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ACCESSION NBR:8906020023 DOC.DATE: 89/05/23 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKETFAMIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear .Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATIONSHRIVER,T.D. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public ServHAYNES,J.G. Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

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05000528NOTES:Standardized plant.

SUBJECT: LER 89-011-00:on 890425,unauthorized entry into highradiation area.

W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL ( SIZE:TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), ncident Rpt, etc.

RECIPIENTID CODE/NAME

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Arizona Public Service CompanyP.O. BOX 53999 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA850724999

~ 192-00484-JGHjTDS/RJRMay 23, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNRC Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 1

Docket No. STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)Licensee Event Report 89-011-00File: 89-020-404

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-011-00 prepared andsubmitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10CFR 50.73(d), we areherewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of theRegion V office.

If you have any questions, please contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at(602) 393-2521.

Very trul yours,

JGH/TDS/RJR/kj

Attachment

cc: D. B. Karner (all w/a)E. E. Van Brunt, Jr .J. B. MartinT. J. PolichM. J. DavisA. C. GehrINPO Records Center

J. G. Ha esVice PresidentNuclear Production

~906020023 89052P PDODR ADOCK 050005288

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HRC form 255(54L)I

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

V.S. HVCI.EAA REOULATORY COMMISSION

AppADYEDDMs No. 21500(oeEXPIAES: 5/2(ISS

FACILITYNAME (I)

Pal o Verde Uni t 1

TITLE (e)

Unauthorized Entry into a High Radiation Area

PA 5DO()KET NUMSER (2)

0 5 0 0 05 28 >oF05

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMSEA (5) REtOAT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(5)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEOVENTIAL .%% r%ytetcotHVMSER ''. 4 HVMPEII MONTH OAY YEAR PACILITYNAMES

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOA THIS LEA (12I

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OTHER ISpnlly in Apttrocttrolow ond in Tost, HIIC Form244AI

NAME

Timothy 0. Shriver, Compliance Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

6 02 39 3-.2 52 1

COLIPLETE ONE LINE fOA EACH COMtONENT FAILUAE DESCRISED IN THIS REPORT (12)

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At approximately 0258 MST on April 25, 1989 a Radiation Protection LeadTechnician observed a Unit 1 Instrument and Control Technician exiting a highradiation area without the radiation monitoring devices required by TechnicalSpecifications. The Radiation Exposure Permit did not permit his entry intothe high radiation area.

The cause of the event was a cognitive personnel error that was contrary to anapproved procedure.

As corrective action, the individual received appropriate disciplinaryaction. As action to prevent recurrence Unit and Central maintenancepersonnel have been made aware of this event as an example of failure tometiculously observe required radiological control practices.

NAC Form 255

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NRC Fossa 344A144(3(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LERI TEXT CONTINUATIONU.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(40&l04EXPIRES.'4/31/44

FACILITYNAME (11 OOCKET NULIEER (31 LER NUMEER (4)

SEOVENT/AL i~ /IEVI5IONNVMddd "IX" NVMddd

PACE (31

Palo Verde Unit 1

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I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:

A. Initial Conditions:

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On April 25, 1989 at approximately 0258 MST Palo Verde Unit 1 wasin Mode 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN).

B. Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and ApproximateTimes of Major Occurrences):

Event Classification: Any operation or condition prohibited by theplant's Technical Specification.

At approximately 0258 MST on April 25, 1989, an Instrument andControl (I&C) Technician (utility, non-licensed) was observedexiting a high radiation area without an alarming dosimeter.Technical Specification 6.12.1 permits personnel access to highradiation areas provided they are provided with or accompahied byone or more of the following:

a. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicatesthe radiation dose rate in the area.

b.

C.

A radiation monitoring device which continuously integratesthe radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a presetintegrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with thismonitoring device may be made after the dose rate level inthe area has been established and personnel have been madeknowledgeable of them.

A radiation protection qualified individual with a radiationdose rate monitoring device who is responsible for providingpositive control over the activities within the area andshall perform periodic radiation surveillance at thefrequency specified by the facility Radiation ProtectionSupervisor or his designated alternate in the REP.

The technician was working under a Radiological Entry Permit (REP)which authorized entry only into radiation areas specifically forinstrument calibration and associated work. Further, theTechnician did not meet the dosimetry requirements for entry to a

High Radiation Area.

Prior to the event, on April 13, 1989 at approximately 0700 MST,work commenced on Surveillance Test 36ST-9SB41, "Plant ProtectionSystem Transmitter Time Response Test." Thirteen transmittersrequired time response time testing and are located in variousareas of the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). Three RadiationExposure Permits were written to authorize entry into the areas toperform the testi.ng.

