general rules in humes treatise

8/3/2019 General Rules in Humes Treatise

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"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise

Hearn, Thomas K.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October

1970, pp. 405-422 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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"General Rules"in Hume's Treatise

THOMAS K. HEARN, JR.

IT COULD BE CONFIDENTLY ASSERTED in 1925 tha t H u m e wa s "n o lon ger a l ivingf i gu r e ." x S t ua r t Ham ps h i r e r eco r ds t ha t wh en h e beg an h i s ph i l o sop hy s t ud i e s i n1 9 3 3 , H u m e ' s c o n c lu s i o n s w e r e r e g a r d e d a t O x f o r d a s " e x t r a v a g a n c e s o f s c e p t-i c i sm w h i c h n o o n e c o u l d s e r io u s l y a c c e p t . " 2 T h a t v i r t u al l y n o A n g l o - A m e r i c a np h i l o s o p h e r w o u l d n o w s h a r e s u ch o p i n io n s a b o u t H u m e t es ti fi es n o t o n l y to t h egene r a l change i n the ph i l o sop h i ca l c l i m a t e bu t , i n add i t i on , i t r ef lec ts a t r an s f o r m a-t i on wh i ch has occu r r ed i n t he i n t e r p r e t a t i on o f Hum e ' s ph i l o sophy . I n e i t e c t i ng t h i st r a n s f o r m a t i o n . m uc h c r e d it is d u e t o t h e w o r k o f N o r m a n K e m p S m i t h . K e m p S m i t ha r g u e d t h a t p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h H u m e ' s e m p i r i c i s t h e r i t a g e a n d h i s s c e p t i c i s m h a db l i nded s cho l a r s t o t he f undam en t a l l y cons t r uc t i ve i n t en t o f h i s ph i l o sophy , and ,i ndeed , t ha t on l y f r om t he pe r spec t i ve o f h i s pos i t i ve ach i evem en t was i t pos s i b l e t og r a sp t he na t u r e and s i gn i fi c ance o f Hu m e an s cep t i ci sm . Th i s pape r , i n keep i ng wi t ht he ba s ic o r i en t a t i on o f K em p Sm i t h , s e ts ou t a c en t r a l f e a t u r e i n t he a t t em pt t od e s c r i b e a n d a s s e s s H u m e ' s c o n s t r u c t i v e , n o n s c e p t i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w :

H um e a t t ri bu t e s t o gene r a l r u le s "a m i gh t y i n fl uence on ou r ac t i ons a nd und e r -s t a n d i n g . . . " ( 37 4) . 4 T h i s p a p e r e x a m i n e s t h e Treatise t o show t ha t t h i s was no tj u s t a c a sua l com m en t . To d i s cus s t he " i n f l ue nce" o f gene r a l r u l e s r equ i r e s ane x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e ir c h a r a c t e r a n d t h e v a r i o u s a s p e c ts o f " a c t io n a n d u n d e r s t a n d -i ng" i n wh i ch such r u l es f unc t i on . Th e t he s i s to be deve l o ped can b e s t a t ed b r ie f ly . I nBo ok I H um e i n t r oduces t w o so r t s o f gene r a l r u l e s wh i ch m u s t be d i s t ingu i shed ca r e -f u ll y . One t ype o f r u le de sc r i be s a p r ope ns i t y o f t he i m ag i na t i on t o ex t end t he s co pe

This research was supported by a grant from the National Foundation on the Artsand Humanities.x Charles W. Hen dcl, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1963),p. 20. (First published in 192 5.) Fo r Professo r He nde l's later com men ts on this statement,see pp. xxi ft."Hume's Place in Philosophy" in David Hume, ed. D. F. Pears (Lon don, 1963), p. 3.a Prope r stress is due here to the phrase "basic orientation." The re is much ab outKe mp Smith's understanding of H um e which is mistaken in my view.9 Th e page references in pa renthe ses refe r to the Svlby-Bigge edition of A Treatise o/Human Nature (Oxford, 1888).[4o5]


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406 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yof judgments form ed in one set of circumstances to othe r resembling bu t non- ident icalcircumstances. The other type of general rule, the discussion of which largely oc-cupies th is paper , funct ions to correct cer tain natural propensi t ies which resul t iner roneous bel ief or act ion i f permit ted to operate unchecked. The same pat tern ,a natural tendency requiring correction by general rules, is exhibited in all threebooks o f the Treatise, and can be said to represent one of the basic ingredients inHum e's account o f human natu re and exper ience.

I t is som ewh at surpr is ing that in a bo ok which pa t ient ly discusses almost evcxytheme in the Treatise, Kemp Smith 's s tudy contains no discussion at al l of rules .This is the more puzzl ing as Kemp Smith clear ly recognized that by ref lect ion theunderstanding supplies pr inciples which are normative for the interpretat ion ofexperience. 5 Ou r aim in this s tudy is to discuss wh at fo r H um e these pr inciplesare, and, as far as possible, how they f it in to the Hum ea n accoun t of hum an nature.A fuller understanding of the nature and function of such reflective principles isrequired to spare Kemp Smith 's in terpretat ion f rom a seeming inconsis tency. Thisapparent inconsis tency ar ises because Kemp Smith takes the s lavery of reason tothe passions as the "key" to his understanding of Hume, but then develops thev iew tha t fo r Hum e rea son /s a pass ion , in Hum e's words , "a wonder fu l and un-intelligible instinct." (179)6 The inconsistency disappears when it is recognizedthat Kem p Smith 's account of Hu m e requires a mo re subt le and complex under-s tanding of the role of reason than that suggested by the emphasis on the "s laveryof reason" especial ly in the ear ly par ts of the book. T his s tud y represents a wayof supplying the bro ade r and mo re const, ructive understanding of rea son whichKemp Smith 's v iew of Hume requires .

Another impor tant element in Kemp Smith 's s tudy is the insis tence on the basicaffinities be twe en Hu me 's mora l th eory and ep istemology. Believing that i t wasthrough the "gateway of morals" that Hume establ ished the basic doctr ines of theTreatise, Ke mp Smith undermined the posi tiv ist ic in terpretat ion of Hu m e by insis t ingthat feeling is no less central to Hu m e's accou nt of empirical jud gme nt th an it is in hisaccount o f morals. The pr inciple of vivacity is the found at ion of empixical bel ief forHume, and this same pr inciple funct ions in Hume's account of morals becausesymp athy is regarded as a mechanism where by ideas of passions bec om e enl ivened.We shaU see that the pr inciple o f vivaci ty does not per se commit Hume to e i therepistemolo gical scepticism or ethical subjectiv, sm. Ge nera l rules pro vide c orrective,normative pr inciples for the evaluat ion of those feel ings which form the basis of bothempir ical and moral bel iefs . Concem4ng matters of fact Hume states that thedegree of vivaci ty and assent are not propor t ional : "A like xeflection on generalrules keeps us f rom augment ing our be l ie f upon every increase o f the fo rce and

The Philosophy of DavM Hume (Lon don, 1960), pp. 128, 382-388. First published 'in 1941.6 Kemp Sm ith regards "passion " in Hume as the name of a cla ss wh ich includes"instinct" among other things. See p. 11.


