galileo military benefits

An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo SystemION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon USA

James Hasik, ConsultantMichael Rip, Michigan State University

ABSTRACT

The US government has publicly and privately expressed concern that the planned Galileo navigation satellite system will adversely effect the integrity of its own Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), and has also questioned the need for a system that appears superficially to duplicate its functions. Despite this concern, Galileo will resolve unfulfilled military needs in four areas: greater availability in northern latitudes, logistical automation through greater integrity, greater accuracy for all navigation satellite services through somewhat friendly competition, and greater availability in urban areas. This last advantage is perhaps the most important in light of the campaigns and operations in which NATO forces [1] may find themselves embroiled in the future. Discounting Galileo's potential for generating revenues, forgoing the system could free money for significant investments in other military hardware. Determining which would be more valuable is a difficult exercise in policy analysis, but the advantages of other systems are not overwhelming for European defense. Thus, apart from some lingering questions about the security arrangements for Galileo's Public Regulated Service (PRS), the US government's hitherto disdain for Galileo may be misplaced.

DUPLICATION OR ENHANCEMENT?

The 30-satellite Galileo system will, if brought to fruition, be the most technically

sophisticated and costly European space initiative to date. The system's technical features

may (as advertised) exceed those of the vaunted Navstar Global Positioning System

(GPS). Indeed, interest within the EU ostensibly comes from many features of Galileo: its

enhanced accuracy, its increased signal strength, and its contribution to the worldwide

COSPAS-SARSAT seach-and-rescue (SAR) program. For example, SAR monitoring

payloads on Galileo satellites and ancillary data streams in its message structure will

provide integrity messages, distress acknowledgements, SAR co-ordination messages,

weather alerts, and accident warnings. [2] This represents a considerable advance on

current capabilities.

However, while valuable and life-saving, features as these do not often translate into

multi-billion euro projects on their own. Rather, the most frequently cited explanation for

Galileo is to foster competition in the market for satellite navigation services by breaking

the effective monopoly that Navstar currently holds. This is an odd argument, as there is

not much market for satellite navigation services—the dominant product is already free.

[After all, while there are still a few businesses selling unique Internet browser software,

few are entering the industry intent on making large sums of money.] From the

perspective of the US government, intent on encouraging greater and more effective arms

spending in Europe, Galileo is a frustrating priority. In the words of Frank Kramer, a

former US assistant secretary of defense, it is difficult to understand how European

members of NATO could spend "money duplicating a system when so many other needs

exist". This and concern over possible interference between Galileo signals and those of

the new GPS M-code have caused consternation in Washington, and prompted concerned

letters from sources as high as Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense. [3]

Many of the more cynical North Americans expect that enthusiasm is strongest for

page 2 The Military Benefits of the Galileo System • Hasik & Rip • ION GPS 2002 • 25 September • Portland, Oregon

Combined Anglo-Franco-US naval task force in the Indian Ocean supporting the campaign in Afghanistan, spring 2002.

Photograph courtesy of the US Navy

All military procurement choices taken within the context of an alliance combine aspects of duplication and enhancement of

one’s allies’ capabilities. Too much duplication is wasteful; too much enhancement leaves one vulnerable to the cooperative

behavior of those allies. NATO aircraft carrier fleet provides an useful analogy. Even if the Charles de Gaule and HMS

Invincible have fraction of the fire power of the US carriers pictured above, the US carriers are not always available all

British and French national purposes.

Artwork on the cover by J. Huart provided courtesy of the European Space Agency

Galileo's potential as a job creation program for European electronics engineers and as a

impetus for preserving the market positions of firms like Nokia, Thales, and Alenia.

ALTERNATE MEANS OF GUIDANCE

Concern in Washington may stem from Washington's pending loss of control. Galileo will

provide the governments of the EU member states with an extremely accurate satellite

navigation system not subject to the operational control of the United States Air Force.

This clearly has strategic advantages for the defense establishments of the EU member

states. [We do not say the EU's defense establishment, as it is still unclear what military

role that organization will eventually adopt.] As stated by the EU Directorate for

Transport and Energy, "if the Galileo program is abandoned, (Europe) will, in the next 20

to 30 years, lose (its) autonomy in defense." [4] Since virtually every new weapon system

and platform is incorporating satellite navigation technology, most new military products

larger than small arms will depend on reliable overhead guidance in some way.