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NRC SorM SEEA(9431

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATIONUS. NUCLEAR REOULATO/IYCOMMISSION

APPROVEO OMS NO SIEOMIIIMEXPIRES: d/Sl/dd

FACILI'TYNAME III

Pa lo, Verde Uni t 1

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OOCKET NUMEER (1)

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On April 24, 1989 at approximately 1900 hours, the Work GroupSupervisor (Utility, Non-licensed) assigned two I&C Technicians(utility, non-licensed) to continue the time response testing. TheI&C Technicians then went to the Radiological Control Area entrypoint where they informed the Radiation Protection (RP) Techniciansof the scope of their work, which was to perform time responsetesting of two transmitters located at approximately the 100 footelevation of the containment. The RP Technician provided the I&CTechnicians the appropriate REP for their review. The REP statedspecifically, "No entry into high radiation areas or locked highradiation areas on this REP.U A discussion of the REP was held andthe technicians then proceeded to dress in accordance with therequirements of the REP.

At the 140 foot elevation containment access desk, the two I&CTechnicians reported to the RP Technician (utility, non-licensed).The I&C Technicians informed the Radiation Protection Technician(Utility, Non-licensed) they would be performing transmitter timeresponse .testing on the 100 foot elevation of the containment andwere on an approved REP.

At .the completion of testing on the transmitters the techniciansdecided to verify the location of the next two transmitters beforeexisting the containment to get the appropriate test equipment.

The technicians left the 100 foot elevation and went to the 80 footelevation as the transmitters are located at approximately the 85foot and 93 foot elevations. The location of transmitter IJ RCC

PDT 0115C was verified. When in the process of locatingtransmitter IJ RCC PDT 0125C, it was decided that the transmitterwas located in a high radiation area which was clearly delineatedas such. The technicians discussed and concluded that their REP

allowed entry in an HRA. The Lead Technician recalled the areadose rates from previous work at the same location and knew itwould take no more than 1 minute to verify the transmitter. Heentered the HRA, verified the transmitter and while exiting theHRA, was observed by a Radiation Protection Lead (utility,non-licensed) performing a routine containment tour. The RP Leadno'ticed that the I&C Technician was not wearing an alarmingdosimeter. Upon review of his REP it was found that it prohibitedentry into High Radiation Areas.

C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable atthe start of the event that contributed to the event:

Not applicable - no structures, systems, or components wereinvolved.

N/IC /ORM SHIAON>

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NRC Eorm 244A(9431

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATIONU.S. NUCLEAR RECULA'TORY COMM($5(ON

APPROVEO OMS NO 2(50 0105EXPIRES: 4/21/44

OACILITY NAME (11 COCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER (41 FACE I21

Palo Verde Uni t 1

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D. Cause of each component or system fail'ure, if known:

Not applicable - no component failure were involved.

E. Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, ifknown:

Not applicable - no failed components were involved.

F. For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systemsor secondary functions that were also affected:

Not applicable - no failed components were involved.

G. For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable,estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until thetrain was returned to service:

Not applicable - no trains of safety systems were involved.

H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure orprocedural error:

Not applicable - no component .or system failures were involved.

I. Cause of Event:

The cause of the event was a cognitive personnel error in that theI&C Technician did not follow directions as stated on the RadiationExposure Permit. The technician entered a High Radiation Areawhich was expressly prohibited by the REP and contrary to approvedstation procedures. There were no unusual characteristics of thework location which contributed to this event.

J. Safety System Response:

Not applicable - no safety system response was involved.

K. Failed Component Information:

Not applicable - there were no failed components involved.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

There were no safety consequences or implications resulting from thisevent. Technical Specification 6. 12. 1 establishes administrativecontrols for ensuring that unauthorized entry into High Radiation Areasdoes not occur. As discussed in Section I.B, the barriers and postingsfor the High Radiation Area were in compliance with Technical

'IRC ICRM 5554(9 42/

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATIONU.S. NUCLEAR AEOULATOAYCOMMISSION

APPAOVEO OMS NO 3150&/04EXPIRES: 9/31/SS

FACILITYNAME 111 OOCKET NUMSEA IEI LEA NUMSEA (SI

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Specification requirements; however, the technician entered the HighRadiation Area contrary to the established posting requirements. Areview of the Technician's Self-Indicating Dosimeter (SID) determinedthat zero (0) millirem were received. Additionally, based upon thescope of work being performed and general area radiation levels in thevicinity of the work, there was no threat of overexposure.

I I I . CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A. Immediate:

The I&C Technician was barred from entry to the RadiologicalControlled Area.

B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:

The I&C Technician received appropriate disciplinary action.

A letter was transmitted from the Plant Director to all sitemaintenance personnel discussing the event as an example of"failure to meticulously observe required radiological controlpractices."

IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LER 528/87-017-00 reported an event where an Auxiliary Operator(utility, non-licensed) had entered a high radiation area without theradiation monitoring devices that are required by TechnicalSpecifications. The cause was identified as a "cognitive personnelerror," the corrective action (i.e., disciplinary action) could onlydeter, but not prevent the event described in this LER.

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