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" G E N E R A L R U L E S " I N H UM E ' S TREATISE 407v i v a c it y o f o u r i d e a s . " ( 6 3 2 ) H e r e c o g n i z es t h a t i n m o r a l m a t t e r s o u r s y m p a t h i e s a r e"m or e li 've ly" depend in g on the spec ia l r e l a tionsh ips in wh ich w e s t and to theob jec t s o f mora l eva lua t ion . Ho wev e r , a s in the ca se o f empi r i ca l be li e f, t he fo rce o ffee l ing mus t be c heck ed by gene ra l ru le s i f one i s to be a " jud ic ious spec ta to r . "Fur the rmore , in bo th fac tua l and mora l ma t t e r s the in f luences o f na tu ra l f ee l ingso r p ropens i t ie s and co r rec t ive ru le s re su l t i n a k ind o f " inn e r conf l i ct . " In B oo k Io f t h e Treatise t he imag ina t ion and the judg men t conf li c t, wh i l e in Bo ok I I I the r e canbe oppos i t ion be tween the judgment and the sympa the t i c a f fec t ions . Such conf l i c tmeans tha t a t some t imes the one and a t o the r t imes the o the r w i l l p reva i l , bu tHu me ' s c l a im is tha t one w ho ad he re s m os t r e so lu te ly to the re f l ec t ive ru le s is mos tl ike ly to rende r an appropr i a t e ve rd ic t .

I t i s i n the con tex t o f " re f l ec t ions " added to the d i s cus s ion o f p robab i l i ty tha tthe subjec t of ru les i s f i rs t ra ised in the Treatise. H u m e ' s r e m a r k s a t t h i s p o i n tconce rn the in f luence o f gene ra l ru le s on the pas s ions , and he comments , "Thesegene ra l ru le s we sha l l exp la in p re sen t ly . " (142) The exp lana t ion fo l lows in the nex ts ec t ion which i s conce rned wi th the sub jec t o f unph i losoph iea l p robab i l i ty . The rei s a spec ie s o f unph i losoph iea l p robab i l i ty , s ays Hu me , wh ich i s de r ived f ro mgene ra l ru le s wh ich we " ra sh ly fo rm to ou rse lves , and which a re the source o f wha twe p ro pe r ly ca ll P re ju d ice . " (146) A n i l lu s tra t ion fo l lows:An Ir ishman cannot have wi t , and a Frenchman cannot have sol id i ty ; for which 'reason, the ' the conversation of the former in any instance be vis ibly very agreeable,and of the lat ter very judicious, we have entertain 'd such a prejudice against them, thatthey must be dunces or fops, in spite of sense and reason. (146)We a re then g iven the p romised exp lana t ion o f gene ra l ru le s :Shou 'd i t be demanded why me n fo rm general ru les , and a l low them to inf luence the i rjudgment, even contrary to present observation and experience, I shou'd reply, thatin my opinion i t proceeds f rom those very pr inc ip les , on which a t [ judgments con-cerning causes and effects depend. O ur judgments concerning cause and effect areder iv 'd f rom cus tom and exper ience ; and when we have been accus tom'd to see oneobject united to another, our imagination passes from the firs t to the second by anatural transit ion, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by i t .Now i t i s the na ture of cus tom not only to opera te wi th i t s fu l l force , when objec tsare presented, that a re exactly the same with those to which we have been acc ustom'd;but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as are s imilar; andtho' the habit loses somewhat of i ts force by every difference, yet ' t is seldom destroy'dwhere any considerable circumstances remain the same. (147)


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408 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H YThus , the o r ig in o f gene ra l ru le s i s to be sough t in the s ame p r inc ip le s "on whicha l l ou r judgmen ts co nce rn ing ea us ~ and e f fec ts depe nd , " i . e. , t he e f fec t o f cons t an tcon ju nc t ion in gene ra t ing hab i t o r cus tom. T he imag ina taon has a p ropens i ty toex tend op in ions de r ived f ro m o ne s e t o f c i rcums tances to re sembl ing s e ts o f c i rcum-s tances . This propens i ty i s a source of genera l ru les . In e ffec t , genera l ru les resul tf rom the com bine d e f fec ts on the imag ina t ion o f cus tom and re semblance .

Hume immedia te ly conf ron t s an ob jec t ion to h i s the s i s tha t a l l j udgments a refo rmed on the bas i s o f cus tom. I f cus tom wi thou t qua l i f i ca t ion were the on ly fo rcea t work in o u r rea son ing , i t wou ld n o t be pos s ib le to a ccou n t fo r conf l i c t ing e l e -men t s in xeason ing . Hu m e acknowledges such co r tf li e t and a t t r ibu tes i t to the d i f -fe r ing in f luence o f cus tom on the imag ina t ion and the judgm ent .Th e ' cus tom be the foundat ion of a l l our judgments, ye t somet imes i t has an effec t onthe imagination in opposit ion to the judgment, and produces a contrariety in oursentiments concerning the same object. (147-148)A mor e comp le te s t a t emen t o f the d i ff i cu l ty i s al so g iven :According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom . . . I tmay, therefore , be concluded, tha t our judgment and imagina t ion can never becontrary , and tha t cus tom cannot opera te on the la t te r facul ty a f te r such a manner ,as to render i t oppos i te to the former . This d i~cul ty we can remove af te r no o thermanner, than by supposing the influence of general rules . (149)

Hawing red uce d a l l r ea son ing conce rn in g ma t t e r s o f fac t to cus tom, ho w i s H um eto exp la in the fac t tha t cus tom ' s in f luence pe rmi t s an oppos i t ion o f judgm ent andi m a g i n a ti o n ? T h e p r o b l e m c a n o n l y b e a ns w e r e d, H u m e c o m m e n t s , b y " s u p p o s i n gthe in f luence o f gene ra l ru le s . " Th i s now b r ings us to an in te re s t ing and impor tan taspec t of our d iscuss ion.

One o f the e ffec ts o f cus tom on the imag ina t ion i s the fo rma t ion o f ru le s o f ace r t a in so r t . "Gene ra l ru le " i s ha rd ly the bes t way to des igna te the no t ion Hume i semploy ing he re . Wha t i s invo lved i s a gene ra l i z ing p ropens i ty o f the imag ina t ionwhich ex tends the s cope o f judgments o r op in ions unde r ce r t a in cond i t ions . Whena g iven judg me nt has bee n fo rm ed on the bas is o f a pa r t i cu la r s e t o f c i rcum -s tances C , the imag ina t ion has a p ropens i ty to gene ra l i ze and make the s ame judg-m e n t i n o i r c u m s t a n c e s C ' o r C " . H a v i n g f o r m e d t h e o p in i o n t h a t I r i s h m e n a r e w it le sson the basi s o f the obse rva t ion o f a ce r t a in num ber o f du l l I r i shmen , the imag ina t ionhas a p ro pens i ty to ex tend th i s ve rd ic t to a new se t o f cond i t ions in wh ich o ne i sc o n f r o n t e d b y a n I r i s h m a n w h o i s a p p a r e n t l y v e r y w i tt y . T h e i m a g i n a t io n ' sp ropens i ty to gene ra l i ze i s gove rned l a rge ly by the degree o f r e semblance o f thecond i t ions , bu t th i s p ropens i ty i s " s e ldom des t roy 'd whe re any ma te r i a l c i rcum-s tances rema in the s ame . " (147)


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" ' G E N E R A L R U L E S " I N H U M E ' S TREATISE 409The same cus tom goes beyond those ins tances , f rom which i t i s der iv 'd , and to whichi t perfect ly corresponds; and inf luences [one 's] ideas of such objects as are in somerespects resembling but fal l not precisely under the same rule. (148) 7

