gender in transition

Gender in TransitionDevelopment and transition affect women and men in differ-ent ways. In many new EU member states, and in the coun-tries of the Western Balkans and Commonwealth of Indepen-dent States (CIS), the post-communist transition has seenreductions in women’s wages and employment rates relativeto men’s; access to assets, property, and political representa-tion has declined. Women as primary-care providers havebeen hard hit by the collapse or declines in social services.When poverty data are disaggregated by gender they gener-ally show that women fare much worse than men. Genderroles most often found in traditional societies have re-assert-ed themselves and may be exacerbating labour market dis-crimination and domestic violence. Concerns about traffick-ing, as a particularly negative outcome of labour migrationand its impact on women, are likewise growing. But somehardships of transition have fallen disproportionately onmen. Male mortality rates in the Russian Federation andWestern CIS countries have risen sharply since the 1980s.

In this issue of Development and Transition, Patrícia EszterMargit suggests that many of the region’s seemingly contra-dictory development trends with respect to gender reflectdifferences in perception, emphasis, and data. Anna Matvee-va links some of the region’s most serious gender chal-lenges–apparent in Central Asia and the Southern Cauca-sus–to the armed conflicts that have occurred there, as wellas to relatively low incomes and the re-emergence of tradi-tional gender roles in these countries. Angela Coyle pointsout that women face challenges even in relatively prosper-ous Poland, where EU membership and migration optionspose threats as well as opportunities. Marta Rawl⁄uszko

describes UNDP’s efforts to help Polish employers complywith the country’s post-accession anti-discrimination legisla-tion by ranking companies via a ‘gender index’. According toFiona Beveridge, Poland is not exceptional: all the new EUmember states face major challenges in complying with the‘gender acquis’ – the gender equality obligations that havecome with membership.

Recent survey data described by Irada Ahmedova suggestthat cultural stereotypes continue to determine gender rolesin Azerbaijan. Survey data from Moldova analysed by MihailPeleah show the impact of migration on intra-householdgender roles, both empowering women and increasing thevulnerability of children whose mothers (and fathers) areworking abroad. Evgeniy Abdullaev presents survey dataamong migrants in Uzbekistan which suggest that the chal-lenges facing female migrant labourers can be particularlydaunting.

Sarah Ashwin reminds us that transition also affects men.Russian male life expectancy has experienced unprecedent-ed declines, both vis-à-vis Russian women and men in OECD(and some other CIS) countries. Gender roles are at the heartof the causes of these declines, Ashwin suggests, particularlyin terms of cultural expectations that leave men demoralizedby the changes to their status brought about by transition.Ben Slay places the unfavourable male mortality trend in abroader demographic context. Slay points out that the trendin Russia is not shared by most other countries in the region,and it began well before the Soviet collapse. This debatereminds us that many of the gender issues in the region pre-date the challenges posed by transition.

James Hughes and Ben Slay

DECEMBER 2007

Published by the United Nations Development Programme and the London School of Economics and Political Science

www.developmentandtransition.net

A l b a n i a A r m e n i a A z e r b a i j a n B e l a r u s B o s n i a a n d H e r z e g o v i n a B u l g a r i a C r o a t i a C y p r u s C z e c h R e p u b l i c F Y R M a c e d o n i a G e o r g i a H u n g a r y K a z a k h s t a n K o s o v o ( S e r b i a ) K y r g y z s t a nL a t v i a L i t h u a n i a M a l t a M o l d o v a M o n t e n e g r o P o l a n d R o m a n i a R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n S e r b i a S l o v a k i a S l o v e n i a T a j i k i s t a n T u r k e y T u r k m e n i s t a n U k r a i n e U z b e k i s t a n

8DEVELOPMENTTRANSITION&

Women on Post-communist Labour Markets:Is the Glass Half Full, or Half Empty? Patrícia Eszter Margit 2

A Gendered Perspective on Conflictsin the South Caucasus and Central Asia Anna Matveeva 4

Has Transition Left Women Behind? Polish Women’s Labour Markets at ‘Home’ and ‘Abroad’ Angela Coyle 6

Balancing the Carrot and the Stick: Promoting Gender Equality in Poland’s Private Sector Marta Rawl⁄uszko 8

Gender and EU Enlargement – Potential and Progress Fiona Beveridge 10

Gender Attitudes and Gender Equality in Azerbaijan Irada Ahmedova 12

The Impact of Migration on Gender Roles in Moldova Mihail Peleah 14

A Portrait of Women Migrant Workers in Uzbekistan Evgeniy Abdullaev 17

Adapting to Russia’s Transformation: Women and Men Compared Sarah Ashwin 19

Demographic Dimensions of Regional Gender Issues Ben Slay 21

Women on Post-communist LabourMarkets: Is the GlassHalf Full, or Half Empty?

Patrícia Eszter Margit

Reverse gender policies, setbacks in the feministmovement, low representation of women in leader-ship positions, the withdrawal of state support forchildcare and parental leave: these alarming factorssuggest that in transition countries women haveexperienced dramatic declines in their labour-marketposition. On the other hand, a good number of schol-ars argue that, despite these negative changes,women have managed to maintain their relative posi-tion vis-à-vis men, and that transition has even creat-ed considerable new opportunities for them.

According to a database published in 2005 by theUnited Nations Economic Commission for Europe(UNECE), gender inequality did not increase duringthe post-communist transition in the region, butremained at pre-transition levels.1 The database alsoshows, however, that the vast majority of women havesuffered economic setbacks, in the form of increasingpoverty and unemployment, as well as growing eco-nomic insecurity and exploitation.

Two major regional studies–a report by the WorldBank and a study by the European Foundation for theImprovement of Living and Working Conditions–cameto different conclusions regarding whether in the caseof gender equality the glass is half full or half empty.The European Foundation is the more pessimistic, andstates that, “Although women continue to constitute45 percent of employed people, female participationrates have gone down, and women have dropped outof the labour force to work in household and informaleconomies, or when still present are overrepresentedamong unemployed people”.2 The World Bank report,in contrast, states that there is no empirical evidenceindicating that women’s participation has systemati-cally deteriorated in transition economies.3

These two reports symbolize the ongoing debateamong scholars and policy makers: some argue thatthe economic transition has harmed the position ofwomen on the labour market, while others focus onthe gains, such as the narrowing wage gap. These

varying conclusions reflect the fact that differentquestions are posed and different factors are takeninto consideration.

Scholars who ask whether the labour-market positionand living standards of women have deterioratedsince 1989 have unfortunately found the answer to beclearly ‘yes’. The most recent (2006) labour marketreport by the United Nations Development Fund forWomen (UNIFEM) states that while unemploymentwas absent during state socialism, after wage liberal-ization and privatization, unemployment grew to 10-30 percent in almost all countries of the region.4 Thisresulted in skyrocketing poverty and social inequali-ties. Nearly 40 percent of unemployed women areclassified as long-term unemployed. UNIFEM alsofound that economic activity rates have declined,especially among younger women.

Experts agree that the position of women in most Cen-tral European countries is no worse than in WesternEurope. According to the European Commission, insome transition states, such as Estonia and Latvia,their position is better.5 Fully integrating women intothe labour market is still one of the major goals ofmost EU policy makers. The EU’s Lisbon targets forEurope’s competitiveness in the world economyrequire that the overall employment rate be increasedto 70 percent by 2010. If achieved, 60 percent of Euro-pean women would be in the labour force.

The question of whether the labour-market positionand overall living standards of women have declinedrelative to men’s is more complex. The 2006 UNIFEMreport states that social class, religion, nationality,race/ethnicity, and geography all intersect to shapethe position of women on the labour market. Thebiggest losers of transition have been women of Romaor Egyptian origin, who are poorly educated, live inrural areas with few employment opportunities, andare more likely to suffer from poverty and domesticviolence. After the overthrow of communism, out-migration became the preferred route to avoid pover-ty in many countries. Unfortunately, too manymigrants–especially children and young women–havefallen prey to criminals.

Women still work more in lower-paid jobs, and areoften employed in the informal economy without thestability and benefits of legal work. The EuropeanCommission states that the gender pay gap is still sig-nificant in the new Member States and, as comparedto men, women have only limited access to manageri-al positions and high-skilled jobs.6

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DEVELOPMENT &TRANSITION

According to UNIFEM, while women comprise themajority of public-sector workers, men make up themajority of employees in the private sector.7 Women’sshare of public-sector employment has significantlyincreased, from 55 percent to 64 percent in the newEU member states, and from 40 percent to 52 percentin Southeast Europe. This would be good news ifsalaries in the public sector weren’t so much lowerthan in the private sector. It is important to note thatwhile work conditions are different for the same job ineach country, public-sector salaries are now lower inreal terms than they were in the pre-transition period,and the state sector offers fewer in-kind benefits thanthe best jobs offered by private companies.

Highly skilled young women, who can benefit from theopportunities created from the social and economictransformation, are among the winners of transition.Yet, after the abolition of the gender quota systemsthat were used during socialism, women have occu-pied proportionately fewer key political positions.According to the UN’s Millennium Development GoalsReport, the share of women in single or lower housesof parliament in Central European countries is 12 per-cent on average.8 This is significantly lower than globalaverages. According to the Commission on the Statusof Women, women make up 16.3 percent of parliamen-tarians worldwide, while in 20 states the representa-tion of women is over 30 percent.9

The picture is even less favourable if we considerUNIFEM’s finding (2006), that younger women’s partici-pation has fallen sharply compared to men’s. The Euro-pean Women’s Lobby (2006) found that women’s pro-fessional success is largely determined by age, numberof children, marital status, education level, as well as bysocial policies such as childcare and parental leave. TheCentre for Work-Life Policy (2003) also found that familyobligations are the most important reason why womenleave the workforce temporarily.10

Therefore, age is a key factor in evaluating whetherthe glass is half full or half empty. Even though thelabour-force participation rates of women older than55 years have increased since 1990, this group is stillsignificantly less likely to be active than men.Women’s labour-force participation rates are highestfor those between 35 and 49 (women tend to return tothe labour market after 35 years of age). The rate is 80-90 percent in most countries, which is close to the rateof active men.

