ga state bar handbook

HandbookORGANIZATION OF THE STATE BAR & ADMISSIONS

Part I - Creation & Organization ...................................................................................................... H-2Part V - Amendment & Effective Date .............................................................................................. H-6Bylaws ............................................................................................................................................ H-7Standing Board Policy 100 (Legislative Policy and Procedure) ...................................................... H-14Standing Board Policy 200 (Annual Statement of Revenue) ........................................................... H-16Standing Board Policy 300 (Board Attendance Policy) ................................................................... H-16Standing Board Policy 400 (Retired Board Members)..................................................................... H-16Standing Board Policy 500 (Special Masters) ................................................................................. H-16Standing Board Policy 600 (Conflicts of Interest) ............................................................................ H-16Standing Board Policy 700 (Document Handling and Disclosure) .................................................. H-17Standing Board Policy 800 (Confidentiality) .................................................................................... H-17Standing Board Policy 900 (Whistleblower Non-Retaliation) ........................................................... H-17Standing Executive Committee Policy 100 (Amicus Brief Policy) ................................................... H-18Standing Executive Committee Policy 200 (Use of State Bar Letterhead) ..................................... H-18Standing Executive Committee Policy 300 (Board At-Large Appointments) ................................... H-18Standing Executive Committee Policy 400 (Appointments to the Bench and Bar Committee) ....... H-18Standing Executive Committee Policy 500 (Fax and E-mail Policy) ............................................... H-18Standing Executive Committee Policy 600 (Establishment of Website) .......................................... H-19Standing Executive Committee Policy 700 (Use of Copyrighted Materials) .................................... H-19Standing Executive Committee Policy 800 (Casemaker Policy) ..................................................... H-19Young Lawyers Division Bylaws ...................................................................................................... H-19Part II - Admission to the Bar........................................................................................................... H-24

ETHICS & DISCIPLINE Part III - Reserved ............................................................................................................................ H-24Part IV - Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct ............................................................................ H-25Internal Rules - Investigative Panel ................................................................................................. H-69Internal Rules - Review Panel ......................................................................................................... H-71Internal Rules - Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board ..................................................................... H-72Advisory Opinions

Internal Rules - Formal Advisory Opinion Board ........................................................................ H-74Topical Index .............................................................................................................................. H-74Question Presented Index .......................................................................................................... H-81Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct Index ........................................................................... H-83Issued Opinions .......................................................................................................................... H-85

STATE BAR PROGRAMS Part VI - Fee Arbitration .................................................................................................................. H-137Part VII - Lawyer Assistance Program ............................................................................................ H-140Part VIII - Continuing Lawyer Competency .................................................................................... H-141Part IX - Professionalism ................................................................................................................ H-147A Lawyer’s Creed............................................................................................................................ H-148Aspirational Statements .................................................................................................................. H-148Part X - Clients’ Security Fund ....................................................................................................... H-149Part XI - Law Practice Management ............................................................................................... H-150Part XII - Consumer Assistance Program ....................................................................................... H-151Part XIII - Judicial District Professionalism Program ...................................................................... H-151

JDPP Internal Operating Procedures ........................................................................................ H-152Part XIV - Rules Governing the Investigation and Prosecution of the Unlicensed Practice of Law ................................................................................................ H-153

JUDICIAL Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct .................................................................................................. H-159

INDEXMaster Index ................................................................................................................................... H-167

Please Note:The State Bar of Georgia Handbook is available online at http://www.gabar.org/handbook/ and is updated as changes occur to ensure it contains the most current information on rules and policies. It is the official report of the State Bar of Georgia.

PART I CREATION AND ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER 1 CREATION AND ORGANIZATION

Rule 1-101. Creation. PursuanttotheauthorityofthiscourtandtheActoftheGeneralAssemblyapprovedbytheGovernoronMarch11,1963(GeorgiaLaws1963,page70)theStateBarofGeorgiaisherebycreatedandestablished.

Rule 1-102. Powers. TheStateBarofGeorgiashallbealegalentity;maysueandbesued;shallhaveperpetualexistence;maycontract;maypurchase,receive,lease,acquire,own,hold,improve,use,andotherwisedealwithrealandpersonalpropertyandanylegalorequitableinterestinproperty,whereverlocated;maysell,convey,mortgage,pledge,lease,exchange,andotherwisedisposeofalloranypartofitsproperty;mayadoptanduseanofficialseal;shallestablishaprincipaloffice;andshallhavesuchotherpowers,privilegesanddutiesasmaybereasonableandnecessaryfortheproperfulfillmentofitspurposes.

Rule 1-103. Purposes. ThepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbe:

(a)tofosteramongthemembersofthebarofthisStatetheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;

(b)toimprovetheadministrationofjustice;and(c)toadvancethescienceoflaw.

CHAPTER 2 MEMBERSHIP

Rule 1-201. Membership. Allpersonsnoworhereafterwhoare:

(1)authorizedtopracticelawinthisStateor;(2)authorizedtoactasaForeignLegalConsultantshallbe

membersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 1-202. Classes of Members. MembershipintheStateBarofGeorgiashallconsistoffiveclass-es:active,foreignlawconsultant,emeritus,disabledandinactive.Thebylawsshallmakeprovisionfortheregistrationofeachactivememberandthelocationofhisorherprincipalofficeforthepracticeoflaw,theregistrationofeachforeignlawconsultantandthelocationofhisorherprincipaloffice,andtheregistrationofemeritusandinactivemembersandtheirmailingaddresses.

(a)InactiveMembers.Alllawyerswhoareneitherengagedinthepracticeoflawnorholdingthemselvesoutaspracticingattorneysnoroccupyinganypublicorprivatepositioninwhichtheymaybecalledupontogivelegaladviceorcounselortoexaminethelawortopassuponthelegaleffectofanyact,docu-ment,orlawmaybeinactivemembersattheirelection.Memberswhoareinmilitaryservicemaybeinactiveiftheysoelect.

(b)ActiveMembers.Activemembersshallbeallotherlaw-yersincludingjudgesbutexcludingforeignlawconsultants.OnlyactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstandingmayvoteorholdofficeintheStateBarofGeorgia.

(c)ForeignLawConsultants.ForeignLawConsultantsshallbethosepersons,whoarelicensedundertheRulesGoverningAdmissiontothePracticeofLawasadoptedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(d)EmeritusMembers.AnymemberingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoshallhaveattainedtheageof70yearsandwhoshallhavebeenadmittedtothepracticeoflawintheStateofGeorgiafor25years,mayretirefromtheStateBaruponpetitiontoandapprovalbytheExecutiveCommittee.Sucharetiredmembershallholdemeritusstatus.AnemeritusmemberoftheStateBarshallnotberequiredtopayduesorannualfees.Anemeritusmem-beroftheStateBarshallnotbeprivilegedtopracticelawexceptthatanemeritusmembermayhandleprobonocasesreferredbyeitheranorganizedprobonoprogramrecognizedbytheProBonoProjectoftheStateBaroranon-profitcorporationthatdeliverslegalservicestothepoor.AnemeritusmembermaybereinstatedtoactiveorinactivemembershipuponapplicationtotheExecutiveDirectorandpaymentofnon-proratedduesfortheyearinwhichtheemeritusmemberreturnstoactiveorinactiveservice.

(e)DisabledMembers.AnymemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoisfoundtobepermanentlydisabledbytheSocialSecurityAdministrationorisintheprocessofapplyingtotheSocialSecurityAdministrationforsuchstatusmayretirefromtheStateBarofGeorgiauponpetitiontoandapprovalbytheExecutiveCommittee.SuchdisabledmembershallholddisabledstatusandshallannuallyconfirminwritingtotheMembershipDepartmentthisdisabledstatus.AdisabledmemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaholdingdisabledstatusunderthisparagraphshall

notbeprivilegedtopracticelawnorberequiredtopayduesorannualfees.Adisabledmembermaybereinstatedtoactivemem-bershipuponapplicationtotheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 1-203. Practice by Active Members; Nonresidents. NopersonshallpracticelawinthisStateunlesssuchpersonisanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstanding;exceptasprovidedbelow:

(1)ApersonwhoisnotamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,butwhoislicensedtopracticeinastateorstatesotherthanGeorgia,andisingoodstandinginallstatesinwhichsuchpersonislicensed,maybepermittedtoappearinthecourtsofthisstateinisolatedcasesinthediscretionofthejudgeofsuchcourt;or

(2)ApersonwhoisnotamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,butwhoislicensedtopracticeinastateorstatesotherthanGeorgia,andisingoodstandinginallstatesinwhichsuchpersonislicensed,maybepermittedtoappearinthecourtsofthisstateifsuchperson:

(i)isenrolledinafulltimegraduatedegreeprogramatanaccreditedlawschoolinthisstate;and

(ii)isunderthesupervisionofaresidentattorney;and(iii)limitshisorherpracticetotheappearanceinthe

courtsofthisstatetotheextentnecessarytocarryouttheresponsibilitiesofsuchgraduatedegreeprogram.(3)ApersonwhoisadmittedtotheBarasaforeignlawcon-

sultantpursuanttoPartDoftheRulesGoverningtheAdmissiontothePracticeofLawasadoptedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,Ga.Ct.&BarRules,p.12-1etseq.,mayrenderlegalservicesinthestateofGeorgiasolelywithrespecttothelawsoftheforeigncountry(i.e.,acountryotherthantheUnitedStatesofAmerica,itspossessionsandterritories)wheresuchpersonisadmittedtopractice,totheextentprovidedbyandinstrictcompliancewiththeprovisionsofPartDoftheRulesGoverningAdmissiontoPractice,butshallnototherwiserenderlegalservicesinthisState.

(4)PersonswhoareauthorizedtopracticelawinthisStateareherebyauthorizedtopracticelawassoleproprietorshipsoraspartners,shareholders,ormembersof:

(i)partnershipsunderO.C.G.A.§14-8-1et.seq.;or(ii)limitedliabilitypartnershipsunderO.C.G.A.§14-8-1et.seq.;or(iii)professionalcorporationsunderO.C.G.A.§14-7-1et.seq.;or(iv)professionalassociationsunderO.C.G.A.§14-10-1et.seq.;or(v)limitedliabilitycompaniesunderO.C.G.A.§14-11-100et.seq.

Rule 1-204. Good Standing. Nopersonshallbedeemedamemberingoodstanding:

(a)whiledelinquentafterSeptember1ofanyyearfornon-paymentofthelicensefeeprescribedinChapter5hereof;

(b)whilesuspendedfordisciplinaryreasons;(c)whiledisbarred;(d)whilesuspendedforfailuretocomplywithcontinuing

legaleducationrequirements;or(e)whileinviolationofBarRule1-209forfailuretopay

childsupportobligations.

Rule 1-205. Bar of Judicial Circuit. EachmemberwhoisaresidentofthisStateshallbeconsideredamemberofthebarofthejudicialcircuitinwhichhisorherprincipalofficeforthepracticeoflawislocated,or,athisorherelection,thecir-cuitinwhichheorsheresides,orifheorshehasnooffice,thecircuitinwhichheorsheresidesorlastresided.

Rule 1-206. Affiliate Members. InadditiontothemembershipandclassesofmembershipprovidedinthisChapter,theStateBarmayrecognizeasaffiliates,withouttherightsandprivilegesofmembership,membersofthelegalprofessionnotauthorizedtopracticelawinGeorgia,butwhoarelicensedtoprac-ticelawinanotherstateortheDistrictofColumbia,andareingoodstandinginalljurisdictionsinwhichtheyarelicensed.Affiliatemem-bersmaybefurnishedcopiesofappropriatepublicationsandmaybeentitledtoattendandparticipate,withouttherighttovoteorholdoffice,inthosemeetingsandactivitiesconductedbytheStateBarandanyofitscomponentpartsorsections.

Rule 1-206.1. Law Student Members. InadditiontothemembershipandclassesofmembershipprovidedinthisChapter,theStateBarmayrecognizeaslawstudentmembers,withouttherightsandprivilegesofmembership,thoselawstudentscurrentlyenrolledinalawschoolapprovedbytheAmericanBarAssociationoranylawschoolapprovedbytheGeorgiaBoardofBarExaminers.LawStudentmembersmaybefurnishedcopiesofappropri-atepublicationsandmaybeentitledtoattendandparticipate,without

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therighttovoteorholdoffice,inthosemeetingsandactivitiescon-ductedbytheStateBarandanyofitscomponentpartsorsections.

Rule 1-207. Change of Address. AllmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallkeepthemember-shipdepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiainformedoftheircurrentname,addressandtelephonenumber.Itisincumbentuponthoseauthorizedtopracticetokeepthemembershipinformationcurrentandaccurate.TheCourtandtheStateBarofGeorgiamayrelyontheaddresscarriedbythemembershipdepartmentandfailureonthepartofamembertonotifythemembershipdepartmentmayhaveadverseconsequencestoamember.ThechoiceofamembertouseonlyapostofficeboxaddressontheBarmembershiprecordsshallconstituteanelectiontowaivepersonalserviceinanyproceedingsbetweentheBarandthemember.NotificationgiventoanydepartmentoftheBarotherthantheMembershipDepartmentshallnotsatisfythisrequirement.

Rule 1-208. Resignation from Membership.(a)Resignationwhileingoodstanding:Amemberofthe

StateBaringoodstandingmayunderoath,petitiontheExecutiveCommitteeforleavetoresignfromtheStateBar.Uponaccep-tanceofsuchpetitionbytheExecutiveCommitteebymajorityvote,suchpersonshallnotpracticelawinthisstatenorbeentitledtoanyprivilegesandbenefitsaccordedtoactivemembersoftheStateBaringoodstandingunlesssuchpersoncomplieswithpart(b)or(c)ofthisRule.

(1)Thepetitionforleavetoresignwhileingoodstand-ingshallbefiled,underoath,withtheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarandshallcontainastatementthattherearenodisciplinaryactionsorcriminalproceedingspendingagainstthepetitionerandthatpetitionerisamemberingoodstanding.AcopyofthepetitionshallbeservedupontheGeneralCounseloftheStateBar.

(2)Nopetitionforleavetoresignwhileingoodstandingshallbeacceptediftherearedisciplinaryproceedingsorcrimi-nalchargespendingagainstthememberorifthememberisnotamemberingoodstanding.

(3)ApetitionfiledunderthisparagraphshallconstituteawaiveroftheconfidentialityprovisionsofRule4-221(d)astoanypendingdisciplinaryproceedings.(b)Readmissionwithinfiveyearsafterresignation:fora

periodoffiveyearsaftertheeffectivedateofavoluntaryresigna-tion,thememberoftheStateBarwhohasresignedwhileingoodstandingmayapplyforreadmissiontotheStateBaruponcomple-tionofthefollowingtermsandconditions:

(1)paymentinfullofthecurrentduesfortheyearinwhichreadmissionissought;

(2)paymentofareadmissionfeetotheStateBarequaltotheamountthememberseekingreadmissionwouldhavepaidifhehadinsteadelectedinactivestatus;and,

(3)submissiontothemembershipsectionoftheStateBarofadeterminationoffitnessfromtheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicants.Providedtheformermemberseek-ingreadmissionhasappliedtotheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicantsbeforetheexpirationofthefiveyearperiodafterhisorherresignation,theformermembershallbereadmit-teduponsubmittingadeterminationoffitnessevenifthefiveyearperiodhasexpired.ThisprovisionshallbeapplicabletoallformermemberswhoappliedtotheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicantsonorafterJanuary1,2008.(c)Readmissionafterfiveyears:aftertheexpirationoffive

yearsfromtheeffectivedateofavoluntaryresignation,theformermembermustcomplywiththeRulesgoverningadmissiontothepracticeoflawinGeorgiaasadoptedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 1-209. Failure to Pay Child Support Obligations.(a)ObligationtoPayChildSupport.ABarmembershallnot

wilfullyrefuse,asdeterminedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdictionundertheproceduresofO.G.C.A.§19-6-28.1,totimelypayachildsupportobligationandcontinuesuchrefusalforthirtydaysaftersaiddeterminationbecomesfinal.Acertifiedcopyofacourtorderfindingthatthememberhaswilfullyfailedtomaintaincom-pliancewithchildsupportobligationsshallbeconclusiveevidenceofaninfractionofthisRule.Solongasamemberiscomplyingfullywiththepurgeprovisionsofacourtorderofcontemptfornon-paymentofchildsupport,thisRuleshallnotapply.

(b)NotinGoodStandingUponNonCompliance.Intheeventacourtofcompetentjurisdictionmakesafinding,undertheproce-duresofO.G.C.A.§19-6-28.1,thatamemberhaswilfullyfailedtotimelypayachildsupportobligationandcontinuessuchrefusalforthirtydaysaftersaiddeterminationbecomesfinal,themembershallbedeemednottobeingoodstandingandshallremaininsuchstatusuntilsuchtimeasthenoncomplianceiscorrected.

(c)ActionbyStateBarofGeorgia.Uponreceiptofacerti-fiedcopyofanorderbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,undertheproceduresofO.G.C.A.§19-6-28.1,findingthatamemberhasfailedtotimelypayachildsupportobligationandcontinuessuchrefusalforthirtydaysaftersaiddeterminationbecomesfinal,anoticeshallbemailedbycertifiedmailtothemember’scurrentaddresscontainedinthemembershiprecordsoftheStateBar.Thenoticeisdeemedreceivedwheneveractuallyreceivedorfivedaysafterthenoticeismailed,whicheverissooner.

(d)ReturntoGoodStanding.AmemberdeemednottobeingoodstandingunderthisRuleshallbedeemedtobeingoodstandinguponprovidingtheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBaracertifiedcopyofacourtorderfindingthatthedelinquencyhasbeensatisfiedandbypayinganadministrativefeesetbytheExecutiveCommittee.Themembershallbereturnedtogoodstandingonlyuponcompliancewiththeforegoingconditions.

CHAPTER 3 BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Rule 1-301. Government by the Board of Governors. ThegovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbevestedinaBoardofGovernors.

Rule 1-302. Composition.(a)TheBoardofGovernorsshallbecomposedofthefol-

lowing:(1)ThePresident,thePresident-Elect,theImmediate

PastPresident,theSecretary,theTreasurer,thePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivision,thePresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivision,theImmediatePastPresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionandtheAttorneyGeneralofGeorgia;

(2)ThenumberofBoardofGovernorsmembersforeachJudicialCircuitasexistedonJanuary1,2001,plusanaddi-tional7BoardofGovernormemberstobeelectedfromtheAtlantaCircuit.

(i)EachJudicialCircuitshallhaveanadditionalmemberforeachadditionalfivehundredactivemembersoftheStateBaraddedtothatcircuitafterJanuary1,2001.ThesizeoftheBoardofGovernors,excludingthosedes-ignatedinsubsection(a)(1)above,shallnotexceed150,exceptassetoutinsubsection(b)below.

(ii)Ifthegeographicallimitsofajudicialcircuitarechanged,andbyreasonofsaidchangethereisareductioninthenumberofSuperiorCourtjudgestowhichthatcircuitwasentitledonJuly1,1979,thenandinthatevent,thereshallbeacorrespondingreductioninthenumberofmem-bersoftheBoardofGovernorsrepresentingthatcircuitprovidedtherewasmorethanoneBoardmemberrepresent-ingthatcircuit.Intheeventthatthereissuchareduction,thelastcreatedpostwillbethefirstposteliminated.

(iii)Ifthechangeinthegeographicallimitsofajudi-cialcircuitdoesnotresultinareductioninthenumberofSuperiorCourtjudgesinsuchcircuit,thensuchcircuitshallretainatleastasmanymembersoftheBoardofGovernorsasithadonJuly1,1979.AdditionalBoardrepresentationwillbedeterminedbythenumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarresidinginthatcircuitasprovidedabove.Achangeinthenameofajudicialcircuitshallhavenoeffectuponthatcircuit’sBoardofGovernors’representatives,exceptasotherwiseprovided.(3)tworepresentativesoftheactivemembersofthe

StateBarofGeorgiaresidingoutsideoftheStateofGeorgia,whothemselvesmustberesidentsofdifferentstatesoftheUnitedStates.ThenonresidentrepresentativeshallbeanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstandingresidingoutsideoftheStateofGeorgia.

(4)threemembersappointedasfollows:ThePresident-ElectinofficewhenthisrulebecomeseffectiveshallappointthreememberstotheBoardofGovernors.Thereafter,thePresident-ElectshallappointthenumberofsuchmemberswhosetermexpiredattheannualmeetingatwhichthePresident-Electassumedoffice.TheappointedmembersshallbechoseninsuchamannerastopromotediversitywithintheBoardofGovernors.(b)Uponthecreationofanewcircuit,suchcircuitshallbe

entitledtoelectonemembertotheBoardofGovernorsevenifthecapof150BoardofGovernorsmembershasbeenreached,andifthecaphasnotbeenreached,maybeentitledtoelectadditionalmembersdependingonthenumberofactivemembersoftheStateofGeorgiaresidinginthecircuitasprovidedabove.

(c)AmemberoftheBoardofGovernorsmustbeanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstanding.Amemberrep-resentingajudicialcircuitshallbeamemberofthebarofthatcircuit.

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(d)MembersoftheBoardofGovernorsshallreceivenocompensationfortheirservices.

Rule 1-303. Meetings. TheBoardofGovernorsshallholdatleastthreeregularmeetingsineachyearatsuchtimesandplacesasmaybedeterminedinaccor-dancewiththebylawsanduponsuchcallandnoticeasmaybesetforthinthebylaws.

Rule 1-304. Election of Members of Board of Governors. TheStateBarofGeorgiashall,initsbylaws,establishthetermofofficeandthemethodofelectionofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorsrepresentingjudicialcircuitsandnonresidentmembers.Suchmethodofelectionshallensurethat:

(a)theelectionwillbebysecretwrittenballot;(b)eachactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,inconjunc-

tionwithaspecifiednumberofotheractivemembers,willhavetheright,uponcompliancewithreasonableconditions,tonominateacan-didatefromhisorherjudicialcircuit(orcandidatesincircuitselectingmorethanonememberoftheBoardofGovernorsinsuchelection)whosenamewillbeprintedontheballotforhisorhercircuit;

(c)eachactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaresidingoutsideoftheState,inconjunctionwithaspecifiednumberofotheractivenonresidentmembers,willhavetheright,uponcom-pliancewithreasonableconditions,tonominateacandidatefromtheactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaresidingoutsideoftheState.

(d)anynominatingpetitionshallbearorbeaccompaniedbyastatementsignedbythenomineeindicatinghisorherwillingnesstoserveifelected;

(e)aballotforhisorherjudicialcircuitwillbemailedtoeachactiveresidentmemberandaballotwillbemailedtoeachactivenonresidentmemberinthecaseofelectionofnonresidentboardmember,havingprintedthereonthenamesofallquali-fiednomineesforsuchcircuitornonresidentpostandspaceforawrite-invoteinampletimeforthemembertocasttheballotbeforethetimefixedfortheelection.

(f)eachnomineeshallbeentitledtohaveatleastoneobserv-erpresentatthecountingoftheballotsfromhisorherjudicialcircuit;and

(g)anychangeinthegeographicallimitsofajudicialcircuitorcircuitsshallautomaticallyterminatethetermsofallmemberselectedtotheBoardofGovernors,accordinglyinsuchmannersasthebylawsmayprovide.IntheeventthegeographicallimitsofacircuitarechangedafterthenoticesofelectionhavebeendistributedtothemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia,thenandinthatevent,thetermsofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorsfromsuchcircuitswillremainastheywerebeforethechangeingeographicallimitsuntiltheelectionoftheBoardofGovernorstobeheldthefollowingyear.

Rule 1-305. Change in Geographical limits of Judicial Circuits. ThenumberandtermsofmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsfromjudicialcircuitsthathaveexperiencedachangeingeographicallimitsshallbedeterminedaccordingtoprovisionsofRules1-302(b),1-304andashereinafterprovidedbyRule1-701andthebylaws.

Rule 1-306. Vacancies; Ties. ThebylawsshallprovideforfillingvacanciesintheBoardofGovernorsandfordecidingtheoutcomeoftievotes.

CHAPTER 4 OFFICERS

Rule 1-401. Designation and Terms. TheofficersoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallincludeaPresident,aPresident-Elect,aSecretary,andaTreasurerandmayincludesuchotherofficersasmaybespecifiedinthebylaws.ThePresident-Elect,theSecretaryandtheTreasurershallbeelectedbythemembershipinaccor-dancewiththebylawsandtheresultspublishedattheannualmeeting.TheSecretaryandTreasurershallserveuntilthenextannualmeeting.ThePresident-ElectshallsucceedtoThePresidencyatthenextannualmeeting.IfthereisnoPresident-Elect,aPresidentshallalsobeelectedatthesametimeandinthesamemannerastheotherofficers.IntheeventofdeathorresignationofthePresident,thePresident-Electshallsucceedtothepresidency,shallserveouttheunexpiredterm,andshallcontinuetoserveforthetermduringwhichheorshewouldregularlyhaveservedasPresident.Theofficersshallhaveduties,rights,andpow-ersasthebylawsmayprovide.

Rule 1-402. Election of Officers. TheStateBarofGeorgiashall,initsbylaws,establishthemethodofelectionoftheofficers.Suchmethodofelectionshallcontainprovi-sionsequivalenttothoserequiredbyRule1-304relatingtoelectionofmembersoftheBoardofGovernors.OfficersmaybenominatedbytheBoardofGovernors.

Rule 1-403. Vacancies; Ties. Thebylawsshallprovideforfillingvacanciesinanyofficeandfordecidingtheoutcomeoftievotes.

Rule 1-404. Eligibility of President-Elect. NopersonshallbeeligibleforelectionasPresident-ElectifamemberofthejudicialcircuitinwhichsuchpersonisamemberwaselectedtotheofficeofPresident-Electatanytimewithinoneyearimmediatelypriortotheelectioninwhichsuchpersonisacandidate.

CHAPTER 5 FINANCE

Rule 1-501. License Fees.(a)AnnuallicensefeesformembershipintheStateBarshall

bedueandpayableonJuly1ofeachyear.UponthefailureofamembertopaythelicensefeebySeptember1,themembershallceasetobeamemberingoodstanding.Whensuchlicensefeesandlatefeesforthecurrentandprioryearshavebeenpaid,themembershallautomaticallybereinstatedtothestatusofmemberingoodstanding,exceptasprovidedinsection(b)ofthisRule.

(b)IntheeventamemberoftheStateBarisdelinquentinthepaymentofanylicensefee,latefee,assessment,reinstatementfeeorpenaltyofanynatureforaperiodofone(1)year,themem-bershallbeautomaticallysuspended,andshallnotpracticelawinthisstate.Thesuspendedmembermaythereafterliftsuchsuspen-siononlyuponthesuccessfulcompletionofallofthefollowingtermsandconditions:

(i)paymentofalloutstandingdues,assessments,latefees,reinstatementfees,andanyandallpenaltiesdueandowingbeforeoraccruingafterthesuspensionofmembership;

(ii)providethemembershipsectionoftheStateBarthefollowing:

(A)acertificatefromtheOfficeofGeneralCounseloftheStateBarthatthesuspendedmemberisnotpresentlysubjecttoanydisciplinaryprocedure;

(B)acertificatefromtheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencythatthesuspendedmemberiscurrentonallrequirementsforcontinuinglegaleducation;

(C)adeterminationoffitnessfromtheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicants;(iii)paymenttotheStateBarofanon-waivablereinstate-

mentfeeasfollows:(A)$150.00forthefirstreinstatementpaidwithinthe

firstyearofsuspension,plus$150.00foreachyearofsus-pensionthereafteruptoatotaloffiveyears;

(B)$250.00forthesecondreinstatementpaidwithinthefirstyearofsuspension,plus$250.00foreachyearofsuspensionthereafteruptoatotaloffiveyears;

(C)$500.00forthethirdreinstatementpaidwithinthefirstyearofsuspension,plus500.00foreachyearofsus-pensionthereafteruptoatotaloffiveyears;or

(D)$750.00foreachsubsequentreinstatementpaidwithinthefirstyearofsuspension,plus$750.00foreachyearofsuspensionthereafteruptoatotaloffiveyears.

Theyearlyincreaseinthereinstatementfeeshallbecomedueandowinginitsentiretyuponthefirstdayofeachnextfiscalyearandshallnotbeproratedforanyfractionofthefiscalyearinwhichitisactuallypaid.

(c)Amembersuspendedundersubsection(b)aboveforatotaloffiveyearsinsuccessionshallbeimmediatelyterminatedasamemberwithoutfurtheractiononthepartoftheStateBar.Theterminatedmembershallnotbeentitledtoahearingassetoutinsection(d)below.TheterminatedmembershallberequiredtoapplyformembershiptotheOfficeofBarAdmissionsforread-missiontotheStateBar.Uponcompletionoftherequirementsforreadmission,theterminatedmembershallberequiredtopaythetotalreinstatementfeedueundersubsection(b)(iii)aboveplusanadditional$750.00asareadmissionfeetotheStateBar.

(d)Priortosuspendingamemberundersubsection(b)above,theStateBarshallsendbycertifiedmailanoticethereoftothelastknownaddressofthememberascontainedintheoffi-cialmembershiprecords.Itshallspecifytheyearsforwhichthelicensefeeisdelinquentandstatethateitherthefeeandallpenal-tiesrelatedtheretoarepaidwithinsixty(60)daysorahearingtoestablishreasonablecauseisrequestedwithinsixty(60)days,themembershipshallbesuspended.

Ifahearingisrequested,itshallbeheldatStateBarHeadquarterswithinninety(90)daysofreceiptoftherequestbytheExecutiveCommittee.Noticeoftimeandplaceofthehearingshallbemailedatleastten(10)daysinadvance.Thepartycitedmayberepresentedbycounsel.Witnessesshallbesworn;and,ifrequestedbythepartycited,acompleteelectronicrecordoratranscriptshallbemadeofallproceed-ingsandtestimony.Theexpenseoftherecordshallbepaidbytheparty


requestingitandacopythereofshallbefurnishedtotheExecutiveCommittee.Thepresidingmemberorspecialmastershallhavetheauthoritytoruleonallmotions,objections,andothermatterspresentedinconnectionwiththeGeorgiaRulesofCivilProcedure,andtheprac-ticeinthetrialofcivilcases.Thepartycitedmaynotberequiredtotestifyoverhisorherobjection. TheExecutiveCommitteeshall(1)makefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawandshalldeterminewhetherthepartycitedwasdelinquentinviolationofthisRule1-501;and(2)uponafindingofdelinquencyshalldeterminewhethertherewasreasonablecauseforthedelinquency.Financialhardshipshortofadjudicatedbankruptcyshallnotconstitutereasonablecause.Acopyofthefindingsandthedeterminationshallbesenttothepartycited.Ifitisdeterminedthatnodelinquencyhasoccurred,themattershallbedismissed.Ifitisdeter-minedthatdelinquencyhasoccurredbutthattherewasreasonablecausetherefor,themattershallbedeferredforone(1)yearatwhichtimethematterwillbereconsidered.Ifitisdeterminedthatdelinquencyhasoccurredwithoutreasonablecausetherefor,themembershipshallbesuspendedimmediatelyuponsuchdetermination.AnappropriatenoticeofsuspensionshallbesenttotheclerksofallGeorgiacourtsandshallbepublishedinanofficialpublicationoftheStateBar.AllegederrorsoflawintheproceedingsorfindingsoftheExecutiveCommitteeoritsdelegateshallbereviewedbytheSupremeCourt.TheExecutiveCommitteemaydelegatetoaspecialmasteranyorallofitsresponsi-bilitiesandauthoritywithrespecttosuspendingmembershipforlicensefeedelinquencyinwhicheventthespecialmastershallmakeareporttotheCommitteeofitsfindingsforitsapprovalordisapproval. Afterafindingofdelinquency,acopyofthefindingshallbeservedupontheRespondentattorney.TheRespondentattorneymayfilewiththeCourtanywrittenexceptions(supportedbythewrittenargument)saidRespondentmayhavetothefindingsoftheExecutiveCommittee.AllsuchexceptionsshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtandservedontheExecutiveCommitteebyserviceontheGeneralCounselwithintwenty(20)daysofthedatethatthefindingswereservedontheRespondentattorney.UponthefilingofexceptionsbytheRespondentattorney,theExecutiveCommitteeshallwithintwenty(20)daysofsaidfiling,fileareportofitsfindingsandthecompleterecordandtranscriptofevidencewiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourt.TheCourtmaygrantextensionsoftimeforfilinginappropriatecases.FindingsoffactbytheExecutiveCommitteeshallbeconclusiveifsupportedbyanyevidence.TheCourtmaygrantoralargu-mentonanyexceptionfiledwithituponapplicationforsuchargumentbytheRespondentattorneyortheExecutiveCommittee.TheCourtshallpromptlyconsiderthereportoftheExecutiveCommittee,excep-tionsthereto,andtheresponsesfiledbyanypartytosuchexceptions,ifany,andenteritsjudgement.AcopyoftheCourt’sjudgementshallbetransmittedtotheExecutiveCommitteeandtotheRespondentattorneybytheCourt. Withinthirty(30)daysafterafinaljudgementwhichsuspendsmembership,thesuspendedmembershall,underthesupervisionoftheSupremeCourt,notifyallclientsofsaidsuspendedmember’sinabil-itytorepresentthemandofthenecessityforpromptlyretainingnewcounsel,andshalltakeallactionsnecessarytoprotecttheinterestsofsaidsuspendedmember’sclients.Shouldthesuspendedmemberfailtonotifysaidclientsorfailtoprotecttheirinterestsashereinrequired,theSupremeCourt,uponitsmotion,oruponthemotionoftheStateBar,andafterten(10)daysnoticetothesuspendedmemberandproofoffailuretonotifyorprotectsaidclients,mayholdthesuspendedmemberincontemptandorderthatamemberormembersoftheStateBartakechargeofthefilesandrecordsofsaidsuspendedmemberandproceedtonotifyallclientsandtakesuchstepsasseemindicatedtoprotecttheirinterests.AnymemberoftheStateBarappointedbytheSupremeCourttotakechargeofthefilesandrecordsofthesuspendedmemberundertheseRulesshallnotbepermittedtodiscloseanyinformationcontainedinthefilesandrecordsinhisorhercarewithouttheconsentofthecli-enttowhomsuchfileorrecordrelates,exceptasclearlynecessarytocarryouttheorderofthecourt.

Rule 1-501.1. License Fees. AnymemberwhohasnotpaidhisorherlicensefeeonorbeforeAugust1shallbepenalizedintheamountofseventy-fivedollars($75.00).AnymemberwhoisdelinquentinhisorherlicensefeeonorafterJanuary1ofeachyearshallbepenalizedintheadditionalamountofonehundreddollars($100)foratotalofonehundredseventy-fivedollars($175).

Rule 1-502. Amount of License Fees. Theamountofsuchlicensefeesforactivemembersshallnotexceed$350.00,andshallannuallybefixedbytheBoardofGovernorsfortheensuingyear;provided,however,thatexceptinthecaseofanemergency,suchannualduesshallnotbeincreasedinanyoneyearbymorethan$25.00overthosesetforthenextprecedingyear.Theannuallicensefeesforinactivemembersshallbeinanamountnottoexceedone-half(1/2)ofthosesetforactivemembers.Subjecttotheabove

limitations,licensefeesmaybefixedindifferingamountsfordifferentclassificationsofactiveandinactivemembership,asmaybeestablishedinthebylaws.

Rule 1-502.1. Fees for Affiliates. TheamountoffeesforaffiliatesasprovidedinRule1-206shallbefixedbytheBoardofGovernorsatanamountlessthantheamountprescribedforactivememberspursuanttoRule1-502,butforsuchamountaswillreasonablycoverthecostofthepublicationsfurnished;provided,however,lawstudentmembershipfeesmaybefixedatanominallevel.

Rule 1-503. Disbursements. TheBoardofGovernorsshallhavethepowertodirectthedis-bursementoffundsoftheStateBar.NoofficernamedhereinandnomemberoftheBoardofGovernorsshallreceiveanycompensationforhisorherservicesexceptthattheBoardofGovernorsmayprovideforthereimbursementoftheactualandnecessaryexpensesincurredbyofficersinthedischargeoftheirduties.

Rule 1-504. Bonds. EverypersonhavingthedutyorrighttoreceiveordisbursethefundsoftheStateBarshallberequiredtofurnishbondconditionedonhisorherfaithfulperformancewithsuchsecurityasthebylawsortheBoardofGovernorsmayrequire.

Rule 1-505. Audit. TheBoardofGovernorsshallannuallycauseanauditofthefinan-cialaffairsoftheStateBartobemade,andthebylawsshallprovideforthecommunicationofthefindingsthereoftothemembership.

Rule 1-506. Clients’ Security Fund Assessment.(a)TheStateBarisauthorizedtoassesseachmemberof

theStateBarafeeof$100.00.This$100.00feemaybepaidinminimumannualinstallmentsof$25.00foraperiodoffour(4)years.EachnewmemberoftheStateBarwillalsobeassessedasimilaramountuponadmissiontotheStateBar.ThisfeeshallbeusedonlytofundtheClients’SecurityFundandshallbeinaddi-tiontotheannuallicensefeeasprovidedinRule1-501throughRule1-502.

(b)ForamemberwhojoinstheStateBaraftertakingtheGeorgiaBarExamination,theClients’SecurityFundassessmentshallbedueandpayablein$25.00installmentsonJuly1ofeachyearuntilthebalanceof$100.00ispaid.Thefailureofamembertopaytheminimumannualinstallmentsshallsubjectthemembertothesamepenaltyprovisions,includinglatefeesandsuspensionofmembership,aspertaintothefailuretopaytheannuallicensefeeassetforthinBarRules1-501and1-501.1.

(c)ForamemberwhoisadmittedasaForeignLawConsultantorwhojoinswithouttakingtheGeorgiaBarExamination,andwhohasnotpreviouslypaidtheClients’SecurityFundAssessment,thefullassessmentshallbedueandpayablepriortooruponregistrationwiththeStateBar.

Rule 1-507. Bar Facility Assessment.(a)TheStateBarisauthorizedtoassesseachmemberofthe

StateBarafeeof$200.00.This$200.00feemaybepaidinmini-mumannualinstallmentsof$50.00foraperiodoffour(4)years.Thisfeeshallbeusedtopurchase,maintain,andoperateafacil-ityfortheStateBarofficesandshallbeinadditiontotheannuallicensefeeasprovidedinRule1-501throughRule1-502andtheClients’SecurityFundAssessmentasprovidedinRule1-506.

(b)ForamemberwhojoinstheStateBaraftertakingtheGeorgiaBarExamination,theBarFacilityassessmentshallbedueandpayablein$50.00installmentsonJuly1ofeachyearuntilthebalanceof$200.00ispaid.FormembersadmittedtotheStateBarpriortoJuly1,1997,suchinstallmentsshallbeginonJuly1,1997.FornewlyadmittedmembersoftheStateBar,suchinstallmentsshallbeginwhenanewmemberisadmittedtotheStateBar.Thefailureofamembertopaytheminimumannualinstallmentsshallsubjectthemembertothesamepenaltyprovisions,includinglatefeesandsuspensionofmembership,aspertaintothefailuretopaytheannuallicensefeeassetforthinBarRules1-501and1-501.1.

(c)ForamemberwhoisadmittedasaForeignLawConsultantorjoinstheStateBarwithouttakingtheGeorgiaBarExamination,andwhohasnotpreviouslypaidtheBarFacilityAssessment,thefullassessmentshallbedueandpayablepriortooruponregistrationwiththeStateBar.

CHAPTER 6 BYLAWS

Rule 1-601. TheStateBarofGeorgia,atitsfirstannualmeeting,shalladoptbylawsasdirectedherein,andatsuchmeetingandanysubsequentannual,annualmidyear,orspecialmeetingmayadoptsuchotherbylaws


notinconsistentherewithasitmaydeemnecessaryandproperandmayamenditsbylawsfromtimetotime.

Rule 1-602. BylawsandamendmentstheretomaybeproposedbytheBoardofGovernorsoranytenmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiabygivingnoticetotheSecretaryatleastsixtydaysbeforethenextannualmeetingorannualmidyearmeeting.Writtennoticeofsuchproposedbylawsandamendmentsshallbemailedtoeachmemberatleastthirtydayspriortothenextannualmeetingorannualmidyearmeetingandmaybeadoptedbyamajorityofthememberspresentandvoting.Theproposedbylawsandanyamendmentsmaybeamendedfromthefloorinanyrespectgermanetothesubjectthereof.ThenoticebymailhereinrequiredmaybebyorthroughanyoneormoreoftheofficialpublicationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

CHAPTER 7 COMMITTEES AND SECTIONS

Rule 1-701. Executive Committee. ThereshallbeanExecutiveCommitteecomposedofsuchoffi-cersandmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsasmaybedesignatedinthebylaws,whichshallexercisethepowersanddutiesoftheBoardofGovernorswhenitisnotinsession,subjecttosuchlimitationsasthebylawsmayprovide.TheExecutiveCommitteeshallalsohavetheauthoritytosupervisetheelectionofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorsasoutlinedinRule1-304hereof,and,inparticular,toascertainonorafterthefirstdayofJanuaryofeachyear,thenumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoresideineachjudicialcircuitasofthelastdayinDecemberoftheprecedingyear;andthere-upontomakeadeterminationofwhetheranyjudicialcircuitmaybeentitledtoadditionalmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsasprovidedinRule1-302(b)hereof.Inaddition,wheneveranewjudicialcircuitiscreated,theExecutiveCommitteeshalldetermine,undertheprovisionsofRule1-302(b)andthebylaws,thenumberofmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsthenewcircuitisentitledtoelectandshallsupervisetheelectionsofsuchmembers.IntheeventthatthecompositionoftheBoardofGovernorsmustbechanged,asaresultofanincreaseordecreaseinthenumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoresideineachjudicialcircuit,asaresultofthecreationofanewjudicialcircuit,orasaresultofachangeinthegeographicallimitsofajudicialcircuit,theExecutiveCommitteeisempoweredtotakeappro-priateactiontoinsurethatthecompositionoftheBoardcomplieswiththeprovisionsofRule1-302(b),includingbutnotlimitedtotheimple-mentingoftheelectionofadditionalmembersandthedesignationofnumericalposts.TheExecutiveCommitteeshallgenerallyhavebroaddiscretionarypowersintheconductofelections.

Rule 1-702. Standing Committees; Special Committees. UnlessotherwiseprovidedintheseRules,thereshallbestandingandspecialcommittees,whichshallbecomposedofsuchmembers,servingsuchterms,appointedinsuchmanner,andhavingsuchdutiesasthebylawsmayprovide.AstatementofthepurposeofeachcommitteeshallbepublishedannuallyintheStateBarDirectory.

Rule 1-703. Young Lawyers Division. ThereshallbeadivisionoftheStateBarcomposedof(1)allmembersoftheStateBarwhohavenotreachedtheirthirty-sixthbirth-daypriortothecloseoftheprecedingAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarand(2)allmembersoftheStateBarwhohavebeenadmittedtotheirfirstbarlessthanfiveyears.AllpersonsholdinganelectiveofficeorpostintheYoungLawyersDivisionwhoarequalifiedbyagetoassumesuchofficeorpostonthedateofhisorherelectionshallremainmembersoftheYoungLawyersDivisionforthedurationoftheirofficesorposts.InthecaseofaPresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivisionwhoisqualifiedbyagetoassumesuchofficeonthedateofsuchperson’selection,suchpersonshallremainamemberoftheYoungLawyersDivisionforthedurationofthetermsofPresidentandImmediatePastPresidenttowhichheorshesucceeds. TheYoungLawyersDivisionshallhavesuchorganization,pow-ers,anddutiesasmaybeprescribedbytheBylawsoftheStateBar.

Rule 1-704. Sections. Suchadditionalsectionsmaybecreatedbythebylawsasmaybedeemeddesirable.

Rule 1-705. Senior Lawyers Section. ThereshallbeasectionoftheStateBarcomposedfromtimetotimeofallmembersoftheStateBarwhohavereachedtheir65thbirthdaypriortothecloseoftheprecedingAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarprovided,however,thatallthosemembersoftheStateBarwhoarebetween60and65yearsofageandaremembersingoodstandingoftheSeniorSection(sometimescalledtheSeniorLawSection)atthetimethisamendmentisadoptedshallbecomemembersoftheSeniorLawyersSection. TheSeniorLawyersSectionshallhavesuchorganization,powersanddutiesasmaybeprescribedbytheBylawsoftheStateBar.

CHAPTER 8 MEETINGS

Rule 1-801. Annual Meeting. AnannualmeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeheldeachyearatsuchtimeandplaceasmaybedesignatedbytheBoardofGovernors.

Rule 1-801.1. Annual Midyear Meeting. AnannualmidyearmeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiamaybeheldeachyearatsuchtimeandplaceasmaybedesignatedbytheBoardofGovernors.

Rule 1-802. Special Meetings. SpecialmeetingsoftheStateBarofGeorgiamaybeheldatsuchtimesandplacesasmaybedeterminedbytheBoardofGovernors.TheSecretaryshallcallaspecialmeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiauponpetitionsignedbynotlessthantenpercentoftheactivemembersandsuchspecialmeetingsshallbeheldwithinsixtydaysafterthepetitionisfiledwiththeSecretary.Thebusinesstobetransactedatspecialmeet-ingsshallbespecifiedinthecall.

Rule 1-803. Notice. Atleastthirtydaysnoticeofthetimeandplaceofeachannualmeeting,annualmidyearmeeting,andanyspecialmeetingshallbegiv-eninwritingbymailtoeachmemberathisorheraddressshownontherecordsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.ThenoticebymailhereinrequiredmaybebyorthroughanyoneormoreoftheofficialpublicationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

PART V AMENDMENT AND EFFECTIVE DATE

CHAPTER 1 AMENDMENT

Rule 5-101. Amendment; Filing, Notice. TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiamay,onmotionoftheStateBarofGeorgia,amendtherulesoftheStateBarofGeorgiaatanytime;pro-vided,however,thatnomotiontoamendtheserulesmaybefileduntilthirty(30)daysafteranoticesettingforththeproposedamendmenthasbeenpublishedintheGeorgia State Bar Journal,TheGeorgia State Bar NewsoranyotherdocumentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Thesaidnoticeshallcontainthefollowing:

(a)thedateuponwhichthemotiontoamendtheserulesshallbefiledintheSupremeCourtofGeorgia;

(b)theverbatimtextofthesaidmotionascertifiedbytheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarofGeorgia;

(c)astatementthatthepublicationofthesaidmotiontoamendtheserulesisintendedtocomplywiththenoticerequire-mentofthisrule;

(d)astatementthatanyobjectiontotheproposedamend-mentshallbemadeonlyinaccordancewithRule5-102.

Atthesametimethatnoticeissenttoitsmembership,theStateBarofGeorgiashallfileacopyofsuchanoticewiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 5-102. Objection to Amendment. EachmemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeentitledtofileawrittenobjectiontoanymotiontoamendtheserulesbytheStateBarofGeorgia.Eachobjectionshallcontainthefollowing:

(a)thegroundsonwhichtheobjectionisbased;(b)arequestfororalargumentontheproposedamendment

ifsuchargumentisdesiredbytheobjectingmember. AllwrittenobjectionsshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtoftheStateofGeorgiabeforethedatewhichtheStateBarofGeorgiahasdesignatedforfilingitssaidmotiontoamendtheserulesunderRule5-101.AnymemberfilingawrittenobjectionshallservetheStateBarofGeorgiawithacopythereofbymailingthesametotheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiaattheaddressofitsheadquarters.

Rule 5-103. Oral Argument. TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiamaygrantorrefusetheobjectingmember’srequestfororalargumentontheStateBarofGeorgia’spro-posedamendmenttotheserulesatitssolediscretion.TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiashallnotifytheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiaandtheobjectingmemberofthedateofanyoralargu-mentgrantedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaundertheprovisionsofRule23(b)oftheRulesoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 5-104. Dues Increase or Decrease; Special Procedure. InadditiontotheproceduresdescribedinRules5-101through5-103,atleastthirty(30)daysnoticeshallbegiventothemember-shipoftheStateBarofGeorgiaintheGeorgia State Bar Journal,theGeorgia State Bar NewsoranyotherdocumentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaofanymeetingoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarof


GeorgiaatwhichamendmentofRule1-502(AmountofLicenseFees)willbeconsideredandactedupon.Thenoticetothegeneralmember-shipoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallcontain:

(a)astatementthattheamendmentofRule1-502(AmountofLicenseFees)shallbeconsideredbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia;

(b)averbatimcopyoftheproposedamendmentascertifiedbytheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarofGeorgia;

(c)thedate,timeandlocationofthemeetingoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaatwhichsuchamendmentwillbeconsidered;

(d)astatementthateachmemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiahasarighttopresenthisorherviewsconcerningtheproposedamendmenteitherthroughhisorhercircuitrepresentativetotheBoardofGovernorsorinpersonbeforesuchBoard;and

(e)theaddresstowhichallwrittenobjectionstothepro-posedamendmentmaybesent.

CHAPTER 2 EFFECTIVE DATE

Rule 5-201. Effective Date. Theserules,asrecodified,shallbeeffectiveJanuary1,1977exceptthatPartIV,Chapter2,DisciplinaryProceedings,shallbeeffec-tiveApril1,1977;provided,however,anycomplaintspendingbeforegrievancetribunalsonsuchdateshallbehandledtoconclusionunderthedisciplinaryproceedingsnowineffect.

BYLAWS OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA

Approved June 5, 1964, and as subsequently amended,including substantial revision adopted June 20, 1992.

ARTICLE I MEMBERS

Section 1. Registration of Members. Personsadmittedbythecourtstothepracticeoflawshall,withinsixtydaysafteradmissiontothebaroftheSuperiorCourt,registerwiththeStateBarandpaytheduesforthefiscalyearofthedateofadmission.Ifthedateofadmissionislessthansixmonthsbeforetheexpirationofthatfiscalyear,themembershallpayone-halfoftheduesforthatyear.IfthedateofadmissionisonorafterMay15,themembershallnotberequiredtopayanyduesforthatfiscalyear.

Section 2. Active Members and Foreign Law Consultants.(a)OnlyactivemembersoftheStateBarareentitledtogive

legaladviceandotherwisepracticelaw.(b)Onlyforeignlawconsultantsareentitledtogivelegal

adviceasauthorizedbytheirlicense.

Section 3. Inactive Members.(a)Inactivemembersshall:(1)payannualduesassetforthinBarRule1-502;(2)beexemptfromcontinuinglegaleducationrequire-

ments(exceptforyearsinwhichthememberisonactivemembershipstatusforanypartofthecalendaryear);

(3)affirmativelyrepresenttheirstatusasinactivemem-bersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhenanystatementofStateBarmembershipismade;

(4)notholdthemselvesoutasbeingabletopracticelawinGeorgiaorrenderadviceonmattersofGeorgialaw;

(5)notholdanypositionthatrequiresthepersontobealicensedGeorgiaattorney;

(6)notnominateamemberforoffice,holdaStateBaroffice,holdasectionorcommitteeoffice,orvoteonanycandi-dateorproposalconcerningtheStateBar;

(7)notreceiveStateBarpublications,includingtheDirectory and HandbookandtheGeorgia Bar Journal,unlesstheinactivemembersorequests;

(8)keepthemembershipdepartmentadvisedoftheircur-rentname,addressandphonenumberasprovidedinBarRule1-207.(b)Aninactivememberingoodstandingmayonapplication

becomeanactivemember.Theapplicationshallbeaccompaniedbypaymentoftheduesofanactivememberfortheyearinwhichthechangeismade,lessduespaidbythememberforthatyearasaninactivemember.Inaddition,themembermustsatisfythecon-tinuinglegaleducationrequirementsforthecalendaryearinwhichthememberisonactivestatus.

Section 4. Failure to Register.(a)Apersonwhoisotherwiseeligibletopracticelawor

practiceasaforeignlawconsultantasdefinedintheRulesoftheStateBar,butwhofailedtoregisterasrequiredbytheRulesandArticleI,Section1oftheseBylaws,shallbeentitledtoregisterat

anytimeforaperiodoneyearafterthedayuponwhichthepersonfirstbecameeligibleuponthefollowingtermsandconditions:

(1)thepaymentoftheduesfortheyearinwhichtheapplicantregisters,togetherwithunpaidduesforanypreviousyearshouldtheperiodoftimeinwhichtheapplicantfailedtoregisterextendbetweentwofiscalyearsoftheStateBar,plusalatefeeof$100.00;and

(2)thesubmissionofanaffidavitstatingthattheappli-cant’sfailuretosoonerregisterwasnotintendedasaviolationoftheStateBarRules,thattheapplicantwasnotawareoftherequirementsoftheRuleswithrespecttoregistration,thattheapplicanthasnotpracticedlawinGeorgiaduringtheperiodbetweenthetimetheapplicantfirstbecameeligibleandthedaytheapplicantsubmitstheaffidavit,andthattheapplicantwillsubmittothejurisdictionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardforanycomplaintsorgrievancesfiledregardingtheapplicant’sconductfortheperiodbetweeneligibilityandregistration;or

(3)intheeventtheapplicantcannotaverthatheorshedidnotpracticelawinGeorgiaduringtheperiodbetweenthetimetheapplicantfirstbecameeligibleandthedaytheappli-cantactuallyregistered,theapplicantshallsubmitanaffidavitstatingthattheapplicant’sfailuretosoonerregisterwasnotintendedasaviolationoftheStateBarRules,andthattheapplicantwasnotawareoftherequirementsoftheRuleswithrespecttoregistration.Theaffidavitshallalsoprovideadetaileddescriptionoftheapplicant’spracticeoflawduringtheperiod,andstatethattheapplicantwillsubmittothejurisdictionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardforanycomplaintsorgrievancesfiledregardingtheapplicant’sconductfortheperiodbetweeneligi-bilityandregistration.AcopyoftheaffidavitshallbesuppliedtoeithertheStandingCommitteeorDistrictCommitteefortheUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw.(b)Apersonwhoisotherwiseeligibletopracticelawor

practiceasaforeignlawconsultantasdefinedintheRulesoftheStateBar,butwhofailedtoregisterwithinoneyearofthedatetheapplicantwasfirsteligibleasrequiredbytheRulesandtheseBylaws,shallbeentitledtoregisteruponthefollowingtermsandconditions:

(1)thepaymentoftheduesfortheyearinwhichtheapplicantregisters,paymentofallunpaidduesforallpastyearsattheactivememberlevel,andpaymentofalatefeeof$100fortheyearinwhichtheapplicantregistersplus$100peryearforallpastyears;

(2)submissionofadeterminationoffitnessfromtheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicants;and

(3)thesubmissionofanaffidavitstatingthattheappli-cant’sfailuretosoonerregisterwasnotintendedasaviolationoftheStateBarRules,thattheapplicantwasnotawareoftherequirementsoftheRuleswithrespecttoregistration,thattheapplicanthasnotpracticedlawinGeorgiaduringtheperiodbetweenthetimetheapplicantfirstbecameeligibleandthedaytheapplicantsubmitstheaffidavit,andthattheapplicantwillsubmittothejurisdictionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardforanycomplaintsorgrievancesfiledregardingtheapplicant’sconductfortheperiodbetweeneligibilityandregistration;or

(4)intheeventtheapplicantcannotaverthatheorshedidnotpracticelawinGeorgiaduringtheperiodbetweenthetimetheapplicantfirstbecameeligibleandthedaytheapplicantsubmitstheaffidavit,theapplicantshallsubmitanaffidavitstatingthattheapplicant’sfailuretosoonerregisterwasnotintendedasaviolationoftheStateBarRulesandthattheapplicantwasnotawareoftherequirementsoftheRuleswithrespecttoregistration.Theaffidavitshallalsoprovideadetaileddescriptionoftheapplicant’spracticeoflawduringtheperiod,andstatethattheapplicantwillsubmittothejurisdictionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardforanycomplaintsorgrievancesfiledregardingtheapplicant’sconductfortheperiodbetweeneligibilityandregistration.Acopyoftheaffidavitshallbesup-pliedtotheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicantsandeithertheStandingCommitteeorDistrictCommitteefortheUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw.

Section 5. List of Active Members. AssoonaspracticalafterJuly1ofeachyear,theStateBarshallfurnishacopyofthemembershipdirectorytotheclerksofeverycourtofrecordintheState.OnorbeforeNovember1,theStateBarshallfur-nishtotheclerksofeverycourtofrecordintheStatealistofmembersofallmembershipcategories,whoareforanyreasonnotingoodstand-ingwiththeStateBar.NolaterthansixmonthsafterNovember1ofeachyear,theStateBarshallupdatethelistofmemberswhoarenotingoodstandingandfurnishthelisttotheclerksofthecourtsofrecords.Alawyernotingoodstandingshallbeprohibitedfromappearingascounselinanycourt,filingpaperstherein,orotherwisepracticinglaw,unlessanduntilthatlawyerhasacertificatefromtheExecutiveDirector


oftheStateBarstatingthatheorshehasbecomeanactivememberingoodstanding.ThelistofallregisteredlawyersingoodstandingwithintheStateshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtandwiththeClerkoftheCourtofAppealsandtheclerksofthevariousfederalcourtsinGeorgia.

Section 6. Affiliate and Law Student Membership. Inadditiontotheclassesofmembershipprovidedinthepreced-ingsectionsofthisArticle,theBoardofGovernorsortheExecutiveCommitteeoftheBoardmayconsiderandapproveordisapproveappli-cationsforAffiliateorLawStudentMembershipwiththeStateBar.AnyAffiliatememberorLawStudentmembershallhavetherighttoattendStateBarmeetingsandreceiveStateBarofficialpublications,butshallnothavetherighttoholdofficeorvoteorhaveotherrightsandprivilegesincidenttomembership.AnAffiliateorLawStudentmembershallnotholdhimselforherselfouttothepublicorimplyinanymannerthatheorsheisamemberingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgiaorentitledtopracticelawinthisState.AnAffiliateorLawStudentmembershallnotusehisorhermembershipnumberforanypurposeotherthancommunicatingwiththeStateBar.TheStateBarretainstherighttodenyorrevokethemembershipprivilegesofanyAffiliateorLawStudentmemberwhoviolatesthisSection. TheapplicationformforanAffiliateorLawStudentmembershipshallincludetherecommendationoftheapplicantbyanactivememberingoodstandingoftheStateBar.AffiliateorLawStudentmembershipmayberenewedeachfiscalyearwithoutadditionalapplication.TheBoardofGovernorsshallprescribetheduesorfeesforAffiliateorLawStudentmembership.AffiliatemembershipshallbeapprovedonlywhentheapplicantislicensedtopracticelawinanotherstateortheDistrictofColumbia,andisingoodstandinginalljurisdictionsinwhichheorsheislicensed,andisanemployeeofgovernment,thearmedservices,aprivateorcommercialinstitutionoralawschool,andisnototherwiseauthorizedtopracticelawinGeorgia.ApplicationtobecomeaLawStudentmembershallbeapprovedwhentheapplicantisenrolledinalawschoolapprovedbytheAmericanBarAssociationortheGeorgiaBoardofBarExaminers.

Section 7. Emeritus Members. InadditiontotheclassesofmembershipprovidedintheprecedingsectionsofthisArticle,theExecutiveCommitteemayapproveordisap-proveapplicationsforemeritusmemberstatusasprovidedforinRule1-202(d)oftheBarRules.ApplicationsforemeritusmembershipshallbeonformsprescribedbytheExecutiveCommittee. Emeritusmembershipshallhavethesameprivileges,rights,dutiesandresponsibilitiesasactivemembership,exceptthatemeritusmembersshallnotgivelegaladviceorotherwisepracticelaw,nominateamem-berforofficeorholdofficeintheStateBar,orvoteonanycandidateforelectedpositioninorproposalconcerningtheStateBar. TheStateBarshallsendannualnoticestoallemeritusmembersconfirmingtheiremeritusstatusandaddress,andinformingthemthattheyneedtakenofurtheractionshouldtheywishtoremainonemeritusstatus.EmeritusmembersshallnotberequiredtopayStateBarduesorannualfees,butmayberequiredtopaysectionduesattheoptionofeachsectionoftheStateBar. Emeritusmembersmayreturntoactiveorinactivestatusbypro-vidingwrittennoticetotheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBaralongwiththeappropriatenon-proratedduesfortheyearinwhichtheyreturntoactiveorinactivestatus.

Section 8. Active Duty Traditional Guardsmen or Reservists. TheExecutiveCommitteemayprovideanannualwaiverofduestoTraditionalGuardsmenorTraditionalReservistswhohavebeencalledtoactivedutyandwhoseactivationordeploymentiscausingafinancialhardship.ThepoliciesandproceduresforrequestingsuchwaivershallbedeterminedbytheExecutiveCommittee.

ARTICLE II MEETINGS OF MEMBERS

Section 1. Annual Meeting. ThemembersoftheStateBarshallmeetatleastonceeachyearatatimeandplacedesignatedbytheBoardofGovernors.ThatmeetingshallbecalledtheAnnualMeeting.

Section 2. Rules of Order. AtallmeetingsofthemembersoftheStateBar,itsBoardofGovernors,oranycommitteethereof,Robert’sRulesofOrder,NewlyRevisedshallgovernastoparliamentaryprocedure,exceptwherethoserulesconflictwithanyprovisionoftheRulesorBylawsoftheStateBar.

Section 3. Order of Business. AteachmeetingofthemembersoftheStateBar,theorderofbusinessmaybeprescribedbytheBoardofGovernors,exceptasprovidedintheseBylaws.Theorderofbusinessmaybechangedbymajorityvoteofthememberspresent.

Section 4. Quorum. Aquorumforthetransactionofbusinessatanymeetingofthemem-bersoftheStateBarshallconsistoffiftyactivemembersinattendance.

Section 5. Resolutions Committee. ThePresidentshallappointannuallyacommitteeonresolutionsconsistingofnotlessthanfivemembers.Eachresolutionproposedtobepresentedforconsiderationbythemembershipatanyannual,mid-yearorspecialmeetingandwhichisofferedbyanindividualmembershallfirstbereferredtothisCommittee.TheCommitteeshallmeetduringthefirstdayoftheStateBarmeetingataplaceandtimewhichshallbedescribedintheofficialprogramofthemeeting.Atthatpublishedtimeandplace,theCommitteeshallholdapublichearingonanyresolutionorresolutionssubmittedtoitandshallreportthoseresolutions,togetherwiththeCommittee’srecommendations,atthenextplenarysessionscheduledforthatmeeting.

Section 6. Proposed Legislation.(a)Nolegislationshallberecommended,supportedor

opposedbytheStateBarunless:(1)suchactionhasbeeninitiatedbyanappropriate

committeeorsection,orbyanytenmembersoftheBoardofGovernors;and

(2)thetextofthelegislationisfurnishedtothePresident,thePresident-ElectandtheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislationatleastthirtydayspriortoitssubmissionforapprovalordisap-provalassetforthbelow;and

(3)providedfurther:(i)thatsuchlegislativepositionreceivesamajority

voteofthemembersoftheStateBarpresentatameeting;or(ii)thatsuchlegislativepositionreceivesatwo-thirds

voteofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvoting;or

(iii)whentheBoardofGovernorsisnotinsession,suchlegislativepositionreceivesatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembersoftheExecutiveCommitteevoting.(b)Inadditiontoandinaidoftheselegislativepowers,the

Boardshallhavethepowertoadopt,byavoteoftwo-thirdsofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvoting,aStandingBoardPolicyregardinglegislation.SuchStandingBoardPolicyshallbebindingfromsessiontosessionunlesssuspended,modifiedorrescindedpursuanttoatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvoting.

(c)NocommitteeorsectionoftheStateBarshallrecom-mend,supportoropposeanylegislationexceptinthemannerhereinprovided.

ARTICLE III BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Section 1. ThisArticleisrestatedtoconformtoanamendmenttoRule1-302asadoptedbytheSupremeCourton[dateofSupremeCourtOrder]

Section 2. TheBoardofGovernorsshallbecomposedofthefollowing:

(a)OfficerMembers.TheOfficerMembersoftheBoardofGovernorsshallconsistofthePresident,thePresident-Elect,theImmediatePastPresident,theSecretary,theTreasurer,thePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivision,thePresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivision,andtheAttorneyGeneral.

(b)CircuitMembers.TheCircuitMembersoftheBoardofGovernorsshallconsistofanumberofmembersfromeachJudicialCircuitequaltothenumberofmembersasexistedonJanuary1,2001,plusanadditional7BoardofGovernorsmem-berstobeelectedfromtheAtlantaJudicialCircuit.EachJudicialCircuitmaygainanadditionalmemberforeachadditional500activemembersoftheStateBaraddedtothatcircuitafterJanuary1,2001.EveryjudicialcircuitshallbeentitledtoelectatleastonememberoftheBoard.

(c)NonresidentMembers.ThereshallbetwononresidentmembersoftheBoardofGovernorswhoshallbeanactivemem-bersoftheStateBaringoodstandingresidingoutsideofGeorgia.Thenonresidentmembersshallbefromdifferentstates.Onenonresidentmemberseatshallbean“odd”seatandtheotheran“even”seatasprovidedinSection4below.

(d)AppointedMembers.ThePresident-ElectinofficewhenthisBylawbecomeseffectiveshallappointthreememberstotheBoardofGovernors.Thefirsttwopositionswillbeconsidered“odd”seats,andthethirdwillbeconsideredan“even”seatasprovidedinSection4below.Thereafter,thePresident-Electshallappointtwomembersinyearswhenthe“odd”seatsexpireandonememberintheyears“even”seatsexpire.TheappointedmembersshallbechoseninsuchamannerastopromotediversitywithintheBoardofGovernors.


(e)Thenumberofthecircuitmembers,plusthenonresidentmembers,plustheappointedmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsshallnotexceed150,exceptassetoutinSection6(a)below.

Section 3. Term of Office. Thetermofofficeofthecircuitmembers,andthenonresidentmembers,andtheappointedmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsshallbefortwoyears;theword“year”asusedhereshallmeantheperiodfromtheadjournmentofanannualmeetinguntiltheadjournmentofthenextannualmeetingofthemembers.Eachcircuitmember,andnonresi-dentmember,andappointedmembershallcontinuetoserveuntilthetermforwhichthememberwaselectedhasexpired,anduntilasucces-sorhasbeenelectedorappointed.Notwithstandingtheabove,theBoardmayadoptattendancerequirementswhichconditionorterminatethetermofaBoardmemberforfailuretoattendBoardmeetings.

Section 4. Thetermsofthecircuitmembers,nonresidentmembers,andappointedmembersoftheBoardshallbestaggeredsothatthosedes-ignated“odd”willexpireattheannualmeetinginodd-numberedyearsandthosedesignated“even”willexpireineven-numberedyears.

Section 5. Thecurrentcircuitmembership,nonresidentmembership,andappointedmembership,withthe“odd”and“even”postsnowinexis-tence,isasfollows:

Section 6. Alterations of Positions on Board of Governors. AftertheorganizationoftheBoardofGovernorsasprovidedforinSection5above,whenalterationsinpositionsontheBoardoccurbecauseofadditionalcircuitmembersoftheStateBarasreferredtoinSection2aboveorbecauseofthecreationorabolitionofcircuitsorwhenthetermsofmembersareterminatedbecauseofachangeingeo-graphicallimitsofcircuitsthetermsofthemembersaffectedshallbedeterminedasfollows:

(a)WhenadditionalpositionsarecreatedinexistingcircuitsbecauseofadditionalmembersoftheStateBarinsuchcircuits,thepositionorpostontheBoardthuscreatedshallbegiventhenexthighernumberafterthelastexistingpost(thememberinacircuithavingtheretoforeonlyonememberbeingconsideredasoccupyingPostNo.1)andthenewpostshallhaveatermexpir-ingoneyearafterthatofthehighestnumberedexistingpost.Thenewlycreatedpost(s)shallbeinsertedintheappropriatecolumninSection5above.Ifacircuitisabolished,thenameofthecir-cuitandallpost(s)thereinshallbestrickenfromtheappropriatecolumn(s)inSection5above.Uponthecreationofanewjudicialcircuit,suchcircuitshallbeentitledtoatleastonemembershipontheBoardevenifthecapof150memberssetoutinSection2(d)abovehasbeenreached,andifthecaphasnotbeenreached,maybeentitledtoadditionalmembersdependingonthenumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarresidinginthecircuit,accordingtotheformulasetforthinSection2ofthisArticle.Likewise,thetermsofofficeandmethodofdesignating“odd”or“even”posts

shallbeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSections3,4,and5ofthisArticle.

