otld', OperationA SOrlie into Arctic waters by pocket battleship

Admiral SchM'.

262

•

Ailsb)', Christopher. Combal Medals of the ThirdReich, Patrick Stephens, Wellingborough, 1987.(Well illustratcd, but some of the text issomcwhat dubious.)

Angolia, John R. and Schlicht, Adolf. DieKriegsmarine Volume I and 2, R. James Bender,San Jose, 1991. (An excellent and well·illustrated work about German naval uniformsof the Third Reich.)

Baasch, H. Handelsschifft! im Kriegseinsatz, GerhardStalling. Oldenburg and Hamburg. 1975. (A

pictorial work of merchant ships used for warsenice.)

Bea\'er, Paul. Gt!rman Capilal Ships, Patrick

Stephens, Cambridge, 1980. (A collection ofgood photographs from the Bundesarchiv,although a good number of captions are wrongand others are somcwhat inadequatc.)

--. £-boats alld Coaslal Craft, Patrick Stephens,Cambridge, 1980. (Excellent Bundesarchiv

photographs but rather inadequate captions.)Beesley, Patrick. l't!1). Spt!cial /nlelligena, Hamish

Hamilton, London, 1977 and Doubleday, New

York, 1978. (An interesting book dealing \\~th

Admiralty Intelligence.)Bekker, Cajus. Das grosse Bildbuch der deu/schen

KritJ,'Sman"lle /939-/94.5, Stalling, Oldenburg andHamburg, 1973. (An excellent pictOlial record.)

Bensel, Rolr. Die deutsche Aotlellpolitik V()11 /933 bis/939, £.5. Mittler, Frankfurt, 1958.

Bid1ingmayer, G. Einsatz. der schweren Kriegs­marilleeinheilen im ouanischen ZuJuhrkrieg,K. Vo\\inkcl, Neckargelllund. (Details about theengagements of the larger ships.)

Blundel, W.D.G. German Navy Warships /939-/945,Almark Publishing Co., New Malden, Surre)',1972. (An excellent little book with ve'1' goodphotographs.)

Bonatz, Heinz. Seekrieg im Ather, E.S. Milller,Herford, 1981. (TIle author was Commandcr-in~

Chief of the Cennan Radio Monitoring Senice

263

and has wrillen this account about the roleplared b)' radio during the war. There are

interesting short .sections on each of the raiders.)Bracke, Gerhard. Die Einulkiimpfer der Kriegsmarine,

MOLOrbuch, Stuugart, 1981. (An interestingaccount of the Midget Weapons Units.)

Bredellleier, Hcinrich. Schlachlschiff Scharnhorst,Koehlers, Herford, 1978. (Wrillen by one ofScharnhorst's officers in conjunction with the

cOlllmandel-, Kurt Caesar Hoffmann and thena\igation officer, Helmuth Giessler.)

Brennecke, Jochen. Die deulschen Hilfskrrour imzweilen lVellkrieg, Koehlers, Herford, 1958.(Originally called 'Das grosse Abmdteud, it is a

chatty account of the auxilia'1' cruisers, withtechnical dctails and information of ships sunk.)

--. Ghost Cruiser HK33, William Kimber,London, 1954 and Crowell, New York, 1955.

(The stOry of auxiliary cruiser Pi"guin.)--. SchwaT7J Schiffe, Wl!ile 1:, Gerhard Stalling,

Oldenburg, 1958. (An account of German

blockade breakers during the Second World\l'ar.)

--. Hilfskreuur Thor, Koehlers, Herford, 1967.

(The StOl1' of auxiliary cmiser Thor.)--. Die \1-ende im U~Bootkrieg, Koehlers, Hcrford,

1987.

Brerer, Sicgfried. Handbllch flir U-Bootkommmldallte'l/935-/ 945, Podzun~Pallas, Wolfcrsheim­Berstadt.

--. F7ottenparade" lmd Repraselltationm der Marine/925-1940, Podzun-Pallas, Wolfersheim~

Berstadt.

--. Stapel/iillf. allfdelltschen Schiffswerften. PodZUIl­

Pallas, \Volfersheilll~Berstadt.

Brice, Martin. Axis Blockade Runners, Batsford,London, 1981.

Brown, David. Tirpitz 'he Floating Forlress, Arms andArmour Press, London, 1978. (Many good

photographs, although their reproductioncould be beller.)

BIBLIOGIUPliY IlIBLIOGIlAPIIY

l

Brustat-!':a"a!. FriLl. Ali Cuma C333 ellsl,in.Frankfurt. 19 3.

-- and Suhren. Teddy. Sasses £;chellltllllJ.

Koehler>. Herford. 1983.Buchheim, LOlhar-Glll1ther. l/'OOoI Krieg. R. Piper,

;\Iunich. 1976. (A pictorial work aboUl theC·boat war.)

Busch. F.O. Kon/eradmiral Roberl EJS5tn, Pabel,R..Utall.

--. Kosoren dRS S«k,ieges. Pabel. Rastatt. (A chatt~

account of the second voyages of auxiliaqcmisers Thorand .\lichel.)

Busch. R....iner and Roll. Hans-Joachim. Der C-Boo/­Krieg /939 bis 19-15. Vol J, IJie deu/schen L'-BooI­Kommandanltm. Koehler/~Iiltler. Hamburg,Berlin, Bonn 1996. (Brief biographies producedfrom the records of lhe Gennan C-OOaI Archive.)

Chapman. John W.M. The Price of Admiroll)'.

nivcrsil}' of Sussex PI"jnting Press. Lewes.1982. (A three volume work with an annotatedtranslation or the war dia!")' or the GermanNaval Anache inJapan rrom 1939 to 1943.)

Childers, Erskine. The Rid(lle oflhe Smuts, Sid~,;ck andJackson, London, 19i2. (A novel set in Gennancoastal waters berore ule First World War. Thereprobably is no belter descliption or Lhose waLers.)

Dau, l-Ieilllich. Ullenldeckt iibe,. die Mee,.e. Berlin, 1940.(The story or Lhe block..1.de breaker and supplyship Altmark. '\1iuen by her last commander.)

Da"is, Brian Leigh. Ger"u", Unifonns of the Third

Reich, Blandford, Poole, 1980.--. Badges a"d Insig'lia of the Third Reich

1933-19-15, Blandford. Poole, 1983.Dechow, F.L. Geistersehiff 28, Ernst Gerdes,

Preest/Holstein, 1962. (The story or auxiliarycruiser MicheL)

Dellners, T. and Brennecke, J. Hilfskreuur

Konnora", Koehlers, Herrord. 1959. (The storyor the auxiliary cruiser by her commander.Translated rrom the original English languageedition: The Raid" Konnorml, William Kimber,London. 1959,)

Deutsches ~larineinstilUl. Mari"esch"le i\liinvik,

E.. ~littler& Sohn, HerroI'd.Dollinger. Hans. The Dedine and Fall of ,\'a:.i

&nna,,)' and Imperial Japan, Odhams, London,1965. (Excellent photographs.)

Donitz, Karl. Tell lea,.s a"d ovelltJ Dap. Weidenrcld& Nicolson, London, 1959.

264

--. O,.IIur!le Stralegie :.Ilr See im Zweilen U;'llkril'g,

Bemal'd & Grade, FrankCul1, 19i2.--. Meill wechselvolles Leben, ~Iuslerschmidl,

GOltingen, 1968.--. Oeutsche Strategie :.ur SH im ZZLll'ilen Ufllkrieg.

Bernard & Graere. Frankrul't, 1970.Elrrath, L'. & Herzog B. Srhlarhlsrhiff His11Ulrck.

Pod71lll. Dorheim, 1975. (A collection orinteresting photographs depicting the lire orthe battleship.)

Elrrath, L'lrich. Oie Deutsche Kn"gsmarinf

1935-1945, Podwn Pallas. Friedberg. 19 5.(With extensive photo captions in English,published in five \·olumes.)