Whereas some younger women might be major winnersof the transitions, many others are in fact becoming mar-

ginalized due to declines in childcare services after priva-tization and financial restructuring. According to ILO sta-tistics (2004), spending in Hungary on family benefitsdeclined from 3.2 percent to 2.0 percent of GDP between1990-2000; in Poland the decline was from 1.7 percent to1.1 percent (1990 to 1998); and in the Czech Republic 1.6percent to 1.2 percent (1996 to 2002).11 Women whobenefit from paid parental leave and sufficient childcaresupport have higher full-time labour participation rates.

Flexible arrangements help women and men reconcilework and family life. While in most European countriesflexible working conditions are settled individually atthe organizational level, European legislation hasattempted to broaden the range of part-time workpossibilities. In the transition economies, employershave not been encouraged to create flex-time arrange-ments, because tax laws require employers to providethe same amount of benefits for their part-timeemployees as for their full-time ones.

In many transition economies, the position of womenwould seem to have improved compared to men’s.However, the gaps between winners and losers in tran-sition are large, and many women are still unable to takefull advantage of the new opportunities. The battle isnow being fought to make the labour market take fullaccount of the needs of women. Governments, employ-ers, and parents should come to a just division ofresponsibilities to provide affordable policies includingchild-care facilities, tax-incentives, financial allowances,flexible work arrangements, and parental leave, tailoredto the personal and professional needs of women.

Patrícia Eszter Margit has been named Media and Gen-der Officer for the Office of the Hungarian Prime Min-ister. She wrote this article in a private capacity.

1. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Gender StatisticsDatabase. http://w3.unece.org/stat/gender.asp.

2. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2005).Working Conditions and Gender in an Enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for OfficialPublications of the European Communities.

3. World Bank (2002). Gender in Transition. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.4. UNIFEM (2006). The Story behind the Numbers: Women and Employment in Central and

Eastern Europe and the Western Commonwealth of Independent States.http://www.unifem.org/resources/item_detail.php?ProductID=66.

5. European Commission (2005). The Social Situation in the European Union. Brussels:European Commission Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and EqualOpportunities.

6. Ibid.7. UNIFEM, 2006.8. United Nations (2007). The Millennium Development Goals Report (New York: Unit-

ed Nations).9. Commission on the Status of Women, 50th session, 27 February-10 March 2006.

Introductory statement by Rachel N. Mayanja, UN Assistant Secretary-General andSpecial Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women.

10. Centre for Work-Life Policy. The Wage Gap: Brief History and Overview. Prepared for‘The Hidden Brain Drain’ Task-Force Meeting. 11 June 2003.

11. International Labour Organization (ILO) (2004). Gender Mainstreaming in LabourStatistics. Working paper No. 7. prepared for the UNECE working session on genderstatistics, Geneva, 18-20 October.

DECEMBER 2007 | issue 8

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A Gendered Perspectiveon Conflicts in theSouth Caucasus andCentral Asia

Anna Matveeva

The wars and social upheavals of the post-independenceperiod in the South Caucasus and Central Asia haveaffected women and men differently. This makes a gen-der perspective on issues of peace and conflict relevant.Women often carry the bulk of the social hardship creat-ed by conflicts. In countries with high labour migration,women remain the backbone of the labour force. Thedangerous shuttle trade in the former Soviet Union islargely a woman’s domain. In this activity women arefaced with hostile border regimes and harassment by cor-rupt law-enforcement agencies. In the Fergana Valley,where the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajik-istan meet and interstate relations are tense, female shut-tle traders are routinely locked up by guards, who try toextort bribes, sometimes under the threat of ‘gynaecolog-ical checks’. The plight of women is further aggravated bythe expansion of conservative values and practices athome, and the growth in domestic violence and earlymarriages. These factors suggest that there is a reservoirof female discontent that is suppressed by the constraintsof traditional societies. Still, women’s protests, howevervocal, are not seen as a credible threat by the ruling andincreasingly authoritarian regimes.

There are many recent cases where women have takenpart in social protests. For example, women have been inthe forefront of the protests over fuel shortages in Tajik-istan, and over the rise of flour prices that hit Central Asiathis autumn. They were also active participants in theprotests against evictions from shanty towns in 2006 inKazakhstan. In one such episode in April 2006, KorlanDolybayeva attempted self-immolation in protest overher family being evicted from the Shanyrak tenement dis-trict of Almaty that was then demolished by the cityauthorities to make way for new construction projects.1

The most important safety valve for social discontent isthe high labour migration, mostly to Russia, whichreceives over 70 percent of labour migrants from CentralAsia, but also to Kazakhstan, where workers have to com-pete with labour migrants from Turkey. Migration takesthe unemployed and discontented young men, and alsothe most energetic and skilled, and potentially the mostpolitically active, out of the local environment. Moreover,

remittances provide an economic lifeline for the majorityof rural households. It is estimated that at least 700,000citizens of Kyrgyzstan and 800,000 citizens of Uzbekistanwork in Russia. In Tajikistan, where out of the populationof 7 million, over 1 million men work in Russia and manyare long-term migrants, migration has had profoundsocial consequences. With one third of the male popula-tion gone, leaving women, children and older menbehind, there are now areas that have large majority pop-ulations of women. The social consequences are many,but their long-term effect is hard to predict. In some vil-lages in Tajikistan, two or three men of adult age are left,e.g. head of administration and a headmaster, whichaffects patterns of male socialization and traditional malenetworks, such as gaps or gashtaks. Many children growup with absent fathers who often have second families inRussia. The social aspirations of teenage boys are formedby an expectation that they will go to Russia for work:even boys from middle-income families, who are not sodependant upon remittances, feel compelled to gothrough this coming-of-age experience that has come toreplace the Soviet Army service as a form of socialization.

The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the only oppo-sition party in Central Asia with real experience of con-testing power, has found its base for recruitment severe-ly undermined. Its strongholds in the Rasht Valley, in thecentral districts, and in the Khatlon province in the south,remain the most economically deprived, with hardly anyactive young men left who could be mobilized into theparty. By the same token, internally displaced persons inAzerbaijan who are victims of the Nagorno Karabakh con-flict, despite their large numbers (estimated at 800,000)have not become ready-made material for fighting totake Karabakh back, despite the rhetoric of their leaders.Many of these men are in Russia, and their families cannotafford for them to return home and thus lose their remit-tances.

In the short term, the current gender and demographictrends support greater political and social stability. Localpublics view labour migration as a positive development,despite its negative impact upon family life. However, themassive exodus could pose long-term risks to economicdevelopment, as most of the potential active labour forceis abroad, thereby stunting the development of domesticproduction. Migration also disrupts social relations andhas created a growing category of women whose socialstatus is uncertain. Young wives of the migrants have nosay in when their husbands come and go to Russia, asdecisions are made by the men’s mothers, whose author-ity behind the scenes as dominant figures in communitylife has grown. Significantly, the migration of men canarrest political development by reducing the scope for

social mobilization. Women’s protests, even if highlyvocal, are constrained by the need to protect their fami-lies first. Consequently, the authorities know that there isa lack of credible potential for violence. While the author-ities fear the spread of coloured revolutions, they recog-nize that such protests require the presence of large num-bers of young men. Even then, in most cases the tacitapproval of their mothers would be essential.

Conflict situations can actually empower women toupgrade their social status, as they shift power relationsand affect traditional gender roles. One such instance isdisplacement in the aftermath of a violent conflict. Whilewomen may find the process of being uprooted moretraumatic than men do, they often show greater flexibili-ty in adapting to their circumstances and developing sur-vival strategies. Men tend to expect assistance from for-mal institutions, and their skills are often not transferable,while women more easily adapt to an informal setting. Inthe aftermath of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, menwere unable to find ‘masculine’ work in the new environ-ments, but considered it unacceptable to do ‘female jobs’,e.g. work as market traders. This left women as the maineconomic providers for the families.

The role of women in formal political and economic insti-tutions has declined compared with the Soviet period. InKyrgyzstan – the most liberal Central Asian country – afterthe March 2005 power change, women are no longer rep-resented in parliament, and only two hold ministerialappointments. In contrast, most leading NGO activists arewomen, often pitted against predominantly male politi-cians. Such NGO leaders include Tolekan Ismailova of theLegal Centre Citizens Against Corruption, or Raya Kadyrovaof Foundation for Tolerance International. A similar patternis evident in Georgia.

International aid practitioners seek to promote the roleof women in conflict resolution. International Alert andthe Heinrich Böll Stiftung South Caucasus Office haveengaged women with more success than other initia-tives such as work with ex-combatants or historians. Inthe South Caucasus, women have been at the forefrontof public efforts at reconciliation. For example, womenfrom Georgia were the first to cross the border over theInguri bridge and speak to women in Abkhazia. In theGeorgian – Abkhaz conflict, IDP women’s groups on theGeorgian side, such as The Sukhumi Foundation based inKutaisi, have been able to establish genuine partnerships


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Women and children displaced by conflict in a camp in Azerbaijan © UNFPA Azerbaijan. Photo by Farid Khayrulin

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Has Transition LeftWomen Behind?1

Polish Women’s LabourMarkets at ‘Home’ and ‘Abroad’

Angela Coyle

Earlier this year Lech Kaczynski, the President of Poland,famously commented on the impossibility of finding adecorator in Warsaw. He was alluding to the skills short-ages that Poland is now experiencing as a result of emi-gration. Poland is regarded as one of the most success-ful of the new EU Member States, yet in common withother new market economies in Central and EasternEurope, high levels of economic growth has not resultedin significant job growth. On the contrary, economicrestructuring has created a large pool of surplus labour,and Poland has shifted from a labour market of fullemployment to having one of the highest levels ofunemployment in the EU 25.

As a result, large numbers of Polish nationals have left tofind alternative employment in other European states.The Polish government estimates that at any given timemore than 2 million Poles, mostly in their 20s and 30s,are working abroad. The migrant Polish constructionworker is a popular stereotype across Europe eventhough around half of Polish labour migrants in Europeare women.2 Both women and men have been affectedby Poland’s transformation, but women have been dis-proportionately affected by job loss, unemployment,impoverishment, and gender discrimination. Emigration

has enabled women to find new work opportunitiesacross Europe as cleaners, nannies, care workers, andnurses. While this is a ‘success story’ of sorts, the exodusof young women is depleting Poland of its mothers anddaughters and large swathes of human and social capi-tal. It is Poland’s ‘care drain’, rather than a shortage ofpainters and decorators, that is now in need of PresidentKaczynski’s attention.