Ifthegeographicallimitsofajudicialcircuitarechanged,andbyreasonofsaidchangethereisareductioninthenumberofSuperiorCourtjudgestowhichthatcircuitwasentitledtoonJuly1,1979,thereshallbeacorrespondingreductioninthenumberofmembersoftheBoardrepresentingthatcircuitifthereweremorethanoneBoardmem-berrepresentingthatcircuit.Intheeventofareduction,thelast-createdpostwillbethefirstposteliminated. IfthechangeinthegeographicallimitsofajudicialcircuitdoesnotresultinareductioninthenumberofSuperiorCourtjudgesinsuchcircuit,thensuchcircuitshallretainatleastasmanymembersoftheBoardasithadonJuly1,1979.ThetermsofofficeofsaidmembersoftheBoardshallremainastheywerepriortothechangeinthegeograph-icallimitsofthecircuit. Additionalmembersofthecircuitwhichhasexperiencedachangeingeographicallimits,ifthecaphasnotbeenreached,willbedeter-minedbythenumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarresidinginthatcircuitasprovidedinSection2ofthisArticle. Achangeinthenameofajudicialcircuitshallhavenoeffectuponthecircuit’sBoard’srepresentatives,exceptasotherwiseprovided.

(b)Whenthegeographicallimitsofcircuitsarealtered,theterm(s)ofthemember(s)fromthenewcircuitwiththesamenameastheformercircuitshallbethesameastheterm(s)ofthemember(s)fromtheformercircuit.ThetermofthefirstmemberfromthenewcircuitwithanewnameshallbedeterminedbyaddingthenameofthatcircuittothecolumninSection5abovecontainingtheleastnumberofpositions.

(c)IftwoormoreoftheeventsreferredtointhisSectionoccurinthesameyear,thetermsofmembersaffectedshallbedeterminedbyperformingthestepsinsubparagraphs(a)and(b)inthatorder,andasbetweentwoormorealterationsofgeographicallimits,intheorderoftheireffectivedatesoriftheyhavethesameeffectivedate,inorderoftheintroductionofthelegislationmakingthealteration.

(d)ForthepurposesofthisSection,legislationshallbedeemedeffectiveonthedateofitsenactmentandelectionsshallbeheldaccordingly,notwithstandingthatbyitstermsthelegisla-tionisnoteffectiveuntilalaterdate.However,apersonelectedtoapositionontheBoardofGovernorsasaresultoflegislationshallnotbecomeamemberuntiltheactualeffectivedateofthelegislation.

(e)Whenever,undersubparagraphs(a)and(b)hereof,itisdirectedthatacircuitorpostbeaddedorstrickenfromthecol-umnsinSection5above,thesectionisautomaticallyamendedaccordingly.

Section 7. Honorary Members. AllpastPresidentsoftheGeorgiaBarAssociation,allpastPresidentsoftheStateBar,excepttheImmediatePastPresident,andallpastPresidentsoftheYoungerLawyersSectionoftheStateBarshallbehonorarymembersoftheBoardofGovernors,providedtheyaremembersoftheStateBar.HonorarymembersmayattendallmeetingsoftheBoardandparticipateinitsproceedings,butshallnotvoteonanyquestionaris-inginthemeetingsoftheBoard,norbecountedinascertainingaquorum.

Section 8. New Positions, Unfilled Positions, Vacancies, and Lost Positions.

(a)Ifanynewpositioniscreatedinacircuitbecauseofanincreaseinmembershipofsuchcircuit,orifanynewpositioniscreatedasaresultoflegislationestablishinganewjudicialcircuit,thePresidentshallappointanactivememberoftheStateBarinsuchcircuittoholdofficefortheremainingterm.

(b)IfnosuccessoriselectedasprovidedforinSection3ofthisArticleIII,thePresidentshall,attheannualmeetingorwithinthirtydaysthereafter,appointasuccessortotheBoardfromthecircuitsofailingtoelect,orinthecaseofanonresidentmember,fromtheactivenonresidentmembersoftheStateBar.

(c)IfanyothervacancyofacircuitmemberseatontheBoardofGovernorsoccursatorbetweenannualmeetingsoftheStateBar,thePresidentshallappointanactivememberofthecir-cuitinwhichthevacancyoccurstoholdofficefortheunexpiredterm.Ifthevacancyisanonresidentmemberseat,thePresidentshallappointanactivememberofastatedifferentfromtheothernonresidentseattoholdofficefortheunexpiredterm.Ifthevacancyisanappointedseat,thePresidentshallappointanactivemembertoholdofficefortheunexpiredterm,keepinginmindthatsuchpositionshouldbeusedtoincreasethediversityofthemem-bersoftheBoardofGovernors.

(d)IntheeventapositioniseliminatedforanyreasonunderthisArticleIII,therepresentativefillingtheposttobeeliminatedshallservefortheremainderofthetermforwhichsaidrepresenta-tivewaselected.


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ODD

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EVEN

(e)Ifasaresultofachangeinthegeographicalboundariesofanyjudicialcircuitaboardmemberisnolongerlocatedwithinthegeographicboundariesoftheposttowhichthememberwaselected,thepresidentshallappointsuchrepresentativetothecircuitinwhichthememberisactuallylocatedifavacancyiscre-atedorexistsinsuchcircuit.Ifnovacancyexistsinthecircuit,theboardmembershallserveouttheremainderofhisorhertermasdescribedinsubsection(d)above.

Section 9. Quorum. FortymembersoftheBoardofGovernorsrepresentingatleastfivejudicialcircuitsshallconstituteaquorumforthetransactionofbusinessatanyBoardmeeting.

Section 10. Powers and Duties. ThegovernmentoftheStateBarshallbevestedintheBoardofGovernors.TheBoardshallcontrolandadministertheaffairsoftheStateBarandshallhavethepowertodoallthingsandtakeallactionswhichinitsjudgmentmaybenecessaryordesirabletocarryoutthepurposesoftheStateBarinkeepingwiththeRulesandtheseBylaws.ItshallkeeparecordofitsproceedingsandshallreportattheannualmeetingofthemembersoftheStateBar.

Section 11. Meetings. TheBoardofGovernorsshallmeetduringorimmediatelyaftertheadjournmentoftheannualmeetingofthemembersoronthefollowingday,astheincomingPresidentmaydirect.ThereshallbeatleastthreeadditionalregularmeetingsoftheBoardeachyearatsuchtimesandplacesasmaybefixedbytheBoardoritsPresident.SpecialmeetingsmaybecalledbythePresident.UpontherequestoftwentymembersoftheBoard,thePresidentortheExecutiveDirectorshallgivenoticeofameetingnotlessthantennormorethantwentydaysaftersuchrequestisreceived.EachmemberoftheBoardshallhaveatleasttendays’noticebymailofeachmeetingoftheBoardofGovernors,otherthanthemeet-ingheldinconjunctionwiththeannualmeeting.

Section 12. Budget. TheBoardofGovernorsshall,atitsmeetingheldinconjunctionwiththeannualmeeting,adoptabudgetforthefollowingfiscalyearshowingtheanticipatedincomeandtentativeappropriationstocoverestimatedexpensesoftheStateBar,whichbudgettheBoardshallhaveauthorityfromtimetotimetoamend.InnoeventshalltheofficershaveauthoritytospendmoneyorincurindebtednessexceptasprovidedforinthebudgetfixedbytheBoard.

ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Section 1. Members. ThereshallbeanExecutiveCommitteeoftheBoardofGovernorscomposedofthefollowing:thePresident,thePresident-Elect,theImmediatePastPresident,theSecretary,theTreasurer,thePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivision,thePresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivision,theImmediatePastPresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionandsix(6)membersoftheBoardofGovernorselectedbytheBoard.TheelectionofmembersoftheExecutiveCommitteebytheBoardofGovernorsshalltakeplaceatthemeetingoftheBoardfollowingadjourn-mentoftheannualmeetingfortheStateBarofGeorgia,andtheyshallserveforthetermforwhichtheyareelectedanduntiltheirsuccessorsareelectedandqualified.Electionsshallbebymajorityvoteofthosemem-bersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvoting.Aballotmustcontainone(1)voteforeachpositiontobefilledinorderforittobecounted.Nocandidatemayreceivemorethanonevoteperballot.Afterthefirstoranysucceedingballot,thosecandidateswiththevotesofamajorityofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvotingshallbedeclaredelectedtotheoffice.IfmorecandidatesreceivethevotesofamajorityofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvotingthantherearevacanciestobefilled,thevacanciesshallbefilledfromthecandidatesreceivingthegreatestnumberofvotes.If,afteranyballot,oneormorepositionsremainunfilled,orthereisatieforthelastposition,additionalballotsshallbecastuntilallpositionsarefilled.Thosepersonsdeclaredelectedshallbedroppedfromallsucceedingballots.Ifonanyballotnocandidateisdeclaredelected,onthenextsucceedingballotthepersonorpersonswhoreceivedthelowestnumberofvotescastshallbedroppedfromthisandallfutureballots,unlesstodosowouldreducethenumberofcandidatestoanumberlessthanthepositionstobefilledplusone. AtthefirstelectionofmembersoftheExecutiveCommitteebytheBoardofGovernorsafteradjournmentofthe1998AnnualMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiasix(6)membersoftheExecutiveCommitteeshallbeelected,three(3)ofwhomshallservefortwo-yeartermsandthree(3)ofwhomshallserveforone-yearterms;andthePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiashalldeterminebylotwhichthree(3)ofthesix(6)memberselectedatsuchfirstelectionshallserveforoneyearandwhichthree(3)shallservefortwo(2)years.Thereafterallmembersof

theExecutiveCommitteeelectedbytheBoardofGovernorsshallbeelectedfortermsoftwo(2)yearseach.

Section 2. Duties. TheExecutiveCommitteeshallexerciseallofthepowersoftheBoardofGovernorsbetweenmeetingsoftheBoardandshallreporttoeachmeetingoftheBoard.IfunanimouslyapprovedbytheCommitteemembers,theExecutiveCommitteemaytransactitsbusinessbytele-phoneorcorrespondence.

ARTICLE V OFFICERS

Section 1. Generally. OfficersoftheStateBarshallconsistofaPresident,aPresident-Elect,anImmediatePastPresident,aSecretary,andaTreasurer.Aftertheirelection,theSecretaryandtheTreasurershallserveuntilthenextannualmeeting.TheSecretaryandtheTreasurermaynotservemorethanthreeconsecutiveterms. ThePresident,ImmediatePastPresident,andthePresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivisionshallbeex-officioofficersoftheStateBar.

Section 2. The President. ThePresidentshall:

(a)presideatallmeetingsoftheStateBar;(b)chairtheBoardofGovernorsandpresideatallofits

meetings;(c)submittotheBoardofGovernorsnolaterthanthesecond

meetingoftheBoardwhichthePresidentchairs,aproposedpro-gramofactivitiesfortheyear,alistoftheappointmentsofchairandmembersofstandingcommitteesfortheyearasprovidedbytheRulesandtheseBylaws,andbudgetaryrecommendationsasdeemedappropriate;and

(d)deliverareportattheannualmeetingofthemembersontheactivitiesoftheStateBarduringhisorhertermofofficeandfurnishacopyofthereporttotheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Section 3. The President-Elect. ThePresident-ElectshallperformdutiesdelegatedtohimorherbythePresident,prescribedbytheBoardofGovernorsandasotherwiseprovidedintheBarRulesandBylaws.Upontheabsence,death,disabil-ity,orresignationofthePresident,thePresident-ElectshallpresideatallmeetingsoftheStateBarandtheBoard,andshallperformallotherdutiesofthePresident. ToensurecontinuityintheprogramoftheStateBarforthebenefitofthelegalprofessionandthepublic,thePresident-ElectshallplantheprogramfortheyearinwhichheorsheshallactasPresidentandmakeneededarrangementsforthepromptinaugurationoftheprogramupontakingofficeasPresident.

Section 4. The Immediate Past President. TheImmediatePastPresidentshall:

(a)chairtheBoardofTrusteesfortheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducation;

(b)serveasex-officiomemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandtheCommissiononLawyerCompetency;and

(c)performotherdutiesdelegatedtohimorherbythePresidentandprescribedbytheBoardofGovernors.

Upontheabsence,death,resignation,ordisabilityoftheImmediatePastPresident,thenextmostimmediatepastpresidentshallassumethedutiesoftheImmediatePastPresident.

Section 5. The Secretary. TheSecretaryshallhavegeneralchargeoftherecordsoftheStateBarandshallactassecretaryformeetingsoftheBoardofGovernorsandoftheExecutiveCommittee.TheSecretaryshallalsoperformdutiesprescribedbytheBoard.

Section 6. The Treasurer. TheTreasurershall:

(a)depositinaccordancewiththeinvestmentpolicyapprovedbytheBoardofGovernorsallfundsreceivedbytheStateBarinabankorbanks,orinvestmentfirmorfirmsdesig-natedbytheBoardofGovernors;

(b)disburseallfundsoftheStateBarpursuanttothebudgetbymeansofchecksorvoucherssignedbytheTreasurerandbyoneofthefollowing:theSecretary,thePresident,theImmediatePastPresident,thePresident-Elect,theExecutiveDirector,theActingExecutiveDirector,theAssistantExecutiveDirectorortheGeneralCounsel;however,intheabsenceoftheTreasurer,thePresidentortheSecretaryshallsignallchecksorvouchers;

(c)keepregularaccountswhichatalltimesshallbeopentoinspectionbythemembersoftheStateBar;

(d)reportannually,andmorefrequentlyifrequiredbythePresidentortheBoardofGovernors,withregardtothefinancialaffairsoftheStateBar;and


(e)directanannualauditofallfunds,propertyandaccountsoftheStateBarperformedbyanindependentcertifiedpublicaccountantselectedbytheBoardofGovernors,thereportofwhichshallbedeliveredtotheofficersandmadeavailabletothemembership.

Section 7. Ex-officio Officers. ThePresident,ImmediatePastPresident,andPresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivisionshallbeex-officioofficersoftheStateBar.TheirdutiesshallbeprescribedbytheBoardofGovernorsordel-egatedbythePresident,President-Elect,ortheExecutiveCommitteeoftheStateBar.

Section 8. Bond. Ablanketfidelitybondshallbeobtainedtocoverallofficers,employees,orotherpersonshandlingfundsoftheStateBar.ThebondshallbepayabletotheStateBarinanamount,notlessthan$25,000,tobedeterminedbytheBoardofGovernors.

ARTICLE VI THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Section 1. Election. TheExecutiveDirectorshallbenominatedandelectedbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBaratitsfirstmeetingofeachyear.

Section 2. Salary, Duties, and Term. ThesalaryanddutiesoftheExecutiveDirectorshallbefixedandoutlinedbytheBoardofGovernors.ThetermofofficeoftheExecutiveDirectorshallbeoneyear.Uponthedeath,resignation,ordisabilityoftheSecretaryortheTreasurer,thedutiesoftheSecretaryorTreasurershallbeperformedbytheExecutiveDirectoruntilasuccessorisappointedasprovidedinArticleXII,Section1.

Section 3. Duties. TheExecutiveDirectorshallperformthedutiesprescribedbytheBoardofGovernorsandthosedelegatedbythePresident,Secretary,andTreasurer.

ARTICLE VII NOMINATIONS AND ELECTIONS

Section 1. Nomination of Officers.(a)TheBoardofGovernorsshallannuallynominatecandi-

datesforeachofthefollowingoffices:President-Elect,Secretary,andTreasurer,andiftheofficeofPresident-Electisvacant,fortheofficeofPresident.NonomineeshallbeproposedtotheBoardasacandidateforanyofficeunlessthemembermakingtheproposalissatisfiedthattheproposednomineeintendstoacceptthenomi-nationandserveifelected.

(b)AfternominationsaremadebytheBoard,tenmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsrepresentingatleastfivedifferentcircuits,orthirtyactivemembersoftheStateBar,includingatleastfiveactivemembersfromeachofthreedifferentcircuits,maynominatecandidatesforPresident-Elect,Secretary,andTreasurer(andwhentheofficeofPresident-Electisvacant,forPresident)byfilingwiththeExecutiveDirectorwithintendaysafternominationsbytheBoardapetitionintheformandsubjecttotherequirementsprescribedinthisArticle.NonomineeshallbeproposedtotheBoardasacandidateforanyofficeunlessthemembersmakingtheproposalaresatisfiedthattheproposednom-ineeintendstoacceptthenominationandserveifelected.

(c)Noperson,otherthanacandidatenominatedaspro-videdinsubparagraphs(a)and(b)above,maybeelectedby“write-in”ballotsorotherwisetoanyofficedescribedinthisSection,unlessthatpersonshallhavefiledwiththeExecutiveDirector,notlessthantendayspriortothedateonwhichthebal-lotsaretobemailedtothemembership,awrittenstatementthatheorsheisa“write-in”candidatefortheofficeindicatedandintendstoserveifelected.

Section 2. Nomination of Members for the Board of Governors.(a)CircuitMembers.Whenthetermofamemberofthe

BoardofGovernorsrepresentingacircuitistoexpireatthenextannualmeeting,membersofthatcircuitmaynominateacandidateforthatofficefortheensuingtwo-yeartermbyfilingwiththeExecutiveDirector,onthedatedeterminedaccordingtoSection14ofthisArticle,apetitionintheformandsubjecttotherequire-mentsprescribedinthisArticle.IfanincumbentmemberoftheBoardofGovernorsintendstoofferasacandidateforre-election,theincumbentshallfileapetition,intheformandsubjecttotherequirementsprescribedinthisArticle,withtheExecutiveDirectoronthedatedeterminedaccordingtoSection14ofthisArticle.ThepetitionshallbesignedbyaminimumnumberofactivemembersoftheStateBarfromthecircuitasfollows:

(1)threefromacircuithavinglessthantwenty-fivemembers;

(2)sevenfromacircuithavingmorethantwenty-fourbutlessthanonehundredmembers;or

(3)twentyfromacircuithavingmorethanninety-ninemembers.(b)NonresidentMembers.Nominationsforelectionofa

nonresidentmemberoftheBoardofGovernorsshallbefiledwiththeExecutiveDirectoronthedatedeterminedaccordingtoSection14ofthisArticleandshallbeinwrittenformasprescribedinthisArticle.ThepetitionshallbesignedbyatleastfiveactivenonresidentmembersoftheStateBar.

Section 3. Circuits Having More Than One Member of Board of Governors. IncircuitshavingmorethanonememberoftheBoardofGovernors,thepositionsshallbedesignatedconsecutivelyas“PostNo.1,”“PostNo.2,”etc.Thenumberingshallbesolelyfornominationsandelections.Nominatingpetitionsshalldesignatethenumberofthepostforwhichthecandidateisnominated.Nopersonshallbenominatedformorethanonepost.Aseparatenominatingpetitionshallbefiledforeachpost.MembersoftheStateBarfromacircuitelectingmorethanonememberoftheBoardofGovernorsinanyyearshallbeentitledtocastonevoteforacandidateforeachpost.

Section 4. Nominating Petitions. Nominatingpetitionsshallbeinsubstantiallythefollowingform:

STATEBAROFGEORGIANOMINATINGPETITION

TheundersignedactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstanding(ormembersoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia)herebynominate_______________fortheofficeofmemberoftheBoardofGovernorsfromthe_________Circuit,Post_________(ifapplicable)or____NonresidentPost[or,theofficeofPresident-Elect,Secretary,Treasurer(or,whentheofficeofPresident-Electisvacant,President)]forthetermbeginningatthecloseoftheAnnualMeetingin20__.

Signature Name(PleasePrint) Bar# Circuit/Nonresident________ ________________ _____ ________________________ ________________ _____ ________________________ ________________ _____ ________________Iintendtoacceptthenominationand,ifelected,toservebyattendingmeetingsoftheBoardandreportingtheactivitiesoftheBoardtomyconstituents.______________________________(Name)

Petitionsshallbesignedpersonallybythenominators.Morethanonecounterpartofapetitionforacandidatemaybefiledand,indeterminingwhetherthepetitionmeetstherequirementsofSections1(b)and2ofthisArticle,shalltogetherbetreatedasasinglepeti-tion.Thepetition(oratleastonecounterpart)shallbesignedbythenomineeindicatinghisorherintentiontoacceptthenominationandtoserveifelected.

Section 5. Accepting Nominations. EachnomineeforofficeintheStateBarnominatedbytheBoardofGovernorspursuanttoSection1(a),shallimmediatelybenotifiedofthenominationandofallotherpersonsnominatedforthesamepositionandshall,withintendays,acceptorrejectthenomina-tion.Nomineesfailingtorespondshallbedeemedtohaveacceptedthenomination.

Section 6. Ballots. TheExecutiveCommitteeshalldeterminethelistofcandidatesandhaveballotsprepared.Theballotshallincludethenameofeachcandi-dateandaspaceforawrite-invoteforeachpositiontowhichtheballotapplies.TheballotshallcontainvotinginstructionsandanoticeofthelastdatebywhichtheballotmustbereceivedattheStateBarHeadquarters.TheBoardofGovernorsshallannuallydeterminethisdate.

Section 7. Voters Lists; Distribution of Ballots.(a)Avoterslistcontainingthenamesofactivemembers

withinthecircuitshallbepreparedforeachcircuit.Eachmembershallbeassignedadistinguishingnumber.

(b)Avoterslistshallbepreparedforactivenonresidentmembers.Eachmembershallbegivenadistinguishingnumber.

(c)OnthedatedeterminedaccordingtoSection14ofthisArticle,eachmembershallbefurnishedbyregularmail:

(1)aballotforelectionofofficersoftheStateBarandforelectionofamemberormembersoftheBoardofGovernorsofthemember’scircuitor,inthecaseofnonresi-dentmembers,forthenonresidentmemberpost,ifanelectionistobeheldinthatyear;and


(2)anenvelopeaddressedtotheheadquartersoftheStateBarbearingthenumberreferredtoinsubparagraphs(a)and(b),above.Theballotsshallbearnonumber.

Section 8. Method of Voting. ThemembershallmarktheballotaccordingtoitsinstructionsandshallreturntheballotorballotsintheenvelopeprovidedtotheStateBaronorbeforethedatespecifiedbytheBoardofGovernors.Onlyballotstimelyreturnedshallbecounted.

Section 9. Election Committee. TheElectionCommitteeshallconducttheelection,countorsupervisethecountingoftheballots,andreporttheresultsonthedatedeterminedaccordingtoSection14ofthisArticleunderproceduresestablishedbytheBoardofGovernors.TheElectionCommitteemayutilizeStateBarstaffandfacilitiesandmayemployimpartialaccount-ingandclericalassistanceasnecessary. Incomputingthenumberofvotesconstitutingamajorityofthosecastineachelection,theCommitteeshallexcludefromthecomputationthevotescastfora“write-in”candidatereceivinglessthantwopercentofthetotalvotescast.

Section 10. Declaration of Results of Elections. ThecandidateinanyelectionforofficersreceivingamajorityofthevotesineachelectionoracandidatefortheBoardofGovernorswhoreceivesapluralityofthevote(accordingtothereportoftheElectionCommitteeoroftheRecountCommittee)shallbedeclaredelected.

Section 11. Tie Vote.(a)Officers.Ifthereisatievotebetweentwoormorecandidatesreceiv-

ingthehighestnumberofvotesinanyelectionforofficers,theincumbentshallcontinuetoserveuntiltheBoardofGovernorselectsoneofthetyingcandidatesasthesuccessor.Ifmorethanoneelectionresultsinatievote,theBoardofGovernorsshallfirstdeterminewhoshallbeelectedinthisorder:Treasurer,Secretary,President-Electand,whenappropriate,President.

(b)CircuitPosts.Ifthereisatievotebetweentwoormorecandidatesreceiv-

ingthehighestnumberofvotesinanyelectionforacircuitpost,arun-offelectionshallbeheldpursuanttoArticleVII,Section12oftheseBylaws.

Section 12. Run-Off. Ifnocandidateforofficereceivesamajorityofthevotescastorifthereisatievoteforacircuitpost,withintendaysfromthedateofthereportoftheElectionCommitteeortheRecountCommittee,theBoardofGovernorsshallmakeprovisionsforarunoffelectionbetweenthetwocandidatesreceivingthehighestnumberofvotesoralltiedcandi-dates.TherunoffelectionshallbeheldnolaterthanthirtydaysfromthedateofthereportoftheElectionCommitteeorRecountCommitteeandshallbeconductedasprovidedforregularelections.Theincumbentshallcontinuetoserveuntilthesuccessorisdetermined.Inrun-offelec-tions,membersoftheBoardshallbeelectedbypluralityvote.

Section 13. Recount. AnycandidatedissatisfiedwiththeresultofthecountbytheElectionCommitteeinhisorherelectioncontestmayrequestwithintwodaysofthedateuponwhichthecountiscompleted,arecountoftheballotspertainingtotheelectionbyfilingarequestinwritingwiththeExecutiveDirector.ThePresidentshallappointarecountcom-mitteecomposedofpersonswhoarenotmembersoftheElectionCommittee.Assoonaspracticable,butnotlessthanthreedayspriortotheWednesdayoftheweekduringwhichtheannualmeetingoftheStateBarisscheduled,theRecountCommitteeshallcounttheballotspertainingtoallelectionsinwhicharecounthasbeenrequested,exam-inetheballotsnotcounted,determinethenumberofvotesvalidlycastforeachcandidateintheelection,andimmediatelyreporttheresultstothePresidentwhoshallannouncetheresultsatthefirstplenarysessionduringthatannualmeeting.Theresultsoftherecountshallbefinal.

Section 14. Date of Elections.(a)Atleast15dayspriortothemeetingoftheExecutive

CommitteeimmediatelyprecedingthefallmeetingoftheBoardofGovernors,theElectionsCommitteeshallmeetandpublishaproposedschedulefortheupcomingelectionswhichshallsetoutthespecificdatesforthefollowingevents:thedatetheOfficialElectionNoticeistobepublishedintheGeorgia Bar Journal;thedatetheNominatingPetitionpackageshallbemailedtoBoardofGovernorsIncumbents;thedatetheBoardofGovernorsshallnominatecandidatesforofficersoftheStateBar;thedeadlineforthereceiptofnominatingpetitionsforincumbentBoardMembers;thedeadlineforthereceiptofnominatingpetitionsfornewBoardMembers;thedeadlineforreceiptofnominationsofnonresidentmembersoftheBoard;thedateonwhichtheballotsaretobe

mailed;thedeadlineforballotstobecastinordertobevalid;andthedatetheelectionresultsshallbereportedandmadeavailable.

(b)TheExecutiveCommitteeshallreviewandapprove,ormodifyandapprovesuchscheduleassubmittedbytheElectionsCommittee.Theschedule,asapprovedbytheExecutiveCommittee,shallthenbesubmittedtotheBoardofGovernorsnolaterthanthefallmeetingforapproval.

(c)ShouldtheExecutiveCommitteedeterminethattheelectionschedulemustbefinalizedpriortothefallmeetingoftheBoardofGovernors,orintheeventthereisnofallmeetingoftheBoardofGovernors,theExecutiveCommitteemaygivefinalapprovaltotheelectionscheduleandsoinformtheBoardofGovernorsatthenextmeeting.

ARTICLE VIII COMMITTEES - GENERALLY

Section 1. Standing Committees.(a)CreationofStandingCommittees;StatementofPurpose.TheBoardofGovernorsmaycreatestandingcommit-

teesforsuchpurposesasitdeemsappropriate.ThemembersofeachstandingcommitteeshallbeappointedbythePresident.Anyrequestforthecreationofastandingcommitteeshallbeaccompaniedbyastatementofpurpose.AlistingofthestandingcommitteesoftheStateBarshallbepublishedannuallyintheStateBarDirectory.Thepublicationshallincludeadescriptionofeachcommittee’spurpose,thenamesofcurrentcommitteemem-bersandtheirrespectiveterms.

(b)AppointmentofMembers.(i)Three-yearterms.Thereshallbeaminimumofnine

membersofeachstandingcommitteeappointedforthree-yearterms.Regardlessofwhentheappointmentwasmade,suchtermshallbeginonJuly1oftheyeartheappointingPresidenttookoffice,andexpireonJune30threeyearslater,exceptfortheFinanceCommitteewhichtermshallbeginonJanuary1oftheBaryeartheappointingPresidenttookoffice,andexpireonDecember31threeyearslater.Allsuchappointmentsshallbeforstaggeredtermsofthreeyearssothat,asreasonableaspos-sible,one-thirdofallcommitteemembersappointedforthreeyeartermsshallretireattheendofeachyear.

(ii)One-yearterms.ThePresidentmayappointadditionalmembersofeachstandingcommitteeasthePresidentdeemsappropriate.Regardlessofwhensuchadditionalcommitteemembersareappointed,thetermofsuchappointeesshallbeginonJuly1oftheyeartheappointingPresidenttookofficeandshallexpireonthefollowingJune30,exceptfortheFinanceCommitteewhichtermshallbeginonJanuary1andexpireonthefollowingDecember31.

(iii)Non-votingadvisorymembers.ThePresidentmayappointnon-votingadvisoryandliaisonmemberstoeachstandingcommitteeasthePresidentdeemsappropri-ate.Regardlessofwhenappointed,suchtermshallbeginonJuly1oftheyeartheappointingPresidenttookofficeandshallexpireonthefollowingJune30,exceptfortheFinanceCommitteewhichtermshallbeginonJanuary1andexpireonthefollowingDecember31.

(iv)Appointmentstofulfillquorumrequirements.Intheeventofanyappointee’sresignations,incapacitation,orper-sistentinabilitytoperformcommitteebusiness,thePresidentshallhavetheauthoritytoappointareplacementtoserveforthedurationoftheoriginalappointee’sterm.ThePresidentshallexerciseallforegoingdiscretionarypowersofappointmenttoadvancetheobjectiveofenablingcommitteestoobtainquo-rumsandconductregularcommitteebusiness.

(v)NoticeofThree-YearTermAppointments.IncomingPresidentsshallinformtheBoardofappointmentstofillexpir-ingorvacantthree-yeartermsonstandingcommitteesattheStateBar’sAnnualMeeting.

(vi)NoticeofOtherAppointments.Appointmentstoone-yeartermsortonon-votingadvisoryorliaisoncapacityonanystandingcommitteeshallbepublishedintheStateBarDirectory,provided,however,thatnothinginthisprovisionshallprohibitaPresidentfromexercisingdiscretiontomakeadditionalsuchappointmentsaftertheDirectoryhasbeenpub-lishedorsentforpublication.

(vii)ExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonMembers.NotlaterthanthesecondBoardofGovernorsmeetingduringthePresident’sterminoffice,thePresidentmayappointanExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonmembertosuchstandingcom-mitteesasthePresidentchooses.SuchExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonMembersshallserveforatermofoneyear,withsuchtermexpiringontheFirstJune30aftersuchappointment,exceptfortheFinanceCommitteewhichtermshallbeginonJanuary1andexpireonthefollowingDecember31.Such


membersshallhavefullvotingprivilegesandcounttowardsaquorumatanymeetingofastandingcommittee.(c)Chairperson,Co-chairsandViceChairpersonorVice

Co-chairs.EachyearthePresidentshallappointachairpersonorco-

chairsandavicechairpersonorviceco-chairsofeachstandingcommittee.Achairpersonor,intheabsenceofthechairperson,thevice-chairpersonmayactonbehalfofthecommitteewhenitisnotpracticalorpossibletoconferwiththecommittee.

(d)AbolitionofStandingCommittees.StandingCommitteesmaybeabolishedbytheBoardof

Governorsfollowingwrittennoticetothechairpersonandmem-bersoftheCommittee.

Section 2. Special Committees.(a)CreationofSpecialCommittees;StatementofPurpose.ThePresidentmaycreatespecialcommitteesforsuch

purposesasdeemedappropriate.Alistofthespecialcommit-teesoftheStateBarshallbepublishedannuallyintheStateBarDirectory.Thepublicationshallincludeadescriptionofeachcom-mittee’spurposeandthenamesofcurrentcommitteemembers.ThePresidentshalldesignateaspecificterm,nottoexceedthreeyears,fortheworkofthecommittee.TheincomingPresidentshallreviewthespecialcommitteeswhosetermsareexpiringtodeter-minewhethersuchcommitteeorcommitteesshouldcontinue.ThePresidentmayextendthetermofsuchspecialcommitteesforaspecificterm,nottoexceedthreeyears.

(b)Non-votingandLiaisonMembers.Theremaybenon-votingadvisoryandliaisonappointmentsto

specialcommitteesappointedbythePresidentathisorherdiscretion.(c)TermsofMembers.Allappointmentsshallbeforthetermofthecommittee

asestablishedbytheappointingPresident.ShouldthePresidentextendthetermofthecommitteeforaspecificterm,thePresidentmayreappointanycurrentmembersheorshemaychoose,appointnewmemberstoreplacetheoriginalmembers,orappointaddi-tionalmemberstothespecialcommittee.ThetermsoftheneworadditionalmembersshallbefortheextendedtermasestablishedbytheappointingPresident.

(d)Chairperson,Co-chairs,ViceChairpersonandViceCo-chairs.

ThePresidentshallappointachairpersonorco-chairsandvice-chairpersonorviceco-chairsofeachspecialcommittee.

Thechairpersonor,intheabsenceofthechairperson,thevice-chairpersonmayactonbehalfofthecommitteewhenitisnotpracticalorpossibletoconferwiththecommittee.

(e)ExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonMembers.NotlaterthanthesecondBoardofGovernorsmeetingdur-

ingthePresident’sterminoffice,thePresidentmayappointanExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonmembertosuchspecialcommit-teesasthePresidentchooses.SuchExecutiveCommitteeLiaisonMembersshallserveforatermofoneyear,withsuchtermexpir-ingonthefirstJune30aftersuchappointment.Suchmembersshallhavefullvotingprivilegesandcounttowardsaquorumatanymeetingofaspecialcommittee.

Section 3. Program Committees and Boards CommitteesandBoardscreatedbyPartIVandPartsVIthroughXIVoftheserulestooverseeProgramsoftheStateBarshallhavesuchtermsandmembersassetoutinsaidrules.Membersofsuchcommit-teesandboardsshallbeappointedaccordingtotherulesestablishingsuchcommitteesandboards.

Section 4. Meetings. CommitteesshallmeetwhennecessarytoperformtheirdutiesandmayactinwritingorbyelectronicconferencinginaccordancewithArticleXII,Section7oftheseBylaws.

ARTICLE IX SECTIONS

Section 1. Young Lawyers Division. TheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarshallbecomposedof(1)allmembersoftheStateBarwhohavenotreachedtheirthirty-sixthbirthdaypriortothecloseoftheprecedingAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarand(2)allmembersoftheStateBarwhohavebeenadmittedtotheirfirstbarlessthanfiveyears.ThisDivisionshallfosterdiscus-sionofideasrelatingtotheduties,responsibilities,andproblemsoftheyoungermembersoftheprofession,aidingandpromotingtheiradvancementandencouragingtheirinterestandparticipationintheactivitiesoftheStateBar.Itshallelectofficersandagoverningboardannually,andshalladoptregulationssubjecttotheRulesandBylawsoftheStateBar.

Section 2. Senior Lawyers Section. ThereshallbeasectionoftheStateBartobeknownastheSeniorLawyersSectioncomposedofallmembersoftheStateBarwhohavereachedtheir65thbirthdaypriortothecloseoftheprecedingAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarprovided,however,thatallthosemembersoftheStateBarwhoarebetween60and65yearsofageandaremembersingoodstandingoftheSeniorSection(sometimescalledtheSeniorLawSection)atthetimethisamendmentisadoptedshallbecomemembersoftheSeniorLawyersSection.ThisSectionisformedforthepurposeoffosteringdiscussion,interchangeofideas,andcamaraderieamongtheoldermembersoftheStateBarandtopromoteprofes-sionalism,CLE,CJEandotheractivitiesoftheStateBarasshallbedeterminedbytheSectionofficers,ExecutiveCommitteeandmembers.TheSeniorLawyersSectionshallhavesuchofficers,committeesandgovernmentasshallbedeterminedbyitsBylaws,subjecttotheRulesandBylawsoftheStateBar. TheStateBarshallfurnishreasonablepostageandmailingexpenseandstaffliaisonassistancefortheSection.AllotheritemsofSectionexpenseshallbetheresponsibilityoftheSectionunlessspecifi-callyauthorizedandapprovedbyboththeExecutiveCommitteeandtheBoardofGovernorsasaseparatebudgetitem. TheSectionshallbeauthorizedtoacceptvoluntarycontributionswhichshallbeheldbytheStateBarforusebytheSection.AnyfundsoftheoldSeniorSection(whichSectionisabolishedbythisamend-ment)inexistenceatthetimeofthisamendmentshallbeheldbytheStateBarfortheuseofthenewSeniorLawyersSection.

Section 3. Other Sections - Purposes. Othersectionsmaybecreatedformembersofthebarinterestedinaspecializedareaoflaworpractice.EachsectionshallhavepowersanddutiesconsistentwiththeRulesandBylawsoftheStateBar,subjecttotheapprovaloftheBoardofGovernors.

Section 4. Establishment of Sections. TheBoardofGovernorsmayestablishanewsectiondedicatedtoanareaoflaworpracticenotduplicatedbyanyothersectionoftheStateBar.EveryapplicationtotheBoardfortheestablishmentofanewsectionshallsetforth:

(a)theareaoflaworpracticetowhichtheproposedsectionistobededicatedwhichshallbewithinthepurposesoftheStateBar;

(b)astatementoftheneedfortheproposedsection;(c)theproposedbylawsforthegovernmentofthesection;

and(d)thenamesandaddressesofatleasttenmembersapplying

forcreationofthesection.

Section 5. Abolition of Sections. Uponnoticebymailtothemembersofasection,theBoardofGovernorsmayabolishasection.

Section 6. Reports. Eachsectionshallsubmittotheregularannualmeetingofthemem-bersoftheStateBarareportoftheactivitiesofthesectionduringtheyear.

ARTICLE X DELEGATES TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Section 1. Delegates: Designation; Nomination and Election; Alternates. ThedelegatesoftheStateBartotheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociationshallbeactivemembersingoodstandingoftheStateBarandoftheAmericanBarAssociation.Thereshallbeasep-aratepostforeachdelegateoftheStateBartotheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociation.Thepostsshallbeconsecutivelynum-beredbytheBoardofGovernorsas“PostNumber1,”“PostNumber2,”etc.Numberingshallbesolelyforthepurposesofdesignations,nomina-tionsandelections. Electeddelegatesshallbenominatedandelectedtostaggeredtwoyeartermsbeginningwithanevennumberedyear,sothatthetermsarestaggeredasequallyaspossible.DelegatesfortheelectedpostsshallbenominatedandelectedinthesamemannerasprovidedintheseBylawsfortheelectionoftheSecretaryoftheStateBar;however,anominationshalldesignatethepostforwhichthecandidateisnominated. SolongastheStateBarisentitledtosixormoredelegates,Post5andPost6shallbedesignatedasfollows:beginningwithatermtostartattheadjournmentoftheyear2000annualmeetingoftheAmericanBarAssociation,Post6shallbefilledbytheimmediatepastpresidentoftheStateBar;andbeginningwithatermtostartattheadjournmentoftheyear2002annualmeetingoftheAmericanBarAssociation,Post5shallbefilledbytheimmediatepastpresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBar,providedthatpersonisundertheageof35yearswhenthetermbegins.Otherwise,Post5shallbefilledbyapersonwhoisundertheageof35appointedbythePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBar.


Shouldanydesignatedorelectedpostbecomevacantpriortotheendofthetermforwhichthepersonfillingthatpostwasselectedbecauseofresignation,deathordisability,thePresidentoftheStateBarshallappointanothermembertofilltheunexpiredterm.

Section 2. Terms of Office. ExceptasotherwiseprovidedinthisArticle,thedelegatesshallservefortwoyearsfromtheadjournmentoftheannualmeetingoftheAmericanBarAssociationintheyearofelectiontotheadjournmentoftheannualmeetingtwoyearslater.

Section 3. Alternate Appointments. Ifforanyreason,anappointedorelecteddelegateisunabletoattendanymeetingoftheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociationduringthedelegate’stermofoffice,thePresidentmayappointamem-beringoodstandingoftheStateBarandtheAmericanBarAssociationasanalternatedelegatetoattendsuchasinglemeetingoftheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociation.ThealternatedelegateshallhavethesamerightsandprivilegesforthesinglemeetingoftheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociationastheappointedorelecteddelegateforwhomheorshehasbeensubstituted.

ARTICLE XIVACANCIES AND SUCCESSION

Section 1. Death, Disability, or Resignation of Officers, Membersof the Executive Committee, or Delegates to the American Bar Association. Intheeventofavacancyforanycauseinthefollowingofficesorpositions,President-Elect,Secretary,Treasurer,memberoftheExecutiveCommitteeelectedbytheBoardofGovernors,oradel-egateoftheStateBartotheHouseofDelegatesoftheAmericanBarAssociation,hisorhertemporarysuccessorshallbeappointedbythePresidenttoholdofficeuntilthenextregularmeetingoftheBoardofGovernorswhenasuccessorfortheunexpiredtermshallbeelectedbymajorityvote.However,anypersonappointedtofilltheunexpiredtermofPresident-ElectshallnotautomaticallysucceedtotheofficeofPresident,butthatofficeshallbefilledbymajorityvoteoftheentiremembershipafternominationasprovidedinArticleVII.

Section 2. Vacancies in Board of Governors. VacanciesontheBoardofGovernorsshallbefilledinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofArticleIII,Section8.

Section 3. Vacancies in Committees. Avacancyinanycommittee,exceptfortheExecutiveCommitteeunlessotherwiseprovidedforbytheRulesortheBylaws,shallbefilledbyPresidentialappointment,andtheappointeeshallholdofficefortheunexpiredtermoruntilhisorhersuccessorischosen.

ARTICLE XII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Section 1. Resignation of Officers. AnofficermayresignatanytimeuponsettlinghisorheraccountswiththeStateBar.

Section 2. Filing and Publication of Proceedings. Alladdresses,reportsandotherpapersreadatanymeetingoftheStateBarshallbefiledwiththeExecutiveDirectorwithinthirtydaysfromtheadjournmentofthemeeting.TheBoardofGovernorsmaypub-lishanypartoftheproceedingsitdeemsappropriate.

Section 3. Fiscal Year. ThefiscalyearoftheStateBarshallbeginonJuly1ofeachyearandendonJune30ofthesucceedingyear.

Section 4. Seal. ThesealoftheStateBarshallbeinthefollowingform:

Section 5. Referendum to Entire Membership. TheBoardofGovernors,uponthevoteoftwo-thirdsofthemembershipoftheBoard,mayreferanyquestiontoavoteofthemem-bershipoftheStateBar.Thememberspresentatanannualmeetingmay,byatwo-thirdsvote,directtheBoardofGovernorstoconductareferendumuponanymatterpresentedoracteduponatthatmeeting.Whenareferendumisconducted,theExecutiveDirectorshallprepareaquestionnairecontainingthemattersuponwhichthevoteistobetaken.ThequestionnairesubmittedtoeachmembershallbereturnedtotheExecutiveDirector.

Section 6. Amendment or Repeal. TheseBylaws,oranyprovisionoftheseBylaws,maybeamendedorrepealedatanyannual,midyearorcalledmeetingofthemembers,byamajorityofthememberspresent,providedthatthenumbervotingfortheamendmentorrepealisnotlessthanfifty.

Section 7. Electronic Conferencing. Ifpriornoticehasbeenprovided,andifsuchfacilitiesareavail-able,anymemberofaSectionofCommitteemayattendameetingbyelectronicconferencing;providedthatthedeviceusedenablestheabsentmembertohearthecommentsoftheSectionofCommitteemem-berspresentatthemeetingandtospeaktothosepresentatthemeeting;andthatthememberspresentatthemeetingcanhearthecommentsofandspeaktotheabsentmember.Anymemberattendingbyelectronicconferencingshallcounttowardsaquorumofsuchmeeting,shallhavefullrightstothefloor,andshallbeentitledtovoteatsuchmeetingasifphysicallypresent.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 100 Legislative Policy and Procedure

Adopted by Board of Governors June 14, 1986, Amended June 20, 1992, June 18, 1994

1.01. General Legislative Policy.(a)TheBylawssetforththerestrictionsonestablishinga

legislativepolicy.ArticleII,Section6oftheBylawsprovidesthat:Nolegislationshallberecommended,supportedoropposed

bytheStateBarunless:(1)suchactionhasbeeninitiatedbyanappropriate

committeeorsection,orbyanytenmembersoftheBoardofGovernors;and

(2)thetextofthelegislationisfurnishedtothePresident,thePresident-ElectandtheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislationatleastthirtydayspriortoitssubmissionforsupportoropposi-tionassetforthbelow;and

(3)providedfurther:(i)thatsuchlegislativepositionreceivesamajority

voteofthemembersoftheStateBarpresentatameeting;or(ii)thatsuchlegislativepositionreceivesatwo-thirds

voteofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvoting;or

(iii)whentheBoardofGovernorsisnotinsession,suchlegislativepositionreceivesatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembersoftheExecutiveCommitteevoting.

Inadditiontoandinaidoftheselegislativepowers,theBoardshallhavethepowertoadopt,byavoteoftwo-thirdsofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvoting,aStandingBoardPolicyregardinglegislation.SuchStandingBoardPolicyshallbebindingfromsessiontosessionunlesssuspended,modifiedorrescindedpursuanttoatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvoting. NocommitteeorsectionoftheStateBarshallrecommend,sup-portoropposeanylegislationexceptinthemannerhereinprovided.

(b)NolegislativepositionshallbetakenbytheStateBaroranycommittee,sectionorotherorganizationalelementthereofexceptasprovidedforinthispolicy.Committees,sectionsorotherorganizationalelementsoftheBarareencouragetodebateanddiscusslegislationrelatingtotheirareasofexpertiseandtolettheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislationknowoftheirpositions.TheultimatepositionoftheStateBar,however,willbedeterminedpursuanttothisPolicy.

(c)Alegislativeposition,onceadopted,shallremainanofficialpositionoftheStateBarduringthefullbiennialsessionoftheGeneralAssemblyinwhichitwasadoptedunlessrescindedormodified.

(d)Failuretoreceiveanecessarytwothirdsvotetofavororopposelegislationshallnotbeconsideredadoptionofthecontraryposition.

(e)AlllegislativepositionsadoptedbytheStateBarshallbereducedtowritingandcommunicatedtotheGeneralAssemblyastheorganizationalpositionsoftheStateBar.

(f)TheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislation,theBoard,ortheExecutiveCommitteemayallowanyinterestedpersontoappearbeforeitinpersonandinwritinginsupportoforinoppositiontoanylegislativeproposalbeingconsideredsubjecttoreasonablelimitationsonavailabletime.

(g)TheBoardandExecutiveCommitteeshallhaveauthoritytotakereasonableactionnecessarytocommunicateandadvocatelegislativepositionsadoptedpursuanttotheBylawsandthispolicy.

(h)TheBoardortheExecutiveCommitteeshallhavetheauthoritytodesignatepersonstopromoteStateBarlegislativepositions.PersonssodesignatedshallbeauthorizedtoagreetoandtosupportamendmentsandsubstitutelegislationwhichareconsistentwithlegislativepositionspreviouslyadoptedpursuanttotheBylawsandthisPolicy.Nosection,committeeorotherBar-


relatedorganizationshallhireordesignateanypersonsorentitiestopromoteStateBarortheirownlegislativepositionsnorshallsuchsections,committeesorBar-relatedorganizationexpendanyfundsofthesection,committeeororganizationinthesupportoforoppositiontoanylegislativepositionsunlessexpresslyapprovedbytheBoardofGovernorsortheExecutiveCommittee.ShouldtheBoardofGovernorsortheExecutiveCommitteeapprovesuchexpenditures,thefundsofthesection,committeeorBar-relatedorganizationshallbepaidintotheLegislativeAdvocacyFund.

(i)Nothinginthispolicyshallbeconstruedtopreventmem-bersoftheStateBarfrompresentingtheirownpersonalviewsconcerninganylegislativematterandmembersareencouragedtodosowhilemakingclearthattheyarespeakingonlyintheirpersonalcapacity.

1.02. Board of Governors.(a)ConsiderationofanylegislativeproposalbytheBoard

shallproceedinthefollowingorder:(1)Awrittenproposalshallbepresentedbyanappropri-

atecommitteeorsectionorbyany10membersoftheBoardtotheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislation,thePresident,thePresident-Elect,andeachmemberoftheExecutiveCommitteeatleast30dayspriortoameetingoftheBoard.Suchproposalshall,asaminimum,includethefollowing:

(i)thespecificlegislation,ifany,whichispendingorproposed;

(ii)ifnospecificlegislationispendingorproposed,astatementoftheissuestobeaddressedbythelegislation;

(iii)asummaryoftheexistinglaw;(iv)principalknownproponentsoropponentsofthe

legislationand,ifpossible,abriefstatementofthereasonsforoppositionorsupportbytheotherinterests;

(v)alistingofanyothercommitteesorsectionswhichmayhaveaninterestinthelegislationandacertificationthatanysuchcommitteeshavebeenprovidedacopyoftheproposalsimultaneoustoitstransmissiontotheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislation;and

(vi)thepositionwhichthecommittee,sectionorgrouprecommendsbeadoptedbytheStateBar.(2)TheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislation,afterconsid-

erationofthelegislativeproposalinaccordancewithRule1.04ofthispolicy,shallmakeawrittenrecommendationconcerningtheproposaltotheBoardatitsnextmeeting.AcopyofthewrittenrecommendationshallbefurnishedtoeachmemberoftheExecutiveCommitteeatleastten(10)dayspriortotheBoardmeeting.

(3)TheBoardshalldeterminespecificallybyamajorityvoteofmemberspresentandvotingwhethertheproposedleg-islativeactionisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBar.

(4)Ifthedeterminationinsection(3)aboveisaffirmative,thenatleasttwothirdsofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvotingmustvotetorecommend,tosupport,ortoopposethelegislativeproposal.(b)Legislativepositionsmaybeconsideredandadoptedby

theBoardatanyspecialorregularmeeting.

1.03. Executive Committee.(a)Considerationofanylegislativeproposalbythe

ExecutiveCommitteeshallproceedinthefollowingorder:(1)aproposaladoptedbytheAdvisoryCommitteeon

LegislationorfromamemberoftheExecutiveCommitteeshallbepresented;

(2)theExecutiveCommitteeshallspecificallydeterminebyamajorityofmembersvotingwhethertheproposedlegislativeactionisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBar;

(3)ifthedeterminationinsubsection(2)aboveisaffir-mative,thentheExecutiveCommitteeshallthendeterminebyamajorityvoteofthosevotingeitherthat(i)therequestedlegislativeactioncouldnotreasonablyhavebeensubmittedforconsiderationbytheBoardofGovernorsinaccordancewithexistingpolicies,or:(ii)thatasignificantmaterialchangeincircumstancessincethelastBoardofGovernorshasmadetheExecutiveCommitteeactionnecessary;

(4)ifeitherdeterminationinsubsection(3)aboveisaffirmative,atleasttwothirdsofthemembersoftheExecutiveCommitteevotingmustvotetorecommend,tosupport,ortoopposethelegislativeproposal.(b)TheExecutiveCommitteeshalltakenoactioninconsis-

tentwithpreviousactionoftheBoardonsubstantiallyidenticallegislationunlesstherehasbeenasignificantmaterialchangeincircumstancessincethelastmeetingoftheBoardofGovernors.ThefailuretoreceivetherequiredtwothirdsvoteoftheBoardofGovernorsshallnotbeconsidered“previousaction”bytheBoard.

(c)IfanyemergencyexistsandisnotfeasiblefortheExecutiveCommitteetoact,thenthepresident,uponconsultationwithandagreementbyanytwofromamongthepresident-elect,theimmediatepastpresidentandthechairoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislationmayactuponpendingorproposedlegislation.

(d)AnyactiontakenbytheExecutiveCommitteeorpresi-dentshallbereportedtotheBoardatitsnextmeeting.

1.04. Advisory Committee on Legislation.(a)Structure–TheAdvisoryCommitteeshallbecomposed

ofatleastninemembers,atleastsixofwhomshallbemembersoftheBoardatthetimeoftheirappointmentandtheImmediatePastPresident.

(b)InitialTerms–TheninemembersoftheAdvisoryCommitteeappointedtoserveeffectiveJuly1,1986,shallbeappointedforinitiallystaggeredtermsassetoutbelow:

(1)threemembers,includingtwomembersoftheBoard,shallbeappointedbytheimmediatepastpresidentforone-yearterms.

(2)threemembers,includingtwomembersoftheBoard,shallbeappointedbythepresidentfortwo-yearterms.

(3)threemembers,includingtwomembersoftheBoard,shallbeappointedbythepresident-electforthreeyearterms.

(4)thechairshallbeappointedbythepresident.(c)Terms–CommencingJuly1,1987,thepresident-elect

shallappointthreemembers,atleasttwoofwhomshallbemem-bersoftheBoardatthetimeoftheirappointment,tothree-yeartermsandshallnameachair-elect.Thechair-electshallbecomechairwhenthepresident-electbecomespresident.ThePresident,uponconsultationwithandagreementbythePresident-ElectshallhavethepowertoappointadditionalvotingmemberstotheAdvisoryCommitteewhoshallserveduringtheone-yeartermofhisorherpresidency.However,inanyeventatleasttwo-thirdsofthisCommitteewillbemembersoftheBoardatthetimeoftheirappointment.

(d)TheAdvisoryCommitteewillmeetforthepurposeofdevelopingitsrecommendationstotheBoardandExecutiveCommitteewithregardtorequeststoadoptalegislativeposition.

(e)Ineachcaseinvolvingaproposedlegislativeposition,theAdvisoryCommitteeshallmakearecommendationtotheBoardortheExecutiveCommitteeonthefollowing:

(1)whethertheproposedlegislativeactionisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBar;and

(2)thelegislativepositionwhichtheBoardorExecutiveCommitteeshouldadopt.(f)Inadditiontotheabove,theAdvisoryCommitteeshall

alsohavetheauthoritytodraftandsubmittotheBoardortheExecutiveCommittee,legislativeconceptswhichmayorshouldbethesubjectoflegislationandrecommendpositionswithrespectthereto.

(g)WhentheGeneralAssemblyisinsession,appropriatecommitteesandsectionsoftheStateBarmaysubmitlegisla-tiveproposalstotheAdvisoryCommitteeforapprovalbytheExecutiveCommittee.Allsuchproposals,however,shallbeinwritingandsatisfytheformatrequirementssetforthinsubsection(a)(1)ofRule1.02ofthispolicy.

(h)Allmattersconcerningcontractandfinanceshallbesub-mittedtotheExecutiveCommitteeforapproval.

1.05. Legislative Drafting and Consulting Services.(a)TheStateBar,atthesolediscretionoftheExecutive

Committee,mayprovidelegislativedrafting,legalresearchandothersimilarservicestotheOfficeoftheGovernorandmembersoftheGeorgiaGeneralAssembly.THEDECISIONBYTHESTATEBARTOPROVIDESUCHSERVICESDOESNOTCONSTITUTEANENDORSEMENTBYTHESTATEBAROFANYLEGISLATIONREVIEWEDORDRAFTED.

(1)Allrequestsforlegislativedraftingorconsultingser-vicesshouldbedirectedtothePresidentoftheStateBarwhoshallimmediatelyplacetherequestontheagendaofthenextExecutiveCommitteeMeeting.

(2)ConsiderationofanylegislativedraftingorconsultingrequestbytheExecutiveCommitteeshallproceedinthefol-lowingorder:

(i)thepresidentshallpresenttherequestforlegislativedraftingorconsultingservicestotheExecutiveCommittee;

(ii)theExecutiveCommitteeshallspecificallydeter-minebyamajorityofmembersvotingthatthedrafting,researchorreviewoftheproposedlegislationwouldnotbeadversetotheinterestsoftheStateBar;

(iii)ifthedeterminationinsubsection(ii)aboveisaffirmative,thentheExecutiveCommitteeshalldeterminebymajorityvotewhetherornottoprovidesuchservices;


(iv)ifthedeterminationinsubsection(iii)aboveisaffirmative,theExecutiveCommitteeshallreferthemattertotheLegislativeResearchCommittee.(3)Shouldanyemergencyexistsanditisnotfeasible

fortheExecutiveCommitteetoact,thenthePresident,uponconsultationwithandagreementbyanytwofromamongthePresident-Elect,theimmediatepastPresident,theChairoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegislationortheChairoftheLegislativeResearchCommittee,mayactuponthependingrequestforlegislativedraftingorconsultingservices.

(4)ThefinalcopyofanyproposedlegislationdraftedbyanymemberormembersoftheStateBarunderthisprovi-sionshallcontainthefollowingdisclaimerattheheadofthefirstpage,unlesstheproposedlegislationhasbeenconsideredundertheprovisionsofsection1.01through1.04above:

“TheStateBarofGeorgiahasdraftedthefollowingpro-posedlegislationasaservicetotheGeorgiaGeneralAssemblyandtheOfficeoftheGovernor.TheStateBartakesnopositioneitherfororagainsttheenactmentofsuchlegislationunlessthelegislationisapprovedundertheprovisionsoftheStateBarofGeorgia’sStandingBoardPolicy100.”(b)WhenevertheExecutiveCommitteegrantsarequestto

providelegislativedraftingorconsultingservicesunderthisrule,thePresident,orhisorherdesignee,shallreporttothenextmeetingoftheBoardofGovernorsthenatureofthereferralanditscurrentstatus.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 200(a)PublicationofExpenditures.TheBarshallpublishat

leastannuallyastatementofitsrevenuesandexpendituresbycategory.Thepurposeofthispublicationshallbetoallowthemembershiptomakeadeterminationastothenatureoftheexpen-dituresorcategories.

(b)Objections.AnyactiveorinactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiamay,withinforty-five(45)daysofthedateofsaidpublication,filewiththeExecutiveDirectorawrittenobjectiontoaparticularexpenditureonthegroundsthatitisnongermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Theobjectionneednotstateitsgrounds.Failuretoobjectwithinthistimeperiodshallconstituteawaiverofanyrighttoobjecttotheparticularexpenditure

(1)Afterawrittenobjectionhasbeenreceived,theExecutiveDirectorshalldeterminetheprorataamountoftheobjectingmember’smandatoryduesatissue,andsuchamountshallbeplacedinescrowpendingdeterminationofthemeritsoftheobjection.

(2)TheExecutiveCommitteeshall,withinsixty(60)daysfromthelastdayforreceiptofwrittenobjections,determinewhethertogiveaproratarefundtotheobjectingmember(s)ortorefertheaction(s)toarbitration.(c)CompositionofArbitrationPanel.Ifthematterisreferred

toarbitration,itshallbeconsideredbyapanelofarbitrators.Thearbitrationpanelshallbecomposedofthree(3)activemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Theobjectingmember(s)shallselectonememberofthearbitrationpanel,theBarshallchoosethesecondpanelmember,andthetwomembersshallchoosethethirdmem-ber.TheobjectingpartyandtheStateBarofGeorgiashallselecttheirarbitratorswithinfifteen(15)daysofthedateonwhichthematterisreferredtoarbitration,andthethirdarbitratorshallbechosenbythetwoselectedwithinthirty(30)daysofsaidreferral.Intheeventthetwomembersareunabletoagree,theChiefJudgeoftheCourtofAppealsoftheStateofGeorgiashallappointthethirdmember.

(d)ProceduresforArbitrationPanel.Withinthirty(30)daysafterthearbitrationpanelisconstituted,theobjectingmembershallfilewiththeGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiaasupplementalwrittenobjectionstatingincompletedetailthegroundsoftheobjection.TheStateBarofGeorgiashall,withinthirty(30)daysofreceiptofthesupplementalobjection,prepareawrittenresponseandserveacopyontheobjectingmember(s).Suchresponse,objection,andsupplementalobjectionshallbefor-wardedtothearbitrationpanel.ThepanelshallscheduleahearingattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawithinforty-five(45)daysofthedateonwhichtheobjection,supplementalobjec-tion,andresponseareforwardedtothepanel.Atsaidhearing,theobjectingmemberandtheBarmayappearinpersonorberepre-sentedbycounsel.Thearbitrationpanelshallthereafterconferanddecidebymajorityvotewhethertheparticularexpenditureisnon-germanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(1)Thescopeofthearbitrationreviewshallbetodeter-minesolelywhethertheexpenditureatissueisconstitutionallyappropriateforfundingfrommandatoryduesandwhethertheprorataamountwascorrectlycomputed.

(2)Theproceedingofarbitrationshallbeinformalinnatureandshallnotbeboundbytherulesofevidence.Any

briefsfiledbyeitherpartyshallbelimitedtofifteen(15)pages.Oralargumentshallbelimitedtotwenty(20)minutesperside.Thedecisionofthearbitratorsshallbebindingastotheobject-ingmember(s)andtheStateBarofGeorgia.Ifthearbitratorsconcludethattheexpenditureatissueisappropriatelyfundedbymandatorydues,thereshallbenorefund,andtheStateBarofGeorgiashallbefreetoexpendtheobjectingmember’sprorataamountofmandatoryduesheldinescrow.Ifthearbitratorsdeterminethattheexpenditureisinappropriatelyfundedfrommandatorydues,thearbitratorsshallorderarefundoftheprorataamountofmandatoryduestotheobjectingmember.

(3)ThearbitratorsshallrenderafinalwrittenreporttotheobjectingmemberandtheExecutiveCommitteewithinfifteen(15)daysoftheconclusionofthehearing.

(4)Intheeventthearbitratorsorderarefund,theStateBarofGeorgiashallprovidesuchrefundwithinthirty(30)daysofthedateofthearbitrationreport,togetherwithinterestcalculatedatthejudgmentrateprovidedbylaw,fromthedateonwhichtheobjectingmember(s)mandatoryduespaymentwasreceived.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 300 AnelectedmemberoftheBoardofGovernorsshallattendatleastfiftypercent(50%)oftheBoardmeetingsheldduringtheBaryear,unlesshis/herattendanceisotherwiseexcusedbytheSecretary.TheburdenofseekingandestablishinganexcusedabsenceshallbeupontheBoardmember.AwrittenrequesttotheSecretaryforanexcusedabsenceshallbemadewithin(30)dayspriortoorafterthemissedmeeting.ShouldanelectedBoardmemberfailtomeettheattendancerequirement,thepositionshallbecomevacant,andthePresidentoftheStateBarshallfilltheunexpiredtermbyappointment.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 400 ItshallbethepolicyoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgiathatanymembersoftheBoardwhohasservedaminimumoftenyearsshall,uponretirementfromtheBoard,beinvitedtoattendallregularlycalledmeetingsoftheBoardofGovernors;provided,suchmemberremainsingoodstandingwiththeStateBar.Suchretiredmem-beroftheBoardmaybeallowedfloorprivilegesatthesolediscretionofthechair,butshallnotvoteonanyquestionnorbecountedinascertain-ingaquorum.TheaffectedretiredBoardmemberswillnotreceiveacopyoftheagendabook.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 500 O.C.G.A.§17-5-32providesforalisttobemaintainedbytheStateBarofGeorgiaforuseintheeventoftheappointmentofaspecialmasterpursuanttothetermsofsaidcodesection.ThislistshallconsistofthemembershipofthisBoardofGovernorsasitmaybeconstitutedfromtimetotime.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 600 Policy on Conflicts of Interest

Preamble TheStateBarofGeorgiaisanadministrativeagencycreatedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforthepurposesof:(a)fosteringamongthemembersoftheStateBartheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;(b)improvingtheadministrationofjustice;and(c)advancingthepracticeoflaw.TheStateBarofGeorgiaandafamilyofseparatelyorganizednon-profitorganizations(including,withoutlimitation,theGeorgiaBarFoundation,Inc.,theInstituteofContinuingLegalEducationinGeorgia,theGeorgiaLegalServicesProgram,Inc.,theCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency,andtheLawyersFoundationofGeorgia,Inc.)(the“AffiliatedOrganizations”)worktogetherforthebenefitofthemembersoftheBar,thejudicialbranchofGeorgiagovernment,andthepublictheyserve. TheConflictsofInterestPolicyoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestab-lishescertainstandardsregardingconflictsofinterestforthefollowingpersonswhoareelected,appointed,orserveexofficio:electedStateBarofficers;membersoftheBoardofGovernors;membersoftheBar’sExecutiveCommittee;officersandothermembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeandExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision;andemployeesandstaffoftheStateBar(“CoveredPersons”).ThisPolicyisintendedtosupplement,butnotreplace,anyapplicablestateorfederallawsorregulationsapplicabletotheStateBarofGeorgiaoritsmem-bers,aswellastheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductandanyotherethicalrulesorobligationsgoverningGeorgialawyers.

Conflicts of Interest(1)ACoveredPersonisrequiredtoexercisepowersanddis-

chargedutiesintheinterestoftheStateBarandnotintheCoveredPerson’sowninterestorintheinterestofanotherentityorperson.

(2)(a)ACoveredPersonisexpectedtoexercisereasonablediligenceinidentifyinganddisclosinganyconflictinginterest,if:

(i)TheCoveredPersoniseither(a)apartyto,or(b)hasabeneficialinterestin,or(c)issocloselylinkedtoa


transaction,giftorfavor,whichisofsuchfinancialsig-nificancetotheCoveredPersonastocreateareasonableexpectationthatsuchcircumstanceswouldexertaninflu-enceontheCoveredPerson’sjudgmentifcalledtovoteupon,approve,orenterintosuchatransaction,or

(ii)TotheactualknowledgeoftheCoveredPersonaRelatedPersonorentityiseither(a)apartyto,or(b)hasabeneficialinterestin,or(c)issocloselylinkedtoatransac-tion,giftorfavor,whichisofsuchfinancialsignificancetotheCoveredPersonastocreateareasonableexpectationthatsuchcircumstanceswouldexertaninfluenceontheCoveredPerson’sjudgmentifcalledtovoteupon,approve,orenterintosuchatransaction.(b)“RelatedPerson”isdefinedas,(a)yourspouse,and

thoseindividualsrelatedtoyouoryourspousebybloodormarriage,includingancestors,parents,children,siblings,grand-parents,grandchildren,great-grandchildren,aunts,uncles,nieces,nephews,andthespousesofthoserelatives,oranymemberofyourhousehold;(b)entitiesofwhichCoveredPersonsaredirec-tors,generalpartners,agents,oremployees,andentitiesthatareunderthecontrolof,orundercommoncontrolwith,entitiesofwhichCoveredPersonsaredirectors,generalpartners,agents,oremployees;(c)individualswhoaregeneralpartners,principals,oremployersofCoveredPersons;(d)trusts,estates,incompe-tents,conservatees,orminorsofwhichCoveredPersonsarefiduciaries;and(e)trustsandestatesofwhichRelatedPersons,asdefinedabove,aresubstantialbeneficiaries.(3)Theperformanceofsimultaneousgovernancerolesfor

boththeStateBarandanAffiliatedOrganization,oranyofthem,shallnotinandofitselfbedeemedtoconstituteconflictinginter-estsortogiverisetoconflictinginteresttransactions.

(4)ACoveredPersonshalldiscloseanyconflictinginteresttotheofficerorchairpersonimmediatelypresidingoverthebusi-nessoftheBartowhichtheconflictmayrelate.

(5)NothinghereinshallimpelanyindividualtorefrainfromexpressingduringthecourseofgovernancedeliberationsoftheStateBarthosepositionstheindividualbelievesingoodfaithtoadvancethestatedpurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 700 Policy on Document Handling and Disclosure

Preamble TheStateBarofGeorgiaisanadministrativeagencycreatedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforthepurposesof:(a)fosteringamongthemembersoftheStateBartheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;(b)improvingtheadministrationofjustice;and(c)advancingthepracticeoflaw. ThePolicyonDocumentHandlingandDisclosureoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestablishescertainstandardsforthefollowingpersonswhoareelected,appointed,orserveexofficio:electedStateBarofficers;membersoftheBoardofGovernors;membersoftheBar’sExecutiveCommittee;officersandothermembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeandExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision;andemployeesandstaffoftheStateBar(“CoveredPersons”).ThisPolicyisintendedtosupplement,butnotreplace,anyapplicablestateorfederallawsorregu-lationsapplicabletotheStateBarofGeorgiaoritsmembers,aswellastheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductandanyotherethicalrulesorobligationsgoverningGeorgialawyers.

Policy on Document Handling and Disclosure(1)Whiledischargingresponsibilitiesofanoffice,employ-

ment,orotherpositionattheStateBar,noCoveredPerson,asdefinedinthePreambletothispolicyshall(a)falsify,orfailtomakerequiredentriesonanyrecordwithintheperson’scontrol,(b)concealanyrecordwithintheperson’scontrolfromanypartyhavingalegalrighttoaccessorreviewtherecord,or(c)destroyormutilateanyrecordwithintheperson’scontrolinviolationofthelaw,oranypolicyoftheStateBarofGeorgia,includingthedestructionofdocumentsthatarethesubjectofaninvestigationoracivilorcriminalaction.