Th e i n f luence o f cus t om o n t he i m ag i na t i on p r ov i des u s wi t h " r u l e s " o f a c e r t a i ns o r t w h i c h a r e a n o p e r a t iv e f a c t o r in o ~ j u d g m e n t s , b u t b e f o r e w e c a n u n d e r s t a n dt he con f l i c t be t ween t he i m ag i na t i on and t he j udgm en t and how such con f l i c t i sexp l i cab l e i n t e r m s o f the i n f l uence o f gene r a l r u l e s , we m us t no t i ce a d i f fe r en t so r to f r ul e t o w h i c h H u m e n o w r e fe r s:We shal l af terwards take not ice of some general rules , by which we ought to regulateour judgment concerning causes and ef fec t s ; and these ru les a re form'd on the na tureof the .understanding, and on our experience of i ts operat ions in the judgments weform concerning objects . By them we learn to dis t inguish accidental ci rcumstancesfro m eff icacious causes . . . (149)Though t he " r u l e s by wh i ch t o j udge causes and e f f ec t s " a~e spec i f i ed l a t e r , t heya r e i n t r oduced he r e a s r u l e s wh i ch a r e no t t he r e su l t o f a p r opens i t y o f t he i m ag i -n a t io n , b u t w h i c h a r e " f o r m ' d o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " B e f o r e w e t r yt o d i s t i ngu i sh t he se t wo so r t s o f gene r a l r u l e s m or e ca r e f u l l y , l e t u~ i nd i ca t e howH u m e a n s w e r s t h e p r o b l e m h e s e t f o r h i m s e l f c o n c e r n i n g t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h ei m a g i n a t io n a n d t h e j u d g m e n t . O n a n y g iv e n o c c a s i o n w h e n w e a r e m a k i n g acausa l j udgm en t , bo t h o f t he se so r t s o f r u l e s a r e ap t t o be p r e sen t and ope r a t i ve . Le tus con t i nue wi t h t he p r eced i ng quo t e :By them [ i .e . the rules formed on the understanding] we learn to dis t inguish accidentalci reurnstances from efficacious causes; and whe n w e find that an effect can be prod uc'dwi thout the concur rence of any par t i cu la r c i rcumstance , we conclude tha t the c i rcum-stance makes not a par t of the eff icacious cause, however frequent ly conjoin 'd with i t .But as this f requent conjunct ion necessar i ly makes i t have some effect on the imagina-t ion, in spi te of the opposi te conclusion from general rules , the opposi t ion of thesetwo pr inciples produces a contrar iety in our thoughts , and causes us to ascr ibe theone inference to our judgment , and the other to our imaginat ion. (149)I n o t he r wor ds , i n t he p r oduc t i on o f adm os t any e f f ec t t he r e i s a com pl i ca t i on o fm an y c i r cum s t ances , so m e o f wh i ch a r e e s sen t i a l to t he g i ven e ff ect , and som ewhi ch t hough f r equen t l y con j o i ned wi t h t he e s sen t i a l c i r cum s t ances a r e supe r f l uous .These supe r f l uous f ac t o r s , howeve r , s t i l l have an e f f ec t on t he i m ag i na t i on :Now we may observe , tha t when these super f luous c i rcumstances a re numerous , andremarkable, and frequent ly conjoin 'd with the essent ial , they have such an inf luence

For other statements by Hurne of this same generalizing tendency, see pp. 374, 551.


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410 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yon the imagination, that even in the absence of the lat ter they carry us on to theconception of the usual effect . . . (148)For example , l e t u s suppose tha t C i s known to be su f f i c i en t and neces sa ry fo r thep rod uc t ion o f E . H ow eve r , when C p roduces E , i t i,s con jo ined wi th D w hich i sen t i re ly inc iden ta l to the p roduc t ion o f E . Th e e f fec t o f the con junc t ion o f D w i thC , howeve r , i s tha t the imag ina t ion ex tends the p r inc ip le " 'C causes E" to the re -s e m b l i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e " C a n d D c a u s e E . " T h e i m a g i n a u o n e v e n c a n b e l e d t oexpec t the p rodu c t ion o f E when D i s p re sen t and C absen t . T h i s e f fec t on theimag ina t ion is wha t H um e he re ca l l s the " f i r s t i n f luence o f gene ra l ru le s . " (150) I fwe ~ re to rea son co r rec t l y abo u t causa l r e l a t ionsh ips , how eve r , i t i s neces sa ry tha twe co r rec t thi s p ropens i ty o f the imag ina t ion :But when we take a review of th is ac t of the mind, and compare i t wi th the moregeneral and authentic operations of the understanding, we find i t to be of an irregularnature, and destructive of al l the most establish 'd principles of reasonings; which isthe cause of ou r rejecting i t. This is a second influence of general rules an d implies thecondemnat ion o f the form er . (150)Th e conf l ic t o f imag ina t ion and judg men t i s to be exp la ined by the conf l i c t o f twosor ts of genera l ru les :Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails , according to the disposit ion andcharacter of the persons. The vulgar are commonly guided by the firs t , and wise menby the second. (150)The f i r s t so r t o f " ru le , " we have s een , i s the re su l t o f the e f fec t o f cus tom andre semblance on the imag ina t ion ; ru le s o f the s econd type a re s a id to be fo rmed "onour undors t and ing , an d on ou r expe r i ence o f i ts ope ra t ions in the judgments wef o r m c o n c e r n in g o b j e c t s . " ( 1 4 9 ) T h e f ir st ar e p r o n e t o l e a d t o e r r o r a s , f o r e x a m p l e ,i n t h e p r e j u d i ce w e h o l d a g a i ns t t h e w i t o f a n I r i s h m a n o r w h e n w e e r r i n i n cl u d in gacc iden ta l c i rcums tances in desc r ib ing causa l , r e l a t ions . "Human na tu re , " Humeno te s , " i s ve ry sub jec t to e r ro r s o f th i s k ind . . . . " (147)

Th e s ense in wh ich the s ec ond so r t o f .rul e i s a p rodu c t o f cus to m wi ll be d i s -cus sed in the nex t s ec t ion . A t th i s po in t , we no te tha t the se ru le s a re p rec i s e lyconce rned to avo id o r co r rec t po ten t i a l e r ro r s r e su l t ing f rom the gene ra l i z ing p ro -pens i ty o f the imag ina t ion . T he s econd so r t o f ru le s a l so hav e a re f l ect ive cha rac te r ;b y t h a t I m e a n t h a t t h e y a r e c o n s c i o us l y f o r m u l a t e d a n d a d o p t e d , s T h e y a r e n o tthe re su l t o f mere p ropens i t i e s . T he jus ti f i ca t ion o f th is c l a im l a rge ly depends u po nthe who le d i s cus sion which fo l lows , bu t in s e t t ing ou t the ru le s fo r the d i rec t ion o f

8 Th e rem ainde r of this pap er is largely concerned with rules of this type. I shall referto them as "reflective rules."


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" G E N E R A L R U L E S " I N H U M E 'S T R E A T I S E 411causa l judgments Hume speaks o f " f ix ing" (173) the se ru le s , and we have s eentha t those who fo l low these ru le s a re des igna ted "w ise . " In add i t ion , the se ru les a red i rec t ive in oha rac te r ; we " oug h t" to fo l lo w them and fa i lu re to do so i s a po ten t i a ls o u r c e o f e r r o r .

