garnett competing and complementary conceptual lenses on crisis communication

8/11/2019 Garnett Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication

1/19

Communicating throughout Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on

Crisis CommunicationAuthor(s): James L. Garnett and Alexander KouzminSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 67, Special Issue on Administrative Failure in theWake of Hurricane Katrina (Dec., 2007), pp. 171-188Published by: Wileyon behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4624695.

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2/19

Part

ll-The

Future:

Hindsight,

Foresight,

nd

Rear-View

Mirror

olitics

James L.

Garnett

Rutgers

University-Camden

Alexander Kouzmin

University

of South Australiaand

Southern

Cross

University

Communicating throughout

Katrina:

Competing

and

ComplementaryConceptualLenseson

CrisisCommunication

James

L.

Garnett

s

a

professor

f

public

olicy

nd dministration

t

Rutgers

University-Camden.

e s

heauthorf

Communicating

or

Results

n

Government,

coeditorf heHandbookfAdministrative

Communication,

nd o-authorfrecent

PAR

rticlesncommunication.is ther

researchnterestsncludedministrative

reform

nd

eorganization

nd risis

management.

E-mail:

[email protected]

AlexanderKouzmin s an

adjunct

professor

n

management

t he

University

of

South ustraliand outhernross

University-Tweed

old oast

ampus.

e

is

also

visitingrofessor

t he

University

of

Plymouth.

e s he

author,oauthor,

r

editor

f

many

ooks

nadministrativend

organizational

ssues nd heauthorr

coauthorf morehan 50

peer-reviewed

articles.es he

ounding

oeditorf he

Journalf

Contingencies

ndCrisis

Management

E-mail: [email protected]

Hurricane Katrina was as much a communication

disaster

as it was a natural and bureaucraticdisaster.

Communication

gaps,

missed

signals, information

technology ailures,

administrative

buffering,

turf

battles,

and deliberate and unintentional

misinterpre-

tations delayedand handicappedboth the recognition

of

the

crisis that Katrina

posed

and the

response

o its

devastation. This

essay

views

crisis

communication

through

our conceptual

lenses:

(1)

crisis communica-

tion as

interpersonal nfluence,

(2)

crisis communica-

tion as media

relations,

(3)

crisis communication as

technology

showcase,

and

(4) crisis

communication

as

interorganizational

networking.

A

conceptual

rame-

work is

presented

that

compares

hese lenses with

regard

to

agency, transparency, echnology,

and

chronology.

The

planning, response,

and

recovery

tages

of

the Hurricane

Katrina disaster are

viewed

through

these

communica-

tion

conceptual

lenses,

illustrating key acets of

each

perspectiveand adding to our deepening understanding

of

the events.

Many

of

the

problems

we

have

identified

can

be

categorized

as

"information

aps"-or

at least

problems

with

information-related

mplications,

or

failures

to act

decisively

because

information

was

sketchy

at best. Better

information

would have

been

an

optimal

weapon against

Katrina.

Infor-

mation sent to the

rightpeople

at the

rightplace

at

the

right

time.

Information

moved within

agen-

cies,

across

departments,

and between

jurisdictions

ofgovernment

as

well.

Seamlessly. ecurely.

Efficiently

.. One would think we could share

informationby

now. But Katrina

again proved

we cannot.

-U.S.

House

Select

Bipartisan

Committee

With

the

floodwalls

gashed

and

hemorrhaging

billions

ofgallons of

waterinto the

city,

it was

only

a matter

of

a

few

hours

on

Monday before

he

communications

citywide began

to

fail...

Communication was

about to become he

biggest

problem of

the

catastrophe.

-Christopher Cooper

and Robert

Block,

Disaster:

Hurricane Katrina and the Failure

of

Homeland

Security

Truthbecamea

casualty,

news

organizations

hat

werepatting their own backs n early September

were

publishingprotracted

mea

culpas

by

the

end

of

the month.

-Matt

Welch,

"They

Shoot

Helicopters,

Don't

They?"

urricaneKatrinawas and

continues

o

be as

much

a communication

crisis as

a

natural

disaster

or

governmental

fiasco. Massive

failures with the

operability

and

interoperability

of

communications

technology

have been

documented,

as

have bureaucraticand

personal squabbles

that

pre-

vented or delayed effective preparedness, response, and

recovery

(Cooper

and

Block

2006;

U.S. House

2006).

Likewise,

the

news

media

were both a

part

of

the

solution and a

part

of the

problem

at

different times.

To

put

this in

perspective,

a

growing

body

of

scholar-

ship

attests

to the crucial roles

that communication

plays

in

successful

crisis

management (Berge

1990;

Comfort

1994;

Coombs

1999, 2006;

Garnett

1992;

Hale,

Dulek,

and Hale

2005;

Lagadec

1987;

Lerbinger

1980;

Mitroff and Pearson

1993;

Scanlon et al.

1985;

Sturges

1994).

According

to

Pijnenburg

and Van

Duin,

"Indeed,

most of the

time crisis situations

turn

out

to

be,

to

a

large

extent,

information

and commu-

nication crises"

1991, 70).

Katrina follows suit, as the

quotations

at

the

beginning

of

this

essay

reinforce.

This

essay

addresses crisis

communication

by identify-

ing

and

describing

four

conceptual

lenses that

are

explicit

in

crises and

in

the

scholarly

literatureand

by

applying

them

to

the Katrina crisis.

The four

lenses

are

(1)

crisis

communication

as

interpersonal

influ-

ence,

(2)

crisis

communication as

media

relations,

(3)

crisis

communication

as

technology

showcase,

and

(4)

crisis

communication

as

interorganizational

network-

ing.

We first

discuss the theoretical

foundation for

Communicating hroughout Katrina 171

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3/19

applying

multiple

paradigms

r

conceptual

enses.

Next,

we examine he

conceptual

hrustand

key

themesof each

ens,

discussing

he focal

actors,

goals,

communication

mode,

key

issues,

and

strengths

nd

limitations

of

each

ens,

illustrated

through

Katrina

events.Each ens is also

compared

with

respect

o the

four variables f

agency,

ransparency,

echnology,

nd

chronology,

gain

with

application

o Katrina.We

then trace he

dynamics

vident

n

these

enses,

ob-

serving

how some lensesmask he valueand contribu-

tions of other enses.We conclude

by

discussing

he

implications

or crisis

communication

nd

manage-

ment within the contextof

Katrina.

Conceptual

Lenseson CrisisCommunication

Burrell nd

Morgan

1979)

lay

the

conceptual

ounda-

tion

for

multiperspectivehinking

with

their

pathbreak-

ing

work

on

paradigm

iversity.

he

ntellectual alue

of

applying aradigmatically

iversemodels

or

lenses o

the sameset of eventsor

phenomena

as beendemon-

strated

Allison

1971;

Burrell nd

Morgan

1979;

Garnett

1980;Ritzer 001;Steinbruner974).Multipleper-

spectives

avealsobeen utilized

ffectively

n crisis

management

esearch

Bovens

nd

't Hart

1996;

Jarman

nd Kouzmin

1991;

Kouzmin nd

Jarman

1989;

Lalonde

004; Rosenthal,

t

Hart,

and Kouzmin

1991).

Our article

ollows his

tradition

f

employing

multiperspectivehinking

o enabledifferent

insights.