Labour market transformations and genderinequality in PolandPrior to the 1990s, Polish women had the highest femaleemployment rates in Europe. They were well represent-ed in higher level, scientific and managerial occupationsand well supported by state-funded family and welfareservices including comprehensive nursery and childcarefacilities. Now, Polish female employment rates are 47.8percent, far lower than the EU-25 average femaleemployment rate of 57.3 percent. The female unem-ployment rate is 14.2 percent, the highest in Europe andexceeds both Polish men’s unemployment rate (11.2percent) and the average female unemployment rate(8.6 percent) in the EU-25. Many older women (aged55+) have withdrawn from the labour market altogetherwith employment rates of just 19.4 percent, comparedwith 34.1 percent for Polish men aged 55+ and 31.7 per-cent for women aged 55+ across the EU-25.3 Educationdoes not protect women against unemployment: unem-ployed women are better educated than unemployedmen. Over 50 percent of unemployed women have sec-ondary, post-secondary or tertiary education, asopposed to 32 percent of unemployed men.4

Market transformations affected women’s jobs first anddisproportionately because they were concentrated in avery narrow band of industries, especially textiles andclothing, and in state-run public services, including

with different women’s groups on the Abkhaz side, forexample the Association of Women of Abkhazia (AWA).The Sukhumi Foundation and AWA recently decided tostudy women’s experience in the resolution of conflictsin the Caucasus via a joint project on ‘Women's contribu-tion to the peace processes’. The Foundation also sup-ports joint business groups with women from the Abk-haz Union of Women-Entrepreneurs, which generatesbusiness activity in the Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarchalidistricts where ethnic Georgian returnees are present.

Women have the advantage of being perceived as lessthreatening and more effective in the diffusion of ten-sions when violent episodes occur and when there is aneed to reach out to the other side to prevent further

escalation. Women’s protests, however, while oftenvocal, are not seen as a credible threat by the rulingregimes given the absence of young males who areabroad. Yet, the role of women is being transformed.High standards of education and social awareness inher-ited from the Soviet past, coupled with a search for newroles, have meant that women in the region haveemerged as prominent civil society actors in matters ofwar and peace.

Anna Matveeva is a Visiting Fellow with the Crisis StatesResearch Centre of the London School of Economics,and is a consultant on Central Asia and the Caucasus.

1. http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=4350.


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health, education, and social work that were all subjectto early restructuring. Job loss in these female-dominat-ed labour markets has not been offset by any significantnew employment opportunities in the private sector,which is distinguished by overt gender discrimination inemployment practices. These detrimental effects oflabour market restructuring have been compounded bythe lack of institutional support for the promotion ofgender equality. On the contrary, thousands of day-carecentres and nurseries that supported working womenhave closed down and European discourses of genderequality are unwelcome.

In the years prior to European enlargement, the EU fre-quently raised its concerns about the Polish state’sapparent disregard for EU equal treatment directivesand the lack of harmonization with EU gender equalityand employment targets. EU labour-market strategiesare based on responses to the twin challenges of anaging population and a diminishing workforce. Pro-moting equal opportunities for women and men,including equal pay, childcare and the better reconcil-iation of working and home life, is seen as the best wayof increasing female labour-force participation andthereby activating Europe’s full labour-force potentialin the face of demographic decline. Poland is a longway from the EU target of female labour-force partici-pation rates of 60 percent. At the same time, Poland’sfertility rates are the lowest in the EU. High unemploy-ment, low household income, and high levels ofwomen’s labour migration are not conducive to familyformation.

Polish women and labour migrationBoth women and men have resorted to migration inresponse to the lack of employment opportunities inPoland’s new market economy. Mobility, not employ-ment, is the new opportunity created by transforma-tion. As most of this labour migration has been irregu-

lar and circular, its scale is very difficult to quantify.Around 1 million Poles are thought to have soughtwork outside of Poland every year since 1989; approxi-mately half have been women. In fact, Polish womenhave very much been at the forefront of this new para-digm of cross-border working and transnational lives.Many have children living in Poland and travel backand forth across borders between work and their fami-lies. They believe themselves to be more like long-dis-tance commuters rather than migrants or settlers. Theyare not concerned with assimilation or settlement;they maintain their lives in Poland by email, cheapphone calls and low-cost travel.

Although the experiences of Polish migrants in Europeare heterogeneous, there are some distinct features oftheir working abroad. Germany, the Netherlands,France and Britain have been favoured destinations;migrants have taken advantage of various means oflegal entry available such as student visas or seasonalworker schemes, but they work in breach of their con-ditions of entry. For both women and men, migrationhas been deskilling. Their undocumented, irregularstatus forces them into low-paid, unskilled, and infor-mal work. They are ‘high-quality migrants in low-wagejobs’.5 Polish nationals have all but taken over seasonaljobs in agriculture and construction in Europe. Polishwomen staff the new army of domestic workers inEurope, working as cleaners, childminders and carers,frequently in private households.

Polish women’s decision to work abroad cannot beunderstood in employment terms alone. It is clear fromtheir narratives that they want to be part of a new,modern, cosmopolitan Europe. They want to be social-ly mobile and independent economic actors, not men’sdependents. Many professionally qualified womensuch as nurses and teachers prefer to work in Europe inthese kinds of occupations than to remain working inPoland. This is an opportunity to speak English and liveabroad and, while their work is not well paid, they canearn more than they would at home.

In 2004, Poland became part of the enlarged EU; Britain,Ireland and Sweden immediately adopted an open-door policy extending the right of Polish nationals towork there. Now an estimated 600,000 Poles arethought to be working in Britain and a further 250,000in Ireland. These arrangements allow these countries toimprove the selective recruitment of skilled migrantworkers; over time, it should enable qualified Polishwomen to access more skilled work. The UK is employ-ing increasing numbers of Polish women as nurses andas care assistants in hospitals and residential care© European Commission

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homes. Still, hard facts on the extent and experience ofPolish labour migration remain patchy. Many Polishwomen in the UK are still ‘invisible’, choosing not toregularize their status through the Workers RegistrationScheme (WRS–although knowledge of the WRS is notwidespread). The key to understanding Polish women’slabour migration is that they do not plan to stay. Eventhough they can’t quite envisage when they will beable to return home, they regard their internationalcommute as wholly temporary.

Sustainable futures?Migration has helped ease the unemployment andsocio-economic insecurity experienced in Poland as aresult of economic transformation. Poles have provedthemselves to be a hard-working, flexible, and usefullabour supply in Europe. However, migration invariablydepletes labour-sending countries of the skills neededfor sustainable economic development. When women

migrate it is not just their labour-force contribution thatis lost: also lost is the unpaid work of social reproductionthat women perform as carers of families, children, andolder people, and which is vital to social sustainability.Until Poland can offer women work opportunities with-in a framework of gender equality and equal rights athome, it is hard to imagine why they will return.

Angela Coyle is Professor of Sociology at City UniversityLondon and has worked extensively as a consultant ongender issues in Central and Eastern Europe.

1. Title ‘borrowed’ from World Bank (2004). Gender and Economic Opportunities inPoland: Has Transition left Women Behind? Report Nr 29205, Poverty Reduction andEconomic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region.

2. European Commission Employment and Social Affairs (2003). Social Agenda No 6, July.ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_agenda/pdf/social_agenda6_en.pdf.

3. European Communities (2007) Eurostat Data in Focus, 16/2007.4. Central Statistical Office of Poland (2005). Women and Men on the Labour Market, Cen-

tral Statistical Office (GUS). http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_1532_ENG_HTML.htm.5. Anderson, B., Ruhs, M., Rogaly, B. and S. Spencer (2006). Fair Enough? Central and East

European Migrants in Low-Wage Employment in the UK, The Centre on Migration, Poli-cy and Society (COMPAS). www.compas.ox.ac.uk/changingstatus.

Balancing the Carrotand the Stick:Promoting GenderEquality in Poland’s Private Sector

Marta Rawl⁄uszko

Discrimination in the workplace remains an importantfactor in explaining women’s inferior social status. WithPoland’s May 2004 accession to the European Union,amendments to the country’s labour code both definedand prohibited direct and indirect discrimination inemployment. Sexual harassment was recognized as aform of discrimination, and an ‘equal pay for equalwork’ rule was introduced. It was also explicitly statedthat the principle of equal treatment is not violated bytemporary measures providing specific advantages tounder-represented groups whenever they aim tosecure equal opportunities.

However, it is quite apparent that these amendmentswould not by themselves reduce discrimination in theworkplace. Additional measures are needed in order tointerest employers in gender equality, convince themof the importance of the issue, and help them combatgender discrimination. At the end of 2004, UNDP initiat-ed the ‘Gender Index’ project1 to promote gender

equality among Polish companies. Since the legalframework was already in place, the project focused onemployers’ attitudes, knowledge, and capacities toredress workplace discrimination.

Quantitative and qualitative data indicate that genderdiscrimination in Polish workplaces occur because ofthe following employer characteristics:

• Inadequate knowledge of Poland’s new anti-discrimi-nation legislation, and of discriminatory practices inthe workplace;

• Poor awareness concerning gender stereotypes; • Weak commitment to ensuring the equal treatment

of women and men in the workplace; and• Inadequate knowledge of equal opportunity policies

and other business tools that can promote genderequality in commercial organizations.

These challenges were addressed in three ways. First, agender index focusing on seven areas (recruitment,security of employment, career advancement, access totraining, equal pay, prevention of sexual harassment,and work/life balance) was developed to measure theposition of women and men within a given company.This index was computed from information gatheredfrom a random sample of employees and from the com-pany’s human resources department. The company’sscore was then entered in a national ‘Equal Opportuni-ty Company’ competition that highlighted businessleaders whose companies had developed the most suc-cessful equal-opportunity policies.


9

Employers were also provided with educational materi-als on ‘How to Manage an Equal Opportunity Company’,consisting of a training model and a good practicesguidebook. The guidebook is a collection of 58 concreteexamples for ensuring equal prospects for women andmen in the workplace, based on good practices from 27companies. These materials, and associated trainingactivities, helped employers and managers to recognizegender discrimination in their workplace, and to intro-duce equal-opportunity policies.

The ‘Gender Index’ turned out to be very successful: itgave gender equality greater visibility in business andhuman resource management. Whereas the first com-petition in 2006 attracted the attention of 52 companies(22 large enterprises and 30 small- and medium-sizedfirms), more than 100 organizations participated in thesecond round in 2007. This doubling of business interestwould not have been possible without strong mediacoverage produced by an effective communicationsstrategy, focusing on the benefits for businesses andlinking gender equality to the broader concept of corpo-rate social responsibility (CSR).