H e n c e , i f I h a v e r e a d t h i s a d m i t t e d l y d l f f i e d t s e c t i o n c o r r e c t l y , H u m e h a sca l l ed "gene ra l ru le s " two th ings wh ich a re ve ry d i f fe ren t . The re i s a p ropens i ty o ft h e i m a g in a t i o n t o g e ne r a li z e, a n d H u m e r e g a r d s t h i s p r o p e n s i t y a s a s o u r c e o f" ru le s . " The re a re a l so " ru le s o f the unde rs t and ing" wh ich , a s con t ra s t ed wi th theprev ious type a re co r rec t ive , r e f lec t ive and d i rec t ive . Th e d i s t inc tion be tw een thesesenses o f " ru le " i s e s s en ti a l i f we a re to u nde r s t and the en t i r e t r ea tme n t o f th i ssubjec t in the Treatise. F o r e x a m p l e , P a s s m o r e , w h o g iv es m o r e a t t en t i o n t o g en e r a lru le s than any recen t com me nta to r , r ega rd s a l l gene ra l ru le s a s p ropensi t i e s , and ,thus is unab le to accou n t fo r the co r rec t ive func t ion H um e a t t r ibu te s to the ser u le s . 9 H a m p s h i r e c o m m e n t s t h a t H u m e l a ck s a n y " a b s o l u t e d i s ti n c ti o n " b e t w e e n" ru le s to wh ich any th ink ing must c o n f o r m " a n d " m e r e h a b i t s a n d u n i f o r m i t i e s i no u r t h o u g h t a n d b e h a v i o r. " l o T h o u g h H a m p s h i r e ' s us e o f " a b s o l u t e" a n d " m u s t "a re t roub le some , i t ~s my con ten t ion tha t the Treatise does con ta in exac t ly th i sdis t inc t ion .

H

Le t us now tu rn ou r a t t en t ion to the ques t ion o f the ec ig in and s t a re s o f the sere f l ec t ive ru le s w i th in the H um ean f ram ewor k . 11 Th e re i s no d i f fi cu lty in accoun t ingfo r the gene ra t l z lng p ropens i ty o f the imag ina t ion which i s exp l i cab le in t e rms o ft h e f a m il i a r H u m e a n p r i n c i pl e s o f c u s t o m a n d r e s e m b l a n c e. T h e p r o b l e m is t od e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r H u m e h a s a l s o a l l o w e d f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d u s e o f r e f l e c t i v er u l e s .

Thi s .l'equi~es a br ie f exam inat ion of Hu m e 's d iscuss ion of be l ie f. I t i s somet im essugges ted tha t Hume ' s theo ry o f be l i e f i s fu l ly ana lysab le in t e rms o f the v ivac i tyo f pe rcep t ions . Howeve r , a s Church po in t s ou t , "Tha t s ,uch ~s the ca se no one whohas t aken s e r ious ly Sec t ions 8 to 14 o f Book I I I [Pa r t I I I , Book I ] w i l l be l ike ly toagree . " 12 Th e func t ion o f v ivac i ty i s mor e accura te ly de sc r ibed in th is c om me ntHume makes ~ega . rd ing the bc~e f wh ich a t t ends the impres s ions o f memory andsense:

9 Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1953), p. 64. Th e only place I have found th e dis-tinction between the two sorts of rules presented is in the work of the French scholarA. Leroy. David Hume. (Paris, 1953), p. 71.x0 Pears (ed. ) , p. 7 .ix Interpreters sometimes accuse Hume of introducing rules as a purely ad hoc devicefo r overcoming difficulties to w hich his comm itments lead him. See, for example, Passmore,pp. 19, 53. Ed . Selby-Bigge , Hume's Enquiries (1899) , p . xxix. Wit hou t dealing with spe-cific arguments, this section attempts to show t hat these rules a re not simply a bit ofphilosophical ad hocery.x2 Hume's Theory of the Understanding (Ithaca, N .Y., 1935 ), p. 192.


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412 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y'Tis merely the force and l ivel iness of the percept ion, which const i tutes the f i rs tac t of judgment , and l ays the foun dat ion of the reasoning which we bui ld u pon i t,when we t race the relat ion of cause and effect . (86)Vi vac i t y , hence , i s t he f ounda t i on no t t he who l e ed i f i c e , and Hum e ' s cons i de r edpos i t ion i s tha t w hi le v iva c i ty i s a necessa ry , i t i s not a suf f i c ien t cond i t ion ofw a r r a n t e d a s s e n t .

T h e p h r a s e " f ir s t a c t o f j u d g m e n t " i n th e p r e c e d i n g q u o t a t i o n is a n i m p o r t a n to n e f o r o u r p u r p o s e s , a n d i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d i t o n e m u s t t u r n t o S e c t io n I o fP a r t I V . A t t hi s p o i n t H u m e r e f e r s t o t h e " f i rs t j u d g m e n t " a n d t h e " f i rs t d e oi s io n , "and a s se r t s he r e a l so t ha t t h i s " f i r s t a c t " i s ba sed upon v i vac i t y o r " f o r ce andl ive l iness . "I suppose , there i s some ques t ion propos 'd to me, and tha t a f t e r revolv ing over theimpressions of my me mo ry and senses, and car rying my thoughts f rom them to suchobjec t s, as a re comm only conjo in 'd w i th them, I fee l a s t ronger and mo re forc ib leconcept ion on the one s ide, than on the other . This s t rong concept ion forms my f i rs tdecision. (184)Th i s f ir s t a c t , howev e r , i s no t su f f i ci en t t o de t e r m i n e ou r be l i e f .In every judgment , which w e can fo rm concerning probabi l i ty , as wel l as concerningknowledge , we ought a lways to cor rec t the f i rs t judgment , der iv 'd f ro m the na ture ofthe objec t, by another der iv 'd f rom the na ture of the unders tanding . . . . Here thenarises a new species of probabi l i ty to correct and regulate the f i rs t , and f ix i ts justs tandard and propor t ion . As demons t ra t ion i s subjec t to the cont ro l of probabi l i ty ,so is probabi l i ty l iable to a new correct ion by a ref lex act of the mind, wherein thena ture of our unders tanding , and our reasoning f rom the f i r s t probabi l i ty becomeour objects. (181-182)Wi t h t h is in m i nd , we m u s t l o ok ag a i n a t t he s ec t i on i n w h i ch gen e r a l r u, e s a r ei n t ro d u c e d . T h i s i s H u m e ' s p r o c e d u r e f o r c o rr e c t in g t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ' s p r o p e n s i t yto genera l i ze :But when we take a rev iew of th i s ac t of the mind, and compare i t wi th the moregeneral and authent ic operat ions of the understanding, we f ind i t to be of an i r regularnature, and destruct ive of al l the most establ ished pr inciples of reasonings; which isthe cause of our rejecting it . (150)T h e r e a r e , th u s , a v a r i et y o f t e x ts s u g g e st in g t h a t H u m e w a s a b u n d a n t l y a w a r e o ft he f ac t t ha t by r e f l ect i ng on t he na t u r e o f ou~ m e n t a l a c t i ~ t i e s and ope r a t i ons , wea r e ab l e t o co r r ec t c e r t a in t endenc i e s wh i ch ~ e "des t r uc t i ve o f a l l t he m os t e s t ab -l i shed p r i nc i p l e s o f r ea son i ng . . . . " I t .is i n t h is r e f l ex ac ti v i t y o f m i nd wh e r e i n ou rcogni t ive ac t iv i t i es them selve s a re sc ru t in ized tha t th e or ig in of re f l ec t ive ru les i s to


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" G E N E R A L R U L E S " IN H U M E ' S T R E A T I S E 413be loca ted. Fo r the ou tcom e of th is re f lec tion i s the form at ion of ru les by the use ofwhich the co r rec t ion occurs . In t he on ly example thus fa r d i scussed , t he ru l e s bywhich to judge of causes and effec ts which serve to correc t the genera l iz ing pro-pens i ty o f t he imag ina t ion am founded on our r e f l ec t ive awareness o f our unde r -s t and ing and "our experience el i ts operations in the j udgment s we fo rm conce rn ingobjects." (149, i tal ics added)

We deferred unt i l th is sec t ion discussing the sense in which these rules a reprodu cts of custom . Clear ly , for Hum e, there i s no sense in which these rules couldbe o the r t han empi r i ca l and , hence , p roduc t s o f p robab le r ea son o r cus tom. Hethus speaks of a new species of probabi l i ty , but , as has just been emphasized, theexpe r i ence re l evan t t o t he i r fo rma t ion conce rns " the na tu re o f t he unde rs t and ing ,and our r ea son ing f rom the f i r s t p robab i l i t y . . . " Th i s new spec ie s o f p robab i l i t yfunct ions io regulate and control the f irs t. As we ref lec t upo n the und erstan ding asemployed in causa l j udgment , we fo rm ce r t a in ru l e s t he fo l lowing o f which makespossible the coherent and ordered in terpre ta t ion of our exper ience .