Scholarly

ttention o communications a

key

element

in

successful

risis

management

has focused

on

different

mphases

over ime and different isci-

plines.

Froman extensive

eview

of thescholarlyiteraturen the

fields

of crisis

management,

mer-

gency

and

disaster

management,

communication,

ontingency,

and

strategic lanning

we

have

identifiedour

major

onceptual

enses

through

which

scholars

ave

examined

risis

ommunication ndthat

have

helped

shape

research nd

understanding. igure

depicts

hese

our enses:

1)

crisis ommunication s

interpersonal

nfluence,

2)

crisis ommunication

s

media

relations,

3)

crisis ommunication

s technol-

ogy

showcase,

4)

and crisis

ommunication

s inter-

organizational

etworking.

Figure compares

hese enses

n

termsof

four dimen-

sions-agency,

transparency,

hronology,

nd

technol-

ogy-as

well

as a

set of

properties.

orour

purposes,

agency

s the extent

to which

focal actors ake the initiative

or

crisis

communication,

hat

is,

they

act

proactively

ather

han

reactively

Bovens

and 'tHart

1996;

Rosenthal

nd Kouzmin

1997).

Transparency

s the

degree

to which

the

actors

and actions

described

y

a

conceptual

ensare

transparent,

hat

is,

visible o external

takeholders

utsidethat lens. Tech-

nology

ndicates he

comparative

evel of communica-

tions

technology

hat

predominates

n

each ens.

Chronology

howsthe

progression

f

scholarly

mpha-

sison the four ensesovertime. Those

higher

on chro-

nology

received ttentionearlier.

We discuss

hese

enses

n

orderof

chronology, tarting

with the first

cholarly

mphasis

nd

proceeding

o the

most recent. t

should

be

kept

n

mind thatthese

enses

arenot

totallymutually

xclusive

nd

fallshortof the

strict

definition

f a

typology

Tiryakian

968).

Con-

siderable

overlapping

nd

blending

f

types

exists

n

actual risis

management

perations.

or

example,

communications

technology

i

a the

technology

how-

case

can

aid

(or nhibit)

nterorganizational

ooperation

in crisis

response

nd

recovery.

hese

enses,however,

convey

different

onceptual mphases

hatenabledif-

ferent

insights

with

implications

or

crisis

heory

and

praxis.

To

explicate

hese

conceptual

enses,

we use

them to viewcommunicatingnvolvingHurricane

Katrina,

he most

devastating

atural

isaster

n

U.S.

history.By

looking

attheseevents

hrough

ach

per-

spective,

we

aim

to add to our overall

understanding

f

the

events hat

occurred

ndthelenses hemselves.

Crisis

Communications

Interpersonal

nfluence

Before he invention

of

telephones,

adios,

or

even

movable

type,

crisiscommunication ccurred

by

word

of

mouth-neighbor

to

neigh-

bor,

or individual o

groups,

uch

as

those

engaged

n

rescue fforts.

Knowledge

f the volcanic

erup-

tions of Thera ca. 1470 BCE)

andVesuvius

79 CE),

the Athens

plague

430 BCE),

and

other

ancientdisasters

omes

from

limitedhistorical ccounts

or

archeological

ecords.

We

gain

the

image,

however,

f

peoplewarning

heir

neighbors

bout the

calamity

t

hand

or those

remaining

omforting

achother face

to face.

During

the Great

Fireof London

n

1666,

King

Charles

I

"joined

he

firefighters

nd

was to be

seen 'smoke-

grimed

and

ash-covered,

andling

pade

and

bucket,

his lacedcoat

wet

and

filthy'"

Kingston

and Lambert

1979,

105).

Doubtless,

he shouted

ordersorexhortations, s wasroyal

prerogative.

The crisiscommunication

s

interpersonal

nfluence

lens,

the earliest

mphasis

n termsof

practice

nd

scholarship,

s

recognizable

oday

in

terms

of the

interpersonal

dynamics

of

presidents,

over-

nors,

mayors,

hief

executive

officers,

heir

top

advisors,

nd

other actors

nvolved

n crisis.

The

growing

use

of crisis

com-

mand

centersand

the

political

...we

have dentified

our

majorconceptual

enses

hrough

which scholars

haveexamined

crisiscommunication....

The crisis

communication

s

interpersonal

nfluence,

he

earliest

mphasis

n termsof

practice

nd

scholarship,

s

recognizable

oday....

172 PublicAdministration Review

*

December 2007 * Special Issue



4/19

imperative

f

leadership

eing

visible

n

these com-

mand

centersdemonstratehe

ongoing

mportance

f

the

interpersonal

nfluence

ens. While

massmedia

and

high-tech

communications re

increasingly eing

used

by

government

nd

corporate

eaders,

much

communication

surrounding

riseseven

today

s

face

to

face,oral,

and

interpersonal

Comfort

and Cahill

1988),

whetherat

the scene of the crisisor

in

a com-

mand

or

operations

enter

within the crisis eam.

A

typical

cenario

n

this

perspective

would

have

key

leaders

interacting

with a

range

of

advisors,

ncluding

police

and

fire

chiefs,

healthand mentalhealth

ex-

perts,

media

consultants,

echnical

specialists

terror-

ism

experts,

hemical

specialists,

tc.),

and others.The

types

of

advisorswould

depend

on the natureof

the

crisis o be confronted.Thecrisiscommunication s

interpersonal

nfluence

perspective

ocuses

on

how

individuals nteractwith other ndividuals-whether

they

are

decision

makers,

neighbors,

olleagues,

r

helpingprofessionals-before,during,

and aftera

crisis.While suchinterpersonalommunication c-

curswithin

organizational

r even societal

contexts,

the

primary

hrustof

this

perspective

s

relating

at

this

most basic evel rather han

communicating hrough

media,

echnology,

r

interorganizationalinkages.

The

communication

goals

areto directaction

through

orders

or

instructions,

nformcrisisdecision

makers,

and

set the tone for

handling

he crisis.

During

Hurricane

Katrina,

nterpersonal

ommunica-

tion

among op

officials

nd

theiraides

ailed o meet

these

key

goals.

President

George

W BushandVice

President

Dick

Cheney

were

away

rom

the White

House and distractedwith other ssueswhen Katrina

struck.

They

werenot

fully

engaged gentsduring

he

firstcrucial

days.Secretary

f

Homeland

Security

MichaelChertoffwas

preoccupied

ith antiterrorism

goals

andwas absent

during

ome of the

key

meetings

on Katrina.He and Michael

Brown,

director f the

Federal

EmergencyManagement gency

FEMA),

had

a strained

relationship

efore,

during,

and

after hat

disaster.

or

days

during

he heat of

response,

Brown

was isolated

n Baton

Rouge

and

stopped

answering

calls rom heDepartment f HomelandSecurity.