Ellenbeck. ~lajor Dr Hans. Die \'erantwortzmg d,s

delltschen Offhiers, Tornisterschrifl desOberkommando der Wehrmacht, 1941.

Enders, Gerd. Aueh kleine Igel haben Stachell1.

Kochlers, Herrord, 1987. (The story aboutU-boats in the Black Sea.)

Evers, H. KriegsschifJbau. Springer, Berlin 1931 and1943. (Contains some interesling technicaldelails orwarship construction.)

E)'ssen, Roben. Hilfskreuur Komet, Koehlers,Herrord. 1960. (An edited version or auxiliarycruiser Kamds log-book by her commander.)

-- et al. Hi/ftkreuur Komel. Oberkommando del'

Kriegsmarine, 1942. (A souvenir album orKomel's voyage with interesting photographs,most or them taken by Gerhard Julius, thoughthe captions are poor ror security reasons.Limited disuibution and now \·ery rare.)

FTU. Das Archiv. U-boat Archive, Cuxhaven. (Ajournal published t\\;ce a year ror members orflU, U-Boot-Archi\', 0-27478 Cuxhaven­Ahenbruch. Please enclose two InternationalPostal Replr Coupons irasking ror details.)

Gander. Terry and Chamberlain. Peter. Small Anus.

Arliller)' and Sptcial Heapolls of the Third Reich.

~Iacdonald and Jane's. London. 197 . (A1ulOughit does not deal direcur '\;Ul ule ?'a\), this bookis jolly uscrul. It is well illustrated and filled \\;thuseful data.)

GalTen, Richard. Scharnhorst and Gunsenau, Da\;d& Charles, Newton Abbot, 1978. (An illlerestingaccount of the tWO e1usi,·e sisters.)

Gibson, Charles. Oas Schiff mil fiinf Xamen,

Wilhelm Heyne, ~Iunich. 1966. (Thc story or

SP<J'ba Ilk/DoggerbaIlk.)

Giese. Fritl.. Die Deutsche Marille 1920-45, Bemard& Graefe, Frankfurt, 1956.

Giese, Ono and Wise. James. Shooting the Hill', NavalInstitute Press, Annapolis, 1994. (Ono Giese wasan officer in the merchalll na,)' when he ran theblockade to Europe al the beginning or the warand thcn ,,'ent on to become a U-boat officer. Aninteresting account "ith good phOtos.)

Groner. Erich. Die delltschen K,.iegs$ehiffe

1815-1945,j.F. Lehmanns. ~lunich, 1968. (Thisis the standard book on the technical data orGerman warships. ~Iuch or the information istabulaled, making it relatively easy rOl' non­German readers. However the seCtion dealing\\'ith U-boat losses contains a good proportionor questionable inronnation.)

--. Die Schiffe der deuisclun Kriegsmaritle Imd

Luftwaffe lind ih,. 1'trbleib. J.F. Lehmanns,Munich, 19i6. (A condensed version or theprevious title.)

--. Oie HandelsJ1olte11 der 1\Jtlt, 1942,J.F. Lehmanns,Munich, reprinted 1976. (Includes details orships sunk up 10 1942. TIl is valuable publicationwas originally a confidential document andcontains a complete list or ships, in similar styleto Lloyd's Register. There is also a lengthy sectionconLaining Groner's line drawings.)

-- and Mickel, Peter. German Warships

1815-1945, Vol. II ·U·boats and Mine WarfareVessels', Conway. London, 1991. (Some or theinrormation aboul U-boat losses is telTibl)' outor date and needs I'e\'ision.)

Groos, Ouo. Seekriegslehren, E.S. ~littler, Berlin,1929. (An account or the lessons learnedduring the First World War, '\'riuen by a captainin the Imperial Na,y.)

Giith. Rolf. Die Marine des Oelltselle" Reiches

1919-1939, Bemard & Graere, Frankfurt, 1972.(A most interesting account of na\'aldevelopments between the wars, ",rillen by anaval captain.)

I-ladle)', ~Iichael. U.cOlltS against Canada, ~IcGill·

Queen's L:ni"ersit)' Press, Kingston andMontreal, 19 5.

--. Collllt not lhe Dead, McGill-Queen's Uni,·ersit)'Press, ~lontreal. Kingston and London. 1995.

Hahn, F. Guidebook to the Mililary' Historical Training

Centre Exhibition of Ihe Ma,.;'uschule Miirwik,

~IarineschulePress, Flensburg, 1978.

265

Hansen. Hans Jl"trgen. Oie Schiffe der delltsehen

FloUta 1848-1945, Stalling. Oldenburg, 1973.(Contains excellent illustrations.)

Harlinghausen, C. Harald. Ein Junge geht %IIr

Kriegsmarine, Wilhelm Kohler. ~Iindcn. 1942.Hamack, Wolrgang, Zerstom- unter delltsellC f7aggt,

Koehler, Herford, 1978.

Has, Lud\\;g and E"ers, August·Lud'\;g. "'ilhelm.shaum

1853-1945, Lohse-Eissing. Wilhelmshaven,1961. (A collection or most interesting andgood qualit), photOgraphs.)

Hcring, Robert. Chronik der Crew 3iA 193 i-I 98i,

produced ror limited distl'iblllion by the alllhOl'.(An excellent account or how naval officers"'ere trained.)

I-ledin, Hans. Oer let::.le .\l0I1Il von der Doggerblwk,

Wilhelm Heyne, Munich. 1979. (Aboul FritzKucrl, the on I)' sun'ivor or Dogger'bank [ex­Spe)'blwk]. He joined the ship in mid-oceanrrom the Charlolle Scli/iemann. arter the mine­la}~ng operaLion ofT SOlllh Africa. Most or thebook deals with his survi''al, rather lhan withDoggerbank's role in tile cnliser war.)

Herzog, Bodo. 60jahre delflsehe Uboote /906-/966,

J.F. Lehmanns, Munich, 1968. (A useful bookwith much l.abulalcd inronnalion.)

--. U-boats in Action, Ian Allan, Sheppenon andPodzun, Dorheim. (A pictorial book withcaptions in English.)

Hirschreld, Wolrgang. feindfahrtell. Neff, Vienna,1982. (The secret diary or a U-boat radiooperator compiled in the radio rooms oroperational submarines. A most invaluableinsight into the \\'ar and probably one or themost significanl accounts OrUle war at sea.)

--. OtIS Ll'tzt, Boot - Atlalltik Fam.~ll. ni"crsitas,~Iunich, 1989. (The last journey or U2J4,

sUITencler in the nited States and lire inplisoner or war camps.)

-- and Brooks, Geoffrey. Hirxlifeld - 7n. lOry' 01a L'-boal seo 1940-46. Leo Cooper, London,1996. (A fascinating English language editionofJ-lirschreld's lire in U-boats.)

Horrmann, Rudolf. 50 Jahre O/Jmpia-Crew,HoITmann, Hamburg, 1986. (An excellenthistory orCre", 1936. \Vell illustrated.)

H6geI, Georg. Embleme "'aPfJt!'1 A/aungs Deutscher I..!bt:JoU!1939-1945. Koehlel''S, I-Iamburg, Bedin, Bonn, 1997.(An excellent work dealing \\itll -boal emblems,

BIBLIOGRAPJlY BIBLIOGRAPJlY

especially those which ,,,ere painted on conninglowers. Very well illustrated with drawings by

the author \,'ho sen'Cd in U-boars dUling me \'<11:)Hi'lmme1chen. Gerhard. Htmdesstorer, Mercator,

Munich, 1960. (Although raLilcr old, this is Slillthe standard reference work on cruiser warfare.It has never been bcncred and is ilwaluable,covering a wide aspect of the raiders'operations.)

--. Die deutschen Suflieger, J.r. Lehmanns,Munich, 1976.