One wi shes tha t Hum e h ad been m ore exp l ic i t and ca re ful abou t t hese ma t t e r s .Par t icular ly , i t would be desi rable to understand prec ise ly how this ru le formingcapac i ty i s t o be r e la t ed to Hum e ' s gene ra l acco un t o f men ta l ac t iv i ty and how suchrules might be just if ied in te rms of Hu m e's genera l out look . In weighing the forceof these texts we have just been consider ing, however , there a re some obvious butimpor t an t ma t t e r s t o keep in mind . The f i r s t i s t ha t much o f Hume ' s en t i r e ph i lo -sophica l achievemen t presupposes our abi l i ty to a t ten d to those pr inc iples opera t ivein hum an n a ture in cogni t ive and affec t ive exper ience . H is ce lebra ted discussion ofcausa l i ty cer ta inly rests upon th is presupposi t ion. One could note , in addi t ion, theimpor t an t func t ions o f t he se lf a s t he observer of i t s own ac t iv i t ies which are d is-cussed by K em p Smi th. 13 Th i s i s on ly to unde r l ine the fac t t ha t t he " ' second ac t o fjudgm ent " re fe r s t o a d imens ion cen t ra l t o Hu me ' s i n t ere s ts i n t he sc i ence o f man .Fur the r , a s Pro fessor Wol f f has a rgued in a m os t conv inc ing manne r , Hu me ' sac tua l accoun t o f men ta l ac t iv i ty i s f a r more sub t le and compl i ca t ed than the p re sup-posi t ions of the ear ly pages of the Treatise could possibly expla in o r just i fy . 14 No wwhi le considera t ions of th is order by no means account for the or ig in or just i fyHume's use of re f lec t ive rules , they do indica te tha t these texts do represent tend-enc ie s i n Hu me ' s t hough t gene ra l ly which m us t be se r ious ly we ighed .

Exposi t ing what Hume says regarding the or ig in and just i f ica t ion of re f lec t iverdes i s bes t accompl i shed by deve lop ing the sugges t ions o f Goodman in h i s we l l -know n d iscuss ion o f Hum e . G oo dm an sugges t s , qu i te apa r t f ro m re fe rence toHume, tha t there i s a "vi r tuous c i rcular i ty" in the re la t ionship be tween rules and

x~ Kemp Smith, pp. 73, 92, 98, 224, etc.~" "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity," Philosophical Review, LXIX (1960). Reprintedin Chappell (ed.), Hume (Garden City, N. Y., 1966). The suggestion developed here tha t theunderstanding reflecting on its ow n activity supplies rules which are in some se nsenormative for the interpretation of experience extends the analysis offered by Wolff.


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414 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Ythe inferences which such rules govern. That i s , the r t r les which de termine va l idin fe rence , deduc t ive o r i nduc tive , do in f ac t r e f lec t our p rac t i ce i n mak in g an d ap-proving such inferences. "The point i s tha t ru les and par t icular inferences a l ike arejus ti f ied by be ing b rough t i n to ag reement wi th each o the r . " i s Thus , t he ru l e s a rein one sense empir ica l , and ye t the i r use i s a t the same t ime de terminat ive of va l idin ference . Hume ' s ve r s ion would requ i re s t a t em ent i n d i f fe ren t t e rms . Wh en wefo l low ce r ta in ru le s i n t he eva lua t ion o f causa l j udgmen t s , we reach conc lus ionswhich make poss ib l e t he cohe ren t and re l i ab l e i n t e rp re t a t ion o f expe r i ence . Theseru le s , de r iv ing f rom re f l ec tion on the ac t iv ity o f t he unde rs t and ing in causa ljudgment , in the f ina l ana lysis become determinat ive for the just i f ica t ion of suchjudgments.

I t wou ld requ i re ano th~ pape r t o exp l i ca t e t he t ex tua l suppor t which unde r l i e sth is p ragma t ic , cohe rence theme in Hu me . Gene ra l ru l es a re " jus t i f i ed" in t ha t t heyenab le us t o dea l r e l i ab ly wi th expe r i ence and to de t e rmine which be l i e f s can andcanno t cohe re wi th those " sys t em(s) o f r ea l i t i e s" (109) which a re fo rmed by thesenses , memory and judgment . For tuna te ly , t h i s a spec t o f Hume has been e l ab .o ra t ed by K emp Smi th in de fense of hi s c l a im tha t i t i s no t shee r cus tom bu t "expe -r i ence a s ex t ended in and th rough o ur r e fl ect ive ac t iv i t i es" which i s norma t ive fo rH u m e ... . reflect ive thinking and the criteria to which i t appeals are . . . indispensablynecessai'y for the condu ct of hum an l ife . . . Only through reflect ive scrut iny can theuniformit ies which are truly causal be dist inguished from those which, as rest ing oncontingently determined c o m b i n a t i o n s of causes, ma y a t any moment vary . . . Clear lyon his f inal view .. . custom is far from king. I t is because i t so usuany u s u r p ssovereign power that reflective thinking, and the logic which ought to govern it , a r eimperat ively demanded. 1~I t is c l ea r now tha t Kem p Smi th ' s accou n t o f Hu me requ i re s an ana lys i s o f gene ra lrules s ince these are the rules of the " logic" which governs " ref lec t ive th inking."

I I I

Thus fa r we have examined re f lec tive ru l es c once rned wi th be li e f, bu t one o f t hea im~ of t h i~ pape r i s t o show tha t t he same no t ion o f ru l e s i s used by Hume inva r ious a spec t s o f h i s ana lys i s o f expe r i ence . Bo th to demons t ra t e t h i s and toprov ide add i t i ona l suppor t fo r t he in t e rp re t a t ion jus t g iven o f t he o r ig in and s t a tus

x~ Fac t , F ic t io n, an d Fo recas t (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955), p. 67.:6 Kemp Smith, p. 386 . Cf . 382-388 .