Secretary

hertoff nd

his

"battlefield

ommander,"

High

Agency

Low

High

Interpersonal

Influence Media Relations

High

Focal

actors:

Leaders,

advisers,

top

teams,

survivors Focal actors:

Spin

doctors,

commentators

Dominantcommunicationmode: Face to face Dominantcommunicationmode:

Mass

media

Key

functions:Direct

action,

inform decision

Key

functions:Promoteand

protect

makers,

set

tone,

console and

counsel

organizational eputation

nd

interests,

disseminatenews, gainmarket hare

Key

issues:

Perspective,

accountability, Key

issues:

Credibility,authenticity

T

groupthink

groupthink

Strengths:

Reach,

visibility

C

a

Strengths:Proximity,

relevance

Limitations:

Distortion,sensationalism,

ack

h

n

Limitations:Lack

of

overall perspective

of

overall perspective

r

s O

p

n

Interorganizational

Networking

Technology

Showcase

a o

r

Focal

actors:

Boundary

brokers,

organizational

eaders Focal actors:

Cybergeeks,

echnocrats

I

e o

n

Dominant

communicationmode:

Boundary panning

Dominant

communicationmode:

IT

networking

g

c

Functions:Allocate

resources,

coordinateaction

Functions:

Demonstrateand validate

y

y technology,

disseminate nformation

Key

issues:

Intelligence,

competition, Key

issues:

Accessibility,

overload,

"wickedness"

technological

failure,

unk,

e-governance,

democratic

governance

versus

security

Strengths:

Cooperative

action

Strengths:Speed, uniformity

Limitations:Turf

boundariesand

battles,

bureau-

Limitations:

Technological

failure,

political blaming,

time,

and

stalemate,

ack of

communicative

redundancy,

echno

stress,

Low

overall

perspective

vulnerability

and

marginalization,

ack of

Low

overall

perspective

Low

High

Technology

Figure Conceptual

enses

or

Understanding

risis

ommunication




5/19

Director

Brown,

ommunicated

briefly

nd

perfuncto-

rily,

having

ittle

quality

ime

together.

According

o

the U.S.

House

Bipartisan

electCommittee

on Ka-

trina

2006,

2),

"These wo

key

players'

ailure o

com-

municate

s

evidenceof the

profounddysfunction

hen

existing

between

DHS andFEMA

leadership."

hese

andother

top

federal

fficials

ailed o ask

many

of the

probing

questions

bout

preparation

nd

response

actionsand failed o

communicate he

proper

one for

handling

he

crisis.

Much of the

public

one

communi-

cated

by

federal

fficials

was one of

"being

n

control"

rather han

showingappropriate

ngagement.

One

key

goal

of the

interpersonal

nfluence ens

in-

volves

directing

preparedness

nd

response.

n this

regard,

t is

linkedwith

the

command

and control-

oriented

rational/centralized

approach

o crisisman-

agement Caplow

1976;

Garnett

1992;

Perry

1985;

't

Hart,

Rosenthal,

nd

Kouzmin

1993).

The

image

here

is of the

top

leader

orderly

onferring

with

key

aides

in

the

crisis

command

centerand

giving

orders or

response perationso police,fire,health,and other

workers

n

the

field that

implement

a

rational,

om-

prehensive lan

for

emergency

management.

A

grow-

ing

amount of

scholarship

as

emphasized

hat

this

rational deal s

more

myth

than

reality

Kouzmin

and

Jarman

1989;Rosenthal,Charles,

nd 't Hart

1989;

Rosenthal,

t

Hart,

and

Kouzmin

1991;

Schneider

2005;

't

Hart,

Rosenthal,

nd Kouzmin

1993).

More

typical,

according

o this

polycentric

ineof scholar-

ship,

is

the

involvement f

multiple,

often

conflicting

actors

amid the chaos

hat crisis

inevitably

brings.

A

key

issuewith the

interpersonal

nfluence

ens is

howcrisismanagers cquire nduseinformation o

make

decisionsand the

dynamics

of crisis

decision

processes.

Much of the

scholarly

ttention n

the crisis

decision

contexthasfocusedon

groupthink,

r "the

tendency

or

premature

nd extreme oncurrence

seeking

within a

decision

group"

't

Hart and Kroon

1997,

102).

After

analyzing

ecision

making

n a

numberof

crisis

contexts,

ncluding

he

PearlHarbor

attack,

Bay

of

Pigs

invasion,

and

Watergate,

Janis

(1972,

1982,

1989)

concluded that

faulty

decision

making

was the

result

of

too much

group

cohesion

and facilitation rather than too little.

This

finding

is

counterintuitive to

prior

(and

still

most)

scholarship

on

group

dynamics

and

goes

too often unheeded

today by

contemporary practitioners

and

scholars who

advocate cohesive

groups

('t

Hart

and Kroon

1997).

Groupthink

is still a controversial

subject

afterconsid-

erable

scholarship

that has

critiqued

Janis's

original

groupthink

theory

and framed new theories

('t

Hart

and Kroon

1997;

Kowart

2001).

From this

wide-ranging

literature,

some

important

findings

emerge.

The

dysfunctional

decision

making

characteristic of

groupthink

is

connected

with

insula-

tion from other information and

advice,

feelings

of

groupsuperiority

ndeven

infallibility,

xcessive

group oyalty

and cohesion

combinedwith

insecurity

by

individual

members,

dominance

by

a

promotional

leaderwho

promotes

a

position

andoutcome

rather

than

remaining

neutral

acilitator,

n

organizational

culture hat

promotes

eam

oyalty

over

ndependence,

shortdeadlines

nd

high

stress,

he influence

of

prior

failures,

nd

group

willingness

and even

eagerness

to

accepthigh-risk,

venreckless ourses

of

action,

ignoring

cautionary

nformation

nd

possible

moral

complications"

't

Hart and Kroon

1997, 122;

seealso

Schafer nd Crichlow

2002).

FEMA

director

Brown's

isolation

physical

nd

administrative),

isoverconfi-

dence,

andhis failure

o widen his

decisioncircle

are

indicativeof the

groupthink

hat

occurred

during

Katrina.But

the decision

dysfunctions

ardly

topped

there:

They

extended o information

bias n

the

Homeland

Security

Operations

Center

(HSOC),

the

New Orleans'

mayor's

ffice,

and

elsewhere.The

ex-

cessive

oyalty

within

decision-making camps"

nd

the

distrustof officials

and

personnel

rom

the

outside

alsodistorteddecisionmaking.

Katrina lso

spotlighted

he less

rational,

more

chaotic

flavor

of the

interpersonal

nfluence

ens.

Because

storm

damage

liminated

orhinderedmuch

available

communication

technology, nterpersonal

ow-tech

communication

ccurred

n

unexpected

ituations.

"The nformation

acuum n the

Superdome

was

especially

angerous.

Cell

phones

didn't

work,

the

arena's

ublic

address

ystem

wouldn't un on

genera-

tor

power,

and the law enforcement n

hand

was

reduced o

talking

o the

20,000

evacuees

using

bull-

horns

and

a

lot of

legwork"

Welch

2005,

16).

In

another nstance,Mississippiocal

governments ept

contactwith

the state

capitalby

running

cars

back

and forthto

relay

nformation n

response perations.

In termsof

our matrix

dimensions,

he

interpersonal

influence ensrates

high

in

agency

becauseactors n

this lenstend to

be

proactively

nvolvedwith

the

crisis-whether on

the scene or behind the scenes

n

a

command

post.

In

either

case,

actors

and actions

n

this

perspective

tend to have

higher

visibility

because

of their central and dramatic nature. This

lens

rates

high

on

chronology,

as it is the

oldest lens

in

practice

and in

scholarly

emphasis,

but low on

technology

because the dominant

media are face to face

and

telephone,

even

though

some

higher-technology

com-

munications media are

increasingly

utilized.