(2)ACoveredPerson,asdefinedinthePreambletothispol-icy,withreportingresponsibilitiesasaresultofhisorheroffice,employment,orotherpositionwiththeStateBarshallprovidefull,fair,accurate,timely,andunderstandabledisclosuresofthesub-jectsonwhichtheyarerequiredtoreportinallreports.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 800 Policy on Confidentiality

Preamble TheStateBarofGeorgiaisanadministrativeagencycreatedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforthepurposesof:(a)fosteringamongthemembersoftheStateBartheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;(b)improvingtheadministrationofjustice;and(c)advancingthepracticeoflaw.

ThePolicyonConfidentialityoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestab-lishescertainstandardsforthefollowingpersonswhoareelected,appointed,orserveexofficio:electedStateBarofficers;membersoftheBoardofGovernors;membersoftheBar’sExecutiveCommittee;officersandothermembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeandExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision;andemployeesandstaffoftheStateBar(“CoveredPersons”).ThisPolicyisintendedtosupplement,butnotreplace,anyapplicablestateorfederallawsorregulationsappli-cabletotheStateBarofGeorgiaoritsmembers,aswellastheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductandanyotherethicalrulesorobligationsgoverningGeorgialawyers.

Policy on Confidentiality (1)ACoveredPerson,asdefinedinthePreambletothispolicy,mayhaveaccesstoconfidential,personal,orproprietaryinformationthat,ifrevealedtooutsiders,couldbedamagingorsensitivetoothersorharmfultothebestinterestsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Informationobtainedbyvirtueofsuchperson’spositionwiththeStateBarshallbeheldinthestrictestofconfidenceandshallnotbedisclosedtoanyoutsideparty,includingothermembersoftheStateBar,withouttheexpresswrittenauthorizationofeitherthePresident,theExecutiveDirector,ortheGeneralCounseloftheStateBar.“Confidentialinfor-mation”shallinclude,withoutlimitation,mattersdiscussedorhandledinexecutivesessionandmattersastowhichtheminutesoftheproceed-ingreflecttheirconfidentialnature. (2)Confidentialinformationcoveredbythispolicyshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto,informationrevealedundertheStateBarofGeorgia’sConflictsofInterestPolicy.

STANDING BOARD POLICY 900 Policy on Whistleblower Non-Retaliation

Preamble TheStateBarofGeorgiaisanadministrativeagencycreatedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforthepurposesof:(a)fosteringamongthemembersoftheStateBartheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;(b)improvingtheadministrationofjustice;and(c)advancingthepracticeoflaw. TheWhistleblowerNon-RetaliationPolicyoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestablishescertainstandardsforthefollowingpersonswhoareelected,appointed,orserveexofficio:electedStateBarofficers;membersoftheBoardofGovernors;membersoftheBar’sExecutiveCommittee;officersandothermembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeandExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision;andemployeesandstaffoftheStateBar(“CoveredPersons”).ThisPolicyisintendedtosupplement,butnotreplace,anyapplicablestateorfederallawsorregulationsapplicabletotheStateBarofGeorgiaoritsmembers,aswellastheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductandanyotherethicalrulesorobligationsgoverningGeorgialawyers.WithrespecttoStateBaremployees,thispolicyisnotintendedtogovernanyissuecoveredbytheemployeemanualoftheStateBar.

Whistleblower Non-Retaliation Policy(1)Anypersonmayreportconcernsregardingsuspected

fraud,violationsoflaw,conflictsofinterest,breakdownsininternalcontrols,financialreportingissues,andotherareasofmajorgov-ernanceconcernregardingtheStateBarofGeorgiatotheGeneralCounseloftheStateBar,orsomeonedesignatedforthatpurposebytheGeneralCounselforinvestigationandactionasitisdeemedtobeappropriate.Suchareportmaybemadeanonymously.

(2)TheStateBarofGeorgiaforbidsanyretalia-toryaction,includingharassment,intimidation,oradverseemploymentactionsofanykind,tobetakenagainstanindi-vidualwho,ingoodfaith,reportsaconcernaboutanymatteraddressedinparagraph1,orwhoingoodfaithcomplainsaboutorraisesaconcernaboutanytypeofharassment,retali-ation,ordiscriminationprohibitedbyapplicablelaworStateBarpolicy.Retaliationisalsoprohibitedagainstpersonswhoarenotthemselvescomplainants,butwhoparticipateingoodfaithinaninvestigation.

Anypersonwhoengagesinanyformofretaliationwillbesubjecttodisciplineuptoandincludingemployeetermi-nation(orremovalofavolunteer)fromhisorherposition.IndividualswhobelievethattheyorsomeonetheyknowisorhasbeensubjecttoretaliationshouldimmediatelyreportthistotheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarorsomeonedesignatedforthatpurposebytheGeneralCounsel.AnysuchreportshallbeinvestigatedandhandledinaccordancewiththeStateBar’sAnti-DiscriminationandHarassmentPolicy,andReportingProceduressetforthas§1.29inthePersonnelManualoftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheGeneralCounseland/orhisorherdes-igneeshallhavetheauthoritytosetupaprocessandproceduresforthehandlingofsuchreports,whichshallbepublishedtoallpotentiallyaffectedpersons,includingbutnotlimitedtotheestablishmentofahotlinetelephonenumber.


(3)NothinginthispolicyshallprohibittheStateBarofGeorgiafromtakingdisciplinaryorotheremploymentactionongroundsindependentoftheactsforwhichretaliationisforbidden

STANDING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POLICY 100

Amicus Brief Policy Adopted February 17, 1994

NoAmicus briefshallbeauthorizedbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaexceptaspro-videdbythispolicy,unlessthefilingofanAmicus briefisrequestedororderedbytheGeorgiaCourtofAppeals,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiaoranyfederalappellatecourt.

(a)TherequestforanAmicusbriefshallbeaccompaniedby15copiesoftheproposedbrief,alistofallthoseindividualsandgroupswithintheBarwhosupporttheissuanceofthebrief,andalistofallthoseindividualsandgroupswithintheBarwhoopposetheissuanceofthebrief.

(b)AllpartiestothelitigationshallbegivennoticeoftherequesttofileanAmicusbriefandanopportunitytobeheardastotheirpositiononthegrantingordenyingoftherequest.

(c)TheBoardofGovernorsshallspecificallydeterminebyamajorityvoteofmemberspresentandvotingthatthesubjectmatteroftheproposedAmicusbriefisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(d)Ifthedeterminationinsection(c)aboveisaffirmative,thenatleasttwo-thirdsofthemembersoftheBoardofGovernorspresentandvotingmustvotetoapprovethefilingoftheproposedAmicusbrief.

(e)TheExecutiveCommitteemay,byatwo-thirdsvoteoftheCommitteepresentandvoting,determinethattherequestedfil-ingofanAmicusbriefcouldnotreasonablyhavebeensubmittedforconsiderationbytheBoardofGovernors.

(f)Ifthedeterminationinsection(e)aboveisaffirmative,thentheExecutiveCommitteemustdeterminebyatwo-thirdsvoteoftheCommitteepresentandvotingthatthesubjectmatteroftheproposedAmicusbriefisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(g)Ifthedeterminationinsections(c)and(f)areintheaffirmativetheExecutiveCommitteemustdeterminebyatwo-thirdsvoteoftheCommitteepresentandvotingthattheproposedAmicusbriefshouldbefiled.

(h)IndeterminingwhethertofileanAmicusbrieftheExecutiveCommitteeshould,amongotherconsiderations,deter-minethat:

(1)theoutcomeofthelitigationwilleffectpersonsotherthanthelitigants,and;

(2)theoutcomeofthelitigationwillbeofgeneralinteresttothemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.


State Bar Letterhead Adopted February 21, 2002

Officers,Governors,MembersandEmployeesoftheStateBarofGeorgiamaynotusestationeryandenvelopesbearingtheletterheadoftheStateBarwhennominating,endorsing,orcommentingonacandi-dateinanyStateBarelection.CandidatesinanyStateBarelectionshallensurethatnocampaignmaterialsstateorimplythatsuchcampaignmaterialsarebeingsentorsuppliedbytheStateBar.


Appointed Members to the Board of Governors Adopted August 22, 2003

ArticleIII,Section2,Subsection(d)oftheBylawsoftheStateBarprovidesthatthePresident-Electshallappointoneortwomem-bers,dependingupontheyear,totheBoardofGovernors.TheexpresspurposeofthisSectionistopromotediversitywithintheBoardofGovernors.TheExecutiveCommitteebelievesthisgoalcanbebestattainedbyencouragingthosewhohavebeenappointedtorunforelec-tionupontheexpirationoftheirappointmentandtoallownewminoritymemberstobeappointedtotheBoardunderthisRule.TheCommitteethereforeadoptsthisPolicy300.

(a)WhenanappointedmemberoftheBoardofGovernorshasservedafullterminofficeasaresultofsuchappointment,theExecutiveCommitteeshouldencouragesuchmembertoseekanelectivepositionontheBoardofGovernors.

(b)TheExecutiveCommitteestronglyencouragesthePresident-ElectnottoreappointtotheBoardofGovernorsunderthisRuleapersonwhohasalreadyservedafulltwo-yeartermontheBoardofGovernors.

(c)ThePresident-ElectshouldexpresslyinformthepersonorpersonsheorsheselectsunderthisRulethattheywillonlyserveasingletermintheappointedposition.


Appointments to the Bench and Bar Committee Adopted August 22, 2003

ThemembersoftheBenchandBarCommitteeoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeappointedasfollows:

(a)ThePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallappointalloftheattorneymembersoftheCommittee,oneCo-ChairpersontotheCommitteeandoneCo-ViceChairpersontotheCommittee;

(b)TheChairpersonoftheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudgesshallappointallofthejudicialmembersoftheCommittee,oneCo-ChairpersonandoneCo-ViceChairpersonontheCommittee;

(c)Totheextentpossible,thenumberofmembersappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBarandtheChairpersonoftheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudgesshouldbethesame.

(d)ThefollowingorganizationsmayappointoneliaisonmembertotheCommittee:

(1)theSupremeCourtofGeorgia;(2)theCourtofAppealsofGeorgia;(3)theCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudges;(4)theCouncilofStateCourtJudges;(5)theCouncilofJuvenileCourtJudges;(6)theCouncilofProbateCourtJudges;(7)theCouncilofMagistrateCourtJudges;(8)theCouncilofMunicipalCourtJudges.

(e)ThePresidentoftheStateBarshallappointanyExecutiveCommitteeLiaison,StaffLiaisonandanyAdvisorstotheCommittee.


Faxes and E-mails To MembersAdopted August 22, 2003

Purpose ItisimportantforthemembersoftheBartobeinformedaboutmattersrelatingtothejudicialsystemandlegalprofession.Tothatend,theStateBarshouldprovideefficientandeffectivecommunicationwithGeorgialawyers.Atthesametime,itisrecognizedthatunnecessaryorunwantedcommunications,especiallyblastfaxesande-mails,havealong-termadverseimpactoneffectivecommunication.Therefore,thispolicyisdesignedtoenhancecommunicationbyauthorizingtheuseoffaxesande-mailsforimportantinformationwithappropriatelimitsonfrequencyandcontent.ItisalsointendedtomaintaincompliancewithFederalandStatelawsgoverningblastfaxesande-mails.

Authorized Communications(a)AllBlastfaxesareprohibited.(b)E-mailsareauthorizedaslimitedbythispolicy.(c)Allcommunicationsshallbeforthelawfulpurposeofthe

StateBarofGeorgia.

Authorized Users(a)SupremeCourtofGeorgia,foranycommunicationto

allmembers;(b)CourtofAppealsofGeorgia,foranycommunicationto

allmembers;(c)StateBarPresident,forlimited,significantBarrelated

matterstoallmembers;(d)YLDPresident,forlimited,significantYLDrelatedmat-

terstoYLDmembers;(e)BoardofGovernorsmembers,forcommunicationswith

theirCircuit’smembers;

(IncircuitswhichhavetwoormorerepresentativesontheBoard,eachcommunicationshallreflecttheviewofthemajorityoftherepresentatives.Theintentisforalimitednumberofe-mailsfromthecircuit’srepresentativesasagroupratherthanmultiplee-mailsfromindividualBoardmembers.Ifthemembersofacircuitareevenlydividedwithnomajor-ityviewpoint,noe-mailshouldbesent.TheBoardmembersineachcircuitmayaccomplishthisbyjointlypreparede-mails,byelectingasinglespokespersonforthegroup,orbyanyothermethodoftheirchoicethataccomplishestheintentofthispolicy.)

(f)StateBarSectionsandCommittees,forcommunicationsfromSectionleaderswiththeirSectionmembers,butnotforsolicitingnewmembers;andCommitteechairswiththeircom-mitteemembers;

(g)CandidatesforStateBarelectedpositions,forOfficersoftheStateBarorYLD,ExecutiveCommitteemembers,andABAdelegates(limitedtocontestedracesandnomorethantwo(2)e-mailsperelection);

(h)AdministrativeOfficeoftheCourts,forusebyindividualcourtstocommunicatewiththelawyerspracticinginthecourts;and


(i)Others,asapprovedbytheExecutiveCommitteeforlim-ited,urgentuses.

All Users Must(a)Notsell,giveorotherwiseredistributethee-mailaddress-

esofthemembers;(b)Useformatthateliminatesdownloadingofdata;(c)UseonlyforofficiallyauthorizedBarorjudicialpurpose;(d)Notbeusedforprivate,commercialpurposes;and(e)Allowrecipientstoberemovedfromlist.

Standards (a)Thesubjectlinewillincludeenoughinformationso

recipientscanquicklydetermineiftheywanttodeletethemessagewithoutopeningit.Onesubjectpermessageispreferred.

(b)Themessagewillbebrief,sometimesincludinginstruc-tionsonwheretogetadditionalinformation.Whenapplicable,weblinksmaybeincluded.

(c)AttachmentsintheformoflinkstoPDFsmayormaynotbeincluded,dependingontheirnumberandsize.

(d)Eache-mailmessagewillincludeunsubscribeoroptoutinstructions.Ifamemberoptsoutofreceivinge-mailmessages,alle-mailcommunicationsfromallentities,includingtheStateBar,willstop.Theremaynotbeawaytoselectivelyoptoutreceivinge-mailsfromanyparticularentity.Thisisespeciallyimportantandshouldbenotedintheoptoutinstructions.

Process(a)Broadcaste-mailmessagesarecoordinatedcentrallyby

theCommunicationsDepartmentandarenottobesentbyindi-viduals,departmentsorentities.Becausemoste-mailsaretimesensitive,allparticipantsinthisprocessshallcooperatetoperformtheirdutiesinatimelymanner.

(b)Theentitywishingtosendane-mailmessagedraftsthemessageandsubmitsittotheChiefOperatingOfficerforapproval.ThePresidentandExecutiveDirectorareavailablefordiscussionwhendeemedappropriatebytheChiefOperatingOfficer.

(c)TheChiefOperatingOfficer-approvede-mailmessageissenttotheCommunicationsDirectorandtoBarCounsel.Afterreviewingthee-mailforcompliancewithlawandStateBarrules/policies,BarCounselwilladvisetheCommunicationsDirectorofitsfindings.

(d)TheMembershipDepartmentisnotifiedoftherequestsothee-mailaddressfilecanbeprepared.

(e)Thefinalizede-mailmessageandallrelatedinformationaresenttotheCommunicationsDepartmentfordistributiontothelist.

(f)TheExecutiveDirectorandChiefOperatingOfficerarecopiedonallfaxande-mailmessages.Theperson(s)initiatingthee-mailrequestisalsocopied.

Note:Duetoanti-spammeasuresandothere-mailfil-teringsoftwareutilizedbyourmembership,InternetServiceProviders(ISP’s),andthevariousdatacommunicationsequipmentwhichprovidestheroutingofallequipmentinter-net-relatedtraffic,theStateBarcannotguaranteethateveryrecipientlistedinitse-mailaddressdatabasewillsuccessfullyreceivethee-mailmessageinstitutedwiththeblaste-mailpro-ceduresspecifiedabove.


Websites Established by State Bar Entities Adopted May 17, 2007

Nosection,division,standingcommittee,specialcommittee,program,departmentorotherentityoftheStateBarofGeorgiamayestablishormaintainawebsiteexceptasfollows:

(a)amockupofthewebsite,includingbothvisualsandtext,shallbesubmittedtothecommunicationsdepartmentandthebarcounselforwrittenapproval.

(b)uponapprovalbyboththecommunicationsdepartmentandbarcounsel,theStateBarentitywebsitemaygoonline,butanymaterialchangetothewebsiteshallfirstbesubmittedforapprovalundersubparagraph“a”above.

TheExecutiveCommittee,communicationsdepartment,orbarcoun-selmayrescindapprovalofanyStateBarentitywebsiteatanytime,withorwithoutcause.

STANDING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POLICY 700Use of Copyrighted Materials

Adopted April 10, 2008AllrequestsforalicensetousematerialswhicharecopyrightedbytheStateBarshallbereferredtotheExecutiveCommitteeforapprovalpur-suanttothispolicy.

(1)Application:AnypersonseekingalicensetousecopyrightedmaterialownedbytheStateBarshallsubmitanappli-

cation,directedtotheExecutiveCommittee,whichcontainsthefollowinginformation:

(a)Thename,address,andcontactinformation(includ-ingphonenumberande-mailaddress)oftheapplicant.Iftheapplicantisactingasanagent,suchcontactinformationforhisorherprincipalshallalsobeprovided;

(b)Abriefdescriptionofthepurposeandcontextoftheintendeduseofthematerial,andanyreasonswhythelicenseshouldbegranted;

(c)Whetherthematerialisintendedforasingleuse,mul-tipleuses,orcontinuingusebytheapplicant;

(d)Thedateordatesduringwhichtheapplicantintendstousethematerial;

(e)Whetherthematerialistobeusedcommerciallyornoncommercially;and,

(f)AstatementthattheapplicantwillacknowledgethecopyrightoftheStateBarinanyreproductionoftheallorpartofthematerial.(2)Acopyofthecopyrightedmaterialforwhichalicenseis

soughtshallaccompanytheapplication.(3)TheExecutiveCommittee,bymajorityvote,shallruleon

theapplicationandmayattachsuchtermsandconditionsonthegrantofthelicenseastheydeemnecessaryanddesirable.

(4)IndeterminingwhethertogranttherequestedlicensetheExecutiveCommitteeshould,amongotherconsiderations,deter-minethat:

(a)TheuseofthelicensewillnotreflectadverselyontheStateBarofGeorgia,

(b)TheuseofthelicensewillbeinaidofandnothinderorbeinconsistentwiththepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgiaasstatedinBarRule1-103,

(c)Theuseofthelicensewillbeinaidofandnotincon-sistentwithconductthatisgermanetothelegitimatepurposesoftheStateBarofGeorgia,and

(d)ThepurposeforwhichthelicensewillbeusedwillbeofgeneralinterestandbenefittothemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.(5)Noexclusivelicenseshallbeprovidedunderthispolicy

andlicensesformultipleuseorcontinuinguseshallnotexceedaterminexcessofoneyear.TheExecutiveCommittee,atitssolediscretion,mayprovideforautomaticrenewalofanylicense.

(6)TheExecutiveCommittee,atitssolediscretionandwith-outcause,mayterminatealicenseatanytimebywrittennoticetothegrantee.


Casemaker Access Policy Adopted September 29, 2008

AccesstoCasemakerisavailable(withoutchargeexceptwherenoted)to:

lAllmembersingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgia;lAllABAorGeorgiaaccreditedlawschoolsinGeorgia

includingtheirteachersandcurrentstudents;lAllABAaccreditedparalegalprogramsinGeorgiacol-

legesincludingtheirteachersandcurrentstudentsforanannualfeeof$1,000perschool;and

lAllGeorgianon-lawyerjudges(magistrate,municipalandprobate)fora$100annualfeeperjudge.

lRequestsshouldcomefromtheappropriatejudicialcouncilandshouldincludeICJEorotherCasemakertrainingforthejudges.

PercontractwithCasemaker,accesstoCasemakerisnotavailabletothepublic,includinglibrariesofferingpublicaccess,ortocriminaljus-tice,businesslaw,andotherlaw-relatedprogramsinGeorgiacolleges.

BYLAWS OF THE YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION

OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIAAdopted January 20, 2007 and as subsequently amended.

(As amended April 18, 2009)

ARTICLE I NAME AND PURPOSE

Section 1. Name. ThenameofthisorganizationshallbetheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia(the“YoungLawyersDivision”).

Section 2. Purpose. ThepurposesoftheYoungLawyersDivisionshallbe:

(a)toencouragetheinterestandparticipationofYLDMembersintheactivities,objectives,andpurposeoftheStateBarofGeorgia;


(b)toaidandpromotetheadvancementofYLDMembersintheactivitiesoftheStateBarofGeorgia;

(c)tofosteramongYLDMemberstheprinciplesofdutyandservicetothepublic;

(d)toprovideYLDMemberswithanopportunitytopartici-pateinactivitiesdirectedtowardimprovingtheadministrationofjustice;

(e)tofosterdiscussionandinterchangeofideasamongYLDMembersrelatingtotheduties,responsibilities,andproblemsofYLDMembers;and

(f)toprovideafullandcompleteprogramofactivitiesandprojectsinthoseareasoftheStateBarofGeorgiainwhichYLDMembersareparticularlysuited.

ARTICLE II MEMBERSHIP

Section 1. Qualification for Membership. A“YLDMember”isamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhosemembershipintheYoungLawyersDivisionhasnotterminatedpursuanttoSection4ofthisArticle.MembershipintheYoungLawyersDivisionisautomatic.

Section 2. Honorary Membership. AnypersonwhohasservedasPresidentshallbean“HonoraryMember”oftheYoungLawyersDivisionforhisorherlifetimeafterthedateonwhichsuchperson’smembershipwouldhaveotherwisetermi-natedpursuanttoSection4(a)ofthisArticle.HonoraryMembersshallnotbeeligibletovoteorholdofficeintheYoungLawyersDivision;provided,howeverthattheImmediatePastPresidentshallbeeligibletovoteandshallbeamemberoftheExecutiveCouncilduringthetermofsuchoffice.MembershipasanHonoraryMembershallterminateshouldanHonoraryMemberceasetobeamemberingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Section 3. Associate Membership. TheYoungLawyersDivisionmayrecognize,asan“AssociateMember,”anypersonengagedinthelegalprofessionwhoisunderthirty-six(36)yearsofage,andwhoisnotauthorizedtopracticelawintheStateofGeorgia,butwhois(a)employedinGeorgiabythegovernmentoragovernmentalagency,thearmedservices,oraprivateorcommercialinstitution,or(b)athird-yearlawstudentorLLMstu-dentattendingalawschoolintheStateofGeorgiathatisapprovedbytheAmericanBarAssociationortheGeorgiaBoardofBarExaminers.AnyindividualdesiringtobecomeanAssociateMembershallbeconsideredformembershipaftersubmittingaletterofinteresttotheSecretary.SuchletterofinterestshallbeconsideredbytheExecutiveCouncilatthenextmeetingafterreceiptthereof.TheExecutiveCouncil,byamajorityvoteofthemembersoftheExecutiveCouncilinattendanceatsuchmeeting,mayapproveordenytherequestedAssociateMembership.

Section 4. Termination of Membership. MembershipintheYoungLawyersDivisionshallterminate:

(a)attheendofthefiscalyearoftheStateBarofGeorgia(the“BarYear”)after(1)thememberattainstheageofthirty-six(36)or(2)thefifthanniversaryofthemember’sbeingadmittedtotheirfirstbar,whicheverdateislater(otherthanHonoraryMembers);or

(b)uponsuchmemberceasingtobeamemberingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgia;or

(c)inthecaseofAssociateMembers,bythevoteofamajor-ityoftheExecutiveCouncilinattendanceatanymeetingoftheExecutiveCouncil.

Notwithstandingtheforegoing,apersonwhomettherequire-mentsofSection4(a)aboveatthetimesuchpersonwaselectedPresident-ElectshallcontinuetobeaYLDMemberforthedurationofthetermsofPresidentandImmediatePastPresidenttowhichheorshesucceeds.

ARTICLE III OFFICERS

Section 1. Officers. The“Officers”oftheYoungLawyersDivisionshallconsistof:(a)president,(b)president-elect,(c)treasurer,(d)secretary,(e)editor(s),and(f)immediatepastpresident.

Section 2. Eligibility. (a)PersonswhoareYLDMembers(butnotHonoraryMembersorAssociateMembers)atthetimeoftheirelectionshallbeeligibletoserveasanOfficeroftheYoungLawyersDivision. (b)Thepresident-electpositionmaybefilledbyanyYLDMemberwhoisalsoanactivememberingoodstandingoftheStateBarofGeorgiawithoutregardtohisorherresidence.

TheprovisionsofthisSectionshallbeeffectivecommencingwiththeelectionstobeheldin2010.

Section 3. President. ThepresidentshallberesponsibleforcarryingoutthepurposesoftheYoungLawyersDivision.Thedutiesofthepresidentshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto,presidingatallmeetingsoftheExecutiveCouncilandthemembership,aswellasdutiesassignedbythemembershipatanyregularmeetingorbytheExecutiveCouncil.ThepresidentshallberesponsibleforthepreparationandsubmissionofanannualreportoftheactivitiesoftheYoungLawyersDivisionattheregularAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgia.ThePresidentshallsubmit,atthefirstmeet-ingoftheExecutiveCouncilfortheBarYear,alistofappointmentsandchairpersonsofcommittees.Thepresidentshallbeanexofficiomemberofallstandingcommittees.

Section 4. President-Elect. Thepresident-electshallperformsuchdutiesasmaybeassignedbythepresident,themembershipatanyregularmeeting,orbytheExecutiveCouncil.Duringanyperiodinwhichthepresidentisunabletoact,thepresident-electshallperformthedutiesofpresident. Thepresident-electshallalsoplanfortheyearinwhichheorsheshallactaspresident,andmakeneededarrangementsforthepromptinaugurationoftheprogramfortheyearuponassumingofficeandtopreventinterruptioninthecontinuingprogramthenbeingcarriedonbytheYoungLawyersDivision.

Section 5. Treasurer. ThetreasurershallhavegeneralsupervisionofthefinancesoftheYoungLawyersDivision.ThetreasurershallkeeporcausetobekeptfullandaccuraterecordsandaccountsshowingthetransactionsoftheYoungLawyersDivisionandshallseethatallexpendituresaredulyauthorized.ThetreasurershallprovideafinancialreporttotheExecutiveCouncilannuallyandmorefrequentlyifrequiredbythepresident.Thetreasurershallperformallotherdutiesasmaybeassignedbythepresident,themembershipatanyregularmeetingorbytheExecutiveCouncil.

Section 6. Secretary. Thesecretaryshallkeepfullminutesofallmeetings,includingmeetingsofthemembershipandtheExecutiveCouncil;shallreadsuchminutesatthepropersubsequentmeetings;shallgivenoticeofmeetings;shallnotifyallofficersanddirectorsoftheirelectionorappointment;andshallperformallotherdutiesasmaybeincidentaltotheofficeofsecretaryorassignedbythepresident,themembershipatanyregularmeetingorbytheExecutiveCouncil.

Section 7. Editor of the Young Lawyers Division Newsletter. Theeditororco-editorsoftheYoung Lawyers Division Newsletter(the“editor(s)”)shallpublishorcausetobepublishedanewsletteroftheactivitiesandprogramsoftheYoungLawyersDivisioninsuchfor-matasmaybeapprovedbytheExecutiveCouncilandatsuchtimesasmaybeapprovedbytheExecutiveCouncilandshallperformallotherdutiesasmaybeincidentaltosaidofficeorassignedbythepresident,themembershipatanyregularmeetingortheExecutiveCouncil.

Section 8. Immediate Past President. Theimmediatepastpresidentshallbeamemberofallstandingcommitteesandshallhavesuchotherresponsibilitiesasareassignedbythepresident,themembershipatanyregularmeetingortheExecutiveCouncil.

Section 9. Election or Appointment of Officers. Thepresident-elect,secretaryandtreasurershallbeelectedinthemannerandshalltakeofficeatthetimeprovidedforinArticleXIIIoftheseBylaws.Theeditor(s)shallbeappointedbythepresidenttoserveatthepleasureofthepresident.Theofficesofpresidentandimmediatepastpresidentshallbefilledbythepersonwhowaspresident-electandpresident,respectively,intheimmediatelyprecedingBaryear.

Section 10. Terms of Office. Thetermsofofficeofpresident,president-elect,secretary,trea-surer,andimmediatepastpresidentshallbefortheperiodbeginningimmediatelyupontheadjournmentoftheAnnualMeetingandendingattheadjournmentofthenextsucceedingAnnualMeetingoruntilsuchofficer’ssuccessoriselectedorappointedandqualified.Thetermofofficeoftheeditor(s)shallbeconcurrentwiththetermofofficeofthepresidentwhoappointedsucheditor(s).

ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Section 1. Purpose and Powers. ThereshallbeanExecutiveCommitteeoftheExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision(the“ExecutiveCommittee”).TheExecutiveCommitteeshallexerciseallofthepowersoftheExecutiveCouncilbetweenmeetingsoftheExecutiveCouncilexceptthoseenu-


meratedinSections1and3(c)ofArticleVIII,Section1ofArticleX,andSection1ofArticleXI.TheExecutiveCommitteeshallreporttotheExecutiveCouncilateachmeetingthereof.

Section 2. Composition of the Executive Committee. TheExecutiveCommitteeshallbecomposedof:

(a)theOfficers,providedthattheEditor(s)shallserveexofficiobutnonvoting;

(b)two(2)DirectorswhoaremembersoftheExecutiveCounciltobeelectedbythatbody;and

(c)theappointedDirectors,exofficiobutnonvoting.

Section 3. Directors.(a)Appointment.Aminimumoffour(4)Directorsshallbe

appointedbythePresidenttoserveatthepleasureofthePresidentandtobedirectlyresponsibletothePresident.

(b)Duties.TheDirectorsshallassistthePresidentduringhisorherterminofficeandshallperformsuchdutiesandresponsi-bilitiesasdesignatedbythePresident.

Section 4. Terms of Office. EachmemberoftheExecutiveCommitteeshallholdofficeforthefollowingterms:

(a)TheappointedDirectorsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfortermsconcurrentwiththatofthePresident.

(b)TheelectedDirectorsshallserveforaperiodbeginningupontheadjournmentoftheAnnualMeetingatwhichtheyareelectedandcontinuinguntiltheadjournmentofthenextsucceed-ingAnnualMeeting.

(c)TheOfficersshallserveforaperiodconcurrentwiththeirtermasanOfficer.

Section 5. Eligibility. PersonswhoareYLDMembers(butnotHonoraryMembersorAssociateMembers)atthetimeoftheirelectionorappointmentshallbeeligibletoserveasamemberoftheExecutiveCommittee.

ARTICLE V EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Section 1. Purpose and Powers. ThereshallbeanExecutiveCounciloftheYoungLawyersDivision(the“ExecutiveCouncil”).TheExecutiveCouncilshallexer-cisethepowersgrantedtoithereunder.

Section 2. Composition of the Executive Council. TheExecutiveCouncilshallbecomposedof:

(a)MembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeoftheYoungLawyersDivision;provided,however,theDirectorsshallbemembersoftheExecutiveCouncilexofficiobutnonvotingunlessqualifiedtovoteunderanotherprovisionofthesebylaws.

(b)Nolessthansix(6)andnomorethanten(10)YLDMembersfromeachFederalJudicialDistrictwithintheStateofGeorgia,providedthateachsuchmemberisaResident(asdefinedinArticleIII,Section2hereof)oftheFederalJudicialDistrictsuchpersonrepresentsatthetimeofelection.

(c)two(2)YLDMemberswhoarenotResidentsofanyFederalJudicialDistrictwithinthestateofGeorgia.

(d)twelve(12)YLDMembersatlarge.(e)thepresidentorchairpersonofeachAffiliateUnit(as

definedinArticleXIIhereof);provided,however,thateachpresi-dentorchairpersonmay,bywrittennoticetothesecretaryatleastten(10)dayspriortoeachExecutiveCouncilmeeting,appointamemberofsuchAffiliateUnitasanalternatedelegatetoserveontheExecutiveCouncilintheeventofhisorherabsence.

(f)allCommitteeChairpersons,whoshallbemembersexofficiobutnonvotingunlessqualifiedtovoteunderanyotherpro-visionofthesebylaws.

(g)One(1)lawstudentrepresentativewhoisanAssociateMemberselectedbythePresidentfromthestudentbodyofeachlawschoolinthestateofGeorgiathatisapprovedbytheAmericanBarAssociationortheGeorgiaBoardofBarExaminers.Thesepersonsshallbemembersexofficiobutnonvoting.

Section 3. Eligibility. PersonswhoareYLDMembers(butnotHonoraryMembersorAssociateMembers)atthetimeoftheirelectionorappointmentshallbeeligibletoserveontheExecutiveCouncil;provided,however,thelawstudentrepresentativesshallbeAssociateMembers.

Section 4. Elections of Members of Executive Council. ThemembersoftheExecutiveCouncildescribedinSection2(b),(c),and(d)ofthisArticleshallbeelectedinthemannerprovidedforinArticleVIIofthesebylawsandshalltakeofficeimmediatelyupontheadjournmentoftheAnnualMeetingatwhichsaidelectionisconducted.

Section 5. Terms on Executive Council. EachmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilshallholdofficeforthefollowingterms:

(a)TheOfficers,Directors,CommitteeChairpersons,andpresidentsorchairpersonsofAffiliateUnitsshallserveforaperi-odoftimeconcurrentwiththetermoftheirrespectivepositions.

(b)EachmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilrepresentingaFederalJudicialDistrictandthenonresidentmembersoftheExecutiveCouncilshallholdofficeforaperiodoftwo(2)yearsoruntiltheirsuccessorshavebeendulychosenandqualified.

(c)EachmemberatlargeoftheExecutiveCouncilshallholdofficeforaperiodofone(1)yearoruntiltheirsuccessorshavebeendulychosenandqualified.

(d)Notwithstandingtheabove,anymemberoftheExecutiveCouncilwhoshallfailtomeettheattendancerequirementsetforthinArticleX,Section2shallbeautomaticallyremovedfromofficeontheExecutiveCouncil.

ARTICLE VI DELEGATES TO THE YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION

OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ThepresidentshallappointalldelegatestotheAmericanBarAssociationYoungLawyersDivisionAnnualandMidyearmeetingforthetermduringwhichheorsheispresident.Suchappointmentsshallbemadeaccordingtothefollowingpriority,indescendingorder,fromtheYLDMembers,asfollows:(1)Officers;(2)Directors;(3)otherExecutiveCouncilmembers;(4)otherYLDMembers.Toreceiveprior-ity,apotentialdelegatemustnotifythepresidentatleastninety(90)daysbeforetheAmericanBarAssociationmeetingatissueofhisorherdesiretobeadelegate.

ARTICLE VII ELECTIONS

Section 1. Effective Date for Implementation of Article VII Thefirstelectionsheldpursuanttothesebylawsshallbeheldin2007.Allpersonswhoareservinginanelectedpositionunderanypastbylawsshallcontinueinofficeorpositionuntilsuchtimeastheirregulartermexpires.Allofficesandpositionsbecomingvacantatthemeetingatwhichsaidfirstelectionsareheldshallbefilledaccordingtothesebylaws.

Section 2. Qualifications for Voting and Making Nomination. OnlyactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoareYLDMembers(otherthanHonoraryMembersorAssociateMembers)shallbeeligibletovoteornominateinanyelectionintheYoungLawyersDivision.

Section 3. Offices Filled by Election. (a)Thepresident-elect,treasurerandsecretaryshallbeelect-

edbymail-outballot,whichshallbefurnishedtothemembershipnolaterthanFebruary28thoftheyearoftheAnnualMeetingatwhichtheYLDmemberselectedwouldtakeofficeorsuchlaterdateasdeterminedpursuanttoSection7(i)ofthisArticle(suchdate,the“ElectionCommencementDate”).

(b)MembersoftheExecutiveCouncilrepresentingFederalJudicialDistricts,non-residentmembersoftheExecutiveCouncil,andmembersatlargeoftheExecutiveCouncilshallbeelectedattheAnnualMeeting.ElectionsofmembersrepresentingFederalJudicialDistrictsshallbestaggered,withnomorethanfive(5)representativesfromeachdistrictelectedperyear.

Section 4. Notification of Elections. Thesecretaryshallperformthefollowingdutiesinconnectionwithelections:

(a)Officers.Thesecretaryshallcauseanoticetobepub-lishedandmailedtoallYLDmembersnotlessthanseventy-five(75)dayspriortotheElectionCommencementDate,settingforth:

(1)thatthepositionsofpresident-elect,treasurerandsec-retaryshallbefilledbyelectionbymail-outballot;

(2)theeligibilityrequirementsforsuchpositions;(3)thenominationandelectionprocedure;and(4)thenamesandaddressesofmembersofthe

NominatingCommitteeandtheElectionCommittee.(b)ExecutiveCouncil.Thesecretaryshallcauseanoticeto

bepublishedandmailedtoallYLDMembersnotlessthansixty(60)dayspriortotheAnnualMeeting,settingforth:

(1)thepositionsontheExecutiveCouncilwhichshallbefilledbyelectionatsuchAnnualMeeting;

(2)theeligibilityrequirementsforsuchpositions;(3)thenominationandelectionprocedure;and(4)thenamesandaddressesofmembersofthe

NominatingCommitteeandtheElectionCommittee.


Section 5. Nominations. NominationsforanyofficeorpositionmaybemadebytheNominatingCommittee(describedinArticleIX,Section1)orbyYLDMembersasfollows:

(a)NominationsfromNominatingCommittee.(1)NominationsofOfficers.Notlessthanforty-five

(45)dayspriortotheElectionCommencementDate,theNominatingCommitteeshallnominateone(1)ormorecandi-datesfortheofficeofpresident-elect,treasurerandsecretary,andshallreportthenamesofallsuchnomineestotheElectionCommittee.

(2)NominationsforExecutiveCouncil.Notlessthanforty-five(45)dayspriortothedateoftheAnnualMeeting,theNominatingCommitteeshallnominate:five(5)ormorecandidatesfromeachFederalJudicialDistrictforelectionasmembersrepresentingsuchdistricttofillthetermsthatwillterminateatthenextAnnualMeeting;twelve(12)ormorecandidatesforelectionasmembersatlargetotheExecutiveCouncil;andtwo(2)ormorecandidatesforelectionasnon-residentmembersoftheExecutiveCouncilintheyearsthatthetermofsuchofficeterminatesatthenextAnnualMeeting.TheNominatingCommitteeshallreportthenamesofallExecutiveCouncilnomineestotheElectionCommitteenotlessthanforty-five(45)dayspriortothedateoftheAnnualMeeting.(b)NominationsfromMembers.Nominationsforcandidates

fortheofficesofpresident-elect,treasurerandsecretaryandforpositionsontheExecutiveCouncilmaybemadebythemember-shipoftheYoungLawyersDivisionasfollows:

(1)NominationsofOfficers.Anytwo(2)YLDMemberswhoarequalifiedtovoteinaccordancewiththeseBylawsmaysubmitanominatingpetitioninwritingtotheElectionCommitteeforthenominationofOfficersnotlessthanthirty(30)dayspriortotheElectionCommencementDate.

(2)NominationsforExecutiveCouncil.AnominatingpetitionforthenominationofExecutiveCouncilmembersmaybesubmittedtotheElectionCommittee(a)notlessthanthirty(30)dayspriortotheAnnualMeetingifsignedbytwo(2)YLDMemberswhoarequalifiedtovoteinaccordancewiththeseBylaws,and(b)notlessthanten(10)dayspriortotheAnnualMeetingifsignedbyten(10)YLDMemberswhoarequali-fiedtovoteinaccordancewiththeseBylaws.IfthenominationisforthepositionofnonresidentmemberoftheExecutiveCouncil,atleasttwo(2)ofthepetitioningYLDMembersshallbenonresidentYLDMembers.

(3)NominatingPetition.Thenominatingpetitionshallbesubstantiallyinthefollowingform:

Nominating Petition The Young Lawyers Division

TheundersignedmembersoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgiaingoodstanding[ifapplicable,whoarenonresi-dentsoftheStateofGeorgia]herebynominate____________________fortheofficeof___________________forthetermbeginningatthecloseoftheAnnualMeetingin______._________________________Nominator_________________________NominatorDate____________ “I,_________________________,thepersonnominatedinthispetition,herebyacceptssaidnominationand,ifelected,willserve.”_________________________Nominee

(c)NoNominations.ShouldapositionontheExecutiveCouncilwhichistobefilledatanAnnualMeetinglackanominationproperlyfiledinaccordancewiththesebylaws,thennominationsforsuchpositionmaybemadefromthefloorattheAnnualMeeting.

Section 6. Certification of Nominees.(a)DeterminationofEligibility.Uponreceiptofthenomi-

nationsfromtheNominatingCommitteeorthemembers,theElectionCommittee(asdescribedinArticleIX,Section1)shalldetermineifthepersonsnominatedareeligibleforoffice.

(b)NotificationofNominees.Withinfive(5)daysofreceiptofthereportoftheNominatingCommitteeorreceiptofanomina-tionfromthemembers,theElectionCommitteeshallnotifyeachnomineeofsuchnominationandofthenamesofotherpersonsnominatedforthesameposition.Eachnomineeshallhavetwo(2)businessdaysfromthedateofnotificationtoacceptorrejectthe

nomination.Nomineesfailingtorespondshallbedeemedtohaveacceptedthenomination.

Section 7. Officer Elections. AtthecloseofthenominationsforPresident-Elect,SecretaryandTreasurer,theElectionCommitteeshallcauseballotstobeprepared.NolaterthantheElectionCommencementDate,eachYLDMembershallbeprovidedwithaballotfortheelectionofpresident-elect,secretaryandtreasurer.

(a)VoterList.AvoterlistshallbepreparedfromthecurrentYoungLawyersDivisionmembershipandeachYLDMembershallbegivenaidentifyingnumber.

(b)ContentofBallots.Eachballotshallhaveprintedthereon(1)thenameofeachpersondulynominatedforeachposition,(2)spaceforawrite-inforeachposition,(3)instructionsastothemethodbywhichavoteforaparticularcandidateshallbeindi-cated,and(4)thelastdayonwhichaballotmustbereceivedattheHeadquartersoftheYoungLawyersDivision(whichdateshallannuallybefixedbytheElectionCommittee).TheballotshallnotcontaintheYLDMember’sidentifyingnumber.

(c)IdentifyingNumber.TheidentifyingnumberoftheYLDMembershallbeindicatedontheenvelopeorothermethodbywhichtheYLDMemberdelivershisorhervote.

(d)Voting.EachYLDMemberdesiringtovoteshallmarkhisorherballotaccordingtotheinstructionsthereonandshallreturntheballotonorbeforethedatespecifiedbytheElectionCommittee.OnlyballotsreturnedbyYLDMemberswhoareeli-gibletovoteonorbeforesaiddateshallbecounted.

(e)CountingandReport.TheElectionCommitteemayutilizeandemploysuchimpartialaccountingandclericalassis-tanceasitmaydeemnecessarytocountthevotes.TheElectionCommitteeshallreporttheresultsatthenextAnnualMeeting.

(f)Recount.Anycandidatedissatisfiedwiththeresultofthecountastohisorherelectionmayrequest,withinsixhoursaftertheresulthasbeenreportedattheAnnualMeeting,arecountoftheballotspertainingtohisorherelectionbyfilingsuchrequestinwritingwiththethencurrentpresident.ThepresidentshallforthwithappointaRecountCommittee(whichshallbecomposedofpersonsdifferentfromtheElectionCommittee)whichshall,assoonaspractical,recounttheballotspertainingtoallelectionsinwhicharecounthasbeenrequestedandexaminetheballotsnotcounted,determinethenumberofvotesvalidlycastforthecandidatesinsuchelection,andreporttheresults.TheresultsdeterminedbytheRecountCommitteeshallbefinalandnotsub-jecttofurtherchallenge.

(g)DeclarationofResultsofElections.Thecandidatereceiv-ingthemajorityofthevotesineachelection(accordingtothereportoftheElectionCommittee,ortheRecountCommitteeasthecasemaybe)shallbedeclaredelected.Incomputingthenumberofvotescastineachelectionforthepurposeofdeterminingthenumberconstitutingamajoritythereof,thereshallbeexcludedfromsuchcomputationthevotescastfora“write-in”candidatereceivinglessthan2%ofthetotalvotescastinsuchelection.

(h)Run-off.Inallinstanceswheretherearemorethantwo(2)candidatesforanyofficeofpresident-elect,secretaryortrea-surerandnooneofsuchcandidatesreceivesamajorityofthevotescastintheelectiontofillsuchoffice,theExecutiveCouncilshall,within10daysfromthedateofthereportoftheElectionCommittee,ortheRecountCommitteeasthecasemaybe,makeandannouncetothemembershipadequateprovisionsforarun-offelectionbetweenthecandidatesreceivingthetwo(2)highestnum-berofvotes,whichsaidrun-offshallbeheldnotlaterthanthirty(30)daysfromthedateofthereportoftheElectionorRecountCommittee,andshallbeconductedinallrespectsasprovidedinthesebylawsforregularelections;providedthattheincumbentholderofthepositionshallcontinuetoserveuntilhisorhersuc-cessorisdetermined.

(i)CoordinationwithStateBarofGeorgiaElections.Thetimeperiodsdealingwithnominationandelectionofthepresi-dent-elect,secretaryandtreasurermaybechangedatthediscretionoftheNominatingCommitteeandtheElectionCommitteetofacilitateareductioninthecostoftheelectionoftheseofficesiftheelectioncanbecoordinatedwiththeelectionofofficersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Section 8. Executive Council Elections. TheelectionoftheExecutiveCouncilandthemembersoftheExecutiveCouncilelectedtotheExecutiveCommitteeshalloccurattheAnnualMeeting.

(a)ContentofBallots.TheElectionCommitteeshallhaveballotsprepared,whichshallinclude(1)thenameofeachpersondulynominatedforeachExecutiveCouncilposition,(2)spaceforawrite-inforeachposition,and(3)instructionsastothemethodbywhichavoteforaparticularcandidateshallbeindicated.


(b)PlanofElection.TheElectionCommitteeshall,attheExecutiveCouncilmeetingimmediatelyprecedingtheAnnualMeeting,presenttotheExecutiveCouncilforitsapprovalaplanfortheconductoftheExecutiveCouncilelectionsattheAnnualMeeting.TheplanshallcontainalistofplacesandtimesforvotingattheAnnualMeetingandshallensurethatthereisadequatetimetocountvotespriortotheformalbusi-nessattheAnnualMeeting.

(c)Voting.EachmemberinattendanceattheAnnualMeetingdesiringtovoteshallmarkhisorherballotaccordingtotheinstructionsthereonandshallreturntheballottooneofthevotingplaces.

(d)CountingandReport.TheElectionCommitteeshall,attheendofthevoting,countthevotesandreporttheresultsattheAnnualMeeting.TheElectionCommitteemayemploysuchimpartialclericalassistanceasitmaydeemnecessary.

(1)Thecandidatesreceivingtheten(10)greatestnumberofvotesintheelectionsformembersfromeachoftheFederalJudicialDistrictstotheExecutiveCouncilshallbedeclaredelected.

(2)Thecandidatesreceivingthetwelve(12)greatestnumberofvotesintheelectionsformembersatlargetotheExecutiveCouncilshallbedeclaredelected.

(3)Thecandidatesreceivingthetwo(2)greatestnumberofvotesintheelectionfornonresidentmembertotheExecutiveCouncilshallbedeclaredelected.

(4)Intheeventtwo(2)ormorecandidatesreceivethesamenumberofvotesinanyelectionandsuchtieisbetweenthecandidateswhoreceivethelowestnumberofvotesthatstillmightresultinsuchcandidatesbeingelected,theYLDMemberspresentattheAnnualMeetingbyvoteshalldeterminewhichofsuchtyingcandidatesshallbedeclaredelected.(e)ExecutiveCouncilRepresentativestoExecutive

Committee.SubsequenttotheelectionoftheExecutiveCouncil,themembersoftheExecutiveCouncil(bothnewandcontinuing)shallbyvoteattheAnnualMeeting,whichneednotbeinwriting,electtwo(2)amongthemwhoshallserveasmembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeforatermendingatthenextAnnualMeeting.

ARTICLE VIII REMOVAL AND VACANCIES

Section 1. Removal of Officer For Cause. TheExecutiveCouncilmay,atanymeetingcalledinaccordancewiththesebylaws,bytwo-thirdsmajorityvoteofthetotalvotingmem-bershipoftheExecutiveCouncilremoveanyOfficerfromofficeforcause.

Section 2. Change of Residence or Office of Certain Persons. Intheeventthat:

(a)anymemberoftheExecutiveCouncilrepresentingaFederalJudicialDistrictceasestobeaResidentoftheFederalJudicialDistrictwhichsuchmemberrepresents;or

(b)anonresidentmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilbecomesaResidentofaFederalJudicialDistrictintheStateofGeorgia,suchmembershallcontinuetoserveontheExecutiveCouncilonlyuntilthenextAnnualMeeting.IfthetermofofficeofsuchmemberdoesnotnormallyexpireatsuchAnnualMeeting,thereshallbeaspecialnominationandelectiontoelectanewmembertoservefortheremainderofsuchunexpiredterm.Suchspecialelectionandnominationsshallbeconductedaselectionsandnominationsforsuchpositionarenormallyconducted.

Section 3. Vacancies. Vacanciesoccurringinanyofficeshallbefilledasfollows:

(a)Anyvacancyarisingintheofficeofpresidentshallbefilledbythepresident-electwhoshallcontinuetoholdtheofficeofpresident-electuntiltheexpirationoftheunexpiredtermandshallcontinuetoserveaspresidentforthetermduringwhichheorshewouldregularlyhaveservedaspresident.

(b)Anyvacancyarisingintheofficeofpresident-elect(exceptpursuanttoSection3(a)above)shallremainunfilledfortheunexpiredterm.Anelectionfortheofficeofpresidentshallbeheldatthenextelectionheldbymail-outballotinthesameman-nerthattheelectionisheldfortheofficeofpresident-elect.

(c)Anyvacancyarisingintheofficeofsecretary,treasurer,orExecutiveCouncilRepresentativetotheExecutiveCommitteeshallbefilledfortheunexpiredtermbysuchpersonelectedatthenextmeetingoftheExecutiveCouncilbymajorityvoteofthosepresentandqualifiedtovoteandvoting.

(d)Anyvacancyarisingintheofficeofeditor(s)shallbefilledfortheunexpiredtermbyappointmentbythepresident.

(e)Anyvacancyarisingintheofficeofcommitteechairper-son(otherthanthosefixedbythetermsofthesebylaws)shallbefilledfortheunexpiredtermbyappointmentbythepresident,or

thepresidentmaydelegatetheappointmenttothemembersofsaidcommittee.

(f)AnyvacancyarisingintheofficeofDirectorshallbefilledfortheunexpiredtermbyappointmentbythepresident.

(g)AnyvacancyarisingintheofficeofmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilrepresentingaFederalJudicialDistrictshallbefilledbyappointmentbytheresidentfortheunexpiredterm,providedthattheappointeeshallbearesidentofthesameFederalJudicialDistrictasthememberwhosepositionheorshefills.

(h)AnyvacancyarisingintheofficeofmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilatlargeshallbefilledbyappointmentbythepresidentfortheunexpiredterm.

(i)AnyvacancyarisingintheofficeofnonresidentmemberoftheExecutiveCouncilshallbefilledbyappointmentbythepresidentfortheunexpiredterm,providedthattheappointeeshallnotbearesidentofanyFederalJudicialDistrictinthestateofGeorgia.

ARTICLE IX COMMITTEES

Section 1. Standing Committees. EachStandingCommitteeshallincludeinitsmembershipatleastsix(6)membersoftheExecutiveCouncil,includingtwo(2)fromeachFederalJudicialDistrict.Themandatorymembersdescribedherein(oth-erthannonvotingmembers)shallcounttowardsfulfillingtheminimummemberrequirement.ThemembershipofeachStandingCommittee(otherthantheBudgetCommittee)shallbeselectedbythepresident,subjecttotherequirementssetforthinthisSection1.TheStandingCommitteesoftheYoungLawyersDivisionshallbeasfollows:

(a)MembershipandMeetings.Thiscommittee,whichshallincludethesecretaryandpresident-electasmembers,shallconsiderandmakerecommendationsonwaystoimprovethemembership’sinvolvementandattendanceatmeetings.

(b)Budget.Thiscommittee,whichshallbechairedbythetreasurer,shallbeappointedandorganizedbythepresident-electatleastsixty(60)daysimmediatelyprecedingtheAnnualMeetingandshallpreparethebudgetforthesubsequentBarYear.

(c)Rules,BylawsandProcedures.ThiscommitteeshallconsiderandmakerecommendationsonallproposedamendmentsorchangesconcerningtheorganizationoftheYoungLawyersDivisionanditsrules,bylawsandprocedures.

(d)Nominating.Thiscommittee,whichshallbechairedbythepresident-elect,whoshallactaschairpersonbutshallhavenovoteonthecommittee,shallbechargedwithmakingnominationsforallelections.Thepresident-electshallnotifyallcommitteemembersofthetimeandplaceofmeetings.Three(3)votingmem-bersoftheNominatingCommitteeshallconstituteaquorumforsuchmeetings.

(e)Election.Thiscommittee,whichshallbechairedbythepresident-elect,shallbechargedwithconductingallelections.

(f)Communications.Thiscommittee,whichshallincludethesecretaryandtheeditor(s)asmembers,shallconsiderandmakerecommendationsonproposedpublicationsoftheYoungLawyersDivisionandthenumberandtypesofpublicationsissuedorspon-soredbytheYoungLawyersDivision.ThiscommitteeshallalsoberesponsibleformaintainingtheYoungLawyersDivision’swebsite.

(g)PublicRelationsandPolicy.Thiscommitteeshallcon-siderandmakerecommendationsonwaystopromoteapositivepublicimageofyounglawyersinthestateofGeorgiaandshallinformthemembershipofanylegislationrelevanttothelegalprofession.TheactionsofthiscommitteeshallcomplywiththerequirementsofArticleXI,Section1.

Section 2. Special Committees. Thepresidentshallappointsuchspecialcommitteesasheorsheshalldeemnecessaryandproperandshalldesignatetheirdutiesandtheirsize.UponmotionofanyYLDMemberandthepassageofsuchmotionbyamajorityvoteatanymeetingoftheExecutiveCouncil,acommitteeforanyspecificpurposemaybeformed,anditshallbeman-datoryforthepresidenttomaketheappointmentofsuchcommittee.Thepresidentmaydelegatetheappointmentofcommitteememberstothecommitteechairpersonoftherespectivecommittees.

Section 3. Committee Chairpersons. All“CommitteeChairpersons”(otherthanthosemandatedbythetermsofthesebylaws)shallbeappointedbythepresidentforatermcoincidentwiththatofthepresidentandshallserveatthepleasureofthepresident.PersonswhoareYLDMembers(butnotHonoraryMembersorAssociateMembers)atthetimeoftheirappointmentshallbeeligibletoserveasacommitteechairperson.Nopersonshallserveasthecommitteechairpersonofanyone(1)committeeoftheYoungLawyersDivisionformorethantwo(2)consecutiveBaryears,oranyportionoftwo(2)consecutiveBaryears;provided,however,suchper-


sonmayserveasacommitteechairpersonofanyothercommitteeoftheYoungLawyersDivision.Thepresidentreservesthepowertoremoveanycommitteechairpersonorcommitteemember.

Section 4. Reports. Eachcommitteechairpersonshallsubmittothepresident,sec-retaryandsuchotherpersonsorcommitteesasdesignatedbythepresident,writtenreportsoftheactivitiesoftheirrespectivecommittee.Reportsmaybesubmittedatintervalsasrequiredordesiredbythepres-identexcepteachcommitteeshallsubmitareportofitsentireactivitiesnotlessthanten(10)dayspriortotheAnnualMeeting.

ARTICLE X MEETINGS

Section 1. Meetings of the YLD Members. YLDMembersshallmeetnotlessthantwo(2)timesduringeachBaryear.

(a)AnnualMeeting.YLDMembersshallmeetannuallyatthetimeandplacedesignatedbytheBoardofGovernorsfortheAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiaunlesstheExecutiveCouncilatanymeetingbymajorityvoteofthememberspresentandvotingheldnotlessthansixty(60)dayspriortothedateoftheAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiadesignatesadifferentplaceandtime.NoticeoftheAnnualMeetingshallbegivenbythesecretarytoallYLDMembersnotlessthanthirty(30)daysbeforesuchAnnualMeeting.

(b)MidyearMeeting.TheYLDMembersshallmeetannu-allyatthetimeandplacedesignatedbytheBoardofGovernorsfortheMidyearMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiaunlesstheExecutiveCouncilatanymeetingbymajorityvoteofthememberspresentandvotingheldnotlessthansixty(60)dayspriortothedateoftheMidyearMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgiadesig-natesadifferentplaceandtime.NoticeoftheMidyearMeetingshallbegivenbythesecretarytoallYLDMembersnotlessthanthirty(30)daysbeforesuchMidyearMeeting.

(c)OtherMeetings.ThepresidentortheExecutiveCouncil,bymajorityvoteofthememberspresentandvoting,maycallothermeetingsoftheYLDMembersatsuchtimesastheyshalldesignate.NoticeofanysuchmeetingshallbegivenbythesecretarytoallYLDMembersnotlessthanthirty(30)daysbeforesuchmeeting.

Section 2. Executive Council Meetings. TheExecutiveCouncilshallmeetnotlessthanfive(5)timesdur-ingeachBaryear.

(a)SchedulingofMeetings.ThepresidentortheExecutiveCouncil,bymajorityvoteofthememberspresentandvoting,maydesignatethetimeandlocationoftheExecutiveCouncilmeetings;provided,thatone(1)ofsuchmeetingsshallcoincidewiththeAnnualMeetingandone(1)ofsuchmeetingsshallcoincidewiththeMidyearMeetingasdescribedabove.NoticeofsuchmeetingsshallbegivenbythesecretarytoallmembersoftheExecutiveCouncilnotlessthanthirty(30)daysbeforesuchmeetings.

(b)AttendanceRequirement.Unlessotherwisesetbymajor-ityvoteoftheExecutiveCouncil,orunlesswaivedbyamajorityvoteoftheExecutiveCouncil,eachExecutiveCouncilmembershallberequiredtoattendatleastthree(3)ofthefive(5)regularlyscheduledmeetings.

Section 3. Executive Committee Meetings. TheExecutiveCommitteeshallmeetuponthecallofthepresidentoruponthewrittenrequestaddressedtothepresidentofamajorityofthevotingmembersoftheExecutiveCommittee.

Section 4. Committee Meetings. Eachcommittee,whetherstandingorspecial,shallmeet,asoftenasnecessaryinordertoperformitsduties,uponthecallofthecommit-teechairpersonforsuchcommittee.

Section 5. Conduct of Meetings. Allmeetingsmaybeconductedinpersonorbyanymeansofcom-municationbywhichallpersonsparticipatingmaysimultaneouslyheareachotherduringthemeeting.Furthermore,allmeetingsofaspecialcommittee,astandingcommitteeortheExecutiveCommitteemaybeconductedbycorrespondenceorotherwiseinwriting(includingelec-tronically),withoutassemblinginpersonatanyparticularplace.Section 6. Quorum.

(a)Ten(10)membersoftheExecutiveCouncilshallconsti-tuteaquorumforExecutiveCouncilmeetings;

(b)Thirty(30)YLDMembersshallconstituteaquorumformeetingsoftheYLDMembers.

Section 7. Voting at Meetings. Exceptasotherwiseprovidedinthesebylaws,allquestionscom-ingbeforeanymeeting(YLDMembers,ExecutiveCouncil,committee

orother)whendulyconvenedshallbedecidedbyamajorityofthememberspresentandvoting.

Section 8. Rules. Allmeetings,includingcommitteemeetings,shallbeconductedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthesebylawsandwherenoprovisionismade,theninaccordancewithRobert’sRulesofOrder.

ARTICLE XI LEGISLATION AND PUBLICITY

Section 1. Legislation. Nolegislationshallberecommended,approvedordisapprovedinthenameoftheYoungLawyersDivisionunlesstherehasbeenareportthereonbyanappropriatecommitteeandunlesssuchactionistakenbyavoteofmajorityoftheYLDMemberspresentatameetingoftheYLDMembers,orbyavoteofamajorityofthemembersoftheExecutiveCouncilpresentatanymeetingoftheExecutiveCouncil,dulyconvened.Anysuchrecommendation,approvalordisapproval,shallbesubmittedtotheStateBarofGeorgiainaccordancewithitsbylaws.

Section 2. Publications. Nopublicationshallbedistributed,publishedorpubliclyendorsedinthenameoftheYoungLawyersDivisionexceptbyapprovalofthepresident.Thepresidentmaydelegatesuchapprovalpowertothecommunicationscommittee.

ARTICLE XII AFFILIATE UNITS

Section 1. Qualification and Application. Anyyounglawyersorganizationoryoungerlawyersunitofanybarassociation,city,SuperiorCourtCircuit,CongressionalDistrict,orotherjurisdictioninwhichmembershipisrestrictedtoyoungerlawyersingoodstandingmayapplytobean“AffiliateUnit”oftheYoungLawyersDivision.Theapplyingorganizationshallsubmittothesecretaryapetitioncontaining:(a)acertifiedcopyofaresolutionregularlyadoptedbytheapplyingorganizationauthorizingaffiliation;(b)apetitionsignedbyatleastthree(3)membersoftheapplyingorganizationdescribingitsorganizationandlistingthesizeofitsmembership;(c)acopyofanyconstitution,bylaws,orarticlesofpro-cedureoftheapplyingorganization.

Section 2. Affiliation. Thesecretaryshallpresenttheaffiliationpetitionatthenextmeet-ingoftheExecutiveCouncilforapproval.UponapprovalbyamajorityofthemembersoftheExecutiveCouncilpresentandvoting,theappli-cantshallimmediatelybeanAffiliateUnit.

Section 3. Termination of Affiliation. AnyYLDMembermaysubmitamotioninwritingtotheExecutiveCouncilatanytime,movingthatanentityceasetobeanAffiliateUnit.SuchmotionshallbepresentedatthenextmeetingoftheExecutiveCouncilforitsconsideration.IfsuchmotionisapprovedbyamajorityoftheExecutiveCouncilmemberspresentandvotingatsuchmeeting,theentityshallimmediatelyceasetobeanAffiliateUnit.

ARTICLE XIII AMENDMENTS

ThebylawsoftheYoungLawyersDivisionmaybeamendedonlyatameetingoftheYLDMembersbymotionmadeinwritingtothepresidentatleastthirty(30)dayspriortothemeeting.CopiesofthemotioncontainingtheproposedamendmentshallbemailedtoallYLDMembersatleasttwenty(20)dayspriortothemeeting.Themotiontoamendshallthenbevoteduponatthemeetingandshallrequireamajor-ityvoteofthoseYLDMemberspresentforadoption.TheprovisionsofthisArticleimposingcertaintimerequirementsmaybewaivedwiththeunanimousconsentofallYLDMemberspresentatanymeeting.

PART II ADMISSION TO THE BAR

CHAPTER 1 ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Rule 2-101. Admission to the Bar. NopersonmaybeadmittedtotheStateBarasanactive,emeritusorinactivemember,orlicensedasanattorneytopracticelawinthisStatewithoutcomplyingwiththeRulesGoverningAdmissiontothePracticeofLawasadoptedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

PART III This Part is Reserved


PART IV GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

CHAPTER 1 GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND

ENFORCEMENT THEREOF

Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. TheStateBarofGeorgiaisherebyauthorizedtomaintainandenforce,assetforthinruleshereinafterstated,GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConducttobeobservedbythemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandthoseauthorizedtopracticelawintheStateofGeorgiaandtoinstitutedisciplinaryactionintheeventoftheviola-tionthereof.

Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

(a)TheRulesofProfessionalConducttobeobservedbythemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandthoseauthorizedtoprac-ticelawinGeorgiaaresetforthhereinandanyviolationthereof;anyassistanceorinducementdirectedtowardanotherforthepurposeofproducingaviolationthereof;oranyviolationthereofthroughtheactsofanother,shallsubjecttheoffendertodisciplin-aryactionashereinafterprovided.

(b)Thelevelsofdisciplinearesetforthbelow.Thepowertoadministeramoreseverelevelofdisciplineshallincludethepowertoadministerthelesser:

(1)Disbarment:AformofpublicdisciplineremovingtherespondentfromthepracticeoflawinGeorgia.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesofseriousmisconduct.ThislevelofdisciplineincludespublicationasprovidedbyRule4-219(b).

(2)Suspension:AformofpublicdisciplinewhichremovestherespondentfromthepracticeoflawinGeorgiaforadefiniteperiodoftimeoruntilsatisfactionofcertainconditionsimposedasapartofthesuspension.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesthatmeritmorethanapublicreprimandbutlessthandisbarment.Thislevelofdisci-plineincludespublicationasprovidedbyRule4-219(b).

(3)PublicReprimand:Aformofpublicdisciplinewhichdeclarestherespondent’sconducttohavebeenimproperbutdoesnotlimittherighttopractice.Apublicreprimandshallbeadministeredbyajudgeofasuperiorcourtinopencourt.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesthatmeritmorethanareviewpanelreprimandbutlessthansuspension.

(4)ReviewPanelReprimand:Aformofpublicdisciplinewhichdeclarestherespondent’sconducttohavebeenimproperbutdoesnotlimittherighttopractice.AReviewPanelReprimandshallbeadministeredbytheReviewPanelatameetingoftheReviewPanel.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesthatmeritmorethananinvestigativepanelreprimandbutlessthanapublicreprimand.

(5)InvestigativePanelReprimand:Aformofconfi-dentialdisciplinewhichdeclarestherespondent’sconducttohavebeenimproperbutdoesnotlimittherighttopractice.AnInvestigativePanelReprimandshallbeadministeredbytheInvestigativePanelatameetingoftheInvestigativePanel.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesthatmeritmorethanaformaladmonitionbutlessthanareviewpanelreprimand.

(6)FormalAdmonition:Aformofconfidentialdisciplinewhichdeclarestherespondent’sconducttohavebeenimproperbutdoesnotlimittherighttopractice.AformaladmonitionshallbeadministeredbyletterasprovidedinRules4-205through4-208.Thislevelofdisciplinewouldbeappropriateincasesthatmeritthelowestformofdiscipline.(c)(1)TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiamayimposeanyofthe

levelsofdisciplinesetforthabovefollowingformalproceed-ingsagainstarespondent;however,anycasewheredisciplineisimposedbytheCourtisamatterofpublicrecorddespitethefactthatthelevelofdisciplinewouldhavebeenconfidentialifimposedbytheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard.

(2)AsprovidedinPartIV,Chapter2oftheStateBarRules,theInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardmayimposeanyofthelevelsofdisciplinesetforthaboveprovidedthatarespondentshallhavetherighttorejecttheimpositionofdisciplinebytheInvestigativePanelpursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-208.3;(d)TheTableofContents,Preamble,Scope,Terminology

andGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductareasfollows:

Contents

Preamble,ScopeandTerminology

Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship

1.1 Competence1.2 ScopeofRepresentation1.3 Diligence1.4 Communication1.5 Fees1.6 ConfidentialityofInformation1.7 ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule1.8 ConflictofInterest:ProhibitedTransactions1.9 ConflictofInterest:FormerClient1.10 ImputedDisqualification:GeneralRule1.11 SuccessiveGovernmentandPrivateEmployment1.12 FormerJudgeorArbitrator1.13 OrganizationasClient1.14 ClientunderaDisability1.15(I) SafekeepingProperty-General1.15(II) SafekeepingProperty-TrustAccountandIOLTA1.15(III) RecordKeeping;TrustAccountOverdraft Notification;ExaminationofRecords1.16 DecliningorTerminatingRepresentation1.17 SaleofLawPractice

Counselor

2.1 Advisor2.2 Intermediary2.3 EvaluationforUsebyThirdPersons

Advocate

3.1 MeritoriousClaimsandContentions3.2 ExpeditingLitigation3.3 CandortowardtheTribunal3.4 FairnesstoOpposingPartyandCounsel3.5 ImpartialityandDecorumoftheTribunal3.6 TrialPublicity3.7 LawyerasWitness3.8 SpecialResponsibilitiesofaProsecutor3.9 AdvocateinNonadjudicativeProceedings

Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients4.1 TruthfulnessinStatementstoOthers4.2 CommunicationwithPersonRepresentedbyCounsel4.3 DealingwithUnrepresentedPerson4.4 RespectforRightsofThirdPersons

Law Firms and Associations

5.1 ResponsibilitiesofaPartnerorSupervisoryLawyer5.2 ResponsibilitiesofaSubordinateLawyer5.3 ResponsibilitiesRegardingNonlawyerAssistants5.4 ProfessionalIndependenceofaLawyer5.5 UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw5.6 RestrictionsonRighttoPractice5.7 RestrictionsRegardingLaw-relatedServices

Public Service6.1 VoluntaryProBonoPublicoService6.2 AcceptingAppointments6.3 MembershipinLegalServicesOrganization6.4 LawReformActivitiesAffectingClient Interests

Information About Legal Services

7.1 CommunicationsConcerningaLawyer’sServices7.2 Advertising7.3 DirectContactwithProspectiveClients7.4 CommunicationofFieldsofPractice7.5 FirmNamesandLetterheads

Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession8.1 BarAdmissionandDisciplinaryMatters8.2 JudicialandLegalOfficials8.3 ReportingProfessionalMisconduct


8.4 Misconduct8.5 DisciplinaryAuthority;ChoiceofLaw

Miscellaneous

9.1 ReportingRequirements9.2 SettlementofClaims9.3 CooperationwithDisciplinaryAuthorities9.4 ReciprocalDiscipline9.5 LawyerasaPublicOfficial

PREAMBLE, SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY PREAMBLE: A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES

[1]Alawyerisarepresentativeofclients,anofficerofthelegalsys-temandacitizenhavingspecialresponsibilityforthequalityofjustice.