--. Die deutschen Sch,ullboole, Koehler/Millier.Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, 1997.

Hurd, Sir Archibald. Britain's Merchant Navy,

Odhams, London. (Wriucn during lhe war, it

contains a rair volume of propaganda andwartime inaccuracies, but it prm;des an excellentinsight into the British Merchant I a\y.)

HUlSon, Harry C. Crimsby's Fighting Flut, HuttonPress, Beverley, 1990. (An imeresting accountof fishing boats' war senice.)

Janssen, Jens. Die Einsamen der H~ltmetre, Pabel,Rastau. (An account of the last voyage of theblockade-breaker £rmland and of Passat's

minelaying operations. Janssen is a pen nameofJochen Brennccke.)

--. S<hiff 23 - Hiljskr<uur 5Ii"" SOS '·Ieft No 197,Munich, 1956.

Jones, Geoffrey. Under Three Flags, William Kimber,London, 1973. (The Story of the Nordmark andOlher anned supply ships of the German Na\'yduring the Second \-Vorld War. Thc authorsen'ed aboard her after the war.)

Joncs, '·V.A. Prisoner of the Konnoran, AustralianPublishing Co., Sydney, 1944. (Cruiser warfarcfrom a prisoner's poim of view.)

Jung, D., Maass, M. and Wenzel, B. Tanker "nd

l'trsorger dtr deutschell Flotte 1900-1980,Motorbuch, Stuttgart, 1981. (This excellentbook is the standard reference work on theGennan supply s}'stem. Well illustrated withinteresting phOtographs.)

--, Adneroth, Arno and Kelling, Norbert.Anstric"e lind Tan/anstriche de,. delltschen

Kriegsmarine, Bernal'd & Graefc, Munich, 1977.(With English captions.)

Kahler, Wolfgang. SchlachtschifJ Cneise,wu,

Koehlers, Herford, 1979. (A detailed accountby the ship's First Gunnery Officer.)

Kahn, Da\·id. Seizi"g the E"igma: The Race to Break

the German U·boat Codes, 1939-45, HoughtonMiffiin, Boston, 1991. (A good comprehensi\'eaccount.)

Kannapin, Norbert. Die Feldpostnummern der

deutscllen K,.iegsma,.ine 1939-1945, Kannapin,ILzehoe, 1974. (A reprinl of an originalKriegsmarine booklet gi\'ing the field postnumbers of sea-going units.)

Kaplan. Philip and Currie. Jack. H'oIJPack, Alinun,London, 1997.

Keatts, Henry and FaiT, George. Dive into History,

American Merchant Marine ~htsel1m Press.New York, 1986. (Well researched withexcellenl illustrations giving a deep insight imoU-boat acti\'ity on America's eastern seaboard.)

Kemp, Paul. The Admiralt), Regrets, uttonPublishing, Stroud, 1998. (British warship lossesof the twentielh century.)

--. U-boats DestruJed, Anns and Almour, London,1997. (All excellent book containing a great dealof recent research and useful explanations.)

KJielmann, Kun·G. AII,sz,eic!wlwgen des delltschen

Reiches /936-/945, Motorbuch, StllUgart, 1982.(A well-illuslrated account of awards andmcdals.)

Koop, Gerhard and Mulitze, Erich. Die Marine in

U'ilhe/mshaven, Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz,1987. (Contains a large number of interestingphotopraphs.)

--. and Schmolke, Klaus-Peter. Battleships oJ the

Bismarck Class, Greenhill, London, 1998.Krancke, Theodor and Brennecke, Jochen. RRR

Das gliickluifte Schiff, Koehlers, Biberach, 1955.(The StolJ' of Admiral Scheerwriucn by the ship'scommander.)

Kroschel, Gl'lI1ther and Evers, August-Ludwig. Die

deu/sche Flotte /848-/945, Lohse-Eissing,Wilhelmshaven, 1974. (A collection ofinteresting photographs from FOLO-Driippei ­now WZ Bilddiensl. ~Iost useful whenidentifying pictures.)

Kl'lhn, Volkmar. Torpedoboott lind ZerstOrtr im £insat:­

/939-1945, Motorbuch, Stuttgart, 1983.Schnellboote iut £insaf1. /939-/945,

MOlOrbuch, Sluugan, 19 6.Lakowski, Richard. Dwtsche U~Boote Ceheim

/939- / 945, Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus,Berlin, 1991.

Ledebur, Gerhard. Freiherr von Die eemine.

J.E Lehmanns, Munich, 1977.Lohmann, W. and Hildebrand, H.H. Die Deutsche

Kriegsmarine /939-/945, Podzun, Dorheim,1956-64. (lllis multi-volume work is the standardrefercnce documem on thc Getman Navy, gi\ingdetails of ships, organisation and personne1.)

Lumsden, R. A. Collector's Guide to Third Reich

Militaria, Ian Allan, London, 1987.~Iattes, Klaus. Die Seehunde, Koehler/Mittler,

Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, 1997.~Ieister, Jl'lrg. Der Stekrieg in den ostellropaischen

Gewassml 1941-/945, j.F. Lehmanns, Munich,1958. (Includes details of cruiser warfare inArctic waters.)

Mewissen, P. Blockadebrecher, Pabel, Rastatt.Millington Drake, Sir Eugene. The Drama oJ the

GraJ S/J« alld the Battle oJ the Plate, Peter Da\is,London, 1964.

.\Iohr. Ulrich. Atlantis, Oberkommando der

Kriegsmarine, /942. (Sou\'enir photographalbum of Atlantis's cmise produced for privatedistribution and now \'ery rare.)

-- and Sellwood, A.V. Atlantis, Werner Laurie,London, 1955. (Dr Mohr was the commander'sadjutanl.)

Mollo, Andrew. Naval, Alarine and Air Force

Unifonns oJ U'orld War 2, Blandford, Poole, 1975.Moore, Captain Arthur R. A Careless Word . .. A

Needless Sinking, American Merchant MarineMuseum, Maine, 1983. (A detailed and \\'ell­illustrated accoum of ships lost during the war.)

Morison, Samuel ElioL History' oJ United Stotes Naval

Operations in World War II, Little, Brown andCompany, BostOn. (A multi-volume officialhistory of the war at sea. Some of the infonnauonis rather one-sided and also somewhat dubious.)

~'Iuggenthaler, August Karl. German Raiders oj

H'()r1d H'ar II, Roben Hale, London, 1978 andPrenlice Hall, New York, 1978. (A detailedaccount dealing \\ith auxiliary cmisers.)

Miillenheim-Rechberg, Baron Burkhard \·on.Ball/eship Bismarrk, Bodle)' Head, London, 198 Iand The United States Naval Institute, 1980. (Amost dctailed accoulll by Bismarck's seniorsurviving officer.)

Mulligan, Timothy P. Lo'lt Wolf: The Life GIld Death

oJ U-lxxll Ace Werner Henke, Pracger, Connecticutand London, 1993. (A well-researched book.)

OKM (Supreme Naval Command). Bekleidungs

Illid Anz..llgsbestimmllllgen Jur die Kriegsrnarille,

Berlin, 1935; reprinted Jak P. MallmannShowell, 1979. (The official dress regulations ofthe German I a\'y.)

--. Rangliste der Drotsche" Kriegsmarine, Minier &

Sohn, published annually, Berlin.Ostertag, Reinhard. Deumhe Mimmmchtr: 80 Jahre

S«minuwbwthr, Koehlers, Herford, 1987.Pargeter, CJ. 'Hipper' Class Heavy Cruisers, Ian

Allan, London, 1982. (An excellent and well·iJiusuated book.)

Philpott, Bryan. German Marine Aircraft, Patricktephens, Cambridge, 1981. (An album of

Bundesarchiv photographs.)Plouke, Herbert. Facher Loos, Podzun-Pallas,

Wolfersheim-Berstadl. (The story of U172.)