Because

presidents, mayors,

governors,

and other actors

associ-

ated with the

interpersonal

influence lens are so

prom-

inent,

newsworthy,

and

visible,

this lens rates

higher

in

transparency

than some

other lenses. These

focal

actors, advisors, consultants,

and others involved

in

small "crisis

councils" often reduce

transparency

n

favor of

secrecy,especially

for certain kinds of

crises,

such as those

dealing

with terrorism

and

national

security.

The

magnitude

of death and destruction

and

174 Public Administration Review

*

December 2007

*

Special Issue



6/19

the

uproar

verthe

handling

of HurricaneKatrina

resulted

n

several ntensiveofficial

investigations,

widespread

media

scrutiny,

nd

participant

atharsis,

all of

which

served o

penetrate

much

of

the

secrecy

that

might

otherwisehaveoccurred.

This

extra cru-

tiny

will neverclose all the information

gaps

about

what

happened

or

failed o

happen.

Crisis

Communicationas Media Relations

This

conceptual

ens focuses

primarily

n the roles

that media

relations,

particularly sing

the massnews

media,

play

n the

varying tages

and

aspects

of crises

and

crisis

management.

The

essenceof this lens is

captured

by

an article

itle,

"Wehave a Problem ..

Call the

Press "

(Berry

1999).

In this

lens,

crisesare

seen

substantially

s mediaevents ecauseof

the

mass

media's

endency

o treatcrisesand

disasters

s

dis-

creteevents nstead

of

periodic

or even

anticipated

occurrences

ithin

technological,

olitical,

ecological,

or

economic

systems

Smith 1992).

Prominent ctors n this lensareeithercommentators

and observers

who

report

on crises or

news

organiza-

tions or

spin

doctors

who

represent

he

organizations

involved

n the

crisis o

the news

media

reporting

t.

Interplay

etween hesesets of actorsand

among

their

counterparts

n

public

nformation nd

media

orms

the

essence

of

mediarelations.

Key

communication

functions n this lens for news

commentators nd observers re

to

disseminatenformation bout

the

crisis;

"frame"he crisis

or

viewers, isteners,

r

readers;

nd

gain

market hare

within

the

newsindustry.Keyfunctions or

government,

usiness,

or

other

spin

doctorsare

to

protect

and

promote

heir

organization's

reputation

nd interests.

Katrina,

oted the

top

news

story

of

2005

by

the

Associated

Press,

howcased

broad

range

of media

actorsat their

best and worst.

The

mediarelations

perspective

lso

has

multiple

strains.One

focus

of

this researchnvolveswhere

citizensobtain

crisis-relevant

nformation.

While mass

mediaare

generally

he most cited

sourceof informa-

tion

aboutdisasterswithin

the

disaster

ommunity

itself(Wenger, ames,andFaupel1980), theirroles

reflect

significant

ariations.

Burkhart

1991),

synthe-

sizing

considerable esearch n

media n

crisis,

con-

cludes hat

massmedia

roles

varyby

the

phase

of the

crisis.Massmediatend to

devote

mostof their

atten-

tion

to the

preparedness/warning

nd

responsephases,

whichhave

highest

dramaand

newsworthiness.

Most

of

the

crisis-relevant

edia

nformation

hat citizens

receiveoccurs

immediately

efore,

during,

and imme-

diately

after he

crisis.The

massmediaare

ound to

be

most

useful

n

conveying

and

amplifying

lerts rom

official ources

Burkhart

991;

Comfortand Cahill

1988;

Drabek

1986;

Perry

1985),

providing

nforma-

tion andinstructions o

help

citizens

prepare

or

the

crisis

Burkhart 991),

and

providing

news

during

he

acute

crisis

responsephase

about the crisisand its

impacts

Burkhart

991;

Horsley

and Barker

002;

NationalResearchCouncil

1980).

Whilemuch

responsible

nd even heroic

journalism

occurred

during

Katrina,

oo often

themassmedia

failed o disseminate ccurate nformation.This false

informationhindered fforts

at

evacuation, escue,

aid,

and

security.

Because f the crisis

mentality

hat

prevails,

specially

uring

he immediate

response

phase,

he

typical

media role

of

independent

ritical

monitor

s often

forgone

Burkhart

991;

Massing

2002;

Nacos and

Torres-Reyna

007)

and

may

even

result

n

media-spread

umors

Scanlon1979).

On

September

,

72

hoursafterHurricane

Katrina

ripped

hrough

New

Orleans,

he As-

sociated

Press

news

wire

flashed

a

nightmare

f

a story:"Hurricane vacuationHaltedAmid

Gunfire .. ShotsAre Firedat

Military

Helicop-

ter."The article lew across he

globe

via at least

150

news

outlets,

from

Indiato

Turkey

o

Spain.

Within 24

hourscommentators

n

every

major

Americannews networkhad

helped

turn

the

helicopter niper

mage

nto the

disaster's

enduring

ymbol

of

dysfunc-

tional urbanites oo

depraved

to

be saved .. But the basic

premise

of the article hat

introduced he New

Orleans

helicopter

niper

o a

global

audiencewasdeadwrong, ust

like

so

many

other

widely

disseminated

Katrina

night-

mares.

No

7-year-old ape

victim with a

slit throatwas ever

ound,

even

though

the

atrocity

was

reported

n

scoresof

newspapers.

he Convention

Centerwas not

stacked

with

30-40

dead bodiesnorwas

the

Superdome

live-in

morgue.

Welch

2005,

16)

Because f

media

coverage

f

the

helicopter

umor,

some rescue

ffortswere

abandoned

r

delayed.

The

rumor

about bodiesat the

convention

center

prompted hediversion f a mortuaryunit fromother

collections

neededto maintain

public

health.The

vacuumof reliable

nformation

spawned

umors

hat

weretoo

oftencirculated

y

news media

without

careful

erification.Rumors

wereeven

spreadby

the

public

officials

responsible

or

handling

he

crisis:

Mayor

Nagin

and his

police

chief

Eddie Com-

pass

contributed

n this

score.For

days,

the two

men

had been

delivering

anciful

descriptions

o

the

press

of the

Superdome

nd the

city

at

large.

Nagin

had

spoken

of the

"animalistic"

tateof

Key

functions for

government,

business,

or

other

spin

doctors

are to

protect

and

promote

their

organization'sreputation

and interests.




7/19


8/19

Katrina'sictims

still

endure

a

month after he

storm-also has

gripped

many

reporters

who want

to

stay

on

the

story

ndefinitely"

Johnson

2005).

This

strong

dentity

with the

people

nvolved n

Katrina

produced

ome

first-rate

journalism

ut also

may

have

affected

objectivity.

ournalistic

xcessoverthe

Super-

dome is a case

n

point.

Another trainof the crisismedia iterature oncen-

trates

on

the media's ole

n

enhancing

or

destroying

personal

r

organizationaleputation.

Because

ew

stakeholders iew

crisis-handling erformance

irst-

hand,

most stakeholders

orm

their

judgments

through

he mass

media.

Few

people

outside

New

York

City

remember

hat

MayorRudolph

Giuliani

was

plagued

with

personal

nd

political

problems

before he

9/11

attacks nd was on

nobody's

ist for

man of the

year.

The

media

images

of

Mayor

Giuliani

and PresidentBush

responding

o that crisis

did

much

to boost their

reputations.