[2]Asarepresentativeofclients,alawyerperformsvariousfunctions.Asadvisor,alawyerprovidesaclientwithaninformedunderstandingoftheclient’slegalrightsandobligationsandexplainstheirpracticalimplica-tions.Asadvocate,alawyerzealouslyassertstheclient’spositionundertherulesoftheadversarysystem.Asnegotiator,alawyerseeksaresultadvan-tageoustotheclientbutconsistentwithrequirementsofhonestdealingwithothers.Asintermediarybetweenclients,alawyerseekstoreconciletheirdivergentinterestsasanadvisorand,toalimitedextent,asaspokespersonforeachclient.Alawyeractsasevaluatorbyexaminingaclient’slegalaffairsandreportingaboutthemtotheclientortoothers.

[3]Inallprofessionalfunctionsalawyershouldbecompetent,promptanddiligent.Alawyershouldmaintaincommunicationwithaclientconcerningtherepresentation.Alawyershouldkeepinconfi-denceinformationrelatingtorepresentationofaclientexceptsofarasdisclosureisrequiredorpermittedbythetheseRulesorotherlaw.

[4]Alawyershouldusethelaw’sproceduresonlyforlegitimatepurposesandnottoharassorintimidateothers.Alawyershoulddem-onstraterespectforthelaw,thelegalsystemandforthosewhoserveit,includingjudges,otherlawyersandpublicofficials.Whileitisalaw-yer’sduty,whennecessary,tochallengetherectitudeofofficialaction,itisalsoalawyer’sdutytoupholdlegalprocess.

[5]Asacitizen,alawyershouldseekimprovementofthelaw,theadministrationofjusticeandthequalityofservicerenderedbythelegalprofession.Asamemberofalearnedprofession,alawyershouldcultivateknowledgeofthelawbeyonditsuseforclients,employthatknowledgeinreformofthelawandworktostrengthenlegaleduca-tion.Alawyershouldbemindfulofdeficienciesintheadministrationofjusticeandofthefactthatthepoor,andsometimespersonswhoarenotpoor,cannotaffordadequatelegalassistance,andshouldthereforedevoteprofessionaltimeandcivicinfluenceintheirbehalf.Alawyershouldaidthelegalprofessioninpursuingtheseobjectivesandshouldhelpthebarregulateitselfinthepublicinterest.

[6]Alawyer’sprofessionalresponsibilitiesareprescribedintheRulesofProfessionalConduct,aswellasbysubstantiveandprocedurallaw.Alawyeralsoisguidedbyconscienceandtheapprobationofpro-fessionalpeers.Alawyershouldstrivetoattainthehighestlevelofskill,toimprovethelawandthelegalprofessionandtoexemplifythelegalprofession’sidealsofpublicservice.

[7]Reserved.

[8]Inthenatureoflawpracticeconflictingresponsibilitiesareencountered.Virtuallyalldifficultethicalproblemsarisefromconflictamongalawyer’sresponsibilitiestoclients,tothelegalsystemandtothelawyer’sowninterestinremaininganuprightperson.TheRulesofProfessionalConductprescribetermsforresolvingsuchconflicts.WithintheframeworkoftheseRules,manydifficultissuesofprofes-sionaldiscretioncanarise.SuchissuesmustberesolvedthroughtheexerciseofsensitiveprofessionalandmoraljudgmentguidedbythebasicprinciplesunderlyingtheRules.

[9]Thelegalprofessionislargelyself-governing.Althoughotherprofessionsalsohavebeengrantedpowersofself-government,thelegalprofessionisuniqueinthisrespectbecauseofthecloserelationshipbetweentheprofessionandtheprocessesofgovernmentandlawenforce-ment.ThisconnectionismanifestedinthefactthatultimateauthorityoverthelegalprofessionisvestedintheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

[10]Totheextentthatlawyersmeettheobligationsoftheirpro-fessionalcalling,theoccasionforgovernmentregulationisobviated.Self-regulationalsohelpsmaintainthelegalprofession’sindependencefromgovernmentdomination.Anindependentlegalprofessionisanimportantforceinpreservinggovernmentunderlaw,forabuseoflegal

authorityismorereadilychallengedbyaprofessionwhosemembersarenotdependentongovernmentfortherighttopractice.

[11]Thelegalprofession’srelativeautonomycarrieswithitspecialresponsibilitiesofself-government.Theprofessionhasarespon-sibilitytoassurethatitsregulationsareconceivedinthepublicinterestandnotinfurtheranceofparochialorself-interestedconcernsofthebar.EverylawyerisresponsibleforobservanceoftheRulesofProfessionalConduct.Alawyershouldalsoaidinsecuringtheirobservancebyotherlawyers.Neglectoftheseresponsibilitiescompromisestheindepen-denceoftheprofessionandthepublicinterestwhichitserves.

[12]Thefulfillmentofalawyer’sprofessionalresponsibilityrolerequiresanunderstandingbythemoftheirrelationshiptoourlegalsys-tem.TheRulesofProfessionalConduct,whenproperlyapplied,servetodefinethatrelationship. SCOPE [13]TheRulesofProfessionalConductarerulesofreason.Theyshouldbeinterpretedwithreferencetothepurposesoflegalrepresenta-tionandofthelawitself.SomeoftheRulesareimperatives,castintheterms“shall”or“shallnot.”Thesedefineproperconductforpurposesofprofessionaldiscipline.Others,generallycastintheterms“may”or“should,”arepermissiveoraspirationalanddefineareasundertheRulesinwhichthelawyerhasprofessionaldiscretion.Disciplinaryactionshallnotbetakenwhenthelawyer’sconductfallswithintheboundsofsuchdiscretion.TheRulesarethuspartlyobligatoryanddisciplinaryandpartlyaspirationalanddescriptive.Togethertheydefinealawyer’spro-fessionalrole.CommentsdonotaddobligationstoorexpandtheRulesbutprovideguidanceforpracticingincompliancewiththeRules.

[14]TheRulespresupposealargerlegalcontextshapingthelawyer’srole.Thatcontextincludescourtrulesandstatutesrelatingtomattersoflicensure,lawsdefiningspecificobligationsoflawyersandsubstantiveandprocedurallawingeneral.CompliancewiththeRules,aswithalllawinanopensociety,dependsprimarilyuponunderstand-ingandvoluntarycompliance,secondarilyuponreinforcementbypeerandpublicopinionandfinally,whennecessary,uponenforcementthroughdisciplinaryproceedings.TheRulesdonot,however,exhaustthemoralandethicalconsiderationsthatshouldinformalawyer,fornoworthwhilehumanactivitycanbecompletelydefinedbylegalrules.TheRulessimplyprovideaframeworkfortheethicalpracticeoflaw.

[15]Furthermore,forpurposesofdeterminingthelawyer’sauthor-ityandresponsibility,principlesofsubstantivelawexternaltotheseRulesdeterminewhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipexists.Mostofthedutiesflowingfromtheclient-lawyerrelationshipattachonlyaftertheclienthasrequestedthelawyertorenderlegalservicesandthelawyerhasagreedtodoso.Buttherearesomeduties,suchasthatofconfidentialityunderRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information,thatmayattachwhenthelawyeragreestoconsiderwhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipwillbeestablished.Whetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipexistsforanyspecificpurposedependsonthecircumstancesandmaybeaquestionoffact.

[16]Undervariouslegalprovisions,includingconstitutional,statutoryandcommonlaw,theresponsibilitiesofgovernmentlawyersmayincludeauthorityconcerninglegalmattersthatordinarilyreposesintheclientinprivateclient-lawyerrelationships.Forexample,alawyerforagovernmententitymayhaveauthorityonbehalfofthegovern-menttodecideuponsettlementorwhethertoappealfromanadversejudgment.Suchauthorityinvariousrespectsisgenerallyvestedintheattorneygeneralandthestate’sattorneyinstategovernment,andtheirfederalcounterparts,andthesamemaybetrueofothergovernmentlawofficers.Also,lawyersunderthesupervisionoftheseofficersmaybeauthorizedbylawtorepresentseveralgovernmententitiesinintergov-ernmentallegalcontroversiesincircumstanceswhereaprivatelawyercouldnotrepresentmultipleprivateclients.Theyalsomayhaveauthor-itytorepresentthe“publicinterest”incircumstanceswhereaprivatelawyerwouldnotbeauthorizedtodoso.TheseRulesdonotabrogateanysuchauthority.

[17]FailuretocomplywithanobligationorprohibitionimposedbyaRuleisabasisforinvokingthedisciplinaryprocess.TheRulespre-supposethatdisciplinaryassessmentofalawyer’sconductwillbemadeonthebasisofthefactsandcircumstancesastheyexistedatthetimeoftheconductinquestionandinrecognitionofthefactthatalawyeroftenhastoactuponuncertainorincompleteevidenceofthesituation.Moreover,theRulespresupposethatwhetherornotdisciplineshouldbeimposedforaviolation,andtheseverityofasanction,dependonallthecircumstances,suchasthewillfulnessandseriousnessoftheviolation,extenuatingfactorsandwhethertherehavebeenpreviousviolations.

[18]ThepurposeoftheseRulesisnottogiverisetoacauseofactionnortocreateapresumptionthatalegaldutyhasbeenbreached.


TheseRulesaredesignedtoprovideguidancetolawyersandtoprovideastructureforregulatingconductthroughdisciplinaryagencies.Theyarenotdesignedtobeabasisforcivilliability.Furthermore,thepur-poseoftheRulescanbesubvertedwhentheyareinvokedbyopposingpartiesasproceduralweapons.ThefactthataRuleisajustbasisforalawyer’sself-assessment,orforsanctioningalawyerundertheadmin-istrationofadisciplinaryauthority,doesnotimplythatanantagonistinacollateralproceedingortransactionhasstandingtoseekenforcementoftheRule.Accordingly,nothingintheRulesshouldbedeemedtoaugmentanysubstantivelegaldutyoflawyersortheextra-disciplinaryconsequencesofviolatingsuchaduty.

[19]Moreover,theseRulesarenotintendedtogovernoraffectjudicialapplicationofeithertheattorney-clientorworkproductprivi-lege.Inrelianceontheattorney-clientprivilege,clientsareentitledtoexpectthatcommunicationswithinthescopeoftheprivilegewillbeprotectedagainstcompelleddisclosure.Theattorney-clientprivilegeisthatoftheclientandnotofthelawyer.Thefactthatinexceptionalsituationsthelawyerundertheruleshasalimiteddiscretiontodiscloseaclientconfidencedoesnotvitiatethepropositionthat,asageneralmatter,theclienthasareasonableexpectationthatinformationrelatingtotheclientwillnotbevoluntarilydisclosedandthatdisclosureofsuchinformationmaybejudiciallycompelledonlyinaccordancewithrecog-nizedexceptionstotheattorney-clientandworkproductprivileges.

[20]Reserved.

[21]TheCommentaccompanyingeachRuleexplainsandillus-tratesthemeaningandpurposeoftheRule.ThePreambleandthisnoteonScopeprovidegeneralorientation.TheCommentsareintendedasguidestointerpretation,butthetextofeachRuleisauthoritative. TERMINOLOGY “Belief”or“believes”denotesthatthepersoninvolvedactuallythoughtthefactinquestiontobetrue.Aperson’sbeliefmaybeinferredfromcircumstances.

“Consult”or“consultation”denotescommunicationofinfor-mationreasonablysufficienttopermittheclienttoappreciatethesignificanceofthematterinquestion.

“DomesticLawyer”denotesapersonauthorizedtopracticelawbythedulyconstitutedandauthorizedgovernmentalbodyofanyStateorTerritoryoftheUnitedStatesortheDistrictofColumbiabutnotautho-rizedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaoritsRulestopracticelawintheStateofGeorgia.

“Firm”or“lawfirm”denotesalawyerorlawyersinaprivatefirm,lawyersemployedinthelegaldepartmentofacorporationorotherorganizationandlawyersemployedinalegalservicesorganization.SeeComment,Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification.

“ForeignLawyer”denotesapersonauthorizedtopracticelawbythedulyconstitutedandauthorizedgovernmentalbodyofanyforeignnationbutnotauthorizedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaoritsRulestopracticelawintheStateofGeorgia.

“Fraud”or“fraudulent”denotesconducthavingapurposetodeceiveandnotmerelynegligentmisrepresentationorfailuretoappriseanotherofrelevantinformation.

“Knowingly,”“known,”or“knows”denotesactualknowledgeofthefactinquestion.Aperson’sknowledgemaybeinferredfromcir-cumstances.

“Lawyer,”denotesapersonauthorizedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaoritsRulestopracticelawintheStateofGeorgiaincludingpersonsadmittedtopracticeinthisstateprohacvice.

“Nonlawyer”denotesapersonnotauthorizedtopracticelawbyeitherthe:

(a)SupremeCourtofGeorgiaoritsRules(includingprohacviceadmission),or

(b)dulyconstitutedandauthorizedgovernmentalbodyofanyotherStateorTerritoryoftheUnitedStates,ortheDistrictofColumbia,or

(c)dulyconstitutedandauthorizedgovernmentalbodyofanyforeignnation.

“Partner”denotesamemberofapartnershipandashareholderinalawfirmorganizedasaprofessionalcorporation.

“Reasonable”or“reasonably”whenusedinrelationtoconductbyalawyerdenotestheconductofareasonablyprudentandcompetentlawyer.

“Reasonablebelief”or“reasonablybelieves”whenusedinrefer-encetoalawyerdenotesthatthelawyerbelievesthematterinquestionandthatthecircumstancesaresuchthatthebeliefisreasonable.

“Reasonablyshouldknow”whenusedinreferencetoalawyerdenotesthatalawyerofreasonableprudenceandcompetencewouldascertainthematterinquestion.

“Substantial”whenusedinreferencetodegreeorextentdenotesamaterialmatterofclearandweightyimportance,ormayrefertothingsofmorethantriflingvalue.

“Tribunal”denotesacourt,anarbitratorinanarbitrationproceed-ingoralegislativebody,administrativeagencyorotherbodyactinginanadjudicativecapacity.Alegislativebody,administrativeagencyorotherbodyactsinanadjudicativecapacitywhenaneutralofficial,afterthepre-sentationofevidenceorlegalargumentbyapartyorparties,willrenderalegaljudgmentdirectlyaffectingaparty’sinterestsinaparticularmatter.

PART ONE CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer’s level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

Comment

Legal Knowledge and Skill

[1A]Thepurposeoftheserulesisnottogiverisetoacauseofactionnortocreateapresumptionthatalegaldutyhasbeenbreached.TheseRulesaredesignedtoprovideguidancetolawyersandtoprovideastructureforregulatingconductthroughdisciplinaryagencies.Theyarenotdesignedtobeabasisforcivilliability.

[1B]Indeterminingwhetheralawyeremploystherequisiteknowledgeandskillinaparticularmatter,relevantfactorsincludetherelativecomplexityandspecializednatureofthematter,thelawyer’sgeneralexperience,thelawyer’strainingandexperienceinthefieldinquestion,thepreparationandstudythelawyerisabletogivethematterandwhetheritisfeasibletoreferthematterto,orassociateorconsultwith,alawyerofestablishedcompetenceinthefieldinques-tion.Inmanyinstances,therequiredproficiencyisthatofageneralpractitioner.Expertiseinaparticularfieldoflawmayberequiredinsomecircumstances.

[2]Alawyerneednotnecessarilyhavespecialtrainingorpriorexperiencetohandlelegalproblemsofatypewithwhichthelawyerisunfamiliar.Anewlyadmittedlawyercanbeascompetentasaprac-titionerwithlongexperience.Someimportantlegalskills,suchastheanalysisofprecedent,theevaluationofevidenceandlegaldrafting,arerequiredinalllegalproblems.Perhapsthemostfundamentallegalskillconsistsofdeterminingwhatkindoflegalproblemsasituationmayinvolve,askillthatnecessarilytranscendsanyparticularspecializedknowledge.Alawyercanprovideadequaterepresentationinawhollynovelfieldthroughnecessarystudy.Competentrepresentationcanalsobeprovidedthroughtheassociationofalawyerofestablishedcompe-tenceinthefieldinquestion.

[3]Inanemergencyalawyermaygiveadviceorassistanceinamatterinwhichthelawyerdoesnothavetheskillordinarilyrequiredwherereferraltoorconsultationorassociationwithanotherlawyerwouldbeimpractical.Eveninanemergency,however,assistanceshouldbelimitedtothatreasonablynecessaryinthecircumstances,forill-consideredactionunderemergencyconditionscanjeopardizethecli-ent’sinterest.

[4]Alawyermayacceptrepresentationwheretherequisitelevelofcompetencecanbeachievedbyreasonablepreparation.ThisappliesaswelltoalawyerwhoisappointedascounselforanunrepresentedpersonsubjecttoRule 6.2: Accepting Appointments.


Thoroughness and Preparation

[5]Competenthandlingofaparticularmatterincludesinquiryintoandanalysisofthefactualandlegalelementsoftheproblem,anduseofmethodsandproceduresmeetingthestandardsofcompetentpractitio-ners.Italsoincludesadequatepreparation.Therequiredattentionandpreparationaredeterminedinpartbywhatisatstake;majorlitigationandcomplextransactionsordinarilyrequiremoreelaboratetreatmentthanmattersoflesserconsequence.

Maintaining Competence

[6]Tomaintaintherequisiteknowledgeandskill,alawyershouldengageincontinuingstudyandeducation.

RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concern-

ing the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the cli-ent’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the cli-ent will testify.

(b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including repre-sentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representa-tion if the client consents after consultation.

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in con-duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of con-duct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the rel-evant limitations on the lawyer’s conduct.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

Comment

Scope of Representation

[1]Bothlawyerandclienthaveauthorityandresponsibilityintheobjectivesandmeansofrepresentation.Theclienthasultimateauthoritytodeterminethepurposestobeservedbylegalrepresentation,withinthelimitsimposedbylawandthelawyer’sprofessionalobligations.Withinthoselimits,aclientalsohasarighttoconsultwiththelawyeraboutthemeanstobeusedinpursuingthoseobjectives.Atthesametime,alawyerisnotrequiredtopursueobjectivesoremploymeanssim-plybecauseaclientmaywishthatthelawyerdoso.Acleardistinctionbetweenobjectivesandmeanssometimescannotbedrawn,andinmanycasestheclient-lawyerrelationshippartakesofajointundertaking.Inquestionsofmeans,thelawyershouldassumeresponsibilityfortechni-calandlegaltacticalissues,butshoulddefertotheclientregardingsuchquestionsastheexpensetobeincurredandconcernforthirdpersonswhomightbeadverselyaffected.

[2]Inacaseinwhichtheclientappearstobesufferingmentaldisability,thelawyer’sdutytoabidebytheclient’sdecisionsistobeguidedbyreferencetoRule 1.14: Client under a Disability.

Independence from Client’s Views or Activities

[3]Legalrepresentationshouldnotbedeniedtopeoplewhoareunabletoaffordlegalservices,orwhosecauseiscontroversialorthesubjectofpopulardisapproval.Bythesametoken,representingaclientdoesnotconstituteapprovaloftheclient’sviewsoractivities.

Services Limited in Objectives or Means

[4]Theobjectivesorscopeofservicesprovidedbyalawyermaybelimitedbyagreementwiththeclientorbythetermsunderwhichthelawyer’sservicesaremadeavailabletotheclient.Forexample,aretain-ermaybeforaspecificallydefinedpurpose.Representationprovidedthroughalegalaidagencymaybesubjecttolimitationsonthetypesofcasestheagencyhandles.Whenalawyerhasbeenretainedbyaninsur-ertorepresentaninsured,therepresentationmaybelimitedtomatters

coveredbytheinsurancepolicy.Thetermsuponwhichrepresentationisundertakenmayexcludespecificobjectivesormeans.Suchlimitationsmayincludeobjectivesormeansthatthelawyerregardsasrepugnantorimprudent.

[5]AnagreementconcerningthescopeofrepresentationmustaccordwiththeRulesofProfessionalConductandotherlaw.Thus,theclientmaynotbeaskedtoagreetorepresentationsolimitedinscopeastoviolateRule1.1:Competence,ortosurrendertherighttoterminatethelawyer’sservicesortherighttosettlelitigationthatthelawyermightwishtocontinue.Theagreementshouldbeinwriting.

Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions

[6]Alawyerisrequiredtogiveanhonestopinionabouttheactu-alconsequencesthatappearlikelytoresultfromaclient’sconduct.Thefactthataclientusesadviceinacourseofactionthatiscriminalorfraudulentdoesnot,ofitself,makealawyerapartytothecourseofaction.However,alawyermaynotknowinglyassistaclientincriminalorfraudulentconduct.Thereisacriticaldistinctionbetweenpresentingananalysisoflegalaspectsofquestionableconductandrecommendingthemeansbywhichacrimeorfraudmightbecommit-tedwithimpunity.

[7]Whentheclient’scourseofactionhasalreadybegunandiscontinuing,thelawyer’sresponsibilityisespeciallydelicate.Thelawyerisnotpermittedtorevealtheclient’swrongdoing,exceptwherepermit-tedbyRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.However,thelawyerisrequiredtoavoidfurtheringthepurpose,forexample,bysuggestinghowitmightbeconcealed.Alawyermaynotcontinueassistingaclientinconductthatthelawyeroriginallysupposesislegallyproperbutthendiscoversiscriminalorfraudulent.Withdrawalfromtherepresentation,therefore,mayberequired.

[8]Wheretheclientisafiduciary,thelawyermaybechargedwithspecialobligationsindealingswithabeneficiary.

[9]Paragraph(d)applieswhetherornotthedefraudedpartyisapartytothetransaction.Hence,alawyershouldnotparticipateinashamtransaction;forexample,atransactiontoeffectuatecriminalorfraudulentescapeoftaxliability.Paragraph(d)doesnotprecludeundertakingacriminaldefenseincidenttoageneralretainerforlegalservicestoalaw-fulenterprise.Thelastclauseofparagraph(d)recognizesthatdeterminingthevalidityorinterpretationofastatuteorregulationmayrequireacourseofactioninvolvingdisobedienceofthestatuteorregulationoroftheinterpretationplaceduponitbygovernmentalauthorities.

[10]Lawdefiningthelawyer’sscopeofauthorityinlitigationaswellasthelanguageofparticularrulesvariesamongjurisdictions.Alawyershouldbemindfulofthenuancesanddifferencesofthelawandrulesofeachlocationinwhichheorshepractices.

RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

Comment

[1]Alawyershouldpursueamatteronbehalfofaclientdespiteopposition,obstructionorpersonalinconveniencetothelawyer,andmaytakewhateverlawfulandethicalmeasuresarerequiredtovindicateaclient’scauseorendeavor.Alawyershouldactwithcommitmentanddedicationtotheinterestsoftheclientandwithzealinadvocacyupontheclient’sbehalf.However,alawyerisnotboundtopressforeveryadvantagethatmightberealizedforaclient.Alawyerhasprofes-sionaldiscretionindeterminingthemeansbywhichamattershouldbepursued.SeeRule 1.2: Scope of Representation.Alawyer’sworkloadshouldbecontrolledsothateachmattercanbehandledadequately.

[2]Perhapsnoprofessionalshortcomingismorewidelyresentedthanprocrastination.Aclient’sinterestsoftencanbeadverselyaffectedbythepassageoftimeorthechangeofconditions;inextremeinstances,aswhenalawyeroverlooksastatuteoflimitations,theclient’slegalposi-tionmaybedestroyed.Evenwhentheclient’sinterestsarenotaffectedinsubstance,however,unreasonabledelaycancauseaclientneedlessanxi-etyandundermineconfidenceinthelawyer’strustworthiness.

[3]UnlesstherelationshipisterminatedasprovidedinRule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation,alawyershouldcarrythrough


toconclusionallmattersundertakenforaclient.Ifalawyer’semploy-mentislimitedtoaspecificmatter,therelationshipterminateswhenthematterhasbeenresolved.Ifalawyerhasservedaclientoverasub-stantialperiodinavarietyofmatters,theclientsometimesmayassumethatthelawyerwillserveonacontinuingbasis.Doubtaboutwhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipstillexistsshouldbeclarifiedbythelawyer,preferablyinwriting,sothattheclientwillnotmistakenlysupposethelawyerislookingaftertheclient’saffairswhenthelawyerhasceasedtodoso.Forexample,ifalawyerhashandledajudicialoradministra-tiveproceedingthatproducedaresultadversetotheclientbuthasnotbeenspecificallyinstructedconcerningpursuitofanappeal,thelawyershouldadvisetheclientofthepossibilityofappealbeforerelinquishingresponsibilityforthematter.

RULE 1.4 COMMUNICATION A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of matters and shall promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1A]Theclientshouldhavesufficientinformationtoparticipateintelligentlyindecisionsconcerningtheobjectivesoftherepresentationandthemeansbywhichtheyaretobepursued,totheextenttheclientiswillingandabletodoso.Forexample,alawyernegotiatingonbehalfofaclientshouldprovidetheclientwithfactsrelevanttothematter,informtheclientofcommunicationsfromanotherpartyandtakeotherreasonablestepsthatpermittheclienttomakeadecisionregardingaseriousofferfromanotherparty.Alawyerwhoreceivesfromopposingcounselanofferofsettlementinacivilcontroversyoraprofferedpleabargaininacriminalcaseshouldpromptlyinformtheclientofitssub-stanceunlesspriordiscussionswiththeclienthaveleftitclearthattheproposalwillbeunacceptable.SeeRule 1.2(a): Scope of Representation.Evenwhenaclientdelegatesauthoritytothelawyer,theclientshouldbekeptadvisedofthestatusofthematter.

[1B]Thetimelinessofalawyer’scommunicationmustbejudgedbyallofthecontrollingfactors.“Prompt”communicationwiththecli-entdoesnotequateto“instant”communicationwiththeclientandissufficientifreasonableundertherelevantcircumstances.

[2]Adequacyofcommunicationdependsinpartonthekindofadviceorassistanceinvolved.Forexample,innegotiationswherethereistimetoexplainaproposal,thelawyershouldreviewallimportantprovi-sionswiththeclientbeforeproceedingtoanagreement.Inlitigationalawyershouldexplainthegeneralstrategyandprospectsofsuccessandordinarilyshouldconsulttheclientontacticsthatmightinjureorcoerceothers.Ontheotherhand,alawyerordinarilycannotbeexpectedtodescribetrialornegotiationstrategyindetail.Theguidingprincipleisthatthelawyershouldfulfillreasonableclientexpectationsforinformationconsistentwiththedutytoactintheclient’sbestinterests,andtheclient’soverallrequirementsastothecharacterofrepresentation.

[3]Ordinarily,theinformationtobeprovidedisthatwhichisappropriateforaclientwhoisacomprehendingandresponsibleadult.However,fullyinformingtheclientaccordingtothisstandardmaybeimpracticable,forexample,wheretheclientisachildorsuffersfrommentaldisability.SeeRule 1.14: Client under a Disability.Whentheclientisanorganizationorgroup,itisoftenimpossibleorinappropriatetoinformeveryoneofitsmembersaboutitslegalaffairs;ordinarily,thelawyershouldaddresscommunicationstotheappropriateofficialsoftheorganization.SeeRule 1.13: Organization as Client.Wheremanyroutinemattersareinvolved,asystemoflimitedoroccasionalreportingmaybearrangedwiththeclient.Practicalexigencymayalsorequirealawyertoactforaclientwithoutpriorconsultation.

Withholding Information

[4]Insomecircumstances,alawyermaybejustifiedindelayingtransmissionofinformationwhentheclientwouldbelikelytoreactimprudentlytoanimmediatecommunication.Thus,alawyermightwithholdapsychiatricdiagnosisofaclientwhentheexaminingpsychi-atristindicatesthatdisclosurewouldharmtheclient.Alawyermaynotwithholdinformationtoservethelawyer’sowninterestorconvenience.Rulesorcourtordersgoverninglitigationmayprovidethatinformationsuppliedtoalawyermaynotbedisclosedtotheclient.Rule 3.4(c): Fairness to Opposing Party and Counseldirectscompliancewithsuchrulesororders.

RULE 1.5 FEES(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be

considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and dif-ficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for simi-lar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the

circumstances;(6) the nature and length of the professional relation-

ship with the client;(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer

or lawyers performing the services; and(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.

(c)(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the

matter for which the service is rendered, except in a mat-ter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.

(2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stat-ing the following:

(i) the outcome of the matter; and, (ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:

(A) remittance to the client; (B) the method of its determination;(C) the amount of the attorney fee; and(D) if the attorney’s fee is divided with anoth-

er lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer’s firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the divi-sion is determined.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or prop-erty settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services per-formed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the repre-sentation;

(2) the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and

(3) the total fee is reasonable. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

Basis or Rate of Fee

[1]Whenthelawyerhasregularlyrepresentedaclient,theyordi-narilywillhaveevolvedanunderstandingconcerningthebasisorrateofthefee.Inanewclient-lawyerrelationship,however,anunderstandingastothefeeshouldbepromptlyestablished.Itisnotnecessarytoreciteallthefactorsthatunderliethebasisofthefee,butonlythosethataredirectlyinvolvedinitscomputation.Itissufficient,forexample,tostatethatthebasicrateisanhourlychargeorafixedamountoranestimatedamount,ortoidentifythefactorsthatmaybetakenintoaccountinfinallyfixingthefee.Whendevelopmentsoccurduringtherepresenta-tionthatrenderanearlierestimatesubstantiallyinaccurate,arevisedestimateshouldbeprovidedtotheclient.Awrittenstatementconcern-


ingthefeereducesthepossibilityofmisunderstanding.Furnishingtheclientwithasimplememorandumoracopyofthelawyer’scustomaryfeescheduleissufficientifthebasisorrateofthefeeissetforth.

Terms of Payment

[2]Alawyermayrequireadvancepaymentofafee,butisobligedtoreturnanyunearnedportion.SeeRule 1.16(d): Declining or Terminating Representation.Alawyermayacceptpropertyinpaymentforservices,suchasanownershipinterestinanenterprise,providingthisdoesnotinvolveacquisitionofaproprietaryinterestinthecauseofactionorsubjectmatterofthelitigationcontrarytoRule 1.8(j): Conflict of Interest.However,afeepaidinpropertyinsteadofmoneymaybesubjecttospecialscrutinybecauseitinvolvesquestionsconcerningboththevalueoftheservicesandthelawyer’sspecialknowledgeofthevalueoftheproperty.

[3]Anagreementmaynotbemade,thetermsofwhichmightinducethelawyerimproperlytocurtailservicesfortheclientorperformtheminawaycontrarytotheclient’sinterest.Forexample,alawyershouldnotenterintoanagreementwherebyservicesaretobeprovidedonlyuptoastatedamountwhenitisforeseeablethatmoreextensiveservicesprobablywillberequired,unlessthesituationisadequatelyexplainedtotheclient.Otherwise,theclientmighthavetobargainforfurtherassistanceinthemidstofaproceedingortransaction.However,itispropertodefinetheextentofservicesinlightoftheclient’sabilitytopay.Alawyershouldnotexploitafeearrangementbasedprimarilyonhourlychargesbyusingwastefulprocedures.

Division of Fee

[4]Adivisionoffeeisasinglebillingtoaclientcoveringthefeeoftwoormorelawyerswhoarenotinthesamefirm.Adivisionoffeefacilitatesassociationofmorethanonelawyerinamatterinwhichneitheralonecouldservetheclientaswell.JointresponsibilityfortherepresentationentailstheobligationsstatedinRule 5.1: Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyerforpurposesofthematterinvolved.

Disputes over Fees

[5]Ifaprocedurehasbeenestablishedforresolutionoffeedis-putes,suchasanarbitrationormediationprocedureestablishedbythebar,thelawyershouldconscientiouslyconsidersubmittingtoit.Lawmayprescribeaprocedurefordeterminingalawyer’sfee,forexample,inrepresentationofanexecutororadministrator,aclassorapersonentitledtoareasonablefeeaspartofthemeasureofdamages.Thelawyerentitledtosuchafeeandalawyerrepresentinganotherpartyconcernedwiththefeeshouldcomplywiththeprescribedprocedure.

RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION(a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information

gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the Court.

(b)(1) A lawyer may reveal information covered by para-

graph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:(i) to avoid or prevent harm or substantial finan-

cial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;

(ii) to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;

(iii) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the cli-ent, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.

(2) In a situation described in Subsection (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.

(3) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to Subsection (1), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.

(c) The lawyer may, where the law does not otherwise require, reveal information to which the duty of confidentiality

does not apply under paragraph (b) without being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.

(d) The lawyer shall reveal information under paragraph (b) as the applicable law requires.

(e) The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. Comment

[1]Thelawyerispartofajudicialsystemchargedwithupholdingthelaw.Oneofthelawyer’sfunctionsistoadviseclientssothattheyavoidanyviolationofthelawintheproperexerciseoftheirrights.

[2]Theobservanceoftheethicalobligationofalawyertoholdinviolateconfidentialinformationoftheclientnotonlyfacilitatesthefulldevelopmentoffactsessentialtoproperrepresentationoftheclientbutalsoencouragespeopletoseekearlylegalassistance.

[3]Almostwithoutexception,clientscometolawyersinordertodeterminewhattheirrightsareandwhatis,inthemazeoflawsandreg-ulations,deemedtobelegalandcorrect.Thecommonlawrecognizesthattheclient’sconfidencesmustbeprotectedfromdisclosure.Baseduponexperience,lawyersknowthatalmostallclientsfollowtheadvicegiven,andthelawisupheld.

[4]Afundamentalprincipleintheclient-lawyerrelationshipisthatthelawyermaintainconfidentialityofinformationrelatingtotherepresentation.Theclientistherebyencouragedtocommunicatefullyandfranklywiththelawyerevenastoembarrassingorlegallydamagingsubjectmatter.

[5]Theprincipleofconfidentialityisgiveneffectintworelatedbodiesoflaw,theattorney-clientprivilege(whichincludestheworkproductdoctrine)inthelawofevidenceandtheruleofconfidentialityestablishedinprofessionalethics.Theattorney-clientprivilegeappliesinjudicialandotherproceedingsinwhichalawyermaybecalledasawitnessorotherwiserequiredtoproduceevidenceconcerningaclient.Theruleofclient-lawyerconfidentialityappliesinsituationsotherthanthosewhereevidenceissoughtfromthelawyerthroughcompulsionoflaw.Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Informationappliesnotmerelytomat-terscommunicatedinconfidencebytheclientbutalsotoallinformationrelatingtotherepresentation,whateveritssource.AlawyermaynotdisclosesuchinformationexceptasauthorizedorrequiredbytheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.SeealsoScope.Therequirementofmaintainingconfidentialityofinformationrelatingtorepresenta-tionappliestogovernmentlawyerswhomaydisagreewiththeclient’spolicygoals.

Authorized Disclosure

[6]Alawyerisimpliedlyauthorizedtomakedisclosuresaboutaclientwhenappropriateincarryingouttherepresentation,excepttotheextentthattheclient’sinstructionsorspecialcircumstanceslimitthatauthority.Inlitigation,forexample,alawyermaydiscloseinformationbyadmittingafactthatcannotproperlybedisputed,orinnegotiationbymakingadisclosurethatfacilitatesasatisfactoryconclusion.

[7]Lawyersinafirmmay,inthecourseofthefirm’spractice,dis-closetoeachotherinformationrelatingtoaclientofthefirm,unlesstheclienthasinstructedthatparticularinformationbeconfinedtospecifiedlawyers.

Disclosure Adverse to Client

[8]Theconfidentialityruleissubjecttolimitedexceptions.Inbecomingprivytoinformationaboutaclient,alawyermayforeseethattheclientintendsseriousharmtoanotherperson.Thepublicisbetterprotectediffullandopencommunicationbytheclientisencouragedthanifitisinhibited.

[9]Severalsituationsmustbedistinguished.First,thelawyermaynotknowinglyassistaclientinconductthatiscriminalorfraudulent.SeeRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation.Similarly,alawyerhasadutyunderRule 3.3(a)(4):Candor toward the Tribunalnottousefalseevi-dence.

[10]Second,thelawyermayhavebeeninnocentlyinvolvedinpastconductbytheclientthatwascriminalorfraudulent.Insuchasitu-ationthelawyerhasnotviolatedRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation,becauseto“knowinglyassist”criminalorfraudulentconductrequiresknowingthattheconductisofthatcharacter.


[11]Third,thelawyermaylearnthataclientintendsprospec-tiveconductthatiscriminalandlikelytoresultindeathorsubstantialbodilyharm.Asstatedinparagraph(b)(1),thelawyerhasprofessionaldiscretiontorevealinformationinordertopreventsuchconsequences.Thelawyermaymakeadisclosureinordertopreventdeathorseriousbodilyinjurywhichthelawyerreasonablybelieveswilloccur.Itisverydifficultforalawyerto“know”whensuchaheinouspurposewillactu-allybecarriedout,fortheclientmayhaveachangeofmind.

[12]Thelawyer’sexerciseofdiscretionrequiresconsiderationofsuchfactorsasthenatureofthelawyer’srelationshipwiththeclientandwiththosewhomightbeinjuredbytheclient,thelawyer’sowninvolve-mentinthetransactionandfactorsthatmayextenuatetheconductinquestion.Wherepractical,thelawyershouldseektopersuadetheclienttotakesuitableaction.Inanycase,adisclosureadversetotheclient’sinterestshouldbenogreaterthanthelawyerreasonablybelievesneces-sarytothepurpose.Alawyer’sdecisionnottotakepreventiveactionpermittedbyparagraph(b)(1)doesnotviolatethisRule.

Withdrawal

[13]Ifthelawyer’sserviceswillbeusedbytheclientinmateri-allyfurtheringacourseofcriminalorfraudulentconduct,thelawyermustwithdraw,asstatedinRule 1.16(a)(1): Declining or Terminating Representation.

[14]Afterwithdrawalthelawyerisrequiredtorefrainfrommak-ingdisclosureoftheclient’sconfidences,exceptasotherwiseprovidedinRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.NeitherthisrulenorRule 1.8(b): Conflict of InterestnorRule 1.16(d): Declining or Terminating Representationpreventsthelawyerfromgivingnoticeofthefactofwithdrawal,andthelawyermayalsowithdrawordisaffirmanyopinion,document,affirmation,orthelike.

[15]Wheretheclientisanorganization,thelawyermaybeindoubtwhethercontemplatedconductwillactuallybecarriedoutbytheorganization.WherenecessarytoguideconductinconnectionwiththisRule,thelawyermaymakeinquirywithintheorganizationasindicatedinRule 1.13(b): Organization as Client.

Dispute Concerning a Lawyer’s Conduct

[16]Wherealegalclaimordisciplinarychargeallegescomplicityofthelawyerinaclient’sconductorothermisconductofthelawyerinvolvingrepresentationoftheclient,thelawyermayrespondtotheextentthelawyerreasonablybelievesnecessarytoestablishadefense.Thesameistruewithrespecttoaclaiminvolvingtheconductorrepre-sentationofaformerclient.Thelawyer’srighttorespondariseswhenanassertionofsuchcomplicityhasbeenmade.Paragraph(b)(1)(iii)doesnotrequirethelawyertoawaitthecommencementofanactionorproceedingthatchargessuchcomplicity,sothatthedefensemaybeestablishedbyrespondingdirectlytoathirdpartywhohasmadesuchanassertion.Therighttodefend,ofcourse,applieswhereaproceedinghasbeencommenced.Wherepracticableandnotprejudicialtothelawyer’sabilitytoestablishthedefense,thelawyershouldadvisetheclientofthethirdparty’sassertionandrequestthattheclientrespondappropriately.Inanyevent,disclosureshouldbenogreaterthanthelawyerreasonablybelievesisnecessarytovindicateinnocence,thedisclosureshouldbemadeinamannerwhichlimitsaccesstotheinformationtothetribunalorotherpersonshavinganeedtoknowit,andappropriateprotectiveordersorotherarrangementsshouldbesoughtbythelawyertothefull-estextentpracticable.

[17]Ifthelawyerischargedwithwrongdoinginwhichtheclient’sconductisimplicated,theruleofconfidentialityshouldnotpreventthelawyerfromdefendingagainstthecharge.Suchachargecanariseinacivil,criminalorprofessionaldisciplinaryproceeding,andcanbebasedonawrongallegedlycommittedbythelawyeragainsttheclient,oronawrongallegedbyathirdperson;forexample,apersonclaimingtohavebeendefraudedbythelawyerandclientactingtogether.Alawyerentitledtoafeeispermittedbyparagraph(b)(1)(iii)toprovetheser-vicesrenderedinanactiontocollectit.Thisaspectoftheruleexpressestheprinciplethatthebeneficiaryofafiduciaryrelationshipmaynotexploitittothedetrimentofthefiduciary.Asstatedabove,thelawyermustmakeeveryeffortpracticabletoavoidunnecessarydisclosureofinformationrelatingtoarepresentation,tolimitdisclosuretothosehav-ingtheneedtoknowit,andtoobtainprotectiveordersormakeotherarrangementsminimizingtheriskofdisclosure.

Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized

[18]Theattorney-clientprivilegeisdifferentlydefinedinvariousjurisdictions.Ifalawyeriscalledasawitnesstogivetestimonycon-cerningaclient,absentwaiverbytheclient,paragraph(a)requiresthe

lawyertoinvoketheprivilegewhenitisapplicable.Thelawyermustcomplywiththefinalordersofacourtorothertribunalofcompetentjurisdictionrequiringthelawyertogiveinformationabouttheclient.

[19]TheRulesofProfessionalConductinvariouscircumstancesper-mitorrequirealawyertodiscloseinformationrelatingtotherepresentation.SeeRules 2.2: Intermediary,2.3: Evaluation for use by Third Persons,3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunaland4.1: Truthfulness in Statements to Others.Inadditiontotheseprovisions,alawyermaybeobligatedorpermittedbyotherprovisionsoflawtogiveinformationaboutaclient.WhetheranotherprovisionoflawsupersedesRule 1.6: Confidentiality of InformationisamatterofinterpretationbeyondthescopeoftheseRules,butapresumptionshouldexistagainstsuchasupersession.

RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent

a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s own inter-ests or the lawyer’s duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the repre-sentation of the client, except as permitted in (b).

(b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may repre-sent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, pref-erably in writing, to the representation after:

(1) consultation with the lawyer,(2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate

information about the material risks of the representation, and

(3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.

(c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation:(1) is prohibited by law or these rules;(2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client

against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or

(3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.


Comment

Loyalty to a Client

[1]Loyaltyisanessentialelementinthelawyer’srelationshiptoaclient.Ifanimpermissibleconflictofinterestexistsbeforerepresenta-tionisundertakentherepresentationshouldbedeclined.Thelawyershouldadoptreasonableprocedures,appropriateforthesizeandtypeoffirmandpractice,todetermineinbothlitigationandnon-litigationmat-tersthepartiesandissuesinvolvedandtodeterminewhetherthereareactualorpotentialconflictsofinterest.

[2]Ifanimpermissibleconflictarisesafterrepresentationhasbeenundertaken,thelawyershouldwithdrawfromtherepresentation.SeeRule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation.Wheremorethanoneclientisinvolvedandthelawyerwithdrawsbecauseaconflictarisesafterrepresentation,whetherthelawyermaycontinuetorepresentanyoftheclientsisdeterminedbyRule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.SeealsoRule 2.2(b): Intermediary.Astowhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipexistsor,havingoncebeenestablished,iscontinuing,seeCommenttoRule 1.3: Diligence; and Scope.

[3]Asageneralproposition,loyaltytoaclientprohibitsundertak-ingrepresentationdirectlyadversetothatclientwithoutthatclient’sconsent.Paragraph(a)expressesthatgeneralrule.Thus,alawyerordi-narilymaynotactasadvocateagainstapersonthelawyerrepresentsinsomeothermatter,evenifitiswhollyunrelated.Ontheotherhand,simultaneousrepresentationinunrelatedmattersofclientswhoseinter-estsareonlygenerallyadverse,suchascompetingeconomicenterprises,doesnotrequireconsentoftherespectiveclients.Paragraph(a)appliesonlywhentherepresentationofoneclientwouldbedirectlyadversetotheother.

[4]Loyaltytoaclientisalsoimpairedwhenalawyercannotcon-sider,recommendorcarryoutanappropriatecourseofactionfortheclientbecauseofthelawyer’sothercompetingresponsibilitiesorinter-ests.Theconflictineffectforeclosesalternativesthatwouldotherwisebeavailabletotheclient.Paragraph(b)addressessuchsituations.Apossibleconflictdoesnotitselfprecludetherepresentation.Thecriti-calquestionsarethelikelihoodthataconflictwilleventuateand,ifitdoes,whetheritwillmateriallyinterferewiththelawyer’sindependentprofessionaljudgmentinconsideringalternativesorforeclosecoursesofactionthatreasonablyshouldbepursuedonbehalfoftheclient.


Considerationshouldbegiventowhethertheclientwishestoaccommo-datetheotherinterestinvolved.

Consultation and Consent

[5]Aclientmayconsenttorepresentationnotwithstandingaconflict.However,asindicatedinparagraph(a)withrespecttorepre-sentationdirectlyadversetoaclient,andparagraph(b)withrespecttomateriallimitationsonrepresentationofaclient,whenadisinterestedlawyerwouldconcludethattheclientshouldnotagreetotherepresenta-tionunderthecircumstances,thelawyerinvolvedcannotproperlyaskforsuchagreementorproviderepresentationonthebasisoftheclient’sconsent.Whenmorethanoneclientisinvolved,thequestionofconflictmustberesolvedastoeachclient.Moreover,theremaybecircum-stanceswhereitisimpossibletomakethedisclosurenecessarytoobtainconsent.Forexample,whenthelawyerrepresentsdifferentclientsinrelatedmattersandoneoftheclientsrefusestoconsenttothedisclosurenecessarytopermittheotherclienttomakeaninformeddecision,thelawyercannotproperlyaskthelattertoconsent.Ifconsentiswith-drawn,thelawyershouldconsultRule 1.16:Declining or Terminating Representation and Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.Lawyer’s Interests

[6]Thelawyer’spersonaloreconomicinterestsshouldnotbepermittedtohaveanadverseeffectonrepresentationofaclient.SeeRules 1.1: Competenceand1.5: Fees.Iftheproprietyofalawyer’sownconductinatransactionisinseriousquestion,itmaybedifficultorimpossibleforthelawyertogiveaclientobjectiveadvice.Alawyermaynotallowrelatedbusinessintereststoaffectrepresentation,forexample,byreferringclientstoanenterpriseinwhichthelawyerhasanundisclosedinterest.

Conflicts in Litigation

[7]Paragraph(a)prohibitsrepresentationofopposingpartiesinlitigation.Simultaneousrepresentationofpartieswhoseinterestsinlitiga-tionmayconflict,suchascoplaintiffsorcodefendants,isgovernedbyparagraph(b).Animpermissibleconflictmayexistbyreasonofsubstan-tialdiscrepancyintheparties’testimony,incompatibilityinpositionsinrelationtoanopposingpartyorthefactthattherearesubstantiallydiffer-entpossibilitiesofsettlementoftheclaimsorliabilitiesinquestion.Suchconflictscanariseincriminalcasesaswellascivil.Thepotentialforcon-flictofinterestinrepresentingmultipledefendantsinacriminalcaseissogravethatordinarilyalawyershoulddeclinetorepresentmorethanonecodefendant.Ontheotherhand,commonrepresentationofpersonshavingsimilarinterestsisproperiftheriskofadverseeffectisminimalandtherequirementsofparagraph(b)aremet.CompareRule 2.2: Intermediaryinvolvingintermediationbetweenclients.

[8]Ordinarily,alawyermaynotactasadvocateagainstaclientthelawyerrepresentsinsomeothermatter,eveniftheothermatteriswhollyunrelated.However,therearecircumstancesinwhichalawyermayactasadvocateagainstaclient.Forexample,alawyerrepresent-inganenterprisewithdiverseoperationsmayacceptemploymentasanadvocateagainsttheenterpriseinanunrelatedmatterifdoingsowillnotadverselyaffectthelawyer’srelationshipwiththeenterpriseorconductofthesuitandifbothclientsconsentuponconsultation.Bythesametoken,governmentlawyersinsomecircumstancesmayrepresentgovernmentemployeesinproceedingsinwhichagovernmententityistheopposingparty.Theproprietyofconcurrentrepresentationcandependonthenatureofthelitigation.Forexample,asuitchargingfraudentailsconflicttoadegreenotinvolvedinasuitforadeclaratoryjudg-mentconcerningstatutoryinterpretation.

[9]Alawyermayrepresentpartieshavingantagonisticpositionsonalegalquestionthathasarisenindifferentcases,unlessrepresenta-tionofeitherclientwouldbeadverselyaffected.Thus,itisordinarilynotimpropertoassertsuchpositionsincaseswhiletheyarependingindifferenttrialcourts,butitmaybeimpropertodososhouldoneormoreofthecasesreachtheappellatecourt.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer’s Service

[10]Alawyermaybepaidfromasourceotherthantheclient,iftheclientisinformedofthatfactandconsentsandthearrangementdoesnotcompromisethelawyer’sdutyofloyaltytotheclient.SeeRule 1.8(f): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions.Forexample,whenaninsureranditsinsuredhaveconflictinginterestsinamatterarisingfromaliabilityinsuranceagreement,andtheinsurerisrequiredtoprovidespecialcoun-selfortheinsured,thearrangementshouldassurethespecialcounsel’sprofessionalindependence.Soalso,whenacorporationanditsdirectorsoremployeesareinvolvedinacontroversyinwhichtheyhaveconflictinginterests,thecorporationmayprovidefundsforseparatelegalrepresenta-

tionofthedirectorsoremployees,iftheclientsconsentafterconsultationandthearrangementensuresthelawyer’sprofessionalindependence.

Non-litigation Conflicts

[11]Conflictsofinterestincontextsotherthanlitigationsometimesmaybedifficulttoassess.Relevantfactorsindeterminingwhetherthereispotentialforadverseeffectincludethedurationandextentofthelawyer’srelationshipwiththeclientorclientsinvolved,thefunctionsbeingper-formedbythelawyer,thelikelihoodthatactualconflictwillariseandthelikelyprejudicetotheclientfromtheconflictifitdoesarise. [12]Inanegotiationcommonrepresentationispermissiblewheretheclientsaregenerallyalignedininteresteventhoughthereissomedifferenceofinterestamongthem.

[13]Conflictquestionsmayalsoariseinestateplanningandestateadministration.Alawyermaybecalledupontopreparewillsforseveralfamilymembers,suchashusbandandwife,and,dependinguponthecircumstances,aconflictofinterestmayarise.Inestateadministrationtheidentityoftheclientmaybeunclearunderthelawofaparticularjurisdiction.Underoneview,theclientisthefiduciary;underanotherviewtheclientistheestateortrust,includingitsbeneficiaries.Thelaw-yershouldmakecleartherelationshiptothepartiesinvolved.

[14]Alawyerforacorporationorotherorganizationwhoisalsoamemberofitsboardofdirectorsshoulddeterminewhethertherespon-sibilitiesofthetworolesmayconflict.Thelawyermaybecalledontoadvisethecorporationinmattersinvolvingactionsofthedirectors.Considerationshouldbegiventothefrequencywithwhichsuchsituationsmayarise,thepotentialintensityoftheconflict,theeffectofthelawyer’sresignationfromtheboardandthepossibilityofthecorporation’sobtain-inglegaladvicefromanotherlawyerinsuchsituations.Ifthereismaterialriskthatthedualrolewillcompromisethelawyer’sindependenceofpro-fessionaljudgment,thelawyershouldnotserveasadirector.

Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party

[15]Resolvingquestionsofconflictofinterestisprimarilytheresponsibilityofthelawyerundertakingtherepresentation.Inlitiga-tion,acourtmayraisethequestionwhenthereisreasontoinferthatthelawyerhasneglectedtheresponsibility.Inacriminalcase,inquirybythecourtisgenerallyrequiredwhenalawyerrepresentsmultipledefendants.Wheretheconflictissuchasclearlytocallintoquestionthefairorefficientadministrationofjustice,opposingcounselmayproperlyraisethequestion.Suchanobjectionshouldbeviewedwithcaution,however,foritcanbemisusedasatechniqueofharassment.SeeScope.

RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS

(a) A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transac-tion with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer’s professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an owner-ship, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the cli-ent in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and

(3) the client consents in writing thereto.(b) A lawyer shall not use information gained in the pro-

fessional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation, except as allowed in Rule 1.6.

(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.

(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representa-tion.

(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or


(2) a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for represent-ing a client from one other than the client unless:

(1) the client consents after consultation;(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s indepen-

dence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representa-tion is appropriate in connection therewith.

(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representa-tion directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer except upon con-sent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.

(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and

(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5: Fees.

The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(b) is disbar-ment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(a) and 1.8(c)-(j) is a public reprimand.

Comment

Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

[1A]Asageneralprinciple,alltransactionsbetweenclientandlawyershouldbefairandreasonabletotheclient.Theclientshouldbefullyinformedofthetruenatureofthelawyer’sinterestorlackofinterestinallaspectsofthetransaction.Insuchtransactionsareviewbyindependentcounselonbehalfoftheclientisoftenadvisable.Furthermore,alawyermaynotexploitinformationrelatingtotherep-resentationtotheclient’sdisadvantage.Forexample,alawyerwhohaslearnedthattheclientisinvestinginspecificrealestatemaynot,with-outtheclient’sconsent,seektoacquirenearbypropertywheredoingsowouldadverselyaffecttheclient’splanforinvestment.Paragraph(a)doesnot,however,applytostandardcommercialtransactionsbetweenthelawyerandtheclientforproductsorservicesthattheclientgener-allymarketstoothers,forexample,bankingorbrokerageservices,medicalservices,productsmanufacturedordistributedbytheclient,andutilities’services.Insuchtransactions,thelawyerhasnoadvantageindealingwiththeclient,andtherestrictionsinParagraph(a)areunneces-saryandimpracticable.

Adverse Use of Information

[1B] Itisageneralrulethatanattorneywillnotbepermittedtomakeuseofknowledge,orinformation,acquiredbytheattorneythroughtheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient,orintheconductoftheclient’sbusiness,tothedisadvantageoftheclient.Paragraph(b)followsthisgeneralruleandprovidesthattheclientmaywaivethisprohibition.However,ifthewaiverisconditional,thedutyisontheattorneytocomplywiththecondition.

Gifts from Clients

[2]Alawyermayacceptagiftfromaclient,ifthetransactionmeetsgeneralstandardsoffairness.Forexample,asimplegiftsuchas

apresentgivenataholidayorasatokenofappreciationispermitted.Ifeffectuationofasubstantialgiftrequirespreparingalegalinstrumentsuchasawillorconveyance,however,theclientshouldhavetheobjec-tiveadvicethatanotherlawyercanprovide.Paragraph(c)recognizesanexceptionwheretheclientisarelativeofthedoneeorthegiftisnotsubstantial.

Literary Rights

[3]Anagreementbywhichalawyeracquiresliteraryormediarightsconcerningthesubjectoftherepresentationcreatesaconflictbetweentheinterestoftheclientandthepersonalinterestofthelawyer.Measuressuitableintherepresentationoftheclientmaydetractfromthepublicationvalueofanaccountoftherepresentation.Paragraph(d)doesnotprohibitalawyerrepresentingaclientinatransactionconcern-ingliterarypropertyfromagreeingthatthelawyer’sfeeshallconsistofashareinownershipintheproperty,ifthearrangementconformstoRule 1.5: FeesandParagraph(j)ofthisRule.

Financial Assistance to Clients

[4]Paragraph(e)eliminatestheformerrequirementthattheclientremainultimatelyliableforfinancialassistanceprovidedbythelawyer.Itfurtherlimitspermittedassistancetocourtcostsandexpensesdirectlyrelatedtolitigation.Accordingly,permittedexpenseswouldincludeexpensesofinvestigation,medicaldiagnosticworkconnectedwiththematterunderlitigationandtreatmentnecessaryforthediagnosis,andthecostsofobtainingandpresentingevidence.Permittedexpenseswouldnotincludelivingexpensesormedicalexpensesotherthanthoselistedabove.

Payment for a Lawyer’s Services from One Other Than The Client [5]Whentheclientisaclass,consentmaybeobtainedonbehalfoftheclassasprovidedbylaw.SettlementofAggregatedClaims

[6]Forexample,Paragraph(g)requiresconsentafterconsultation.Thisrequirementisnotmetbyablanketconsentpriortosettlementthatthemajoritydecisionwillrule.

Agreements to Limit Liability

[7]Forexamplealawyermaynotconditionanagreementtowithdraworthereturnofaclient’sdocumentsontheclient’sreleaseofclaims.However,thisparagraphisnotintendedtoapplytocustomaryqualificationsandlimitationsinopinionsandmemoranda.

[8]Alawyershouldnotseekprospectively,bycontractorothermeans,tolimitthelawyer’sindividualliabilitytoaclientforthelawyer’smalpractice.Alawyerwhohandlestheaffairsofaclientproperlyhasnoneedtoattempttolimitliabilityforthelawyer’sprofessionalactivitiesandonewhodoesnothandletheaffairsofclientsproperlyshouldnotbepermittedtodoso.Alawyermay,however,practicelawasapartner,member,orshareholderofalimitedliabilitypartnership,professionalassociation,limitedliabilitycompany,orprofessionalcorporation.

Family Relationships Between Lawyers

[9]Paragraph(i)appliestorelatedlawyerswhoareindifferentfirms.RelatedlawyersinthesamefirmaregovernedbyRules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule,1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client,and1.10: Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.

Acquisition of Interest in Litigation

[10]Paragraph(j)statesthetraditionalgeneralrulethatlawyersareprohibitedfromacquiringaproprietyinterestinlitigation.Thisgeneralrule,whichhasitsbasisinthecommonlawprohibitionofchampertyandmaintenance,issubjecttospecificexceptionsdevelopedindecisionallawandcontinuedintheseRules,suchastheexceptionforreasonablecon-tingentfeessetforthinRule 1.5: Feesandtheexceptionforlawyer’sfeesandforcertainadvancesofcostsoflitigationsetforthinParagraph(e).

RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in

a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously rep-resented a client:


(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that per-son; and

(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, that is material to the matter; unless the former client consents after consultation.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly repre-sented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information or Rule 3.3: Candor Towards the Tribunal would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information or Rule 3.3: Candor Towards the Tribunal would permit or require with respect to a client.


Comment

[1]TheprinciplesinRule1.7:ConflictofInterestdeterminewhether,andtotheextenttheinterestsofapresentandformerclientareadverse.Thus,alawyercouldnotproperlyseektorescindonbehalfofanewclientacontractdraftedonbehalfoftheformerclient.Alawyerwhohasprosecutedanaccusedpersoncouldnotproperlyrepresenttheaccusedinasubsequentcivilactionagainstthegovernmentconcerningthesametransaction.

[2]Thescopeofa“matter”forpurposesofthisRulemaydependonthefactsofaparticularsituationortransaction.Thelawyer’sinvolvementinamattermaybeoneofdegree.Theunderlyingquestioniswhetherthelawyerwassoinvolvedinthematterthatthesubsequentrepresentationcanbejustlyregardedasachangingofsidesinthematterinquestion.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms

[3]Reserved.

[4]Reconciliationofthesecompetingprinciplesinthepasthasbeenattemptedundertworubrics.Oneapproachhasbeentoseekperserulesofdisqualification.Forexample,oneviewisthatapartnerinalawfirmisconclusivelypresumedtohaveaccesstoallconfidencesconcern-ingallclientsofthefirm.Underthisanalysis,ifalawyerhasbeenapartnerinonelawfirmandthenbecomesapartnerinanotherlawfirm,theremaybeapresumptionthatallconfidencesknownbythepartnerinthefirstfirmareknowntoallpartnersinthesecondfirm.Thispresump-tionmightproperlybeappliedinsomecircumstances,especiallywheretheclienthasbeenextensivelyrepresented,butmaybeunrealisticwheretheclientwasrepresentedonlyforlimitedpurposes.Furthermore,sucharigidruleexaggeratesthedifferencebetweenapartnerandanassoci-ateinmodernlawfirms.

[5]Theotherrubricformerlyusedfordealingwithdisqualifica-tionistheappearanceofimproprietyproscribedinCanon9oftheABAModelCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Thisrubrichasatwo-foldproblem.First,theappearanceofimproprietycanbetakentoincludeanynewclient-lawyerrelationshipthatmightmakeaformerclientfeelanxious.Ifthatmeaningwereadopted,disqualificationwouldbecomelittlemorethanaquestionofsubjectivejudgmentbytheformercli-ent.Second,since“impropriety”isundefined,theterm“appearanceofimpropriety”isquestion-begging.Itthereforehastoberecognizedthattheproblemofdisqualificationcannotbeproperlyresolvedeitherbysimpleanalogytoalawyerpracticingaloneorbytheverygeneralcon-ceptofappearanceofimpropriety.

Confidentiality

[6]Preservingconfidentialityisaquestionofaccesstoinforma-tion.Accesstoinformation,inturn,isessentiallyaquestionoffactinparticularcircumstances,aidedbyinferences,deductionsorworkingpresumptionsthatreasonablymaybemadeaboutthewayinwhichlawyersworktogether.Alawyermayhavegeneralaccesstofilesofallclientsofalawfirmandmayregularlyparticipateindiscussionsoftheiraffairs;yieldinganinferencethatsuchalawyerinfactisprivytoallinformationaboutallthefirm’sclients.Incontrast,anotherlawyermayhaveaccesstothefilesofonlyalimitednumberofclientsandparticipateindiscussionsoftheaffairsofnootherclients;yieldinganinferencethatsuchalawyerinfactisprivytoinformationaboutthecli-entsactuallyservedbutnotthatofotherclients.

[7]Applicationofparagraph(b)dependsonasituation’sparticularfacts.

[8]Paragraph(b)operatestodisqualifythelawyeronlywhenthelawyerinvolvedhasactualknowledgeofinformationprotectedbyRules 1.6: Confidentiality and 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.Thus,ifalawyerwhilewithonefirmacquirednoknowledgeorinfor-mationrelatingtoaparticularclientofthefirm,andthatlawyerlaterjoinedanotherfirm,neitherthelawyerindividuallynorthesecondfirmisdisqualifiedfromrepresentinganotherclientinthesameorarelatedmattereventhoughtheinterestsofthetwoclientsconflict.SeeRule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualificationfortherestrictionsonafirmoncealawyerhasterminatedassociationwiththefirm.

[9]Independentofthequestionofdisqualificationofafirm,alaw-yerchangingprofessionalassociationhasacontinuingdutytopreserveconfidentialityofinformationaboutaclientformerlyrepresented.SeeRules 1.6: Confidentialityand1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.

Adverse Positions

[10]Thesecondaspectofloyaltytoaclientisthelawyer’sobliga-tiontodeclinesubsequentrepresentationsinvolvingpositionsadversetoaformerclientarisinginsubstantiallyrelatedmatters.Thisobliga-tionrequiresabstentionfromadverserepresentationbytheindividuallawyerinvolved,butdoesnotproperlyentailabstentionofotherlawyersthroughimputeddisqualification.Hence,thisaspectoftheproblemisgovernedbyRule 1.9(a): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.Thus,ifalawyerleftonefirmforanother,thenewaffiliationwouldnotprecludethefirmsinvolvedfromcontinuingtorepresentclientswithadverseinterestsinthesameorrelatedmatters,solongastheconditionsofparagraphs(b)and(c)concerningconfidentialityhavebeenmet.

[11]Informationacquiredbythelawyerinthecourseofrepresent-ingaclientmaynotsubsequentlybeusedorrevealedbythelawyertothedisadvantageoftheclient.However,thefactthatalawyerhasonceservedaclientdoesnotprecludethelawyerfromusinggenerallyknowninformationaboutthatclientwhenlaterrepresentinganotherclient.

[12]Disqualificationfromsubsequentrepresentationisfortheprotectionofformerclientsandcanbewaivedbythem.Awaiveriseffectiveonlyifthereisdisclosureofthecircumstances,includingthelawyer’sintendedroleinbehalfofthenewclient.

[13]Withregardtoanopposingparty’sraisingaquestionofconflictofinterest,seeCommenttoRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest.Withregardtodisqualificationofafirmwithwhichalawyerisorwasfor-merlyassociated,seeRule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification.

RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.

(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:

(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.

(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. Comment

Definition of “Firm”

[1]ForpurposesoftheseRules,theterm“firm”includeslawyersinaprivatefirm,andlawyersinthelegaldepartmentofacorporationorotherorganization,orinalegalservicesorganization.Whethertwoormorelawyersconstituteafirmwithinthisdefinitioncandependonthespecificfacts.Forexample,twopractitionerswhoshareoffice


spaceandoccasionallyconsultorassisteachotherordinarilywouldnotberegardedasconstitutingafirm.However,iftheypresentthem-selvestothepublicinawaysuggestingthattheyareafirmorconductthemselvesasafirm,theyshouldberegardedasafirmforthepurposesoftheRules.Thetermsofanyformalagreementbetweenassociatedlawyersarerelevantindeterminingwhethertheyareafirm,asisthefactthattheyhavemutualaccesstoinformationconcerningtheclientstheyserve.Furthermore,itisrelevantindoubtfulcasestoconsidertheunderlyingpurposeoftheRulethatisinvolved.Agroupoflawyerscouldberegardedasafirmforpurposesoftherulethatthesamelawyershouldnotrepresentopposingpartiesinlitigation,whileitmightnotbesoregardedforpurposesoftherulethatinformationacquiredbyonelawyerisattributedtotheother. [2]Withrespecttothelawdepartmentofanorganization,thereisordinarilynoquestionthatthemembersofthedepartmentconsti-tuteafirmwithinthemeaningoftheRulesofProfessionalConduct.However,therecanbeuncertaintyastotheidentityoftheclient.Forexample,itmaynotbeclearwhetherthelawdepartmentofacorpo-rationrepresentsasubsidiaryoranaffiliatedcorporation,aswellasthecorporationbywhichthemembersofthedepartmentaredirectlyemployed.Asimilarquestioncanariseconcerninganunincorporatedassociationanditslocalaffiliates.

[3]Similarquestionscanalsoarisewithrespecttolawyersinlegalaid.Lawyersemployedinthesameunitofalegalserviceorganizationconstituteafirm,butnotnecessarilythoseemployedinseparateunits.Asinthecaseofindependentpractitioners,whetherthelawyersshouldbetreatedasassociatedwitheachothercandependontheparticularrulethatisinvolved,andonthespecificfactsofthesituation.

[4]Wherealawyerhasjoinedaprivatefirmafterhavingrepre-sentedthegovernment,thesituationisgovernedbyRule1.11(a)and(b):SuccessiveGovernmentandPrivateEmployment;wherealawyerrepresentsthegovernmentafterhavingservedprivateclients,thesitua-tionisgovernedbyRule 1.11(c)(1): Successive Government and Private Employment.TheindividuallawyerinvolvedisboundbytheRulesgen-erally,includingRules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information,1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Ruleand1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.

[5]Differentprovisionsarethusmadeformovementofalawyerfromoneprivatefirmtoanotherandformovementofalawyerbetweenaprivatefirmandthegovernment.Thegovernmentisentitledtoprotec-tionofitsclientconfidencesand,therefore,totheprotectionsprovidedinRules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information,1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client,and1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment.However,ifthemoreextensivedisqualificationinRule 1.10: Imputed Disqualificationwereappliedtoformergovernmentlawyers,thepotentialeffectonthegovernmentwouldbeundulyburdensome.Thegovern-mentdealswithallprivatecitizensandorganizationsand,thus,hasamuchwidercircleofadverselegalintereststhandoesanyprivatelawfirm.Inthesecircumstances,thegovernment’srecruitmentoflawyerswouldbeseriouslyimpairedifRule 1.10: Imputed Disqualificationwereappliedtothegovernment.Onbalance,therefore,thegovernmentisbetterservedinthelongrunbytheprotectionsstatedinRule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment.