Pope, Dudley. 73 North, Weidenfeld & icolson,London, 1958. (Aboullhe Batde of d,e Barents Sea)

Porten, Edward P. \'on del". The German Navy ;11

World H't1r II, Arthur Baker, London, 1970.--. Pictorial History' oJ the German Navy in World

War lJ, Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, 1976. (Allexcellem book spoilt by poor reproduction ofphotographs.)

Powell, Michael. Die SchicksalsJahrt der CmJ Spee,

Heyne, Munich, 1976.Prager Hans-Georg. PanurschifJ De'u/schland /

Schwerer Kreuur Lutz.ow, Koehlers, Herford,1981. (A detailed accoulll of the ship, heroperations and her crew. \Vell illustrated withmany interesling phoLOgraphs, diagrams andmaps. The author served aboard her.)

Preston, Alllhony. U-boats, Arms and ArmourPress, London, 1978. (Excellent photographs.)

Price, Alfred. Aircraft versus Submarine, WilliamKimber, London, 1973.

Raeder, Erich. 51rugg/<lar lhe &a, William Kimber,London, 1959.

--. My Life, nited States Naval Institute, 1960;translation of Mnn uben, F. Schlichtenma)'er,Tl'tbingen, 1956.

Rasenack, F.W. PanurschifJ Admiral GraJ Spee,

Wilhelm Heyne, Munich, 1981.Rogge, Bernhard and Frank, Wolfgang. Under Ten

Flags, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1957;translation of Schiff /6, Stalling, Oldenburg andHamburg, 1955. (Rogge was commander ofauxiliary cnliser Atlantis.)

.'

266

•

267

BIIlLIOGHAPIIY IlIBLIOGHAPflY

Rohwer. J. Der Krieg :ur Su /939-/945. UI-bes.

~lunich. 1992. (Excellclll phOlographs aboutthe war at sea. but there are no captions and it

is necessary to read through the text toundersland their meaning.)

--. Axis Submarine Sucusses oj 1\'orld "'or /I

1939-45, Patrick Stephens. Cambridge, 1983.(To be republished by Greenhill. London.199 .)

-- and Hummelchen. G. Clirollolng)' of tilt Hhr 01

Sea 1939-/945, Greenhill, London, 1992. (Agood, solid and informative work. Well indexedand 1110St useful for anyone slUd~;ng the "'al" atsea.)

Rosignoli, Guido. Xaval and Marine Badges and

Insignia, Blandford, Poole, 1980.Roskill, C3prnin .W. nu H't1r 01 Sell, 4 ,·o)s, HMSO,

London. 1954. reprinted 1976. (The officialhistory of the war at sea, J939 to 1945.Somewhat one-sided.)

Rossler, Eberhard. Die deu/schen Uboote lind ih,.e

l1'nflen, Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz, 19;9.--. Die Torpedoes der delltschen U~Boote, Koeh lers,

Herford, 1984.--. Geschichte des delltschen Ubootbaus, Bemard &

Graefe, Koblenz, 1986.Ruge, Friedrich. Sea Warfare 1939-45: A German

Viewpoinl, Cassell, London, 195;; translation ofD", Seekrieg 1939-/945. Koehler, S'ullgan, 1962and published in the United States as Der

Seekrieg (The German Navy's Slory. 1939-45),Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 195;. (Rugewas an officer in the Kriegsmarine.)

Schmalenbach, Paul. Die deutsehen Hilfskreuur,

Stalling, Oldenbtll'g and Hamburg, 19;;. (Thisis a pictorial record of German auxiliarycruise.-s from 1895 to 1945, the bestphotographs being from the two world wars.)

--. Kreuur Prin: Ellgen uliler drei Flaggtn.

Koehlers. Herford, 19;8.Schmeelke, Michael. Alann Kiiste, Podzun·Pallas.

\\'01 fersheim·Bersradl.&hmelzkopf, Reinhard. Die deulsche Handelss€hiffahrt

1919-1939, Stalling, Oldenburg and Hamburg.(A two..yolume chronology about thedevelopment of the German merchant na\"ybet\\'een the t\,'O wars.)

Schmoeckel, Helmut. Menchlichkeit im Seekriegr

MitLier und Sohn, Herford, 1987.

SchuiLL. Willy. Kreu:.er Leip:ig. ~lotorbuch Verlag.Sttlugarl.

Schwandtke. Karl~Heinz. Dellischlaml.s I-Iandelsschiffe,

Stalling, Oldenburg and Hamburg. (Details ofGennan merchant ships at the Start of the war.WiUl information about hips caplured duringlhe conflict. Also included are vessels that \,'erenOt completed. and detailed line dl<t\\;ngs.)

Showell, Jak P. ~lallmann. The German Savy in

World War Two, Arms and Armour Press.London. 19;9: 1':a\'al Institute PI-ess, Annapolis19;9 and translated as Das Blleh d~r deutschen

Kriegsmarine, ~Iotorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart,1982. (CO\'ers history. organisation, the ships.code writen, na\-al charts and a section onranks, uniforms, awards and insignias byGOI-don Williamson. Named by the UnitedStales Naval Institute as 'One of theOutslanding Naval Books of the Year'.)

--. U~boats under fhe Swastika, Ian Allan,Shepperlon, 19;3; Arco, New York, 1973 andtranslated as Uboote gegen England, MOlOrbuch,Stuttgart, 1974. (A well·illustrated introductionLO the German U·boat service, which is nowone of the longest selling naval books inGerman)'.)

--. U-boats IInder lhe Swaslika, Ian Allan, London,198;. (A second edition with difTerent photosand new lext oCthe above-mentioned litle.)

--. U·b(){ll Ccmmand alld the Baffle of lhe Atlalltic,

Conway Maritime Press, London, 1989;Vanwell, New York, 1989_ (A delailed hislor)'based on the U·boat Command's war diary.)

--. Germallia Illlernaliollal, Journal of theGerman Navy Study Group. Now oul of print.

--. U.fJooI Ccmmandns and lheir CrtWs, CrowoodPress, ~Iadborough, 1998.

Smith, Constance Babington_ Evidence in Camera,

Da\'id & Charles, Newton Abbot. 1974. (Thestory of the Ro)'al Air Force's PhotographicReconnaissance Unit, with an interestinginsight into how the major German warshipswel-e tracked and consequently attacked.)

Sorge, Siegfried. Der Marineoffizier als Ftih,." 100d

EniehtT, E.S. Mittler. Berlin, 1937.Stahl, Peter. Kriegsman-ne Unijon1l.S, InsiK1lia, Daggers

& Medals of the German Natl)' 1935-1945, DieWehrmacht, Stanford (California), 19;2.(A well-illustrated book,)

268

Stark. I-Ians. .\farhullnleroffi:iersdlU/e, ~a\'al

Officers' School. Pion. 1974.Slern. Robert C. f....riegsmllrille: A Pictorial Hi.sIOl)" of

the Cermll" XliV)' 1939-19-15. Arms and ArmourPress. London. (Vel1 good phOtographs.)

Syrett, Da\·id. The De/eal of lhe Wolf Packs. SoulhCarolina Press. Columbia. 199-1.

Tarram, V.E. 71,e C-bool Offensive 191-1-19-15. Annsand Armour Press. London. 1989.

Terraine. John. Business in Greal H'oUrs. LeoCooper. London. 1989.

TIlOmas, D;l\;d A. The Atlantic Star 1939-45. W.1-1.Allen. London, 1990.

Trevor.Roper. Hiller's 1\~r Directives 1939-1945,

Sidgwick &Jackson. London. 196-1_ (One wouldthink that the name 'Hitler' in the title \\'ouldnOt require the years al the end! But still a goodbook, giving an insight into the highercommand.)

US Nm'al Intelligence. German SlIval \essels of

World \1'0,. Two, Greenhill, London, 1993. (Anexcellent book for identifying warships. It wasoriginall)' can-ied on board ships at sea foridentifying \'essels lhey mighl meet.)