Armaments manufacturers in EU member states will want to be able to sell precision

guided weapons overseas without asking US permission for the PPS. Also, the overlay of

the Galileo PRS signal atop the GPS L1 signal will greatly complicate US efforts to jam

Galileo signals without affective GPS service, because the US would have great difficulty

jamming any signal that sits atop one that they themselves want to use. [5] For these

reasons, building the Galileo navigation system is a very effective way of raising the

marketability of European-built weapons systems.

THE SUEZ SCENARIO

However, it should be noted that Galileo will not necessarily 'liberate' European countries

from reliance on a non-national authority for satellite navigation. The national

governments of France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the rest of the EU member states will

not, of their own accords, control Galileo. While "the European Parliament recently voted

to ask the EU/ESA Joint Undertaking on Galileo not to exclude the possibility for

European military forces to use Galileo in the context of peace-keeping operations," [6] it


A USAF Predator drone of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron comes in to land, and a French Army Piver drone

of the 7th Artillery Regiment lifts off. Photographs courtesy of the USAF and the Armée de Terre.

Not all modern weapons systems carry satellite navigation receivers: the Piver drone above navigates with an inertial

system, a Doppler radar, and an altimeter. It is rather inconceivable, however, that a similar system would be

built today without satellite navigation capability.

is unclear whether the European Commission, the European Parliament, or the national

governments themselves would indefinitely look the other way at all questionable uses of

Galileo. London and Paris might wonder what would happen if the Commission in

Brussels disapproved of a British or French expedition overseas—one that used the

encrypted signals of the PRS to restore order on their terms. Even countries like Belgium

(in the Congo) or Spain (in Morocco) have reasons for military activities outside the

bounds of the EU. Furthermore, the possibility of war between Greece (a NATO and EU

member) and Turkey (a current NATO member, and possible future EU member) raises

questions about how the ESA and the EU would react. Scenarios as these have not been

adequately analyzed, largely because the EU has not had to contend to date with

international but inter alia strife as this.

ADVANTAGES OF GALILEO

While these scenarios seem a bit far-fetched, a loss of GPS access probably is as well. As

dependent as civil transportation has become today on the proper functioning of GPS, it

is likely that only a drastic emergency could lead the US government to interfere with

GPS C/A code signals. Furthermore, expanded opportunities for arms sales may or may

not enhance Europe's military security, but they do not, eo ipso, fulfill military

requirements. For the purposes of this analysis, the relevant question is how Galileo will,

on the margin, conquer practical military guidance problems that yet evade solutions. We

see four main military advantages to the deployment of the Galileo constellation, which

we describe below in increasing order of importance.

Greater availability in northern latitudes. Improved access in polar regions will

unquestionably benefit civil air navigation, particularly on long-haul flights between

Europe and the western Pacific Rim. Polar areas today are mostly for aerial transit from

North America to Russia and Central Asia and from Europe to the Far East. Enhanced

availability would also enable military aircraft to travel with closer safe separations and

with less aircrew attention to navigation. Still, while one should not completely discount

the value of polar navigation to military forces, it would be far more interesting if NATO


USS Hawkbill breaking through the ice at the North Pole. Photograph courtesy of the US Navy

While Galileo’s greater coverage in northern latitudes will be commercially valuable to Swedes and Finns, its military value

would have been considerably greater during the Cold War.

were still expecting to fight the Russians over the North Cape of Norway.

Pushing GPS competitively for greater accuracy. As Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz

claims, plans are already being laid to enhance the accuracy of GPS to match that planned

for Galileo. Indeed, the history of GPS throughout the 1990s has been one of ever

increasing accuracy as USAF engineers and their contractors worked continuously to

improve the system. GPS modernization will replace all satellites with Block II-R

versions, which should render the accuracy of the Standard Positioning Service (SPS)

even more impressive than today's performance, which is already on the order of but a

few meters. If this is so, one might then ask how Galileo would be useful on the margin.

