george mason school of law

*George Mason School of Law

Contracts II

Warranties

F.H. [email protected]

*Conditions and WarrantiesPromises

ConditionsWarranties ElectionForfeitureDamages Damages only

Warranties

With a warranty a seller assumes a risk as to the product

The prior question is whether the risk should be born by the seller or the buyer*

*Lets say seller sells a whizbang

*The whizbang50% chance of a whizIt might go whiz

*The whizbang50% chance of a whiz, 50% of a bangIt might go whiz or it might go bang

*

The expected monetary value of an accident is p*LEvaluating risk: Expected Values

*

The expected monetary value of an accident is p*Lwhere p is the probability of occurrenceAnd L is the cost of the accident on occurenceEvaluating risk: Expected Values

*

So the expected monetary value for an accident with a 50 percent probability of a loss of $250 is $125

Evaluating risk: Expected Values

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsThe Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expected cost of a bang is $125The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expected cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100Seller is the least-cost risk avoiderThe Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100How will the parties assign the risk?The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Assume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100How will the parties assign the risk?Buyer will pay seller to assume the riskThe Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Assume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100How will the parties assign the risk?Buyer will pay seller to assume the riskAnd what will this do to the purchase price? The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Assume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100How will the parties assign the risk?Buyer will pay seller to assume the riskWhat is the range of prices between which the parties will bargain? The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Assume that the expect cost of a bang is $125Seller (but not Buyer) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100How will the parties assign the risk?Buyer will pay seller to assume the riskSeller will not accept less than $100 and (risk-neutral) buyer will not pay more than $125The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expected cost of a bang is $125Buyer (but not Seller) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100What happens now?Lets flip thisBuyer as Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*Seller sells a whizbang to Buyer for $1,000, with no warranties as to bangsAssume that the expected cost of a bang is $125Buyer (but not Seller) can eliminate this risk at a cost of $100Buyer will spend $100 to eliminate a risk with an EMV of $125Lets flip thisBuyer as Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*The parties will seek to assign the risk to the party who can most efficiently eliminate it.

The Least-Cost Risk Avoider

*The parties will seek to assign the risk to the party who can most efficiently eliminate it.An application of the Coase TheoremIf bargaining is costless, does it matter who bears the risk?


*The parties will seek to assign the risk to the party who can most efficiently eliminate it.An application of the Coase TheoremAnd if bargaining isnt costless?


*The parties will seek to assign the risk to the party who can most efficiently eliminate it.An application of the Coase TheoremYoure a judge. You have a pretty good idea who the least-cost risk avoider is. The parties have left the question of risk silent in their contract. How do you assign the risk?


*The parties will seek to assign the risk to the party who can most efficiently eliminate it.An application of the Coase TheoremMimicking the market


*

Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $125.On whom should the risk fall? Does it matter?A second way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*

Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $150.On whom should the risk fall? Does it matter?Suppose that seller is a large corporation and buyer is an impecunious consumer. Does that make a difference?A second way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*

Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $150.On whom should the risk fall? Does it matter?Suppose that seller is a large corporation and buyer is an impecunious consumer. Does that make a difference?Do risk preferences matter?A second way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

Are you an EMVer?An EMVer always selects the payoff with the highest expected monetary value (p*O)*

Are you an EMVer?An EMVer always selects the payoff with the highest expect monetary value (p*O)Suppose I offer you a lottery ticket with a .5 probability of 0 and a .5 probability of $2. Would you pay me 50 for the ticket?*

Are you an EMVer?An EMVer always selects the payoff with the highest expect monetary value (pO)Suppose I offer you a lottery ticket with a .5 probability of 0 and a .5 probability of $2. Would you pay me 50 for the ticket?EMV = .5($2) = $1.00*

Are you an EMVer?An EMVer always selects the payoff with the highest expect monetary value (pO)Suppose I offer you a lottery ticket with a .5 probability of 0 and a .5 probability of $10,002. Would you pay me $5,000 for the ticket?*

Are you an EMVer?An EMVer always selects the payoff with the highest expect monetary value (pO)Suppose I offer you a lottery ticket with a .5 probability of 0 and a .5 probability of $10,002. Would you pay me $5,000 for the ticket?EMV = .5($10,002) = $5,001*

*Three kinds of people

EMVers are risk neutralThey always take the gamble with the highest EMV


EMVers are risk neutral

Most people are risk averseTheyll pass on some opportunities with a positive EMV


EMVers are risk neutral

Most people are risk averse

Risk lovers are risk proneThey will accept some gambles with a negative EMV

*Recall what we said about utilityUtility is the economists measure of well-being (cf. utilitarianism)Ordinal Utility measures preferences without weighing them (first, second, third are ordinal numbers)Cardinal Utility (Benthams utils) weighs utility (one, two, three are cardinal numbers)

*Cardinal Utility plotted against EMVUtility$EMVFor EMVers, utility is linear with money

*Cardinal Utility plotted against EMVUtility$EMVFor the risk averse, the marginal utility of money declines (more money generates increasingly smaller increases in utility).