Val, Dan van del'. The Atllllllic Campaign, Hodder &SLOuglHon. 1988. (A well-researched andinteresting book.)

Verband Deutscher Ubootsfahrer. Sclw!lllng Kiiste

Uournal or the German Submariners'Association).

Wagner, Gerhard (ed.). Lagt!Vorlriige des

OberfJt>.jehlsl/llbers der Kriegsmari'le VOl' Hiller. J-r.Lehmanns, ~Iunich, 19;2. (Translated asFuehrer COllferences 011 Naval Affairs. Greenhill.London_ reprinted \\;th new introduction 1990.

but originallr the English language edition \,-aspublished before Lhe Gellllan version.)

Walts. A.J. The Loss of lhe Scharnhorst. Ian Allan.Sheppenon. 19;0.

269

--. The C-bOlll Hlllilers, Macdonald and Jane's,London. 1976.

\\'e1ham. ~lichael. Kampfschwimmer. ~lotorbuch,

Stuugan, 199;.

Werner. Herbert. Iron Coffins, Arthur Bakel".London. 1969.

Werher. Kurt and Ehrlich, l-Ians:Jtirgen.\agablmden aufSu, Kaumann, Tllbingen, 1953.(TIle story of the au.xilial1- cnaiser Orion by hercommander.)

Whitley, ~I.J. Deslra)'"! German Destra)'trS ill WorldWar II, Arms and Armour Press, London,1983.

--. Gemwll C",i.sers of n'Odd nor Two, Arms andArmour Press, London, 1985. (An excellentaccount. wel1~il1ustrated wilh plans andphologrdphs.)

Williamson, Gordon. The Iron Cross, Blandford,Poole, 1984. (An excellent and well·illustrdtedaccount.)

--. Knights of lite Iron Cross, Blandford, Poole,198;. (An excellent follow-on from the aboveLitle.)

-- and Pavlovik, Darko. U·boat Cmos 1914-45,

Osprey, London, 1995. (A most intereslingbook with excellent colour drawings and blackand white pholOgraphs.)

Winton, John. Ullra al Sea. Leo Cooper, London,1988. (About breaking the U·boat I-adiocodes.)

Witthoft, Hans Jllrgen. Lexikon WI' deutschen

Ma";'ltgeschichle, Koehler, Herford. 19;7. (Anexcellent lwo-\'olume encyclopedia.)

Woodward, Da\·id. The Secrtl Raiders, WilliamKimber, London. 1955. (An account of GermanatLxiliary cnaisers.)

Zienen, J. t.:n..srre Marillellllijonll. Helmut GerhardSchulz. Hamburg, 19;0. (An excellent recordofCenllan naval uniforms.)

""here entries run over more than one page, only the first page has been indexed.

INDEX

Acasta, HMS 58AchillLs, HMS 29, 67Adllm, midget submaline 165Adjutant, whale catcher 134, 135Admiral Gra] Spee, pocket battleship

ix, x, 26, 28, 30, 57, 61, 66,191Admiral Hipper, cmiser 35, 37, 39, 50, 76Admiral Makarow, cmiser 94Admiral Scheer, pocket battleship 27,

35,37,39,41,54,61,69,206Admiral's baton, 248Admiralstab (Admirahy) 219Adria. lanker 58, 79,116.125AdtJi!1ltun. mine layer 119aelialtorpedo 183air gap 154air raids 17air ships 171aircraft and air ann 171Ajax, HMS 29, 67Albatross, torpedo ooal 107A(Jx,t lLo Schlagder, sailo-dining ship 138Auantara AMC 33. 93Almeria, Spain 69Alstertor. suppl)' ship 37. 116Alsterufer, suppl)' ship 116Altmark,supplyship45, 116, 122, 123Amerskerk. freighter 41, 87Amfaldern,josef 78Anglo-German Naval Agreement x,

15,141Anneliese Essberger, supply ship and

blockade breaker 38, I 16, 191anti-aircraft guns 158Ami-$ubmarine School, Kiel 142Arado 177Archallgtlsk, warship 164Arcona, small cruiser 221Mk Rayal, HMS 30, 60Arnauld de la Periere, Lothar von viiiAschmoneit, Christoph 212Atlantic expedition viiAtlantic, Battle of the 153Atlantic. South 151Atlantik Tank Reederei 125Atlantis, raider xi, 37,39, 48, 86Atlas-Levante Line 92Aurora, HMS 117Australia, mines laid 135AUlo~don, freighter 86auxiliary cruisers 32, 84

Babitollga. suppl)' ship 37, 117Bachstelze 179Baltic 145Baltic Command 221barrier breakers 126Bartels, Hans 132, 163bases 195Basillg Steam, freighter 122battle swimmer 170Bauer, Ernst 39Bauer, Wilhelm 195B-Dienst 30, 52, 58, 69&am, aircraft carrier 30Behncke. Paul v, ,~i. 2218ekhen, suppl), ship 117Berger, Fritz 100Berger, Georg von 104Berlitl, cruiser vii, ,~ii, 221Berntsen, I"ar, IDO-6Berwick, HMS 29,79Be)', Erich 100Bianca, tanker 59Biber, midget submarine 164. 165Bikini Atoll 84Bismarck, battleship x, xi, xii, i, 15,

25,32,37,39,5\Bismarck, Quo \'on 139Black Sea 147Bleichl'oeil, Heinrich 46, 49Blessin, Kpt. 71Bletchley Park 39, 87Blohm und Voss 200Blucher Pier 197, 206Bliicher, cruiser x, xi, 62, 76, 80Blucher, Prince \'on 139Boehm, Hennann 19Bonau, Heinz 30&mtl90Bonte, Friedrich 100, IlOBow Protection Gear 131Brandtaucher. submarine 195, 206Braunschweig, battleship 22Bredow, Horst 215Bremer Vulkan 209Brem.se, artillery training ship 3Brilliant, HMS 37,119Brinkmann, Helmuth 37,39,51,82British Advocate, freighter 121Brocksien, Ulrich 41. 87Br1l1nmer, minela)'er and artillef)'

training vessel 207

270

BlilaWllJO, HMS 119Bundesmarinc IBurchardi, Theodor 56Blirgellland, supply ship 117BULOW, Hans 110

Cairo, freighter 92Cameron, Lt 161camouflage 189CampbelJtQuJ1l. HMS 50Canberra. HMAS 74, 117Cap Al'ko1Ul, passenger ship xivCa/Jet()'um, HylS 74Caradoc, HMS 3D, 119Caribbean 150Carls, Rolf 132, 224CanlllnJOn Castle, AMC 93Casablanca Conference xiii, 17Channel Dash xiii, 39, 40. 41, 82Channel deslfoyer 131Channel Islands xiChariots. midget cran 54Charlotte Schliematln 117Checkmate S)'Stem 36Chilean Retfer, freighter 59Churcher,j.B.251Ciliax, Quo 41Cit), of Benam, passenger ship 46Cit), ofAillt. freighter '15, 46, 62Clausen, Nicolai 79Clement, freighter 28, 66Cl)'de, HM Submarine 58Coburg, raider 43, 87Coburg, supply ship 117colour schemes 189combat swimmer, 170Collet:llh. USS 118com'o)'

HX8469HX229 154ONI66 182ONSI54 182PQ854QPI254SC4847SCI22 \54SLS64 37WS5A 79

Cork, Operalion 154ConllualJ, HMS xii, 29, 92Coronel41, 43, 87

CQrJda, tanker 122Cossack. HMS 45Cruiser War 5Cumber/mul, HMS 28, 29, 33Cuxha\'cn 2. 90. 198cycloidal propellers 132

