AbstrctAccountability engenders performance with afocus on results. Every institution ororganisation knows that accountability isconceptwhich governments are onlybeginningtocometogrips with.This studyexamines the genesis of accountability: a globalview.Theconcept of accountabilityhasbeenviewed fromvarious disciplinary lenses inorder to develop an integrated understanding ofthe term. Special attention is devoted toprincipalagent perspectives from politicalscience and economics. An integratedframework is developed based on four centralobservations.!"# Accountabilityisrelationalinnature andis constructed through inter$ andintra$organi%ational relationships. !Accountability is complicated by the dual roleofnonprofitsasbothprincipalsandagentsintheir relationships with other actors. !'#(haracteristics of accountability necessarilyvarywiththe type of nonprofit organi%ationbeing examined. !)# Accountability operatesthrough external as well as internal processessuch that an emphasis on external oversight andcontrol misses other dimensions ofaccountability essential to nonprofitorgani%ations.The time has come forindividuals organisations stakeholdersestablishments institutions and governmentsto focus on reporting on their programmeresults. *eing clear about intentions measuringand understanding results and makingad+ustments where necessary would helpassure taxpayers,stakeholders that their moneyis being spent wisely. Afocus on resultswouldalsohelptoensure that limited publicresources are being applied in a waythatprovides the most value to all concerned.IntroductionAccountability is an often used word yetthe concept of accountability is not easilyunderstood. -hen peoplehear the wordaccountability theyknow thatit meanssomethingimportantbut that.sabout asfar as itgoes.Subse/uentlybecausethey don.tgrasp theconcept ofaccountability theydon.tknowhowto !andcan.t#achieve it.0ften thewordresponsibilityis usedincon+unctionwiththewordaccountability. -henhearing thewordaccountabilitymanyThe emancipation of accountability from its bookkeeping origins is therefore originally an Anglo-American phenomenon if only becauseother languages, such as French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, utch, or !apanese, ha"e no e#act e$ui"alent an% %o not &yet' %istinguish semantically bet(een responsibility an% accountability &)ulgan *+++, -arlo( *++*./0-/1, ubnick *++*'2/ /2* Accountability as a Symbol1nthe234ideologypublicaccountabilityisboth an instrument and a goal. -hat started asan instrument to enhance the effectiveness andefficiency of public governance has graduallybecome a goal in itself. 2owadaysaccountabilityhas becomea5oodThing ofwhich it seems we cannot have enough !3ollit&66': 78#. As a concept however9accountability. is rather elusive. 1t has becomea hurrah$word like 9learning. 9responsibility.or 9solidarity. to which no one can ob+ect. 1t isone of those evocative political words that canbeusedtopatchuparamblingargument toevoke an image of trustworthiness fidelity and+ustice or to hold critics at bay. 4elvin :ubnick !&66&: &$'# gives a fineexample of the evocative use of the concept. ;e" 1n 5ermanic languages such as :utch there is a distinction between "erant(oor%eli3khei% and "erant(oor%ing which to some extent resembles the contemporary distinction between 9responsibility. and 9accountability.. *ut even here both obviously are semantically closely related they are derived from ant(oor%en and therefore closely connected to 9responsibility.. 1n :utch policy discourse 9accountability. is therefore often left untranslated because it is taken to stand for a broad loosely defined trend towards a more managerial approach in the public sector. 1n :utch the word rekenschap !4echenschaft in 5erman# comes closest to the original auditory meaning of accountability.has madea scan ofthelegislationthat hasbeenproposedtothe 6proposedbills ineach two$year term.The focusof these9accountabilitybills. isextremelybroad andranged in&66"$&66&from theAccountability forAccountants Act theAccountability for3residential 5iftsAct and5egal accountability.courts 1nmost westerncountries legal accountabilityisofincreasingimportance to public institutions as a result ofthe growingformalisation of social relations!?riedman "87=@ *ehn &66": =A$=7# or becauseof thegreater trust whichisplacedincourtsthaninparliaments !;arlow&66&:"7#. Thesecan be the 9ordinary. civil courts as in *ritainor also specialised administrative courtsas in?rance *elgium and The 2etherlands !;arlow&66&:"A$"7#. 