However, this approach to reducing gender inequalityin the workplace is not without its limitations. Someemployers chose not to get involved in the ‘GenderIndex’, so that their employees do not benefit from theopportunities it creates. Employers seemed most inter-ested in using equal-opportunity instruments in orderto recruit and retain valuable workers. The business casefor equality becomes less evident in the case of blue-col-lar workers, and solutions developed under the project

may not apply to them. Also, the labour code’s non-dis-crimination provisions only apply to employees workingon contracts regulated by it. Employees working on con-tracts regulated by the civil code (e.g., commission con-tracts), or the self-employed, are not covered by thelabour code’s anti-discrimination clauses. Many Polishemployers prefer contracting employees under the civilcode, or outsourcing employment to other companies(particularly in the service sector), thereby escaping thelabour code’s anti-discrimination provisions.

Difficult questions remain as to whether the caseagainst gender discrimination in the workplace shouldbe based solely on commercial criteria and competitiveadvantage, as opposed to ethical considerations. Argu-ments about whether equal opportunity ‘pays’ in theworkplace can lose sight of broader goals and equalityprinciples, which are rooted in the values of humanrights and social justice. Likewise, the creation ofopportunities for businesses to promote themselvesand their brands should not be allowed to underminethe importance of state control (e.g., labour inspec-torates) and the judicial review of discrimination cases.Furthermore, companies that have invested in develop-ing successful equal-opportunity instruments are notalways eager to share these instruments with ‘the com-petition’. This makes the collection of data and the dis-semination of these tools more demanding than wouldotherwise be the case.

Gender discrimination on the Polish labour market doesnot exist in a vacuum: it also reflects gendered powerrelations in society. Treating workplace discrimination as

‘Equal at work – it pays off’

10


Gender and EUEnlargement –Potential and Progress

Fiona Beveridge

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements created importantspaces for the pursuit of gender politics in the Centraland East European Member States. On the one hand,accession preparations fuelled a rush to implement newlaws and create new institutions to implement the equalopportunities acquis, that is the existing body of Treatyprovisions, directives, and European Court of Justicedecisions on equal pay, equal treatment, and maternityand parental leave which is binding on Member States.On the other hand, preparations for accession alsofuelled capacity development in candidate countries.Officials became involved in ‘twinning’ arrangements,whereby officials from Member States assisted thosefrom candidate countries in producing the necessarylaws and regulations. EU funds became available to sup-port these activities. NGOs and activists became moredrawn in, in some cases, to EU-wide or EU-funded activ-ities, and sought to exploit pre-accession leverage tosecure equality gains in national arenas.

There nonetheless remained, at the time of accession,significant shortfalls both in the transposition of law andin the capacity for its effective enforcement. A verypatchy picture is revealed, with governments, nationalcourts, and state equality bodies struggling to realizethe promise of accession.

BackgroundAdopting EU laws and regulations and decisions of theEuropean Court of Justice on gender equality – the gen-der acquis – is just one of the conditions for EU member-

ship. In principle, candidate countries are required todemonstrate not only that their domestic legislationconforms to EU law, but also that it is actuallyapplied–that state institutions, including courts, havethe tools, capacity, and willingness to apply the relevantlaws. The European Commission is tasked first withassisting a country’s preparations for accession and laterwith monitoring its progress. However, because genderequality is only one of its many concerns, the Commis-sion’s de facto scrutiny has often been quite cursory.

For many candidate countries or ‘new’ Member States,gender equality may not seem of the highest politicalpriority. Nevertheless, the political imperative to securea ‘green’ light from the Commission to proceed towardsmembership can provide unique opportunities for gen-der activists to make important gains. Persuading gov-ernments to collect gender-sensitive statistics, enactgender-equality laws, and create state bodies chargedwith advancing gender equality has rarely been easier.As a result, the 10 post-communist countries whobecame members in 2004 and 2007 all saw significantchanges in equality laws and institutions in the pre-accession period. However, the post-accession periodhas demonstrated significant shortfalls both in thetransposition of law and in the capacity within the newmember states for their effective enforcement. A num-ber of different factors explain this.

The transplantation industry: In the rush to adoptnew laws, existing member state legislation was oftenheld up as a blueprint. ‘Twinning’ arrangements (oftenwith very short deadlines) reinforced this process. Over700 such projects were approved in preparations for the2004 enlargement. While often billed as ‘mutual learn-ing’ experiences, in reality these relationships felt farfrom equal. In any case, time pressures often left candi-date countries with little option other than implement-ing an ‘off-the-shelf’ reform package not tailored to

a problem of human resource management and organi-zational culture can downplay broader issues of inclusion,participation, and justice. Likewise, gender discriminationis not only a matter of individual stereotypes or preju-dices, attitudes or behaviour: discrimination in the work-place occurs in a broader social and institutional context.Getting employers to adhere to good practices is onlyone way of combating and preventing gender discrimi-nation. More fundamental progress requires advocacy forstronger and more rigorous observance of anti-discrimi-nation legislation so that employers would fear the repu-tational damage caused by discrimination litigation and

penalties for negative verdicts. Educational programmeson employee rights targeted at women and workers fromvulnerable groups are urgently needed. It is also crucial tobuild institutional support for individuals asserting theirrights in discrimination cases against employers. Last butnot least, gender equality should become more visible inexisting social dialogue.

Marta Rawl⁄uszko is gender specialist for UNDP Poland.

1. The ‘Gender Index’ project is financed by the European Social Fund within the frame-work of the Community Initiative EQUAL. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal/index_en.cfm.


11

domestic legal systems. Post-accession, these ‘trans-plants’ often prove to be an awkward fit with domesticlaw, leaving judges with huge problems trying to fit newemployment protection obligations, for instance, intoexisting civil-code provisions for remedies.

Lost in translation: Key concepts of EU law are some-times translated differently into domestic legislation.For example, the transposition of the EU’s ‘indirect dis-crimination’ principle (which seeks to prevent discrimi-nation resulting from practices that do not necessarilyhave discriminatory intents) into Croatian law has beenhampered by its divergent treatment in two key piecesof national legislation – the Gender Equality Act and theLabour Code.

Differing national judicial traditions: EU gender equal-ity law depends on national judiciaries for effective imple-mentation, partly because compensation to the individ-ual ‘victim’ is central to its concept of ‘effectiveness’, andpartly because it relies on ‘balancing tests’, e.g., to deter-mine when indirect discrimination can be justified. Thisnecessarily requires adjudication on a case-by-case basis.However, many judges in the new Member States whowere schooled under socialist legal regimes are not fullyprepared to abandon their inherited formalistic legal tra-ditions and apply the ‘European’ rule-of-reasonapproaches. Though some judicial training has beenfunded through EU programmes, deep cultural changesare often required for judges to fully realize their potentialas independent guardians of individual rights.

Weak political support: While the pre-accession periodmay have provided attractive reform opportunities, gen-der equality measures and institutions in the new Mem-ber States have rarely enjoyed strong support from exist-ing political groupings. Most new Member States boastfew ‘gender champions’ within the administration whoremain actively engaged post-accession. Indeed, the factthat gender equality legislation was often ‘fast-tracked’through parliament with little time for debate exacerbat-ed problems of inadequate support from domestic con-stituencies. Many gender-equality bodies in the newMember States have therefore seen their roles and budg-ets slashed, or their work criticized by the government.And while the acquis may have been transposed on timepre-accession, some outstanding legal issues nonethe-less remain. The Czech Republic currently faces enforce-ment action by the Commission in relation to Directive2002/73 which should have been transposed by October2005. A draft Anti-Discrimination Act to implement this(and other EU provisions) was rejected by the Czech par-liament in January 2006, and still remains outstanding.

What’s a ‘good practice’? Although the EU presentsitself as a ‘champion’ of gender equality and has com-mitted itself to mainstreaming gender through all itsactivities, there is no consensus about how this shouldbe done. Even in such key areas as employment andsocial exclusion, where the EU is committed to the‘open method of coordination’ based on peer reviewand the exchange of ‘good practice’, important debatesabout what good practice might entail continue. A vari-

ety of strategies and arrangements existin the ‘old’ member states, none of whichcan claim superiority, as the persistenceof employment and pay gaps in all Mem-ber States readily testifies.1 Is the LisbonStrategy target of 60 percent participa-tion of women in the labour market by2010 appropriate for all states? Howshould this participation be defined?While the Netherlands can claim afemale labour force participation rate of67.5 percent, 74.7 percent of thesewomen work part-time. Bulgaria, on theother hand, falls below the target with 55percent of women in employment, butonly 2.7 percent of women work part-time, as this is not traditionally anemployment option.2

For these and other reasons, the pictureof gender equality in the new MemberStates is one of patchy implementation

Transplanting EU laws in new member states has proven more difficult than expected© Panos Pictures

12


Gender Attitudes and Gender Equality in Azerbaijan

Irada Ahmedova

Like a number of other CIS countries, Azerbaijan’s constitu-tional and legal framework for promoting gender equalitygrew out of Soviet-era equality and the international normscontained in UN conventions and treaties on the rights ofwomen. During 16 years of independence, efforts havebeen made to adapt this legal framework to the Azerbai-jani context, to enable women and men to contribute tonation-building, and to the completion of the transition todemocracy and the market economy. In the process, a gaphas opened up between de jure and de facto gender equal-ity in the country. Some have argued that this is largely dueto the revival of traditional attitudes towards gender andfamily values, after being suppressed during 70 years ofcommunist rule. If correct, these arguments suggest thatmajor barriers to post-Soviet gender equality lie not ininadequate legal frameworks or insufficient institutionalcapacity, but in traditional beliefs and behaviour.

What exactly are the barriers to gender equality in Azer-baijan, and to what extent do traditional gender atti-tudes contribute to them? The findings of the firstnational independent survey of gender attitudes ever

conducted in Azerbaijan (and possibly in the CIS) providea lucid illustration of popular perceptions regarding gen-der disparities in the country.1 This survey covered per-ceptions on the gender dimensions of employment andliving conditions, education, health, marriage, and familyand social life. The results on the whole support the con-clusion that gender inequalities in Azerbaijan are oftendue to negative attitudes and stereotypes that have theirroots in household and inter-personal relations.