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

[6]Theruleofimputeddisqualificationstatedinparagraph(a)giveseffecttotheprincipleofloyaltytotheclientasitappliestolaw-yerswhopracticeinalawfirm.Suchsituationscanbeconsideredfromthepremisethatafirmoflawyersisessentiallyonelawyerforpurposesoftherulesgoverningloyaltytotheclient,orfromthepremisethateachlawyerisvicariouslyboundbytheobligationofloyaltyowedbyeachlawyerwithwhomthelawyerisassociated.Paragraph(a)oper-atesonlyamongthelawyerscurrentlyassociatedinafirm.Whenalawyermovesfromonefirmtoanother,thesituationisgovernedbyRules 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client,and1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.

[7]Rule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualificationoperatestopermitalawfirm,undercertaincircumstances,torepresentapersonwithinterestsdirectlyadversetothoseofaclientrepresentedbyalawyerwhofor-merlywasassociatedwiththefirm.TheRuleappliesregardlessofwhentheformerlyassociatedlawyerrepresentedtheclient.However,thelawfirmmaynotrepresentapersonwithinterestsadversetothoseofapres-entclientofthefirm,whichwouldviolateRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest.Moreover,thefirmmaynotrepresentthepersonwherethematteristhesameorsubstantiallyrelatedtothatinwhichtheformerlyassoci-atedlawyerrepresentedtheclientandanyotherlawyercurrentlyinthefirmhasmaterialinformationprotectedbyRules 1.6: Confidentiality of Informationand1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.

RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any par-ticipation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain com-pliance with the provisions of this rule.

(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a law-yer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a law-yer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:

(1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer partici-pated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer’s stead in the matter; or

(2) negotiate for private employment with any per-son who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).

(d) As used in this Rule, the term “matter” includes:(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application,

request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and

(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.

(e) As used in this Rule, the term “confidential gov-ernment information” means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.


Comment

[1]ThisRulepreventsalawyerfromexploitingpublicofficefortheadvantageofaprivateclient.ItisacounterpartofRule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification,whichappliestolawyersmovingfromonefirmtoanother.

[2]Alawyerrepresentingagovernmententity,whetheremployedorspeciallyretainedbythegovernment,issubjecttotheRulesofProfessionalConduct,includingtheprohibitionagainstrepresentingadverseinterestsstatedinRule 1.7: Conflict of Interestandtheprotec-tionsaffordedformerclientsinRule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.Inaddition,suchalawyerissubjecttoRule 1.11:Successive Government and Private Employmentandtostatutesandgovernmentregulationsregardingconflictofinterest.SuchstatutesandregulationsmaycircumscribetheextenttowhichthegovernmententitymaygiveconsentunderthisRule.

[3]Wherethesuccessiveclientsareapublicentityandaprivateclient,theriskexiststhatpowerordiscretionvestedinpublicauthor-itymightbeusedforthespecialbenefitofaprivateclient.Alawyershouldnotbeinapositionwherebenefittoaprivateclientmightaffectperformanceofthelawyer’sprofessionalfunctionsonbehalfofpublicauthority.Also,unfairadvantagecouldaccruetotheprivateclientbyreasonofaccesstoconfidentialgovernmentinformationaboutthe


client’sadversaryobtainableonlythroughthelawyer’sgovernmentservice.However,therulesgoverninglawyerspresentlyorformerlyemployedbyagovernmententityshouldnotbesorestrictiveastoinhibittransferofemploymenttoandfromthegovernment.Thegov-ernmenthasalegitimateneedtoattractqualifiedlawyersaswellastomaintainhighethicalstandards.Theprovisionsforscreeningandwaiverarenecessarytopreventthedisqualificationrulefromimposingtoosevereadeterrentagainstenteringpublicservice.

[4]Whentheclientisanagencyofonegovernment,thatagencyshouldbetreatedasaprivateclientforpurposesofthisRuleifthelawyerthereafterrepresentsanagencyofanothergovernment,aswhenalawyerrepresentsacityandsubsequentlyisemployedbyafederalagency.

[5]Paragraphs(a)(1)and(b)donotprohibitalawyerfromreceiv-ingasalaryorpartnershipshareestablishedbypriorindependentagreement.Theyprohibitdirectlyrelatingthelawyer’scompensationtothefeeinthematterinwhichthelawyerisdisqualified.

[6]Paragraph(a)(2)doesnotrequirethatalawyergivenoticetothegovernmententityatatimewhenprematuredisclosurewouldinjuretheclient;arequirementforprematuredisclosuremightprecludeengagementofthelawyer.Suchnoticeis,however,requiredtobegivenassoonaspracticableinorderthatthegovernmententitywillhaveareasonableopportunitytoascertainthatthelawyeriscomplyingwithRule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employmentandtotakeappropriateactionifitbelievesthelawyerisnotcomplying.

[7]Paragraph(b)operatesonlywhenthelawyerinquestionhasknowledgeoftheinformation,whichmeansactualknowledge;itdoesnotoperatewithrespecttoinformationthatmerelycouldbeimputedtothelawyer.

[8]Paragraphs(a)and(c)donotprohibitalawyerfromjointlyrepresentingaprivatepartyandagovernmententitywhendoingsoispermittedbyRule 1.7: Conflict of Interestandisnototherwiseprohib-itedbylaw.

[9]Paragraph(c)doesnotdisqualifyotherlawyersintheentitywithwhichthelawyerinquestionhasbecomeassociated.

RULE 1.12 FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not

represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the law-yer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after consultation.

(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and sub-stantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudica-tive officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.

(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any par-ticipation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provi-sions of this Rule.

(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subse-quently representing that party.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

ThisRulegenerallyparallelsRule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment.Theterm“personallyandsubstantially”signifiesthatajudgewhowasamemberofamultimembercourt,andthereafterleftjudicialofficetopracticelaw,isnotprohibitedfromrepresentingaclientinamatterpendinginthecourt,butinwhichthe

formerjudgedidnotparticipate.Soalsothefactthataformerjudgeexercisedadministrativeresponsibilityinacourtdoesnotpreventtheformerjudgefromactingasalawyerinamatterwherethejudgehadpreviouslyexercisedremoteorincidentaladministrativeresponsibilitythatdidnotaffectthemerits.Theterm“adjudicativeofficer”includessuchofficialsasjudgespro tempore,referees,specialmasters,hearingofficersandotherparajudicialofficers,andalsolawyerswhoserveaspart-timejudges.ComplianceCanonsA(2),B(2)andCoftheModelCodeofJudicialConductprovidethatapart-timejudge,judgepro tem-poreorretiredjudgerecalledtoactiveservice,maynot“actasalawyerinanyproceedinginwhichheorsheservedasajudgeorinanyotherproceedingrelatedthereto.”AlthoughphraseddifferentlyfromthisRule,thoserulescorrespondinmeaning.

RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization

represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a mat-ter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to mini-mize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:

(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter

be sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and

(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

(c) If, despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accor-dance with Rule 1.16.

(d) In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is appar-ent that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.

(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s consent to the dual representa-tion is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the indi-vidual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

(f) “Organization” as used herein includes governmental entities.


Comment

The Entity as the Client

[1]Anorganizationalclientisalegalentity,butitcannotactexceptthroughitsofficers,directors,employees,shareholdersandotherconstituents.Officers,directors,employeesandshareholdersaretheconstituentsofthecorporateorganizationalclient.ThedutiesdefinedinthisCommentapplyequallytounincorporatedassociations.“Othercon-stituents”asusedinthisCommentalsoincludesthepositionsequivalenttoofficers,directors,employeesandshareholdersheldbypersonsactingfororganizationalclientsthatarenotcorporations.

[2]Whenoneoftheconstituentsofanorganizationalclientcom-municateswiththeorganization’slawyerinthatperson’sorganizationalcapacity,thecommunicationisprotectedbyRule 1.6: Confidentiality


of Information.Thus,bywayofexample,ifanorganizationalclientrequestsitslawyertoinvestigateallegationsofwrongdoing,inter-viewsmadeinthecourseofthatinvestigationbetweenthelawyerandtheclient’semployeesorotherconstituentsarecoveredbyRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatcon-stituentsofanorganizationalclientaretheclientsofthelawyer.ThelawyermaynotdisclosetosuchconstituentsinformationrelatingtotherepresentationexceptfordisclosuresexplicitlyorimpliedlyauthorizedbytheorganizationalclientinordertocarryouttherepresentationorasotherwisepermittedbyRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.

[3]Whenconstituentsoftheorganizationmakedecisionsforit,thedecisionsordinarilymustbeacceptedbythelawyereveniftheirutilityorprudenceisdoubtful.Decisionsconcerningpolicyandoperations,includ-ingonesentailingseriousrisk,arenotassuchinthelawyer’sprovince.However,differentconsiderationsarisewhenthelawyerknowsthattheorganizationmaybesubstantiallyinjuredbyactionofaconstituentthatisinviolationoflaw.Insuchacircumstance,itmaybereasonablyneces-saryforthelawyertoasktheconstituenttoreconsiderthematter.Ifthatfails,orifthematterisofsufficientseriousnessandimportancetotheorganization,itmaybereasonablynecessaryforthelawyertotakestepstohavethematterreviewedbyahigherauthorityintheorganization.Clearjustificationshouldexistforseekingreviewovertheheadoftheconstituentnormallyresponsibleforit.Thestatedpolicyoftheorganiza-tionmaydefinecircumstancesandprescribechannelsforsuchreview,andalawyershouldencouragetheformulationofsuchapolicy.Evenintheabsenceoforganizationpolicy,however,thelawyermayhaveanobli-gationtoreferamattertohigherauthority,dependingontheseriousnessofthematterandwhethertheconstituentinquestionhasapparentmotivestoactatvariancewiththeorganization’sinterest.Reviewbythechiefexecutiveofficerorbytheboardofdirectorsmayberequiredwhenthematterisofimportancecommensuratewiththeirauthority.Atsomepointitmaybeusefuloressentialtoobtainanindependentlegalopinion.

[4]Inanextremecase,itmaybereasonablynecessaryforthelawyertoreferthemattertotheorganization’shighestauthority.Ordinarily,thatistheboardofdirectorsorsimilargoverningbody.However,applicablelawmayprescribethatundercertainconditionshighestauthorityreposeselsewhere,forexample,intheindependentdirectorsofacorporation.

Relation to Other Rules

[5]Theauthorityandresponsibilityprovidedinparagraph(b)areconcurrentwiththeauthorityandresponsibilityprovidedinotherRules.Inparticular,thisRuledoesnotlimitorexpandthelawyer’sresponsibil-ityunderRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information,1.8,1.16,3.3or4.1.Ifthelawyer’sservicesarebeingusedbyanorganizationtofurtheracrimeorfraudbytheorganization,Rule 1.2(d): Scope of Representationcanbeapplicable.Government Entity

[6]ThedutydefinedinthisRuleappliestogovernmentalentities.However,whentheclientisagovernmentalentity,adifferentbalancemaybeappropriatebetweenmaintainingconfidentialityandassur-ingthatthewrongfulofficialactispreventedorrectified,forpublicbusinessisinvolved.Inaddition,dutiesoflawyersemployedbythegovernmentorlawyersinmilitaryservicemaybedefinedbystatutesandregulation.Therefore,definingpreciselytheidentityoftheclientandprescribingtheresultingobligationsofsuchlawyersmaybemoredifficultinthegovernmentcontext.Althoughinsomecircumstancestheclientmaybeaspecificagency,itisgenerallythegovernmentasawhole.Forexample,iftheactionorfailuretoactinvolvestheheadofabureau,eitherthedepartmentofwhichthebureauisapartorthegovernmentasawholemaybetheclientforpurposeofthisRule.Moreover,inamatterinvolvingtheconductofgovernmentofficials,agovernmentlawyermayhaveauthoritytoquestionsuchconductmoreextensivelythanthatofalawyerforaprivateorganizationinsimilarcir-cumstances.ThisRuledoesnotlimitthatauthority.SeenoteonScope.

Clarifying the Lawyer’s Role

[7]Therearetimeswhentheorganization’sinterestmaybeorbecomeadversetothoseofoneormoreofitsconstituents.Insuchcircumstancesthelawyershouldadviseanyconstituent,whoseinterestthelawyerfindsadversetothatoftheorganization(1)oftheconflictorpotentialconflictofinterest,(2)thatthelawyercannotrepresentsuchconstituent,and(3)thatsuchpersonmaywishtoobtainindependentrepresentation.Caremustbetakentoassurethattheindividualunder-standsthat,whenthereissuchadversityofinterest,thelawyerfortheorganizationcannotprovidelegalrepresentationforthatconstituentindividual,andthatdiscussionsbetweenthelawyerfortheorganizationandtheindividualmaynotbeprivileged.

[8]Whethersuchawarningshouldbegivenbythelawyerfortheorganizationtoanyconstituentindividualmayturnonthefactsofeachcase.

Dual Representation

[9]Paragraph(e)recognizesthatalawyerforanorganizationmayalsorepresentaprincipalofficerormajorshareholder.

Derivative Actions

[10]Undergenerallyprevailinglaw,theshareholdersormembersofacorporationmaybringsuittocompelthedirectorstoperformtheirlegalobligationsinthesupervisionoftheorganization.Membersofunincorporatedassociationshaveessentiallythesameright.Suchanactionmaybebroughtnominallybytheorganization,butusuallyis,infact,alegalcontroversyovermanagementoftheorganization.

[11]Thequestioncanarisewhethercounselfortheorganizationmaydefendsuchanaction.Thepropositionthattheorganizationisthelawyer’sclientdoesnotaloneresolvetheissue.Mostderivativeactionsareanormalincidentofanorganization’saffairs,tobedefendedbytheorganization’slawyerlikeanyothersuit.However,iftheclaiminvolvesseriouschargesofwrongdoingbythoseincontroloftheorganization,aconflictmayarisebetweenthelawyer’sdutytotheorganizationandthelawyer’srelationshipwiththeboard.Inthosecircumstances,Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interestgov-ernswhoshouldrepresentthedirectorsandtheorganization.

RULE 1.14 CLIENT UNDER A DISABILITY(a) When a client’s ability to make adequately considered

decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of age, mental or medical disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably pos-sible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest.


Comment

[1]Thenormalclient-lawyerrelationshipisbasedontheassumptionthattheclient,whenproperlyadvisedandassisted,iscapableofmakingdecisionsaboutimportantmatters.Whentheclientisaminororsuffersfromamentaldisorderordisability,however,maintainingtheordinaryclient-lawyerrelationshipmaynotbepossibleinallrespects.Inparticular,anincapacitatedpersonmayhavenopowertomakelegallybindingdeci-sions.Nevertheless,aclientlackinglegalcompetenceoftenhastheabilitytounderstand,deliberateupon,andreachconclusionsaboutmattersaffect-ingtheclient’sownwell-being.Furthermore,toanincreasingextentthelawrecognizesintermediatedegreesofcompetence.Forexample,childrenasyoungasfiveorsixyearsofage,andcertainlythoseoftenortwelve,areregardedashavingopinionsthatareentitledtoweightinlegalproceed-ingsconcerningtheircustody.Soalso,itisrecognizedthatsomepersonsofadvancedagecanbequitecapableofhandlingroutinefinancialmatterswhileneedingspeciallegalprotectionconcerningmajortransactions.

[2]Thefactthataclientsuffersadisabilitydoesnotdiminishthelawyer’sobligationtotreattheclientwithattentionandrespect.Ifthepersonhasnoguardianorlegalrepresentative,thelawyeroftenmustactasdefactoguardian.Evenifthepersondoeshavealegalrepresentative,thelawyershouldasfaraspossibleaccordtherepresentedpersonthestatusofclient,particularlyinmaintainingcommunication.

[3]Ifalegalrepresentativehasalreadybeenappointedfortheclient,thelawyershouldordinarilylooktotherepresentativefordeci-sionsonbehalfoftheclient.Ifalegalrepresentativehasnotbeenappointed,thelawyershouldseetosuchanappointmentwhereitwouldservetheclient’sbestinterests.Thus,ifadisabledclienthassubstantialpropertythatshouldbesoldfortheclient’sbenefit,effec-tivecompletionofthetransactionordinarilyrequiresappointmentofalegalrepresentative.Inmanycircumstances,however,appointmentofalegalrepresentativemaybeexpensiveortraumaticfortheclient.Evaluationoftheseconsiderationsisamatterofprofessionaljudgmentonthelawyer’spart.

[4]Ifthelawyerrepresentstheguardianasdistinctfromtheward,andisawarethattheguardianisactingadverselytotheward’sinterest,thelawyermayhaveanobligationtopreventorrectifytheguardian’smisconduct.SeeRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation.


Disclosure of the Client’s Condition

[5]Rulesofprocedureinlitigationgenerallyprovidethatminorsorpersonssufferingmentaldisabilityshallberepresentedbyaguardianornextfriendiftheydonothaveageneralguardian.However,disclo-sureoftheclient’sdisabilitycanadverselyaffecttheclient’sinterests.Forexample,raisingthequestionofdisabilitycould,insomecircum-stances,leadtoproceedingsforinvoluntarycommitment.Thelawyer’spositioninsuchcasesisanunavoidablydifficultone.Thelawyermayseekguidancefromanappropriatediagnostician.

RULE 1.15(I) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third

persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safe-guarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.

(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective inter-ests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.


Comment

[1]Alawyershouldholdpropertyofotherswiththecarerequiredofaprofessionalfiduciary.Securitiesshouldbekeptinasafedepositbox,exceptwhensomeotherformofsafekeepingiswarrantedbyspe-cialcircumstances.Allpropertywhichisthepropertyofclientsorthirdpersonsshouldbekeptseparatefromthelawyer’sbusinessandpersonalpropertyand,ifmonies,inoneormoretrustaccounts.Separatetrustaccountsmaybewarrantedwhenadministeringestatemoniesoractinginsimilarfiduciarycapacities.

[2]Lawyersoftenreceivefundsfromthirdpartiesfromwhichthelawyer’sfeewillbepaid.Ifthereisriskthattheclientmaydivertthefundswithoutpayingthefee,thelawyerisnotrequiredtoremittheportionfromwhichthefeeistobepaid.However,alawyermaynotholdfundstocoerceaclientintoacceptingthelawyer’scontention.Thedisputedportionofthefundsshouldbekeptintrustandthelawyershouldsuggestmeansforpromptresolutionofthedispute,suchasarbitrationorinterpleader.Theundisputedportionofthefundsshallbepromptlydistributed.

[3]Thirdparties,suchasaclient’screditors,mayhavejustclaimsagainstfundsorotherpropertyinalawyer’scustody.Alawyermayhaveadutyunderapplicablelawtoprotectsuchthird-partyclaimsagainstwrongfulinterferencebytheclient,andaccordinglymayrefusetosurrenderthepropertytotheclient.However,alawyershouldnotunilaterallyassumetoarbitrateadisputebetweentheclientandthethirdparty.TheobligationsofalawyerunderthisRuleareindependentofthosearisingfromactivityotherthanrenderinglegalservices.Forexample,alawyerwhoservesasanescrowagentisgovernedbytheapplicablelawrelatingtofiduciarieseventhoughthelawyerdoesnotrenderlegalservicesinthetransaction.

[4]A“Clients’SecurityFund”providesameansthroughthecol-lectiveeffortsofthebartoreimbursepersonswhohavelostmoneyorpropertyasaresultofdishonestconductofalawyer.Wheresuchafundhasbeenestablished,alawyershouldparticipate.

RULE 1.15(II) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY- TRUST ACCOUNT AND IOLTA

(a) Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available a trust account as

required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from such account.

(b) No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a law-yer’s trust account, except that unearned attorney’s fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover main-tenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned attorney’s fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.

(c) All client’s funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.

(1) With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1), with the interest to be paid to the client. No earnings from such an account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.

(2) With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) in compliance with the following provisions:

(i) No earnings from such an IOLTA account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.

(ii) The account shall include all clients’ funds which are nominal in amount or which are to be held for a short period of time.

(iii) An interest-bearing trust account may be established with any approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1). Funds in each interest-bearing trust account shall be subject to withdrawal upon request and without delay.

(iv) The rate of interest payable on any interest-bearing trust account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time or quantity minimum, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposit funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.

(v) Lawyers or law firms shall direct the deposi-tory institution:

(A) to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any charges or fees on that account, on the average monthly balance in that account, or as otherwise computed in accordance with a financial institution’s standard accounting practice, at least quarterly. Any bank fees or charges in excess of the interest earned on that account for any month shall be paid by the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if required by the bank;

(B) to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly balance against which the interest rate is applied, the service charges or fees applied, and the net interest remittance;

(C) to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm at the same time a report showing the amount paid to the Foundation, the rate of interest applied, the average account balance of the period for which the report is made, and such other infor-mation provided to non-lawyer customers with similar accounts.

(3) No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients’ funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.

(4) Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may elect to remit all


interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.

The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15(II)(a) and Rule 1.15(II)(b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15(II)(c) is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1]Thepersonalmoneypermittedtobekeptinthelawyer’strustaccountbythisRuleshallnotbeusedforanypurposeotherthantocoverthebankfeesandifusedforanyotherpurposethelawyershallhaveviolatedthisRule.Ifthelawyerwishestoreducetheamountofpersonalmoneyinthetrustaccount,thechangemustbeproperlynotedinthelawyer’sfinancialrecordsandthemoniestransferredtothelaw-yer’sbusinessaccount.

[2]NothinginthisRuleshallprohibitalawyerfromremovingfromthetrustaccountfeeswhichhavebeenearnedonaregularbasiswhichcoincideswiththelawyer’sbillingcyclesratherthanremovingthefeesearnedonanhour-by-hourbasis.

RULE 1.15(III) RECORD KEEPING; TRUST ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS

(a) Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall main-tain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this Rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer’s office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.

(b) Description of Accounts:(1) A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether

general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as either an “Attorney Trust Account,” “Attorney Escrow Account” or “Attorney Fiduciary Account.”

(2) A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a “Business Account,” a “Professional Account,” an “Office Account,” a “General Account,” a “Payroll Account”, “Operating Account” or a “Regular Account.”

(3) Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts main-tained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.

(c) Procedure:(1) Approved Institutions:

(i) A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar, which shall annually publish a list of approved institu-tions. Such institutions shall be located within the State of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer’s office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or fiduciary. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be feder-ally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the State Disciplinary Board whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the finan-cial institution and shall not be canceled except upon thirty days notice in writing to the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information custom-arily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the State of Georgia it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.

(ii) The State Disciplinary Board shall establish procedures for a lawyer or law firm to be excused from

the requirements of this Rule if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree to com-ply with the provisions of this Rule.

(2) Timing of Reports:(i) The financial institution shall file a report

with the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds and said instrument is not honored within three business days of presentation.

(ii) The report shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel within fifteen days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored after the three business days provided in (2)(i) above.

(3) Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this Rule.

(4) Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these Rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this Rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.

(d) Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pur-suant to this Rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by attorneys and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing attorney trust accounts.

(e) Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these Standards at the request of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court. This obliga-tion shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these Rules for the production of docu-ments and evidence.

(f) Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an Audit for Cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.


Comment

[1]EachfinancialinstitutionwishingtobeapprovedasadepositoryofclienttrustfundsmustfileanoverdraftnotificationagreementwiththeStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheStateBarofGeorgiawillpublishalistofapprovedinstitutionsatleastannually.

[2]TheoverdraftagreementrequiresthatalloverdraftsbereportedtotheOfficeofGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiawhetherornottheinstrumentishonored.Itisimproperforalawyertoaccept“overdraftprivileges”oranyotherarrangementforapersonalloanonaclienttrustaccount,particularlyinexchangefortheinstitution’sprom-isetodelayornottoreportanoverdraft.TheinstitutionmustnotifytheOfficeofGeneralCounselofalloverdraftsevenwheretheinstitutioniscertainthatitsownerrorcausedtheoverdraftorthatthemattercouldhavebeenresolvedbetweentheinstitutionandthelawyerwithinarea-sonableperiodoftime.

[3]Theoverdraftnotificationprovisionisnotintendedtoresultinthedisciplineofeverylawyerwhooverdrawsatrustaccount.Thelawyerorinstitutionmayexplainoccasionalerrors.TheprovisionmerelyintendsthattheOfficeofGeneralCounselreceiveanearlywarningofimpropri-etiessothatcorrectiveaction,includingauditsforcause,maybetaken.

Audits

[4]Everylawyer’sfinancialrecordsandtrustaccountrecordsarerequiredrecordsandthereforeareproperlysubjecttoauditforcause.Theauditprovisionsareintendedtouncovererrorsandomissionsbeforethepublicisharmed,todeterthoselawyerswhomaybetemptedtomisuseclient’sfundsandtoeducateandinstructlawyersastopropertrustaccountingmethods.AlthoughtheauditorswillbeemployedbytheOfficeofGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia,itisintendedthatdisciplinaryproceedingswillbebroughtonlywhentheauditorshavereasonablecausetobelievediscrepanciesorirregularitiesexist.Otherwise,theauditorsshouldonlyeducatethelawyerandthelawyer’sstaffastopropertrustaccountingmethods.


[5]AnauditforcausemaybeconductedatanytimeandwithoutadvancenoticeiftheOfficeofGeneralCounselreceivessuf-ficientevidencethatalawyerposesathreatofharmtoclientsorthepublic.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselmusthavethewrittenapprovaloftheChairoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandthePresident-ElectoftheStateBarofGeorgiatoconductanauditforcause.

RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materi-ally impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged.(b) except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may

withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:

(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

(2) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpe-trate a crime or fraud;

(3) the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;

(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unrea-sonably difficult by the client; or

(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.(c) When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compli-

ance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwith-standing good cause for terminating the representation.

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a cli-ent’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refund-ing any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.


Comment

[1]Alawyershouldnotacceptrepresentationinamatterunlessitcanbeperformedcompetently,promptly,withoutimproperconflictofinterestandtocompletion.ButseeRule 1.2(c): Scope of Representation.

Mandatory Withdrawal

[2]Alawyerordinarilymustdeclineorwithdrawfromrepresenta-tioniftheclientdemandsthatthelawyerengageinconductthatisillegalorviolatestheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.Thelawyerisnotobligedtodeclineorwithdrawsimplybecausetheclientsuggestssuchacourseofconduct;aclientmaymakesuchasuggestioninthehopethatalawyerwillnotbeconstrainedbyaprofessionalobligation.

[3]Whenalawyerhasbeenappointedtorepresentaclient,with-drawalordinarilyrequiresapprovaloftheappointingauthority.SeealsoRule 6.2: Accepting Appointments.Difficultymaybeencounteredifwithdrawalisbasedontheclient’sdemandthatthelawyerengageinunprofessionalconduct.Thecourtmaywishanexplanationforthewithdrawal,whilethelawyermaybeboundtokeepconfidentialthefactsthatwouldconstitutesuchanexplanation.Thelawyer’sstatementthatprofessionalconsiderationsrequireterminationoftherepresentationordinarilyshouldbeacceptedassufficient.

Discharge

[4]Aclienthasarighttodischargealawyeratanytime,withorwithoutcause,subjecttoliabilityforpaymentforthelawyer’sservices.Wherefuturedisputeaboutthewithdrawalmaybeanticipated,itmaybeadvisabletoprepareawrittenstatementrecitingthecircumstances.

[5]Whetheraclientcandischargeappointedcounselmaydependonapplicablelaw.Totheextentpossible,thelawyershouldgivetheclientanexplanationoftheconsequences.Theseconsequencesmayincludeadecisionbytheappointingauthoritythatappointmentofsuccessorcounselisunjustified,thusrequiringtheclienttobeself-represented.

[6]Iftheclientismentallyincompetent,theclientmaylackthelegalcapacitytodischargethelawyer,andinanyeventthedischargemaybeseriouslyadversetotheclient’sinterests.Thelawyershouldmakespecialefforttohelptheclientconsidertheconsequencesand,inanextremecase,mayinitiateproceedingsforaconservatorshiporsimi-larprotectionoftheclient.SeeRule 1.14: Client under a Disability.Optional Withdrawal

[7]Thelawyerhastheoptiontowithdrawifitcanbeaccom-plishedwithoutmaterialadverseeffectontheclient’sinterests.Withdrawalisalsojustifiediftheclientpersistsinacourseofactionthatthelawyerreasonablybelievesiscriminalorfraudulent,foralawyerisnotrequiredtobeassociatedwithsuchconductevenifthelawyerdoesnotfurtherit.Withdrawalisalsopermittedifthelawyer’sservicesweremisusedinthepastevenifthatwouldmateriallyprejudicetheclient.Thelawyeralsomaywithdrawwheretheclientinsistsonarepugnantorimprudentobjective.Thelawyer’sstatementthatprofes-sionalconsiderationsrequireterminationoftherepresentationordinarilyshouldbeacceptedassufficient.

[8]Alawyermaywithdrawiftheclientrefusestoabidebythetermsofanagreementrelatingtotherepresentation,suchasanagree-mentconcerningfeesorcourtcostsoranagreementlimitingtheobjectivesoftherepresentation.

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal

[9]Evenifthelawyerhasbeenunfairlydischargedbytheclient,alawyermusttakeallreasonablestepstomitigatetheconsequencestotheclient.

[10]Whetherornotalawyerforanorganizationmayundercer-tainunusualcircumstanceshavealegalobligationtotheorganizationafterwithdrawingorbeingdischargedbytheorganization’shighestauthorityisbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

RULE 1.17 SALE OF LAW PRACTICE A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) Reserved.(b) The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer

or law firm;(c) Actual written notice is given to each of the seller’s

clients regarding:(1) the proposed sale;(2) the terms of any proposed change in the fee

arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);(3) the client’s right to retain other counsel or to take

possession of the file; and(4) the fact that the client’s consent to the sale will be

presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice.

If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the represen-tation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.

(d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.


Comment

[1]Thepracticeoflawisaprofession,notmerelyabusiness.Clientsarenotcommoditiesthatcanbepurchasedandsoldatwill.PursuanttothisRule,whenanotherlawyerorfirmtakesovertherep-resentation,thesellinglawyerorfirmmayobtaincompensationforthereasonablevalueofthepracticeasmaywithdrawingpartnersoflaw


firms.SeeRules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyerand5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice.

Termination of Practice by the Seller

[2]Therequirementthatalloftheprivatepracticebesoldissatis-fiediftheselleringoodfaithmakestheentirepracticeavailableforsaletothepurchaser.Thefactthatanumberoftheseller’sclientsdecidenottoberepresentedbythepurchaserbuttaketheirmatterselsewhere,therefore,doesnotresultinaviolation.Neitherdoesareturntoprivatepracticeasaresultofanunanticipatedchangeincircumstancesresultinaviolation.Forexample,alawyerwhohassoldthepracticetoacceptanappointmenttojudicialofficedoesnotviolatetherequirementthatthesalebeattendanttocessationofpracticeifthelawyerlaterresumespri-vatepracticeuponbeingdefeatedinacontestedoraretentionelectionfortheoffice.

[3]Reserved.

[4]Reserved.

Single Purchaser

[5]TheRulerequiresasinglepurchaser.Theprohibitionagainstpiecemealsaleofapracticeprotectsthoseclientswhosemattersarelesslucrativeandwhomightfinditdifficulttosecureothercounselifasalecouldbelimitedtosubstantialfee-generatingmatters.Thepurchaserisrequiredtoundertakeallclientmattersinthepractice,subjecttocli-entconsent.If,however,thepurchaserisunabletoundertakeallclientmattersbecauseofaconflictofinterestinaspecificmatterrespectingwhichthepurchaserisnotpermittedbyRule 1.7: Conflict of Interestoranotherruletorepresenttheclient,therequirementthattherebeasinglepurchaserisneverthelesssatisfied.Client Confidences, Consent and Notice

[6]NegotiationsbetweensellerandprospectivepurchaserpriortodisclosureofinformationrelatingtoaspecificrepresentationofanidentifiableclientnomoreviolatetheconfidentialityprovisionsofRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Informationthandopreliminarydiscussionscon-cerningthepossibleassociationofanotherlawyerormergersbetweenfirms,withrespecttowhichclientconsentisnotrequired.Providingthepurchaseraccesstoclient-specificinformationrelatingtotherepresenta-tionandtothefile,however,requiresclientconsent.TheRuleprovidesthatbeforesuchinformationcanbedisclosedbythesellertothepur-chasertheclientmustbegivenactualwrittennoticeofthecontemplatedsale,includingtheidentityofthepurchaserandanyproposedchangeinthetermsoffuturerepresentation,andmustbetoldthatthedecisiontoconsentormakeotherarrangementsmustbemadewithin90days.Ifnothingisheardfromtheclientwithinthattime,consenttothesaleispresumed.

[7]Alawyerorlawfirmceasingtopracticecannotberequiredtoremaininpracticebecausesomeclientscannotbegivenactualnoticeoftheproposedpurchase.Sincetheseclientscannotthemselvesconsenttothepurchaseordirectanyotherdispositionoftheirfiles,theRulerequiresanorderfromacourthavingjurisdictionauthorizingtheirtrans-ferorotherdisposition.TheCourtcanbeexpectedtodeterminewhetherreasonableeffortstolocatetheclienthavebeenexhausted,andwhethertheabsentclient’slegitimateinterestswillbeservedbyauthorizingthetransferofthefilesothatthepurchasermaycontinuetherepresentation.Preservationofclientconfidencesrequiresthatthepetitionforacourtorderbeconsideredin camera.

[8]Alltheelementsofclientautonomy,includingtheclient’sabsoluterighttodischargealawyerandtransfertherepresentationtoanother,survivethesaleofthepractice.

Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser

[9]Thesalemaynotbefinancedbyincreasesinfeeschargedtheclientsofthepractice.Existingagreementsbetweenthesellerandtheclientastofeesandthescopeoftheworkmustbehonoredbythepur-chaser,unlesstheclientconsents.Thepurchasermay,however,advisetheclientthatthepurchaserwillnotundertaketherepresentationunlesstheclientconsentstopaythehigherfeesthepurchaserusuallycharges.Topreventclientfinancingofthesale,thehigherfeethepurchasermaychargemustnotexceedthefeeschargedbythepurchaserforsubstan-tiallysimilarservicesrenderedpriortotheinitiationofthepurchasenegotiations.

[10]Thepurchasermaynotintentionallyfragmentthepracticewhichisthesubjectofthesalebychargingsignificantlydifferentfeesinsubstantiallysimilarmatters.Doingsowouldmakeitpossibleforthepurchasertoavoidtheobligationtotakeovertheentirepractice

bychargingarbitrarilyhigherfeesforlesslucrativematters,therebyincreasingthelikelihoodthatthoseclientswouldnotconsenttothenewrepresentation.

Other Applicable Ethical Standards

[11]Lawyersparticipatinginthesaleofalawpracticearesub-jecttotheethicalstandardsapplicabletoinvolvinganotherlawyerintherepresentationofaclient.Theseinclude,forexample,theseller’sobligationtoexercisecompetenceinidentifyingapurchaserqualifiedtoassumethepracticeandthepurchaser’sobligationtoundertaketherepresentationcompetently(seeRule 1.1: Competence);theobliga-tiontoavoiddisqualifyingconflicts,andtosecureclientconsentafterconsultationforthoseconflictswhichcanbeagreedto(seeRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest);andtheobligationtoprotectinformationrelatingtotherepresentation(seeRules 1.6and1.9).

[12]Ifapprovalofthesubstitutionofthepurchasinglawyerforthesellinglawyerisrequiredbytherulesofanytribunalinwhichamatterispending,suchapprovalmustbeobtainedbeforethemattercanbeinclud-edinthesale(seeRule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation).

Applicability of the Rule

[13]ThisRuleappliestothesaleofalawpracticebyrepresenta-tivesofadeceased,disabledordisappearedlawyer.Thus,thesellermayberepresentedbyanon-lawyerrepresentativenotsubjecttotheseRules.Since,however,nolawyermayparticipateinasaleofalawpracticewhichdoesnotconformtotherequirementsofthisRule,therepresenta-tivesoftheselleraswellasthepurchasinglawyercanbeexpectedtoseetoitthattheyaremet.

[14]Admissiontoorretirementfromalawpartnershiporprofes-sionalassociation,retirementplansandsimilararrangements,andasaleoftangibleassetsofalawpractice,donotconstituteasaleorpurchasegovernedbythisRule.

[15]ThisRuledoesnotapplytothetransfersoflegalrepresentationbetweenlawyerswhensuchtransfersareunrelatedtothesaleofaprac-tice.

PART TWO COUNSELOR

RULE 2.1 ADVISOR In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

Comment

Scope of Advice

[1]Aclientisentitledtostraightforwardadviceexpressingthelawyer’shonestassessment.Legaladviceofteninvolvesunpleasantfactsandalternativesthataclientmaybedisinclinedtoconfront.Inpresentingadvice,alawyerendeavorstosustaintheclient’smoraleandmayputadviceinasacceptableaformashonestypermits.However,alawyershouldnotbedeterredfromgivingcandidadvicebytheprospectthattheadvicewillbeunpalatabletotheclient.

[2]Inrenderingadvice,alawyermayrefernotonlytolawbuttootherconsiderationssuchasmoral,economic,socialandpoliticalfac-torsthatmayberelevanttotheclient’ssituation.Advicecouchedinnarrowlylegaltermsmaybeoflittlevaluetoaclient,especiallywherepracticalconsiderations,suchascostoreffectsonotherpeople,arepredominant.Purelytechnicallegaladvice,therefore,cansometimesbeinadequate.Itisproperforalawyertorefertorelevantmoralandethi-calconsiderationsingivingadvice.

[3]Aclientmayexpresslyorimpliedlyaskthelawyerforpurelytechnicaladvice.Whensucharequestismadebyaclientexperiencedinlegalmatters,thelawyermayacceptitatfacevalue.Whensucharequestismadebyaclientinexperiencedinlegalmatters,however,thelawyer’sresponsibilityasadvisormayincludeindicatingthatmoremaybeinvolvedthanstrictlylegalconsiderations.

[4]Mattersthatgobeyondstrictlylegalquestionsmayalsobeinthedomainofanotherprofession.Familymatterscaninvolveproblemswithintheprofessionalcompetenceofpsychiatry,clinicalpsychologyorsocialwork;businessmatterscaninvolveproblemswithinthecom-


petenceoftheaccountingprofessionoroffinancialspecialists.Whereconsultationwithaprofessionalinanotherfieldisitselfsomethingacompetentlawyerwouldrecommend,thelawyershouldmakesucharecommendation.Atthesametime,alawyer’sadviceatitsbestoftenconsistsofrecommendingacourseofactioninthefaceofconflictingrecommendationsofexperts.

Offering Advice

[5]Ingeneral,alawyerisnotexpectedtogiveadviceuntilaskedbytheclient.However,whenalawyerknowsthataclientproposesacourseofactionthatislikelytoresultinsubstantialadverselegalconse-quencestotheclient,dutytotheclientunderRule1.4:Communicationmayrequirethatthelawyeractiftheclient’scourseofactionisrelatedtotherepresentation.Alawyerordinarilyhasnodutytoinitiateinvesti-gationofaclient’saffairsortogiveadvicethattheclienthasindicatedisunwanted,butalawyermayinitiateadvicetoaclientwhendoingsoappearstobeintheclient’sinterest.

RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY(a) A lawyer acting as an intermediary by representing

two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests shall withdraw if:

(1) any of the clients so request; or(2) there comes into existence any of the conditions

which would cause an attorney “not to accept or continue the representation” under the provisions of Rule 1.7.

(b) Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.


Comment

[1]AlawyeractsasintermediaryunderthisRulewhenthelawyerrepresentstwoormorepartieswithpotentiallyconflictinginterests.Akeyfactorindefiningtherelationshipiswhetherthepartiesshareresponsibilityforthelawyer’sfee,butthecommonrepresentationmaybeinferredfromothercircumstances.Becauseconfusioncanariseastothelawyer’srolewhereeachpartyisnotseparatelyrepresented,itisimportantthatthelawyermakecleartherelationship.

[2]TheRuledoesnotapplytoalawyeractingasarbitratorormediatorbetweenoramongpartieswhoarenotclientsofthelawyer,evenwherethelawyerhasbeenappointedwiththeconcurrenceoftheparties.Inperformingsucharolethelawyermaybesubjecttoapplicablecodesofethics,suchastheCodeofEthicsforArbitrationinCommercialDisputespreparedbyajointCommitteeoftheAmericanBarAssociationandtheAmericanArbitrationAssociation.

[3]Alawyeractsasintermediaryinseekingtoestablishoradjustarelationshipbetweenclientsonanamicableandmutuallyadvantageousbasis;forexample,inhelpingtoorganizeabusinessinwhichtwoormoreclientsareentrepreneurs,workingoutthefinancialreorganizationofanenterpriseinwhichtwoormoreclientshaveaninterest,arrangingapropertydistributioninsettlementofanestateormediatingadisputebetweenclients.Thelawyerseekstoresolvepotentiallyconflictinginterestsbydevelopingtheparties’mutualinterests.Thealternativecanbethateachpartymayhavetoobtainseparaterepresentation,withthepossibilityinsomesituationsofincurringadditionalcost,complicationorevenlitigation.Giventheseandotherrelevantfactors,alltheclientsmaypreferthatthelawyeractasintermediary.

[4]Inconsideringwhethertoactasintermediarybetweenclients,alawyershouldbemindfulthatiftheintermediationfailstheresultcanbeadditionalcost,embarrassmentandrecrimination.Insomesituationstheriskoffailureissogreatthatintermediationisplainlyimpossible.Forexample,alawyercannotundertakecommonrepre-sentationofclientsbetweenwhomcontentiouslitigationisimminentorwhocontemplatecontentiousnegotiations.Moregenerally,iftherelationshipbetweenthepartieshasalreadyassumeddefiniteantago-nism,thepossibilitythattheclients’interestscanbeadjustedbyintermediationordinarilyisnotverygood.

[5]Theappropriatenessofintermediationcandependonitsform.Formsofintermediationrangefrominformalarbitration,whereeachclient’scaseispresentedbytherespectiveclientandthelawyerdecidestheoutcome,tomediation,tocommonrepresentationwheretheclients’interestsaresubstantiallythoughnotentirelycompatible.Oneformmaybeappropriateincircumstanceswhereanotherwouldnot.Otherrelevantfactorsarewhetherthelawyersubsequentlywillrepresentbothpartiesonacontinuingbasisandwhetherthesituationinvolvescreatingarelation-shipbetweenthepartiesorterminatingone.Thelawyermustreasonably

believethatthemattercanberesolvedontermscompatiblewiththeclients’bestinterests,thateachclientwillbeabletomakeadequatelyinformeddecisionsinthematterandthatthereislittleriskofmaterialprejudicetotheinterestsofanyoftheclientsifthecontemplatedresolu-tionisunsuccessful;andthelawyerreasonablybelievesthatthecommonrepresentationcanbeundertakenimpartiallyandwithoutimpropereffectonotherresponsibilitiesthelawyerhastoanyoftheclients.

Confidentiality and Privilege

[6]Aparticularlyimportantfactorindeterminingtheappropriate-nessofintermediationistheeffectonclient-lawyerconfidentialityandtheattorney-clientprivilege.Inacommonrepresentation,thelawyerisstillrequiredbothtokeepeachclientadequatelyinformedandtomaintainconfidentialityofinformationrelatingtotherepresentation.SeeRules1.4and1.6.Complyingwithbothrequirementswhileactingasintermedi-aryrequiresadelicatebalance.Ifthebalancecannotbemaintained,thecommonrepresentationisimproper.Withregardtotheattorney-clientprivilege,theprevailingruleisthatasbetweencommonlyrepresentedclientstheprivilegedoesnotattach.Hence,itmustbeassumedthatiflitigationeventuatesbetweentheclients,theprivilegewillnotprotectanysuchcommunications,andtheclientsshouldbesoadvised.

[7]Sincethelawyerisrequiredtobeimpartialbetweencommonlyrepresentedclients,intermediationisimproperwhenthatimpartialitycannotbemaintained.Forexample,alawyerwhohasrepresentedoneoftheclientsforalongperiodandinavarietyofmattersmighthavedifficultybeingimpartialbetweenthatclientandonetowhomthelaw-yerhasonlyrecentlybeenintroduced.

Consultation

[8]Inactingasintermediarybetweenclients,thelawyerisrequiredtoconsultwiththeclientsontheimplicationsofdoingso,andproceedonlyuponconsentbasedonsuchaconsultation.Theconsulta-tionshouldmakeclearthatthelawyer’sroleisnotthatofpartisanshipnormallyexpectedinothercircumstances.

[9]Paragraph(b)isanapplicationoftheprincipleexpressedinRule 1.4: Communication.Wherethelawyerisintermediary,theclientsordinarilymustassumegreaterresponsibilityfordecisionsthanwheneachclientisindependentlyrepresented.

Withdrawal

[10]Commonrepresentationdoesnotdiminishtherightsofeachclientintheclient-lawyerrelationship.Eachhastherighttoloyalanddiligentrepresentation,therighttodischargethelawyerasstatedinRule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation,andtheprotectionofRule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Clientconcerningobligationstoaformerclient.

RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter

affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the

evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client; and

(2) the client consents after consultation.(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a

report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.


Comment

Definition

[1]Anevaluationmaybeperformedattheclient’sdirectionbutfortheprimarypurposeofestablishinginformationforthebenefitofthirdparties;forexample,anopinionconcerningthetitleofpropertyrenderedatthebehestofavendorfortheinformationofaprospectivepurchaser,oratthebehestofaborrowerfortheinformationofapro-spectivelender.Insomesituations,theevaluationmayberequiredbyagovernmententity;forexample,anopinionconcerningthelegalityofthesecuritiesregisteredforsaleunderthesecuritieslaws.Inotherinstances,theevaluationmayberequiredbyathirdperson,suchasapurchaserofabusiness.

[2]Lawyersforthegovernmentmaybecalledupontogiveafor-malopiniononthelegalityofcontemplatedgovernmententityaction.Inmakingsuchanevaluation,thegovernmentlawyeractsatthebehest


ofthegovernmentastheclientbutforthepurposeofestablishingthelimitsoftheagency’sauthorizedactivity.Suchanopinionistobedis-tinguishedfromconfidentiallegaladvicegivenagencyofficials.Thecriticalquestioniswhethertheopinionistobemadepublic.

[3]Alegalevaluationshouldbedistinguishedfromaninvestiga-tionofapersonwithwhomthelawyerdoesnothaveaclient-lawyerrelationship.Forexample,alawyerretainedbyapurchasertoanalyzeavendor’stitletopropertydoesnothaveaclient-lawyerrelationshipwiththevendor.Soalso,aninvestigationintoaperson’saffairsbyagovern-mentlawyer,orbyspecialcounselemployedbythegovernment,isnotanevaluationasthattermisusedinthisRule.Thequestioniswhetherthelawyerisretainedbythepersonwhoseaffairsarebeingexamined.Whenthelawyerisretainedbythatperson,thegeneralrulesconcern-ingloyaltytoclientandpreservationofconfidencesapply,whichisnotthecaseifthelawyerisretainedbysomeoneelse.Forthisreason,itisessentialtoidentifythepersonbywhomthelawyerisretained.Thisshouldbemadeclearnotonlytothepersonunderexamination,butalsotootherstowhomtheresultsaretobemadeavailable.

Duty to Third Person

[4]Whentheevaluationisintendedfortheinformationoruseofathirdperson,alegaldutytothatpersonmayormaynotarise.ThatlegalquestionisbeyondthescopeofthisRule.However,sincesuchanevaluationinvolvesadeparturefromthenormalclient-lawyerrelation-ship,carefulanalysisofthesituationisrequired.Thelawyermustbesatisfiedasamatterofprofessionaljudgmentthatmakingtheevaluationiscompatiblewithotherfunctionsundertakeninbehalfoftheclient.Forexample,ifthelawyerisactingasadvocateindefendingtheclientagainstchargesoffraud,itwouldnormallybeincompatiblewiththatresponsibilityforthelawyertoperformanevaluationforotherscon-cerningthesameorarelatedtransaction.Assumingnosuchimpedimentisapparent,however,thelawyershouldadvisetheclientoftheimplica-tionsoftheevaluation,particularlythelawyer’sresponsibilitiestothirdpersonsandthedutytodisseminatethefindings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information

[5]Thequalityofanevaluationdependsonthefreedomandextentoftheinvestigationuponwhichitisbased.Ordinarilyalawyershouldhavewhateverlatitudeofinvestigationseemsnecessaryasamatterofprofessionaljudgment.Undersomecircumstances,however,thetermsoftheevaluationmaybelimited.Forexample,certainissuesorsourcesmaybecategoricallyexcluded,orthescopeofsearchmaybelimitedbytimeconstraintsorthenoncooperationofpersonshavingrelevantinformation.Anysuchlimitationswhicharematerialtotheevaluationshouldbedescribedinthereport.Ifafteralawyerhascom-mencedanevaluation,theclientrefusestocomplywiththetermsuponwhichitwasunderstoodtheevaluationwastohavebeenmade,thelaw-yer’sobligationsaredeterminedbylaw,havingreferencetothetermsoftheclient’sagreementandthesurroundingcircumstances.

Financial Auditors’ Requests for Information

[6]Whenaquestionconcerningthelegalsituationofaclientarisesattheinstanceoftheclient’sfinancialauditorandthequestionisreferredtothelawyer,thelawyer’sresponsemaybemadeinaccordancewithpro-ceduresrecognizedinthelegalprofession.SuchaprocedureissetforthintheAmericanBarAssociationStatementofPolicyRegardingLawyers’ResponsestoAuditors’RequestsforInformation,adoptedin1975.

PART THREE ADVOCATE

RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:

(a) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the law-yer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;

(b) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwar-ranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argu-ment for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.


Comment

[1]Theadvocatehasadutytouselegalprocedureforthefullestbenefitoftheclient’scause,butalsoadutynottoabuselegalprocedure.Thelaw,bothproceduralandsubstantive,establishesthelimitswithin

whichanadvocatemayproceed.However,thelawisnotalwaysclearandneverisstatic.Accordingly,indeterminingtheproperscopeofadvocacy,accountmustbetakenofthelaw’sambiguitiesandpotentialforchange.

[2]Thefilingofanactionordefenseorsimilaractiontakenforaclientisnotfrivolousmerelybecausethefactshavenotfirstbeenfullysubstantiatedorbecausethelawyerexpectstodevelopvitalevidenceonlybydiscovery.Suchactionisnotfrivolouseventhoughthelawyerbelievesthattheclient’spositionultimatelywillnotprevail.Theactionisfrivolous,however,iftheclientdesirestohavetheactiontakenpri-marilyforthepurposeofharassingormaliciouslyinjuringaperson,or,ifthelawyerisunableeithertomakeagoodfaithargumentonthemeritsoftheactiontakenortosupporttheactiontakenbyagoodfaithargumentforanextension,modificationorreversalofexistinglaw.

[3]Itisnotethicallyimproperforalawyertofilealawsuitbeforecompletefactualsupportfortheclaimhasbeenestablishedprovidedthatthelawyerdeterminesthatareasonablelawyerwouldconcludethatthereisareasonablepossibilitythatfactssupportingthecauseofactioncanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim;andprovidedfurtherthatthelawyerisnotrequiredbyrulesofprocedure,orotherwisetorepre-sentthatthecauseofactionhasanadequatefactualbasis.Ifafterfilingitisdiscoveredthatthelawsuithasnomerit,thelawyerwilldismissthelawsuitorinthealternativewithdraw.

[4]ThedecisionofacourtthataclaimisnotmeritoriousisnotnecessarilyconclusiveofaviolationofthisRule.

RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1]Dilatorypracticesbringtheadministrationofjusticeintodisrepute.

[2]Thereasonablenessofalawyer’sefforttoexpeditelitigationmustbejudgedbyallofthecontrollingfactors.“Reasonableefforts”donotequateto“instantefforts”andaresufficientifreasonableundertherelevantcircumstances.

RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the con-clusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed deci-sion, whether or not the facts are adverse.


Comment

[1]Theadvocate’staskistopresenttheclient’scasewithpersua-siveforce.Performanceofthatdutywhilemaintainingconfidencesoftheclientisqualifiedbytheadvocate’sdutyofcandortothetribunal.However,anadvocatedoesnotvouchfortheevidencesubmittedinacause;thetribunalisresponsibleforassessingitsprobativevalue.

Representations by a Lawyer

[2]Anadvocateisresponsibleforpleadingsandotherdocu-mentspreparedforlitigation,butisusuallynotrequiredtohave


personalknowledgeofmattersassertedtherein,forlitigationdocu-mentsordinarilypresentassertionsbytheclient,orbysomeoneontheclient’sbehalf,andnotassertionsbythelawyer.CompareRule 3.1: Meritorious Claims and Contentions.However,anassertionpurportingtobeonthelawyer’sownknowledge,asinanaffida-vitbythelawyerorinastatementinopencourt,mayproperlybemadeonlywhenthelawyerknowstheassertionistrueorbelievesittobetrueonthebasisofareasonablydiligentinquiry.Therearecircumstanceswherefailuretomakeadisclosureistheequivalentofanaffirmativemisrepresentation.Whetherdisclosureisneces-saryshallbeconsideredinlightofalloftherelevantcircumstances.TheobligationprescribedinRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representationnottocounselaclienttocommitorassisttheclientincommittingafraudappliesinlitigation.RegardingcompliancewithRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation,seetheCommenttothatRule.SeealsotheCommenttoRule 8.4(b): Misconduct.

Misleading Legal Argument

[3]Legalargumentbasedonaknowinglyfalserepresentationoflawconstitutesdishonestytowardthetribunal.Alawyerisnotrequiredtomakeadisinterestedexpositionofthelaw,butmustrecognizetheexistenceofpertinentlegalauthorities.Furthermore,asstatedinparagraph(a)(3),anadvocatehasadutytodisclosedirectlyadverseauthorityinthecontrollingjurisdictionwhichhasnotbeendisclosedbytheopposingparty.Theunderlyingconceptisthatlegalargumentisadiscussionseekingtodeterminethelegalpremisesproperlyapplicabletothecase.

False Evidence

[4]Whenevidencethatalawyerknowstobefalseisprovidedbyapersonwhoisnottheclient,thelawyermustrefusetoofferitregard-lessoftheclient’swishes.

[5]Whenfalseevidenceisofferedbytheclient,however,acon-flictmayarisebetweenthelawyer’sdutytokeeptheclient’srevelationsconfidentialandthedutyofcandortothecourt.Uponascertainingthatmaterialevidenceisfalse,thelawyershouldseektopersuadetheclientthattheevidenceshouldnotbeofferedor,ifithasbeenoffered,thatitsfalsecharactershouldimmediatelybedisclosed.Ifthepersuasionisineffective,thelawyermusttakereasonableremedialmeasures.

[6]Exceptinthedefenseofacriminalaccused,therulegenerallyrecognizedisthat,ifnecessarytorectifythesituation,anadvocatemustdisclosetheexistenceoftheclient’sdeceptiontothecourtortotheotherparty.Suchadisclosurecanresultingraveconsequencestotheclient,includingnotonlyasenseofbetrayalbutalsolossofthecaseandperhapsaprosecutionforperjury.Butthealternativeisthatthelawyercooperateindeceivingthecourt,therebysubvertingthetruth-findingprocesswhichtheadversarysystemisdesignedtoimplement.SeeRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation.Furthermore,unlessitisclearlyunder-stoodthatthelawyerwillactuponthedutytodisclosetheexistenceoffalseevidence,theclientcansimplyrejectthelawyer’sadvicetorevealthefalseevidenceandinsistthatthelawyerkeepsilent.

Perjury by a Criminal Defendant

[7]Whetheranadvocateforacriminallyaccusedhasthesamedutyofdisclosurehasbeenintenselydebated.Whileitisagreedthatthelawyershouldseektopersuadetheclienttorefrainfromperjurioustestimony,therehasbeendisputeconcerningthelawyer’sdutywhenthatpersuasionfails.Iftheconfrontationwiththeclientoccursbeforetrial,thelawyerordinarilycanwithdraw.Withdrawalbeforetrialmaynotbepossible,however,eitherbecausetrialisimminent,orbecausetheconfrontationwiththeclientdoesnottakeplaceuntilthetrialitself,orbecausenoothercounselisavailable.

[8]Themostdifficultsituation,therefore,arisesinacriminalcasewheretheaccusedinsistsontestifyingwhenthelawyerknowsthatthetestimonyisperjurious.Thelawyer’sefforttorectifythesitu-ationcanincreasethelikelihoodoftheclient’sbeingconvictedaswellasopeningthepossibilityofaprosecutionforperjury.Ontheotherhand,ifthelawyerdoesnotexercisecontrolovertheproof,thelawyerparticipates,althoughinamerelypassiveway,indeceptionofthecourt.

[9]Threeresolutionsofthisdilemmahavebeenproposed.Oneistopermittheaccusedtotestifybyanarrativewithoutguidancethroughthelawyer’squestioning.Thiscompromisesbothcontendingprinciples;itexemptsthelawyerfromthedutytodisclosefalseevidencebutsubjectstheclienttoanimplicitdisclosureofinformationimpartedtocounsel.Anothersuggestedresolution,ofrelativelyrecentorigin,isthattheadvocatebeentirelyexcusedfromthedutytorevealperjuryifthe

perjuryisthatoftheclient.Thisisacoherentsolutionbutmakestheadvocateaknowinginstrumentofperjury.

[10]Theotherresolutionofthedilemmaisthatthelawyermustrevealtheclient’sperjuryifnecessarytorectifythesituation.Acriminalaccusedhasarighttotheassistanceofanadvocate,arighttotestifyandarightofconfidentialcommunicationwithcounsel.However,anaccusedshouldnothavearighttoassistanceofcounselincommit-tingperjury.Furthermore,anadvocatehasanobligation,notonlyinprofessionalethicsbutunderthelawaswell,toavoidimplicationinthecommissionofperjuryorotherfalsificationofevidence.SeeRule 1.2(d): Scope of Representation.

Remedial Measures

[11]Ifperjuredtestimonyorfalseevidencehasbeenoffered,theadvocate’spropercourseordinarilyistoremonstratewiththeclientconfidentially.Ifthatfails,theadvocateshouldseektowithdrawifthatwillremedythesituation.Ifwithdrawalwillnotremedythesituationorisimpossible,theadvocateshouldmakedisclosuretothecourt.Itisforthecourtthentodeterminewhatshouldbedone-makingastate-mentaboutthemattertothetrieroffact,orderingamistrialorperhapsnothing.Ifthefalsetestimonywasthatoftheclient,theclientmaycontrovertthelawyer’sversionoftheircommunicationwhenthelawyerdisclosesthesituationtothecourt.Ifthereisanissuewhethertheclienthascommittedperjury,thelawyercannotrepresenttheclientinresolu-tionoftheissue,andamistrialmaybeunavoidable.Anunscrupulousclientmightinthiswayattempttoproduceaseriesofmistrialsandthusescapeprosecution.However,asecondsuchencountercouldbecon-struedasadeliberateabuseoftherighttocounselandassuchawaiveroftherighttofurtherrepresentation.

Constitutional Requirements

[12]Thegeneralrule-thatanadvocatemustdisclosetheexistenceofperjurywithrespecttoamaterialfact,eventhatofacli-ent-appliestodefensecounselincriminalcases,aswellasinotherinstances.However,thedefinitionofthelawyer’sethicaldutyinsuchasituationmaybequalifiedbyconstitutionalprovisionsfordueprocessandtherighttocounselincriminalcases.Insomejurisdic-tionstheseprovisionshavebeenconstruedtorequirethatcounselpresentanaccusedasawitnessiftheaccusedwishestotestify,evenifcounselknowsthetestimonywillbefalse.TheobligationoftheadvocateundertheseRulesissubordinatetosuchaconstitutionalrequirement.

Duration of Obligation

[13]Apracticaltimelimitontheobligationtorectifythepresentationoffalseevidencehastobeestablished.Theconclusionoftheproceedingisareasonablydefinitepointfortheterminationoftheobligation.

Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False

[14]Generallyspeaking,alawyerhasauthoritytorefusetooffertestimonyorotherproofthatthelawyerbelievesisuntrustworthy.Offeringsuchproofmayreflectadverselyonthelawyer’sabilitytodiscriminateinthequalityofevidenceandthusimpairthelawyer’seffectivenessasanadvocate.Incriminalcases,however,alawyermay,insomejurisdictions,bedeniedthisauthoritybyconstitutionalrequire-mentsgoverningtherighttocounsel.

Ex Parte Proceedings

[15]Ordinarily,anadvocatehasthelimitedresponsibilityofpresentingonesideofthemattersthatatribunalshouldconsiderinreachingadecision;theconflictingpositionisexpectedtobepresentedbytheopposingparty.However,inanyex parteproceeding,suchasanapplicationforatemporaryrestrainingorder,thereisnobalanceofpresentationbyopposingadvocates.Theobjectofanex parteproceed-ingisneverthelesstoyieldasubstantiallyjustresult.Thejudgehasanaffirmativeresponsibilitytoaccordtheabsentpartyjustconsideration.Thelawyerfortherepresentedpartyhasthecorrelativedutytomakedisclosuresofmaterialfactsknowntothelawyerandthatthelawyerreasonablybelievesarenecessarytoaninformeddecision.

RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

(b)(1) falsify evidence;


(2) counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely;(3) pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of

compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:

(i) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying;

(ii) reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying;

(iii) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;

(c) Reserved.;(d) Reserved.;(e) Reserved.;(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from

voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or

(2) the information is subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client; and

(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information and the request is not otherwise prohibited by law;

(g) use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or

(h) present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.


Comment

[1]Theprocedureoftheadversarysystemcontemplatesthattheevidenceinacaseistobemarshaledcompetitivelybythecontendingparties.Faircompetitionintheadversarysystemissecuredbypro-hibitionsagainstdestructionorconcealmentofevidence,improperlyinfluencingwitnesses,obstructivetacticsindiscoveryprocedure,andthelike.

[2]Documentsandotheritemsofevidenceareoftenessentialtoestablishaclaimordefense.Subjecttoevidentiaryprivileges,therightofanopposingparty,includingthegovernment,toobtainevidencethroughdiscoveryorsubpoenaisanimportantproceduralright.Theexerciseofthatrightcanbefrustratedifrelevantmaterialisaltered,concealedordestroyed.Applicablelawinmanyjurisdictionsmakesitanoffensetodestroymaterialforpurposeofimpairingitsavailabilityinapendingproceedingoronewhosecommencementcanbeforeseen.Falsifyingevidenceisalsogenerallyacriminaloffense.Paragraph(a)appliestoevi-dentiarymaterialgenerally,includingcomputerizedinformation.

[3]Reserved.

[4]Paragraph(f)permitsalawyertoadviseemployeesofaclienttorefrainfromgivinginformationtoanotherparty,fortheemployeesmayidentifytheirinterestswiththoseoftheclient.SeealsoRule 4.2: Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel.

[5]Astoparagraph(g),theresponsibilitytoaclientrequiresalawyertosubordinatetheinterestsofotherstothoseoftheclient,butthatresponsibilitydoesnotimplythatalawyermaydisregardtherightsoftheopposingpartyorcounsel.Itisimpracticaltocata-logueallsuchrights,buttheyincludelegalrestrictionsonmethodsofobtainingevidence.

RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer rep-resents a client in the matter:

(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;

(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law; or

(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. The maximum penalty for a violation of part (a) of this Rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of part (b) or part (c) of this Rule is a public reprimand. Comment

[1]Manyformsofimproperinfluenceuponthetribunalareproscribedbycriminallaw.Allofthosearespecifiedinthe Georgia

Code of Judicial Conductwithwhichanadvocateshouldbefamiliar.AttentionisalsodirectedtoRule 8.4: Misconduct,whichgovernsotherinstancesofimproperconductbyalawyer/candidate.

[2]Ifwearetomaintaintheintegrityofthejudicialprocess,itisimperativethatanadvocate’sfunctionbelimitedtothepresentationofevidenceandargument,toallowacausetobedecidedaccordingtolaw.Theexertionofimproperinfluenceisdetrimentaltothatprocess.Regardlessofanadvocate’sinnocentintention,actionswhichgivetheappearanceoftamperingwithjudicialimpartialityaretobeavoided.TheactivityproscribedbythisRuleshouldbeobservedbytheadvocateinsuchacarefulmannerthattherebenoappearanceofimpropriety. [3A]TheRulewithrespecttoex partecommunicationslimitsdirectcommunicationsexceptasmaybepermittedbylaw.Thus,courtrulesorcaselawmustbereferredtoinordertodeterminewhethercer-tainex partecommunicationsarelegitimate.Ex partecommunicationsmaybepermittedbystatutoryauthorization.

[3B]Alawyerwhoobtainsajudge’ssignatureonadecreeintheabsenceoftheopposinglawyerwherecertainaspectsofthedecreearestillindispute,mayhaveviolatedRule 3.5: Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunalregardlessofthelawyer’sgoodintentionsorgoodfaith.

[4]Alawyermaycommunicateastothemeritsofthecausewithajudgeinthecourseofofficialproceedingsinthecase,inwritingifthelawyersimultaneouslydeliversacopyofthewritingtoopposingcoun-selortotheadversepartyifthepartyisnotrepresentedbyalawyer,ororallyuponadequatenoticetoopposingcounselortotheadversepartyifthepartyisnotrepresentedbyalawyer.

[5]IfthelawyerknowinglyinstigatesorcausesanothertoinstigateacommunicationproscribedbyRule 3.5: Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal,aviolationmayoccur.

[6]Directorindirectcommunicationwithajurorduringthetrialisclearlyprohibited.AlawyermaynotavoidtheproscriptionofRule 3.5: Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunalbyusingagentstocommu-nicateimproperlywithjurors.Alawyermaybeheldresponsibleifthelawyerwasawareoftheclient’sdesiretoestablishcontactwithjurorsandassistedtheclientindoingso.

[7]Reserved.

[8]Whilealawyermaystandfirmagainstabusebyajudge,thelawyer’sactionsshouldavoidreciprocation.Fairnessandimpartialityofthetrialprocessisstrengthenedbythelawyer’sprotectionoftherecordforsubsequentreviewandthispreservestheprofessionalintegrityofthelegalprofessionbypatientfirmness.

RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in

the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

(b) Reserved.(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a

statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).


Comment

[1]Itisdifficulttostrikeabalancebetweenprotectingtherighttoafairtrialandsafeguardingtherightoffreeexpression.Preservingtherighttoafairtrialnecessarilyentailssomecurtailmentoftheinforma-tionthatmaybedisseminatedaboutapartypriortotrial,particularlywheretrialbyjuryisinvolved.Iftherewerenosuchlimits,theresultwouldbethepracticalnullificationoftheprotectiveeffectoftherulesofforensicdecorumandtheexclusionaryrulesofevidence.Ontheoth-erhand,therearevitalsocialinterestsservedbythefreedisseminationofinformationabouteventshavinglegalconsequencesandaboutlegal


proceedingsthemselves.Thepublichasarighttoknowaboutthreatstoitssafetyandmeasuresaimedatassuringitssecurity.Italsohasalegitimateinterestintheconductofjudicialproceedings,particularlyinmattersofgeneralpublicconcern.Furthermore,thesubjectmatteroflegalproceedingsisoftenofdirectsignificanceindebateanddelibera-tionoverquestionsofpublicpolicy.

[2]Specialrulesofconfidentialitymayvalidlygovernproceedingsinjuvenile,domesticrelationsandmentaldisabilityproceedings,andperhapsothertypesoflitigation.

[3]TheRulesetsforthabasicgeneralprohibitionagainstalawyer’smakingstatementsthatthelawyerknowsorshouldknowwillhaveasubstantiallikelihoodofmateriallyprejudicinganadju-dicativeproceeding.Recognizingthatthepublicvalueofinformedcommentaryisgreatandthelikelihoodofprejudicetoaproceedingbythecommentaryofalawyerwhoisnotinvolvedintheproceedingissmall,theruleappliesonlytolawyerswhoare,orwhohavebeeninvolvedintheinvestigationorlitigationofacase,andtheirassoci-ates.

[4]Reserved.