The answer is the competition that Galileo enthusiasts cite, albeit vaguely, in official

justifications for the program. The Pentagon will not stand to have a significantly less

accurate global navigation system than another available outside the United States. The

Galileo PRS is advertised to be eventually just that, and the security arrangements have

not added to the Pentagon's level of comfort. While the PRS is to be limited to the

military, police, firefighting, customs, and rescue forces of EU members and other

participating states, opponents of the US could, it is feared, eventually hack into the PRS

for better accuracy than that available to US forces. [7] Thus, whether from GPS or

Galileo, significantly improved accuracy is on order for NATO military forces.

This accuracy will be valuable in many ways. Some of the leading ones include:

• Increased lethality against hard targets. By decreasing the CEP in aerial

bombardment, coordinate attack weapons will derive increased lethality against

hardened point targets. The rather loose CEPs of GPS-guided weapons in the 1990s

meant that targets like command and control bunkers and ammunition storage igloos

required the use of laser- or televisually-guided weapons, which exposed aircrews to

increased danger as they loitered in the target area, their attention focused on the

business at hand. GPS and Galileo-guided weapons are, of course, launch-and-leave

(or, fire-and-forget) weapons whose use considerably increases survivability. Use of

GPS and Galileo-guided weapons under this regime of increased accuracy will,


A tank of the Vojska Republika Srpska being struck by a NATO 450-kilogramme laser-guided bomb,

September 1995. Video frames courtesy of NATO.

Ever increasing accuracy by global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) means that considerably smaller

weapons can be used to destroy the same targets. Increasing integrity means greater safeguards against collateral damage. Both of these trends are reinforced

by a competitive environment in GNSS development and refinement.

however, require increased attention to the selection of target coordinates down to

the metre level. This may require additional effort at target reconnaissance activities,

which could be costly. Finally, weapon accuracy, it is well-known, is a function of

more than simply navigation system accuracy. As other factors in the

equation—chiefly target location error—conspire to confound the excellence of the

GPS/Galileo guidance, improved accuracy from the constellation may already be

reaching the point of diminishing marginal returns—unless the considerable

improvements are made in target intelligence. [We discuss this further below.]

• Increased lethality per strike aircraft. Coordinate attack weapons also offer

adverse weather capability that laser- and televisually-guided weapons do not, so a

wider range of targets will be at risk during times of heavy cloud cover. Target

obscuration was a significant problem in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in the 1995

Bosnia Campaign, and in the 1999 Kosovo War. With renewed interest in using at

least small parties of ground troops to spot for the aviators, and the recent

demonstration in Afghanistan of the suitability of coordinate attack weapons for close

air support, the ability to drop large numbers of precision weapons through the

clouds is quite attractive. Also, while weapons in the 450-kilogram (kg) class and

above already have considerable lethality against hard targets, a considerable increase

in accuracy (coupled with improvements underway in the energy of explosive fills)

may offer their capabilities to weapons in the 225-kg class or less. This will increase

by a quantum factor (or more) the number of weapons that a bomber or fighter-

bomber can carry, which will increase considerably the number of targets that can be

attacked per sortie. Lethality will thus dramatically improve without any other

modifications to airframes (assuming that the aircraft have a sufficient number of

connections in their avionics to communicate with all those weapons). However, it

will pose the same target data collection challenges noted in the preceding paragraph,

and the same problem of diminishing returns from satellite guidance accuracy.

• Mine and obstacle clearance. Whether under combat conditions or simply after

the fighting is over, clearing the battlefield of ordnance and obstacles is dangerous


A munitions technician readies 900-kilogramme GPS-guided bombs for loading onto a B-2 bomber at Whiteman Air Force

Base in Missouri. Photograph courtesy of the US Air Force.

The Pentagon’s original accuracy requirement for GPS-guided bombs was that any given round should have a 50% probability of landing with 13 metres of its target. Increasing accuracy means increasing lethality per strike aircraft. With

the sort of accuracy offered by the next generation of GNSS, a B-2 bomber could theoretically carry up to 84 GPS-guided 225-kilogramme weapons, and expect to destroy targets all day. At that point, the limitation on operations could be the

length of time that a stealth aircraft wishes to spend with its bomb bay doors open.

and time-consuming. Metre-level accuracy will help mine clearing teams locate and

mark their quarry with considerable confidence, speeding their work without

increasing their risks. With millions of mines scattered and forgotten throughout the

world, the value of the PRS to civilian clearance teams should not be underestimated.