*Cardinal Utility plotted against EMVUtility$EMVA justification for progressive income taxation?

*There is a 50 percent probability of a loss of $250Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $125Would you assume that firms are risk-neutral and consumers risk averse as to a loss of $250?This suggests a second way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*There is a 50 percent probability of a loss of $250Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $125Would you assume the firms are risk-neutral and consumers risk averse?Would you expect the risk to be born by the wealthier party?This suggests a second way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*There is a 50 percent probability of a loss of $250Same example. But now neither party can eliminate the risk for less than $125On whom should the risk fall? Does it matter?Suppose that seller sells 10,000 whizbangs and buyer buys only one? Does that make a difference?Now--A third way of thinking about Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

Probability distribution for buyer*$EMV7501,000$750%.5

Probability distribution for seller of 60 whizbangs*$EMV%.5875

Probability distribution for seller of 10,000 whizbangs*$EMV875%1.0

Probability distribution for seller of 10,000 whizbangs*875%1.0All Curves have the same mean value ($875) but different risk (dispersion from the mean).

Probability distribution for seller of 10,000 whizbangs*$EMV875%1.0

*Where one party is better able to reduce the risk or the harm (or to value the loss)Assuming risk aversion, where one party is wealthier than the otherAssuming risk aversion, where one party is a better insurer because he can diversify the riskThree kinds of Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*Where one party is better able to reduce the risk or the harm (or to value the loss)Assuming risk aversion, where one party is wealthier than the otherAssuming risk aversion, where one party is a better insurer because he can diversify the riskWhere might third party insurance substitute?Three kinds of Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

*Where might third party insurance substitute?Liability for a faulty transmission?Break-in of a house?Emotional DistressWorld War III?Three kinds of Least-Cost Risk Avoiders

Express Terms: Sessa v. RiegleWas there a finding that the horse that was sold was defective?*

Express TermsWas there a finding that the horse that was sold was defective?Tendenitis might have resulted from the drive, or from unclean conditions in Sessas stableIn the later case, buyer took the risk*

Express TermsWas there a finding that the horse that was sold was defective?Tendenitis might have resulted from the drive, or from unclean conditions in Sessas stableIn the former case, who took the risk? UCC 2-501(1)(a), 2-504*

Express TermsWas there a finding that the horse that was sold was defective?Tendenitis might have resulted from the drive, or from unclean conditions in Sessas stableThrombosis might have been a pre-existing latent conditionMight the seller be liable for this?*

Express TermsWas this a promise that the horse would be sound after the saleLike a 5 year warranty on a sale of a car?

*

Express TermsWas this a promise that the horse would be sound after the saleE.g. 5 year warranty on a sale of a car

Was this a promise that the horse was sound at the time of the sale?the horse is soundthe horse is a good oneyou will like him*

Express Terms

Was this within UCC 2-313?A sale of goods? UCC 2-105*

Express Terms

Why this within UCC 2-313?Affirmation of factPart of the basis of the bargainNot an opinion or simple commendation*

Express Terms

A special rule for horse traders?horses are fragile creatures*

Express Terms

What about cattle and chinchillas?Can you distinguish Frederickson from McNair? p 665*

Express Terms

When does a statement become part of the basis of the bargain?*

Royal Business Machines p. 665

Copy machine:Was of high qualityExperience showed that the frequency of repair was very lowWould remain soWill bring buyer substantial profits*

Royal Business Machines p. 665

Copy machine:Machines were tested and ready to be marketedMaintenance costs specified*

Royal Business Machines

Copy machine:Machines will not cause fire*


Remand to determine if the statements formed part of the basis of the bargain*


Is reliance essential on an action for breach of warranty?UCC 2-313 Illustration 3*


Is reliance essential on an action for breach of warranty?UCC 2-313 Illustration 3But cf. Sessa at 664: this is essentially a reliance requirement*

Express Terms: Specificity

Searls v. Glasser 668: recession resistant?