[5A]Thereare,ontheotherhand,certainsubjectswhicharemorelikelythannottohaveamaterialprejudicialeffectonaproceeding,particularlywhentheyrefertoacivilmattertriabletoajury,acriminalmatter,oranyotherproceedingthatcouldresultinincarceration.Thesesubjectsrelateto:

(a)thecharacter,credibility,reputationorcriminalrecordofaparty,suspectinacriminalinvestigationorwitness,ortheiden-tityofawitness,ortheexpectedtestimonyofapartyorwitness;

(b)inacriminalcaseorproceedingthatcouldresultinincar-ceration,thepossibilityofapleaofguiltytotheoffenseortheexistenceorcontentsofanyconfession,admission,orstatementgivenbyadefendantorsuspectorthatperson’srefusalorfailuretomakeastatement;

(c)theperformanceorresultsofanyexaminationortestortherefusalorfailureofapersontosubmittoanexaminationortest,ortheidentityornatureofphysicalevidenceexpectedtobepresented;

(d)anyopinionastotheguiltorinnocenceofadefendantorsuspectinacriminalcaseorproceedingthatcouldresultinincarceration;

(e)informationthatthelawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowislikelytobeinadmissibleasevidenceinatrialandthatwould,ifdisclosed,createasubstantialriskofprejudicinganimpartialtrial;or

(f)thefactthatadefendanthasbeenchargedwithacrime,unlessthereisincludedthereinastatementexplainingthatthechargeismerelyanaccusationandthatthedefendantispresumedinnocentuntilandunlessprovenguilty.

[5B]Inaddition,therearecertainsubjectswhicharemorelikelythannottohavenomaterialprejudicialeffectonaproceeding.Thus,alawyermayusuallystate:

(a)theclaim,offenseordefenseinvolvedand,exceptwhenprohibitedbylaw,theidentityofthepersonsinvolved;

(b)informationcontainedinapublicrecord;(c)thataninvestigationofamatterisinprogress;(d)theschedulingorresultofanystepinlitigation;(e)arequestforassistanceinobtainingevidenceandinfor-

mationnecessarythereto;(f)awarningofdangerconcerningthebehaviorofaperson

involved,whenthereisreasontobelievethatthereexiststhelike-lihoodofsubstantialharmtoanindividualortothepublicinterest;and

(g)inacriminalcase,inadditiontosubparagraphs(1)through(6):

(i)theidentity,residence,occupationandfamilystatusoftheaccused;

(ii)iftheaccusedhasnotbeenapprehended,informationnecessarytoaidinapprehensionofthatperson;

(iii)thefact,timeandplaceofarrest;and(iv)theidentityofinvestigatingandarrestingofficersor

agenciesandthelengthoftheinvestigation.

[6]Anotherrelevantfactorindeterminingprejudiceisthenatureoftheproceedinginvolved.Criminaljurytrialswillbemostsensitivetoextrajudicialspeech.Civiltrialsmaybelesssensitive.Non-juryhearingsandarbitrationproceedingsmaybeevenlessaffected.TheRulewillstillplacelimitationsonprejudicialcommentsinthesecases,butthelikeli-hoodofprejudicemaybedifferentdependingonthetypeofproceeding.

[7]Finally,extrajudicialstatementsthatmightotherwiseraiseaquestionunderthisRulemaybepermissiblewhentheyaremadeinresponsetostatementsmadepubliclybyanotherparty,anotherparty’slawyer,orthirdpersons,whereareasonablelawyerwouldbelieveapublicresponseisrequiredinordertoavoidprejudicetothelawyer’sclient.Whenprejudicialstatementshavebeenpubliclymadebyothers,responsivestatementsmayhavethesalutaryeffectoflesseninganyresultingadverseimpactontheadjudicativeproceed-ing.Suchresponsivestatementsshouldbelimitedtocontainonlysuchinformationasisnecessarytomitigateundueprejudicecreatedbythestatementsmadebyothers.

RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which

the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of

legal services rendered in the case; or(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substan-

tial hardship on the client.(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which

another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.


Comment

[1]Combiningtherolesofadvocateandwitnesscanprejudicetheopposingpartyandcaninvolveaconflictofinterestbetweenthelawyerandclient.

[2]Theopposingpartyhasproperobjectionwherethecombina-tionofrolesmayprejudicethatparty’srightsinthelitigation.Awitnessisrequiredtotestifyonthebasisofpersonalknowledge,whileanadvo-cateisexpectedtoexplainandcommentonevidencegivenbyothers.Itmaynotbeclearwhetherastatementbyanadvocate-witnessshouldbetakenasprooforasananalysisoftheproof.

[3]Paragraph(a)(1)recognizesthatifthetestimonywillbeuncon-tested,theambiguitiesinthedualrolearepurelytheoretical.Paragraph(a)(2)recognizesthatwherethetestimonyconcernstheextentandvalueoflegalservicesrenderedintheactioninwhichthetestimonyisoffered,permittingthelawyerstotestifyavoidstheneedforasecondtrialwithnewcounseltoresolvethatissue.Moreover,insuchasituationthejudgehasfirsthandknowledgeofthematterinissue;hence,thereislessdepen-denceontheadversaryprocesstotestthecredibilityofthetestimony.

[4]Apartfromthesetwoexceptions,paragraph(a)(3)recognizesthatabalancingisrequiredbetweentheinterestsoftheclientandthoseoftheopposingparty.Whethertheopposingpartyislikelytosufferprejudicedependsonthenatureofthecase,theimportanceandproba-bletenorofthelawyer’stestimony,andtheprobabilitythatthelawyer’stestimonywillconflictwiththatofotherwitnesses.Evenifthereisriskofsuchprejudice,indeterminingwhetherthelawyershouldbedisquali-fied,dueregardmustbegiventotheeffectofdisqualificationonthelawyer’sclient.Itisrelevantthatoneorbothpartiescouldreasonablyforeseethatthelawyerwouldprobablybeawitness.TheprincipleofimputeddisqualificationstatedinRule 1.10: Imputed Disqualificationhasnoapplicationtothisaspectoftheproblem.

[5]Whetherthecombinationofrolesinvolvesanimpropercon-flictofinterestwithrespecttotheclientisdeterminedbyRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest:GeneralRuleorRule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client.Forexample,ifthereislikelytobesubstantialconflictbetweenthetestimonyoftheclientandthatofthelawyeroramemberofthelawyer’sfirm,therepresentationisimproper.Theproblemcanarisewhetherthelawyeriscalledasawitnessonbehalfoftheclientoriscalledbytheopposingparty.Determiningwhetherornotsuchaconflictexistsisprimarilytheresponsibilityofthelawyerinvolved.SeeCommenttoRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest.Ifalawyerwhoisamemberofafirmmaynotactasbothadvocateandwitnessbyreasonofconflictofinterest,Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualificationdisqualifiesthefirmalso.

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

(b) refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;

(c) Reserved.


(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;

(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohib-ited from making under subsection (g) of this Rule;

(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other crimi-nal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:

(1) the information sought is not protected from disclo-sure by any applicable privilege;

(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and

(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and

(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likeli-hood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.


Comment

[1]Aprosecutorhastheresponsibilityofaministerofjusticeandnotsimplythatofanadvocate.Thisresponsibilitycarrieswithitspecificobligationstoseethatthedefendantisaccordedproceduraljusticeandthatguiltisdecideduponthebasisofsufficientevidence.Preciselyhowfartheprosecutorisrequiredtogointhisdirectionisamatterofdebateandvariesindifferentjurisdictions.Manyjurisdic-tionshaveadoptedtheABAStandardsofCriminalJusticeRelatingtotheProsecutionFunction,whichinturnaretheproductofprolongedandcarefuldeliberationbylawyersexperiencedinbothcriminalprosecutionanddefense.Applicablelawmayrequireothermeasuresbytheprosecutorandknowingdisregardofthoseobligationsorasys-tematicabuseofprosecutorialdiscretioncouldconstituteaviolationofRule 8.4: Misconduct.

[2]Reserved.

[3]Reserved.

[4]Paragraph(f)isintendedtolimittheissuanceoflawyersubpoenasingrandjuryandothercriminalproceedingstothosesituationsinwhichthereisagenuineneedtointrudeintotheclient-lawyerrelationship.

[5]Paragraph(g)supplementsRule 3.6: Trial Publicity,whichprohibitsextrajudicialstatementsthathaveasubstantiallikelihoodofprejudicinganadjudicatoryproceeding.Inthecontextofacrimi-nalprosecution,aprosecutor’sextrajudicialstatementcancreatetheadditionalproblemofincreasingpubliccondemnationoftheaccused.Althoughtheannouncementofanindictment,forexample,willneces-sarilyhavesevereconsequencesfortheaccused,aprosecutorcan,andshould,avoidcommentswhichhavenolegitimatelawenforcementpur-poseandhaveasubstantiallikelihoodofincreasingpublicopprobriumoftheaccused.NothinginthisCommentisintendedtorestrictthestate-mentswhichaprosecutormaymakewhichcomplywithRule 3.6(b)or3.6(c): Trial Publicity.

RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administra-tive tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1]Inrepresentationbeforebodiessuchaslegislatures,municipalcouncils,andexecutiveandadministrativeagenciesactinginarulemakingorpolicymakingcapacity,lawyerspresentfacts,formulateissuesandadvanceargumentinthemattersunderconsideration.Thedecisionmakingbody,likeacourt,shouldbeabletorelyontheintegri-tyofthesubmissionsmadetoit.Alawyerappearingbeforesuchabodyshoulddealwiththetribunalhonestlyandinconformitywithapplicablerulesofprocedures.

[2]Lawyershavenoexclusiverighttoappearbeforenonadjudica-tivebodies,astheydobeforeacourt.TherequirementsofthisRulethereforemaysubjectlawyerstoregulationsinapplicabletoadvocateswhoarenotlawyers.However,legislaturesandadministrativeagencieshavearighttoexpectlawyerstodealwiththemastheydealwithcourts.

[3]ThisRuledoesnotapplytorepresentationofaclientinanegotiationorotherbilateraltransactionwithagovernmentalentity;rep-resentationinsuchatransactionisgovernedbyRules4.1through4.4.

PART FOUR TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not know-ingly:

(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or

(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-lent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.


Comment

Misrepresentation

[1]Alawyerisrequiredtobetruthfulwhendealingwithothersonaclient’sbehalf,butgenerallyhasnoaffirmativedutytoinformanoppos-ingpartyofrelevantfacts.Amisrepresentationcanoccurifthelawyerincorporatesoraffirmsastatementofanotherpersonthatthelawyerknowsisfalse.Misrepresentationscanalsooccurbyfailuretoact.

Statements of Fact

[2]ThisRulereferstostatementsoffact.Whetheraparticularstatementshouldberegardedasoneoffactcandependonthecircum-stances.Undergenerallyacceptedconventionsinnegotiation,certaintypesofstatementsordinarilyarenottakenasstatementsofmaterialfact.Commentswhichfallunderthegeneralcategoryof“puffing”donotviolatethisrule.Estimatesofpriceorvalueplacedonthesubjectofatransactionandaparty’sintentionsastoanacceptablesettlementofaclaimareinthiscategory,andsoistheexistenceofanundis-closedprincipalexceptwherenondisclosureoftheprincipalwouldconstitutefraud.Fraud by Client

[3]Paragraph(b)recognizesthatsubstantivelawmayrequirealawyertodisclosecertaininformationtoavoidbeingdeemedtohaveassistedtheclient’scrimeorfraud.Therequirementofdisclosurecre-atedbythisparagraphis,however,subjecttotheobligationscreatedbyRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.

RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

(a) A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by constitutional law or statute.

(b) Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.


Comment

[1]ThisRuledoesnotprohibitcommunicationwitharepresentedperson,oranemployeeoragentofsuchaperson,concerningmattersoutsidetherepresentation.Forexample,theexistenceofacontroversybetweenagovernmententityandaprivateparty,orbetweentwoorganizations,doesnotprohibitalawyerforeitherfromcommunicat-ingwithnonlawyerrepresentativesoftheotherregardingaseparatematter.Also,partiestoamattermaycommunicatedirectlywitheachotherandalawyerhavingindependentjustificationorlegalauthoriza-tionforcommunicatingwitharepresentedpersonispermittedtodoso.Communicationsauthorizedbylawinclude,forexample,therightofapartytoacontroversywithagovernmententitytospeakwithgovern-mentofficialsaboutthematter.


[2]Communicationsauthorizedbylawalsoincludeconstitu-tionallypermissibleinvestigativeactivitiesoflawyersrepresentinggovernmentalentities,directlyorthroughinvestigativeagents,priortothecommencementofcriminalorcivilenforcementproceedings,whenthereisapplicablejudicialprecedentthateitherhasfoundtheactivitypermissibleunderthisRuleorhasfoundthisRuleinapplicable.However,theRuleimposesethicalrestrictionsthatgobeyondthoseimposedbyconstitutionalprovisions.

[3]ThisRuleappliestocommunicationswithanyperson,whetherornotapartytoaformaladjudicativeproceeding,contractornegotia-tion,whoisrepresentedbycounselconcerningthemattertowhichthecommunicationrelates.

[4A]Inthecaseofanorganization,thisRuleprohibitscommuni-cationsbyalawyerforanotherpersonorentityconcerningthematterinrepresentationwithpersonshavingamanagerialresponsibilityonbehalfoftheorganization,andwithanyotherpersonwhoseactoromissioninconnectionwiththatmattermaybeimputedtotheorganizationforpurposesofcivilorcriminalliabilityorwhosestatementmayconstituteanadmissiononthepartoftheorganization.Ifanagentoremployeeoftheorganizationisrepresentedinthematterbyhisorherowncounsel,theconsentbythatcounseltoacommunicationwillbesufficientforpurposesofthisRule.CompareRule 3.4(f): Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel.

[4B]InadministeringthisRuleitshouldbeanticipatedthatinmanyinstances,priortothebeginningoftheinterview,theinterviewinglawyerwillnotpossesssufficientinformationtodeterminewhetherornottherelationshipoftheintervieweetotheentityissufficientlyclosetoplacethepersoninthe“represented”category.Inthosesituationsthegoodfaithofthelawyerinundertakingtheinterviewshouldbeconsidered.Evidenceofgoodfaithincludesanimmediateandcandidstatementoftheinterestofthepersononwhosebehalftheinterviewisbeingtaken,afullexplanationofwhythatperson’spositionisadversetotheinterestsoftheentitywithwhichtheintervieweeisassociated,theexplorationoftherelationshipissueattheoutsetoftheinterviewandthecessationoftheinterviewimmediatelyupondeterminationthattheinterviewisimproper.

[5]Theprohibitiononcommunicationswitharepresentedpersononlyapplies,however,incircumstanceswherethelawyerknowsthatthepersonisinfactrepresentedinthemattertobediscussed.Thismeansthatthelawyerhasactualknowledgeofthefactoftherepresenta-tion;butsuchactualknowledgemaybeinferredfromthecircumstances.SeeTerminology.Suchaninferencemayariseincircumstanceswherethereissubstantialreasontobelievethatthepersonwithwhomcommu-nicationissoughtisrepresentedinthemattertobediscussed.Thus,alawyercannotevadetherequirementofobtainingtheconsentofcounselbyignoringtheobvious.

[6]Intheeventthepersonwithwhomthelawyercommunicatesisnotknowntoberepresentedbycounselinthematter,thelawyer’scommunicationsaresubjecttoRule 4.3: Dealing with Unrepresented Person.

[7]Theanti-contactruleservesimportantpublicinterestswhichpreservetheproperfunctioningofthejudicialsystemandtheadmin-istrationofjusticebya)protectingagainstmisuseoftheimbalanceoflegalskillbetweenalawyerandlayperson;b)safe-guardingtheclient-attorneyrelationshipfrominterferencebyadversecounsel;c)ensuringthatallvalidclaimsanddefensesareraisedinresponsetoinquiryfromadversecounsel;d)reducingthelikelihoodthatclientswilldiscloseprivilegedorotherinformationthatmightharmtheirinterests;ande)maintainingthelawyersabilitytomonitorthecaseandeffectivelyrep-resenttheclient.

[8]ThisRuleisnotintendedtoaffectcommunicationsbetweenpartiestoanactionenteredintoindependentofandnotattherequestordirectionofcounsel.

RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not repre-sented by counsel, a lawyer shall not:

(a) state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepre-sented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misun-derstanding;

(b) give advice other than the advice to secure counsel; and(c) initiate any contact with a potentially adverse party in

a matter concerning personal injury or wrongful death or oth-erwise related to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the contact is addressed or a relative of that person,

unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the contact.


Comment

[1]Anunrepresentedperson,particularlyonenotexperiencedindealingwithlegalmatters,mightassumethatalawyerisdisinterestedinloyaltiesorisadisinterestedauthorityonthelawevenwhenthelawyerrepresentsaclient.

[2]Insomecircumstancesalawyermustdealwithapersonwhoisunrepresented.Insuchaninstance,alawyershouldnotundertaketogiveadvicetothatperson,otherthantheadvicetoobtaincounsel.

RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1]Responsibilitytoaclientrequiresalawyertosubordinatetheinterestsofotherstothoseoftheclient,butthatresponsibilitydoesnotimplythatalawyermaydisregardtherightsofthirdpersons.Itisimpracticaltocatalogueallsuchrights,buttheyincludelegalrestric-tionsonmethodsofobtainingevidencefromthirdpersons.

PART FIVE LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER

(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reason-able assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s vio-lation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the partner or supervisory lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.


Comment

[1]Paragraphs(a)and(b)refertolawyerswhohavesupervisoryauthorityovertheprofessionalworkofafirmorlegaldepartmentofagovernmententity.Thisincludesmembersofapartnershipandtheshareholdersinalawfirmorganizedasaprofessionalcorporation;law-yershavingsupervisoryauthorityinthelawdepartmentofanenterpriseorgovernmententity;andlawyerswhohaveintermediatemanagerialresponsibilitiesinafirm.

[2]Themeasuresrequiredtofulfilltheresponsibilityprescribedinparagraphs(a)and(b)candependonthefirm’sstructureandthenatureofitspractice.Inasmallfirm,informalsupervisionandoccasionaladmonitionordinarilymightbesufficient.Inalargefirm,orinpracticesituationsinwhichintenselydifficultethicalproblemsfrequentlyarise,moreelaborateproceduresmaybenecessary.Somefirms,forexample,haveaprocedurewherebyjuniorlawyerscanmakeconfidentialrefer-ralofethicalproblemsdirectlytoadesignatedseniorpartnerorspecialcommittee.SeeRule 5.2: Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer.Firms,whetherlargeorsmall,mayalsorelyoncontinuinglegaleduca-tioninprofessionalethics.Inanyevent,theethicalatmosphereofafirmcaninfluencetheconductofallitsmembersandalawyerhavingauthorityovertheworkofanothermaynotassumethatthesubordinatelawyerwillinevitablyconformtotheRules.


[3]Paragraph(c)(1)expressesageneralprincipleofresponsibilityforactsofanother.SeealsoRule 8.4(a): Misconduct.

[4]Paragraph(c)(2)definesthedutyofalawyerhavingdirectsupervisoryauthorityoverperformanceofspecificlegalworkbyanoth-erlawyer.Whetheralawyerhassuchsupervisoryauthorityinparticularcircumstancesisaquestionoffact.Partnersofaprivatefirmhaveatleastindirectresponsibilityforallworkbeingdonebythefirm,whileapartnerinchargeofaparticularmatterordinarilyhasdirectauthorityoverotherfirmlawyersengagedinthematter.Appropriateremedialactionbyapartnerwoulddependontheimmediacyofthepartner’sinvolvementandtheseriousnessofthemisconduct.Thesupervisorisrequiredtointervenetopreventavoidableconsequencesofmisconductifthesupervisorknowsthatthemisconductoccurred.Thus,ifasuper-visinglawyerknowsthatasubordinatemisrepresentedamattertoanopposingpartyinnegotiation,thesupervisoraswellasthesubordinatehasadutytocorrecttheresultingmisapprehension.

[5]Professionalmisconductbyalawyerundersupervisioncouldrevealaviolationofparagraph(b)onthepartofthesupervisorylawyereventhoughitdoesnotentailaviolationofparagraph(c)becausetherewasnodirection,ratificationorknowledgeoftheviolation.

[6]ApartfromthisRuleandRule 8.4(a): Misconduct,alawyerdoesnothavedisciplinaryliabilityfortheconductofapartner,associateorsubordinate.Whetheralawyermaybeliablecivillyorcriminallyforanotherlawyer’sconductisaquestionoflawbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

RULE 5.2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER

(a) A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accor-dance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.


Comment

[1]Althoughalawyerisnotrelievedofresponsibilityforaviola-tionbythefactthatthelawyeractedatthedirectionofasupervisor,thatfactmayberelevantindeterminingwhetheralawyerhadtheknowl-edgerequiredtorenderconductaviolationoftheRules.Forexample,ifasubordinatefiledafrivolouspleadingatthedirectionofasupervisor,thesubordinatewouldnotbeguiltyofaprofessionalviolationunlessthesubordinateknewofthedocument’sfrivolouscharacter.

[2]Whenlawyersinasupervisor-subordinaterelationshipencounteramatterinvolvingprofessionaljudgmentastoethicalduty,thesupervisormayassumeresponsibilityformakingthejudgment.Otherwiseaconsistentcourseofactionorpositioncouldnotbetaken.Ifthequestioncanreasonablybeansweredonlyoneway,thedutyofbothlawyersisclearandtheyareequallyresponsibleforfulfillingit.However,ifthequestionisreasonablyarguable,someonehastodecideuponthecourseofaction.Thatauthorityordinarilyreposesinthesuper-visorandasubordinatemaybeguidedaccordingly.Forexample,ifaquestionariseswhethertheinterestsoftwoclientsconflictunderRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest,thesupervisor’sreasonableresolutionofthequestionshouldprotectthesubordinateprofessionallyiftheresolutionissubsequentlychallenged.

RULE 5.3 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or asso-ciated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reason-able assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obliga-tions of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority

over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

(d) a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been sus-pended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:

(1) represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status;

(2) have any contact with the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing; or

(3) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the office either in person, by telephone or in writing.


Comment

[1]Lawyersgenerallyemployassistantsintheirpractice,includ-ingsecretaries,investigators,lawstudentinterns,andparaprofessionals.Suchassistants,whetheremployeesorindependentcontractors,actforthelawyerinrenditionofthelawyer’sprofessionalservices.Alawyershouldgivesuchassistantsappropriateinstructionandsupervisionconcerningtheethicalaspectsoftheiremployment,particularlyregardingtheobliga-tionnottodiscloseinformationrelatingtorepresentationoftheclient,andshouldberesponsiblefortheirworkproduct.Themeasuresemployedinsupervisingnonlawyersshouldtakeaccountofthefactthattheydonothavelegaltrainingandarenotsubjecttoprofessionaldiscipline.

[2]Theprohibitionsofparagraph(d)applytoprofessionalconductandnottosocialconversationunrelatedtotherepresentationofclientsorlegaldealingsofthelawoffice,orthegatheringofgeneralinforma-tioninthecourseofworkinginalawoffice.Thethrustoftherestrictionistopreventtheunauthorizedpracticeoflawinalawofficebyapersonwhohasbeensuspendedordisbarred.

RULE 5.4 PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;

(2) a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursu-ant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and

(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and

(4) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensa-tion which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.

(5) a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calcu-lated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.

(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for anoth-er to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:

(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time dur-ing administration;

(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or

(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.



Comment

[1]TheprovisionsofthisRuleexpresstraditionallimitationsonsharingfees.Theselimitationsaretoprotectthelawyer’sprofessionalindependenceofjudgment.Wheresomeoneotherthantheclientpaysthelawyer’sfeeorsalary,orrecommendsemploymentofthelawyer,thatarrangementdoesnotmodifythelawyer’sobligationtotheclient.Asstatedinparagraph(c),sucharrangementsshouldnotinterferewiththelawyer’sprofessionaljudgment.

RULE 5.5 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that juris-diction, or assist another in doing so.

(b) A Domestic Lawyer shall not:(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law,

establish an office or other systematic and continuous pres-ence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or

(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

(c) A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspend-ed from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:

(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;

(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the Domestic Lawyer, or a person the Domestic Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or poten-tial arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice and are not servic-es for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice.

(d) A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspend-ed from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

(1) are provided to the Domestic Lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

(2) are services that the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.

(e) A Foreign Lawyer shall not, except as authorized by this Rule or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Such a Foreign Lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized prac-tice of law in this jurisdiction when on a temporary basis the Foreign Lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:

(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;

(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or poten-tial proceeding before a tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States if the Foreign Lawyer, or a person the Foreign Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or poten-tial arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceedings held or to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice;

(4) are not within paragraphs (2) or (3) and(i) are performed for a client who resides or has

an office in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authoriza-tion; or

(ii) arise out of or are reasonably related to a mat-ter that has a substantial connection to a jurisdiction in

which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or

(iii) are governed primarily by international law or the law of a non-United States jurisdiction.

(f) For purposes of this grant of authority, the Foreign Lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment.

Comment

[1]Alawyermaypracticelawonlyinajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisauthorizedtopractice.Alawyermaybeadmittedtopracticelawinajurisdictiononaregularbasisormaybeauthorizedbycourtruleororderorbylawtopracticeforalimitedpurposeoronarestrictedbasis.Paragraph(a)appliestounauthorizedpracticeoflawbyalawyer,whetherthroughthelawyer’sdirectactionorbythelawyerassistinganotherperson.

[2]Thedefinitionofthepracticeoflawisestablishedbylawandvariesfromonejurisdictiontoanother.Whateverthedefinition,limit-ingthepracticeoflawtomembersofthebarprotectsthepublicagainstrenditionoflegalservicesbyunqualifiedpersons.ThisRuledoesnotprohibitalawyerfromemployingtheservicesofparaprofessionalsanddelegatingfunctionstothem,solongasthelawyersupervisesthedelegatedworkandretainsresponsibilityfortheirwork.SeeRule 5.3; Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.

[3]Alawyermayprovideprofessionaladviceandinstructiontononlawyerswhoseemploymentrequiresknowledgeofthelaw;forexample,claimsadjusters,employeesoffinancialorcommercialinstitu-tions,socialworkers,accountantsandpersonsemployedingovernmentagencies.Lawyersalsomayassistindependentnonlawyers,suchasparaprofessionals,whoareauthorizedbythelawofajurisdictiontopro-videparticularlaw-relatedservices.Inaddition,alawyermaycounselnonlawyerswhowishtoproceedprose.

[4]OtherthanasauthorizedbylaworthisRule,aDomesticLawyerviolatesparagraph(b)andaForeignLawyerviolatesparagraph(e)iftheDomesticorForeignLawyerestablishesanofficeorothersystematicandcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionforthepracticeoflaw.PresencemaybesystematicandcontinuouseveniftheDomesticorForeignLawyerisnotphysicallypresenthere.SuchDomesticorForeignLawyermustnotholdouttothepublicorotherwiserepresentthattheDomesticorForeignLawyerisadmittedtopracticelawinthisjurisdiction.SeealsoRules7.1(a)and7.5(b).

[5]ThereareoccasionsinwhichaDomesticorForeignLawyer,whoisnotdisbarredorsuspendedfrompracticeinanyjurisdiction,mayprovidelegalservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionundercircumstancesthatdonotcreateanunreasonablerisktotheinterestsoftheirclients,thepublicorthecourts.Paragraph(c)identifiesfoursuchcircumstancesfortheDomesticLawyer.Paragraph(e)identifiesfivesuchcircumstancesfortheForeignLawyer.Thefactthatconductisnotsoidentifieddoesnotimplythattheconductisorisnotauthorized.Withtheexceptionofparagraphs(d)(1)and(d)(2),thisRuledoesnotauthorizeaDomesticLawyertoestablishanofficeorothersystematicandcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionwithoutbeingadmittedtopracticegenerallyhere.

[6]ThereisnosingletesttodeterminewhetheraForeignorDomesticLawyer’sservicesareprovidedona“temporarybasis”inthisjurisdiction,andmaythereforebepermissibleunderparagraph(c)orparagraph(e).Servicesmaybe“temporary”eventhoughtheForeignorDomesticLawyerprovidesservicesinthisjurisdictiononarecurringbasis,orforanextendedperiodoftime,aswhentheDomesticLawyerisrepresentingaclientinasinglelengthynegotiationorlitigation.

[7]Paragraphs(c)and(d)applytoDomesticLawyers.Paragraphs(e)and(f)applytoForeignLawyers.Paragraphs(c)and(e)contemplatethattheDomesticorForeignLawyerisauthorizedtopracticeinthejurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticorForeignLawyerisadmittedandexcludesaDomesticorForeignLawyerwhowhiletechnicallyadmit-tedisnotauthorizedtopractice,because,forexample,theDomesticorForeignLawyerisoninactivestatus.

[8]Paragraph(c)(1)recognizesthattheinterestsofclientsandthepublicareprotectedifaDomesticLawyerassociateswithalawyerlicensedtopracticeinthisjurisdiction.Paragraph(e)(1)recognizesthat


theinterestsofclientsandthepublicareprotectedifaForeignLawyerassociateswithalawyerlicensedtopracticeinthisjurisdiction.Fortheseparagraphstoapply,however,thelawyeradmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionmustactivelyparticipateinandshareresponsibilityfortherepresentationoftheclient.

[9]DomesticLawyersnotadmittedtopracticegenerallyinajurisdictionmaybeauthorizedbylawororderofatribunaloranadmin-istrativeagencytoappearbeforethetribunaloragency.Thisauthoritymaybegrantedpursuanttoformalrulesgoverningadmissionprohacviceorpursuanttoinformalpracticeofthetribunaloragency.Underparagraph(c)(2),aDomesticLawyerdoesnotviolatethisRulewhentheDomesticLawyerappearsbeforeatribunaloragencypursuanttosuchauthority.Totheextentthatacourtruleorotherlawofthisjuris-dictionrequiresaDomesticLawyertoobtainadmissionprohacvicebeforeappearingbeforeatribunaloradministrativeagency,thisRulerequirestheDomesticLawyertoobtainthatauthority.

[10]Paragraph(c)(2)alsoprovidesthataDomesticLawyerren-deringservicesinthisjurisdictiononatemporarybasisdoesnotviolatethisRulewhentheDomesticLawyerengagesinconductinanticipa-tionofaproceedingorhearinginajurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerisauthorizedtopracticelaworinwhichtheDomesticLawyerreasonablyexpectstobeadmittedprohacvice.Examplesofsuchconductincludemeetingswiththeclient,interviewsofpotentialwit-nesses,andthereviewofdocuments.Similarly,aDomesticLawyermayengageinconducttemporarilyinthisjurisdictioninconnectionwithpendinglitigationinanotherjurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerisorreasonablyexpectstobeauthorizedtoappear,includingtakingdepositionsinthisjurisdiction.

[11]WhenaDomesticLawyerhasbeenorreasonablyexpectstobeadmittedtoappearbeforeacourtoradministrativeagency,paragraph(c)(2)alsopermitsconductbylawyerswhoareassociatedwiththatlawyerinthematter,butwhodonotexpecttoappearbeforethecourtoradministrativeagency.Forexample,subordinateDomesticLawyersmayconductresearch,reviewdocuments,andattendmeetingswithwit-nessesinsupportoftheDomesticLawyerresponsibleforthelitigation.

[12]Paragraph(c)(3)permitsaDomesticLawyer,andParagraph(e)(3)permitsaForeignLawyer,toperformservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionifthoseservicesareinorreasonablyrelatedtoapendingorpotentialarbitration,mediation,orotheralternativedisputeresolutionproceedinginthisoranotherjurisdiction,iftheservicesariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtotheDomesticorForeignLawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticorForeignLawyerisadmittedtopractice.TheDomesticLawyer,however,mustobtainadmissionprohacviceinthecaseofacourt-annexedarbitrationormediationorotherwiseifcourtrulesorlawsorequire.

[13]Paragraph(c)(4)permitsaDomesticLawyertoprovidecertainlegalservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionthatariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtotheDomesticLawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerisadmittedbutarenotwithinparagraphs(c)(2)or(c)(3).Theseservicesincludebothlegalservicesandservicesthatnonlawyersmayperformbutthatareconsideredthepracticeoflawwhenperformedbylawyers.Paragraph(e)(4)(i)permitsaForeignLawyertoprovidecertainlegalservicesinthisjurisdictiononbehalfofaclientwhoresidesorhasanofficeinthejurisdictioninwhichtheForeignLawyerisauthorizedtopractice.Paragraph(e)(4)(ii)permitsaForeignLawyertoprovidecertainlegalservicesonatempo-rarybasisinthisjurisdictionthatariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtoamatterthathasasubstantialconnectiontothejurisdictioninwhichtheForeignLawyerisauthorizedtopractice.Theseservicesincludebothlegalservicesandservicesthatnonlawyersmayperformbutthatareconsideredthepracticeoflawwhenperformedbylawyers.

[14]Paragraphs(c)(3)and(c)(4)requirethattheservicesariseoutoforbereasonablyrelatedtotheDomesticLawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerisadmitted.Paragraphs(e)(3)and(e)(4)(ii)requirethattheservicesariseoutoforbereasonablyrelatedtotheForeignLawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichtheForeignLawyerisadmittedtopractice.Avarietyoffactorsevidencesucharelationship.TheDomesticorForeignLawyer’sclientmayhavebeenpreviouslyrepresentedbytheDomesticorForeignLawyer,ormayberesidentinorhavesubstantialcontactswiththejurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticorForeignLawyerisadmitted.Thematter,althoughinvolvingotherjurisdictions,mayhaveasignificantcon-nectionwiththatjurisdiction.Inothercases,significantaspectsoftheDomesticorForeignLawyer’sworkmightbeconductedinthatjuris-dictionorasignificantaspectofthemattermayinvolvethelawofthatjurisdiction.Thenecessaryrelationshipmightarisewhentheclient’sactivitiesorthelegalissuesinvolvemultiplejurisdictions,suchas

whentheofficersofamultinationalcorporationsurveypotentialbusi-nesssitesandseektheservicesoftheirDomesticorForeignLawyerinassessingtherelativemeritsofeach.Inaddition,theservicesmaydrawontheDomesticorForeignLawyer’srecognizedexpertisedevelopedthroughtheregularpracticeoflawonbehalfofclientsinmattersinvolvingaparticularbodyoffederal,nationally-uniform,for-eign,orinternationallaw.

[15]Paragraph(d)identifiestwocircumstancesinwhichaDomesticLawyer,whoisnotdisbarredorsuspendedfrompracticeinanyjurisdiction,mayestablishanofficeorothersystematicandcon-tinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionforthepracticeoflawaswellasprovidelegalservicesonatemporarybasis.Exceptasprovidedinpara-graphs(d)(1)and(d)(2),aDomesticLawyerwhoestablishesanofficeorothersystematicorcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionmustbecomeadmittedtopracticelawgenerallyinthisjurisdiction.

[16]Paragraph(d)(1)appliestoaDomesticLawyerwhoisemployedbyaclienttoprovidelegalservicestotheclientoritsorga-nizationalaffiliates,i.e.,entitiesthatcontrol,arecontrolledby,orareundercommoncontrolwiththeemployer.Thisparagraphdoesnotauthorizetheprovisionofpersonallegalservicestotheemployer’sofficersoremployees.Theparagraphappliestoin-housecorporatelaw-yers,governmentlawyersandotherswhoareemployedtorenderlegalservicestotheemployer.TheDomesticLawyer’sabilitytorepresenttheemployeroutsidethejurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerislicensedgenerallyservestheinterestsoftheemployeranddoesnotcre-ateanunreasonablerisktotheclientandothersbecausetheemployeriswellsituatedtoassesstheDomesticLawyer’squalificationsandthequalityoftheDomesticLawyer’swork.

[17]IfanemployedDomesticLawyerestablishesanofficeorothersystematicpresenceinthisjurisdictionforthepurposeofrender-inglegalservicestotheemployer,theDomesticLawyermaybesubjecttoregistrationorotherrequirements,includingassessmentsforclientprotectionfundsandmandatorycontinuinglegaleducation.

[18]Paragraph(d)(2)recognizesthataDomesticLawyermayprovidelegalservicesinajurisdictioninwhichtheDomesticLawyerisnotlicensedwhenauthorizedtodosobyfederalorotherlaw,whichincludesstatute,courtrule,executiveregulationorjudicialprecedent.Paragraph(e)(4)(iii)recognizesthataForeignLawyermayprovidelegalserviceswhentheservicesprovidedaregovernedbyinternationallaworthelawofaforeignjurisdiction.

[19]ADomesticorForeignLawyerwhopracticeslawinthisjurisdictionpursuanttoparagraphs(c),(d)or(e)orotherwiseissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdiction.SeeRule8.5(a).

[20]Insomecircumstances,aDomesticLawyerwhopracticeslawinthisjurisdictionpursuanttoparagraphs(c)or(d)mayhavetoinformtheclientthattheDomesticLawyerisnotlicensedtopracticelawinthisjurisdiction.Forexample,thatmayberequiredwhentherepresentationoccursprimarilyinthisjurisdictionandrequiresknowledgeofthelawofthisjurisdiction.SeeRule1.4.

[21]Paragraphs(c),(d)and(e)donotauthorizecommunicationsadvertisinglegalservicestoprospectiveclientsinthisjurisdictionbyDomesticorForeignLawyerswhoareadmittedtopracticeinotherjurisdictions.WhetherandhowDomesticorForeignLawyersmaycom-municatetheavailabilityoftheirservicestoprospectiveclientsinthisjurisdictionisgovernedbyRules7.1to7.5.

RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.


Comment

[1]Anagreementrestrictingtherightofpartnersorassociatestopracticeafterleavingafirmnotonlylimitstheirprofessionalautonomybutalsolimitsthefreedomofclientstochoosealawyer.Paragraph(a)prohibitssuchagreementsexceptforrestrictionsincidenttoprovisionsconcerningretirementbenefitsforservicewiththefirm.


[2]Paragraph(b)prohibitsalawyerfromagreeingnottorepresentotherpersonsinconnectionwithsettlingaclaimonbehalfofaclient.

[3]ThisRuledoesnotapplytoprohibitrestrictionsthatmaybeincludedinthetermsofthesaleofalawpracticepursuanttoRule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice.

RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW- RELATED SERVICES

(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:

(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or

(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer indi-vidually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-law-yer relationship do not exist.

(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.


Comment

[1]Whenalawyerperformslaw-relatedservicesorcontrolsanorganizationthatdoesso,thereexiststhepotentialforethicalproblems.Principalamongtheseisthepossibilitythatthepersonforwhomthelaw-relatedservicesareperformedfailstounderstandthattheservicesmaynotcarrywiththemtheprotectionsnormallyaffordedaspartoftheclient-lawyerrelationship.Therecipientofthelaw-relatedservicesmayexpect,forexample,thattheprotectionofclientconfidences,prohibi-tionsagainstrepresentationofpersonswithconflictinginterests,andobligationsofalawyertomaintainprofessionalindependenceapplytotheprovisionoflaw-relatedserviceswhenthatmaynotbethecase.

[2]Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Servicesappliestotheprovisionoflaw-relatedservicesbyalawyerevenwhenthelawyerdoesnotprovideanylegalservicestothepersonforwhomthelaw-relatedservicesareperformed.TheRuleidentifiesthecircum-stancesinwhichalloftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductapplytotheprovisionoflaw-relatedservices.Evenwhenthosecircumstancesdonotexist,however,theconductofalawyerinvolvedintheprovisionoflaw-relatedservicesissubjecttothoseRulesthatapplygenerallytolawyerconduct,regardlessofwhethertheconductinvolvestheprovi-sionoflegalservices.See,e.g.,Rule 8.4: Misconduct.

[3]Whenlaw-relatedservicesareprovidedbyalawyerundercircumstancesthataredistinctfromthelawyer’sprovisionoflegalservicestoclients,thelawyerinprovidingthelaw-relatedservicesneednotadheretotherequirementsoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductasprovidedinRule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services.

[4]Law-relatedservicesalsomaybeprovidedthroughanentitythatisdistinctfromthatthroughwhichthelawyerprovideslegalser-vices.Ifthelawyerindividuallyorwithothershascontrolofsuchanentity’soperations,theRulerequiresthelawyertotakereasonablemea-surestoassurethateachpersonusingtheservicesoftheentityknowsthattheservicesprovidedbytheentityarenotlegalservicesandthattheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductthatrelatetotheclient-lawyerrelationshipdonotapply.Alawyer’scontrolofanentityextendstotheabilitytodirectitsoperation.Whetheralawyerhassuchcontrolwilldependuponthecircumstancesoftheparticularcase.

[5]Whenaclient-lawyerrelationshipexistswithapersonwhoisreferredbyalawyertoaseparatelaw-relatedserviceentitycontrolledbythelawyer,individuallyorwithothers,thelawyermustcomplywithRule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest.

[6]Intakingthereasonablemeasuresreferredtoinparagraph(a)(2)toassurethatapersonusinglaw-relatedservicesunderstandsthepracticaleffectorsignificanceoftheinapplicabilityoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,thelawyershouldcommunicatetothepersonreceivingthelaw-relatedservices,inamannersufficienttoassurethatthepersonunderstandsthesignificanceofthefact,thatthe

relationshipofthepersontothebusinessentitywillnotbeaclient-lawyerrelationship.Thecommunicationshouldbemadebeforeenteringintoanagreementforprovisionoforprovidinglaw-relatedservices,andpreferablyshouldbeinwriting.

[7]Theburdenisuponthelawyertoshowthatthelawyerhastakenreasonablemeasuresunderthecircumstancestocommunicatethedesiredunderstanding.Forinstance,asophisticateduseroflaw-relatedservices,suchasapubliclyheldcorporation,mayrequirealesserexpla-nationthansomeoneunaccustomedtomakingdistinctionsbetweenlegalservicesandlaw-relatedservices,suchasanindividualseekingtaxadvicefromalawyer-accountantorinvestigativeservicesinconnectionwithalawsuit.

[8]Regardlessofthesophisticationofpotentialrecipientsoflaw-relatedservices,alawyershouldtakespecialcaretokeepseparatetheprovisionoflaw-relatedandlegalservicesinordertominimizetheriskthattherecipientwillassumethatthelaw-relatedservicesarelegalservices.Theriskofsuchconfusionisespeciallyacutewhenthelawyerrendersbothtypesofserviceswithrespecttothesamematter.Undersomecircumstancesthelegalandlaw-relatedservicesmaybesocloselyentwinedthattheycannotbedistinguishedfromeachother,andtherequirementofdisclosureandconsultationimposedbyparagraph(a)(2)oftheRulecannotbemet.Insuchacasealawyerwillberesponsibleforassuringthatboththelawyer’sconductand,totheextentrequiredbyRule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants,thatofnonlawyeremployeesinthedistinctentitywhichthelawyercontrolscompliesinallrespectswiththeGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.

[9]Abroadrangeofeconomicandotherinterestsofclientsmaybeservedbylawyers’engaginginthedeliveryoflaw-relatedservices.Examplesoflaw-relatedservicesincludeprovidingtitleinsurance,financialplanning,accounting,trustservices,realestatecounseling,legislativelobbying,economicanalysis,socialwork,psychologicalcounseling,taxpreparation,andpaten,medicalorenvironmentalcon-sulting.

[10]WhenalawyerisobligedtoaccordtherecipientsofsuchservicestheprotectionsofthoseRulesthatapplytotheclient-lawyerrelationship,thelawyermusttakespecialcaretoheedtheproscrip-tionsoftheRulesaddressingconflictofinterest(Rules1.7through1.11,especiallyRules1.7(b)and1.8(a),(b)and(f)),andtoscrupulouslyadheretotherequirementsofRule 1.6: Confidentiality of Informationrelatingtodisclosureofconfidentialinformation.Thepromotionofthelaw-relatedservicesmustalsoinallrespectscomplywithRules7.1through7.3,dealingwithadvertisingandsolicitation.Inthatregard,lawyersshouldtakespecialcaretoidentifytheobligationsthatmaybeimposedasaresultofajurisdiction’sdecisionallaw.

[11]WhenthefullprotectionsofalloftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductdonotapplytotheprovisionoflaw-relatedser-vices,principlesoflawexternaltotheRules,forexample,thelawofprincipalandagent,governthelegaldutiesowedtothosereceivingtheservices.Thoseotherlegalprinciplesmayestablishadifferentdegreeofprotectionfortherecipientwithrespecttoconfidentialityofinforma-tion,conflictsofinterestandpermissiblebusinessrelationshipswithclients.SeealsoRule 8.4: Misconduct.

PART SIX PUBLIC SERVICE

RULE 6.1 VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLICO SERVICE A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:

(a) provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:

(1) persons of limited means; or(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, govern-

mental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of lim-ited means; and

(b) provide any additional services through:(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substan-

tially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization’s economic resources or would be other-wise inappropriate;

(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or


(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.

In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. No reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amend-ments to these Rules. There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule.

Comment

[1]Everylawyer,regardlessofprofessionalprominenceorpro-fessionalworkload,hasaresponsibilitytoprovidelegalservicestothoseunabletopay,andpersonalinvolvementintheproblemsofthedisadvantagedcanbeoneofthemostrewardingexperiencesinthelifeofalawyer.TheAmericanBarAssociationurgesalllawyerstoprovideaminimumof50hoursofprobonoservicesannually.States,however,maydecidetochooseahigherorlowernumberofhoursofannualser-vice(whichmaybeexpressedasapercentageofalawyer’sprofessionaltime)dependinguponlocalneedsandlocalconditions.Itisrecognizedthatinsomeyearsalawyermayrendergreaterorfewerhoursthantheannualstandardspecified,butduringthecourseofhisorherlegalcareer,eachlawyershouldrenderonaverageperyear,thenumberofhourssetforthinthisRule.Servicescanbeperformedincivilmattersorincriminalorquasi-criminalmattersforwhichthereisnogovernmentobligationtoprovidefundsforlegalrepresentation,suchaspost-convic-tiondeathpenaltyappealcases.

[2]Paragraphs(a)(1)and(2)recognizethecriticalneedforlegalservicesthatexistsamongpersonsoflimitedmeansbyprovidingthatasubstantialmajorityofthelegalservicesrenderedannuallytothedisad-vantagedbefurnishedwithoutfeeorexpectationoffee.Legalservicesundertheseparagraphsconsistofafullrangeofactivities,includingindividualandclassrepresentation,theprovisionoflegaladvice,leg-islativelobbying,administrativerulemakingandtheprovisionoffreetrainingormentoringtothosewhorepresentpersonsoflimitedmeans.Thevarietyoftheseactivitiesshouldfacilitateparticipationbygovern-mentlawyers,evenwhenrestrictionsexistontheirengagingintheoutsidepracticeoflaw.

[3]Personseligibleforlegalservicesunderparagraphs(a)(1)and(2)arethosewhoqualifyforparticipationinprogramsfundedbytheLegalServicesCorporationandthosewhoseincomesandfinancialresourcesareslightlyabovetheguidelinesutilizedbysuchprogramsbutwhoneverthelesscannotaffordcounsel.Legalservicescanberenderedtoindividualsortoorganizationssuchashomelessshelters,batteredwomen’scentersandfoodpantriesthatservethoseoflimitedmeans.Theterm“governmentalorganizations”includes,butisnotlimitedto,publicprotectionprogramsandsectionsofgovernmentalorpublicsec-toragencies.

[4]Becauseservicemustbeprovidedwithoutfeeorexpectationoffee,theintentofthelawyertorenderfreelegalservicesisessentialfortheworkperformedtofallwithinthemeaningofparagraphs(a)(1)and(2).Accordingly,servicesrenderedcannotbeconsideredprobonoifananticipatedfeeisuncollected,buttheawardofstatutorylawyers’feesinacaseoriginallyacceptedasprobonowouldnotdisqualifysuchser-vicesfrominclusionunderthissection.Lawyerswhodoreceivefeesinsuchcasesareencouragedtocontributeanappropriateportionofsuchfeestoorganizationsorprojectsthatbenefitpersonsoflimitedmeans.

[5]Whileitispossibleforalawyertofulfilltheannualresponsibil-itytoperformprobonoservicesexclusivelythroughactivitiesdescribedinparagraphs(a)(1)and(2),totheextentthatanyhoursofserviceremainunfulfilled,theremainingcommitmentcanbemetinavarietyofwaysassetforthinparagraph(b).Constitutional,statutoryorregulatoryrestric-tionsmayprohibitorimpedegovernmentandpublicsectorlawyersandjudgesfromperformingtheprobonoservicesoutlinedinparagraphs(a)(1)and(2).Accordingly,wherethoserestrictionsapply,governmentandpublicsectorlawyersandjudgesmayfulfilltheirprobonoresponsibilitybyperformingservicesoutlinedinparagraph(b).

[6]Paragraph(b)(1)includestheprovisionofcertaintypesoflegalservicestothosewhoseincomesandfinancialresourcesplacethemabovelimitedmeans.Italsopermitstheprobonolawyertoacceptasubstantiallyreducedfeeforservices.ExamplesofthetypesofissuesthatmaybeaddressedunderthisparagraphincludeFirstAmendmentclaims,TitleVIIclaimsandenvironmentalprotectionclaims.

Additionally,awiderangeoforganizationsmayberepresented,includingsocialservice,medicalresearch,culturalandreligiousgroups.

[7]Paragraph(b)(2)coversinstancesinwhichlawyersagreetoandreceiveamodestfeeforfurnishinglegalservicestopersonsoflim-itedmeans.Participationinjudicareprogramsandacceptanceofcourtappointmentsinwhichthefeeissubstantiallybelowalawyer’susualrateareencouragedunderthissection.

[8]Paragraph(b)(3)recognizesthevalueoflawyersengaginginactivitiesthatimprovethelaw,thelegalsystemorthelegalprofession.Servingonbarassociationcommittees,servingonboardsofprobonoorlegalservicesprograms,takingpartinLawDayactivities,actingasacontinuinglegaleducationinstructor,amediatororanarbitratorandengaginginlegislativelobbyingtoimprovethelaw,thelegalsystemortheprofessionareafewexamplesofthemanyactivitiesthatfallwithinthisparagraph.

[9]Becausetheprovisionofprobonoservicesisaprofessionalresponsibility,itistheindividualethicalcommitmentofeachlawyer.Nevertheless,theremaybetimeswhenitisnotfeasibleforalawyertoengageinprobonoservices.Atsuchtimesalawyermaydischargetheprobonoresponsibilitybyprovidingfinancialsupporttoorganizationsprovidingfreelegalservicestopersonsoflimitedmeans.Suchfinancialsupportshouldbereasonablyequivalenttothevalueofthehoursofservicethatwouldhaveotherwisebeenprovided.Inaddition,attimesitmaybemorefeasibletosatisfytheprobonoresponsibilitycollectively,asbyafirm’saggregateprobonoactivities.

[10]Becausetheeffortsofindividuallawyersarenotenoughtomeettheneedforfreelegalservicesthatexistsamongpersonsoflimitedmeans,thegovernmentandtheprofessionhaveinstitutedadditionalprogramstoprovidethoseservices.Everylawyershouldfinanciallysupportsuchprograms,inadditiontoeitherprovidingdirectprobonoservicesormakingfinancialcontributionswhenprobonoserviceisnotfeasible.

[11]TheresponsibilitysetforthinthisRuleisnotintendedtobeenforcedthroughdisciplinaryprocess.

RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS For good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person. There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule.

Comment

[1]Alawyerordinarilyisnotobligedtoacceptaclientwhosecharacterorcausethelawyerregardsasrepugnant.Thelawyer’sfreedomtoselectclientsis,however,qualified.Alllawyershavearesponsibilitytoassistinprovidingprobonopublicoservice.SeeRule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service.Anindividuallawyerfulfillsthisresponsibilitybyacceptingafairshareofunpopularmattersorindi-gentorunpopularclients.Alawyermayalsobesubjecttoappointmentbyacourttoserveunpopularclientsorpersonsunabletoaffordlegalservices.

Appointed Counsel

[2]Forgoodcausealawyermayseektodeclineanappointmenttorepresentapersonwhocannotaffordtoretaincounselorwhosecauseisunpopular.Goodcauseexistsifthelawyercouldnothandlethemattercompetently,seeRule 1.1: Competence,orifundertakingtherepre-sentationwouldresultinanimproperconflictofinterest,forexample,whentheclientorthecauseissorepugnanttothelawyerastobelikelytoimpairtheclient-lawyerrelationshiporthelawyer’sabilitytorep-resenttheclient.Alawyermayalsoseektodeclineanappointmentifacceptancewouldbeunreasonablyburdensome,forexample,whenitwouldimposeafinancialsacrificesogreatastobeunjust.

[3]Anappointedlawyerhasthesameobligationstotheclientasretainedcounsel,includingtheobligationsofloyaltyandconfidentiality,andissubjecttothesamelimitationsontheclient-lawyerrelationship,suchastheobligationtorefrainfromassistingtheclientinviolationoftheRules.

[4]ThisRuleisnotintendedtobeenforcedthroughdisciplinaryprocess.

RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons hav-ing interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:


(a) if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer’s obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or

(b) where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organiza-tion whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule.

Comment

[1]Lawyersshouldbeencouragedtosupportandparticipateinlegalserviceorganizations.Alawyerwhoisanofficeroramemberofsuchanorganizationdoesnottherebyhaveaclient-lawyerrelationshipwithpersonsservedbytheorganization.However,thereispotentialconflictbetweentheinterestsofsuchpersonsandtheinterestsofthelawyer’sclients.Ifthepossibilityofsuchconflictdisqualifiedalawyerfromservingontheboardofalegalservicesorganization,theprofes-sion’sinvolvementinsuchorganizationswouldbeseverelycurtailed.

[2]Itmaybenecessaryinappropriatecasestoreassureaclientoftheorganizationthattherepresentationwillnotbeaffectedbyconflict-ingloyaltiesofamemberoftheboard.Established,writtenpoliciesinthisrespectcanenhancethecredibilityofsuchassurances.

RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer par-ticipates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule.

Comment

[1]Lawyersinvolvedinorganizationsseekinglawreformgener-allydonothaveaclient-lawyerrelationshipwiththeorganization.SeealsoRule 1.2(b): Scope of Representation.WithoutthisRule,itmightfollowthatalawyercouldnotbeinvolvedinabarassociationlawreformprogramthatmightindirectlyaffectaclient.Forexample,alaw-yerspecializinginantitrustlitigationmightberegardedasdisqualifiedfromparticipatingindraftingrevisionsofrulesgoverningthatsubject.Indeterminingthenatureandscopeofparticipationinsuchactivities,alawyershouldbemindfulofobligationstoclientsunderotherRules,particularlyRule 1.7: Conflict of Interest.Alawyerisprofessionallyobligatedtoprotecttheintegrityoftheprogrambymakinganappropri-atedisclosurewithintheorganizationwhenthelawyerknowsaprivateclientmightbemateriallybenefited.

PART SEVEN INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER’S SERVICES

(a) A lawyer may advertise through all forms of public media and through written communication not involving personal contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading if it:

(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

(2) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(3) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;

(4) fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or

(5) contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer:

“Contingent attorneys’ fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.”

(6) contains the language ‘no fee unless you win or collect’ or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer:

“No fee unless you win or collect” [or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases.

(b) A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.

(c) A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to ensure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer’s ser-vices comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.


Comment

[1]Thisrulegovernsthecontentofallcommunicationsaboutalawyer’sservices,includingthevarioustypesofadvertisingpermittedbyRules7.3through7.5.Whatevermeansareusedtomakeknownalawyer’sservices,statementsaboutthemshouldbetruthful.

[2]Theprohibitioninsub-paragraph(a)(2)ofthisRule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Servicesofstatementsthatmaycreate“unjustifiedexpectations”wouldordinarilyprecludeadvertise-mentsaboutresultsobtainedonbehalfofaclient,suchastheamountofadamageawardorthelawyer’srecordinobtainingfavorableverdicts,andadvertisementscontainingclientendorsements.Suchinformationmaycreatetheunjustifiedexpectationthatsimilarresultscanbeobtainedforotherswithoutreferencetothespecificfactualandlegalcircumstances.

Affirmative Disclosure

[3]Ingeneral,theintrusionontheFirstAmendmentrightofcom-mercialspeechresultingfromrationally-basedaffirmativedisclosurerequirementsisminimal,andisthereforeapreferableformofregula-tiontoabsolutebansorothersimilarrestrictions.Forexample,thereisnosignificantinterestinfailingtoincludethenameofatleastoneaccountableattorneyinallcommunicationspromotingtheservicesofalawyerorlawfirmasrequiredbysub-paragraph(a)(5)ofRule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services.Noristhereanysubstantialburdenimposedasaresultoftheaffirmativedisclaimerrequirementofsub-paragraph(a)(6)uponalawyerwhowishestomakeaclaiminthenatureof“nofeeunlessyouwin.”Indeed,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasspecificallyrecognizedthataffirmativedis-closureofaclient’sliabilityforcostsandexpensesoflitigationmayberequiredtopreventconsumerconfusionoverthetechnicaldistinctionbetweenthemeaningandeffectoftheuseofsuchtermsas“fees”and“costs”inanadvertisement.

[4]Certainpromotionalcommunicationsofalawyermay,asaresultofcontentorcircumstance,tendtomisleadaconsumertomistak-enlybelievethatthecommunicationissomethingotherthanaformofpromotionalcommunicationforwhichthelawyerhaspaid.Examplesofsuchacommunicationmightincludeadvertisementsforseminarsonlegaltopicsdirectedtothelaypublicwhensuchseminarsaresponsoredbythelawyer,oranewsletterornewspapercolumnwhichappearstoinformortoeducateaboutthelaw.Paragraph(b)ofthisRule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Serviceswouldrequireaffir-mativedisclosurethatalawyerhasgivenvalueinordertogeneratethesetypesofpubliccommunicationsifsuchisinfactthecase.

Accountability

[5]Paragraph(c)makesexplicitanadvertisingattorney’sultimateresponsibilityforallthelawyer’spromotionalcommunicationsandwouldsuggestthatreviewbythelawyerpriortodisseminationisadvis-ableifanydoubtsexistconcerningconformityoftheendproductwiththeseRules.AlthoughpriorreviewbydisciplinaryauthoritiesisnotrequiredbytheseRules,lawyersarecertainlyencouragedtocontactdis-ciplinaryauthoritiespriortoauthorizingapromotionalcommunicationifthereareanydoubtsconcerningeitheraninterpretationoftheseRulesortheirapplicationtothecommunication.

RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a

lawyer may advertise services through:(1) public media, such as a telephone directory, legal

directory, newspaper or other periodical;(2) outdoor advertising;(3) radio or television;(4) written, electronic or recorded communication.

(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or commu-nication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.



Comment

[1]Toassistthepublicinobtaininglegalservices,lawyersshouldbeallowedtomakeknowntheirservicesnotonlythroughreputationbutalsothroughorganizedinformationcampaignsintheformofadver-tising.Advertisinginvolvesanactivequestforclients,contrarytothetraditionthatalawyershouldnotseekclientele.However,thepublic’sneedtoknowaboutlegalservicescanbefulfilledinpartthroughadver-tising.Thisneedisparticularlyacuteinthecaseofpersonsofmoderatemeanswhohavenotmadeextensiveuseoflegalservices.Theinterestinexpandingpublicinformationaboutlegalservicesoughttoprevailoverconsiderationsoftradition.Nevertheless,advertisingbylawyersentailstheriskofpracticesthataremisleadingoroverreaching.

[2]ThisRulepermitspublicdisseminationofinformationcon-cerningalawyer’snameorfirmname,addressandtelephonenumber;thekindsofservicesthelawyerwillundertake;thebasisonwhichthelawyer’sfeesaredetermined,includingpricesforspecificservicesandpaymentandcreditarrangements;alawyer’sforeignlanguageability;namesofreferencesand,withtheirconsent,namesofclientsregularlyrepresented;andotherinformationthatmightinvitetheattentionofthoseseekinglegalassistance.

[3]Questionsofeffectivenessandtasteinadvertisingaremattersofspeculationandsubjectivejudgment.Somejurisdictionshavehadextensiveprohibitionsagainsttelevisionadvertising,againstadvertisinggoingbeyondspecifiedfactsaboutalawyer,oragainst“undignified”advertising.Televisionisnowoneofthemostpowerfulmediaforget-tinginformationtothepublic,particularlypersonsoflowandmoderateincome;prohibitingtelevisionadvertising,therefore,wouldimpedetheflowofinformationaboutlegalservicestomanysectorsofthepublic.Limitingtheinformationthatmaybeadvertisedhasasimilareffectandassumesthatthebarcanaccuratelyforecastthekindofinformationthatthepublicwouldregardasrelevant.

[4]NeitherthisRulenorRule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clientsprohibitscommunicationsauthorizedbylaw,suchasnoticetomembersofaclassinclassactionlitigation.

Record of Advertising

[5]Paragraph(b)requiresthatarecordofthecontentanduseofadvertisingbekeptinordertofacilitateenforcementofthisRule.

RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS

(a) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer’s firm, lawyer’s part-ner, associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:

(1) it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;

(2) the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;

(3) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the com-munication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or

(4) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.

(b) Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked “Advertisement” on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.

(c) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer’s employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer’s employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public commu-nications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:

(1) A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bona fide lawyer referral service operat-

ed by an organization authorized by law and qualified to do business in this state; provided, however, such organization has filed with the State Disciplinary Board, at least annu-ally, a report showing its terms, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participat-ing, and the names and addresses of lawyers participating in the service;

(2) A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service, including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:

(i) the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospec-tive clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agen-cies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regula-tions, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;

(ii) the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience require-ments established by the bar association;

(iii) The combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the cli-ent would have paid had no service been involved; and,

(iv) A lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.

(3) A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer’s services, the lawyer’s partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;

(4) A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees charged by a lay public relations or marketing organization provided the activities of such organization on behalf of the lawyer are otherwise in accordance with these Rules.

(5) A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice.

(d) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone con-tact, with a non-lawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.

(e) A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization prohibited under Rules 7.3(c)(1), 7.3(c)(2) or 7.3(d): Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.


Comment

Direct Personal Contact

[1]Thereisapotentialforabuseinherentinsolicitationthroughdirectpersonalcontactbyalawyerofprospectiveclientsknowntoneedlegalservices.Itsubjectsthelaypersontotheprivateimportuningofatrainedadvocate,inadirectinterpersonalencounter.Aprospectivecli-entoftenfeelsoverwhelmedbythesituationgivingrisetotheneedforlegalservices,andmayhaveanimpairedcapacityforreason,judgmentandprotectiveself-interest.Furthermore,thelawyerseekingtheretainerisfacedwithaconflictstemmingfromthelawyer’sowninterest,whichmaycolortheadviceandrepresentationofferedthevulnerableprospect.

[2]Thesituationisthereforefraughtwiththepossibilityofundueinfluence,intimidation,andoverreaching.Thepotentialforabuseinherentinsolicitationofprospectiveclientsthroughpersonalcontactjustifiesitsprohibition,particularlysincethedirectwrittencontactpermittedunderparagraph(b)ofthisRuleoffersanalternativemeansofcommunicatingnecessaryinformationtothosewhomaybeinneedoflegalservices.Also


includedintheprohibitedtypesofpersonalcontactaredirectpersonalcontactthroughanintermediaryandlivecontactbytelephone.

Direct Mail Solicitation

[3]SubjecttotherequirementsofRule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Servicesandparagraphs(b)and(c)ofthisRule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients,promotionalcommunica-tionbyalawyerthroughdirectwrittencontactisgenerallypermissible.Thepublic’sneedtoreceiveinformationconcerningtheirlegalrightsandtheavailabilityoflegalserviceshasbeenconsistentlyrecognizedasabasisforpermittingdirectwrittencommunicationsincethistypeofcommunicationmayoftenbethebestandmosteffectivemeansofinforming.Solongasthisstreamofinformationflowscleanly,itwillbepermittedtoflowfreely. [4]Certainnarrowly-drawnrestrictionsonthistypeofcommu-nicationarejustifiedbyasubstantialstateinterestinfacilitatingthepublic’sintelligentselectionofcounsel,includingtherestrictionsofsub-paragraph(a)(3)&(4)whichproscribedirectmailingstopersonssuchasaninjuredandhospitalizedaccidentvictimorthebereavedfam-ilyofadeceased.

[5]Inordertomakeitclearthatthecommunicationiscommercialinnature,paragraph(b)requiresinclusionofanappropriateaffirmative“advertisement”disclaimer.Again,thetraditionalexceptionforcontactwithclosefriends,relativesandformerclientsisrecognizedandpermitseliminationofthedisclaimerindirectwrittencontactwiththeseper-sons.

[6]ThisRuledoesnotprohibitcommunicationsauthorizedbylaw,suchasnoticetomembersofaclassinclassactionlitigation.

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer

[7]AlawyerisallowedtopayforcommunicationspermittedbytheseRules,butotherwiseisnotpermittedtopayanotherpersonforchannelingprofessionalwork.Thisrestrictiondoesnotpreventanorganizationorpersonotherthanthelawyerfromadvertisingorrec-ommendingthelawyer’sservices.Thus,alegalaidagency,aprepaidlegalservicesplanorprepaidlegalinsuranceorganizationmaypaytoadvertiselegalservicesprovidedunderitsauspices.Likewise,alawyermayparticipateinlawyerreferralprogramsandpaytheusualfeeschargedbysuchprograms,providedtheprogramsareincompli-ancewiththeregistrationrequirementsofsub-paragraph(c)(1)or (c)(2) ofthisRule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clientsandthecommunicationsandpracticesoftheorganizationarenotdeceptiveormisleading.

[8]AlawyermaynotindirectlyengageinpromotionalactivitiesthroughalaypublicrelationsormarketingfirmifsuchactivitieswouldbeprohibitedbytheseRulesifengagedindirectlybythelawyer.

RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a spe-cialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide profes-sional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading.


Comment

[1]ThisRulepermitsalawyertoindicateareasofpracticeincom-municationsaboutthelawyer’sservices.Ifalawyerpracticesonlyincertainfields,orwillnotacceptmattersexceptinsuchfields,thelawyerispermittedtosoindicate.

[2]Alawyermaytruthfullycommunicatethefactthatthelawyerisaspecialistoriscertifiedinaparticularfieldoflawbyexperienceorasaresultofhavingbeencertifiedasa“specialist”bysuccessfullycompletingaparticularprogramoflegalspecialization.Anexampleofaproperuseofthetermwouldbe“CertifiedasaCivilTrialSpecialistbyXYZInstitute”providedsuchwasinfactthecase,suchstatementwouldnotbefalseormisleadingandprovidedfurtherthattheCivilTrialSpecialistprogramofXYZInstituteisarecognizedandbonafideprofessionalentity.

RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or

other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.

(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the juris-dictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.

(c) The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

(e) A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if:

(1) the trade name includes the name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under said name. A law firm name consisting solely of the name or names of deceased or retired members of the firm does not have to include the name of an active member of the firm; and

(2) the trade name does not imply a connection with a government entity, with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other organization, association or insti-tution or entity, unless there is, in fact, a connection.


Comment

[1]Firmnamesandletterheadsaresubjecttothegeneralrequire-mentofalladvertisingthatthecommunicationmustnotbefalse,fraudulent,deceptiveormisleading.Therefore,lawyerssharingofficefacilities,butwhoarenotinfactpartners,maynotdenominatethemselvesas,forexample,“SmithandJones,”forthattitlesuggestspartnershipinthepracticeoflaw.NormayafirmengageinpracticeinGeorgiaundermorethanonename.Forexample,afirmpracticingasA,BandCmaynotsetupaseparateofficecalled“ABCLegalClinic.”

[2]Tradenamesmaybeusedsolongasthenameincludesthenameofatleastoneormoreofthelawyersactivelypracticingwiththefirm.Firmnamesconsistingentirelyofthenamesofdeceasedorretiredpartnershavetraditionallybeenpermittedandhaveprovenausefulmeansofidentification.Sub-paragraph(e)(1)permitstheircontinueduseasanexceptiontotherequirementthatafirmnameincludethenameofatleastoneactivemember.

PART EIGHT MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in con-nection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misappre-

hension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise pro-tected by Rule 1.6.


Comment

[1]ThedutyimposedbythisRuleextendstopersonsseekingadmissiontothebaraswellastolawyers.Hence,ifapersonmakesamaterialfalsestatementinconnectionwithanapplicationforadmission,itmaybethebasisforsubsequentdisciplinaryactionifthepersonisadmitted,andinanyeventmayberelevantinasubsequentadmissionapplication.ThedutyimposedbythisRuleappliestoalawyer’sownadmissionordisciplineaswellasthatofothers.Thus,itisaseparateprofessionaloffenseforalawyertoknowinglymakeamisrepresenta-tionoromissioninconnectionwithadisciplinaryinvestigationofthelawyer’sownconduct.ThisRulealsorequiresaffirmativeclarificationofanymisunderstandingonthepartoftheadmissionsordisciplinaryauthorityofwhichthepersoninvolvedbecomesaware.

[2]ThisRuleissubjecttotheprovisionsoftheFifthAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandcorrespondingprovisionsofstateconstitutions.Apersonrelyingonsuchaprovisioninresponsetoaquestion,however,shoulddosoopenlyandnotusetherightofnondis-closureasajustificationforfailuretocomplywiththisRule.