In the more martial realm, naval commandos marking assault lanes and clearing

beaches for amphibious attacks will be able to provide boat crews with considerably

greater confidence with meter-grade coordinates. As the US Marines and SEALs plan

how to seize Al-Faw and Basra, the value of this increased accuracy is apparent.

Logistical automation through greater integrity. GPS does not yet handle many

aspects of civil air navigation in which safety is immediate and critical. This is because it

was designed for a less stringent range of military navigational problems, and because it

occasionally suffers unpredictable outages over considerable areas. [8] Problems with a

single system could, in theory, be safely ignored on dual GPS-Galileo receivers. As

Galileo's proponents are quick to note, this will cut the cost of transportation in a wide

variety of ways. In the maritime environment, Galileo's enhanced integrity (combined

with automated warning systems) may allow for one-man operation of cargo ships—even

automated moorings at piers. Galileo could make large-scale automation of military

logistics operations through cooperative navigation by platoons of unmanned ground

vehicles (UGVs). This will lower the cost of logistics, which will be very important in

facilitating significant military operations outside the NATO areas. Of course, since

systems like these represent a considerable rethinking of the way that operations are

currently conducted, their advent may be some time in the future.

Greater availability in urban areas. This last selling point of Galileo is probably its

greatest near term benefit to military forces. The combined GPS and Galileo

constellations of 57 satellites will provide four-satellite availability of 95% in dense urban

areas. The current performance of GPS in the most built-up cities is 55%—not a figure on

which one would want to rely in combat. [9] While the potential for logistical automation

is perhaps a ways off, greater signal availability in urban areas will still be valuable as

soon as the Galileo constellation is fully functional.


US Army Rangers in Mogadishu, 1993; and a notional Galileo-enabled wireless communicator.

Photographs courtesy of the Philadelphia Enquirer

and the ESA.

Unfamiliar cities can be bewildering places on the

first visit, particularly under sniper fire. GNSS systems

of Galileo’s planned accuracy may redress this

class of problem by helping automate some of the more dangerous tasks

in military logistics and communications

Urban warfare has been unappealing in the West because it invariably accelerates

casualties. In its 1994 assault on Grozny, the Russian Army suffered over 2,000 killed and

10,000 wounded before giving up. In its 1998 reprise of the attack, the Army decided to

destroy much of the city with artillery fire and aerial bombs before rooting the Chechen

rebels out of the rubble. In Bosnia in 1995, Serb commanders chose an extended siege of

Sarajevo to an assault on the city for two reasons: the narrow streets of the old city were

ideal for a house-to-house defense, and their own infantry lacked the morale and training

required for close quarters fighting. Consequently, their artillery was required to do all

the work, and with spectacular damage, but without any politically useful results.

Indeed, urban fighting is ugly, and many potential opponents know this. Today, one of

the greatest impediments to a quick and decisive conquest of Iraq is the possibility that

Iraqi forces will hole up in Mesopotamian cities, avoiding an easy, open-desert roll-up,

and hurl chemical weapons at US and UK forces from behind the shield of a large civilian

population. Once in the cities, tasks that might be quite simple elsewhere suddenly

become quite difficult. As one marketing brochure recently described the commercial

analog to the problem, "just take an engineer on a fault-find: to-the-nearest-metre tasks

such as locating manhole covers can be time-consuming when you've got to scour up to

30 square metres in a busy city." [10] Doing this under sniper fire is even less appealing.

Troops very easily get lost in the confusion of unfamiliar streets and undistinguishable

buildings, and recent exercises have only confirmed past experience in this regard. [11]

On the other hand, to cite another civilian analog, "any system precise enough to lead a

blind person to an unfamiliar doorway could just as accurately steer a Galileo-guided

weapon through the door." [12] This sort of accuracy—guidance to the correct door—is the

issue in applying remote, precision technologies in cities—places with lots of doors and

unfriendly things hiding behind them. The combined GPS and Galileo constellations

could improve enhance military capabilities in urban areas in at least two ways:

• Fire support. In 1993, US Rangers deployed infrared strobe beacons in the streets


Somali technical vehicle, 1998. Photograph courtesy of the Philadelphia Enquirer.