Likewise,

handling

a crisis

badly

can ruin one's

personal eputation

nd

political

fortune,asPhiladelphiaMayorWilsonGoodediscov-

ered

following

he

1985

MOVE confrontation

(Nagel

1991).

Media

coverage

f Katrina

learly

damaged

PresidentBush's

reputation.

One

indicator

of

this is

that more critical

artoonswererun about President

Bushthan

any

other

figure

n

the disaster

(Kelly-

Romanoand

Westgate

007).

Homeland

ecurity

secretary

Chertoffand FEMA

directorBrownalso

received ritical

coverage

CNN 2005).

To

put

their

bossesand

their

organization

n better

media

light,

Department

f

Homeland

Security

mployees

were

told

by

e-mailto "dowhatever

hey

could

to

makethe

department

ook

good.

What

this meantaboveall was

making ure hat,wheneverhepresswasaround, he

Homeland

Security

gencies

were

clearly

n a

leading

role.

Complicating

heir

task,

though,

was

the

fact

that otherfederal

departments

werealso

seeking

o

present

a

high profile

o the TV cameras"

(Cooper

and Block

2006,

232).

Indicative f the

research

n

maintaining

eputation

s

the

emphasis

n the

consequences

f different

risis

communication

strategies

including

denial,

stalling,

deflection/blaming, aggression/counterattack,

forming

alliances,

ingratiation,

and

acceptance

(Sturges

1994;

Ray

1999;

Booth

2000;

Coombs

2006).

The blame

game

started with

heavy

criticism of FEMA and the

feds

(CNN

2005;

Cooper

and Block

2006).

To

take

heat

off

the

federal failures over

Katrina,

the White

House

attempted

the

deflection/blaming

strategy.

"Administration officials

began talking

less about what

President Bush

had

called the

'unacceptable'

federal

response

in

Katrina

and more

about what local offi-

cials

might

have

done to

aggravate

the

problems"

(Cooper

and Block

2006,

235).

Later

on,

after

receiv-

ing pushback

from

Governor

Blanco

and other Gulf

officials,

the

Bush

administration

backed off

from its

blaming strategy.

Partly

because t

rates

higher

n both

visibility

and

technology,

hemedia

relations

ens has

received

he

most

scholarly

ttentionof

the four

perspectives

d-

dressedhere.The mediahave

greater

ccess o

diverse

publics

and,

by

their

very

nature,

an even

self-

promote

heirrole

during

crises.

Visibility

and

reach

are

clearly

he

strengths

f the massmedia.

Because

this lens was also one of

the first o

gain

the

attention

of

researchers,

t hasbeenable

to

gain

momentum

and critical

mass

(see,

e.g.,

Barton

1993;

Benthall

1993;

Berge

1990;

Burkhart

991;

Nacos

2005;

Nacos

and

Torres-Reyna

007;

Scanlon

1980;

Smith

1992).

The

degree

of

agency ypical

within the

media

relations ensis lower

han that of the

interpersonal

influenceor

interorganizational

etworking

enses.

Mediarelations till

plays

moreof anobservation

ole

on the

reporting

ide

and,

all

too

often,

on the

public

relations ide as well.

A

trend oward

greater

gency

within

the mediarelations ens is

apparent,

owever,

as

both

mediaand

organizational

ctors akemore

initiativewithin the

crisis

communication ontext.

Somereportersndcamera perators venrescued

people

during

Katrina.

Media

figures

uch as

Ander-

son

Cooper

weremore than

observers t

times.

In-

creased

agency

within the

mediarelations ens

can

produce

more

probing ournalism

r

more sensation-

alized

reporting,

s with the

Superdome

r

convention

center

coverage.

n either

case,

heightenedagency

during

crises

runs the risk

of

violating

normsof

"objective"

eporting.

While

the mass

media

play

some vitalroles n crisis

management,

we

argue

hat research ttentionhas

exceeded he

actualcontribution f the

massmedia

and left otherperspectivesnderresearchedndun-

derreported,

hus

masking

he

natureand

potential

of

other enses.

The

mass

mediado not

typically

play

the

key

communication oles n

preventing

crisis,

mobi-

lizing

crisis

response,

r

achieving ong-term ecovery.

The mass

mediacan raise

he salienceof

emergency

management

n

the

policy

arena

Burkhart 991),

but

their

nattentiveness

o

longer-range

mitigation

and

recovery

ssues

essens his

contribution. n

addition,

the mass

media's

tendency

to

be

highly

critical

of

government

response

to

emergencies

as

"nearly

nevi-

table

failure" s

clearly

overstatedand

counterproduc-

tive

(Schneider

1992),

the

colossal

governmental

failures in Katrina

notwithstanding.

The mass media

are

also of

limited value in

notifying

the

families

of

victims

and

helping

rehabilitate

survivors

(Hodgkinson

and Stewart

1991;

Myer

2001;

Pijnenburg

and

van

Duin

1991;

Raphael

1986).

Crisis

Communicationas

Technology

Showcase

The

technology

showcase

perspective

emphasizes

the

application

of

communications

technologies,

usually

advanced

technologies,

for

communicating

before,

during,

and after

crises.

Crises

become

opportunities

to

showcase the

capabilities

of

advanced,

virtual




9/19

communications

hardware nd software.

Key

actors

in

this lens

are

the

cybergeeks

who are conversant

with communications

echnologies

and

can

apply

them

and

the administrativeechnocratswho

super-

vise them

(Jarman

1993;

Kouzmin,

Jarman,

and

Rosenthal

1995).

Increasingly

nvolvedwithin the

technology

showcase

ens are consultants

who

supply

expertise

on an

outsourcing

basis

that

gov-

ernmentsand businesses

are

increasingly

ess able

to

provide

(Korac-Kakabadse,

akabadse,

nd

Kouzmin

2002).

Attention ends to

focus on the

capacities

f the tech-

nologies

nvolved,

whether

hey

were

appliedappro-

priately,

nd the results

of

their

use.

Illustrative

f

scholarship

n communication

technologies

ncludes

research n

the

use

of CitizensBandradio

Drabek

et al.

1979;

Drabek

t al.

1981),

interactive talk

adio"

(Kouzmin,

Leivesley,

nd Carr

1997),

telecommuni-

cationsnetworks

Chartrand

985;

Giuffrida

1985;

Wrobel

1993),

geographic

nd

spatial

nformation

systems Jarman 993;Newkirk1993;Newsomeand

Mitrani

1993),

decision

support

ystems

Booth

1993;

Mitroff

1994; Torrieri,Concilio,

and

Nijkamp

2002),

and

e-mail,

chat

rooms,

and Web

sites

(Fischer

1999).

These

technologies

havebeen

applied

o a

numberof

crisis

types, ncludingearthquake

nd

volcano

detection

and

behavior,

il

spill tracking,

disease

epidemiology,

vacuation

tracking,

orest

ire

detection,

errorist

ynamics

modeling,

and emer-

gency response

monitoring.

The

principal

nstrumentalunction

within the

technology

showcase

ens is to

apply

communica-

tions technologyforbettercrisishandling, particu-

larly

disseminating

nformation

relating

o

mitigation,

preparedness,

arning,

response,

recov-

ery,

or

learning.

In

many

crisis

situations,

communi-

cations

technologies

are the

only

feasible

way

to

disseminate

nformation

o those

on the

scene

and

to those

managing

and

responding

o

the

crisis.