1n some spectacular cases ofadministrative deviance such as the affaire dusang !the ;1B contaminated blood products# in?rance or the Tangentopoli prosecutions in1taly public officials have even beensummoned before penal courts. A%ministrati"e. au%itors, inspectors, an%controllers2ext to the courts a wide range of/uasi$legal forums exercising independent andexternal administrative and financialsupervision and control has been established inthe past decades $ some even speak of an 9auditexplosion. !3ower "88)#. These newadministrative forums vary from Europeannational or local ombudsmen and audit officesto independent supervisory authoritiesinspector generals anti$fraud offices andchartered accountants. Professionalaccountability.professional peers4anypublicmanagersare apartfrombeinggeneralmanagersprofessionals in amoretechnicalsense.They havebeentrained asengineersdoctorsveterinariansteachersor policeofficers!Abbot"877@?reidson&66"#.This mayimplyaccountabilityrelationships with6n%i"i%ual accountability:7ach for himself:uring the +udgement phase which can involvethe imposition of sanctions hierarchical andcollective accountability strategies often run upagainst moral ob+ections as a proportionalrelation between crime and punishment is by nomeans always evident. An individualaccountability in which each individual officialisheldproportionatelyliablefor hispersonalcontribution to the infamous conduct of theorganisation isfromamoral standpoint afarmoreade/uatestrategy. @ *ehn&66": '6@ ;alachmi &66&a@ Tonkens &66'#. The/uestions remains however: howdoweestablish whether these different sorts of inade/uacies do existC ?or an institutionalised ideal that is so broadly supported and applied there are very few referencesto be found in the literature that could lead to such an evaluation being performed let alone any reports onsystematic comparative research conducted in this area. Authors such as Ban Twist !"888# *ehn !&66"#;alachmi !&66&b# and 4ulgan !&66'# offer discussions of the many dilemmas and design problems in thestructure of accountability arrangements but the underlying normative /uestions K what is the purpose ofpublic accountabilityin a constitutional democratic state and what are the evaluation principles foraccountability arrangements ensuing from thisC K tend to be glossed over in these contributions. SowhyispublicaccountabilityimportantC-hat isthepurposeof thevariousdifferent formsdistinguished in this paperC 1n the academic literature and in policy publications about public accountabilitythreeanswers recur albeit implicitly timeandagain. 3ublicaccountabilityis important toprovideademocratic means to monitor and control government conduct for preventing the development ofconcentrations of power and to enhance the learning capacity and effectiveness of public administration!Aucoin I ;eint%man &666#. Each of these three answers yields a separate theoretical perspective on therationalebehindpublicaccountabilityandaseparateperspectivefor theassessment of accountabilityrelations. The cybernetic perspecti"e. enhancing the learning capacity1na cybernetic perspective on publicaccountability the purpose of accountabilitylies more inmaintainingandstrengtheningthe learningcapacity of the public administration !Ban den *erg "888: )6@ Aucoin I;eint%man &666:=&$=)#.Accountability is not only useful as a check it also leads to prevention. Accountability forces administratorsto traceconnections betweenpastpresent and future !9t;art&66"#. Anadministratorwho iscalledtoaccount is confronted with his policy failures and he is aware that in the future he can be called upon againevenmore pitilesslyto renderaccount.The publicnatureofgiving accountteachesothersin thesameposition about the accountability process. 3arliamentary in/uiries for example K especially when broadcaston TB K cast their shadow well ahead far beyond the concrete issue forming the sub+ect of the in/uiry andcan oblige numerous administrators and public servants to ad+ust their policies.There is a longstanding cybernetic tradition in political science and related fields with which thisidea neatly fits. At the heart of this tradition is the /uestion of the extent to which political systems arecapable of dealing ade/uately with changes in environment and with feedback about their own functioning!:eutsch "8A'@ Easton "8A=@ Fuhmann "8AA#. 1n this context Findblom !"8A=# referred to the Lintelligenceof democracy.: the superiority of the pluralist democracy to that of other political systems lies in the greaternumber of incentives it contains to encourage intelligence and learning in the process of policymaking. :o# 0. The importance of public accountabilityirect:emocratic control(hecks and balances1mprovement,learning6n%irectFegitimacy(atharsis;2; 7"aluation frame(orks for accountability The three perspectives outlined above offer more systematic frameworks to evaluate the effects ofaccountability arrangements. !The two other indirect rationales for public accountability will not be furtherdiscussed as these concern meta$effects that are difficult to evaluate or play a role in special cases only#.The /uestion central to the democratic perspective is whether the accountability arrangement adds tothe possibilities open to voter parliament or other representative bodies to control the executive power. Thusviewed themainconcernisthat theaccountabilityarrangements yieldrelevant informationabout theconduct of the government. The ma+or issue in assessing accountability arrangements from this perspectiveis whether theyhelp to overcome agencyproblems such as moral ha%ard !Strom&66'#: do theseaccountabilityarrangements helptoprovide political principals withsufficient informationabout thebehaviour of their agentsanddotheyoffer enoughincentives toagentstocommit themselvestotheagenda.s of their democratically elected principalsC?rom a constitutional perspective the key /uestion is whether the arrangement