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" G E N E R A L R U L E S " I N H U M E ' S T R E A T I S E 415of re f l ec t ive ru le s , we move to Book I I o f the Treatise t o examine ce r t a in "en la rg -e m e n t s " o r " l i m i t a t io n s " w h ic h H u m e a d d s t o h is a c c o u n t o f p r id e a n d h u m i l it y .I m a y ad d . . . t h a t general rule s have a great influence upon pride and humili ty, aswel l as on a l l the o ther pass ions . Hence we form a not ion of d i f fe rent ranks of men,suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change notupon account of any pecul ia r i t ies of the hea l th or temper of the persons , which maydeprive them of a l l enjoyment of the i r possess ions . This may be accounted for f romthe same principles , that explain 'd the influence of general rules on the understanding.Custom readily carries us beyond the just "bounds" in our passions, as well as in ourreasonings.It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence of general rules andmaxims of the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all theprinciples, which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. For 'tis evident, thatif a person fullgrown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a suddentransported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, andwould not readily find what degree of love or hatred, pride or humility, or any otherpassion he ought to attribute to it. The passions are often vary'd by very inconsider-able principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially onthe first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles,and have settled the just value of everything; this must certainly contribute to the easyproduction of the passions, and guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, inthe proportions we ought to observe in preferring one subject to another. (293-294) ~7Th is i s in som e respec ts a d i f ficult passage , bu t I sha l l a rgue tha t i t s chief d i ff icul tycan be re so lved on the bas i s o f the p rev ious d i s cus s ion . F i r s t a t e rmino log ica lma t t e r mu s t be c l ar i fi ed . Hu m e speaks h e re o f exp la in ing the se ru le s f rom the s am epr inc ip le s wh ich accoun ted fo r the i r in f luence on the understanding, and the pri n-c ip le p rov id ed is tha t o f cus tom. Hu m e was no to r iou s ly l ax abo u t t e rmino logy , bu ti t i s c l ea r tha t "unde rs t and ing" i s u sed he re in the b road s ense in wh ich i t occursin the t i tl e o f Bo ok I and no t in the re s t r i c t ed s ense in wh ich "und e rs t and ing" o r" judgment" i s con t ra s t ed wi th " imag ina t ion . " The p l l zz l ing pa r t o f th i s t ex t ,howeve r , i s tha t i t appea rs to s ay two conf l i c t ing th ings abou t the in f luence o fc u s t o m . C u s t o m " c a r r i e s u s b e y o n d o u r j u s t b o u n d s , " b u t i t a ls o g u id e s u s " i n t h ep ropo r t ions w e ough t to obse rve . . . " T he d i f fi cu lty i s re so lved by no t i c ing th a tcus tom i s ope ra t ing he re a t two d i s t inc t l eve l s . The imag ina t ion , we have s een ,has a p ropen s i ty to gene ra l i ze i l l eg i t ima tely on the bas is o f the in f luence o f cus t omand re semblance . The pas s ions a l so have ce r t a in "na tu ra l de f i c i enc ie s . " In Hume ' sin imi tab le way o f pu t ting i t, the pas s ions a re " va r y ' d by ve r y incons ide rab lep r inc ip le s . " P lume o f t en po in t s ou t tha t the pas s ions a re in f luenced by spec ia l

~' The first sentence of the second paragraph of this quotation again emphasizes theimportance of general rules for Hume.


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416 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yrela t ions in which we s tand to the exc i t ing objec ts , and as a resul t they fa i l to beappor t ioned to t he " in t rins i c wo r th" o f t he ob jec t s. Cus tomar i ly , t he re fo re , t he pas -s ions a re ap t t o can-y us "b eyo nd our jus t bounds ." N ow the second re fe rence tooustom and prac t ice re fers not t o our immedia t e expe r i ence o f t he pass ions them-se lves, but to our awareness of those principles accord ing to which the pass ionsa re i n f luenced . Th i s second l eve l "cus tom," co r re spond ing to wha t was ca l l ed inBook I t he second ac t o f judgm ent , enab les us t o fo r m "gene ra l e st ab l, sh 'd ma x ims "which then can be used to "gu ide u s . . . i n t he p ropor t ions we ough t t o obse rve inpreferr ing one objec t to another ."

The pa~aale l be tween th is d iscussion of the pr inc iples opera t ive on the passionsand the t r ea tment o f the bas i c t hemes o f Book I i s unde r l ined by Hu me ' s use o f t he"Adam a rgument " bo th he re and in h i s ana lys i s o f causa l i t y . Be fore an Adarn ief igure cou ld make causa l j udgment s o r know how to p ropor t ion h i s a t t i t udes , i twould be necessa ry tha t he have expe r i ence in bo th senses jus t des igna ted . Theexper ience of the co njunc t ion of objec ts and the arou sa l of passion m ust f ina l ly bescrut in ized by . ref lec tive insight in to those pr inc iples opera t ive wh en we ma kecausa l c la ims or expor ience passions when these ac t iv i t ies a re appropr ia te ly done .Thus , . re flec tive rules as th ey apply to passion and be l ie f a r i se f ro m insight in to thepr inc iples opera t ive in human awareness . I f fo l lowed, these rules d i rec t us in theway m ost l ike ly to prov ide us wi th correc t m ean s of d ea l ing wi th exper ience , t8

IV

Having no ted the emp loyme nt o f gene ral ru l es i n be l i e f and passions, i t i s nowour in t en t ion to show tha t Hume ex tends the app l i ca t ion o f such ru l e s i n to thea rea o f hum an ac t ion .

I n B o o k I I I o f t h e Treatise Hume divides the vi r tues in to two ca tegor ies . Thenatura l v i r tues a re those der iving f rom inst inc t ive human responses. The ar t i f ic ia lv i rtues, however , come abo u t "b y m eans o f an a r ti f ice o r con t r ivance which a r ise sf rom the c i r cumstances and necessi ty o f man k in d ." (477) The a r ti fi c ia l v i r tuescompr i se t he " ru l e s o f j us ti ce" (o r t he " l aws o f na tu re" a s he a l so t e rms them) , t he" l aws o f na t ions " which conce rn the o r ig in o f gove rnm ent and the na tu re o f o urobl iga tions of obedience to sovere ignty, and '~another se t of dut ies , v iz . the chastityan d modesty which be long to t he fa i r sex . . . . " (570) I t i s v it a l t o recogn ize,however , tha t these ar t i f icia l v i r tues const i tu te , for H~ me , ano ther . instance ofref lec t ive genera l ru les . Most of Hume's d iscussion i s g iven to the rules of just ice.These ru l es a re t h ree in numb er and conce rn the s t ab i l i ty O possess ions , t he t r a m-

is "All the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficultin their application . . . . " (175)


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"GENERAL RULES" IN HUME'S TREATISE 417ferenc , of possession by consent of the owner, and the performance of promises. Ofthese Hume regards the stability of possessions as the most important, and sincemy concea-n here is to demonstrate the employment of the concept of rules andnot to discuss the a~tificial virtues as such, I shall use the rule concerning propertyas exemplary of a pattern which can be discerned in nil the artificial virtues. Inshort, I intend to show that the rule concerning the stability of possessions is areflective general rule. There are, in the first place, several texts in which this ruleconcerning possession is called a "general rule." x9 In addition, this class of ruleshas all the essential characteristics distinguishing reflective rules.

To see how these rules of justice come about, we must imagine the life of manin the so-called "state of nature," a concept which Flume regarded as a convenient"philosophic fiction." The establishment of society, says Hume, depends upon theinstitution of these general rules of justice. Thee are two distinct matters to bedealt with: the first and for purposes here more important, is how these rules are"establish'd by the artifice of men," given that there is no natt~al or instinctivemotive which causes men to act in accordance with such rules; the second is whythere comes to be a moral sentiment attached to these rules, i.e,, why the artificialvirtues are virtues. No virtue, Hume asserts, "is more esteem'd than justice; nor arethere any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable orodious." (577) Briefly, Hume's solution to this second problem is that once theselaws or rules of justice are established, we recognize their utility, and the moralsentiment of humanity and the moral effects of sympathy cause us to morallyapprove whatever serves the social good.

The first problem concerning the origin of these rules Hume attacks by observingthat only in man, among all nature's animals, is there such a great disparity betweenthe quantity of wants and necessities for sustaining life and the scarcity of physicalendowments for the satisfaction of these many needs. (485) The solution to theproblems created by the disjunction of ability and need is to be found in the for-marion of society. The beginning of the social order comes as a result of the sexappetite which unites a man and woman and "preserves their uniTon, fi1,1 a new tyetakes place in their concern for their common offspring." (485) The children whichspring .from this natural necessity become, by custom and habit, sensible of theadvantages to be derived from the societal relationship.