Earlier

applications

of

technology

concentrated

n

establishing

inks outside

the

disasterarea

Drabek

1986;

Pijnenburg

and

Van Duin

1991)

and

among

agents

involved in

crisis

handling

(Drabek

et al.

1979;

Pijnenburg

and

Van Duin

1991).

This

linkage

can be invaluable

in

directing

citizen

and

emergency

personnel

actions within the disaster area and coor-

dinating responses

from

outside.

A

more current

application

of communications

technology

is aimed

at

detecting

actual

or

potential

disasters.

Remote

sensing

technology

has been used

to

detect

forest

fires,

earthquakes,

hurricanes,

and

other

types

of

natural disasters.

At

its most

effective,

communica-

tions

technologies

allow for

more

rapid

and

more

uniform

communication

with

the actors

who need

the information.

Certainly,

remote-sensing

technolo-

gies

can send

warnings

from isolated

areas

where

it

would be

infeasible

to have staffed

stations or even

regularmonitoring.

A combinationof seismic

alert,

geographic

nformation

ystems

or

locating

response

and

recovery

needs and

efforts,

oss

estimation,

and

other forms

of communications

technologies

used

after

the

1994

Northridge

earthquake

n

California

considerably

hortened he time

required

o

imple-

ment

federal,

tate,

and

emergency

esponses

(Comfort1994).

A

corollary

unction,

but one that often seems to

take

precedence,

s

demonstrating

he

efficacy

of the

technologies

themselves.The

emphasis

on "show-

casing"

a

new

communications

technology

can be

expected

because t

has to

gain

acceptance

before

it

can

be

used

to benefit either those actors

applying

the

technology

or thosewho have invested

n the

technology

(Newsome

and

Mitrani

1993).

If

com-

munications

technologies

or

specific

products

come

underfire as

being

unreliable

or

outmoded,

show-

casing again

becomes

important.

In

promoting

new

or threatened

communications

echnologies,

advo-

catesmaybe temptedto oversell hem as "techno-

fixes."

Some

of the

technology

perspectiveattempts

to

combat

the

technofix

mentality

that

is so

appeal-

ing

to

many

citizens and

public

officials

(e.g.,

Newkirk

1993;

Korac-Kakabadse, akabadse,

nd

Kouzmin

1998),

while other works fostersuch a

mentality

by

making

overly

ambitious

claims for

technological

performance.

Despite

the lure of a

technofix,

some

scholarsof crisis

management

rec-

ognize

the limited role

of communications

echnol-

ogy

for crisis

management.

These imitationsfocus

on overreliance

n

technology

when other

commu-

nications media would

be useful

complements-

andprobablymoreappropriate-and the failureof

technology

to work under

the conditions

encountered.

As with the

9/11

terrorist

ttacks,

he Katrina atas-

trophe

showcased

he

vulnerabilities

f communica-

tions

technology.

While

some successes

ccurred,

much

of the communications

nfrastructureas made

useless

by

water,

winds,

or

mismanagement.

andline

and cellular

telephone

service was

virtually

nonexis-

tent

for

days

because

of

flooding, power

outages,

and

even

theft of

equipment.

The

emergency

911

system

was also down

in

13

counties

(U.S.

House

2006).

Attempts

to

get

these

systems

back online were de-

layed by

fuel

shortages,

conflicting

demands

for re-

sources,

and

lack of communication

itself.

Citizens

largely

lacked

means

of

communicating pleas

for

help

except

in

person.

The

toppling

of cell

towers,

cutting

of

fiber-optic

cables,

and

other

devastation

also frus-

trated

relief efforts.

Technology

failures also

hampered

the

response

and

rescue

efforts.

The House

Bipartisan

Select

Committee concluded

that

"Destruction

to

communications

capability

hindered command

and

control and

severely

limited situational

awareness"

(2006,

166).


*

December 2007

*

Special Issue



10/19

Some failure

o utilizecommunications

technologies

had human

rather

han natural auses.

Despite

FEMA's

promises

fter he

Hur-

ricane

Pam

exercise,

ederal

om-

munications

equipment

was

scarce

during

he

earlydays

of

the Katrina

esponse.

Some

promised

units never

material-

ized,

and

FEMA

kept

its

high-

techmobile communications

truck"RedOctober"

afely

n Baton

Rouge

for

several

days

after

he storm

hit

instead

of

placing

t near

city

hall,

which would

haveenabled

bettercommunication

capacity

n New Orleans tself.This mobile unit could

have

helped

ederal, tate,

and

city

officials

tay

n the

communication

oop (Cooper

and Block

2006).

The

lack

of

interoperability

f communications

echnolo-

gies

used

by

federal, tate, ocal,

and

nongovernmental

organizations

lso

hampered

he

response

nd

the

identification

f resources

U.S.

House

2006).

In

some

cases,

agencies

ould

not even communicate

with theirownpersonneln differentocations,much

less across

organizations.

At

the

time Katrina

it,

the Homeland

Security

Op-

erationsCenter

HSOC)

had

a

budget

of

$70

million,

a staffof

300

assigned

rom

45

government gencies,

and

high-techcomputers,

monitors,

and other

equip-

ment,

making

t the

largest

24/7

operations

enter

n

the nation.

However,

HSOC head

MatthewBroderick

brought

a

military

ntelligencebackground

hatin-

sistedon detailed nformationwith

multiple

verifica-

tions,

thus

filtering

out some of the

key

intelligence

about evee

breaches,

he number

of

people

at the

conventioncenter,and othersituations.Suchkey

informationwas therefore

ot

reported

o

Secretary

Chertoffand the White House

as

accurately

r

as

timely

as needed

despite

he abundance f communi-

cations

technology.

For

example,

a

FEMA

report

estimating

he numberof flooded

homes,

the

product

of

cross-hatching

ensusdata

with

remote-sensing

imagery,

ailed

o

convinceBroderick nd the HSOC

of the

severity

f

flooding (Cooper

and Block

2006).

Satellite

photos

from the National

Geospatial

ntel-

ligenceAgency

also

could

not

help

the

HSOC con-

nect the

dots.

Likewise,

he fabled

"CEO COM

LINK,"

high-tech

ystem

or

connecting op

officials

with thechief executiveofficers f Fortune100 com-

panies,

remainedunutilized

by

Secretary

Chertoff

and

HSOC

director

Broderick

t

key

times

during

Katrina.

Other

nformation,

nexplicably,

urvived

Broderick'sarrow ilter

and

influenced

his

thinking

andfederalaction-or inaction:

Late

Monday

afternoon,

the

[CNN]

network

aired a

report

from New

Orleans. The focus of

the

video

snippet

was a scene on

Bourbon

Street,

near the

highest point

in

the

city,

where

people

"seemed to be

having

a

good

time,"

Broderick

aid.

"The

one data

point

that

I

really

had,

personally,

isually,

was the celebration

n

the streets

of New

Orleans

..

and

they

came

up

with the

word 'we

dodged

the

bullet,"'

Broderick

aid.

"So

that'sa

pretty

good

indicator

right

there."

(Cooper

and

Block

2006,

151)

Ironically,

ne form of

technology

hat worked

during

the

response

o Katrinawas text

messaging

rom

cell

phones.

TheAssociation f

CommunityOrganiza-

tions

for ReformNow

(ACORN)

used text

messaging

to

send

messages equesting

elp

around

he

country

and received 00

replies.

