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    Gendlin, E.T. (1992). The primacy of the body, not the primacy of perception [Excerpt

    from pages !"#, slightly re$ised%. Man and World, 25("!), !1"#. &rom

    http'.foc*sing.orggendlindocsgol+212.html

    The primacy of the body, not theprimacy of perception:

    How the body knows the situation and

    philosophy

    E. T. Gendlin

    -ni$ersity of hicago

    The primacy of perception leads to a traditional problem. /erception inherently in$ol$esa dat*m, clear or *nclear, something that exists for  someone, happens to someone, or is

     present before someone. /erception remains a being"for. 0f one begins ith perception,

    then interaction seems to consist of to indi$id*al percepts.

    The percept is a ind of di$iding screen. That is not an error. The di$iding"screen lies in

    the $ery nat*re of perception. There is an error only in starting ith perception.

    /erception is a dat*m"ha$ing. o it cannot be the basic form of life. The plant is an

    interaction directly ith its en$ironment, itho*t a percept*al dat*m in front of itself 0ts

     body does not first exist and only then interact. 3ather, its groth and life"processes

    consist of en$ironmental interaction. 4nd o*r bodies also consist of s*ch en$ironmental

    interaction processes. That ind of interaction is s*rely prior to the ha$ing of presented

     percept*al data.

    5hen philosophy considers perception it cannot help b*t consider a percept, something

     presented, an ob6ect constit*ted between the body and the en$ironment. 7f co*rse one

    nos that percepts do not exist alone8 they pre"s*ppose a body8 they do not float alone,

    first. *t if one begins by considering perception, the percept p*ts itself first and di$ides

    the percei$er off, p*ts the percei$er behind the percept, and renders the body as merely

    a percei$er.

    0 o*ld lie to bring home ho odd this common ay of proceeding really is. 4 perceptact*ally exists only as a presented before, or a coming into, a coming at. 0t exists only

    for someone. 4nd yet it presents itself as if it ere a thing that exists. The percept is

    lopped off:lops itself off:as if it co*ld be a thing on its on, e$en hile one f*lly

    nos that it isn;t. That is in the $ery nat*re of perception, something presented,

    something happening"to"someone.

    /erception di$ides the someone off, as coming second, *nderstood only bacard from

    hat is already a percept. 7nce the percept is taen as hat it seems to be, then the

     percei$er cannot add m*ch. Traditionally the percei$er added nearly nothing, 6*st the

    ha$ing"of, the conscio*sness"of, 6*st the percei$er of"the"percept, the transparent

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    The scientific constr*ction of the *ni$erse consists of percepts and percept"lie patterns

     presented  before *s. 0t renders h*mans and animals as something presented in a space

     before *s (or before someone). *t e are not the presented8 e are the to"hom of the

     presented. The to"hom that is inherent in anything presented cannot be a presented

    dat*m. o e h*mans cannot find o*rsel$es ithin the scientific pict*re, since it

    consists of presenteds. 5e seem to be only the percei$ers"of or constr*ctors"of the pict*re, as if e ere o*tside the *ni$erse, the percei$er ho does not appear in the

     percept.

    To begin philosophy by considering perception maes it seem that li$ing things can

    contact reality only thro*gh perception. *t plants are in contact ith reality. They are

    interactions, =*ite itho*t perception. 7*r on li$ing bodies also are interactions ith

    their en$ironments, and that is not lost 6*st beca*se o*rs also ha$e perception. 7n the

    contrary, for *s that f*nctions in many additional ays. 4nimal bodies:incl*ding o*rs

     :sense themsel$es, and thereby e sense the interactional li$ing e are. 0n sensing

    themsel$es, o*r bodies sense o*r physical en$ironment and o*r h*man sit*ations. The

     perception of colors, smells, and so*nds is only a small part of this.

    7*r bodies sense themsel$es in li$ing in o*r sit*ations. 7*r bodies do o*r li$ing. 7*r

     bodies are infraction in the en$ironment8 they interact as bodies, not 6*st thro*gh hat

    comes ith the fi$e senses. 7*r bodies don;t l*r in isolation behind the fi$e peepholes

    of perception.

    5hat the ord

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    not the fi$e senses, b*t the sentient bodily interaction that taes on lang*age and history

     :and then alays still exceeds them. >et me sho this'

    ?erlea*"/onty says that e sense the space behind o*r bacs. /lease notice for a

    moment that this is tr*e8 yo* can sense the space behind yo*r bac.