Keith 668: sure-footed seaworthiness?*

Implied UCC Warranties

Merchantabilty: UCC 2-314

Fitness: UCC 2-315*

Merchantability

UCC 2-314: When goods are sold by a merchant dealing with goods of that kind2-314(2) Pass without objection in the tradeFair average qualityFit for ordinary purposes*

Merchantability

UCC 2-314: When goods are sold by a merchant dealing with goods of that kind2-314(2) Does reliance come into this?Should it be presumed?*

Merchantability

CausationQu. Lapse of timeI sell you a car whose transmission fails six months later?UCC 2-314, cmt. 13

*

Flippo 669

Remedy in tort?

*

Flippo

Remedy in tort?

Remedy in contract?

*

Flippo

Remedy in tort?

Remedy in contract?I.e., strict liability if breach of warrantyCf. Prosser on p. 672UCC 2-313B Note how materiality substitutes for reliance

*

Flippo

Remedy in tort?

Remedy in contract?What were the goods?

*

Merchantability

Qu. A car dealer sells a car which the buyer wants to use for off-terrain driving? *

Fitness: UCC 2-315

How is this different from merchantability?*

Fitness: UCC 2-315

How is this different from merchantability?What more is needed before fitness duties arise?Seller knows or has reason to knowParticular purposeBuyers reliance*

Fitness: UCC 2-315

How is this different from merchantability?What more is needed?Seller knows or has reason to knowParticular purposeBuyers reliance Why no warranty in Lewis and Sims at 674?*

Warranty of Workmanlike Performance

*


Does Article 2 apply to construction and services contracts? *


Would such as warranty amount to a guarantee as to quality, as under merchantability?*


Does Article 2 apply to construction and services contracts?What about Gulash v. Stylarama? 675 *


Does Article 2 apply to construction and services contracts?Suppose the pool had been negligently installed?*

Exemption Clauses

Pelc v. Simmonds

*

Exemption Clauses

Did the oral statements by Simmons amount to a warranty?*

Exemption Clauses

Did the oral statements by Simmons amount to a warranty?If so, were they excluded by the as is clause?UCC 2-316(3)(a)*

Exemption Clauses What if it had been proven that seller knew it was a clunker?Morris v. Macks*

Exemption Clauses What if seller in Pelc had said I guarantee its in good shape*

Exemption Clauses What if seller in Pelc had said I guarantee its in good shapeUCC 2-316(1)*

Weisz v. Parke-Bernet 680Can you spot the fake Van Gogh?*

Weisz v. Parke-Bernet

Why was the exemption clause ignored?*


Just what is a Raoul Dufy?*


Just what is a Raoul Dufy?Suisse Atlantique, [1967] A.C. 361 (H.L.)*


Contracts II

Warranties


Next day

Excuse (up to Scott 781)*

Perfect Tender vs.Substantial Performance Perfect tender required in UCC 2-601

Substantial PerformanceRestatement 229 (no disproportionate forfeiture unless material event)Restatement 237 (no uncured material failure

*

Is this a UCC transaction?

UCC 2-105Qu. Car dealer sells a factory car yet to be built?*


UCC 2-105Qu. Car dealer sells a factory car yet to be built?future goods 2-105(2)*


UCC 2-105Qu. In-ground swimming pool?Chlan 690*

Perfect Tender vs.Substantial Performance

When might the parties prefer perfect tender to substantial performance, and when vice versa?

*


When might the parties prefer perfect tender to substantial performance, and when vice versa?Relational contract that has been ongoing for five years?

*


When might the parties prefer perfect tender to substantial performance, and when vice versa?Contract where substantial reliance expenditures by one party (e.g. jacob and Young)

*


When might the parties prefer perfect tender to substantial performance, and when vice versa?Volatile commodities markets?

*

*Tempering the perfect tender rule

DivisibilityPresumption against forfeiture Waiver and estoppel Cure*


DivisibilityPresumption against forfeiture Modification, waiver and estoppel Cure*

*Presumption Against ForfeitureHoward

*

Presumption Against ForfeitureJacob & Young

Did the parties bargain for perfect tender in Jacob & Young?

*

Substantial Performance in Jacob & Young

*

Presumption Against ForfeitureJacob & Young

Would the parties have bargained for perfect tender?*

Substantial Performance

Was this like Grun Roofing at 682?