ACORN set

up

a

message

board

on

its Web

site that

allowed

people

to contact

one

another

Rathke

nd Laboistre

006).

This s an-

other nstance n which communications

technology

aided

interorganizational

inking.

Because

adio,

which had

proven

effective

n

previous

loods

(Drabek

et al. 1979),wasamongthe fewtechnologiesunc-

tioning,

the Salvation

Army,

Red

Cross,

and

govern-

ment

agenciesdeployed

amateur adio

operators

o

send and receive

ital

messages.

For

example,

n Mis-

sissippi,

FEMA

stationedamateur

adio

operators

n

evacuation

enters,

hospitals,

and

emergencymanage-

ment

posts

to

aid communication

U.S.

House

2006,

177).

Radio inks coordinated

through

heNational

Communication

System

were nvaluable

or

rescue

and reliefefforts.

The

Internet

also

contributed

reatly

o

the rescue

and

recovery

fforts.At some evacuation

enters,

people

could searchWeb sitesto findmissing amilymem-

bers.New Orleansnative

and Yahoo

hief

executive

officerDavid Filo

developed

a metasearch

engine

that

concurrently

earched ll sites created

o

find

missing

persons.

The

Web

also

facilitated

fund-raising

or

recovery.

Yahoo ink forKatrina eliefraised

$26

million

during

ts first

day

(Webster

006).

Many

corporations

nd

nonprofitorganizations

inked

to

the

Red Crossor other relief

agencies

on their

Web

sites. Mishra

2006)

foundthat

51

percent

of the Best

100 GlobalBrand

corporations

ad Katrina inks on

theirWeb sitesand

that

86

percent

of

those

compa-

nies also

contributed o Katrina elief.

In

our matrix

ramework,

he

technology

howcaseens

rates oweron

both

agency

and

transparency.

hile

technocrats,

ybergeeks,

onsultants,

nd

other

ens

actorsdo

get

involved

n

crises,

hat

nvolvements not

as

intenseor directas thatof

actorswithin the

interper-

sonal and

interorganizational

enses. The more

remote,

sidelines roles of

the HSOC and the

Red October

communications

unit illustrate this for Katrina.The

role of

communications

technology

has

generally

been

to

facilitate flows of information

from which crisis

decisions are

made,

while

it is

interpersonal,

face-to-face


Somefailure o

utilize

communications

echnologies

had

human rather

han

natural auses.



11/19

communicating

hat

eads o thesecritical

ecisions

nd

the

implementation

ctions hat result

Korac-Boisvert

and Kouzmin

1994;Rosenthal,

Charles,

nd 't Hart

1989).

The

technology

howcaseens s lower n

trans-

parency

ecause

muchof the

actionoccursout of

sight

and often

beyond

he technical

understanding

f both

citizens

and

public

officials.This

creates n

accountabil-

ity

problem

hat s

magnified

when the

technical

pro-

fessionalswho

apply

he

technologies

nd

the

technical

professionals

ho

monitor hem are

increasingly

ut-

sourced onsultants.Who

in

the

public

domain s

able

to

keep

hese

consultants ccountable?

Downsizing

n

the

public

sectorhas

greatly

educed

he

numberof

professional

pecialists

ithin

government

ho can

competently

versee uch

technologicallyomplex

applications.

hiskind of

organizational

norexia as

left the

public

ectorvulnerableo

technical

incompe-

tence,

mismanagement,

nd

fraud

concerning

ommu-

nicationshardwarend software

applications.

Excessively

ownsized, ean,

"anorexic"

organizations

aremore at riskof immediate ailuresbecause hey

lack

buffering.Buffering

with extra

layers,

esources,

and

competencies elpsprotect

an

organization's

ore

technology

rom critical

nvironmental

isturbances

(Thompson

1967).

Without

buffering, rganizations

aremorevulnerable o

crises.Whencrises

occur,

coordinated ction s

crucial,

but it tends to

be more

nonroutine

n

overly

ean

organizations

han n

buff-

ered

organizations

Perrow 967).

Anorexic

organiza-

tions lack

both the resources ndthe

operating

routines o

cope effectively

with

crises.The "survivor's

syndrome"xperienced y manyemployees

eft

in

downsized

organizations ompounds

his

problem,

as

theseemployees reoftenalreadyhell-shocked nd

havea lowermorale

and senseof trust.The

significant

cuts

in

FEMA's

budget,

staff,

reputation,

nd leader-

ship

greatly

educed he

agency'sapacity

o

cope

with

a disaster f Katrina's

magnitude.

DirectorBrown

testifiedbefore he House SelectCommittee hat

FEMA

had

been

understaffed nd

underfunded,

ad

undergone

brain

drain,

and had become"emaciated"

(U.S.

House

2006,

13).

The

technology

ens is

among

the most

recentand has

captured

much

interest.

t can

provide

ssential

sup-

port

for the

interpersonal,

media,

and

interorganiza-

tional ensesbut tendsto be not as

integral

o crisis

handling

as those enses.The amountof

scholarly

nd

practitioner

ttention t

has received

appears

o be

more

related o its

high-techappeal

and

potential

rather hanto itsactualcontributiono crisis

handling.

CrisisCommunicationas

Interorganizational

Networking

The crisiscommunication s

interorganizational

et-

workingperspective

ocuseson

written,oral,

and

electronic ommunication

amonggovernment gen-

cies,

businesses,

olice

and fire

departments,

escue

units,

hospitals,

elief

agencies,

and otherofficialand

unofficial

organizations

nvolved

n

different

stages

of

the crisis.While

some

illustrations f

this

perspective

are

hardly

new

(e.g.,

Drabeket al.

1981;

Dynes

1978),

the

interorganizational

etworking

ens

tends

to be

newerand less

emphasized

n

scholarship

n

crisis

communication

han the other

perspectives.Key

actors

n this lens are

the

leaders f the

respective

organizations

nd other

boundary

brokers f

organiza-

tions

like those

previously

isted. But

interorganiza-

tional

networking

lso

occurswithin

increasingly

utilizedcrisis eams

comprising

arying

ombinations

of

emergency

management ersonnel,

health

special-

ists,

scientific

experts,

and others.

Interorganizational

networking

lso occurs

among

these

teams

and

through

heir nteractionswith other

networks n-

volved

n

the crisis

Comfort

1994,

1997a;

Comfort

and Cahill

1988; Comfort,

Ko,

and

Zagorecki

004;

Rosenthal,

t

Hart,

and

Kouzmin

1991).

The centralgoalsareto allocate esources ndcoordi-

nate action.

Agenciesrepresented

n the

networkhave

much of the

expertise, quipment,

and other

tangible

resources-and often the

official

authority-to

re-

spond

to a

crisis.

Allocating

resourcesor crisisre-

sponse

nvolves nformation

sharing

and

often

negotiation

Rosenthal,

t

Hart,

and Kouzmin

1991;

Wise

2002).

Coordinating

risis

operations

within the

interorganizational

ens is

viewed

ess

as a

centralized

command tructure

issuing

orders

o

operatives

n

the

field

than

as a

complexprocess

of

multipleorganiza-

tions within

multiple

networks

debating

options,

exchanging

nformation,

nd

negotiating

which ac-

tions to take.Having he rightorganizationsn the

relevantnetworks nd

ensuring

ontinuous

communi-

cationflowswithin and

among

these

networkshave

been shown to

be

crucial o effective

risis

handling

(Comfort

and Cahill

1988;

Garnett

1992;

Rosenthal

and Kouzmin

1997;

Wise

2002).