What do the survey data say?The survey data show that the Azerbaijani family isinclined towards patriarchy in terms of expectations vis-à-vis men and women, stereotypes about male and femaleroles, gender-biased divisions of labour, and attitudestowards male and female employment. Deeply rootedcultural norms perpetuate traditional gender roles andfacilitate their internalization by both women and men.One male respondent explained: “In our families, powerbelongs to men. It has always been like this. Our traditionspropagate this idea”.

The Azerbaijani family is currently undergoing rapidtransformation and change. Family sizes are decreasing,and the vast majority of families are now nuclear (asopposed to extended). However, the gender division oflabour and authority within families show much greaterresistance to change. There is a hard-core stereotypicalgender division of labour, and a near consensus on the‘ideal’ role models for men as the ‘breadwinner’ andwomen as the ‘homemaker’.

and progress.3 However, as this conclusion could alsoapply to old Member States–some of which have beenworking towards this goal for decades–this is perhapsnot so surprising.

Future prospectsAccession is the beginning, rather than the end, of adebate about the role of the EU as a promoter ofequality in Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargementshould also herald a new chapter in debates withinthe ‘old’ Member States about future gender equalitypolicy – not least due to the increasing dependence ofthose states on migrants from new Member States tofill gaps in the employment market, often in low-paidoccupations, with serious repercussions for family anddomestic life. Recent moves to extend the scope of EUgender policy to embrace areas such as domestic vio-lence and health4 require the development of widerand more inclusive processes, embracing viewpointsfrom all over the EU. However, progress on genderequality within Member States – especially the new

Member States and candidate countries – will dependon the more gradual evolution of domestic attitudes,public institutions, and behaviour. Better statistics,new laws and regulations, and new gender equalitybodies will help, but common efforts from manyactors are required for any real improvements toemerge.

Fiona Beveridge is Professor of Law at the University ofLiverpool.

1. For example, see Plantenga, J. and Remery, C. (2006), The Gender Pay Gap: Origins andPolicy Responses. A Comparative Review of 30 European Countries, Directorate-Generalfor Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Brussels: The European Com-mission.

2. All figures from EUROSTAT, 2006. In Bulgaria rates of part-time female employmentare particularly low, but they are generally low across Central and Eastern Europe,compared with ‘old’ Member States.

3. For statistical information and an overview, see the EU’s Annual Reports on equalitybetween women and men, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/gen-der_equality/gender_mainstreaming/activity_reports_en.html For states outside theEU see e.g. Open Society Institute On the Road to the EU: Monitoring Equal Opportuni-ties for Women and Men in South Eastern Europe, May 2006.

4. European Commission (2006). Roadmap for Equality Between Women and Men for thePeriod 2006-10. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2006/mar/com06092_roadmap_en.pdf.


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The survey results indicate that the male ‘breadwinner’and female ‘homemaker’ roles are internalized by mostmembers of society, and are reflected in what mostrespondents believe to be suitable jobs for women andmen. Women and men are virtually unanimous in theirviews that ideal jobs for men are those that enable themto fulfil their dual roles of breadwinner and householdhead by providing sufficient income and securing socialprestige and status. This differentiation is reflected inthe wage gap: women in Azerbaijan tend to work inlower-paid jobs. Moreover, fewer women than menwere in favour of wage equality: 65 percent of male sur-vey respondents “agreed” and “strongly agreed” withthe ‘equal pay for equal work’ principle, compared with62 percent for female respondents (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Responses (in %) to the statement: Womenand men should receive the same wage for the same job.

Traditional gender roles often constitute a burden onwomen, since they can either restrict female engage-ment in economic activity and decrease the range ofchoices they enjoy. In Azerbaijan, women are concen-trated in ‘feminized professions’ in health and educa-tion, where they tend to find employment in lower-paid jobs than do men. Socialization and negativestereotyping reinforce tendencies for decision-makingto remain a male domain. In the private sector, womenare under-represented in management positions andare often concentrated at lower levels of the manage-ment pyramid. The survey data suggest, however, thatAzerbaijani women and men may be parting ways onthis subject. Whereas some 57 percent of femalerespondents agreed with the statement that “womencan do men’s work”, only 24 percent of male respon-dents agreed.

Differing labour market outcomes also reflect unequaleconomic opportunities for women and men. In agricul-ture, a strict gender division of labour persists. Despitethis, the survey respondents viewed land reform as apositive socio-economic development for both women

and men, even though women lacked the knowledgeand skills needed to fully benefit from the opportunitiescreated by private land ownership. As a result, womentend to be excluded from private ownership of agricul-tural property. As the labour market is expanding andprivate enterprise is increasingly driving economicdevelopment in Azerbaijan, the relatively greater barri-ers to credit facing women are a key feature of genderinequalities in economic opportunities.

The survey data also suggest that traditional gender dif-ferences concerning employment and supporting thefamily are becoming less rigid. For example, 46 percentof female and 34 percent of male respondents dis-agreed with the statement that there is no need for awoman to work if her husband’s income was sufficient.

Most respondents shared a high regard for education asa source of knowledge and social capital for bothwomen and men. Compared to men, women are moreinclined to disagree with gender stereotypes limitingwomen’s educational opportunities. One young womansurveyed remarked “… if we had an education, wewould not be afraid of anybody, I mean of men. Wecould go and work”. The majority of male and femalerespondents supported higher education for both girlsand boys (but a higher proportion of those surveyedgave preferences to boys for higher education, particu-larly at the post-graduate level).

Table 1. Gender differences in views about education (%)

Statement Disagree Partially agree Agree

Male Female Male Female Male Female

There is no point 47 38 25 24 28 38sending girls to universities of engineering, because they won’t be able to find a job suitable to their profession

If a girl goes 57 59 25 23 18 18abroad to get an education, she loses her opportunity toget married

Men only get an 25 23 20 22 55 56education in order to earn money in the future

Women get an 52 61 25 18 23 22education in order to become mothers and take care of their children

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2

Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree Agree Strongly agreenor disagree

4

20

12

1720

46

56

16

9

14


The Impact ofMigration on GenderRoles in Moldova1

Mihail Peleah

Understanding the distribution of gender roles within fam-ilies is crucial for identifying and addressing the genderdimensions of policies, programmes, and projects. While

gender roles may seem constant over time, they are notcarved in stone; they can change significantly with broadersocial developments, external shocks, or changes in familystructures. Moldova’s massive labour migration, which haspushed some 30 percent of the labour force into workingabroad, could constitute such a change.

In Moldova (as in most other CIS countries), men are seenas ‘family breadwinners’. Not surprisingly, they were thefirst to be expected to migrate in response to the shrinkingopportunities for income generation during the crisis years

Persisting stereotypes of gendered professions, influencingviews on education and career choices, were also evidentamong respondents (see Table 1). At the same time, genderattitudes concerning specific aspects of education varieddepending on the age, gender, religion, income, and educa-tion level of respondents. Gender equality in access to edu-cation can clearly help eliminate other forms of genderinequality, forming more egalitarian intra-family relationsand increasing women’s participation in social life. Howev-er, the survey results suggest that, although the vast major-ity of respondents had secondary or higher education, sig-nificant gender prejudices remain concerning girls’ educa-tion, choice of profession, and free access to information(specifically the Internet). Greater access to education initself may not be sufficient to change traditional attitudesconcerning female education.

The survey data also underscore the continuing influenceof traditional views on women’s participation in Azerbai-jan’s social and political life. However, some weakening of

gender-biased attitudes is also apparent, particularlyamong more highly educated respondents. The majority ofboth female and male respondents supported women’smore active participation in parliamentary elections: only12 percent of female and 27 percent of male respondentswere against this. One female respondent observed that“women are born politicians. A woman deals in politicswith her children, between her daughter and son andamong her neighbours, ensuring there are no disputes”.

ConclusionsThe survey data demonstrate that, while some gender atti-tudes in Azerbaijan tend to be passed from generation togeneration, others are evolving with the gradually chang-ing circumstances in families, communities, neighbour-hoods, and society in general. Still, they confirm thatwomen’s participation in economic, social, and political lifeis largely determined by tradition. Women suffer not onlyfrom the gender roles attributed to them, but also fromstereotypes associating them with ‘weakness’ and ‘power-lessness’.

While better laws and improved enforcement can helpreduce gender inequalities, changing traditional attitudesabout gender roles may be more important in Azerbaijan.In the view of one female activist, “Experience bears outthat in the most difficult issues the mechanism of equalrights does not work. Laws on the books are one thing, andreality is an altogether different thing”. Improving genderequality within the family without violating intra-familyharmony and national identity can be quite a challenge.More robust public debate on gender attitudes amongstate, civil society, and media organizations can play animportant role in meeting this challenge.

Irada Ahmedova, UN Coordination Analyst, was formerlythe Gender Focal Point for UNDP Azerbaijan.

1. This article is based on survey data analysed in UNDP-Azerbaijan’s 2007 HumanDevelopment Report entitled Gender Attitudes in Azerbaijan: Trends and Challenges.This report is based on a national survey of 1,500 women and men, discussions with80 focus groups, and in-depth interviews with 50 experts. The report can be accessedin Azerbaijani and English at http://www.un-az.org/undp/publications.php.

Survey results indicate that the female ‘homemaker’ role is internalizedby most members of society


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of the 1990s. However, women’s share among migrants isalso quite high: according to data provided by the Interna-tional Organization of Migration (IOM), in 2006 42 percentof Moldova’s migrants were women. Migration thereforeaffects large numbers of Moldovan women–particularly interms of migration to the EU (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Socioeconomic characteristics of migrantsfrom Moldova in 2006 (in %)

Source: IOM Migrants Survey, 2006

Moldovan migrants and families: A statistical portraitPrevious research2 suggests that intra-family genderroles are significantly affected by migration–particularlywhen the migrants are mothers (the ‘keepers of hearthand home’). As the data in Figure 1 show, the migrationof one or both parents definitely rearranges the divisionof labour within the family in Moldova. One family mem-ber’s departure entails handing over household respon-sibilities to other family members.

For families without migrants, the survey data suggestthat Moldovan mothers are largely responsible for cook-ing and preparing meals, taking children to the doctor,helping them with schoolwork, taking care of the home,and supervising children during their leisure time. Tradi-tional roles for the father include earning money andagricultural work. Some of these tasks (e.g., educatingand taking care of children, agricultural work) are com-monly shared by both parents: in nearly half the familiessurveyed, both father and mother are perceived asbreadwinners and childcare providers.