[3]Alawyerrepresentinganapplicantforadmissiontothebar,orrepresentingalawyerwhoisthesubjectofadisciplinaryinquiryorproceeding,isgovernedbytherulesapplicabletotheclient-lawyerrelationship.

RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS(a) Reserved.(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall

comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.


Comment

[1]Assessmentsbylawyersarereliedoninevaluatingthepro-fessionalorpersonalfitnessofpersonsbeingconsideredforelectionorappointmenttojudicialofficeandtopubliclegaloffices,suchasattorneygeneral,prosecutingattorneyandpublicdefender.Expressinghonestandcandidopinionsonsuchmatterscontributestoimprovingtheadministrationofjustice.Conversely,falsestatementsbyalawyercanunfairlyunderminepublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjustice.

[2]Whenalawyerseeksjudicialoffice,thelawyershouldbeboundbyapplicablelimitationsonpoliticalactivity.

[3]Tomaintainthefairandindependentadministrationofjustice,lawyersareencouragedtocontinuetraditionaleffortstodefendjudgesandcourtsunjustlycriticized.

RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has

committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that law-yer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.

(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has com-mitted a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.

There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule.

Comment

[1]Self-regulationofthelegalprofessionrequiresthatmembersoftheprofessioninitiatedisciplinaryinvestigationswhentheyknowofaviolationoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.Lawyershaveasimilarobligationwithrespecttojudicialmisconduct.Anapparentlyisolatedviolationmayindicateapatternofmisconductthatonlyadis-ciplinaryinvestigationcanuncover.Reportingaviolationisespeciallyimportantwherethevictimisunlikelytodiscovertheoffense.

RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT(a) It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:(1) violate or attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(2) be convicted of a felony;(3) be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral tur-

pitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law;

(4) engage in professional conduct involving dishon-esty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(5) fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten (10) days after the time appointed in the order or judgment. In such cases the record of the judgment is conclusive evidence unless obtained without valid service of process.

(b)(1) For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall include:

(i) a guilty plea;(ii) a plea of nolo contendere;(iii) a verdict of guilty; or(iv) a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.

(2) The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contende-re, a verdict of guilty, or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be con-clusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary rules.

(c) This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringe-ment of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a

conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) above.

(d) Rule 8.4(a)(1) does not apply to Part Six of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) through Rule 8.4(c) is disbarment.

Comment

[1]TheprohibitionsofthisRuleaswellastheprohibitionsofBarRule4-102prohibitalawyerfromattemptingtoviolatetheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductorfromknowinglyaidingorabetting,orprovidingdirectorindirectassistanceorinducementtoanotherpersonwhoviolatesorattemptstoviolatearuleofprofessionalconduct.Alawyermaynotavoidaviolationoftherulesbyinstructinganonlawyer,whoisnotsubjecttotherules,toactwherethelawyercannot.

[2]ThisRule,asitspredecessor,isdrawnintermsofactsinvolv-ing“moralturpitude”with,however,arecognitionthatsomesuchoffensesconcernmattersofpersonalmoralityandhavenospecificcon-nectiontofitnessforthepracticeoflaw.Heretheconcernislimitedtothosematterswhichfallunderboththerubricof“moralturpitude”andinvolveunderlyingconductrelatingtothefitnessofthelawyertoprac-ticelaw.

[3]Manykindsofillegalconductreflectadverselyonfitnesstopracticelaw,suchasoffensesinvolvingfraudandtheoffenseofwillfulfailuretofileanincometaxreturn.However,somekindsofoffensescarrynosuchimplication.Traditionally,thedistinctionwasdrawnintermsofoffensesinvolving“moralturpitude.”Thatconceptcanbecon-struedtoincludeoffensesconcerningsomemattersofpersonalmorality,suchasadulteryandcomparableoffenses,thathavenospecificconnec-tiontofitnessforthepracticeoflaw.Althoughalawyerispersonallyanswerabletotheentirecriminallaw,alawyershouldbeprofessionallyanswerableonlyforoffensesthatindicatelackofthosecharacteristicsrelevanttolawpractice.Offensesinvolvingviolence,dishonesty,breachoftrust,orseriousinterferencewiththeadministrationofjusticeareinthatcategory.Apatternofrepeatedoffenses,evenonesofminorsig-nificancewhenconsideredseparately,canindicateindifferencetolegalobligation.

RULE 8.5 DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW

(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal ser-vices in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.

(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide other-wise; and

(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct will occur.

Comment

Disciplinary Authority

[1]Itislongstandinglawthattheconductofalawyeradmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdiction.ExtensionofthedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdictiontoDomesticorForeignLawyerswhoprovideoroffertoprovidelegalservicesinthisjurisdictionisfortheprotectionofthecitizensofthisjurisdiction.Reciprocalenforcementofajurisdiction’sdisciplinaryfind-ingsandsanctionswillfurtheradvancethepurposesofthisRule.See,


Rule9.4:JurisdictionandReciprocalDiscipline.ADomesticorForeignLawyerwhoissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdictionunderRule8.5(a)appointsanofficialtobedesignatedbythisCourttoreceiveserviceofprocessinthisjurisdiction.ThefactthattheDomesticorForeignLawyerissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjuris-dictionmaybeafactorindeterminingwhetherpersonaljurisdictionmaybeassertedoverthelawyerforcivilmatters.

Choice of Law

[2]AlawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyermaybepotentiallysubjecttomorethanonesetofrulesofprofessionalconductwhichimposedifferentobligations.ThelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyermaybelicensedtopracticeinmorethanonejurisdictionwithdifferingrules,ormaybeadmittedtopracticebeforeaparticularcourtwithrulesthatdifferfromthoseofthejurisdictionorjurisdictionsinwhichthelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyerislicensedtopractice.Additionally,thelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyer’sconductmayinvolvesignificantcontactswithmorethanonejurisdiction.

[3]Paragraph(b)seekstoresolvesuchpotentialconflicts.Itspremiseisthatminimizingconflictsbetweenrules,aswellasuncertain-tyaboutwhichrulesareapplicable,isinthebestinterestofbothclientsandtheprofession(aswellasthebodieshavingauthoritytoregulatetheprofession).Accordingly,ittakestheapproachof(i)providingthatanyparticularconductofalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyershallbesubjecttoonlyonesetofrulesofprofessionalconduct,(ii)makingthedeterminationofwhichsetofrulesappliestoparticularconductasstraightforwardaspossible,consistentwithrecognitionofappropriateregulatoryinterestsofrelevantjurisdictions,and(iii)providingprotec-tionfromdisciplineforlawyersorDomesticorForeignLawyerswhoactreasonablyinthefaceofuncertainty.

[4]Paragraph(b)(1)providesthatastoalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyerconductrelatingtoaproceedingpendingbeforeatri-bunal,thelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyershallbesubjectonlytotherulesofthejurisdictioninwhichthetribunalsitsunlesstherulesofthetribunal,includingitschoiceoflawrule,provideotherwise.Astoallotherconduct,includingconductinanticipationofaproceed-ingnotyetpendingbeforeatribunal,paragraph(b)(2)providesthatalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyershallbesubjecttotherulesofthejurisdictioninwhichthelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyer’sconductoccurred,or,ifthepredominanteffectoftheconductisinanotherjurisdiction,therulesofthatjurisdictionshallbeappliedtotheconduct.Inthecaseofconductinanticipationofaproceedingthatislikelytobebeforeatribunal,thepredominanteffectofsuchconductcouldbewheretheconductoccurred,wherethetribunalsitsorinanotherjurisdiction.

[5]WhenalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyer’sconductinvolvessignificantcontactswithmorethanonejurisdiction,itmaynotbeclearwhetherthepredominanteffectofthelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyer’sconductwilloccurinajurisdictionotherthantheoneinwhichtheconductoccurred.SolongasthelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyer’sconductconformstotherulesofajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyerreasonablybelievesthepredominanteffectwilloccur,thelawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyershallnotbesubjecttodisciplineunderthisRule.

[6]IftwoadmittingjurisdictionsweretoproceedagainstalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyerforthesameconduct,theyshould,apply-ingthisrule,identifythesamegoverningethicsrules.Theyshouldtakeallappropriatestepstoseethattheydoapplythesameruletothesameconduct,andinalleventsshouldavoidproceedingagainstalawyerorDomesticorForeignLawyeronthebasisoftwoinconsistentrules.

[7]ThechoiceoflawprovisionappliestolawyersorDomesticorForeignLawyerengagedintransnationalpractice,unlessinternationallaw,treatiesorotheragreementsbetweencompetentregulatoryauthori-tiesintheaffectedjurisdictionsprovideotherwise.

PART NINE MISCELLANEOUS

RULE 9.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall notify the State Bar of Georgia of:

(a) all other jurisdictions in which the member is admit-ted to the practice of law and the dates of admission; and

(b) the conviction of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, within sixty days of conviction.


Comment

[1]TheStateBarofGeorgiaistheregulatoryauthoritycreatedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiatooverseethepracticeoflawinGeorgia.Inordertoprovideeffectivedisciplinaryprograms,theStateBarofGeorgianeedsinformationaboutitsmembers.

RULE 9.2 SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit involving misuse of funds held in a fiduciary capacity, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that the person bringing the claim will be prohibited or restricted from filing a disciplinary complaint, or will be required to request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint concerning that conduct.


Comment

[1]Thedisciplinarysystemprovidesprotectiontothegeneralpublicfromthoselawyerswhoarenotmorallyfittopracticelaw.Oneprobleminthepasthasbeenthelawyerwhosettlesthecivilclaim/dis-ciplinarycomplaintwiththeinjuredpartyonthebasisthattheinjuredpartynotbringadisciplinarycomplaintorrequestthedismissalofapendingdisciplinarycomplaint.Thelawyeristhenisfreetoinjureothermembersofthegeneralpublic.

[2]Topreventsuchabusesinsettlements,thisruleprohibitsalaw-yerfromsettlinganycontroversyorsuitinvolvingmisuseoffundsonanybasiswhichpreventsthepersonbringingtheclaimfrompursuingadisciplinarycomplaint.

RULE 9.3 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authori-ties in accordance with State Bar Rules. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.

Comment

[1]Muchoftheworkinthedisciplinaryprocessisperformedbyvolunteerlawyersandlaypersons.Inordertomakegooduseoftheirvaluabletime,itisimperativethatthelawyercomplainedagainstcoop-eratewiththeinvestigation.Inparticular,thelawyermustfileaswornresponsewiththememberoftheInvestigativePanelchargedwiththeresponsibilityofinvestigatingthecomplaint.

[2]NothinginthisRuleprohibitsalawyerfromrespondingbymakingaFifthAmendmentobjection,ifappropriate.However,disci-plinaryproceedingsarecivilinnatureandtheuseofaFifthAmendmentobjectionwillgiverisetoapresumptionagainstthelawyer.

RULE 9.4 JURISDICTION AND RECIPROCALDISCIPLINE

(a) Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or con-stitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the court in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admit-ted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdic-tion, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia State Disciplinary Board.

(b) Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or dis-barred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been disciplined in another jurisdic-tion, the Office of General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Nothing in the Rule shall prevent a lawyer disciplined in another jurisdiction from filing a petition for voluntary discipline under Rule 4-227.


(1) Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demon-strating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:

(i) A copy of the order from the other jurisdiction; and

(ii) A notice approved by the Review Panel that the lawyer must inform the Office of General Counsel and the Review Panel, within thirty days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)(3) below, that the imposition of the substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim.

(2) In the event the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed there, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this jurisdiction shall be deferred until the stay expires.

(3) Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1), the Review Panel shall recommend to the Georgia Supreme Court the substantially similar discipline, or removal from practice on the grounds provided in Rule 4-104, unless the Office of General Counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or the Review Panel finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:

(i) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or

(ii) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or

(iii) The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the juris-diction; or

(iv) The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or

(v) (a) the conduct did not occur within the state

of Georgia; and,(b) the discipline imposed by the foreign

jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules.(vi) the discipline would if imposed in identical

form be unduly severe or would require action not con-templated by these Rules.

If the Review Panel determines that any of those elements exists, the Review Panel shall make such other recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to dem-onstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

(4) The Review Panel may consider exceptions from either The Office of The General Counsel or the Respondent on the grounds enumerated at Part (b) (3) of this Rule, and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Review Panel within thirty days from service of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have ten days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.

(5) In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.

(6) Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be con-sidered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.


Comment

[1]Ifalawyersuspendedordisbarredinonejurisdictionisalsoadmittedinanotherjurisdictionandnoactioncanbetakenagainstthelawyeruntilanewdisciplinaryproceedingisinstituted,tried,andcon-cluded,thepublicinthesecondjurisdictionisleftunprotectedagainstalawyerwhohasbeenjudiciallydeterminedtobeunfit.Anyprocedure

whichsoexposesinnocentclientstoharmcannotbejustified.Thespec-tacleofalawyerdisbarredinonejurisdictionyetpermittedtopracticeelsewhereexposestheprofessiontocriticismandunderminespublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjustice.

[2]TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiashouldbenotifiedbydisciplinarycounselofthejurisdictionwheretheoriginaldisciplinewasimposed.Uponreceiptofsuchinformation,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshouldpromptlynotifytheInvestigativePanel.ThePanelshouldpromptlyobtainandserveuponthelawyeranordertoshowcausewhyidenticaldisciplineshouldnotbeimposedinGeorgia.Thecertifiedcopyoftheorderintheoriginaljurisdictionshouldbeincorporatedintotheordertoshowcause.

[3]TheimpositionofdisciplineinonejurisdictiondoesnotmeanthatGeorgiaandeveryotherjurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisadmittedmustnecessarilyimposediscipline.TheReviewPanelhasjurisdictiontorecommendreciprocaldisciplineonthebasisofpublicdisciplineimposedbyajurisdictioninwhichtherespondentislicensed.

[4]Ajudicialdeterminationofmisconductbytherespondentinanotherjurisdictionisconclusive,andnotsubjecttorelitigationintheforumjurisdiction.TheReviewPanelshouldrecommendidenticaldisciplineunlessitdetermines,afterreviewlimitedtotherecordoftheproceedingsintheforeignjurisdiction,thatoneofthegroundsspecifiedinparagraph(b)(3)exists.ThisRuleapplieswhetherornottherespon-dentisadmittedtopracticeintheforeignjurisdiction.Seealso,Rule 8.5: Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law,Comment[1].

[5]ForpurposesofthisRule,thesuspensionorplacementofalawyeroninactivestatusinanotherjurisdictionbecauseofwantofsoundmind,senility,habitualintoxicationordrugaddiction,totheextentofimpairmentofcompetencyasanattorneyshallbeconsideredadisciplinarysuspensionundertheRulesoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

RULE 9.5 LAWYER AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL(a) A lawyer who is a public official and represents the

State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provi-sions of these Rules.

(b) No provision of these Rules shall be construed to pro-hibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.

Rule 4-103. Multiple Violations. Afindingofathirdorsubsequentdisciplinaryinfractionundertheserulesshall,inandofitself,constitutediscretionarygroundsforsuspensionordisbarment.TheReviewPanelmayexercisethisdiscre-tionarypowerwhenthequestionisappropriatelybeforethatPanel.AnydisciplineimposedbyanotherjurisdictionascontemplatedinRule9.4maybeconsideredadisciplinaryinfractionforthepurposeofthisRule.

Rule 4-104. Mental Incapacity and Substance Abuse.(a)Wantofasoundmind,senility,habitualintoxicationor

drugaddiction,totheextentofimpairingcompetencyasanattor-ney,whenfoundtoexistundertheprocedureoutlinedinPartIV,Chapter2oftheserules,shallconstitutegroundsforremovingtheattorneyfromthepracticeoflaw.NoticeoffinaljudgmenttakingsuchactionshallbegivenbytheReviewPanelasprovidedinRule4-220(a).

(b)UponafindingbyeitherpaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardthatanattorneymaybeimpairedorincapacitatedtoprac-ticelawduetomentalincapacityorsubstanceabuse,thatpanelmay,initssolediscretion,makeaconfidentialreferralofthemat-tertotheCommitteeonLawyerImpairmentforthepurposesofconfrontationandreferraloftheattorneytotreatmentcentersandpeersupportgroups.Eitherpanelmay,initsdiscretion,deferdis-ciplinaryfindingsandproceedingsbasedupontheimpairmentorincapacitationofanattorneypendingattemptsbytheCommitteeonLawyerImpairmenttoaffordtheattorneyanopportunitytobeginrecovery.InsuchsituationsthecommitteeshallreporttothereferringpanelandBarcounselconcerningtheattorney’sprogresstowardrecovery.

(c)IntheeventofafindingbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiathatalawyerisimpairedorincapacitated,theCourtmayreferthemattertotheCommitteeonLawyerImpairment,beforeorafteritsentryofjudgmentunderBarRules4-219or4-220(a),sothatrehabilitativeaidmaybeprovidedtotheimpairedorincapacitateattorney.InsuchsituationsthecommitteeshallbeauthorizedtoreporttotheCourt,eitherpaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandBarcounselconcerningtheattorney’sprogresstowardrecovery.


Rule 4-105. Deceased, Incapacitated, Imprisoned and Disappearing Attorneys. WhenitappearstotheInvestigativePanelthatanattorney’sdeath,incapacity,imprisonmentordisappearanceposesasubstantialthreatofharmtohisorherclientsorthepublic,theInvestigativePanelshallimmediatelyinvestigatethematter.IftheInvestigativePaneldeterminesthatsuchthreatexistsandthatnopartner,associateorotherappropriaterepresentativeisavailabletopreventtheharm,itshallfileitsfindingsandrecommendationofactionintheSupremeCourtandshallseekjudgmentasprovidedinRule4-219.

Rule 4-106. Conviction of a Crime; Suspension and Disbarment.(a)Uponreceiptofinformationorevidencethatanattor-

neyhasbeenconvictedofanyfelonyormisdemeanorinvolvingmoralturpitude,whetherbyverdict,pleaofguilty,pleaofnolocontendereorimpositionoffirstoffenderprobation,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallimmediatelyassignthematteraStateDisciplinaryBoarddocketnumberandpetitiontheGeorgiaSupremeCourtfortheappointmentofaspecialmastertoconductashowcausehearing.

(b)Thepetitionshallshowthedateoftheverdictorpleaandthecourtinwhichtherespondentwasconvicted,andshallbeservedupontherespondentpursuanttoBarRule4-203.1.

(c)UponreceiptofthePetitionforAppointmentofSpecialMaster,theClerkoftheGeorgiaSupremeCourtshallfilethematterintherecordsoftheCourt,shallgivethematteradocketnumberandnotifytheCourtthatappointmentofaspecialmasterisappropriate.

(d)TheCourtwillappointaspecialmaster,pursuanttoRule4-209(b).

(e)TheshowcausehearingshouldbeheldwithinfifteendaysafterserviceofthePetitionforAppointmentofSpecialMasterupontherespondentorappointmentofaspecialmaster,whicheverislater.Withinthirtydaysofthehearing,thespecialmastershallfilearecommendationwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgiawhichshallbeempoweredtoordersuchdisciplineasdeemedappropriate.

(f)(1)IftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaorderstherespondent

suspendedpendingtheappealoftheconviction,uponthetermi-nationoftheappealtheStateBarofGeorgiamaypetitionthespecialmastertoconductahearingforthepurposeofdetermin-ingwhetherthecircumstancesoftheterminationoftheappealindicatethatthesuspendedrespondentshould:

(i)bedisbarredunderRule8.4,or(ii)bereinstated,or(iii)remainsuspendedpendingretrialasaprotection

tothepublic,or(iv)bereinstatedwhilethefactsgivingrisetothe

convictionareinvestigatedand,ifproper,prosecutedunderregulardisciplinaryproceduresintheserules.(2)Reportsofthespecialmastershallbefiledwiththe

ReviewPanelasprovidedhereafterinRule4-217.TheReviewPanelshallmakeitsfindingsandrecommendationasprovidedhereafterinRule4-218.(g)Forpurposesofthisrule,acertifiedcopyofaconviction

inanyjurisdictionbaseduponaverdict,pleaofguiltyorpleaofnolocontendereortheimpositionoffirstoffendertreatmentshallbeprimafacieevidenceofaninfractionofRule8.4ofBarRule4-102andshallbeadmissibleinproceedingsunderthedisciplinaryrules.

Rule 4-107. (Reserved)

Rule 4-108. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients or Public; Emergency Suspension.

(a)Uponreceiptofsufficientevidencedemonstratingthatanattorney’sconductposesasubstantialthreatofharmtohisorherclientsorthepublicandwiththeapprovaloftheImmediatePastPresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandtheChairpersonoftheReviewPanel,oratthedirectionoftheChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanel,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshallpetitiontheGeorgiaSupremeCourtforthesuspensionoftheattorneypendingdisciplinaryproceedingspredicatedupontheconductcausingsuchpetition.

(b)Thepetitionforemergencysuspensionshallstatetheevi-dencejustifyingtheemergencysuspension.

(c)ThepetitionforemergencysuspensionshallbeservedupontheRespondentpursuanttoBarRule4-203.1.

(d)Uponreceiptofthepetitionforemergencysuspension,theClerkoftheGeorgiaSupremeCourtshallfilethematterintherecordsoftheCourt,shallassignthematteradocketnumberandshallnotifytheCourtthatappointmentofaSpecialMasterisappropriate.

(e)TheCourtwillnominateaSpecialMasterpursuanttoRule4-209.2toconductahearingwheretheStateBarshallshow

causewhytheRespondentshouldbesuspendedpendingdisciplin-aryproceedings.

(f)WithinfifteendaysafterserviceofthepetitionforemergencysuspensionupontheRespondentorappointmentofaSpecialMaster,whicheverislater,theSpecialMastershallholdahearingonthepetitionforemergencysuspension.

(g)Withintwentydaysofthehearing,theSpecialMastershallfilehisorherrecommendationwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgia.TheCourtsittingen bancmaysuspendtheRespondentpendingfinaldispositionofdisciplinaryproceedingspredicatedupontheconductcausingtheemergencysuspension,orordersuchotheractionasitdeemsappropriate.

Rule 4-109. Refusal or Failure to Appear for Reprimand; Suspension. EitherpaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardbasedontheknowl-edgeorbeliefthatarespondenthasrefused,orfailedwithoutjustcause,toappearinaccordancewithBarRule4-220beforeapanelorthesupe-riorcourtfortheadministrationofareprimandmayfileintheSupremeCourtamotionforsuspensionoftherespondent.Acopyofthemotionshallbesenttotherespondentbyregisteredmail.TheSupremeCourtmayinitsdiscretion,tendaysafterthefilingofthemotion,suspendtherespondentuntilsuchtimeasthereprimandisadministered.

Rule 4-110. Definitions.(a)Respondent:Apersonwhoseconductisthesubjectof

anydisciplinaryinvestigationorproceeding.(b)Confidentialproceedings:Anyproceedingunderthese

ruleswhichoccurspriortoafilingintheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(c)Publicproceedings:AnyproceedingundertheseruleswhichhasbeenfiledwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(d)Grievance/MemorandumofGrievance:Anallegationofunethicalconductfiledagainstanattorney.

(e)Probablecause:AfindingbytheInvestigativePanelthatthereissufficientevidencetobelievethattherespondenthasviolatedoneormoreoftheprovisionsofPartIV,Chapter1oftheBarRules.

(f)PetitionforVoluntarySurrenderofLicense:APetitionforVoluntaryDisciplineinwhichtherespondentvoluntarilysur-rendershisorherlicensetopracticelawinthisState.Avoluntarysurrenderoflicenseistantamounttodisbarment.

(g)He,himorhis:Genericpronounsincludingbothmaleandfemale.

(h)Attorney:AmemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaoroneauthorizedbylawtopracticelawintheStateofGeorgia.

(i)NoticeofDiscipline:ANoticebytheInvestigativePanelthattherespondentwillbesubjecttoadisciplinarysanctionforviolationofoneormoreRulesofProfessionalConductunlesstherespondentaffirmativelyrejectsthenotice.

Rule 4-111. Audit for Cause. UponreceiptofsufficientevidencethatalawyerwhopracticeslawinthisStateposesathreatofharmtohisorherclientsorthepub-lic,theStateDisciplinaryBoardmayconductanAuditforCausewiththewrittenapprovaloftheChairoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandthePresident-ElectoftheStateBar.Beforeapprovalcanbegranted,thelawyershallbegivennoticethatapprovalisbeingsoughtandbegivenanopportunitytoappearandbeheard.Thesufficiencyofthenoticeandopportunitytobeheardshallbelefttothesolediscretionofthepersonsgivingtheapproval.TheStateDisciplinaryBoardmustinformthepersonbeingauditedthattheauditisanAuditforCause.ThefailureofalawyertosubmittoanAuditforCauseshallbegroundsfordisciplinepursuanttoRule1.15III.

CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

4-201. State Disciplinary Board. ThepowerstoinvestigateanddisciplinemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandthoseauthorizedtopracticelawinGeorgiaforviola-tionsoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductsetforthinBarRule4-102areherebyvestedinaStateDisciplinaryBoardandaConsumerAssistanceProgram.TheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallconsistoftwopanels.ThefirstpanelshallbetheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard(InvestigativePanel).ThesecondpanelshallbetheReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard(ReviewPanel).TheConsumerAssistanceProgramshalloperateasdescribedinPartXIIoftheseRules.

(a)TheInvestigativePanelshallconsistofthePresident-ElectoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandthePresident-ElectoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia,onememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiafromeachjudicialdistrictoftheStateappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiawiththeapprovaloftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,onememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiafromeachjudicialdis-


trictoftheStateappointedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,oneat-largememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaappointedbytheSupremeCourt,oneat-largememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaappointedbythePresidentwiththeapprovaloftheBoardofGovernors,andsixpublicmembersappointedbytheSupremeCourttoserveaspublicmembersofthePanel.

(1)Allmembersshallbeappointedforthree-yeartermssubjecttothefollowingexceptions:

(i)anypersonappointedtofillavacancycausedbyresignation,death,disqualificationordisabilityshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredtermofthememberreplacedunlessreappointed;

(ii)ex-officiomembersshallserveduringthetermoftheiroffice;and

(iii)certaininitialmembersassetforthinparagraph(2)below.(2)Itshallbethegoaloftheinitialappointmentsthatone-

third(1/3)ofthetermsofthemembersappointedwillexpireannually.

(3)AmembermayberemovedfromthePanelpursuanttoproceduressetbythePanelforfailuretoattendregularmeet-ingsofthePanel.ThevacancyshallbefilledbyappointmentofthecurrentPresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(4)TheInvestigativePanelshallannuallyelectachair-person,avice-chairperson,oravice-chairpersonforanysubcommitteeforwhichthechairpersonisnotamembertoserveaschairpersonforthatsubcommittee,andsuchotheroffi-cersasitmaydeemproper.ThePanelshallmeetinitsentiretyinJulyofeachyeartoelectachairperson.AtanytimethePanelmaydecidetodivideitselfintosubcommitteesortoconsolidateafterhavingdivided.Amajorityshallconstituteaquorumandamajorityofaquorumshallbeauthorizedtoact.However,inanymatterinwhichoneormoreInvestigativePanelmembersaredisqualified,thenumberofmembersconstitutingaquorumshallbereducedbythenumberofmembersdisqualifiedfromvotingonthematter.

(5)TheInvestigativePanelisauthorizedtoorganizeitselfintoasmanysubcommitteesasthePaneldeemsnecessarytoconducttheexpeditiousinvestigationofdisciplinarymattersreferredtoitbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel.However,nosubcommitteeshallconsistoffewerthanseven(7)membersofthePanelandeachsuchsubcommitteeshallincludeatleastone(1)ofthepublicmembers.(b)TheReviewPanelshallconsistoftheImmediatePast

PresidentoftheStateBar,theImmediatePastPresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoramemberoftheYoungLawyersDivisiondesignatedbyitsImmediatePastPresident,ninemem-bersoftheStateBar,threefromeachofthethreefederaljudicialdistrictsoftheStateappointedasdescribedbelow,andfourpublicmembersappointedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(1)TheninemembersoftheBarfromthefederaljudi-cialdistrictsshallbeappointedforthreeyeartermssothatthetermofonePanelmemberfromeachdistrictwillexpireeachyear.ThethreevacantpositionswillbefilledinoddyearsbyappointmentbythePresident,withtheapprovaloftheBoardofGovernors,andinevenyearsbyappointmentbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(2)ThePanelmembersservingatthetimethisrulegoesintoeffectshallcontinuetoserveuntiltheirrespectivetermsexpire.NewPanelmembersshallbeappointedassetforthabove.

(3)Anypersonappointedtofillavacancycausedbyres-ignation,death,disqualificationordisabilityshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredtermofthememberreplacedunlessreappointed.

(4)Ex-officiomembersshallserveduringthetermortermsoftheiroffices.

(5)TheReviewPanelshallelectachairpersonandsuchotherofficersasitmaydeemproperinJulyofeachyear.ThepresenceofsixmembersofthePanelshallconstituteaquorum.FourmembersofthePanelshallbeauthorizedtoactexceptthatarecommendationoftheReviewPaneltosuspendordisbarshallrequiretheaffirmativevoteofatleastsixmembersoftheReviewPanel,withnotmorethanfournegativevotes.However,inanycaseinwhichoneormoreReviewPanelmembersaredisqualified,thenumberofmembersconstitutingaquorumandthenumberofmembersnecessarytovoteaffirmativelyfordisbarmentorsuspension,shallbereducedbythenumberofmembersdisqualifiedfromvotingonthecase.Norecommenda-tionofdisbarmentorsuspensionmaybemadebyfewerthanfouraffirmativevotes.Forthepurposesofthisruletherecusalofamembershallhavethesameeffectasdisqualification.

Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel.(a)AllgrievancesotherthanthoseinitiatedbytheSupreme

CourtofGeorgia,theInvestigativePanelorinquirieswhichmaybefiledwiththeConsumerAssistanceProgramunderPartXIIoftheseRulesshallbefirstfiledwiththeOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallrequirethatoralgrievances,andgrievancesillegiblyorinformallydrawn,bereducedtoamemorandumofgrievanceinsuchformasmaybeprescribedbytheInvestigativePanel.

(b)Uponreceiptofagrievanceinproperform,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallscreenittodeterminewhetherthegrievanceisunjustified,frivolous,patentlyunfoundedorfailstostatefactssufficienttoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallbeempoweredtocollectevidenceandinformationconcerninganygrievanceandtoaddthefindingsandresultsofitsinvestigationtothefilecontainingsuchgrievance.Thescreeningprocessmayincludeforwardingacopyofthegrievancetotherespondentinorderthattherespondentmayrespondtothegrievance.

(c)Uponcompletionofitsscreeningofagrievance,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallbeempoweredtodismissthosegrievanceswhichareunjustified,frivolous,patentlyunfoundedorwhichfailtostatefactssufficienttoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateBarofGeorgia;provided,however,thatarejectionofsuchgrievancesbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallnotdeprivethecomplainingpartyofanyrightofactionheorshemightotherwisehaveatlaworinequityagainsttherespondent.ThosegrievanceswhichappeartoallegeanyviolationofPartIV,Chapter1oftheStateBarRulesshallbeforwardedtotheInvestigativePanelorasubcommitteeoftheInvestigativePanelaccordingtoRule4-204.1.

Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties.(a)Inaccordancewiththeserules,theInvestigativePanel

shallhavethefollowingpowersandduties:(1)Toreceiveandevaluateanyandallwrittengrievances

againstmembersoftheStateBarandtoframesuchchargesandgrievancesasshallconformtotherequirementsoftheserules.AcopyofanygrievanceservingasthebasisforinvestigationorproceedingsbeforethePanelshallbefurnishedtotherespon-dentbytheproceduressetforthinRule4-204.2;

(2)Toinitiategrievancesonitsownmotion,torequireadditionalinformationfromacomplainant,whereappropriate,andtodismissandrejectsuchgrievancesastoitmayseemunjustified,frivolous,orpatentlyunfounded.However,therejectionofagrievancebytheInvestigativePanelshallnotdeprivethecomplainingpartyofanyrightofactionheorshemightotherwisehaveatlaworinequityagainsttherespondent;

(3)Toissuelettersofinstructionwhendismissingagrievance;

(4)TodelegatethedutiesofthePanelenumeratedinsubparagraphs(1),(2),(11)and(12)hereoftothechairpersonofthePanelorchairpersonofanysubcommitteeofthePanelorsuchothermembersasthePaneloritschairpersonmaydesig-natesubjecttoreviewandapprovalbytheInvestigativePanelorsubcommitteeofthePanel;

(5)Toconductprobablecauseinvestigations,tocollectevidenceandinformationconcerninggrievances,toholdhear-ingswhereprovidedforintheserules,andtocertifygrievancestotheSupremeCourtforhearingsbyspecialmastersasherein-afterprovided;

(6)Topassuponpetitionsforprotectionoftheclientsofdeceased,disappearingorincapacitatedmembersoftheStateBar;

(7)Toadoptformsforformalcomplaints,subpoenas,notices,andanyotherwritteninstrumentsnecessaryordesir-ableundertheserules;

(8)Toprescribeitsownrulesofconductandprocedure;(9)Toreceive,investigate,andcollectevidenceand

information;andtoreviewandacceptorrejectsuchPetitionsforVoluntaryDisciplinewhichrequesttheimpositionofconfi-dentialdisciplineandarefiledwiththeInvestigativePanelpriortothetimeofissuanceofaformalcomplaintbyBarcounsel.Eachsuchpetitionshallcontainadmissionsoffactandadmis-sionsofconductinviolationofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserulessufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofdiscipline.Barcounselshall,uponfilingofsuchpetition,filewiththePanelitsrecom-mendationsastoacceptanceorrejectionofthepetitionbythePanel,givingthereasonstherefor,andshallserveacopyofitsrecommendationupontherespondentpresentingsuchpetition;

(10)Tosignandenforce,ashereinafterdescribed,sub-poenasfortheappearanceofpersonsandfortheproductionofthingsandrecordsatinvestigationsandhearings;

(11)Toextendthetimewithinwhichaformalcomplaintmaybefiled;

(12)ToissuelettersofformaladmonitionandInvestigativePanelReprimandsashereinafterprovided;


(13)ToenteraNoticeofDisciplineprovidingthatunlesstherespondentaffirmativelyrejectsthenotice,therespondentshallbesanctionedasorderedbytheInvestigativePanel;

(14)Tousetheinvestigators,auditors,and/orstaffoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselinperformingitsduties.(b)Inaccordancewiththeserules,theReviewPanelorany

subcommitteeofthePanelshallhavethefollowingpowersandduties:

(1)Toreceivereportsfromspecialmasters,andtorecom-mendtotheSupremeCourttheimpositionofpunishmentanddiscipline;

(2)Toadoptformsforsubpoenas,notices,andanyotherwritteninstrumentsnecessaryordesirableundertheserules;

(3)Toprescribeitsownrulesofconductandprocedure;(4)(Reserved).(5)Throughtheactionofitschairpersonorhisorher

designeeandupongoodcauseshown,toallowalatefilingoftherespondent’sanswerwheretherehasbeennofinalselectionofaspecialmasterwithinthirtydaysofserviceoftheformalcomplaintupontherespondent;

(6)Throughtheactionofitschairpersonorhisorherdesignee,toreceiveandpassuponchallengesandobjectionstospecialmasters.

(7)toreceiveNoticeofReciprocalDisciplineandtorec-ommendtotheSupremeCourttheimpositionofpunishmentanddisciplinepursuanttoBarRule9.4(b)(3).

Rule 4-203.1. Uniform Service Rule.(a)AttorneysauthorizedtopracticelawinGeorgiashall

informtheMembershipDepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,inwriting,oftheircurrentname,addressandtelephonenumber.TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaandtheStateBarofGeorgiamayrelyontheaddressonfilewiththeMembershipDepartmentinalleffortstocontact,communicatewith,andperfectserviceuponanattorney.ThechoiceofanattorneytoprovideonlyapostofficeboxaddresstotheMembershipDepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallconstituteanelectiontowaivepersonalservice.NotificationofachangeofaddressgiventoanydepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaotherthantheMembershipDepartmentshallnotsatisfytherequirementherein.

(b)InallmattersrequiringpersonalserviceunderPartIVoftheBarRules,servicemaybeperfectedinthefollowingmanner:

(1)AcknowledgmentofService:AnacknowledgmentofservicefromtheRespondentshallconstituteconclusiveproofofserviceandshalleliminatetheneedtoutilizeanyotherformofservice.

(2)WrittenResponsefromRespondent:AwrittenresponsefromtheRespondentorRespondent’scounselshallconstituteconclusiveproofofserviceandshalleliminatetheneedtoutilizeanyotherformofservice.

(3)Intheabsenceofanacknowledgmentofservice,orawrittenresponsefromtheRespondentorRespondent’scounsel,andsubjecttotheprovisionsofsubparagraph(4)below,theRespondentshallbeservedinthefollowingmanner:

(i)PersonalService:ServicemaybeaccomplishedbytheSheriff,oraCourtapprovedagentforserviceofprocess,oranypersonapprovedbytheChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanelortheChair’sdesignee.ReceiptofaReturnofServiceNonEstInventusfromtheSherifforanyotherpersonapprovedforserviceoftheservicedocuments,shallconstituteconclusiveproofthatservicecannotbeper-fectedbypersonalservice.

(ii)Servicebypublication:Intheeventthatpersonalservicecannotbeperfected,orwhentheRespondenthasonlyprovidedapostofficeboxtotheMembershipDepartmentandRespondenthasnotacknowledgedservicewithintwenty(20)daysofamailingtoRespondent’spostofficebox,servicemaybeaccomplishedbypublicationonceaweekfortwoweeksinthelegalorganofthecountyofRespondent’saddress,asshownontherecordsoftheMembershipDepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,and,contemporaneouslywiththepublication,mailingacopyoftheservicedocumentsbyfirstclassmailtoRespondent’saddressasshownontherecordsoftheMembershipDepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.(4)WhenitappearsfromanaffidavitmadebytheOffice

ofGeneralCounselthattheRespondenthasdepartedfromthestate,orcannot,afterduediligence,befoundwithinthestate,orseekstoavoidtheservice,theChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanel,orthechair’sdesignee,mayauthorizeservicebypubli-cationwithoutthenecessityoffirstattemptingpersonalservice.TheaffidavitmadebytheOfficeofGeneralCounselmustdem-onstraterecentunsuccessfulattemptsatpersonalserviceupontheRespondentregardingotherorrelateddisciplinarymatters

andthatsuchpersonalservicewasattemptedatRespondent’saddressasshownontherecordsoftheMembershipDepartmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.(c)Wheneverserviceofpleadingsorotherdocumentssubse-

quenttotheoriginalcomplaintisrequiredorpermittedtobemadeuponapartyrepresentedbyanattorney,theserviceshallbemadeupontheattorneyunlessserviceuponthepartyhimselfisother-wiserequiredbytheserules.Serviceupontheattorneyoruponapartyshallbemadebydeliveringacopytohimorbymailingittohimathisorherlastknownaddress.Asusedinthisrule,theterm“deliveryofacopy”meanshandingittotheattorneyortotheparty,orleavingitathisorherofficewithhisorherclerkorotherpersoninchargethereofor,iftheofficeisclosedorthepersontobeservedhasnooffice,leavingitathisorherdwellinghouseorusualplaceofabodewithsomepersonofsuitableageanddiscretionthenresidingtherein.Servicebymailiscompleteuponmailing.Proofofservicemaybemadebycertificateofanattorneyorofhisorheremployee,bywrittenadmission,byaffidavit,orbyotherproofsatisfactorytothecourt.Failuretomakeproofofserviceshallnotaffectthevalidityofservice.

Rule 4-204. Preliminary Investigation by Investigative Panel-Generally.

(a)EachgrievanceallegingconductwhichappearstoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbereferredinaccordancewithRule4-204.1bytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseltotheInvestigativePanelorasubcommitteeoftheInvestigativePanelforinvestiga-tionanddispositioninaccordancewithitsrules.TheInvestigativePanelshallappointoneofitsmemberstoberesponsiblefortheinvestigation.TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallsimultane-ouslyassignastaffinvestigatortoassistintheinvestigation.IftheinvestigationofthePanelestablishesprobablecausetobelievethattherespondenthasviolatedoneormoreoftheprovisionsofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserules,itshall:

(1)issuealetterofadmonition;(2)issueanInvestigativePanelReprimand;(3)issueaNoticeofDiscipline;or(4)referthecasetotheSupremeCourtofGeorgiafor

hearingbeforeaspecialmasterandfileaformalcomplaintwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgia,allashereinafterprovided.AllothercasesmaybeeitherdismissedbytheInvestigative

PanelorreferredtotheFeeArbitrationCommitteeortheCommitteeonLawyerImpairment.

(b)Theprimaryinvestigationshallbeconductedbythestaffinvestigators,thestafflawyersoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel,andthememberoftheInvestigativePanelresponsiblefortheinvestigation.TheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallfundtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselsothattheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselwillbeabletoadequatelyinvesti-gateandprosecuteallcases.

Rule 4-204.1. Notice of Investigation.(a)Uponcompletionofitsscreeningofagrievanceunder

Rule4-202,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallforwardthosegrievanceswhichappeartoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateBarofGeorgiatotheInvestigativePanel,orsubcommit-teeoftheInvestigativePanelbyservingaNoticeofInvestigationupontheRespondent.

(b)TheNoticeofInvestigationshallaccordtherespondentreasonablenoticeofthechargesagainsthimandareasonableopportunitytorespondtothechargesinwritingandshallcontain:

(1)astatementthatthegrievanceisbeingtransmittedtotheInvestigativePanel,orsubcommitteeoftheInvestigativePanel;

(2)acopyofthegrievance;(3)alistoftheRuleswhichappeartohavebeenviolated;(4)thenameandaddressofthePanelmemberassignedto

investigatethegrievanceandalistofthePanel,orsubcommit-teeofthePanel,members;

(5)astatementofrespondent’srighttochallengethecom-petency,qualificationsorobjectivityofanyPanelmember;(c)TheformfortheNoticeofInvestigationshallbe

approvedbytheInvestigativePanel.

Rule 4-204.2. Service of the Notice of Investigation. TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallcausetheNoticeofInvestigationtobeservedupontherespondentpursuanttoBarRule4-203.1.

Rule 4-204.3. Answer to Notice of Investigation Required.(a)Therespondentshallfileawrittenresponseunderoath

totheNoticeofInvestigationwiththepanelmemberassignedtoinvestigatethegrievancewithinthirty(30)daysofservice.

(b)ThewrittenresponsemustaddressspecificallyalloftheissuessetforthintheNoticeofInvestigation.


(c)Thepanelmemberassignedtoinvestigatethegrievancemayinthepanelmember’sdiscretiongrantextensionsoftimeforrespondent’sanswer.Anyrequestforextensionoftimemustbemadeinwritingonorbeforethedateonwhichtheresponsewasdueandthegrantofanextensionoftimemustalsobeinwriting.Extensionsoftimeshallbereasonableinlengthandshouldnotberoutinelygranted.

(d)Incaseswherethemaximumsanctionisdisbarmentorsuspension,failuretorespondbytherespondentmayauthorizetheInvestigativePanelorsubcommitteeofthePaneltosuspendtherespondentuntilaresponseisfiled.

(1)ThedeterminationthatanadequateresponsehasbeenfilediswithinthediscretionoftheInvestigativePanelorsub-committeeofthePanel.

(2)WhentheInvestigativePanelorsubcommitteeofthePaneldeterminesthatarespondenthasfailedtorespondinaccordancewiththerulesofthePanelandthattherespondentshouldbesuspended,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallnotifytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiathatthePanelhasmadesucharecommendation.TheSupremeCourtshallenteranappropriateOrder.

(3)WhentheInvestigativePanelorsubcommitteeofthePaneldeterminesthatarespondentwhohasbeensuspendedforfailuretorespondinaccordancewiththerulesofthePanelhasfiledanappropriateresponseandshouldbereinstated,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallnotifytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiathatthePanelhasmadesucharecommendation.TheSupremeCourtshallenteranappropriateOrder.

Rule 4-204.4. Finding of Probable Cause; Referral to Special Master.(a)InallcaseswhereintheInvestigativePanel,orsubcom-

mitteeofthePanel,findsprobablecauseoftherespondent’sviolationofoneormoreoftheprovisionsofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserulesandrefersthemattertotheSupremeCourtforappoint-mentofaspecialmaster,itshallfilewiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiathefollowingdocumentsinduplicate:

(1)noticeofitsfindingofprobablecause;(2)apetitionfortheappointmentofaspecialmasterand

proposedorderthereon;(3)aformalcomplaint,ashereinprovided.

(b)Thedocumentsspecifiedinparagraph(a)aboveshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtwithinthirty(30)daysofthefindingofprobablecauseunlesstheInvestigativePanel,orsubcommitteeofthePanel,oritsChairpersongrantsanextensionoftimeforthefilingofthedocuments.

Rule 4-204.5. Letters of Instruction.(a)Inadditiontodismissingacomplaint,theInvestigative

Panel,orsubcommitteeofthePanel,mayissuealetterofinstruc-tioninanydisciplinarycaseuponthefollowingconditions:

(1)thecasehasbeenthoroughlyinvestigated,therespon-denthasbeennotifiedofandhashadanopportunitytoanswerthechargesbroughtagainsthim,andthecasehasbeenreportedtotheentirePanel,orsubcommitteeofthePanel,assembledataregularlyscheduledmeeting;and

(2)theInvestigativePanel,orsubcommitteeofthePanel,asevidencedthroughthemajorityvoteofitsmemberspresentandvoting,isoftheopinionthattherespondenteither:

(i)hasnotengagedinconductwhichisinviolationoftheprovisionsofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserules;or

(ii)hasengagedinconductthatalthoughtechnicallyinviolationofsuchrulesisnotreprehensible,andhasresultedinnoharmorinjurytoanythirdperson,andisnotinviolationofthespiritofsuchrules;or

(iii)hasengagedinconductinviolationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityofPartIIIoftheserulesoranyrecognizedvoluntarycreedofprofessionalism;(b)Lettersofinstructionshallcontainastatementofthecon-

ductoftherespondentwhichmayhaveviolatedPartIIIoftheserulesorthevoluntarycreedofprofessionalism.

(c)Aletterofinstructionshallnotconstituteafindingofanydisciplinaryinfraction.

Rule 4-205. Confidential Discipline; In General. Inlieuoftheimpositionofanyotherdiscipline,theInvestigativePanelorasubcommitteeoftheInvestigativePanelmayissuelettersofformaladmonitionoranInvestigativePanelReprimandinanydisciplin-arycaseuponthefollowingconditions:

(a)thecasehasbeenthoroughlyinvestigated,therespondenthasbeennotifiedofandhashadanopportunitytoanswer,thechargesbroughtagainsthim,andthecasehasbeenreportedtotheentirePanelorasubcommitteeofthePanelassembledataregu-larlyscheduledmeeting;

(b)thePanelorasubcommitteeofthePanel,asevidencedthroughthemajorityvoteofitsmemberspresentandvoting,isof

theopinionthattherespondenthasengagedinconductwhichisinviolationoftheprovisionsofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserules;

(c)thePanelorasubcommitteeofthePanel,asevidencedthroughthemajorityvoteofitsmemberspresentandvoting,isoftheopinionthattheconductreferredtoinsubpart(b)hereofwasengagedin:

(1)inadvertently;or(2)purposefully,butinignoranceoftheapplicabledisci-

plinaryruleorrules;or(3)undersuchcircumstancesthatitistheopinionof

theInvestigativePanelorasubcommitteeoftheInvestigativePanelthattheprotectionofthepublicandrehabilitationoftherespondentwouldbebestachievedbytheissuanceofaletterofadmonitionoranInvestigativePanelReprimandratherthanbyanyotherformofdiscipline.

Rule 4-206. Confidential Discipline; Contents.(a)LettersofformaladmonitionandInvestigativePanel

ReprimandsshallcontainastatementofthespecificconductoftherespondentwhichviolatesPartIV,Chapter1oftheserules,shallstatethenameofthecomplainantandshallstatethereasonsforissuanceofsuchconfidentialdiscipline.

(b)Aletterofformaladmonitionshallalsocontainthefol-lowinginformation:

(1)therightoftherespondenttorejecttheletterofformaladmonitionunderRule4-207;

(2)theprocedureforrejectingtheletterofformaladmoni-tionunderRule4-207;and

(3)theeffectofanacceptedletterofformaladmonitionintheeventofathirdorsubsequentimpositionofdiscipline.(c)AnInvestigativePanelReprimandshallalsocontain

informationconcerningtheeffectoftheacceptanceofsuchrepri-mandintheeventofathirdorsubsequentimpositionofdiscipline.

Rule 4-207. Letters of Formal Admonition and Investigative Panel Reprimands; Notification and Right of Rejection. InanycasewheretheInvestigativePanel,orasubcommitteeofthePanel,votestoimposedisciplineintheformofaletterofformaladmonitionoranInvestigativePanelReprimand,suchvoteshallconsti-tutethePanel’sfindingofprobablecause.Therespondentshallhavetherighttoreject,inwriting,theimpositionofsuchdiscipline.Awrittenrejectionshallbedeemedanelectionbytherespondenttocontinuedis-ciplinaryproceedingsundertheserulesandshallcausetheInvestigativePaneltoproceedunderRule4-204.4

(a)Notificationtorespondentshallbeasfollows:(1)inthecaseoflettersofformaladmonition,theletterof

admonition;(2)inthecaseofanInvestigativePanelReprimand,the

letternotifyingtherespondenttoappearfortheadministrationofthereprimand;

(3)senttotherespondentathisorheraddressasreflectedinStateBarrecords,viacertifiedmail,returnreceiptrequested.(b)Rejectionbyrespondentshallbeasfollows:(1)inwriting,withinthirtydaysofnotification;(2)senttotheInvestigativePanelviacertifiedmail,return

receiptrequested,directedtotheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiaatthecurrentheadquartersaddressoftheStateBar.(c)Iftherespondentrejectstheimpositionofaformal

admonitionorInvestigativePanelReprimand,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallfileaformalcomplaintwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiawithinthirtydaysofreceiptoftherejectionunlesstheInvestigativePaneloritsChairpersongrantsanextensionoftimeforthefilingoftheformalcomplaint.

(d)InvestigativePanelReprimandsshallbeadministeredbeforethePanelbytheChairpersonorhisorherdesignee.

Rule 4-208. Confidential Discipline; Effect in Event of Subsequent Discipline. AnacceptedletterofformaladmonitionoranInvestigativePanelReprimandshallbeconsideredasadisciplinaryinfractionforthepur-poseofinvokingtheprovisionsofBarRule4-103.Intheeventofasubsequentdisciplinaryproceeding,theconfidentialityoftheimpositionofconfidentialdisciplineshallbewaivedandtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselmayusesuchinformationasaggravationofdiscipline.

Rule 4-208.1. Notice of Discipline.(a)InanycasewheretheInvestigativePanelorasubcom-

mitteeofthePanelfindsprobablecause,thePanelmayissueaNoticeofDisciplineimposinganylevelofpublicdisciplineautho-rizedbytheserules.

(b)UnlesstheNoticeofDisciplineisrejectedbytherespon-dentasprovidedinRule4-208.3,(1)therespondentshallbeindefault;(2)therespondentshallhavenorighttoanyevidentiaryhearing;and(3)therespondentshallbesubjecttosuchdiscipline


andfurtherproceedingsasmaybedeterminedbytheSupremeCourt.

Rule 4-208.2. Notice of Discipline; Contents; Service.(a)TheNoticeofDisciplineshallstatethefollowing:(1)TheRuleswhichtheInvestigativePanelfoundthatthe

respondentviolated,(2)Thefacts,whichifunrefuted,supportthefindingthat

suchRuleshavebeenviolated,(3)Thelevelofpublicdisciplinerecommendedtobe

imposed,(4)Thereasonswhysuchlevelofdisciplineisrecom-

mended,includingmattersconsideredinmitigationandmattersconsideredinaggravation,andsuchotherconsiderationsdeemedbytheInvestigativePaneltoberelevanttosuchrecom-mendation,

(5)TheentireprovisionsofRule4-208.3relatingtorejec-tionofNoticeofDiscipline.ThismaybesatisfiedbyattachingacopyoftheRuletotheNoticeofDisciplineandreferencingsameintheNotice,

(6)AcopyoftheMemorandumofGrievance,(7)Astatementofanypriordisciplineimposeduponthe

respondent,includingconfidentialdisciplineunderRules4-205to4-208.(b)TheoriginalNoticeofDisciplineshallbefiledwiththe

ClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,andacopyoftheNoticeofDisciplineshallbeservedupontherespondentpursuanttoBarRule4-203.1.

(c)Thissubparagraphisreserved.(d)Thissubparagraphisreserved.(e)Thissubparagraphisreserved.(f)Thissubparagraphisreserved.(g)TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallfilethedocuments

bywhichservicewasaccomplishedwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(h)ThelevelofdisciplinarysanctioninanyNoticeofDisciplinerejectedbytherespondentortheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallnotbebindingontheSpecialMaster,theReviewPanelortheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 4-208.3. Rejection of Notice of Discipline.(a)InordertorejectTheNoticeofDisciplinetherespondent

ortheOfficeofGeneralCounselmustfileaNoticeofRejectionoftheNoticeofDisciplinewiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiawithinthirty(30)daysfollowingserviceoftheNoticeofDiscipline.Intheeventservicewasaccomplishedbycertifiedmail,therespondentshallhavethirty-three(33)daysfromthedatetheNoticeofDisciplinewasmailedtofiletheNoticeofRejection.

(b)AnyNoticeofRejectionbytherespondentshallbeservedupontheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia.AnyNoticeofRejectionbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeservedupontherespondent.NorejectionbytheRespondentshallbeconsideredvalidunlesstheRespondentfilesawrittenresponsetothependinggrievanceatorbeforethefilingoftherejection.AcopyofsuchwrittenresponsemustalsobefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtatthetimeoffilingtheNoticeofRejection.

(c)ThetimelyfilingofaNoticeofRejectionshallconstituteanelectionfortheSupremeCourttoappointaSpecialMasterandthemattershallthereafterproceedpursuanttoRules4-209through4-225.

Rule 4-208.4. Formal Complaint Following Notice of Rejection of Discipline.

(a)TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallfileaformalcomplaintwithinthirtydaysfollowingthefilingofaNoticeofRejection.AtthesametimeaPetitionforAppointmentofSpecialMasterandproposedorderthereonshallbefiled.TheNoticeofDisciplineshalloperateasthenoticeoffindingofprobablecausebytheInvestigativePanel.

(b)TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselmayobtainextensionsoftimeforthefilingoftheformalcomplaintfromtheChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanelorhisorherdesignee.

(c)AftertherejectionofaNoticeofDisciplineandpriortothetimeofthefilingoftheformalcomplaint,theInvestigativePanelmayconsideranynewevidenceregardingthegrievanceandtakeappropriateaction.

Rule 4-209. Docketing by Supreme Court; Appointment of Special Master; Challenges to Special Master.

(a)Uponreceiptofafindingofprobablecause,apetitionforappointmentofaspecialmasterandproposedorderthereonandaformalcomplaintfromtheInvestigativePanel,theClerkoftheGeorgiaSupremeCourtshallfilethematterintherecordsoftheCourt,givethematteradocketnumberandnotifytheCourtthatappointmentofaspecialmasterisappropriate.Inthoseproceed-

ingswhereaNoticeofDisciplinehasbeenfiled,thefindingofprobablecauseneednotbefiled.

(b)Uponreceiptofapetition/motionforappointmentofaspecialmasterornotificationthataspecialmasterpreviouslyappointedhasbeendisqualified,theCourtwillnominateaspe-cialmastertoconductformaldisciplinaryproceedingsinsuchcomplaintwithinfourteendays.TheCourtshallselectasspecialmastersexperiencedmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhopossessareputationintheBarforethicalpractice;provided,thataspecialmastermaynotbeappointedtohearacomplaintagainstarespondentwhoresidesinthesamecircuitasthatinwhichthespecialmasterresides.

(c)UponbeingadvisedofappointmentofaspecialmasterbytheCourt,theClerkoftheCourtshallreturntheoriginalnoticeofdiscipline,rejectionofnoticeofdiscipline,ifapplicable,formalcomplaint,probablecausefinding,petitionforappointmentofspe-cialmasterandthesignedorderthereontotheOfficeofGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia.Uponnotificationoftheappointmentofaspecialmaster,theStateBarshallimmediatelyservetherespondentwiththeorderofappointmentofaspecialmasterandwithitsformalcomplaintashereinafterprovided.

(d)Withintendaysofserviceofthenoticeofappointmentofaspecialmaster,therespondentandtheStateBarshalllodgeanyandallobjectionsorchallengestheymayhavetothecompetency,qualificationsorimpartialityoftheSpecialMasterwiththechair-personoftheReviewPanel.AcopyoftheobjectionsorchallengesshallbeservedupontheopposingcounselandtheSpecialMaster,whomayrespondtosuchobjectionsorchallenge.ThechairpersonoftheReviewPanelshall,withinfifteendays,considerthechal-lenges,theresponsesofcounselandoftheSpecialMaster,ifany,determinewhethertheSpecialMasterisdisqualifiedandnotifythepartiesandtheSpecialMasterofhisorherdecision.Exceptionstothechairperson’sdenialofdisqualificationaresubjecttoreviewbytheentireReviewPaneland,thereafter,bytheSupremeCourtwhenexceptionsarisingduringtheevidentiaryhearingandexcep-tionstothereportoftheSpecialMasterandtheReviewPanelareproperlybeforetheCourt.IntheeventofdisqualificationofaSpecialMasterbythechairpersonoftheReviewPanel,theClerkoftheSupremeCourt,theSpecialMasterandthepartiesshallbenotifiedofthedisqualificationandnominationofasuccessorSpecialMastershallproceedasprovidedinthisrule.

Rule 4-209.1. Special Masters.(a)TheSupremeCourtshallselectandmaintainalimited

poolofqualifiedlawyerstoserveasSpecialMasters.ThenamesofthosesoselectedshallbeplacedonalistmaintainedbytheSupremeCourtandshallbepublishedannuallyinaregularStatepublication.Althoughnotmandatory,itispreferablethatalawyersoselectedshallonlyremainonsuchlistforfiveyears,sothatthetermmaygenerallybeconsideredtobefiveyears.Anylaw-yerwhosenameisremovedfromsuchlistshallbeeligibletobeselectedandplacedonthelistatanysubsequenttime.

(b)TrainingforSpecialMastersisrequired,subjecttothetermsofthisRule.SpecialMastersshallattendoneSpecialMastertrainingsessionwithintwelvemonthsafterselectionbytheSupremeCourttoserveasSpecialMaster.TheSpecialMastertrainingshallconsistofaminimumofasixhourplannedses-sionconductedbyICJEorICLEwithinputfromtheOfficeofGeneralCounsel,theRespondent’sBarandtheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.SpecialMasterswhofailtoattendsuchaminimumtrainingsessionshallperiodicallyberemovedfromconsiderationforappointmentinfuturecases.FailuretoattendsuchatrainingsessionshallnotbethebasisforadisqualificationofanySpecialMaster,assuchqualificationsshallremaininthesolediscretionoftheSupremeCourt.AttorneyswhoareservingasSpecialMastersatthetimethisRuleisamendedtorequireSpecialMastertrainingshallbeexemptfromtheprovisionsofthissubparagraph;how-ever,theyareencouragedtoparticipateinsuchtrainingsessions.

(c)TheSpecialMastersmaybepaidbytheStateBarofGeorgiafromthegeneraloperatingfundsonapercaseratetobesetbytheSupremeCourt.

(d)OnorbeforethefirstdayofMarchofeachyear,theSupremeCourtmaysettheamounttobepaidtotheSpecialMastersduringthefiscalyearbeginningthefirstdayofJulyofthatyear,whichrateshallcontinueuntiltheconclusionofthefis-calyearoftheStateBar.

Rule 4-209.2. Special Masters in Emergency Suspension Proceedings; Qualifications, Training, Terms, Powers and Duties.

(a)InadditiontothepoolofSpecialMastersdescribedinRule4-209.1,theSupremeCourtshallappointsixmembersoftheStateBar,andsuchadditionalnumberofmembersastheCourtmayfeeltobedesirableornecessaryfromtimetotime,toserveasSpecialMastersinemergencysuspensionshowcause


hearingsandinsuchothermattersasmaybedesignatedbytheSupremeCourt.Two(2)barmembersshallbeselectedfromeachofthethreefederaljudicialdistrictsinGeorgia,additionalmembersshallbeselectedfromappropriatefederaljudicialdis-trictsinGeorgiaasdeterminedbytheCourt,andallappointeesshallserveforfive-yearterms.ASpecialMastershallbeeligibleforreappointment.

(b)TrainingforSpecialMasterswhoserveinemergencysuspensionproceedingsisrequiredasprovidedinBarRule4-209.1(b).

(c)ASpecialMasterinanemergencysuspensionproceedingshallhavethefollowingpowersandduties:

(1)toexercisegeneralsupervisionoverproceedingsassignedtohimorherandtoperformalldutiesspecificallyenumeratedintheseRules;

(2)topermitnegotiationsbetweentheStateBarofGeorgiaandtheRespondent;

(3)toreceiveandevaluateanyPetitionforVoluntaryDisciplinefiledbyaRespondent,toreceiveandevaluateresponsestosuchpetitionfromtheOfficeofGeneralCounselandtomakerecommendationstotheSupremeCourtonsuchpetition;

(4)tograntcontinuancesandtoextendanytimelimitpro-videdforhereinastoanymatterpendingbeforehimorher;

(5)toapplytotheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforanordernamingasuccessorintheeventthattheSpecialMasterbecomesincapacitatedtoperformhisorherduties;

(6)tosignsubpoenasandexercisethepowersdescribedinRule4-221(b);

(7)topresideoverevidentiaryhearingsandtodecidequestionsoflawandfactraisedduringsuchhearings;and

(8)tomakearecommendationastowhethertheRespondentshouldbesuspendedpendingfurtherdisciplinaryproceedings.

Rule 4-210. Powers and Duties of Special Masters. Inaccordancewiththeserulesadulyappointedspecialmastershallhavethefollowingpowersandduties:

(a)toexercisegeneralsupervisionoverdisciplinarypro-ceedingsassignedtohimandtoperformalldutiesspecificallyenumeratedintheseRules;

(b)topassonallquestionsconcerningthesufficiencyoftheformalcomplaint;

(c)toconductthenegotiationsbetweentheStateBarofGeorgiaandtherespondent,whetheratapretrialmeetingsetbythespecialmasteroratanyothertime;

(d)toreceiveandevaluateanyPetitionforVoluntaryDiscipline;

(e)tograntcontinuancesandtoextendanytimelimitpro-videdforhereinastoanymatterpendingbeforehim;

(f)toapplytotheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforanordernaminghisorhersuccessorintheeventthatheorshebecomesincapacitatedtoperformhisorherdutiesorintheeventthatheorshelearnsthatheorsheandtherespondentresideinthesamecircuit;

(g)todeferactiononanycomplaintpendingbeforehimwhenheorshelearnsofthedocketingofanothercomplaintagainstthesamerespondentandbelievesthatthenewcomplaintwillbeassignedtohimbytheSupremeCourt;

(h)tohearanddetermineactiononthecomplaints,wheretherearemultiplecomplaintsagainstarespondentgrowingoutofdifferenttransactions,whethertheyinvolveoneormorecomplainants,asseparatecounts,andmayproceedtomakerec-ommendationsoneachcountasconstitutingaseparateoffense;

(i)tosignsubpoenasandexercisethepowersdescribedinRule4-221(b);

(j)topresideoverevidentiaryhearingsandtodecideques-tionsoflawandfactraisedduringsuchhearings;

(k)tomakefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawashere-inafterprovidedandtosubmithisorherfindingsforconsiderationbytheReviewPanel;

(l)toexercisegeneralsupervisionoverdiscoverybypartiestodisciplinaryproceedingsandtoconductsuchhearingsandsignallappropriatepleadingsandorderspertainingtosuchdiscoveryasareprovidedforbythelawofGeorgiaapplicabletodiscoveryincivilcases.

Rule 4-211. Formal Complaint; Service.(a)Withinthirtydaysafterafindingofprobablecause,a

formalcomplaintshallbepreparedwhichshallspecifywithrea-sonableparticularitytheactscomplainedofandthegroundsfordisciplinaryaction.Aformalcomplaintshallincludethenamesandaddressesofwitnessessofarasthenknown.Acopyoftheformalcomplaintshallbeservedupontherespondentafternomi-nationofaSpecialMasterbytheSupremeCourt.Inthosecases

whereaNoticeofDisciplinehasbeenfiledandrejected,thefilingoftheformalcomplaintshallbegovernedbythetimeperiodsetforthinRule4-208.4.Theformalcomplaintshallbeservedpursu-anttoBarRule4-203.1.

(b)Thissubparagraphisreserved.(c)Atallstagesoftheproceedingboththerespondentand

theStateBarofGeorgiamayberepresentedbycounsel.CounselrepresentingtheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeauthorizedtoprepareandsignnotices,pleadings,motions,complaints,andcer-tificatesforandinbehalfoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandtheStateDisciplinaryBoard.

Rule 4-211.1. Dismissal after Formal Complaint. AtanytimeaftertheInvestigativePanelfindsprobablecause,theOfficeofGeneralCounselmaydismisstheproceedingwiththeconsentoftheChairpersonorViceChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanelorwiththeconsentofanythreemembersoftheInvestigativePanel.

Rule 4-212. Answer of Respondent; Discovery.(a)Therespondentshallservehisorheranswertotheformal

complaintoftheStateBarwithinthirtydaysafterserviceoftheformalcomplaint.Intheeventthatrespondentfailstoanswerortoobtainanextensionoftimeforhisorheranswer,thefactsallegedandviolationschargedintheformalcomplaintshallbedeemedadmitted.Intheeventtherespondent’sanswerfailstoaddressspe-cificallytheissuesraisedintheformalcomplaint,thefactsallegedandviolationschargedintheformalcomplaintandnotspecificallyaddressedintheanswershallbedeemedadmitted.Arespondentmayobtainanextensionoftimenottoexceedfifteendaystofiletheanswerfromthespecialmaster,or,whenachallengetothespecialmasterispending,fromthechairpersonoftheReviewPanel.Extensionsoftimeforthefilingofananswershallnotberoutinelygranted.

(b)Thependencyofobjectionsorchallengestooneormorespecialmastersshallprovidenojustificationforarespondent’sfailuretofilehisorheranswerorforfailureoftheStateBarortherespondenttoengageindiscovery.

(c)BothpartiestothedisciplinaryproceedingmayengageindiscoveryundertherulesofpracticeandprocedurethenapplicabletocivilcasesintheStateofGeorgia.

(d)InlieuoffilingananswertotheformalcomplaintoftheStateBar,therespondentmaysubmittothespecialmasteraPetitionforVoluntaryDiscipline;provided,however,thateachsuchpetitionshallcontainadmissionsoffactandadmissionsofconductinviolationofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserulessufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofdiscipline.AsprovidedinRule4-210(d),thespecialmastermaysolicitaresponsetosuchpetitionfromBarcounsel.

Rule 4-213. Evidentiary Hearing.(a)Withinninetydaysafterthefilingofrespondent’s

answertotheformalcomplaintorthetimeforfilingoftheanswer,whicheverislater,thespecialmastershallproceedtohearthecase.Theevidentiaryhearingshallbestenographicallyreportedandmaybetranscribedattherequestandexpenseoftherequestingparty.Whenthehearingiscomplete,thespecialmastershallproceedtomakefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawandfileareportwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardashereinafterprovided.AllegederrorsinthetrialmaybereviewedbytheSupremeCourtwhenthefindingsandrec-ommendationsofdisciplineoftheReviewPanelarefiledwiththeCourt.Thereshallbenodirectappealfromsuchproceed-ingsofthespecialmaster.

(b)Uponashowingofnecessityandashowingoffinancialinabilitybytherespondenttopayforthetranscription,thespecialmastershallordertheStateBarofGeorgiatoprovidethetranscript.

Rule 4-214. Thisruleisreserved.



Rule 4-217. Report of the Special Master to the Review Panel.(a)Withinthirtydaysfromreceiptofthetranscriptofthe

evidentiaryhearing,theSpecialMastershallprepareareportwhichshallcontainthefollowing:

(1)findingsoffactontheissuesraisedbytheformalcom-plaint,and

(2)conclusionsoflawontheissuesraisedbytheplead-ingsoftheparties;and

(3)arecommendationofdiscipline.(b)TheSpecialMastershallfilehisorheroriginalreportand

recommendationwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard


andshallserveacopyontherespondentandcounselfortheStateBarpursuanttoRule4-203.1.