Network

stability

has been linkedto crisis

management

ffectiveness.

Communication

low can

be

uncontrolled,

ometimes

reducing

network

ffectiveness,

nd

more communi-

cationvolume

does

not

necessarily

qual mproved

communication,

specially

f

it lacks

order

Drabek

et al.

1981).

During

Katrina,

he lackof a

working

commandand

control

systemplaced

extra

dependence

n

interorga-

nizational

networking

o share nformation nd

coop-

erate

on

preparedness,

esponse,

nd

recovery.

Anotherof the

tragedies

f Katrina amewhen inter-

organizational

etworking

ailed

o rise to the occa-

sion. Federal

agencies

were

too

seldom

on the same

page-even agencies

within the same

department,

such as

FEMA

and

the HSOC. Partof this stemmed

from

technological

ailure,but,

as discussed

arlier,

t

also stemmed

rom

differences

n

organizational

ul-

ture

and

lack of trust hat surfaced

eforeKatrina

ad


*

December 2007 * Special Issue



12/19

even

formed.

The

feds

and Louisiana uthorities ften

squabbled

federal

elations

with

Mississippi

were

better),

and

municipalities

wereoftenleft to

go

their

own

way,

as

they

did

in

evacuating

eople

outside

New Orleanson their

own

timetables nstead

of ac-

cording

o the

approved lan.

Eventhe U.S. Coast

Guard,

often

given

high

marks or its

rescue

opera-

tions,

slipped

on

interorganizational

ooperation.

According

o

Cooper

and

Block,

"Throughout

he

disaster,

tateandfederal

agencies

worked

ndepen-

dently,

under

heirown

initiative,

ometimes

at cross-

purposes.

The Coast Guardwasone of the worst

offenders:

FEMA

officials

would later

ay

the

agency

[CoastGuard]

did

almost

nothing

to

keep

other

units

up

to

speed

on

its

activities"

2006, 230).

Several

dvantages

f

interorganizationaletworking

for

handling

criseshavebeen noted. Because f the

multiple

sets of actorswith

multipleorganizational

perspectives

nd

interests,

heriskof the

faulty,

ingle-

minded decision

making

hat

is characteristicf

groupthinks reduced Rosenthal,tHart,andKouz-

min

1991).

Relianceon

interorganizational

etworks

canalsomakecrisiscommunicationmore

open.

By

involving

moreactors-even more sets

of

actors-in

crisis

handling,

he

ability

o

keep

a

tight

lid on crisis

deliberations nd interactions

ecomesmore

problem-

atic.

If

some

organizations

ail to

perform

as

expected

within the networks-whether

intentionally

r unin-

tentionally-other

organizational

ctors

end

to ar-

ticulatedissatisfactionither o the

offending

organization,

o the mass

media,

or

both.

Thus,

mul-

tiple organizational

ctors

can

serve

as

checksand

balanceswithin the crisis

management

rocess,

both

in termsof performancendaccountability/transpar-

ency.

Because f these

strengths, nterorganizational

networking

as been found to be more

appropriate

or

tackling

"wicked"

problems

Harmon

and

Mayer

1986),

that

is,

problems

o

complex

and

messy

hat

theydefy permanent

olutionsand

require emporary

resolution.

During

Katrina,

ther

players

teppedup

to

the

plate.

State-to-state

cooperationhelped

illsome of the void

left

by

federal naction

(U.S.

Senate

2006).

Texas ent

significant

evelsof

emergency esponders, upplies,

and

equipment

o Louisiana nd

promptlypaved

he

way

forevacuees n Houston'sAstrodomeandother

places.

Florida,

with its

highly developed

mergency

management

apability eared specially

owardhur-

ricanes,

helpedMississippi

n

similar

ways.

Rescue

and

relief

personnel, upplies,

and

equipment

also

poured

in

from other

states

and

localities,

and

businesses

nd

voluntary rganizations

lso

helped.

The

role of Wal-

Mart

as

a

logistical upplier

of

water,

generators,

nd

otherneeded

tems has been

recognized,

n

addition

to the

invaluable

elp

received rom

churches,

ivic

organizations,

ndotherefforts.

Operation

Brother's

Keeper,

or

example,

used several

hundred hurches o

evacuate

parishioners,

many

of

whom

may

havebeen

left behind.Much of this

help,

though

valiant,

acked

the

integration

nd coordination

expected

of interor-

ganizational

etworks.

Key

imitationsof the

interorganizationaletworking

perspective

ave also been noted.

With so

many

orga-

nizational ctors

n

multiple

organizational

ets

or

networks,

he

probability

f information

slippage

or

blockage

s increased

Garnett

andKouzmin

1999;

Rosenthal,

t

Hart,

and Kouzmin

1991).

Unless

net-

work channelsare

planned

horoughly-and

perhaps

creatively-withholding

of

information

by

one

orga-

nizationcan

cause

disruption

n the

communication

flow

among

othernetworks r

singleorganizations

that need to act on the basisof thatinformation.The

tendency

or information

o

become

distortedas it

passes hroughmultiple

evelsandunitshas also been

documented

Downs

1967;

Garnett

1992).

In

addition o

disruptions

r distortions

n

informa-

tion flow,anotherkeyissueforinternational risis

handling

nvolves rust.

According

o Comfortand

Cahill,

"In

environments f

high

uncertainty,

his

quality

of

interpersonal

rust s essential

or

collective

action.

Building

hat trust

n

a

multiorganizational

operating

nvironment s

a

complexprocess,

perhaps

the most difficult ask n

creating

n

emergency

man-

agement

ystem"

1988, 184).

Differences

n

values,

allegiance,

nd even

language

e.g.,

jargon)

can com-

plicate

communication

among

civilian,

paramilitary,

and

military

organizations;

outine

and

emergency

response rganizations;

ndeven thecentral

head-

quarters

nd local units of the same

organization

(Garnettand Kouzmin1999; Rosenthal,tHart,and

Kouzmin

1991).

During

a

crisis,

uch

differences ave

"been

known to

trigger

onflicts

between

communal

and official

relief

effortsas well as

true

bureaucratic

battlesbetween he

good

Samaritans

f various om-

peting

rescueand relief

organizations"

Rosenthal

nd

Kouzmin

1997,

6).

Key

problems

within this lens

includethe

tendency

for

organizationalompetition

and

the

maintenance

of

intelligence

n the

face of sometimes

dysfunctional

competition.

Dysfunctional

ompetitionamong orga-

nizationsarises

becauseof

competinggoals

(Lewis

1988;RomzekandDubnick

1987)

or

organizational

rivalries

Rosenthal

nd

Kouzmin

1997).

Interorgani-

zationaldistrustand

rivalry

bounded

among

Katrina

actors.

Some

officials

withinFEMA

considered ocal

emergencymanagers

o

be

unsophisticated

nd even

called

hem

"goobers,"

ften

treating

hem with

dis-

dain

or

indifference

(Cooper

and Block

2006,

73).

In

the

other

direction,

Louisiana

overnor

Kathleen

Babineaux

Blanco

and

ot

garnett competing and complementary conceptual lenses on crisis communication

Documents