There are, however, disintegrating forces which threaten the social order. Chiefamong these is the selfishness which character~.es man's "natural temper." (485)Though what Hume terms the "kind affections" or the "benevolent principles ofour f rame" taken together outweigh selfishness, man's first concern is for himselfand then for his family and friends. This partiali:ty of our affections coupled with

a9 pp. 497, 502, 504n. , 532. In some cases , what Hume s tresses by the term "general"in these t ex t s i s tha t th i s ru le m us t app ly to a l l and to each wi th equa l i ty . T h is em phas izesthe "genera l i ty" o f these ru les , and the po in t cou ld be m ade abou t a l l r e f l ec t ive ru les . T heyapply to the whole class of judgments or act iv i t ies which they regulate .


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418 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYthe scarcity of essential goods means that each person's possessions are "expos'dto the violence of others." (487) This problem threatens the fabric of society andbecause it is created by the state of man's natural temper, this partiality is not opento a "n a~ ra l remedy," i.e., one based solely on instinctive human tendencies.This remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properlyspeaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and the understanding for whatis irregular and incommodious in the affections. (489)Notice, especially, that the remedy is provided by the "judgment and understand-ing." The remedy is,... a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability onthe possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoymentof what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. (489)This convention is formulated as the rule of justice, the general rule establishing thestability of possession, and this rule "is of all circumstances the most necessary tothe establishment of society." (49I)

Though the rule here being discussed by Hume concerns the direction of actionrather than belief or feeling, it shares the same characteristics which marked thereflective rrules d, scussed already. As just noted, the rule is reflective. Hume'sentire discussion is based upon the fact that man becomes aware of the problemcreated by the partiality Of his instincts, and judges what means he must take tosolve this problem. The alteration of ot~r love of gain, he commen~s, "must takeplace necessarily upon the .least reflection . . . " (492) Human nature, he points out,is composed of two principal paxts, the affections and the understanding:"' Tis certain, that the blind motior~,s of the former, without the direction of thelatter, incapacitate men for society . . . "(493) Thus the establishment of the rule hasthe deliberate chaxacter of an "invention." (543) The reflective insight required forthe establishing of this rule differs from that required by the rules previouslydiscussed. Those rules required insight into the nature of the human understandingand affections ~since these were the dimensions of experience in which they func-tioned. Here, what is required is the ability to grasp the consequences of ouractions, in brief, "causal foresight." 20

The corrective aspect of these rules is equally apparent, being devised preciselyto correct a problem which arises from man's natural temper. The correction heredoes not take the form of destroying man's avidity, any more than by following therules of causal judgment one destroys the propensities of the imagination.. Whathappens, however, is that the acquisitive Lmpulse is redirected to a more suitable

~0 This expression is A. B. Glathe's. Hume's Theory of the Pass ions and of Morals(Berke ley , 1950) , p . 113. Glathe g ives no at tent ion to Hume's account of ru les even thoughhis work comprises a most careful s tudy of Books H and III of the Treatise.


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"GENERAL RULES" IN HUME'S T R E A T I S E 419means of satisfaction. It is the function of this rule to bring about what Hume callsa "remedy" or a "restraint."

The third characteristic, directiveness, is also stressed, for without the ob-servance of this rule man will not be able to enjoy the benefits of society which areessential to his well being. Hece the notion of coherence is extended to the require-ments of the social order. Originally, there is no moral sanction involved in thefollowing of this rule, and the "ought" .involved here is a purely prudential onebased upon the fact that without compliance to this rule the social fabric will bedestroyed. Once established and their utility reco~iTed, a moral sentiment comes tobe attached to ~hese rules and their obed~ience becomes a moral as well as a prud-ential requirement. With the formation of government, legal sanctions are broughtinto being and a host of social forces converge to aid in the inculcation and pro-motion of these rules. The artifices of politicians, the concern of each man for hisreputation, parenta1 concern, private education and public praise, all "assist interestand reflection." (500)Thus, when Hume speaks of the "rules of justice," it is clear that he intendsus to understand this discussion from the perspective of his treatment of rules inBooks I and II. There is additional internal evidence to justify this claim. In discuss-ing general rules in Book I, Hume makes reference to "rules of good breeding"which "condemn whatever is openly disobliging, and gives a sensible pain and con-fusion to those with whom we converse." (152) In Book III the "rules of goodbreeding" are compared to the "laws of nature" or artificial virtues.In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secureproperty in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish rules ofgood breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversa-tion agreeable and inoffensive. (597)This seems to be decisive support for the claim that axtifieial virtues are regardedby Hume as reflective general rules.

V

There is one other important use of general rules made by Hume which occursin the concluding section of the Treatise. In the presentation of this part of Hume'smoral theory, two issues must be separated. One is the experience of the moralsentiments; the other is the judgments made which have these sentiments as theirbasis. The form of Hume's argument will be familiar for his claim is that the moralsentiments require correction by reflective principles if one is to be a "judiciousspectator." (581)


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420 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H YHu me beg ins by s t res s ing the pe rvas ive in f luence o f the mech an i sm o f sympa thy

in accoun t ing fo r mora l approva l . Th i s d i s cus s ion i s f ami l i a r an d does no t r equ i rec o m m e n t . H o w e v e r , o f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t h e r e a r e H u m e ' s c o m m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t w oc i r c u m s ta n c e s " w h i c h m a y s e e m o b j e c t i on s t o t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m . " ( 5 8 0 ) T h e f ir sts t ems f rom the fac t tha t the in t ens i ty o f the s en t imen t s we rece ive sympa the t i ca l lyi s va r i ab le accord ing to the re l a t ionsh ips in wh ich we s t and to those wi th whomwe sympa th ize :But notwithstanding this variat ion of our sympathy, we give the same approbation tothe same moral qualifies in China as in England. They appear equaUy vi r tuous , andrecommend themsdves equal ly to the es teem of a judic ious spec ta tor . The sympathyvaries without a variat ion in our esteem. Our esteem therefore, proceeds not fromsympathy. (581)H u m e p o i n ts o u t t h a t o u r o w n p e r s o n a l s i t u a ti o n i s " i n c o n t i n u a l f lu c t u a ti o n , " a n di f o u r m o r a l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s r e f l e c te d o n l y o u r p e r s o n a l p e r s p ec t iv e s , " . . . ' ti si m p o s si b le w e c o u ' d e v e r c o n v e r s e t o g e t h e r o n a n y r e a s o n a b l e t e r m s . . . . " ( 5 8 1 )The so le t ion to th i s f luc tua t ion i s the p rov i s ion o f a ru le wh ich spec i f i e s the po in to f v iew which a l eg i t ima te mo ra l judg men t m us t r e f l ect . He p roceed s to s t a t e th ispo in t o f v iew: " ' T i s the re fo re f rom the in f luence o f cha rac te r s and qua li t ie s , upont h o s e w h o h a v e a n i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h a n y p e r s o n t h a t w e p r a i se o r b l a m e h i m . " ( 5 8 2 )Give n th is po in t o f view, i t fo l lows tha t m ora l jud gments a re s t r i c t ly impa r t ia l : "W econs ide r no t wh e the r the pecsons , a f fec ted by the qua l i f i es , by o ur a cqua in tanceo r s t r a ng e r s, c o u n t r y m e n o r f o r e i g n e r s. " ( 5 8 2 )

Thus , the s ame pa t t e rn o f a na tu ra l p ropens i ty ~equ ir ing co r re c t ion by a re -f l ec t ive p r inc ip le o r ru le i s fou nd aga in . He re the xe f lec t ive awarenes s co nce rns thep r inc ip le s by which the mechan i sms o f sympa thy a re in f luenced , and un le s s ce r t a inn a t u r a l p r o p e ns i ti e s o f s y m p a t h y w e r e c o r r e c t e d i t w o u l d b e i m p o s s i bl e f o r m e n t o"conv e rse toge the r on rea son ab le t e rm s" regard in ,g m o r a l m a t t e rs . B e f o r e c o m i n g t othe s econd ob jec t ion Hume poses aga ins t h i s pos i t ion , the re a re th ree ma t t e r s Humement ions in th i s d i s cus s ion which shou ld be unde rsco red .