Galileo’s greatest military benefit will arguably be in urban operations. With the increased accuracy and availability

possible from a combined constellation of 57 or more GPS and Galileo satellites, difficult targets as these (surrounded

by non-combattants) could be held at risk with autonomous, indirect fire weaponry.

of Mogadishu to mark their own positions and those of their opponents in the Habr

Gidr clan for attacks by AH-6 Little Bird helicopter gunships. [13] This was

accomplished at considerable risk to the Rangers, as some beacons had to placed in

the middle of streets or on enemy-occupied buildings. While precision was not quite

the goal of the gunship pilots on their strafing runs, civilian casualties might be a

more pressing consideration in the next urban engagement. While the sensor systems

on aircraft like the AC-130 Spectre and Spooky fixed-wing gunships can target a

single window, or the corner of a room, this requires direct visual observation and

relatively unthreatening enemy air defenses. Further, gunship aircraft do run out of

ammunition (as they did frequently over Mogadishu), and are not always available

overhead. It also assumes that the aircrews know through which window to shoot. As

we note below, this is entirely another matter.

Assuming that those problems can be resolved, 95% availability from GPS and Galileo

satellites could be used for guiding precision guided mortar rounds, howitzer shells,

and rockets into exactly the right room of a building. Fire support could be

requested—at least in extremis—on positions that would now be considered

imprudently close to friendly troops, because those troops would be able to mark

their own positions with extreme accuracy. This does, in many cases, assume that the

GPS/Galileo receivers on the weapons can be sufficiently jam-proofed to preclude

easy interdiction. This may be difficult for a round sitting in the barrel of a artillery

tube. It may be less difficult for a rocket whose nose cone or tail fins (where one

would presumably place its receiver) could be exposed even part of the sky. With

access to a single satellite and GPS or Galileo timation, additional satellites are much

easier to acquire. This approach mimics the pre-launch tracking of satellites that was

tested with AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOWs) under the wings of F-16 and

F-18 strike aircraft.

• Close-quarters coordination of unmanned systems. The aforementioned

advantages of Galileo for operation of UGV fleets and activities like mineclearing

might be most useful in urban areas. Enhanced accuracy and availability in urban


Formerly secret US military planning slide produced for the attack on the Yugoslav Federal Directorate of Supply and

Procurement. The building annotated in the satellite photograph was heavily damaged on 7 May 1999 by five GBU-32 GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped

by B-2 bombers (not the GBU-27 laser-guided bombs described on the slide). Regardless, the building was actually

the mainland Chinese Embassy. A series of targeting errors had led analysts to misinterpret the imagery.

The great but self-limiting advantage of coordinate attack systems is their ability to seek out targets based solely on their

locations. While this keeps friendly forces high above ground fire, it also creates an enormous intelligence collection and

analysis burden associated with producing the extremely accurate targeting intelligence that these weapons require.

areas could make possible the deployment of convoys of self-following autonomous

trucks—of perhaps widely varying sizes—for maintaining physical communications

with foot soldiers in difficult situations. Truck columns were sent to retrieve US

Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993 and to resupply Russian infantry in Grozny in 1994;

both were shot up rather badly in the narrow streets. One solution has been the

suggestion of armed and armored supply vehicles. Another one—perhaps less costly

in the long run—might be to remove the men from a task that does not require their

direct presence.

The problem with this theorizing about paper systems is that it assumes not just highly

precise and reliable guidance, but highly accurate maps of the cities in question, three-

dimensional computer models for predicting periods of GPS + Galileo shadowing by city

block, and (of course) sensor-based navigation systems for detecting and avoiding

obstacles (like chunks of buildings that have landed in the middle of the street). Making

use of systems and products as these will require considerable ability in software

integration, data warehousing, and automated intelligence systems. These are not

uncomplicated things, and to date, they have not been things on which European military

forces have spent money at the same rate that the Pentagon has. The Pentagon, after all,

probably spends at least as much each year on intelligence as most European countries

spend on all their military procurement.

SO WHAT ELSE WOULD THIS BUY?

If we discount for the moment the intelligence support requirements, the military utility

of Galileo is considerable. However, Galileo's costs, while not exorbitant, are considerable

as well. The development, deployment, and first 30 years of operation of Galileo are

expected to cost some €9800 million. This figure includes €3200 million to build and

deploy the 30 satellite constellation and its control infrastructure, and an additional

€6600 million to sustain the system over time (at €220 million annually). Supporters of

Galileo like to note that the construction costs will be less than those of the Brenner-Basis

Tunnel under the Alps or the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden.