*

Substantial Performance

Was this like Grun Roofing at 682?

What is the test for substantial performanceand what is the border between warranty and conditionWhat did the court order?

*

Haymore v. Levinson 685

Is this Jacob and Young all over again?

Is substantial performance what the parties would bargain for? *

Grun Roofing vs. Haymore

Personal taste or fancy vs. operative fitnessSubjective mere taste may be controlling in the former case, and objective standard in the latter*

When is a breach material?

Restatement 229, 241*


Restatement 229, 241Qu. Intentional breaches?Builder substitutes a less expensive part he considers just as good?*


Restatement 229, 241Qu. Intentional breaches?Builder substitutes a part he considers just as good?Cardozo at 66: the willful transgressorMaterial Movers at 687*

Measure of damages

Plante v. Jacobs at 688Cost or repair or diminished value?How is this like the distinction between condition and warranty?*

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelClark v. West 644*The dirty little secret of textbook publishing revealed

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelWhat are Modifications?*

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelModifications are bilateral agreements to vary obligations under a contractRestatement 89Promises are modified*

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelModifications are bilateral agreements to vary obligations under a contractWhat are Waivers?*

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelModifications are bilateral agreements to vary obligations under a contractWaivers are unilateral acts by one party to excuse anothers performance of an obligationClark at 646Waivers as an election*

*Clark v. West

UCC 1-107. Waiver or Renunciation of Claim or Right After Breach. Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.

*

*Modification, Waiver, EstoppelModifications are bilateral agreements to vary obligations under a contractWaivers are unilateral acts by one party to excuse anothers performance of an obligation(Promissory) Estoppel bars a promisor from enforcing a right where he knows that a promisee has detrimentally relied on him. *

*Modification, Waiver, Estoppel at common law

Agreement Required?Reliance required?ModificationyesnoWaivernonoEstoppelnoyes

*Clark v. WestWhat was the promise?

*

*Clark v. WestWhat was the promise?Now you know why textbooks are so long.

Facts alleged on 647Would this be enough for an estoppel? A waiver?

*

*Election Waivers

Lee v. Casualty at p.656

*

*Estoppel WaiversWisconsin Knife Works

What was the contract?Spade Bits

*

Wisconsin Knife Works

What was the contract?Six Purchase Orders in Aug-Sept 1981 for delivery in Oct-Nov 1981New purchase orders in July 1982Seller not able to deliver first orders until December 198213 months lateJan 1983buyer rescinds after 50% completion under original orders*

*


What was the contract?Qu. The no-modification clausetracking UCC 2-209(2)How do you parse this?*

*


Modifications are binding w/o consideration. UCC 2-209(1)

*

*


Modifications are binding w/o consideration. UCC 2-209(1)Opportunism is addressed not by the consideration doctrine but by good fatih requirementsComment 2

*

*Post-contractual opportunism

Opportunism is addressed not by the consideration doctrine but by good faith requirements 1-203. Obligation of good faith. Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. *

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?

*

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?

*

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?How do you interpret 2-209(2)?But except as between merchantsEasterbrook at 655 (casual subsequent remarks)

*

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4)

*

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4)So does waiver eat up modification?

*

*Loss of the right to rescind:Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel

Agreement Required?Reliance required?ModificationyesnoWaivernonoEstoppelnoyes

*


What was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4)So does waiver eat up modification?Posner: Not if waiver requires reliance: can operate as a waiver

*

*

Wisconsin Knife WorksWhat was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4)So does waiver eat up modification?Posner: Not if waiver requires relianceAnd was there reliance here?NMCs work from July 82 on?

*

*Wisconsin Knife WorksWhat was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4) Easterbrook on waiver: 2-209(5) implies that waiver does not ordinarily require reliance

*

*Wisconsin Knife WorksWhat was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4) Easterbrook on waiver: 2-209(5) implies that waiver does not ordinarily require reliance What instead it requires is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.

*

*Wisconsin Knife WorksWhat was the evidence of modification or waiver here?Was an unwritten modification valid?Was waiver available? UCC 2-209(4) Easterbrook on waiver: 2-209(5) implies that waiver does not ordinarily require reliance What instead it requires is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. And might work even if modification doesnt.

*

*Modification and Waiver in the UCCModifications are binding w/o consideration. UCC 2-209(1)Modifications can be barred by express agreement, UCC 2-209(2)Unless signed written modificationBut waivers still permitted. UCC 2-209(4)Tho these can be retracted unless other parties changes position. UCC 2-209(5)

*

*Why no waiver in Suzuki?*

*Why no waiver in Suzuki?