Danzig 44, 210Dau, Heinrich 45,27D-Day 154DOC Hallsa 92Deadlighl, Operation 46Dechend, Walther 189deck guns 158DeljJhill. midget craft 170Densch, Hermann 19Deschimag AG Weser 207destroyers, foreign IIIDetmers, Theodor 35, 87Deutsche Werft 204Deutsche Werke 206Demsches Museum 162DeutslhllUld, pocket battleship 'iii,S,

6,27,30,32,46,56,61Devonshirt, HMS xii. 86diesel engines 3Dieu'ichs, Horst 182disguise 20, 84, 189distress calls 3D, 36Dithmarshell, supply ship 79, 118, 125Dillen, Paul von "iiDjakarta 151Doba 118DOeler, Heinz 116Daggerballk, blockade breaker and

auxiliary minelayer 118, 137Dommes, Wilhelm 150Donitz, Karl ix, xiii, xiv, 17, 19,48,

49,142,154,161,224,250DQrsetshin, HMS 29, 33,121'duck pond' 173Dunedin, freighter 39, 119Dunkerque, French warship 6, 30Dunkirk, France xiDuppel, Martin 49Duquesa, refrigerated ship 118Dwarfs, minesweepers 132

Eagle, I-IMS 29, 37, 39. 119Eagle, sail training ship 138E-boat Ste S-boat IIIEd" Heinz-Wilhelm 48Ed.ernfOrde 184Egerlalld, supply ship 37Eider waterway 199£1 Alamein xiiiElbt 2 lightship 25Elbe II bunker 203, 205Elbt, blockade breaker 37clectro-submarines 154Eltfllnt. project 169Elsa fusbt:rger, freigillcr 119

I NO EX

EM-mine 185Emdell, cruiser ,~i, 3, 94, 125, 142Eml1l)' Friedrichs, supply ship 30, 119Ems, freighler 87Enigma code writer xii, 23, 37, 216Enterprise, HMS 74Erdmenger, Hans 104Erhardt, WOlfgang 151Ermland. supply ship 119, 125escort battleship 6Esper-anceBa)', HMS 119Esso Hambtlrg, suppl)' ship 37, 119Ester Thorsen, freighter 78Eurofeld, suppl)' ship 71Ewerth, KJaus 148Exeter, HMS 29, 67experimental cran 169Erssen, Robert xiii, 74

Falmouth, HMS 48Fangtx>ote 131Far East 150FAT torpedo 181F-boaLS 131FdS 1\4FdT 110FdZ 108Fechenheim, freighter 94Federal Fleet IFederal Navy (Bundesmarine) IFegen, E.S.F, 71Fein, Ouo 35, 39Felix, Qperation 46Fencer, H~'IS 55Fink 2 bunker 204fireanns 244Fischel, I-IeI'mann von 50Flag Officer for Destroyers ~ FdZFlag Officer for 5-boats see FdSFlag Officer for Torpedo boats see

FdTFM (Ri,'er Mine) 185Focke Achgelis 179Foerster, Richard ,~ii, 125Forbes,john 65foreign destroyers IIIForste, Erich 56Fraau, Georg-Werner 47Franco, General 46Franken, supply ship 125Franz, Hans 184Frauenheim, Fritz 163Freiwald, Kurt 142, 223, 244Friedcburg, Hans-Georg von 33,

145Friedrich Breme, supply ship 39. 79.

1\9Friends of the V-boat Archive 218frock coal 83Frost, Lt Cdr 47ITU 218Fuchs, Werner 15

271

Fiuhrer Conferences OIL Naval Afftarl 221FuriollS. HMS 55

G7·torpedol80Gadow. Hans"joachim 100Gainard,joseph 62Geclania, supply ship 39&get! Engtland, ne\\'Spaper 60General von Streube11, passenger ship

xi\,,145eelleraladmiral230Gerlach, Heinrich 104Gerlach, Horst 41, 92Gcnnan·Anglo Naval Agreement ix,

x, i, 15, 141Gennaniawerft 201,205Gibraltar 46Glasford, Cdr 58Glasgow, HMS 74Glattes, Gerhard 184Glengany, freighler 87Gloin, cruiser 30Glcnlnuorm, HMS 78Gneiscnau, August 139Gntisenau, ballieship x, 12,25,30.37,

39,51,56,78Godt. Eberhard 145, 154,224Goetsch, Erwin 74Colden Part)' Badge 251Golden]els, freighter 86Goliah, radio station 145Conunheim. supply ship 39, 119GOring, Hennann Iii, 176Cork Fock. sail training ship 206Golenhafen 200Go)'a, passenger ship xiv, 145GrafSpee. M. \'on 139GrafSpa see Admiral GrafSpaGraf 'Zeppelin, aircraft carrier xGrau. Peter Ottmar 27,32,76Greer, USS 47Gregory, George 82Greif, torpedo boat 100Grenz, Alfons 59Group Commands 221Gri"ltzemacher, Waldemar 151Guanabara, sail training ship 138guerre d~ course 5Gumprich, Gumher 41,90,93

Habekost,johannes 198Hadley, Michael 218Hague Conference see The HagueHamburg 200Hamburg, cruiser ,~ii, 221Hamburg-America Line 87, 90HalInover, batlleship 221Hansa Line 86HmlSa, raider 87HmlSa, tanker 125'Happy Time' 153Harding, Warren 12

-

I-Iancmtcin. Wemer xiii. 4SHan,'ood. Commodore 30. 67HOt/flll/l/(l. supph ship 125HowkmJ. I-I~I 7'1HOW KieJ 201. 205. 206he.w... cnliscrs 76H«ht. midgct submarine 166Heiligenhafen. 161Heinrich of Ilmssia. Prince 248Heinrich. Fra07 211J-Iodor. freigiller 92Hemmer. Hans-Kad 92. 135J-In7110nll SchQfllIlmll. destroyer 7J-In7t14 tHIS 30Herrle. F.G. 143He\'e. Helmlllh xi\'. 76. 163.213Hindenburg. Paul \'on ,ii. \iiiHipper. Franl. \on 139.223I-lipp" 5N Admiral J-lippn-Hitler. Adolf\;ii. xi\·. 9.12.28.39.41.

54.1-11. 171. 212. 219. 221HolTmann. August 48HolTmann. KllI,-<:aes..1r 30. 35. 39. 56I-Ioltenau (Kid) 171I-Ioltendorf. Hennig "on 248Hood. HMS xii. 52Hoppe. Konrad 90.151Horsl I1tssil. sailll'aining ship 138t-Iowaldtswerke Hamburg. 203HO\\'<lldlSwerke Kiel206 y, also HOWhUllling forces in 193929Hutchinson. Lt Cdr 97I-IJt!m. midgct cr,lrt 169

Ibbekcn. Hans 151Ibila. Spain 62IIJ. 13nkel' 1191lJi'f. raider 87Imperial Na,)' IIngram. Da\'id 58Inlmmslab251in\'asion of Engl;:md 50

Japanese ship building 1jtnJlS 80)'. A\lC 35. 37.71Johannesson. Rolf 100Junkennann. Ernst \iiJutland. Baule of I. 60

,,"lhler. Ono xii. 93Kaistrlir'" MarinI' (Imperial ~a\y) IKamenz. Kptlt. 86KampfMh:l'imln,,-170Kandeler. Hennann 151Kan<klftls. freighter 92Karlsrulv. cmiser \iii. 94. 181Karsten. Wilfred 137Kallra. ~orn'cgian submarine 215IVnNl), L:SS 47Kenned)', R.C. 56Kemrat. Eitel-Friedrich lSIK"'Jo. H~IS 117

ISDEX

l\"t0501l0. supph ~hip 119Ketds. Hans-Heinrich 1831\1'11)' Brr:"'ig. freighter 119Kiel 17. 195. 196Kid Canal 196. 199.200l\i"g{.I'O'!? \: tHtS53KleiL.1mp. Gusta\ 44. 50Klemp. Lt.1.. 59Klockner. Clm 209K.nole. Bodo Heinrich 39Kobe.Jlpan 90.151Koester. Hans \'on 24Kohler.Ono 134Kolbe. C1.r1 \iii1\.0111. cmiser 34. 56. SO. 94. 207. 208Ko""t. raider xiii. 32. 41. 74. 84. 87.