contributes to thepreventionof corruptionandtheabuseof powers. Thisstandpoint demandsthat publicaccountabilityforums be visible tangible and powerful in order to be able to withstand both the inherent tendency of thosein public office to dexterously evade control and the autonomous expansion of power of the all$encompassing bureaucracy. The ma+or issue from this perspective is whether accountability arrangementsoffer enough incentives for officials and agencies to refrain from abuse of authority. :oes the accountabilityforum have enough in/uisitive powers to reveal corruption or mismanagement are the available sanctionsstrong enough to have preventive effectsCThe cybernetic perspective obviously focuses on the /uestion of whether the arrangement enhancesthe learning capacity and effectiveness of the public administration. This viewpoint will +udgeaccountabilityarrangementsandotherfeedbackmechanismstobesuccessful iftheygeneratefeedbackinformation and stimulate elite groups to reflect and to debate about the significance of this information withothers !Ban der Gnaap "88=#. The crucial /uestions from this perspective are whether the accountabilityarrangements offer sufficient feedback but also the right incentives to officials and agencies to reflect upontheir policies and procedures and to improve upon them.4 Analysing and assessing accountability1n Europe there has long been a concern that the trend toward European policymaking is not being matchedbyane/uallyforceful creationof appropriateaccountabilityregimes!Schmitter &666#. Accountabilitydeficits are said to exist and even grow compromising the legitimacy of the European polity !(urtin &66)@*ergman and :amgaard &666#. *ut how can we make a more systematic assessment of the various publicaccountabilities regardingin thiscasetheexerciseofEuropeangovernance andestablishwhether andwhere accountability deficits do existCThis paper has tried to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by askingthreetypesof /uestions thusprovidingthreetypesof buildingblocksfor suchanevaluation. ?irst aconceptual one: what exactly is meant by accountabilityC Accountability is often used in a very broad senseas asynonymfor avarietyof evaluative but essentiallycontestedconcepts suchas responsivenessresponsibility and effectiveness. 1n this paper the concept of accountability is taken in a much more narrowsense: a relationship between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to+ustify his or her conduct the forum can pose /uestions and pass +udgment and the actor can be sanctioned.This implies that the focus of accountability research should be on ex post facto processes in governanceand not on ex ante inputs. The ex ante inputs in governance are very important for the legitimacy of theEuropean 7 9Accountability and ;elping: -hen 2eeds ExceedEesourcesN!ournal of Personality an% Social Psychology 'A: ')'$'=6.Algemene Eekenkamer &66) Achtergron%stu%ie bre%e publieke "erant(oor%ing bi3 47 8rganisational 5earning. A Theory of ActionPerspecti"e Eeading 4ass.Arnull A. I :. -incott &66" Accountability an% 5egitimacy in the 7uropean >nion 2ewHork I 0xford: 0nion Fondon: ?rank (ass.*ickel Alexander "8A& The least %angerous branch. The Supreme @ourt at the bar ofpolitics 1ndianapolis,2ew Hork.*ovens 4ark "887 The Auest for 4esponsibility. Accountability an% @iti9enship in@omple# 8rganisations. (ambridge: (ambridge ).;arlow (. &66& Accountability in the 7uropean >nion, 0xford: 0xford >$A8).4agnette 3aul (hristian Fe/uesne 2icolas Jabko I 0livier (osta &66' 9(onclusion: :iffuse democracy in the European : )>"$)8).4ei+er Albert &66&e %oor9ichtige o"erhei%. Parlementaire en 3uri%ische controle in hetinformatieti3%perk :elft: Eburon.4ei+er Albert &66' 9Transparent government: 3arliamentary and legal accountability in an information age.6nformation Polity 7: A>$>7.4ei+er Albert &66) ?reem%e ogen %(ingen. e betekenis "an internet "oor maatschappeli3ke controle in%e publieke sector, :en ;aag: *oom Juridisch. 4ulgan Eichard &666a 9(omparing Accountability in the 3ublic and 3rivate sector. Australian !ournal ofPublic A%ministration =8,": 7>$8>.4ulgan Eichard &666b 9DAccountabilityD: An ever expanding (onceptC. Public A%ministration >7: ===.4ulgan E. &66' -ol%ing Po(er to Account. Accountability in )o%ern emocracies *asingstoke: 3elgrave.0.(onnell Fenahan &66= 93rogram Accountability as an Emergent 3roperty: The Eole of Stakeholders in a 3rogram.s ?ield. Public A%ministration 4e"ie( A= ": 7=$8'.0.:onnell 5uillermo "888 9;ori%ontal Accountability in 2ew :emocracies. in: Andreas Schedler Farry :iamond I 4arc ?. 3lattner !ed# The Self-4estraining State. Po(er an% Accountability in Be( emocracies Fonden: Fynne Eienner 3ublishers: &8$=".3ollitt (. I ;. Summa "88> 9Eeflexive watchdogsC ;ow supreme audit institutions account for themselves. Public A%ministration >=,&: '"'$''A.3ollitt (. &66' The 7ssential Public )anager Fondon: 0pen :&A"$&78.Strom Gaare &66' 93arliamentary :emocracy and :elegation. in: G. Strom et al.!eds.# elegation an% Accountability in Parliamentary emocracies 0xford: 0): 86=$8"A.Tonkens E. &66' )on%ige burgers, getem%e professionals. )arkt(erking, "raagsturing en professionaliteit in %e publieke sector