Costs of Galileo vs. Costs of an A400M wingCosts of Galileo vs. Costs of an A400M wingCosts of Galileo vs. Costs of an A400M wingCosts of Galileo vs. Costs of an A400M wingInitial Cost 30-year cost Total cost

30 Galileo SVs ¤3200 MM ¤6600 MM ¤9800 MM36 A400Ms ¤2800 MM ¤7200 MM ¤10800 MM

Above: artist’s conception of Airbus A400M airlifters loading armored cars, courtesy of Airbus.

It is useful to consider the Galileo system’s military benefits in the context of the other large, pan-European aerospace development

effort underway. Forgoing the Galileo project would enable European countries to purchase and operation a wing of 36

A400M airlifters—a considerable, but not overwhelming number.

Cost data for the satellites and the airlifters were provided by the ESA and Airbus, respectively. This comparison does not consider

the potential economic benefits of the project. The two cost streams are roughly equivalent in net present value terms at a discount rate of 4.65%, which is arguably reasonable for long-

term governmental projects as these.

In military terms, this would also purchase a wing of 36 A400M airlifters. This assumes a

procurement cost per aircraft of €80 million, an additional 30 year life cycle cost of €200

million, and a constant discount rate of approximately 4.65%. [14] This small fleet could

fly a battalion group of infantry, armored cars, and even medium-lift helicopters and

Patriot missile launchers about 2000 nautical miles from Europe, and then resupply and

reinforce it over time. This is not an inconsiderable force to project, especially for multi-

national peacekeeping operations, but it should be considered in the context of the rest of

the force projection projects that European armed forces have in mind. Further, the

marginal value of 36 A400Ms should be considered in light of the current pan-European

intent to procure 196 of these aircraft. More than €3200 million might be required to

purchase a new aircraft carrier for a European navy, but that sum would not buy many

strike aircraft to occupy its decks. Further, we must reiterate that musings as these do

presume that Galileo will earn little money from value-added services and possible

chipset licensing. Any revenues that defray expenses will be more than those expected

from wholly military procurements.

A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT

We should admit that Galileo, like GPS, will be available worldwide, and that keeping its

signals beyond the use of unfriendly forces will be quite difficult. The Galileo PRS will not

be as secure as the GPS PPS, at least not if one is handing cryptographic gear to

ambulance drivers. Therefore, military forces may wish to consider employing receivers

that make use of GPS and Galileo signals, but that lend more weight to GPS solutions in

sitiuations where each single-constellation solution diverges significantly from the other.

[15] However, while the PRS might constitute the most valuable signal, any Galileo (or

more accurate GPS SPS) signal will offer considerable navigation capabilities to enemies

of US and the EU as well. Jamming of GPS and Galileo frequencies away from those

carrying the P-code, the M-code, and the PRS will still be possible, and possibly advisable

under some emergency conditions. The real advantage to NATO (and other EU) forces

comes from their (hopefully) superior communications, organization, and training, that


Artist’s conception of the proposed Net Fires solution—the “rockets in a box” solution for replacing US artillery—courtesy of

the Lockheed Martin Corporation.

Washington has reason to get “transformationally” enthused about the military potential of the Galileo system. In addition to

improving GNSS service for US forces, particularly in cities—the most difficult places to fight today—Galileo could provide impetus for European military transformation by spurring the development

of precision weapons and advanced intelligence systems

will permit them to make far better use of the extreme accuracy provided by Galileo and

tomorrow's enhanced GPS. That said, we would advise the US federal government to

stand down from its recent criticism of the Galileo undertaking for two broad reasons:

• Improved positioning for US forces. Assuming that Galileo's security issues can

be addressed, its accuracy and availability (in conjunction with the existing GPS

signal) will remedy deficiencies in critical requirements, especially in urban

operations, which are among the most challenging environments today. This will

benefit US, Canadian, and other forces as much as it benefits European ones.