88.117.137KiinlgWtrg. cruiser xi. 94Kiilligsbl'rg. supph ship 119Korltlorall. mider 35. 87. 137A.·oto XO/XJI/. block.1.de breaker 119Koule. Friedrich 100Krd.nckc. Theodor 35. 41. 69. 224Krech. G. 123KretSChmer. 0110 xii. 153.212K"11=.1"1*ri'IJ 5Krieg. Hanno 161Kriegsmarinc 1

organisalion of 19Kricgsmarincwcrft 207Kross/ouli. freighter 39.119.122,125Kriidcr. Enlst-Felix xii. 39. 92.191Krupp 3Krupp Germania Works 201. 205.

215Krupps 206Kuen. Flit1 138Kulmulmld. supply ship 84. 119Kllnllm*. freighter 90K-\'erband (Midget Weapons l:nit) 163

[",i>oe (Kie1) 211Laconia Order 48Lacollia. troopship xiii, 48Lammenz. \rilhelm 211Langhcld. Georg 100. 10-1L1.ngsdorfT. Hans 27. 66. 100. 104L1.I"Sen. Lcif 54fLamlt'J'. H~IS 117Lnjr-'g. cnliser 3. 94Lemp. Friu.:Julius xii. 45Letter of ~Iarqlle 84Le\\it. Walter 135Liebe. Heinrich 49Lindau. Eligen \iii. 50Lindemann. Emst 37. 51Lindenau. \remer 50Lin~. midget cmft 168L1o\'d George 10Loch Eriboll 46Loch Fo) Ie 46Loch Ryan 46

272

LOdige. Project 169London :"<1\<1.1 Ag,"eemcllI 14London Submarine Agrccmcl1I 1-11...o"doll. H:\15 37. 117. 119Lornlt: H: 1-I01l.VII, freighter 28Lothri"K"I. battle<ihip 221l.QIhrill~ll. supp" ship 39. 119LS boats 116. 193Ludl$. torpedo bo.'ll IIILlldde-~eur.rl.lh.\ralter 49Luftwaffe I 71Luppis. Blasius 180LeT torpedo 181Liiycns. Gunther 19.37.51. 58Liiu.ow. Adolf 139Lr"it::.uw. ex-Dtumhlaf/d32. 39. 61Liit=ml'. Russian heavy cmi.ser 207Lyme Sa.\. De\'oll 116Lyuleton. ~e\,· Zealand 13-1

,11/132.\12132.11/88.134.146.228,\/984.\11334. 128M1452. 4.131MagdalJllr. freighter 145i\lagdeburg. .-adio 145magnetic mine 176MA1\' 3Mann, Ernst Ritter mn 219Marder, midget craft 167i\lalinebund 212. 251Mariluhtlferinlll't1 178Mm'illesOl/d"di~IlSt t 26Marschall. Wilhelm 19. 30MandaiI'. Hi\IS 39. 116Martrn jl'tlsr'l. schooner 138~Iauchenheim. Theodor mn 10-1~Iediterranean 1'18MaI'lSa. cmiser 221~leendsen·80hlken. \\'ilhelm 74MetTSbllrg. freighter 87~leise1. Wilhelm 35. 78. 100~Ienche. Admiral 151MnulaoJ. freighter 193Mtttor. sun'e\, ship \;i~1C)'er. \\illi 215~tichaclis. William 219.\lic:hrl. raider xiii. 41. 43. 90, 193~lidget Weapons L-nit 163.\lilwaItJr~. CSS 116minelayers 134mines 185

in European \\<lte..... 126mines\\'eepcrs 126~firbach. calL \'on 116~foehle. K-I-I 197i\lohr. Richard 161~fohr. Ulrich 86.\lolch. midgelSubmarine 167.207~fommsen.Konrad \;i

monitors £)

~Ionte,;deo 30. 67:\Iontgomer\'. Field ~larshaJl J70Mopall. freighter 69motor mine s'\"eepcrs 131mOtor loq>edo boats 8i. III~Iullheim-Rechberg.B. \"011 53~Iunich Agreement x-lliillJurla"d. suppl\' ship x. 119~lllI17er. CUSt3\' 212

:\ational L1bollr From ix:\a'-dl Arscllal206. 215:\a\'31 Auache.jap.1.n 86~a\'31 Dock Yard. Wilhelmsha,'en 195~(l\a1 federation ()farinebwld) 212.251~a'<l1 ~femorial. Laboe x. 52. 211~a\<l1 Officers' School 251~a''al \rar StalT221~ali Ilart) y, ~SDAP

Xtgn; midget cran 162. 167-,"t!.soll, H~I 119"''1J1I1I1I'. cruiser 30~et1band. Hardld 30~ellbecker, Dr Oltfried 249Xtll/1/0rk. freighter 93Ne\\' York 95"'iob#'. sailu71ining ship 138, 221Nordll/llI'k, Sllppl)' ship 32, 119, 121.

123.191NOl'llulIl;a, auxili,lI)' cmiser 84. 116Nonh Cape. Hattle of xi\'. 60Nonh German Federation INorth German Lloyd 87North Sea Command 221Northmark 119NSDAP\,. \i. 7.12.141.\7J\'irlsnl Alonso, freighter 182Nuremberg Trials 224Nlinrbtrg. cmiser 94.\)·mpht. cruiser 221

Obladen. ~Iichael 163Oehrn. Victor 148Oelrichs. Adolf 182Oldenburg. Duke of 195Okjuroo. tanker 121Omaha. t.:SS 122Operation Deparunent (t:-boats) 145Operational Intelligence Centre 33. 3,:;OrgaJlisntion DepanmcllI (t.:-oo.11S) 145Orion. raider x. 37. 90. 234Oslo Fjord SO0s01l0. freighter 121Ostfril'Sla'ld. battleship \.OtIO U·iillKht. training ship 36Oll\T)·.j.G.D.185O\'erseas cmiser' 6

Pan American Neutrality Zone 28/Xmunc:hiff sn pocket b.1.uleship 5Pa~ndrt(ht. freiglllcr 119

I ND EX

Paris Congress of 185684Passat. auxiliarv minela\'er 135Paulus. Friedrich xiiiPearl Harbor xiii. 48. 86P1'11'1I5. freighter 48Penang 150Peters. Heill1 100Petersen. Rudolf xiii. 114Pttropoli5, freighter 69PietsCh. Clrich 69Pi"K"i". raider xii. 39. 92.13-1. 191Plaice, Lt 161Plate. River 30. 67pocket b::utleship 5. 61. 76Pol IX whale catcher 135Poland 44Polar Seas 152PolJCllrp. mnker 59Poml1lt",. baltlt.'Ship IPonitl, Gottfried 104Pon Dixon. Russia 76Pmirir. tanker 121. 191Preuss, Georg 48!)y,"5SI'tI. b.1uleship 221Ilrien. GOmer 153. 185Pri1luofm,li'-s. HM 52Illi III Eugen von $a\'o"en 139PJ'i,,::; EIll:"I/. cruiser x. 37. 39. 40. 42.

75,76.82. 176,215Ilrile Ordimlllce Regulations 14.27.

28,143Prussian Fleet 1Ilufendorf. Rudolfvon 100Pllffrr. US Submarine 123P'lnlll'r. I-IMS 55Pussbach. I-Ieinl 62PtlItkamll1er. Karl:Jcsko \'on 41. 224P)'(1I011. suppl)'Ship 39. 121

QQQ30

rddar xii, 26. 28. 36. 53. 69radio 39. 145. 179

use of24Rat.-dcr. Erich xiii. 5, 6. 9, 15.39. 41.