    0s that still to be called

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     bodily sense separate from the sit*ation and merely internal. 0t is certainly not 6*st an

    emotional reaction to the danger. 0t is that, b*t it also incl*des more of the intricacy of

    yo*r sit*ation than yo* can see or thin. Ao*r bodily ... is yo*r sit*ation. 0t is not a

     percei$ed ob6ect before yo* or e$en behind yo*. The body"sense is the sit*ation,

    inherently an interaction, not a mix of to things.

    o*ld one arg*e that the ... is merely indeterminate? I  arg*e that s*ch a ... is not at all

    indeterminate. 3ather, it is more determinate than anything that is already formed. Ao*

    can see this beca*se the next mo$e, hen it comes, ill ha$e taen acco*nt of more

    than anything formed can bring. Ao* can see that this bodily f*nction is more than 6*st

    the contradictory alternati$es. 0f only they ere there, they co*ld not be together:they

    o*ld cancel each other o*t. *t yo*r body can ha$e them together, and hat is more,

    has them eighed and interrelated as possible next mo$es. 0f yo* fight, there are too

    many of them8 if yo* sho*t yo* might be attaced immediately8 if yo* r*n, so ill they8

    if yo* enter a b*ilding, they ill come in after yo*8 if yo* .... Ao* don;t ha$e time to

    thin each of the possible mo$es separately, b*t they are implicitly at or in yo*r

     bodily sensed ... hich f*nctions to determine yo*r act*al mo$e.

    The

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    &rom contradictory forms alone one co*ld only get indeterminacy. *t the animal body

    f*nctions also after and ith all the h*man elaborations. 0t li$es the alternati$es f*rther

    and can shape something ne. 5hen at last yo* mae yo*r mo$e, it may ell be

    something yo* ne$er heard of 

    4n artist stands before an *nfinished pict*re, pondering it, seeing, feeling, bodilysensing it, ha$ing a .... *ppose the artist;s ... is one of some dissatisfaction. 0s that an

    emotional reaction, simply a feeling"tone@ Bo indeed. 0mplicit in the ... is the artist;s

    training, experience ith many designs, and m*ch else. *t more' the ... is also the

    implying of the next line, hich has not yet come. The artist ponders i$ing bodies imply their on next steps. This

    implying and shaping of next steps is *s*ally attrib*ted only to repetitio*s processes.

    *t e see that the body also taes on the elaborations of =*ite no$el sit*ations, and

    then it also implies a next step, and may shape one.

    The li$ing body is an ongoing interaction ith its en$ironment8 of co*rse it therefore is

    en$ironmental information. The bodily ... can contain information that is not (or not yet)

    capable of being phrased. *t can e concei$e of the body so that e co*ld *nderstand

    ho it can contain (or be) information@ 0t is not the *s*al *se of the ord

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    o is it that the bodily ... has all this information, more than e can thin item by

    item, and is also capable of s*ch finely t*ned no$elty@ 4ccording to the *s*al

    conception of the physiological body, it co*ld not do any of that. ince it can, let *s try

    to thin of a li$ing body in s*ch a ay that it co*ld be information and no$elty.

    0f e thin of the li$ing body:not as a piece of merely percei$EF machinery, nor as percei$ing, b*t as interaction ith its en$ironment, then of co*rse, the body 0

    en$ironmental information.

    4nimals bodies are complex interactions ith their en$ironments. &rom one ancient

     bone one can reconstr*ct not only the hole animal, b*t from its body also the ind of

    en$ironment in hich it li$ed. &rom the ind of feet it had one can infer the ind of

    gro*nd on hich it mo$ed. &rom its stomach ca$ity one can no hat it fed on and

    chased. The body e$en as a dead str*ct*re still contains all that implicit information

    abo*t its en$ironment. 5hen ali$e, its bodily life"process is m*ch more implicit

    information. 4nd this bodily sentience implies and generates the animal;s next mo$e.

    ?*ch more arri$es at birth than a blan tablet. The body arri$es already implying its

    en$ironment $ery intricately. The h*man infant implies the breast and the mother.

    (tem, 19#) /erceptions enter into an already intricate implied en$ironment in hich

    the fi$e senses are already related. 0nfants come ith good mothering already implicit,

    interpersonal comm*nication already ongoing, the complexity of syntax already in

     place. They need not first be made from perceptions.

    7f co*rse e do not no ha$e the body 6*st as it existed before and without  lang*age.

    *t that first body still f*nctions no. 4fter and ith lang*age it implies and mo$es

     beyond lang*age.

    Ao*r body before lang*age contin*es to li$e also beyond lang*age no, as yo* listen to

    me. 5hile yo* hear my ords, yo* are not thining yo*r on ords. Be$ertheless yo*r

    li$e body retains ho yo* are, yo*r past and all yo* no. 5hat 0 say comes into all of

    that.

    0f e *nderstand the body as en$ironmental interaction e need not limit o*rsel$es to

    sentient animals. /lants, =*ite itho*t perception are bodily ongoing life processes.

    They also imply their on next mo$es.

    0n saying this of plants 0 am *sing this conception of o*r interactional body to de$elop aconception of li$ing bodies that co*ld e$ol$e into o*rs. &or a form*lated philosophical

    treatment of this ith ne terms, see 4 /rocess ?odel.