• Impetus for the European military transformation. Next, the technical and

systems integration requirements for taking advantage of the capabilities Galileo

promises are considerable. These include substantial investments in reconnaissance,

surveillance, secure communications, and intelligence processing. Someday a

European 'strategic corporal' fighting a 'three block war' far from Europe may want

to make use of Galileo's ability to help him locate the right manhole cover on a dark

and stormy night. If his headquarters were unable to provide him instantly the exact

location of that cover, and a briefing on its significance to his mission, Galileo's

accuracy will either be for naught—or will be exploited only by US forces. The

construction of the Galileo system by the EU and ESA civil authorities is thus a

challenge to which European military authorities need to respond. If Galileo provides

the technical impetus that drags European forces into revolutionary military

transformation, then the United States will found its way to transatlantic burden-

sharing paved through Brussels.

While Washington may wish for greater European military spending in other areas, the

Galileo system is rapidly becoming a reality. Thus, with the advantages it offers, the US

government needs to begin searching for ways to exploit Galileo rather than ways to

complain about it.


About the Authors

James Hasik holds an MBA from the University of Chicago in finance and business economics, and a BA

from Duke University in history and physics. A former US Navy officer, he toured the Persian Gulf about the

helicopter carrier USS Saipan in the early 1990s. Since leaving the military he has been a mangement consultant to a variety of commercial and governmental entities. His

government clients have included the US Air Force, the US Navy, and the Defense Science Board, which he has

advised on the financial and technological aspects of weapons acquisition. He has also been a consultant for

Global 2000 companies in procurement, logistics, strategic planning, experimental economics, and marketing.

Michael Rip holds a BS from the University of Cape Town (UCT) in geography with a specialty in satellite remote sensing and digital image processing, an MS from the

UCT Medical School in community health, and a PhD from Michigan State University (MSU) in medical geography

and epidemiology. He currently holds a joint appointment at James Madison College and the College of Human

Medicine at MSU.

Michael Rip and James Hasik are together the authors ofThe Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial

Warfare (Naval Institute Press, 2002), and the forthcoming Just a Little Bombing: NATO’s Balkan Wars

and the Question of Military Transformation.

NOTES

1. We say NATO forces, not EU forces, since it is yet unclear what sort of military structure the European Union might adopt. We also have doubts that those few member states of the EU that are not members of at least NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) might undertake significant military operations outside Europe. While the Irish Republic, for example, does occasionally send peacekeeping troops abroad as part of UN missions, these again do not constitute EU activities.

2. J. Benedicto, S.E. Dinwiddy, G. Gatti, R. Lucas, & M. Lugert, ‘Galileo: Satellite System Design and Technology Developments,’ European Space Agency, November 2000.

3. ‘US Warns EU About Galileo's Possible Military Conflicts,’ Agence France-Presse, 18 Dec 2001. Quotes El País (Madrid), 18 December 2001.

4. ‘Galileo: An Imperative for Europe,’ EU Directorate for Transport and Energy, position paper, 31 December 2001.

5. Dee Ann Davis, ‘Military Role Emerges for Galileo,’ GPS World, 1 May 2002.

6. Pascale Campagne, ‘Galileo and Security,’ Galileo's World, 1 June 2002.

7. Vidal Ashkenazi, ‘Galileo: Friend of Foe?,’ briefing to the Interagency GPS Executive Board, Washington DC, 28 February 2002.

8. Instances include the faulty navigation message data on SVN35 in 1997, the 18 minutes of service disruption over Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska in 2000, and the satellite clock error on SVN22 in 2001.

9. Dr. Sally Howes, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis for Galileo,’ US/UN Conference on the Use and Applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Vienna, Austria, 28 November 2001.

10. Comment by Steve Denison, Managing Director, APD Communications.

11. Greg Jaffe, ‘Street Smarts: As Threats Evolve, Marines Learn Skill of Combat in Cities,’ The Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2002, p. A9.

12. Rick Skinner, ‘Galileo and GPS–Competitors or Complements,’ speech to the Centre français sur les États-Unis, 5 April 2002, p. 4

13. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, Penguin Books, 1999.

14. Cost data for Galileo and the A400M were supplied by the ESA and Airbus, respectively. The figure of 4.65% was a plug to match a whole figure of aircraft with a low rate of interest available for a government-financed project, and seems reasonable.

15. Flt. Lt. David Riddel, RAAF, ‘The Implications of the Proposed Galileo Satellite Navigation System for the Ministry of Defence,’ unpublished paper, Royal Air Force College Cranwell, June 2002.


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