Migration inevitably rearranges these gender roles. In fam-ilies where both parents are at home, the care provider

role is played either by both the father and the mother (in53 percent of families surveyed), or just the mother (in 32percent of families surveyed). When the mother leaves,her role is often taken by the father or another femalehousehold member. For instance, in families withoutmigrants, fathers cook only in 1 percent of cases, while infamilies where the mother has migrated 41 percent offathers prepare meals. “My father is like a mother to me, hecooks, he does everything” (14 year old girl). “I missed hervery much. Usually when I came from school the food wasready, my father also cooks but not like my mother” (16-year-old urban male). “I take care of the ducks, one of my brotherstakes care of the poultry, and the elder takes care of the hog.We wash the dishes and the clothes, which mother used to dowhen she was home” (11-year-old rural male).

When mothers migrate, children still view them as careproviders (in 9 percent of cases individually, and in 23percent of cases–together with the father). This could beexplained by the short-term seasonal nature of migra-tion, or by the maintenance of close contacts betweenmigrant mothers and their children.

Figure 2: Who takes care of children in families withand without migrants? (in %)

All EUAge (years)Below 30 years 37 3430-50 years 54 57Above 50 years 9 9GenderFemale 42 59Male 58 41EducationPrimary 5 3Secondary 38 31Tertiary 36 35University 29 19OriginRural 65 56Urban 35 44

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The survey data indicate that many children have diffi-culty adapting to the changes in the intra-householddivisions of labour produced by migration. “It was verydifficult, very, very difficult. There was no one to wake me inthe morning, to prepare meals until I learned how to dowhat usually mother or father did, but now I can do thismyself” (16-year-old rural male). “Then both parents hadleft and it was very hard as neither mother nor father wasnearby. Then I got used to it, but it isn’t the same. It is not abig deal, but I worry without them.” (15-year-old ruralfemale). Some children have noticed that their mother’sleaving has affected their usual schedule as they haveless spare time to play and are more involved in house-hold chores. “Dad doesn’t let us go play somewhere, justsometimes on holidays, but mom allowed us to go play.Father doesn’t allow us because we’ve got things to do athome” (11-year-old rural male).

As labour migration from Moldova generally reflects eco-nomic factors, migrants are often perceived by familymembers as the main providers. Interestingly, both inmigrant and non-migrant cases the share of dual-earningfamilies is quite high (close to 45 percent). In families inwhich the father has migrated, the father is more likely tobe perceived as the main breadwinner (in 47 percent ofcases, compared with 31 percent in families withoutmigrants). Likewise, the motheris less likely to be perceived asthe main breadwinner (down to6 percent, compared with 13 per-cent in families withoutmigrants). Mothers are men-tioned as the main providers in45 percent of families where themother is absent–a sharpincrease on the 13 percentreported in non-migrant families.Both father and mother are per-ceived as important breadwin-ners in 46 percent of families inwhich mothers have migrated.

Migration, gender, and communitiesAs a result, women working abroad are more self-confi-dent and have more self-esteem. While violence againstwomen is widespread in Moldova, women who haveworked abroad seem less willing to tolerate abuse bytheir partners. Instead, they seem more likely to insistthat abusive partners change their behaviour; if not,they divorce and try to rebuild their lives. “Women arenow more confident. From docile women afraid of theirmen, they have turned into self-confident persons in con-trol of their lives and even of their family situations. I knowmany cases of women who if they had not left the country

would have tolerated their husbands, while upon returninghome they tell them, “Don’t you dare lay a hand on me everagain. If you do, then you will have problems for the rest ofyour life and [will] not be a free man again. If you want youcan change. Look how people live abroad”, and some menhave started to change. They moved to the city andbecame more orderly and gave up drinking habits andbuddies. These are some positive examples, but there arealso cases when women make demands and husbands dis-agree, and some families fall apart” (representative of alocal municipality).

Do some parental roles ‘disappear’?The migration of mothers seems to have a much largernegative impact on childcare than the migration offathers. The survey data suggest that in 14 percent offamilies with mother-migrants, children believe that noone is taking care of them (compared with only 3 per-cent for families with ‘only’ the father abroad). Similarproblems are evident in other areas of family life inwhich women traditionally play significant roles, such aseducating children, helping with school work, takingchildren to the doctor, and supervising children duringtheir leisure time.

Figure 3: Non-performed roles in migrants’ families (in %)

ConclusionChanges in gender roles can influence communities aswell as families. Many respondents suggested thatwomen’s migration gives them financial independenceand increased decision-making power. They also notedthat migrant women increasingly model themselves onthe behaviour of women in the host country. A wife’sdeparture to work abroad may therefore be perceivedas threatening by her husband, particularly in view ofpaternalistic expectations in Moldovan society. She willearn more and may try to manage this income herself.This can threaten the husband’s status as head of the


17

A Portrait of WomenMigrant Workers in Uzbekistan

Evgeniy Abdullaev

In Uzbekistan, as in many other CIS countries, thegrowing rural population has tried to compensate forpoor access to non-agricultural employment by seek-ing temporary, informal employment in cities. Accord-ing to the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, thenumber of internal labour migrants in Uzbekistanincreased from 44,000 in 2001 to more than 750,000 in2007 (5 percent of the able-bodied population). Thismigration reflects Uzbekistan’s population growth,which generates some 250,000 new job-seekers in thelabour market annually. Since 2002, this also reflectsthe out-migration of labour from agriculture (wheresome 29 percent of Uzbekistan’s population wasemployed in 2006), due to the transformation ofshirkats (quasi-collective farms) into single-farmerenterprises. At the same time, with a growing gapbetween rich and poor in rural areas, there is increas-ing short-term agricultural migration of poor low-skilled women workers. In the Soviet period, migrationrates among the Uzbek population were very lowcompared with those of other Central Asian republics.1

Since the early 1990s, Uzbek rates have increased sig-nificantly.

Women are the most vulnerable group of labourmigrants in Uzbekistan. According to traditional cul-tural views, women belong to the family and mustshoulder heavy domestic responsibilities. Womenmigrants reportedly suffer from labour abuse and sex-ual harassment. To identify the key issues affecting therights of migrant workers, UNDP–jointly with theWomen’s Committee of Uzbekistan and the ‘Takhlil’Social Research Centre–interviewed some 1,000 peo-ple (62 percent men and 38 percent women) in tworegions: Kashkadarya and Namangan (in the Ferganavalley), which have the highest rate of out-migration,

and the capital city of Tashkent, which attracts most ofthe migrant labour. The survey was conducted in thesummer of 2007.2

The survey results show that while female migrants gen-erally have the same educational level as male migrants,they are usually employed in less-skilled jobs in suchsectors as catering and retail trade, and as harvest work-ers. As a result, their wages are some 30 percent belowthose of their male counterparts. While both female andmale respondents voiced concerns about bad workingand living conditions, and the non-payment of wages,women migrants were likely to report rudeness, insults,and sexual harassment. They are also much less aware oftheir rights, and of the opportunities provided throughlocal temporary employment centres.

About 45 percent of female migrants are single; anoth-er 22 percent reported being divorced or widowed. Inrural social structures, such women are much more vul-nerable than married ones, in light of traditional disap-proval of women who leave home in search of a job.Women respondents were also three times more likelyto report deteriorating family relations due to theirout-migration. Perhaps for these reasons, some 30 per-cent of female respondents (compared with 24 percentof male respondents) declared that they would notreturn home under any circumstances.

Constraints of the propiskaSome 70 percent of survey respondents reported seek-ing work in Tashkent.3 However, the propiskasystem–state issued permits that register the bearer'splace of residence, and may deny the bearer the right tomigrate elsewhere–hampers migration to urban areas.Because a propiska is often difficult to obtain, the surveydata show that informal resettlement and bribery arecommon methods of circumventing the law. As most(79 percent) of the respondents do not have a propiska,they cannot receive legal income or assistance fromlocal labour agencies. Their informal employment there-fore means the absence of a stable income, or no accessto legal or social protection (pensions, sick benefits,etc.). Although female respondents reported being

family; he may look for a new partner or may seek com-fort in drinking. In cases where women’s work abroad isassociated with prostitution, women’s migration maybring stigma for both themselves and their families.Migration–particularly of mothers–may lead to the ‘dis-appearance’ of certain family roles. This ‘disappearance’could be especially dangerous if it has a long-termimpact on childhood development and well-being.

Mihail Peleah, Research Assistant in the Poverty Reduc-tion Practice of UNDP’s Bratislava Regional Centre, for-merly worked for UNDP Moldova.

1. This paper is based on survey data from 300 Moldovan families with children thatwere surveyed in October 2006 within the framework of the UNDP/UNICEF study onthe ‘Impact of Migration and Remittances of Families and Communities’.

2. Scalabrini Migration Centre (2003). Hearts Apart: Migration in the Eyes of Filipino Chil-dren. http://www.smc.org.ph/heartsapart/.

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stopped by police for propiska checks less often thanmale respondents, women migrants are more likely tobe ordered to the police station for further investigation,and forced to leave the city.

Mardikor-bazaarsAbout 50 percent of survey respondents during 2006-2007 were involved in temporary or seasonal jobs that arearranged at the mardikor-bazaars day markets. Eachregion has several mardikor-bazaars; the biggest ones arelocated in Tashkent. The number of migrant workers atsuch markets varies from 100 to 2,000. The mardikor-bazaars are strictly divided into ‘male’ and ‘female’ parts:the ‘male’ bazaars provide manpower for hard physicallabour, while the ‘female’ bazaars offer workers for suchunskilled tasks as weeding and grading of fruits and veg-etables. Since such work is labour intensive, employersprefer to deal with a crew (brigada) rather than with indi-vidual employees. They typically negotiate with a femalecrew-leader (brigadir), who gets a ‘bonus’ for each mem-ber of the crew, and who guarantees the quality andtimeliness of their work. However, employment as crewmembers does not protect women from violations oftheir rights; respondents hired at mardikor-bazaars com-

plained of insults (49 percent), non-payment of wages (34percent) and sexual harassment (19 percent)–much moreoften than other categories of women labour migrants.

Although the local authorities have established tem-porary employment centres for the protection of work-ers’ rights, most workers do not use these centres.Workers and recruiting agents are reluctant to legalizetheir business–workers do not want to pay taxes ontheir low wages, and agents do not want to expose thepoor working conditions. As is the case in much of thedeveloping world, migrant workers in Uzbekistan–par-ticularly women migrants–remain outside the protec-tion of state policies and institutions.