    Going no the other ay, this conception of li$ing bodies:e$en plants:o*ld explain

    hy, if s*ch a body sensed itself, that body"sense o*ld be a $ast amo*nt of

    en$ironmental information:and hy, if it li$ed this information forard f*rther, it

    co*ld mo$e in ne ays. 4nd then, if s*ch a self"sensing body co*ld also think, and

    co*ld *se its bodily ... in its thining, ell, it o*ld alays thin after, with, but with

    more than concept*al and lang*age forms. This more o*ld be realistic since it o*ld

    be the body"en$ironmental interaction.

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    4ll thining in$ol$es the bodily ... to some degree. Tae for example any ordinary

    sentence. 0n the middle of it yo* ha$e an *nfinished sense of ho ... Ao* don;t no the

    end, and yet, all thro*gh it, as the sentence ends its ay ....

    0t has seemed, recently, that there is no lang*age in hich to disc*ss hat is more than

    lang*age. ince e find that still f*nctioning all the hile e tal, of co*rse it f*nctionsalso to let me tal abo*t its f*nctioning.

    4nd it is also ith s*ch a ... that e thin. 5e pose o*rsel$es some problem or some

    chain of tho*ght. There is this, and that, that other, and then 0f e get distracted and lose

    hold of the .... e go o$er the familiar gro*nd. This, and that, and that other, and ah ....

    That is here ne thining happens.

    *t it isn;t a grand mystery. 5e m*st thin ith a ... in many sit*ations e$ery day. E$en

    if the sit*ation is only slightly tro*bling, it gi$es *s pa*se. 5e no the ro*tine things

    e can say and do, b*t .... o the body is being the sit*ation is more than e can thin 

    in concepts or ords. o e better thin ith the .... thin ith the ay the body has,li$es in, is:the sit*ation.

    o it is not the case that yo* ha$e only yo*r perceptions of me, that o*r perceptions of

    each other are beteen *s. 3ather, e affect each other, bodily and sit*ationally,

    hether e sense or see it or not. ?y armth or hostility ill affect yo*r ongoing

     bodily being hether yo* percei$e it or not. Ao* may find it there, if yo* sense ho

    yo*r body has the sit*ation.

    The bodily ... is realistic. 0t is the interaction, and since the interaction is already

    happening, of co*rse it is a possible interaction in the orld. o, of co*rse e can learn

    something abo*t reality from it. The ... is alays realistically an interaction and

    therefore right abo*t something. 4s therapy shos, it can be chiefly (ne$er entirely) a

     past sit*ation. 0t can be realistic also abo*t something that it nely li$es and maes,

    something that has ne$er been done before. o e *nderstand ho the body can thin

     beyond anything e$er form*lated before:ho it senses on the edge of h*man thining.

    That is hy 0 enco*rage my st*dents to attend $ery caref*lly to any sense of excitement,

     p*DDlement, conf*sion or *nclear *n"ease, that might come as they read and thin. 5hat

    a h*man organism registers is ne$er 6*st nothing, ne$er an indeterminate limbo. 4t first

    it seems to be 6*st a*tistic. *t the body is alays already interaction8 it cannot fail to

    contain implicit information ith and from hich e can thin. 4ny h*man hoattends to a ... thins on the edge of h*man noledge. 0t does also re=*ire some

    concept*al and philosophical sills hich 0 cannot go into, here. 7ne needs at least to

     be familiar ith many theoretical strategies and many traditional mo$es, so as not 6*st

    to fall into one ith no reco*rse.

    >aying something o*t in distinct parts changes it. >aying it o*t can ill it, b*t not if e

    eep the hole ... ith *s as e thin. Then laying o*t can carry the ... f*rther, change it

    in a ay that lets it de$elop. 5hen e thin f*rther in this ay, e can also find and

    correct errors. &rom a ... there are more"than"logical criteria that let *s no hich

    mo$e carries forard, hich line satisfies the design that is not yet. 5e can tell hen

    laying a ... o*t

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    5e sense hat contin*es o*r plant and animal life, and hat does not. 5e sense hat

    next mo$e is st*ltifying, too comfortable, g*iltily a$oidant. 5e can sense hen hat e

    thin is gl*ed together, internally closed so that e cannot enter. 5e no hen e

    ha$e o$en a thin bridge of s*perficial logic o$er a problem that still remains.

    These internal criteria of carrying forard a bodily ... do not ins*re against error, b*tthey do sho that there is error:and therefore also tr*th:in thining ith more than

    form.

    .2 "he order 

    >et *s begin ith the body as e 6*st re"concei$ed it, instead of the traditional order

    hich begins ith perception, adds relations or interactions, and then lang*age and

    tho*ght. 0 deny that old order. &or example, /eirce called sensations ;Hfirstness.< They

    are ass*med to be opa#ue like bits of color, smell, or to*ch. They are 6*st hat they are.

    Examine them as deeply as yo* might, in color there is 6*st color. 0 deny that this is

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    sense that it is internally intricate. 0t in$ol$es yo*r noledge of philosophy and m*ch

    else. 0t is a bodily implying of some speech and tho*ght. 5here do yo* find that@ 0s it

    implicit in external percept*al patterns@ Bo. *t if yo* no attend to yo*r bodily sense,

    many incipient tho*ghts ...