Termination clauses and agency costsWisconsin Fair Dealership Law, 1974 135.03Cancellation and alteration of dealerships. No grantor, directly or through any officer, agent or employee, may terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause. The burden of proving good cause is on the grantor.*

*Why no waiver in Suzuki?Free riding in franchises*Dirty Macdonalds restaurant

*Things looked simple at common lawPromises

ConditionsWarranties ElectionForfeitureDamages Damages only

Theyre more complicated in the UCCBuyers Remedies2-601 Perfect Tender requiredConforming goods 2-106

*

Buyers Remedies in the UCC2-601 Perfect Tender requiredAccept2-606Reject 2-602

*


Action for price paid 2-711(1)Damages for non-delivery 2-711(1)(b), 2-713Cover 2-711(1)(a), 2-712

*

Cure by Seller2-601 Perfect Tender requiredAccept2-606Reject 2-602

Cure 2-508Dont cure*


Damages 2-714, 2-715

*


Revocation of Acceptance 2-608, 2-607(2)

*


Damages 2-714, 2-715Revocation of Acceptance 2-608, 2-607

Cancel 2-711(1), 2-106(4)Damages 2-711, 2-713Specific performance? 2-711(2)

*

Sellers Remedies

Goods not deliveredGoods delivered

*

Sellers Remedies


Withhold delivery 2-703(a)Stoppage in transitu 2-703(b), 2-705Damages 2-703(d)-(e), 2-708*

Sellers Remedies


Action for the price 2-709(1)Damages 2-709(1), 2-710*

Cure and Perfect Tender

The problem of buyer opportunism is in part addressed by the sellers right to cure

*

Opportunism and Perfect Tender?

TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?

*


TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?The sulfur content was promised to be 0.5%The price of oil had fallen by 25%

*


*


TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508When was delivery to take place?*


TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508When was delivery to take place, and when did it take place?*


TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508When was delivery to take place, and when did it take place?What if seller had retendered on Jan. 28?*

Whats the opportunism problem under perfect tender?TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508Before delivery date: 2-508(1)Cure after: 2-508(2)Seasonable noticeReasonable timeSeller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, with or without money allowance

*

Whats the opportunism problem under perfect tender?TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508Before delivery dateCure afterSeasonable noticeReasonable timeSeller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, with or without money allowanceMust seller know that tender will be non-conforming? Nordstrom on Sales*

Opportunism and Perfect Tender?TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508Qu. Cure before delivery dateSeasonably notify buyer---why?What if first tender is junk?*

Opportunism and Perfect Tender?TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508Before delivery dateSeasonably notify buyer---why?What if first tender is junk?Ramirez at 697: an unconditional right to cure before the delivery date*

Opportunism and Perfect Tender?TW Oil: Why did buyer reject?Cure: 2-508Before delivery dateSeasonably notify buyer---why?What if first tender is junk?Ramirez at 697: an unconditional right to cure before the delivery dateWhat was the delivery date in Zabriskie p. 702*

Why no cure permitted in Ramirez?

Delivery scheduled for August 3Trial Court finds rejection on Aug. 14*

Why no cure permitted in Ramirez?Delivery scheduled for August 3Rejection on Aug. 14Did sellers effect a cure?Held not: 2-508(2)

Why no cure permitted in Ramirez?Delivery scheduled for August 3Rejection on Aug. 14Did sellers effect a cure?Did buyers accept the goods?2-606Semble not, so no need to revoke acceptanceNo revocation unless substantial impairment: 2-608*

Can 2-508 be waived by seller?Qu. Consumer goods where seller specifies goods satisfactory or money refunded*

When is buyer opportunism most a problem, and cure rights most needed?*

When is buyer opportunism most a problem, and cure rights most needed?

Idiosyncratic goods

Volatile markets

*

How might sellers behave opportunistically, given cure rights?*

How might sellers behave opportunistically, given cure rights?Sloppiness as to delivery?*

How might sellers behave opportunistically, given cure rights?Sloppiness as to delivery?

Sloppy repair: Ramirez, Zabriskie*


Contracts II

Mistake


*************************************************

george mason school of law

Documents

cost risk avoiderthe

expected cost

riskneutral buyer

levaluating risk

occurenceevaluating

expected values

expected monetary value

lwhere p