Evgeniy Abdullaev is Programme Legal Specialist forUNDP Uzbekistan.

1. For example, in 1968-1970 only 1.4 percent of Uzbeks were labour migrants com-pared with 6.7 percent of Russians, 4.6 percent of Kazakhs, 2.5 percent of Kyrgyz and2.2 percent of Tajiks (Itogy Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g. T. VII. Moscow: Statis-tika, 1974).

2. The complete data set will be published at the end of 2007. 3. See Maksakova, L (2005). ‘Labour Migration of the Population of Uzbekistan: Tenden-

cies and Regional Features’. In: Abdullaev, E. and Azimova, D. (eds.) Labour Migration:Social and Legal Aspects. Tashkent: Association of Business Relations, 16-17.

The wages of women migrants in Uzbekistan are some 30 percent below those of their male counterparts


19

Adapting to Russia’sTransformation:Women and MenCompared

Sarah Ashwin

Russia’s economic and social transformation has not hadthe anticipated effects on women and men. At thebeginning of the reform era, most commentators ongender in Russia predicted that women would be the pri-mary casualties of reform. It was anticipated that unem-ployment would have a ‘female face’, that the wage gapwould grow and that female labour participation waslikely to fall. These predictions proved inaccurate.Despite sweeping economic change, continuity in gen-der trends in employment has been notable. Althoughmen have retained their economic advantage, womenhave maintained their presence in the labour force.Arguments that women would be the ‘losers’ duringreform were also confounded by trends in life expectan-cy, which indicated that men were experiencing greaterproblems in adapting to the new Russia than women.The situation of men in Russia thus presents a paradox.Men continue to enjoy a labour market advantage, butwomen have proved better able to ‘survive’ the transfor-mation in the literal sense of the term.

When the Labour Force Survey, using the international-ly comparable definition of unemployment, was intro-duced in Russia in 1992, the male unemployment ratewas found marginally to exceed the female. Since then,the unemployment rates of women and men have beenroughly equal, standing at 6.7 percent and 6.5 percentrespectively in 2006. Meanwhile, women’s labour partic-ipation rates, which at the end of the Soviet era wereclose to the biological maximum, have shown a similardecline to that of men. Both male and female labour par-ticipation dropped significantly between 1989 and1998, but the gender difference in these falls was mar-ginal. In 2006 women still comprised over 48 percent ofthe economically active population.

Although women have managed to maintain theirattachment to the labour market, men continue, as inthe Soviet era, to enjoy a more favourable position atwork. Studies of the wage gap during the transition erasuggest that it has remained more or less constant, withwomen continuing to earn between 60–70 percent ofmen’s wages. Meanwhile, the gender restructuring of

employment during transition also appears to favourmen, with men increasing their presence in the now-lucrative, but once female-dominated, spheres of bank-ing and commerce, and women continuing to make upthe overwhelming majority of employees in the poorly-paid ‘budget sector’ areas of health care and education.

While men are in a better economic position thanwomen, this is not mirrored in their well-being. The bestindication of this is the life expectancy figures, which tella dramatic story of male distress. Male life expectancyplummeted in the reform era, declining from 64.2 yearsof age in 1989 (Goskomstat, 2002: 105), to a low of 57.5in 1994. It then recovered to 61.3 in 1998, only to fallback to 58.4 in 2002 (Goskomstat, 2003: 117). In 2005 itwas still below 59, approximately 16 years below the EUaverage. Meanwhile, female life expectancy remainedmore constant, declining from 74.4 in 1989 (Goskom-stat, 2002: 105) to a nadir of 71.1 in 1994, followed by astabilization at over 72 between 1996-2005. The gendergap in life expectancy is nearly 14 years, the highest inthe world according to UN figures.

Why has economic change had this dramatic impact onmen? Detailed research on responses to reform sug-gests that the household division of labour is an impor-tant factor in explaining these gender differences (Ash-win, 2006). Evidence suggests that women’s role ashousehold managers provides them with a sense of effi-cacy and meaning, which plays some role in alleviatingthe psychological effects of unemployment or down-ward mobility at work. By contrast, men’s identity ismore closely connected with work. Men’s main contri-bution to the household is as primary breadwinners,while women run the household, do most of the domes-tic work, and usually manage the household budget.This has two effects. First, given men’s marginal role inthe household and the underdevelopment of the civicsphere and leisure infrastructure in Russia, it is difficultfor men to find meaning and validation outside work,which leaves them vulnerable in the face of labour mar-ket reversals. This is not to say that unemployed or low-earning women do not experience psychological dis-comfort. Rather, they are better able to deal with thisbecause their pivotal role in the household is a sustain-ing and motivating force.

Second, the fact that men’s main role in the household isas primary breadwinners renders them vulnerable whenthey lose their status as main earner. Thus, falling wages orunemployment can threaten married men with domestic‘redundancy’, and increase their chances of being left bytheir wives. This is a particular threat when their responseto their labour market problems is seen to exacerbate the

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problems of the household – as is the case when men turnto alcohol for solace (of which more below). Meanwhile,when men are excluded from the household it generallyaccelerates their decline, as both the social support pro-vided by the family and female control in relation to drink-ing and other risky behaviours are lost.

Women’s embeddedness in the household brings otherbenefits. In particular, women’s role as household man-agers binds them to a web of on-going exchange rela-tions with family members and female acquaintancesalongside the relations they have with colleagues fromwork. By contrast, men’s social networks tend to be morenarrowly focused on the workplace. While this undoubt-edly has positive effects in terms of job search and pro-motion prospects, it means that men’s networks can berendered vulnerable in the face of changes in employ-ment status. Men who become unemployed or marginal-ized at work can find themselves cut off from the contactscapable of helping them. This danger is intensified by thefact that perceived equality of status is a more importantconsideration in mediating relations between men thanbetween women. Thus, while women’s household-focused networks are unlikely to be disrupted by changesin their labour market status, the fragility of men’s work-centred networks tends to be revealed precisely inmoments of adversity when they are most needed.

Russia’s drinking culture adds a lethal element to thecocktail of risks which attend men’s marginality in thehousehold. There is little doubt that excessive drinking ispredominately a male problem. One study of alcohol con-sumption in the Russian population calculated that alco-hol consumption was 10 times higher among men thanamong women (Bobak et al., 1999: 864). Althoughwomen’s use of alcohol appears to have increased some-what recently, heavy drinking among women is still cul-turally proscribed, while it is considered normal amongmen. In the absence of other means of compensating for,or dealing with, their labour market problems, men areliable to turn to the treacherous ‘medicine’ of alcohol. Thisis confirmed by recent research in the Urals city of Izhevsk(Tomkins et al., 2007). This carefully-executed studylooked at the socio-economic determinants of hazardousdrinking among men (behaviours including going onextended drinking binges and drinking surrogates suchas industrial spirits), and found a strong association withunemployment and low levels of wealth and householdamenities. Obviously, alcoholism can cause such prob-lems, but while acknowledging that the causality couldrun in both directions, the authors argued that ‘menstruggling economically are driven to alcoholism, andeventually end up consuming surrogates’ because theycannot afford spirits (Tomkins et al., 2007: 551). The con-sequences for the longevity of such men are clear: there is

Alcohol consumption in Russia is 10 times higher among men than among women © Panos Pictures


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Demographic Dimensions of RegionalGender Issues

Ben Slay

Gender issues in many post-communist countries ofEurope and Central Asia diverge significantly fromother regions. Women live much longer than men inthe Russian Federation and a number of other CIScountries; women in the region enjoy relatively highrates of labour-force participation; and unemploy-ment rates are lower for women than for men in signif-icant numbers of CIS and European countries.1

This does not mean that women have not been affect-ed adversely by the post-communist transition. Like-wise, neither are women untouched by problems oflabour market discrimination, domestic violence,inadequate guarantees of reproductive rights, andother forms of inequality and oppression.

Still, arguments (made inter alia by Sarah Ashwin onpp. 19-21) that the costs of transition have not beenborne disproportionately by women raise importantquestions about the extent to which gender patternsapparent in some parts of the region (e.g., Russia) maynot be present in other parts (e.g., Central Asia, or thenew EU member states). This paper suggests that anumber of important differences in development pat-

terns between women and men reflect varying demo-graphic trends in the region.

The gender dimensions of socialist demographic legacies2

The ‘East bloc’ countries were already displayingsome surprising demographic features in the1980s–surprises that affected women and men differ-ently. With the exception of the Southern Caucasus,Central Asia, Albania, and parts of what was thenYugoslavia (e.g., Kosovo), population growth hadeither stopped or turned negative across the region.For the European countries that subsequently joinedthe EU, these were essentially mirror images of thedemographic trends apparent in ‘old Europe’, wherefalling birth and death rates had already producedstable or shrinking populations. However, while pop-ulations in some CIS countries since the 1980s havealso been shrinking, this is due in part to relativelyhigh mortality rates–particularly for men. Data showthat transition has accelerated this trend. But there ismore to the story than this.

In the mid-1960s, female and male mortality ratesreported in most of the non-Central Asian Sovietrepublics were quite close to those of the OECD coun-tries. Starting in the late 1960s, however, lifeexpectancy in much of the USSR stopped rising, pro-ducing gaps vis-à-vis OECD countries that have beengrowing for some 40 years–particularly for men livingin Russia and the Western CIS countries (see Figure 1).Likewise, life expectancy for both women and men in

no doubt that alcohol abuse is a major proximate cause ofthe crisis in male mortality (ibid).

Women in Russia are more likely to live in poverty, but itseems that men are more vulnerable to its effects. Women’sdomestic role and rich social networks help protect themfrom demoralization in the face of adversity, while culturalbarriers mean they are less exposed to the lure of alcohol. Bycontrast, heavy drinking offers the most readily available‘cure’ to men dealing with problems such as unemploymentand poverty, since they lack the household-focused socialresources that women are able to draw on. Obviously, how-ever, while alcohol may lessen feelings of pain or anxiety, itexacerbates the problems from which relief was originallysought. Ironically, therefore, women’s notorious ‘double bur-den’ of work and household management has turned out tohave hidden benefits in a period of economic crisis, whilemen’s ‘freedom’ from domestic responsibilities and licenseto drink have proved very dangerous to their health.

Sarah Ashwin is Reader in Industrial Relations at theLondon School of Economics.