I t i s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s a r e " c o m m o n t o a ll t h e s en s es . . . . " T h e r e isa co r rec t ive , re f l ec t ive fac to r ope ra t ive in pe r cep tua l r epor t s a s we l l a s in mo ra land ae s the t i c de te rmina t ions . "M omenta ry appea rances , " in each ca se , . r equ i reco r rec t ion b y re f lec tion . Such co r rec t ions t ake p lace by the use o f gene ra l ru le s . Th esecond po in t i s tha t ou r fe l t mora l s en t imen t s o f t en a re no t a f fec ted by thesecor rec t ions :But however the genera l princ iple of o ur b lame or pra ise may be correc ted by thoseother principles , ' t is certain, they a re not al together efficacious, nor do our passionsoften correspond entirely to the present theory. "I ' is seldom men hearti ly love whatl ies a t a d istance f rom them, and what n o way redounds to the i r par ticular benefi t . . . "(583)


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" G E N E R A L R U L E S " IN H U M E 'S T R E A T I S E 42 1Jus t a s the ru le s o f ju s t i ce do no t ob l i t e ra t e the na tu ra l s e l f i sh p ropens i ty o f mannor the causa l rule s the t endenc ie s o f the imag ina t ion , so the se "o the r p r inc ip le s " dono t a lways a l t e r ou r- fe l t mo ra l s en t imen t s . H ow eve r , an d th is i s the th i rd po in t , t here f l ec t ive p r inc iple s a re "a lone adm i t t ed a s the s t anda rd o f v i r tue and mo ra l i ty . "(591) F ur th e rm ore , th is r e fl ec tive po in t o f v iew a lone de te rmines whe n i t i s appro -p r i a t e t o u s e m o r a l t e rm s , f o r e v e n w h e n w e c a n n o t c o r r e c t o u r s e n ti m e n ts , w e c a nc o r r e c t o u r language. ( 5 8 2 )And the ' t he heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulateits love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all ourpurposes in company, in the pulpit , on the theatre, and in the schools . (603)T h e s e c o r r e c ti v e p r i n ci p l es h e n c e d e t e r m i n e w h e n o n e c a n a p p r o p r i a t e l y u s e m o r a lt e rms , and , thus , when one can be s a id to be mak ing moral j u d g m e n t s a s o p p o s e dto judgm ents re f lec t ing one 's ow n in te re s t s a lone .

W e c o m e n o w t o t h e s e c o n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h i o h H u m e c o n c e d e s a s c o u n t i n gprima facie aga ins t h i s the s i s tha t sympa the t i c fee l ings a re the p redominan t sourceo f m o r a l a p p r o v a l. T h e d i t ~ c u lt y a r is e s f r o m H u m e ' s r e c o g n it i o n th a t t h e r e m i g h tbe a pe r son the na tu ra l t endenc ie s o f whose ac t ions wou ld norma l ly be bene f i c i a lto those a round h im, ye t "pa r t i cu la r acc iden t s " p reven t th i s pe r son ' s ac t iv i t i e s f romrea l i z ing the i r in t ended consequences . I t wou ld s eem tha t sympa thy wi th the goodof mank ind i s pos s ib le on ly i f t he good has . i n fac t been ach ieved . Th i s v iew,howev e r , wou ld con t rad ic t Hum e ' s a l read y s t at ed c l a im tha t mot ives a lone a re thea p p r o p r i a t e o b j e ct s o f m o r a l e v a l u a t io n . " ' T i s e v i d en t , t h at w h e n w e p r a i s e a n ya c ti o ns , w e r eg a r d o n l y t h e m o t iv e t h at p r o d u c e d t h e m . . . . T h e e x t er n a l p e r f o r m -ance has no mer i t . " (477) To Hume ' s spec i f i ca t ion o f the po in t o f v iew o f a mora ljudgment , we s ee tha t such judgments a l so have a spec i f i ed ob jec t . The manne r inwhich he re so lves the s eeming d i s c repancy be tween the ob jec t o f a mora l judgmentan d the e f fec ts o f sympa thy i s in t e re s t ing because we a l so f ind he re the op e ra t io n o fthe gene ra l i z ing p ropens i ty o f the imag ina l ion .

The f i r s t ques t ion a s to why we a re ab le to sympa th ize wi th "consequences "which are no t rea l ized is dea l t w.ith as fo l lows:. . . where any object , in al l i ts parts , is fi t ted to at tain any agreeable end, i t naturallygives pleasure, and is esteem'd beautiful , even the ' some external circumstances bewanting to rende r i t a l together effectual, q ' is sufficient if everything be co mp leat in th eobject i tself . . . Wh ere a charac ter is, in every respect, f i t ted to be beneficial to society,the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect , without considering thatthere are s t i l l some circumstances wanting to render the cause a compleat one. Generalrules create a species o f probabil i ty, which sometimes influences the judgment, andalways the imagination. (584-585)H um e i s cl a iming he re tha t ou r app rov a l ,in the se c.a~ses re s t s up on the p rope ns i tyo f the imag ina t ion to gene ra l i ze f rom one s e t o f c i rcums tances in wh ich ce r t a in


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422 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYqualifies have produced good consequences to resembling ones in which the quali-fies are seemingly present but the consequences prevented. This generMizing tend-eney has a~ready been explained though in this case Hume does not regard thispropensity as a source of error. Yet there is still necessity here for the operation ofthose general rules which "sometimes influences the judgment." This function .isnecessary because our sympathies are "more lively" when the effect of a virtuousmotive is existent, and "ye t we do not say that it ,is more virtuous, or that we esteemit more." (585) Hume regards this as a parallel instance of the correction .involvedwhen "we correct the different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from ,its differentdistances from ourselves ... " (585)Here again, reflecting on the nature of sympathy, rules a~re formulated whichenable us to correct certain natural propensities, and thus to provide order in theinterpretation of moral experience.

VIThe object of this paper has been to discuss a neglected aspect of Hume's

account of experience in the Treat i se . 2x Human nature is subject to the influenceof certain feelings and propensities which if uncorrected tend to result in erroneousbelief and action. General rules serve this corrective function, and Hume assertsthat those who employ these rules are the "wi, e" and "judicious." The importanceto Hume of these .rules is underscored by the fact that they appear in each bookof the Trea t i s e . The recognition of this function permits us to understand howHume sought to avoid the apparently sceptical, subjective consequences of hisemphasis on the role of feeling in both cognitive and moral experience.

The task remains of working out in detail the 4inplications of a proper appreci-ation of general rules for various issues in Hume's philosophy. In some cases, thedirection such work might take seems rather clear and quite suggestive. Forexample, there has been a scholarly eontxoversy concerning whether Hume's moraltheory is more adequately characterized as some form of naturalism or non-cogni-tivism. The results of this study suggest that a genuine moral judgment for I-Iume isthe outcome of certain moral feelings corrected or evaluated by general rules. If so,Hume's view of moral judgment would appear to approximate the "qualifiedatti tude" theory whose best known recent advocate is Richard Brandt. 22 Thisinterpretation, if sustained, would represent a considerable cl a~ ca ti on of the issuesbasic to the understanding of Hume's moral philosophy.C o l le g e o f W i l li a m a n d M a r y

~1 Other than the Treatise, the work in which .most use is made of general rules is theEnquiry Concerning the Principles o/ Morals. See especially Sections V, IX, Appendix I.There are scattered references to these rules in Hume's other works.as Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1959), Ch. 10.

general rules in humes treatise

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