141. 163. li9. 219. 221. 222. 248RAF 39. 79. 82. 208Rahmlo\\'. Hans xiiRnwalpi,ldi. A.\IC xi. 30. 56Reche. Reinhardt 152Regenbogen. Operation 49&gm.sburg. suppk ship 122Reichsmarine \'. I&ltu",. tanker 122Rmmull. H~IS30RhaJro/is. suppl)' hip 122Rio Gf(l"d~. blockade breaker 122li,'er mine 185Ri\'er Plate. Hattie of 30. 67rockets 188Rodl1f)', HM 53,59Rogge. Bernhard xi. 37, 86

273

Rogge. ~Ia.ximilian 219Rohwer.jOrgen 145Rosenbaum. l-Ielmtll 147Rosenstiel.jurgen \'On 150RO'j'aIOllR. H~I xi. 185RRR30,74Ruckteschell. Helmuth 41, 90, 94.

116.193RudolfAlbl?r'hl. suppl)' ship 122. 125Ruge. Friedrich 19Rumpf. Edh'ard 150

St .;\a7.aire xiii. 49Samurdi S\\'ord 8iSan wimiro. tanker 59San Diego. t.:SA 97. 99Salld1jord. tanker 74. 119$-boats IIIScharnhorst bunker 18Sc:harnhorst. battleship x. xi, 30. 31.

35.37.39.51.56.78Scharnhorst. Gerhard \'on 139SchI'er. pocket lxtuleship s« Ad,niml&/uyrScheer. Reinhard 140,212Schemmel. Alfred 100Schepke.joachim xii. 153Scheuermann. Hclmlll 249Scheurlen. Ernst 50Schichau Ship Yard 209Sc:hiff(ship) as prefix 86Sc:Jliffsla/1//1/division 240Schillig Roads 69&Mesien. battleship 51. 50, 221Srhll'swig-Hol.s(ti1l, battleship 44. 51,

60,221&hlms(at!t. suppl)' ship 122Schneidehind. Paul 137. 163Schnic\\ind. OttO 19, 163sch norkel xi\·. 160Scholer, Clemens 147Scholtz, Klaus 151Schulte-Hinrichs. Kpt,z_S, 100Schultze. Wilhem 74Schwantke. Hans-.joachim 137SchlL~lJ(IL midget craft 170Sealion. Operation 50Sl'arrhn'. H~IS 55Seebeck Wern 208

hlll/d. midget submarine 16-1. 165Srdril'gSlritll1lg22 IStdmftll69Seydliu. Friedrich 140shaft mine 185ShiffiM. H~IS 39. 119ship ''ards 200Shropshire Light Infantry 251Shropshi". H~fS 29.74Siberian Sea Passage 32. N. 87SibiriJroll'. ice breaker 76SKL 221Soldbuch 237Somali coaSt 48

Sondn-flilmr 126o 30

South Atlantic 151Spanish Chil War x, 62SfJtorflSh. HM Submarine 32. 65Special :":aval Service 126. 150Spec. Maximilian Graf\"on 139spn-rbrt.chn-69. 119. 126. 132Spt:ybtl1lk, freighter 118, 137Spichn'n. SUPpl}' ship 39. 79, 119, 122Spie . Friu ,iiSSS30StaJingrad xiiiStehr, }(Pl. 87

ltlmtla,*. freighter 87Steinhoff, Friedrich 188Suphm HopJciru, ship xiii, 92Sfin-. raider 41, 92Stiller, Alfred 125

lOOSS, Qtto 82Storstad. freighter 134, 135Strasbollrg. French h'arship 6, 30St.rauord·upon-A\'01l 145St{Ukenwerfl 204Suckling, Michael 52Suffoll<. I1MS 53Suhren, Teddy 182suicide weapons 167supplies 24. 39, 116Supply Ship Ann 125Surcouf, French submarine 150SUSSlX. HMS 29SJdnt!)', !-IMAS xiii, 87Sylt Island 171

T5 torpedo 181TIS 105Tl5i 11,109Tamlelfels, supply ship 32, 92, 122-n,rpon. US Submarine xiii, 90The Hague Conference 84Thetis. cruiser 221Thiele. August 32, 62Thienemann, Ernst 41. 87Thor. raider xii. 21. 33. 35. 4 I. 92. 163Thorn, tanker 79, 80, 123Tiechler, ,'On 219Tigris. HMS 123Timm, Heinrich 76Tirpitz, Alfred von 5, lOB, 140.248Tirpit:., battleship i, 15,25,51.56,

161,24Topp. Karl 51'Torpedo Crisis' 183torpedo mines 185Torpedo Trials Cenve 161.180torpedoes ISOTowariMhts<h, sail tr'aining ship 138Tre,'Or-Roper. H.R. 222Tridelt. HM Submarine 82Tnmchiffvnfxwd 125Trotha.Adolfvon 219

J N 0 EX

Truant, H~l Submarine 97T)'J>e VII performance 155T)l>e XXI xiv. 204. 207. 210Type XXIII xiv. 210

VB 145L'26148t.:2i 184V3045.156WI 198L'3i 79U39184U43137U4i 185U4846. 174, 182. 199U49156U81161U92182U99xiiU/()()xiiU//OxiiUI2314.47,197V/2474UI2639U/56xiiiUI81142U25276U255 152U30i143U406182U459 xiiU490xivU502150U51 I 188U558 123U56848U5iOxiiU6O/76U65247U85248U9iO 183U995215U232/ xivU250/ xi"U2505204U3004204U3506204U4i08206VA 15U·boat Archi,'e 211, 216U-boat bunkers 204, 209U-boat flotilla No.5 IU-boat Memorial 211Udcmrlarlt, suppl}' ship 78. 93. 123lflJ.un, freighter 94'Unconditional Surrender' 17unrestricted sea warfare 45

V2, rocket IValentin, bunker 207Vennehren, Werner 126Versailles Diktat v, ix, I, 10.61. 94.

274

95, I'll. iiiVeucr. Alfred 169Viano P.L. 45\'ic/OriOIiS. HMS 55\'1adi\"ostok 74Voith-Schneider propulsion 132Volksmarine 1l'Olla;rt. A.\IC 93V-ships 123Vulcanwerke 209Vulkanhafen 203

Wangenheim. Freiher von 100Warbunon·Lee. Bernard xiWarning. Erich 135Washington Treaty Cruisers 5Washington Treat)· 2. 12Wassner. En,i.n ,iiiWeddigen flotilla ixWeichold. Eberhard 162Weisspfennig. Walter 48Wellington. Duke of213Wellington. j'\ew Zealand 134Wenneker, l>auI27. 62, 86,126.150\\~, supply ship 123Westerplaue 44l'lslmuald. supply ship 27. 33. 119, 123Westip, LLZ.S. 59Werher, Kun xi, 37. 92Wichers.JJ.I60Widder. raider 43. 93"Whelm Guslloff, passenger ship xiv. 145Wilhelm Heidkamp, desu'o)'er 110Wilhelm, Kaiser xii, 219, 242Wilhelmshaven 3. 16. 69. 195. 207Wilkitzki Strait 76Wilm. HJ..jewcllers 249,251\\'innetou, supply ship 123Wiuhoeft-Emden ,~ii

Woennann Line 87Woldag, I-Ieinrich SOWolff, Max-Eckart 100Wollin, tanker 79, 123WOtan steel 3Wunderland. Operation i4Wunnbach, Hans-Heinrich 27, 69

X6161Xil61X-eraft xiii, 54. 161

trials in Gennan)' 161X-Plan 15

lO>*. I1MS 29Y-Plan 15

Zatorski, Walter '-on 79Zaullkonigtorpedo 181Zenker, Hans ,ii, 5, 223Zeppelin. Graf"on 140. 171Z-Plan x. 6, 15z..ships 123