References:

– Ashwin (ed.). 2006. Adapting to Russia’s New LabourMarket: Gender and Employment Behaviour. Londonand New York: Routledge.

– Bobak, M., McKee, M., Rose, R. and Marmot, M. (1999).Alcohol consumption in a National Sample of theRussian Population. Addiction. 94, 9: 857-866.

– Goskomstat. 2002. Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii2002. Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii.

– Goskomstat. 2003. Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik2003. Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii.

– Tomkins et al. 2007. Prevalence and Socio-EconomicDistribution of Hazardous Patterns of Alcohol Drink-ing: Study of Alcohol Consumption in Men aged 25–54Years in Izhevsk, Russia. Addiction. 102, 4: 544–553.

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Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova stopped risingin the 1960s, and has not undergone significantimprovement since then (see Figure 2). Whereas lifeexpectancy has remained roughly constant forwomen in these countries, it declined for men, there-by worsening this ‘gender gap’ inherited from theSoviet period. By contrast, life expectancy for womenand men in OECD countries rose during this time. Like-wise, life expectancy in the Baltic states (Estonia,Latvia, and Lithuania) began to improve shortly afterthe Soviet collapse–particularly for women.

Figure 1–Growth/decline in life expectancy in selectedcountries (in years)

Sources: Source: Recent Demographic Development in Europe, 2004.Council of Europe, 2005. Statistical Abstract of the United States 2004-2005. Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004. Health, United States 2006.World Bank: World Development Indicators. Statistics Bureau, Japan.

Ashwin reconsideredThese data suggest that Ashwin’s ‘Russian men devas-tated by transition’ portrait should perhaps be general-ized and amended, in three respects. First, becausemany of Russia’s disturbing mortality trends begandecades before the USSR collapsed, they should not beascribed solely to the post-Soviet transition. Second,

Ashwin’s portrait would seem to apply only to men inRussia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The fact thatthese countries account for the bulk of the region’s pop-ulation should not deflect attention from differenttrends apparent in other transition countries.

Figure 2–Life expectancy in Russia, the Western CIS,3

and Baltic States,4 1964-2005 (in years)

Source: Recent Demographic Development in Europe, 2004. Council ofEurope, 2005. TransMONEE 2007 Database, UNICEF Innocenti ResearchCentre, Florence.

Indeed, these mortality trends are not found in most ofthe rest of the region. The data in Figure 3 show thatthe new EU member states have succeeded in reversingmany of the unfavourable demographic trends–affect-ing both women and men–inherited at the start of the1990s. In 1990, for example, the Czech Republic ranked29th and 28th in the world in female and male mortalityrates, respectively; male life expectancy had declinedbetween 1960 and 1990. (In the early 1960s, the CzechRepublic ranked 11th in the world for female lifeexpectancy and 12th for male life expectancy.) Duringthe 1990-2003 period, female and male life expectancyin the Czech Republic rose by 3.1 and 4.5 years, respec-

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tively–reflecting a ‘demographic convergence’ vis-à-visthe wealthier European countries.

Figure 3–Changes in life expectancy during 1990-2005(in years)

Source: TransMONEE 2007 Database, UNICEF Innocenti ResearchCentre, Florence.

Likewise, while many of the Yugoslav successor statesexperienced devastating military conflicts and largedeclines in incomes and output during the 1990s, maleand female mortality trends in these countries havegenerally continued to converge towards Europeanpatterns. The Russian and Western CIS experience alsocontrasts with demographic trends in Turkey, Albania,Kosovo, Central Asia, and Azerbaijan, where popula-tions are growing and gender issues tend to resemblethose in more ‘traditional’ developing societies.

The data in Figure 4 show that, despite per-capitaincome levels that are generally much lower, bothwomen and (particularly) men in the Southern Caucasusand Central Asia live longer than in Russia (and theWestern CIS countries), as well as in Kazakhstan (the CIScountry with the second largest per-capita GDP). Forwhatever reasons, the hardships of transition in poor,post-conflict Tajikistan would seem not to have had thesame devastating effects on men that they have had inother, wealthier CIS countries to the north and west.

Gender, women, and menIn addition to highlighting the importance of demo-graphic factors behind some of the differing develop-mental trends affecting women and men in the coun-tries of Europe and the CIS, this paper points to ways inwhich the challenges facing women in these countriesmay differ from those facing women in other develop-ing regions.

It also underscores how many of these challenges areclosely linked to the development challenges facingmen. For example, national data in Russia and the

Western CIS countries as a rule show that poverty ratesare higher for women than for men. But might this notreflect in part the poverty experienced by Russian wid-ows, many of whom must live on meagre state pensionsthat cannot be supplemented with incomes supplied bydeceased husbands or brothers (or sons)? Likewise, ifrural areas in Central Asia, Moldova, and the Caucasushad not been denuded of young men working asmigrants in Russia, Kazakhstan, or EU countries, mightnot women in these rural communities enjoy greater–orat least different–development opportunities?

Ben Slay, Director of UNDP’s Bratislava Regional Centre,is Executive Editor of Development and Transition.

1. Countries in which unemployment rates for women have been at or below those ofmen for the past 10-15 years include Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.

2. This and the subsequent section are based on data and analysis provided by AnatoliiVishnevskii of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

3. Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.4. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.5. The ‘Caucasus’ refer to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. ‘Central Asia’ refers to Kyr-

gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The regional data are unweighted averages ofnational data.

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Figure 4–Life expectancy in the CIS (1985-2005, in years)5

Sources: Sources: Recent Demographic Development in Europe, 2004.Council of Europe, 2005. Country data (CD-Rom); WHO European Healthfor All database. World Bank: World Development Indicators.

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An academic conference on corporate social responsibili-ty (CSR) will take place on 12 December 2007 in Vilnius,Lithuania. The conference will seek to stimulate a discussionbetween the Lithuanian higher education institutions andrepresentatives of other academic institutions on CSR, as wellas foster cooperation in implementing CSR training pro-grammes. The conference will seek to involve Lithuanianschools and scholarly institutions in the CSR discussion, aswell as identify higher educational institutions for developingand implementing CSR training courses. For more informa-tion please contact Ms. Lyra Jakuleviciene, Head of Office,UNDP Lithuania, ([email protected]); or IevaBurneikaite-Labanauskiene, Communications Officer, UNDPLithuania, ([email protected]).

On 14 and 25 December 2007 the Georgian Parliament willserve as the venue for two awards ceremonies for the bestgender-sensitive media reporting (printed press/broadcast-ing) and the best gender-sensitive companies and organiza-tions. The events are organized by UNDP in cooperation withthe Gender Equality Council of the Georgian Parliament. NinoBurjanadze, Parliamentary Speaker, will take part in her capac-ity as the Chairperson of the Council. For more information,please contact Natia Cherkezishvili, UNDP Programme Ana-lyst ([email protected]) or Nino Lagvilava, ProjectManager ([email protected]).

The Committee on the Elimination of Discriminationagainst Women (CEDAW) will hold its 40th session from 14January - 1 February 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland. It will exam-ine the country reports from the following States Parties:Saudi Arabia, Bolivia, Burundi, France, Lebanon, Luxembourg,Morocco, Sweden. For more information, please visit:http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/40sess.htm.

The 52nd session of the Commission on the Status ofWomen (CSW) will be held in New York at UN Headquartersfrom 25 February - 7 March 2008. The CSW will consider thetheme ‘Financing for gender equality and the empowermentof women’ at the session. The UN Division for the Advance-ment of Women (DAW) will be hosting the event. The CSW isa functional commission of the United Nations Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC), dedicated exclusively to gender

equality and the advancement of women. Every year, repre-sentatives of Member States gather at United Nations Head-quarters in New York to evaluate progress on gender equali-ty, identify challenges, set global standards, and formulateconcrete policies to promote gender equality and advance-ment of women worldwide.

The OECD Global Forum on International Investment (GFII)will be held on 27-28 March 2008 in Paris. The relationshipbetween investment and development was a key theme dur-ing the 2007 G-8 Summit. The GFII will focus on best practicesin promoting investment for growth and sustainable devel-opment by engaging governments worldwide and interestedstakeholders in peer learning and dialogue on emergingissues facing the investment policy community. Seewww.oecd.org/daf/investment/gfii for further information orcontact [email protected].

The European Feminist Forum will take place on 13-15 June2008 in Warsaw, Poland. The European ‘F’ Forum builds anopen and diverse dialogue, organizes an energetic space fortalking about women, and will make change happen inEurope. A number of Polish organizations will organize activi-ties throughout the country during the conference, which isexpected to bring together 500 participants. Registration willstart in January 2008. For more information please visithttp://www.iiav.nl/eng/ic/eff/index.html.

From 14-17 November 2008, up to 1,500 women's rights lead-ers and activists from around the world will converge on CapeTown, South Africa to take part in the 11th AWID InternationalForum to discuss the power of movements. AWID is the Asso-ciation for Women’s Rights in Development. The InternationalForum is both a conference and a call to action. The largestrecurring event of its kind, the AWID Forum brings togetherwomen's rights leaders and activists from around the worldevery three years to strategize, network, celebrate, and learn ina highly charged atmosphere that fosters deep discussions andsustained personal and professional growth. For more informa-tion please visit http://www.awid.org.

Forthcoming issues of Development and Transitionwill focus on:

The Environment in Europe and the CIS (April 2008)

Reform of the post-communist state (July 2008)

The editors welcome contributions. If you wish to sub-mit an article, please follow the guidelines atwww.developmentandtransition.net

DECEMBER 2007 | issue 8DEVELOPMENT &TRANSITION

Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UKwww.lse.ac.uk

UNDP Bratislava Regional CentreGrosslingova 35Bratislava 81109Slovakia

Tel: +421 2 59337 111Fax: +421 2 59337 450http://europeandcis.undp.org

Development & Transition is published by the United NationsDevelopment Programme and the London School of Economicsand Political Science. The ideas expressed here do not necessarilyreflect the views or policies of either organization. www.developmentandtransition.net

Editor: James Hughes: [email protected] Executive Editor: BenSlay Deputy Editor: Gwendolyn Sasse Managing Editor: PeterSerenyi Marketing and Production Coordinator: Viera Petrulak-ova Advisory Board: Nicholas Barr, Willem Buiter (Chair), StanislavGomulka, Mary Kaldor, Dominic Lieven, Margot Light, Kate Mortimer

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