(c)ThirtydaysaftertheSpecialMaster’sreportandrec-ommendationisfiled,theSpecialMastershalldirecttheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardtofiletheoriginalrecordinthecasedirectlywiththeSupremeCourtunlesseitherpartyrequestsreviewbytheReviewPanelasprovidedinSubsection(d)ofthisrule.IntheeventneitherpartyrequestsreviewbytheReviewPanelandthemattergoesdirectlytotheSupremeCourt,bothpar-tiesshallbedeemedtohavewaivedanyrighttheymayhaveundertherulestofileexceptionswithormakerequestfororalargumenttotheSupremeCourt.AnyreviewundertakenbytheSupremeCourtshallbesolelyontheoriginalrecord.

(d)UponreceiptoftheSpecialMaster’sreport,thepartiesmayrequestreviewbytheReviewPanelasprovidedinRule4-218.TherequestshallbesubmittedinwritingtotheSpecialMasterwithinthirtydaysaftertheSpecialMaster’sreportisfiledwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard.Acopyoftherequestshallbeservedontheopposingparty.Uponreceiptofatimelywrittenrequest,theSpecialMastershalldirecttheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardtoprepareandfiletherecordandreportwiththeReviewPanel.

Rule 4-218. Findings by the Review Panel.(a)UponreceiptofthereportfromaSpecialMasterpursuant

toRule4-217(d),theReviewPanelshallconsidertherecord,makefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawanddeterminewhetherarecommendationofdisciplinaryactionwillbemadetotheSupremeCourtandthenatureofsuchrecommendeddiscipline.ThefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawmadebyaSpecialMastershallnotbebindingonthePanelandmaybereversedbyitonthebasisoftherecordsubmittedtothePanelbytheSpecialMaster.

(b)Therespondentshallhavetherighttochallengethecompetency,qualifications,orobjectivityofanymemberoftheReviewPanelconsideringthecaseagainsthimunderaprocedureasprovidedforintherulesofthePanel.

(c)ThereshallbenodenovohearingbeforetheReviewPanelexceptbyunanimousconsentofthePanel.

(d)TheReviewPanelmaygrantrehearings,ornewtrials,forsuchreasons,insuchmanner,onsuchissuesandwithinsuchtimesastheendsofjusticemayrequire.

(e)TheReviewPanelmayconsiderexceptionstothereportofthespecialmasterandmayinitsdiscretiongrantoralargument.ExceptionsandbriefsshallbefiledwiththeReviewPanel,inaccordancewithBarRule4-221(f),nolaterthantwentydayspriortothenextscheduledmeeting.Therespondingpartyshallhavetendaysafterserviceoftheexceptionswithinwhichtorespond.

(f)TheReviewPanelshallfileitsreportandthecom-pleterecordinthedisciplinaryproceedingwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourt.AcopyofthePanel’sreportshallbeservedupontherespondent.

Rule 4-219. Judgments and Protective Orders.(a)AftereithertheReviewPanel’sreportortheSpecial

Master’sreportisfiledwiththeSupremeCourt,therespondentandtheStateBarmayfilewiththeCourtanywrittenexceptions,supportedbywrittenargument,eachmayhavetothereportsub-jecttotheprovisionsofRule4-217(c).AllsuchexceptionsshallbefiledwiththeCourtwithintwentydaysofthedatethatthereportisfiledwiththeCourtandacopyservedupontheopposingparty.TherespondingpartyshallhaveanadditionaltwentydaystofileitsresponsewiththeCourt.Thecourtmaygrantoralargumentonanyexceptionfiledwithituponapplicationforsuchargumentbyapartytothedisciplinaryproceedings.TheCourtwillpromptlyconsiderthereportoftheReviewPanelortheSpecialMaster,anyexceptions,andanyresponsesfiledbyanypartytosuchexcep-tions,andenterjudgmentupontheformalcomplaint.AcopyoftheCourt’sjudgmentshallbetransmittedtotheStateBarandtherespondentbytheCourt.

(b)IncasesinwhichtheSupremeCourtordersdisbarment,voluntarysurrenderoflicenseorsuspension,ortherespondentisdisbarredorsuspendedonaNoticeofDiscipline,theReviewPanelshallpublishinalocalnewspaperornewspapersandontheofficialStateBarwebsite,noticeofthediscipline,includingtheRespondent’sfullnameandbusinessaddress,thenatureofthedisciplineimposedandtheeffectivedates.

(c)(1)Afterafinaljudgmentofdisbarmentorsuspension,

includingadisbarmentorsuspensiononaNoticeofDiscipline,therespondentshallimmediatelyceasethepracticeoflawinGeorgiaandshall,withinthirtydays,notifyallclientsofhisorherinabilitytorepresentthemandofthenecessityforpromptlyretainingnewcounsel,andshalltakeallactionsnecessarytoprotecttheinterestsofhisorherclients.Withinforty-fivedays

afterafinaljudgmentofdisbarmentorsuspension,therespon-dentshallcertifytotheCourtthatheorshehassatisfiedtherequirementsofthisRule.ShouldtherespondentfailtocomplywiththerequirementsofthisRule,theSupremeCourt,uponitsownmotionoruponmotionoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel,andaftertendaysnoticetotherespondentandproofofhisorherfailuretonotifyorprotecthisorherclients,mayholdtherespondentincontemptandorderthatamemberormembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiatakechargeofthefilesandrecordsoftherespondentandproceedtonotifyallclientsandtotakesuchstepsasseemindicatedtoprotecttheirinterest.MotionsforreconsiderationmaybetakenfromtheissuanceordenialofsuchprotectiveorderbyeithertherespondentorbytheStateBarofGeorgia.

(2)AfterafinaljudgmentofdisbarmentorsuspensionunderPartIVoftheseRules,includingadisbarmentorsuspen-siononaNoticeofDiscipline,therespondentshalltakesuchactionnecessarytocausetheremovalofanyindiciaoftherespondentasalawyer,legalassistant,legalclerkorpersonwithsimilarstatus.Intheeventtherespondentshouldmaintainapresenceinanofficewherethepracticeoflawisconducted,therespondentshallnot:

(i)haveanycontactwiththeclientsoftheofficeeitherinperson,bytelephoneorinwriting;or

(ii)haveanycontactwithpersonswhohavelegaldealingswiththeofficeeitherinperson,bytelephone,orinwriting.(d)UponafinaldeterminationbytheCourtthatanattorney

hasdisappeared,died,orbecomephysicallyormentallyincapaci-tated,orposesasubstantialthreatofharmtohisorherclientsorthepublic,andthatnopartner,associateorotherappropriaterepresenta-tiveisavailabletonotifyhisorherclientsofthisfacttheSupremeCourtmayorderthatamemberormembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiabeappointedasreceivertotakechargeoftheattorney’sfilesandrecords.Suchreceivershallreviewthefiles,notifytheattorney’sclientsandtakesuchstepsasseemindicatedtoprotecttheinterestsoftheclients,theattorneyandthepublic.Amotionforreconsiderationmaybetakenfromtheissuanceordenialofsuchprotectiveorderbytherespondent,hisorherpartners,associatesorlegalrepresentativesorbytheStateBarofGeorgia.

(e)AnymemberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaappointedbytheSupremeCourtasreceivertotakechargeofthefilesandrecordsofadisciplined,deceased,incapacitated,imprisonedordisappear-ingattorneyundertheserulesshallnotbepermittedtodiscloseanyinformationcontainedinthefilesandrecordsinhisorhercarewithouttheconsentoftheclienttowhomsuchfileorrecordrelates,exceptasclearlynecessarytocarryouttheorderoftheCourt,oruponapplicationbyorderoftheSupremeCourt.

(f)Anypersonservingasareceiverundertheserulesshallbeimmunefromsuitforanyconductinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

Rule 4-220. Notice of Punishment or Acquittal; Administration of Reprimands.

(a)Uponafinaljudgmentofdisbarmentorsuspension,noticeoftheactiontakenshallbegivenbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiatotheclerksofallcourtsofrecordinthisStateandtotheSecretaryoftheStateBarofGeorgia,andthenameoftherespondentinquestionshallbestrickenfromtherollsofsaidcourtsandfromtherollsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaeitherpermanently,incaseofdisbarment,orfortheprescribedperiodincaseofsuspension.

(b)ReviewPanelReprimandsshallbeadministeredbeforethePanelbythechairpersonorhisorherdesignee.

(c)PublicReprimandsshallbepreparedbytheReviewPanel,theChairpersonoftheReviewPanelorhisorherdesignee,andshallbereadinopencourt,inthepresenceoftherespon-dent,bythejudgeofthesuperiorcourtinthecountyinwhichtherespondentresidesorinthecountyinwhichthedisciplin-aryinfractionoccurred,withthelocationtobespecifiedbytheReviewPanel,subjecttotheapprovaloftheSupremeCourt.

(d)AfteraPublicorReviewPanelReprimandhasbeenadministered,acertificaterecitingthefactoftheadministrationofthereprimandandthedateofitsadministrationshallbefiledwiththeSupremeCourt.Thereshallbeattachedtosuchcertificateacopyofthereprimand.Boththecertificateandthecopyofthereprimandshallbecomeapartoftherecordinthedisciplinaryproceeding.

(e)Intheeventofafinaljudgmentofacquittal,theStateBarofGeorgiashall,ifdirectedbytherespondent,givenoticethereoftotheclerkofthesuperiorcourtofthecountyinwhichtherespon-dentresides.Therespondentmaygivereasonablepublicnoticeofthejudgmentoracquittal.


Rule 4-221. Procedures.(a)Oaths.Beforeenteringuponhisorherdutiesasherein

providedeachmemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandeachspecialmastershallsubscribetoanoathtobeadministeredbyanypersonauthorizedtoadministeroathsunderthelawsofthisState,suchoathtobeinwritingandfiledwiththeExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarofGeorgia.Theformofsuchoathshallbe:

“IdosolemnlyswearthatIwillfaithfullyandimpartiallydischargeandperformallofthedutiesincumbentuponmeasamemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia/specialmasteraccordingtothebestofmyabilityandunderstandingandagreeabletothelawsandConstitutionofthisStateandtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatessohelpmeGod.”

(b)WitnessesandEvidence;Contempt.(1)TherespondentandtheStateBarshallhavetheright

torequiretheissuanceofsubpoenasfortheattendanceofwit-nessestotestifyortoproducebooksandpapers.TheStateDisciplinaryBoardoraspecialmastershallhavepowertocom-peltheattendanceofwitnessesandtheproductionofbooks,papers,anddocuments,relevanttothematterunderinvestiga-tion,bysubpoena,andasfurtherprovidedbylawincivilcasesunderthelawsofGeorgia.

(2)Thefollowingshallsubjectapersontoruleforcon-temptofthespecialmasterorPanel:

(i)disregard,inanymannerwhatever,ofasubpoenaissuedpursuanttoRule4-221(b)(1),

(ii)refusaltoansweranypertinentorproperquestionofaspecialmasterorBoardmember,or

(iii)wilfulorflagrantviolationofalawfuldirectiveofaspecialmasterorBoardmember.

ItshallbethedutyofthechairpersonoftheaffectedPanelorspecialmastertoreportthefacttotheChiefJudgeofthesuperiorcourtinandforthecountyinwhichsaidinvestigation,trialorhearingisbeingheld.ThesuperiorcourtshallhavejurisdictionofthematterandshallfollowtheproceduresforcontemptasareapplicableinthecaseofawitnesssubpoenaedtoappearandgiveevidenceonthetrialofacivilcasebeforethesuperiorcourtunderthelawsinGeorgia.(3)AnymemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandany

specialmastershallhavepowertoadministeroathsandaffir-mationsandtoissueanysubpoenahereinprovidedfor.

(4)DepositionsmaybetakenbytherespondentortheStateBarinthesamemannerandunderthesameprovisionsasmaybedoneincivilcasesunderthelawsofGeorgia,andsuchdepositionsmaybeuseduponthetrialoraninvestigationorhearinginthesamemannerassuchdepositionsareadmissibleinevidenceincivilcasesunderthelawsofGeorgia.

(5)Allwitnessesattendinganyhearingprovidedforundertheserulesshallbeentitledtothesamefeesasnowareallowedbylawtowitnessesattendingtrialsincivilcasesinthesupe-riorcourtsofthisStateundersubpoena,andsaidfeesshallbeassessedagainstthepartiestotheproceedingsundertheruleoflawapplicabletocivilsuitsinthesuperiorcourtsofthisState.

(6)WheneverthedepositionofanypersonistobetakeninthisStatepursuanttothelawsofanotherstate,territory,provinceorcommonwealth,oroftheUnitedStatesorofanothercountryforuseinattorneydiscipline,fitnessordis-abilityproceedingsthere,thechairpersonoftheInvestigativePanel,orhisorherdesigneeuponpetition,mayissueasum-monsorsubpoenaasprovidedinthissectiontocompeltheattendanceofwitnessesandproductionofdocumentsatsuchdeposition.(c)VenueofHearings.(1)Thehearingsonallcomplaintsandchargesagainst

residentrespondentsshallbeheldinthecountyofresidenceoftherespondentunlessheorsheotherwiseagrees.

(2)WheretherespondentisanonresidentoftheStateofGeorgiaandthecomplaintaroseintheStateofGeorgia,thehearingshallbeheldinthecountywherethecomplaintarose.

(3)WhentherespondentisanonresidentoftheStateofGeorgiaandtheoffenseoccursoutsidetheState,thehearingmaybeheldinthecountyoftheStateBarofGeorgiaheadquarters.

(d)ConfidentialityofInvestigationsandProceedings.(1)TheStateBarshallmaintainasconfidentialalldisci-

plinaryinvestigationsandproceedingspendingatthescreeningorinvestigativestage,unlessotherwiseprovidedbytheserules.

(2)AfteraproceedingundertheserulesisfiledwiththeSupremeCourt,allevidentiaryandmotionshearingsshallbeopentothepublicandallreportsrenderedshallbepublicdocuments.

(3)Nothingintheserulesshallprohibitthecomplainant,respondentorthirdpartyfromdisclosinginformationregard-

ingadisciplinaryproceeding,unlessotherwiseorderedbytheSupremeCourtoraSpecialMasterinproceedingsundertheserules.

(4)TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarortheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardmayrevealorauthorizedisclosureofinformationwhichwouldotherwisebeconfidentialunderthisruleunderthefollowingcircumstances:

(i)IntheeventofachargeofwrongfulconductagainstanymemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoranypersonwhoisotherwiseconnectedwiththedisciplinaryproceedinginanyway,eitherPaneloftheBoardoritsChairpersonorhisorherdesignee,mayauthorizetheuseofinformationconcerningdisciplinaryinvestigationsorproceedingstoaidinthedefenseagainstsuchcharge.

(ii)IntheeventtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselreceivesinformationthatsuggestscriminalactivity,suchinformationmayberevealedtotheappropriatecriminalprosecutor.

(iii)Intheeventofsubsequentdisciplinaryproceed-ingsagainstalawyer,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselmay,inaggravationofdisciplineinthependingdisciplin-arycase,revealtheimpositionofconfidentialdisciplineunderRules4-205to4-208andfactsunderlyingtheimpo-sitionofdiscipline.

(iv)Acomplainantorlawyerrepresentingthecom-plainantmaybenotifiedofthestatusordispositionofthecomplaint.

(v)Whenpublicstatementsthatarefalseormislead-ingaremadeaboutanyotherwiseconfidentialdisciplinarycase,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselmaydiscloseallinformationnecessarytocorrectsuchfalseormisleadingstatements.(5)TheOfficeofGeneralCounselmayrevealconfidential

informationtothefollowingpersonsifitappearsthattheinfor-mationmayassisttheminthedischargeoftheirduties:

(i)TheCommitteeontheArbitrationofAttorneyFeeDisputesorthecomparablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(ii)TheTrusteesoftheClients’SecurityFundorthecomparablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(iii)TheJudicialNominatingCommissionorthecomparablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(iv)TheLawyerAssistanceProgramorthecompa-rablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(v)TheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicantsorthecomparablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(vi)TheJudicialQualificationsCommissionorthecomparablebodyinotherjurisdictions;

(vii)TheExecutiveCommitteewiththespe-cificapprovalofthefollowingrepresentativesoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard:thechairperson,thevice-chairpersonandathirdrepresentativedesignatedbythechairperson;

(viii)TheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoard;(ix)TheConsumerAssistanceProgram;(x)TheGeneralCounselOverviewCommittee;and(xi)Anofficeorcommitteechargedwithdiscipline

appointedbytheUnitedStatesCircuitorDistrictCourtorthehighestcourtofanystate,DistrictofColumbia,com-monwealthorpossessionoftheUnitedStates.(6)AnyinformationusedbytheOfficeoftheGeneral

CounselinaproceedingunderRule4-108orinaproceedingtoobtainaReceivertoadministerthefilesofamemberoftheStateBar,shallnotbeconfidentialunderthisrule.

(7)TheOfficeofGeneralCounselmayrevealconfidentialinformationwhenrequiredbylaworcourtorder.

(8)Theauthorityordiscretiontorevealconfidentialinformationunderthisruleshallnotconstituteawaiverofanyevidentiary,statutoryorotherprivilegewhichmaybeassertedbytheStateBarortheStateDisciplinaryBoardunderBarRulesorapplicablelaw.

(9)NothinginthisruleshallprohibittheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselortheInvestigativePanelfrominterviewingpotentialwitnessesorplacingtheNoticeofInvestigationoutforservicebysherifforotherauthorizedperson.

(10)MembersoftheOfficeofGeneralCounselandStateDisciplinaryBoardmayrespondtospecificinquiriesconcern-ingmattersthathavebeenmadepublicbythecomplainant,respondentorthirdpartiesbutareotherwiseconfidentialundertheserulesbyacknowledgingtheexistenceandstatusoftheproceeding.

(11)TheStateBarshallnotdiscloseinformationconcern-ingdisciplineimposedonalawyerunderpriorSupremeCourt


Rulesthatwasconfidentialwhenimposed,unlessauthorizedtodosobysaidpriorrules.(e)BurdenofProof;Evidence.(1)InallproceedingsunderthisChaptertheburdenof

proofshallbeontheStateBarofGeorgia,exceptforproceed-ingsunderBarRule4-106.

(2)InallproceedingsunderthischapteroccurringafterafindingofprobablecauseasdescribedinRule4-204.4,theproceduresandrulesofevidenceapplicableincivilcasesunderthelawsofGeorgiashallapply,exceptthatthequantumofproofrequiredoftheStateBarshallbeclearandconvincingevidence.(f)PleadingsandCopies.Originalpleadingsshallbefiled

withtheappropriatePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandcopiesserveduponthespecialmasterandallpartiestothedisciplinaryproceeding.Depositionsandotheroriginaldiscoveryshallberetainedbycoun-selandshallnotbefiledexceptaspermittedundertheUniformRulesofSuperiorCourt.

(g)PleadingsandCommunicationsPrivileged.PleadingsandoralandwrittenstatementsofmembersoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard,membersanddesigneesoftheCommitteeonLawyerImpairment,specialmasters,Barcounselandinvestigators,com-plainants,witnesses,andrespondentsandtheircounselmadetooneanotherorfiledintherecordduringanyinvestigation,inter-vention,hearingorotherdisciplinaryproceedingunderthisPartIV,andpertinenttothedisciplinaryproceeding,aremadeinper-formanceofalegalandpublicduty,areabsolutelyprivileged,andundernocircumstancesformthebasisforarightofaction.

Rule 4-222. Limitation.(a)NoproceedingunderPartIV,Chapter2,shallbebrought

unlessaMemorandumofGrievancehasbeenreceivedatStateBarofGeorgiaheadquartersorinstitutedbytheInvestigativePanelwithinfouryearsafterthecommissionoftheact.Provided,how-ever,thislimitationshallbetolledduringanyperiodoftime,nottoexceedtwoyears,thattheoffenderortheoffenseisunknown,theoffender’swhereaboutsareunknown,ortheoffender’snameisremovedfromtherollofthoseauthorizedtopracticelawinthisState.

(b)ReferralofamattertotheInvestigativePanelbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshalloccurwithintwelvemonthsofthereceiptoftheMemorandumofGrievanceatStateBarofGeorgiaheadquartersorinstitutionofaMemorandumofGrievancebytheInvestigativePanel.

Rule 4-223. Advisory Opinions.(a)AnyFormalAdvisoryOpinionissuedpursuanttoRule

4-403whichisnotthereafterdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiashallbebindingontheStateBarofGeorgia,theStateDisciplinaryBoard,andthepersonwhorequestedtheopinion,inanysubsequentdisciplinaryproceedinginvolvingthatperson.FormalAdvisoryOpinionswhichhavebeenapprovedormodifiedbytheSupremeCourtpursuanttoRule4-403shallalsobebindinginsubsequentdisciplinaryproceedingswhichdonotinvolvethepersonwhorequestedtheopinion.

(b)ItshallbeconsideredasmitigationtoanygrievanceundertheserulesthattherespondenthasactedinaccordancewithandinreasonablerelianceuponawrittenInformalAdvisoryOpinionrequestedbytherespondentpursuanttoRule4-401oraFormalAdvisoryOpinionissuedpursuanttoRule4-403,butnotreviewedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 4-224. Expungement of Records.(a)Therecordofanygrievanceagainstarespondent

undertheseruleswhichdoesnotresultindisciplineagainsttherespondentshallbeexpungedbytheStateDisciplinaryBoardinaccordancewiththefollowing:

(1)thosegrievancesclosedbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselafterscreeningpursuanttoRule4-202(c)shallbeexpungedafteroneyear;

(2)thosegrievancesdismissedbytheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardafteraprobablecauseinvesti-gationpursuanttoRule4-204(a)shallbeexpungedaftertwoyears;and

(3)thosecomplaintsdismissedbytheSupremeCourtafterformalproceedingsshallbeexpungedaftertwoyears.(b)Definition.Theterms“expunge”and“expunction”shall

meanthatallrecordsorotherevidenceoftheexistenceofthecomplaintshallbedestroyed.

(c)EffectofExpungement.Afterafilehasbeenexpunged,anyagencyresponsetoaninquiryrequiringareferencetothemattershallstatethatanyrecordtheagencymayhavehadofsuchmatterhasbeenexpungedpursuanttocourtruleand,inaddition,shallstatethatnoinferenceadversetotherespondentistobe

drawnonthebasisoftheincidentinquestion.Therespondentmayansweranyinquiryrequiringareferencetoanexpungedmatterbystatingthatthegrievanceorformalcomplaintwasdismissedandthereafterexpungedpursuanttocourtrule.

(d)RetentionofRecords.UponapplicationtotheStateDisciplinaryBoardbybarcounsel,forgoodcauseshownandwithnoticetotherespondentandopportunitytobeheard,recordswhichshouldotherwisebeexpungedunderthisRulemayberetainedforsuchadditionalperiodoftimenotexceedingthreeyearsastheStateDisciplinaryBoarddeemsappropriate.Counselmayseekafurtherextensionoftheperiodforwhichretentionoftherecordsisauthorizedwheneverapreviousapplicationhasbeengrantedforthemaximumperiodpermittedhereunder.

(e)Alawyermayrespondinthenegativewhenaskedifthereareanycomplaintsagainstthelawyerifthematterhasbeenexpungedpursuanttothisrule.Beforemakinganegativeresponsetoanysuchinquiry,thelawyershallconfirmtheexpunctionoftherecordandshallnotpresumethatanymatterhasbeenexpunged.

(f)Alawyermayrespondinthenegativewhenaskedifheorshehaseverbeenprofessionallydisciplinedordeterminedtohaveviolatedanyprofessionaldisciplinaryrulesifallgrievancesfiledagainstthelawyerhaveeitherbeendismissedordismissedwithaletterofinstruction.

Rule 4-225. Jurisdiction. TheStateDisciplinaryBoardandanypersonwhoisconnectedwithdisciplinaryproceedingsinanywayshallnotbesubjecttothejurisdictionofanycourtotherthantheSupremeCourtwithrespectthereto,exceptasprovidedinRules4-214,4-215and4-216.

Rule 4-226. Immunity. TheregulatoryproceedingsoftheStateBararejudicialinnature.Therefore,membersoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard,membersanddes-igneesoftheCommitteeonLawyerImpairment,specialmasters,Barcounsel,specialprosecutors,investigatorsandstaffareentitledtojudi-cialimmunitywhenengagedinregulatoryactivities.

Rule 4-227. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline.(a)Apetitionforvoluntarydisciplineshallcontainadmis-

sionsoffactandadmissionsofconductinviolationofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserulessufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofdiscipline.

(b)Priortotheissuanceofaformalcomplaint,arespondentmaysubmitapetitionforvoluntarydisciplineseekinganylevelofdisciplineauthorizedundertheserules.

(1)ThosepetitionsseekingprivatedisciplineshallbefiledwiththeOfficeofGeneralCounselandassignedtoamemberoftheInvestigativePanel.TheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallconductaninvestigationanddeterminewhethertoacceptorrejectthepetitionasoutlinedatBarRule4-203(a)(9).

(2)ThosepetitionsseekingpublicdisciplineshallbefileddirectlywiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourt.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallhave30dayswithinwhichtofilearesponse.Thecourtshallissueanappropriateorder.(c)AftertheissuanceofaformalcomplaintaRespondent

maysubmitapetitionforvoluntarydisciplineseekinganylevelofdisciplineauthorizedundertheserules.

(1)ThepetitionshallbefiledwiththeSpecialMasterwhoshallallowbarcounsel30dayswithinwhichtorespond.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselmayassenttothepetitionormayfilearesponse,statingobjectionsandgivingthereasonsthere-fore.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallserveacopyofitsresponseupontherespondent.

(2)TheSpecialMastershallconsiderthepetition,theBar’sresponseand,therecordasitthenexistsandmayacceptorrejectthepetitionforvoluntarydiscipline.

(3)TheSpecialMastermayrejectapetitionforsuchcauseorcausesasseemappropriatetotheSpecialMaster.Suchcausesmayincludebutarenotlimitedtoafindingthat:

(i)thepetitionfailstocontainadmissionsoffactandadmissionsofconductinviolationofPartIV,Chapter1oftheserulessufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofdisci-pline;

(ii)thepetitionfailstorequestappropriatediscipline;(iii)thepetitionfailstocontainsufficientinformation

concerningtheadmissionsoffactandtheadmissionsofconduct;

(iv)therecordintheproceedingdoesnotcontainsuf-ficientinformationuponwhichtobaseadecisiontoacceptorreject.(4)TheSpecialMaster’sdecisiontorejectapetitionfor

voluntarydisciplinedoesnotprecludethefilingofasubsequentpetitionandisnotsubjecttoreviewbyeithertheReviewPanelortheSupremeCourt.IftheSpecialMasterrejectsapetition


forvoluntarydiscipline,thedisciplinarycaseshallproceedasprovidedbytheserules.

(5)IftheSpecialMasteracceptsthepetitionforvoluntarydiscipline,s/heshallenterareportmakingfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawanddeliversametotheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard.TheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallfilethereportandthecompleterecordinthedisciplinaryproceedingwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourt.AcopyoftheSpecialMaster’sreportshallbeservedupontherespondent.TheCourtshallissueanappropriateorder.

(6)PursuanttoBarRule4-210(e),theSpecialMastermayinhisorherdiscretionextendanyofthetimelimitsintheserulesinordertoadequatelyconsiderapetitionforvoluntarydiscipline.

RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PANEL STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD

PursuanttothepowersanddutiesaccordeditinRule4-203(a)(8)inPartIVoftheRulesandRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,theInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestablishesthefollowingrulesofconductandprocedure.

Rule 1. Oaths of Office. MembersoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshall,upontheirselection,befurnishedbytheExecutiveDirectorwiththeoathofofficerequiredofthem,shallimmediatelysigntheoathfurnishedtothem,andshallreturnthesignedoathofofficetotheExecutiveDirectorwhowillpreservetheoathsintherecordsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaatStateBarHeadquarters.

Rule 2. Powers and Duties. TheInvestigativePanelshallhavesuchpowersandperformsuchdutiesasaresetforthinPartIVoftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,referredtoasthe“BarRules.”

Rule 3. Meetings. TheInvestigativePanelorasubcommitteethereofshallmeetasoutlinedatBarRule4-201(a)(4)andatsuchdates,timesandplacesasmaybesetbythePanelorasubcommitteethereof.TheInvestigativePanelshallalsomeetatothertimesonthecallofthechairpersonoftheInvestigativePanel.

Rule 4. Election of Officers; Powers and Duties. PursuanttoBarRule4-201(a)(4),theInvestigativePanelshallelectofficers. Thechairpersonorvice-chairpersonactingaschairpersonofasubcommitteeshallalsoexercisesuchpowersandassumesuchdutiesasarehereinafterprovided.Incaseoftheabsence,disqualificationorincapacityofthechairperson,thevice-chairpersonshallassumethedutiesandpowersofthechairperson.Incaseofadisqualificationofboththechairpersonandvice-chairpersonwhileaPanelmeetingisinsession,thePanelshallvoteuponamembertopresideoverthePanel’sconsiderationofthematteratissue.Incaseofadisqualificationofboththechairpersonandvice-chairpersonwhenthePanelisnotinsession,thepresident-electoftheStateBarofGeorgiashalldesignateanothermemberofthePaneltopresideoverthePanel’sconsiderationofthematteratissue.

Rule 5. Initiation of Grievances; Duties and Powers of the Office of General Counsel.

(a)AllgrievancesagainstmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia,otherthanthoseinitiatedbytheSupremeCourtoftheStateofGeorgiaortheInvestigativePanel,shallbeinwrittenmemorandumformsignedbythecomplainant.ThegrievanceformwhichshallbeusedinallgrievancesconsideredbytheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallbeapprovedbytheInvestigativePanel.

(b)AllgrievancesproperlysubmittedongrievanceformsshallbereferredtotheOfficeofGeneralCounselforinitialscreeningandreview.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshalldeterminewhethereachgrievancerecitesfactsandassertionssufficienttoallegetheviola-tionofoneormoreGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductlistedinPartIV,Chapter1oftheStateBarRules.

(c)Allgrievancesnototherwisefoundtobeunjustified,frivolous,orpatentlyunfoundedandallegingtheviolationofoneormoreoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductcontainedinPartIV,Chapter1,oftheStateBarRulesshallbeforwardedbytheOfficeofGeneralCounseltoamemberoftheInvestigativePanelforinvestigationashereinafterprovided.Allothergriev-ancesshallbedismissedbytheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.

(d)AteverymeetingoftheInvestigativePanel,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshallreportonthenumberofgrievancesithasdismissedsincethepreviousmeetingforfailuretoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateBar.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallcauseallgrievanceswhichithasreceivedandwhichhavebeendismissedeitherbyitorbytheStateDisciplinaryBoard

tobekeptonfileattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgiauntilexpungedpursuanttoBarRules4-224(a)(1)and(2).

(e)WhentheOfficeofGeneralCounselreceivesinformationthatappearstoinvokethedisciplinaryjurisdictionoftheStateBarofGeorgia,butnogrievanceformisfiled,theinformationshouldbebroughttotheattentionofthePanelforthePaneltoconsiderinsti-tutingagrievanceonitsownmotionpursuanttoBarRule4-203.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallusetheguidelinessetforthintheBarRulesandtheserulesregardingthescreeningofgrievanceformstodeterminewhenamattershouldbebroughttotheattentionofthePanel.

Rule 6. Evaluation of Grievances; Selection of Investigative Members. PursuanttoBarRules4-203(a)(14)and4-204,theInvestigativePanelherebydelegatestotheOfficeofGeneralCounselassignmentofcasesforinvestigationbyindividualmembersoftheInvestigativePanel.SuchassignmentshallbeinthesounddiscretionoftheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.Inassigningcases,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshalltakeintoconsiderationthegeographicalproximityofthemembertotherespondentlawyerandthenumberofactiveinvestigationsforwhichthememberhasresponsibilityatthetimeoftheassignment.Noassign-mentshallbemadetothepresident-electoftheStateBarofGeorgia,thepresident-electoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia,thechairpersonoftheInvestigativePaneloranylaymemberoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardwithoutthatmember’spriorapproval.

Rule 7. Investigation by the Investigative Panel.(a)Allgrievancesassignedforinvestigationtoamemberof

theInvestigativePanelshallbeservedupontherespondentlawyerwithaNoticeofInvestigationandtheenclosuresoutlinedatBarRule4-204.1

(b)Theinvestigatingmemberisauthorizedtofurnishsupple-mentalinformationtomorefullyapprisetherespondentlawyerofthechargesagainstthatRespondent.ServiceoftheNoticeofInvestigationandgrievanceshallbeasoutlinedatBarRule4-204.2.

(c)Therespondentlawyershallfileawritten,verifiedresponsetothegrievancewiththeinvestigatingmemberasout-linedatBarRule4-204.3.

(d)TheinvestigationofagrievanceassignedtoamemberoftheInvestigativePanelshallbewithinthatmember’sexclusivejurisdiction.NoothermemberofthePanelshallentertheinvestigationofthecaseorengageinexpartecommunicationconcerningthemeritsofthecasewithouttheexpresspriorauthorizationoftheinvestigatingmember.

Rule 8. Report of the Investigating Member. AteachmeetingoftheInvestigativePanel,eachmemberwhohasbeenassignedagrievanceforinvestigationshallreport.Ifthemember’sinvestigationhasbeencompleted,theinvestigatingmembershallgiveanaccountingoftheformandsubstanceoftheinvestigationafterwhichthemembermayrecommendandthePanelshalldetermineeitherthatprobablecausedoesordoesnotexist. TheinvestigatingmemberortheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallmakeavailabletoanymemberofthePanelsodesiringaphotocopyoftheentireinvestigativefileoranyportionthereof.

Rule 9. Investigation of Petitions for Voluntary Discipline.(a)Ifduringthecourseoftheinvestigationofagrievance

byamemberoftheInvestigativePanel,therespondentlawyersubmitsapetitionforvoluntarydisciplineunderStateBarRule4-203(a)(9),acopyshallbefurnishedtotheinvestigatingmemberandtheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.Themembermaycontinuetheinvestigation.TheOfficeofGeneralCounselshallfileitsrecom-mendationonthepetitionwiththeinvestigatingmember.

(b)TheinvestigatingmembershallreporttotheInvestigativePanelonthepetitionforvoluntarydisciplineandtheOfficeofGeneralCounsel’srecommendationatsuchtimeasthemembermakesareportunderRule8.

(c)IftheInvestigativePanelvotestoacceptthepetitionforvoluntarydiscipline,itshallimposeconfidentialdisciplineunderRule4-205.

Rule 10. Investigative Powers. IninvestigatinggrievancesagainstmembersoftheStateBar,theInvestigativePanelshallhaveallofthosepowersenumeratedinPartIVoftheStateBarRules.EachmemberoftheInvestigativePanelshallbeauthorizedtoissueoathsandaffirmationsandtoissuesubpoenasfortheappearanceofpersonsandfortheproductionofthingsandrecordsdur-ingthecourseoftheinvestigationofagrievanceagainstamemberoftheStateBar.

Rule 11. Report of the Findings of Probable Cause to the State Supreme Court. Afterafindingofprobablecause,thechairpersonmaydelegateauthorityforthepreparation,executionandfilingofthedocumentsrequiredbyBarRule4-204.4totheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.


Rule 12. Original Pleadings. Eachinvestigatingmembershallkeepafileforeachassignedcasewiththeoriginaldocumentsgatheredduringthecourseoftheinvestigation.Whentheinvestigatingmembercompletesaninves-tigationandreportsonthegrievanceasoutlinedatRule8,thefilecontainingoriginaldocumentsshallbereturnedtotheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.

Rule 13. Expedited Treatment for Certain Cases.(a)Uponreceiptofsufficientevidencedemonstrating

thatanattorneyposesasubstantialthreatofharmtoclientsorthepublic,theOfficeofGeneralCounsel,withtheapprovaloftheimmediatepastpresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandthechairpersonoftheReviewPanel,oratthedirectionofthechairpersonoftheInvestigativePanel,maypetitiontheGeorgiaSupremeCourtforthesuspensionoftheattorneypendingdis-ciplinaryproceedingspredicatedupontheconductcausingsuchpetitionpursuanttotheproceduresoutlinedinRule4-108oftheStateBarRules.

(b)AftertheInvestigativePanelhasfoundprobablecauseforthelodgingofaformalcomplaintunderInvestigativePanelInternalRule11,anymembermaymovethatthecasebegivenexpeditedtreatmentasoutlinedatRule4-108.Ifthemajorityofthosememberspresentvotetoexpeditethecase,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshallproceedasoutlinedinRule4-108.

Rule 14. Contempt Procedure. Contemptproceedingsagainstanypersonwhofailstoappearandgivetestimonyortoproducebooks,papers,ordocuments,orwhorefusestoappeartotestifybeforetheInvestigativePanel,itssubcom-mittees,oranymemberthereofafterbeingsubpoenaedtodoso,shallbeasoutlinedatRule4-221(b).

Rule 15. Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of Investigative Panel Members.

(a)Arespondentlawyershallhavetherighttochallengethecompetency,qualificationsorobjectivityofanymemberoftheInvestigativePanelconsideringthegrievance.Withinten(10)daysafterreceiptoftheoriginalgrievanceunderRule4-204.1,therespondentlawyershalldelivertotheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardwrittenobjectiontothecompetency,qualifi-cationsorobjectivityofanymemberoftheInvestigativePanelsettingforththefactualbasisforthechallenge.TherespondentlawyershallmailacopyofthechallengetoeachmemberoftheInvestigativePanelandtotheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.

Thechallengedmembershallhavetheoptiontoanswertherespondentlawyer’schallengeinwriting.AnysuchanswershallbemailedtotheremainingmembersoftheInvestigativePanel,therespondentlawyerandtheOfficeofGeneralCounsel.

Atitsnextmeeting,theInvestigativePanelshallexcusethechallengedmemberfromthemeetingroomandconsiderthechallenge.Theaffirmativevoteofthree(3)membersthatthechal-lengedmembershouldbeexcludedshallbesufficienttosustainthechallenge.

(b)AnymemberoftheInvestigativePanelshallhavetherighttowithdrawvoluntarilyfromconsiderationofanygrievancewhenthecompetency,qualificationsorobjectivityofthatmemberarechallengedbytherespondentlawyer.

Rule 16. Letters of Admonition and Reprimands. TheInvestigativePanelshallhavethepowertoissueformallettersofadmonitionandInvestigativePanelreprimandsinlieuoftherecom-mendationofotherdisciplineupontheconditionssetforthatRule4-205.

Rule 17. Nonresident Members; Venue of Hearing for Special Master. VenueofhearingsshallbeassetforthatBarRule4-221(c).

Rule 18. Extension of Time Within Which a Formal Complaint May Be Filed. Thechairpersonorchair-designeemayextendthetimewithinwhichtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselmayfileaformalcomplaintwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforgoodcauseshown.

Rule 19. Notification to Complainants. TheInvestigativePanelshallnotifythecomplainantorcomplain-antsofthedispositionofthegrievance.

Rule 20. Files. AfileshallbeopenedforallmatterswhichmaycomebeforetheInvestigativePanelforconsideration.Whensuchmattersareclosed,suchfilesshallbeexpungedinaccordancewithRule4-224.

Rule 21. Violation of Criminal Statute. Intheeventthechargeagainstarespondentlawyeramountstoaviolationofacriminalstatute,theInvestigativePanelmaydirecttheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseltoreferthemattertotheappropriatedis-

trictattorneyforcriminalprosecutionandtheInvestigativePanelmaydeferanyfurtheractiontoawaitthedispositionofthecriminalcharge.

Rule 22. Appearances Before the Investigative Panel. ItshallbethepolicyoftheInvestigativePanelnottopermitper-sonalappearancesbeforethePaneloritssubcommitteesatmeetings,exceptasotherwisespecificallyprovidedintheseRules.Anypresen-tationstothePaneloranysubcommitteethereofshouldbebybrief,memorandumorinotherwrittenform,unlessotherwisedecidedbyamajorityvoteoftheInvestigativePanelmemberspresentatameetingatwhichapersonalappearanceisrequested.

Rule 23. Chairperson’s Review of Screening Decisions. Whenrequestedtodosobythecomplainant,theChairpersonoftheInvestigativePanelshallhavediscretionaryauthoritytoreviewadecisionoftheOfficeofGeneralCounseltodismissagrievanceunderBarRule4-202(c).IftheChairpersonagreeswiththedecisiontodis-missthegrievance,thecomplainantshallbenotifiedofthatdecisioninwriting.IftheChairpersondisagreeswiththedecisiontodismissthegrievance,thegrievanceshallbeforwardedtotheInvestigativePanelorsubcommitteeunderBarRule4-202(c)and4-204.

Rule 24. Review of Newly Discovered Evidence. AfterthegrievancehasbeenconsideredbythePanel,theOfficeofGeneralCounselmayreferagrievancebacktotheInvestigatingmemberofthePanelupontherequestofeitherthecomplainantortherespondentwhenthatpersonhaspresentednewlydiscoveredevidence.Theinvestigatingmember,inthemember’ssounddiscretionmayreviewthenewlydiscoveredevidenceanddecideifthemattershouldbepresentedtotheentirePanel.IftheinvestigatingmemberisnolongeronthePanel,theChairpersonmayreviewthenewlydiscoveredevidence.

Rule 25. Removal of Panel Members.(a)AnyInvestigativePanelmemberwhoisabsentfrom

eitherthree(3)consecutivemeetingsofthesub-committeetowhichthatmemberisassignedoranyfour(4)meetingsofthatmember’ssub-committeeinacalendaryear,shallbeconsideredforremovalbythePanel,inExecutiveSession,atthenextmeet-ingofthePanelfollowingsaidabsences.AnysuchPanelmembershallberemovedfromtheInvestigativePanel,unlessthePaneldetermines,bymajorityvote,thatbonafide,unavoidablereasonsexistforsomeoralloftheabsences,andthatsuchPanelmemberisnotinviolationofthecasehandlingtimelimitssetforthinsub-paragraph(b).Panelmembersmayreceivecreditforattendingameetingofthesub-committeetowhichtheyarenotassigned.

(b)AnyPanelmemberwhohas,afteranytwomeetingsofthePanelinacalendaryear,morethanthree(3)casesinexcessof180daysold,measuredfromthedateofserviceoftheRespondent,shallbeconsideredforremovalinExecutiveSession,atthenextmeetingofthePanelfollowingsaidoccurrence.AnysuchPanelmembershallberemovedfromtheInvestigativePanel,unlessthePaneldetermines,bymajorityvote,thatbonafide,unavoidablereasonsexistforthelackofresolutionofsomeoralloftheunresolvedcasesinquestion,andthatsuchPanelmemberhasmettheattendancerequirementssetforthinsub-paragraph(a).ThePanelmaygrantextensionsoftime,forgoodandsufficientreasons,tocompletetheinvestigationofanycase.

(c)ThePanelmemberbeingconsideredforremovalshallnotvoteontheissueofremoval,andshallnotbepresentduringthePanel’sdeliberationandvote.ThePanelmemberunderconsider-ationmayaddressthePanelinwriting,orpersonally,priortothePanel’sdeliberationandvote.

(d)ThefailureofaPanelmembertocomplywithanyoftheprovisionsofthisRuleshallnothaveanyeffectwhatsoeverupontheresolutionofanycasebythePanelandshallnotoperateasadefensetothePanel’srulingonthepartofanyRespondent.

(e)ThevacancycreatedbyanyPanelmemberwhoisremovedfromtheInvestigativePanelundertheprovisionsofthisRuleshallbefilledbyappointmentofthecurrentPresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 26. Pending Civil Litigation. Inthosegrievanceswherethereisrelatedcivillitigationpending,thePanelmay,initsdiscretion,deferactiononthematteruntilthecivillitigationiscompleted.

Rule 27. Disqualification. NomemberoftheInvestigativePanelortheReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallrepresentarespondentinanyphaseofanattorneydisciplinaryproceeding.IfaPanelmember’spartnersorasso-ciatesrepresentarespondentinanyphaseofanattorneydisciplinaryproceeding,thenthePanelmemberisautomaticallyrecusedfromdeter-mination,investigation,orreviewregardingrespondent’scaseduringallphasesofthedisciplinaryproceeding.


RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE REVIEW PANEL

STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD PursuanttothepowersanddutiesaccordeditinRule4-203(b)(3)inPartIVoftheRulesandRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,theReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiaestablishesthefollowingRulesofConductandProcedure.

Rule 1. Oaths of Office. MembersoftheReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshall,upontheirselection,befurnishedbytheOfficeofGeneralCounselwiththeoathofofficerequiredofthem,shallimmediatelysigntheoathfurnishedtothem,andshallreturnthesignedoathofofficetotheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardwhowillpreservetheoathsintherecordsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaatStateBarHeadquarters.

Rule 2. Powers and Duties. TheReviewPanelshallhavesuchpowersandperformsuchdutiesasaresetforthinPartIVoftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaasapprovedbytheSupremeCourtoftheStateofGeorgiaonNovember30,1976,andsubsequentlyamended.Thesaidrulesarehereinafterreferredtoasthe“BarRules.”

Rule 3. Meetings. TheReviewPanelshallmeetatsuchtimesandplacesasmaybesetbythePanel.TheReviewPanelshallalsomeetatothertimesonthecallofthechairpersonoftheReviewPanelorofthepresident-electoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 4. Election of Offices; Powers and Duties. AtitsfirstmeetingsubsequenttotheAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarofGeorgia,themembershipoftheReviewPanelshallelectachairpersonandavice-chairperson.ThechairpersonshallpresideatallmeetingsoftheReviewPanelandshallserveuntilasuccessoriselectedorthechairperson’stermontheReviewPanelexpires. Thechairpersonshallalsoexercisesuchpowersandassumesuchdutiesasarehereinafterprovided.Incaseoftheabsence,disqualifica-tionorincapacityofthechairperson,thevice-chairpersonshallassumethedutiesandpowersofthechairperson.Incaseofadisqualificationofboththechairpersonandvice-chairperson,thepresident-electoftheStateBarofGeorgiashalldesignateanothermemberoftheBoardtopresideoverthePanel’sconsiderationofthematteratissue.

Rule 5. Thisruleisreserved.

Rule 6. Original Pleadings. OriginalpleadingsshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.BarCounselandtherespondentlawyershallberesponsibleforserv-ingcopiesofallpleadingsonthespecialmasterandallpartiestothedisciplinaryproceeding.TheoriginalpleadingsshallbemaintainedattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgiabytheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoarduntiltheClerkfilestherecordinthecasewiththeSupremeCourtpursuanttoBarRule4-217(c)or4-218(f).

Rule 7. Review of the Report of the Special Master.(a)IfapartyrequestsreviewbytheReviewPanelpursuant

toRule4-217(d),theClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardoradesigneeoftheClerkshallcausecopiesofthereportofspecialmasterandthecompleterecordinthecasetobedeliveredtothechairpersonofthePanelandthePanelmemberdesignatedtoreviewthecase.TheClerkoradesigneeoftheClerkshalldeliveranabbreviatedcopyoftherecord(includingtheformalcomplaint,answer,andreportofthespecialmaster)toallothermembersoftheReviewPanelatleastthirty(30)dayspriortothenextsched-uledmeeting.TheClerkshalldeliverportionsoftherecordtoanyotherPanelmemberuponrequestbythatPanelmember.Atitsnextmeeting,theReviewPanelshallreviewtherecordandreportofthespecialmaster.PursuanttoRule4-218(a),theReviewPanelshallconsidertherecordandthefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawofthespecialmaster.

(b)AtthetimethereportoftheSpecialMasterandtherecordinthecasearetransmittedtothePanelmembers,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshallnotifytheRespondentinwritingofhisorherrightsunderBarRule4-218.Specifically,theRespondentshallbeadvisedofhisorherrighttochallengethecompetency,qualifi-cations,orobjectivityofanyPanelmemberandshallbeprovidedthenamesandaddressesofallPanelmembers.

(c)TheReviewPanelmaygrantrehearingsornewtrialseitherbeforeitselforbeforeaspecialmasteronsuchissuesandwithinsuchtimesasappeartoitappropriatetoservetheendsofjustice.Amajorityvoteofthosememberspresentshallbesuf-ficienttoorderarehearingornewtrialexceptthattheremaybeno

denovohearingbeforetheReviewPanelwithoutitsunanimousvotewiththeconsentoftherespondentlawyer.

(d)TheReviewPanelmayconsiderexceptionstothereportofthespecialmaster.ExceptionsandbriefsshallbefiledwiththeReviewPanel,inaccordancewithBarRule4-218(e),nolaterthantwenty(20)dayspriortothenextscheduledmeeting.Therespondingpartyshallhaveten(10)daysafterserviceoftheexceptionswithinwhichtorespond.

(e)TheReviewPanelmayinitsdiscretiongrantoralargu-ment.EitherpartymayrequestoralargumentbyfilingsuchrequestwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardatleasttwenty(20)dayspriortothedateofthemeetingofthePanelatwhichthecasewillbeconsidered.Asubcommitteeconsistingofthechairperson,vice-chairpersonandthereviewingPanelmem-bershallreviewtherequestandshalldecidetheissueatleastten(10)dayspriortothemeetingofthePanelatwhichthecasewillbeconsidered,andshallnotifythepartiesofthesubcommittee’sdecision.AnydecisiondenyingoralargumentshallbesubjecttoreviewbytheentireReviewPanel.

Rule 8. Report to the Supreme Court and Recommendation of Discipline. Afterthecompletionofitsreviewofthefinalreportofthespe-cialmasterorreviewofaNoticeofReciprocalDiscipline,theReviewPanelshallprepareitsreporttotheSupremeCourt.TheReviewPanel’sreportshallcontainthePanel’sfindingsoffact,conclusionsoflaw,andrecommendationofdiscipline,ifany.TheReviewPanelmaydelegateresponsibilityforthepreparationofitsreporttoanymemberofthePanelortoeitherparty. ThechairpersonoftheReviewPanelshallfilethereportoftheReviewPanelwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardandserveacopyofthereportonthepartiestothedisciplinaryproceeding.TheClerkshallfilethereportandthecompleterecordwiththeSupremeCourtpursuanttoBarRule4-218(f).

Rule 9. Notice of Punishment. UponafinaljudgmentbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaofdisbar-ment,suspensionoracceptanceofapetitionforvoluntarysurrenderoflicensefordisciplinaryreasons,theOfficeofGeneralCounselshallcausenoticeoftheactiontobegiventotheclerksofallcourtsofrecordintheStateofGeorgia.ThesaidnoticeshalldirectthatthenameoftherespondentlawyerbestrickenfromtherollsofthecourtandfromtheStateBarofGeorgiaeitherpermanentlyinthecaseofdisbarmentorvoluntarysurrenderoflicenseorforaprescribedperiodinthecaseofsuspension.

Rule 10. Preparation of Reprimands.(a)Uponfinaljudgmentofreprimand,eitherpublicor

ReviewPanel,bytheStateSupremeCourt,thechairpersonshallcausetobepreparedawrittenreprimand.ThechairpersonmaydelegateresponsibilityforpreparingwrittenreprimandstotheOfficeofGeneralCounseloranyPanelmember,butsuchwrittenreprimandshallbereviewedandapprovedbythechairpersonpriortoadministrationtotherespondentlawyer.

(b)Inthecaseofpublicreprimands,thechairpersonshallforwardthewrittenreprimandthroughtheOfficeofGeneralCounseltothechiefjudgeofthesuperiorcourtinthecountywherethereprimandistobeadministeredinaccordancewithStateBarRule4-220(c).

(c)InthecaseofReviewPanelreprimands,thechairpersonorhis/herdesigneeshalladministerthereprimandatasubsequentmeetingoftheReviewPanel.Thechairpersonshallbeauthorizedtocompeltheattendanceoftherespondentlawyerbysubpoena.

Rule 11. Thisruleisreserved.

Rule 12. Expedited Treatment for Certain Cases. Thisruleisreserved.

Rule 13. Contempt Procedure. Wheneveranypersonsubpoenaedtoappearandgivetestimonyortoproducebooks,papers,ordocumentsrequiredbysuchsubpoenashallrefusetoappearbeforetheReviewPanel,oranymemberthereof,ortoansweranypertinentorproperquestion,orwheneveranypersonshallwilfullyandflagrantlyviolatealawfuldirectiveofanymemberoftheReviewPanel,thensuchpersonshallbedeemedincontemptoftheReviewPanelanditshallbethedutyofthechairpersontoreportthefacttothesuperiorcourtinandforthecountyinwhichthesaidinvestigationisbeingheld;andthereupon,thesaidcourtshallissueanattachmentinausableforminsaidsuperiorcourtdirectedtothesheriffofsaidcountycommandinghimorhertoattachsuchpersonandforthwithbringhimorherbeforesuchcourt.Onthereturnofsaidattachmentandtheproductionofthepersonattached,thesuperiorcourtshallhavejurisdictionofthematterandthepersonmaypurgehimorherselfofthecontemptinthesamewayandthesameproceedingsshall


behadandpenaltiesmaybeimposedandthesamepunishmentinflictedasinthecaseofawitnesssubpoenaedtoappearandgiveevidenceonthetrialofacivilcausebeforeanysuperiorcourtundertheexistinglawsoftheStateofGeorgia.

Rule 14. Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of Review Panel.

(a)Arespondentlawyershallhavetherighttochallengethecompetency,qualificationsorobjectivityofanymemberoftheReviewPanelconsideringthecomplaintagainsthimorher.Withinten(10)daysaftertheSpecialMaster’sreportoraNoticeofReciprocalDisciplineistransmittedtotheReviewPanel,therespondentlawyermayfilewrittenobjectiontothecompetency,qualificationsorobjectivityofanymemberormembersoftheReviewPanelsettingforththefactualbasisforthechallenge.TherespondentlawyershallserveacopyofthechallengeoneachmemberoftheReviewPanelandontheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel.

Thechallengedmembershallhavetherighttoanswertherespondentlawyer’schallengeinwritingathisorheroption.AnysuchanswershallbeservedontheremainingmembersoftheReviewPanel,therespondentlawyerandtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel.

Atitsnextmeeting,theReviewPanelshallexcusethechallengedmemberfromthemeetingroomandconsiderthechallenge.Theaffirmativevoteofthree(3)membersthatthechallengedmembershouldbeexcludedshallbesufficienttosus-tainthechallenge.

(b)AnymemberoftheReviewPanelshallhavetherighttowithdrawvoluntarilyfromconsiderationofanycomplaintinwhichhisorhercompetency,qualificationsorobjectivityarechal-lengedbytherespondentlawyer.

Rule 15. Publication. TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselshallpublishinoneissueofanofficialpublicationoftheStateBarofGeorgiathenamesofpersonsagainstwhomordersofdisbarment,suspensionorpublicreprimandhavebecomefinal.

Rule 16. Standards for Approval of Specialization Programs. Thisruleisreserved.

Rule 17. Removal of Panel Members. AnyReviewPanelmemberwhoisabsentfromeitherthree(3)consecutiveReviewPanelmeetingsoranyfour(4)meetingsinacal-endaryear,shallberemovedfromtheReviewPanel.ThevacancyshallbefilledbyappointmentofthecurrentPresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 18. Disqualification. NomemberoftheReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallrepresentarespondentinanyphaseofanattorneydisciplin-aryproceeding.IfaPanelmember’spartnersorassociatesrepresentarespondentinanyphaseofanattorneydisciplinaryproceeding,thenthePanelmemberisautomaticallyrecusedfromdetermination,investigation,orreviewregardingthecaseduringallphasesofthedis-ciplinaryproceeding.

Rule 19. Petitions for Reinstatement. APetitionforReinstatementandallrelevantpleadings,includingtheresponsefromtheOfficeofGeneralCounselandanyreportfromaspecialmaster,shallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardinaccordancewithBarRule4-221(f).Whenallresponsesandreportshavebeenfiled,therecordshallbedeliveredtotheReviewPanelnotlessthantwenty(20)dayspriortothenextmeetingoftheReviewPanel.

RULES OF THE CLERK OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD

Rule 1. Office of the Clerk. InaccordancewithBarRule4-221(f),pleadingsordocumentsindisciplinarycasespendingbeforeaspecialmastershallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardattheheadquartersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaatitsofficesinAtlanta,Georgia.

Rule 2. Hours. TheClerk’sOfficeisopenfrom8:30a.m.until4:30p.m.MondaythroughFriday,exceptlegalholidays,toacceptdocumentsorpleadingsforfiling.Thereisnodropboxorfilingafterhours.

Rule 3. Filing. PleadingsordocumentsmaybemailedordeliveredtotheClerk’sOfficeforfiling.AdocumentorpleadingwillbefiledwhenactuallyreceivedbyordeliveredtotheClerk’sOfficeduringthedaysandtimestheClerk’sOfficeisopen,exceptthatdocumentsaredeemedfiledonthedaywhendepositedwiththeUnitedStatesPostalServicefordeliverybycertifiedmailorwhendeliveredtoacommer-

cialdeliveryserviceforovernightdelivery,asprovidedinSupremeCourtRule1.5.

Rule 4. Originals. Onlyoriginaldocumentsorpleadingswillbeacceptedforfiling.Letters,orcopiesofletters,unlessattachedasexhibitstopleadingsorhearingtranscripts,willnotbeacceptedforfiling.Copiesofdocuments,pleadings,orlettersnotattachedtopleadingsortranscriptswillbereturnedandnotfiled.Pleadingsarenotacceptedforfilingbyfacsimileorelectronicmail.

Rule 5. Docket Numbers. OriginalpleadingsorotherdocumentsshallbeartheappropriateStateDisciplinaryBoarddocketnumber.IncasesnotconsolidatedbypriororderoftheInvestigativePanel,thespecialmaster,ortheSupremeCourt,anoriginalpleadingorotherdocumentshallbefiledineachsep-aratedocketnumber,asappropriate.Ifanoriginaldocumentorpleadinglistsmorethanonedocketnumber,theoriginalwillbefiledwiththedisciplinarycasefileofthefirstlisteddocketnumber.

Rule 6. Discovery Documents. AsprovidedinBarRule4-221(f),depositionsandotheroriginaldiscoveryshallnotbefiled,exceptinaccordancewiththeUniformRulesoftheSuperiorCourt.

Rule 7. Number of Copies. Alongwiththeoriginalofadocumentorpleadingforfiling,attorneysshallfurnishtheClerkwithtwocopies.Attorneysdesiringfile-markedcopiesofdocumentsorpleadingsfiledinadisciplinarycaseshallfurnishtotheClerkaself-addressedandstampedenvelope.

Rule 8. Certificate of Service. Informalcomplaintproceedings,copiesofallpleadingsshallbeservedonthespecialmasterorthemembersoftheInvestigativePanelortheReviewPanel,asappropriate,aswellasonallpartiestothedisci-plinaryproceeding.PleadingspresentedtotheClerkforfilingshallbearacertificateofservice,signedbycounselfortheparty,ortherespon-dentifproceedingpro se,showingserviceonallpartiesandonthespecialmasterorthemembersoftheInvestigativePanelortheReviewPanel,asappropriate.Pleadingsnotbearingacertificateofservicewillbereturnedandnotfiled.

Rule 9. Removal of Files.ThefileoforiginaldocumentsandpleadingsmaynotberemovedfromtheofficeoftheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoard,exceptbyorderoftheSupremeCourt,thespecialmaster,apaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard,orwhentheoriginalisfiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtforitsreviewpursuanttoBarRule4-219.

Rule 10. Filing of Record in the Supreme Court. OncetherecordofadisciplinaryproceedingisfiledwiththeSupremeCourtinaccordancewithBarRule4-219,allpleadingsshallbefiledwiththeClerkoftheSupremeCourtanddirectedtotheCourt.Anydocumentorpleadingsubmittedaftertherecordhasbeentransmit-tedtotheSupremeCourtshallbereturnedandnotfiled,exceptonorderoftheSupremeCourt.

Rule 11. Inspection and Copies of Files. ThefilesofdisciplinarycasesmaintainedbytheClerkoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardanddocketedbytheSupremeCourtmaybeinspectedbypriorarrangementwiththeClerk’sOffice.CopiesofpleadingsorotherdocumentsfiledwiththeClerkmaybeobtainedbyfirstpaying$1forthefirst,and25centsforeachsubsequent,pageofthedisciplinarycaserecordrequested.TheClerkmaycertifycopiesofpleadingsorotherdocumentsfiledwiththeClerkastruecopies.CopiesofadisciplinarycaserecordalreadyfiledwiththeSupremeCourtmustbesoughtfromtheClerkoftheSupremeCourt.

CHAPTER 3 This Chapter is Reserved








CHAPTER 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS

Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions. TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbeauthorizedtorenderInformalAdvisoryOpinionsconcern-ingtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel’sinterpretationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductoranyofthegroundsfordisciplinaryactionasappliedtoagivenstateoffacts.TheInformalAdvisoryOpinionshouldaddressprospectiveconductandmaybeissuedinoralorwrittenform.AnInformalAdvisoryOpinionisthepersonalopinionoftheissuingattorneyoftheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselandisneitheradefensetoanycomplaintnorbindingontheStateDisciplinaryBoard,theSupremeCourtofGeorgia,ortheStateBarofGeorgia.Ifthepersonrequest-inganInformalAdvisoryOpiniondesires,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselwilltransmittheInformalAdvisoryOpiniontotheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardfordiscretionaryconsiderationofthedraftingofaProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinion.

Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board.(a)TheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshallconsistonlyof

activemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhoshallbeappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,withtheapprovaloftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(b)ThemembersoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshallbeselectedasfollows:

(1)FivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaat-large;(2)OnememberoftheGeorgiaTrialLawyers

Association;(3)OnememberoftheGeorgiaDefenseLawyers

Association;(4)OnememberoftheGeorgiaAssociationofCriminal

DefenseLawyers(5)OnememberoftheYoungLawyersDivisionofthe

StateBarofGeorgia;(6)OnememberoftheGeorgiaDistrictAttorneys

Association;(7)OnememberofthefacultyofeachAmericanBar

AssociationAccreditedLawSchooloperatingwithintheStateofGeorgia;

(8)OnememberoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard;and

(9)OnememberoftheReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard.(c)Allmembersshallbeappointedfortermsoftwoyears

subjecttothefollowingexceptions:(1)Anypersonappointedtofillavacancyoccasionedby

resignation,death,disqualification,ordisabilityshallserveonlyfortheunexpiredtermofthememberreplacedunlessreap-pointed;

(2)ThemembersappointedfromtheInvestigativePanelandReviewPaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardshallserveforatermofoneyear;

(3)ThetermsofthecurrentmembersoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardwillterminateattheAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarfollowingtheamendmentofthisRuleregard-lessofthelengthofeachmember’scurrentterm;thereafterallappointmentswillbeasfollowstoachievestaggered,two-yearterms:

(i)ThreeoftheinitialAssociationmembers(includ-ingtheGeorgiaTrialLawyersAssociation,theGeorgiaAssociationofDefenseLawyers,theGeorgiaAssociationofCriminalDefenseLawyers,theGeorgiaDistrictAttorneysAssociationandtheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBar)shallbeappointedtoone-yearterms;twooftheinitialAssociationmembersshallbeappointedtotwo-yearterms.Aseachinitialtermexpires,thesuccessorappointeeshallbeappointedforatermoftwoyears;

(ii)TwooftheinitialmembersappointedfromtheStateBarofGeorgiaat-large(the“At-LargeMembers”)shallbeappointedtoone-yearterms;threeoftheinitialAt-Largemembersshallbeappointedtotwo-yearterms.Aseachinitialtermexpires,thesuccessorappointeeshallbeappointedforatermoftwoyears;

(iii)TwooftheinitialRepresentativesfromtheAmericanBarAssociationAccreditedLawSchoolsshallbeappointedtooneyearterms;twooftheinitiallawschoolrepresentativesshallbeappointedtotwo-yearterms.Aseachinitialtermexpires,thesuccessorappointeeshallbeappointedforatermoftwoyears;(4)Allmembersshallbeeligibleforimmediatereap-

pointmenttooneadditionaltwo-yearterm,unlessthePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,withapprovaloftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,deemsitappropriateto

reappointamemberforoneormoreadditionalterms.(d)TheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshallhavethe

authoritytoprescribeitsownrulesofconductandprocedure.

Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions.(a)TheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshallbeautho-

rizedtodraftProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionsconcerningaproperinterpretationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductoranyofthegroundsfordisciplinaryactionasappliedtoagivenstateoffacts.TheProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionshouldaddressprospectiveconductandmayrespondtoarequestforareviewofanInformalAdvisoryOpinionorrespondtoadirectrequestforaFormalAdvisoryOpinion.

(b)WhenaFormalAdvisoryOpinionisrequested,theFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshouldreviewtherequestandmakeapreliminarydeterminationwhetheraProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionshouldbedrafted.FactorstobeconsideredbytheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardincludewhethertheissueisofgeneralinteresttothemembersoftheBar,whetheragenuineethicalissueispresented,theexistenceofopinionsonthesubjectfromotherjurisdictions,andthenatureoftheprospectiveconduct.

(c)WhentheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardmakesapre-liminarydeterminationthataProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionshouldbedrafted,itshallpublishtheProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinioninanofficialpublicationoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandsolicitcommentsfromthemembersoftheBar.Followingarea-sonableperiodoftimeforreceiptofcommentsfromthemembersoftheBar,theFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardshallthenmakeafinaldeterminationtoeitherfiletheProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionasdraftedormodified,orreconsideritsdecisionanddeclinetodraftandfiletheProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinion.

(d)AftertheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardmakesafinaldeterminationthattheProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionshouldbedraftedandfiled,theFormalAdvisoryOpinionshallthenbefiledwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgiaandrepublishedinanofficialpublicationoftheStateBarofGeorgia.UnlesstheSupremeCourtgrantsreviewasprovidedhereinafter,theopinionshallbebindingonlyontheStateBarofGeorgiaandthepersonwhorequestedtheopinion,andnotontheSupremeCourt,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.Within20daysofthefilingoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinionorthedatethepublicationismailedtothemembersoftheBar,whicheverislater,theStateBarofGeorgiaorthepersonwhorequestedtheopinionmayfileapetitionfordiscretionaryreviewthereofwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgia.ThepetitionshalldesignatetheFormalAdvisoryOpinionsoughttobereviewedandshallconciselystatethemannerinwhichthepetitionerisaggrieved.IftheSupremeCourtgrantsthepetitionfordiscretionaryreviewordecidestoreviewtheopiniononitsownmotion,therecordshallconsistofthecommentsreceivedbytheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardfrommembersoftheBar.TheStateBarofGeorgiaandthepersonrequestingtheopinionshallfollowthebriefingschedulesetforthinSupremeCourtRule10,countingfromthedateoftheordergrantingreview.ThefinaldeterminationmaybeeitherbywrittenopinionorbyorderoftheSupremeCourtandshallstatewhethertheFormalAdvisoryOpinionisapproved,modified,ordisapproved,orshallprovideforsuchotherfinaldispositionasisappropriate.

(e)IftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiadeclinestoreviewtheFormalAdvisoryOpinion,itshallbebindingonlyontheStateBarofGeorgiaandthepersonwhorequestedtheopinion,andnotontheSupremeCourt,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.IftheSupremeCourtgrantsreviewanddisap-provestheopinion,itshallhaveabsolutelynoeffectandshallnotconstituteeitherpersuasiveorbindingauthority.IftheSupremeCourtapprovesormodifiestheopinion,itshallbebindingonallmembersoftheStateBarandshallbepublishedintheofficialGeorgiaCourtandBarRulesmanual.TheSupremeCourtshallaccordsuchapprovedormodifiedopinionthesameprecedentialauthoritygiventotheregularlypublishedjudicialopinionsoftheCourt.

(f)TheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardmaycallupontheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselforstaffsupportinresearchinganddraftingProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinions.

(g)ThenameofalawyerrequestinganInformalAdvisoryOpinionorFormalAdvisoryOpinionwillbeheldconfidentialunlessthelawyerotherwiseelects.

Rule 4-404. Immunity. ThemembersoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoard,aswellasstaffpersonsandcounselassistingtheBoardanditsmembers,including,butnotlimitedtostaffcounsel,advisorsandtheStateBarofGeorgia,itsofficersandemployees,membersoftheExecutiveCommittee,andmembersoftheBoardofGovernors,shallhaveabso-


luteimmunityfromcivilliabilityforallactsperformedinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD

PursuanttothepowersanddutiesaccordeditinRule4-402(d)ofPartIVoftheRulesandRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,theFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardestablishesthefollowingrulesofcon-ductandprocedures.

Rule 1. Meetings(a)TheChairorViceChairoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinion

BoardshalldeterminewhenandwherethemeetingsoftheBoardshalloccur.

(b)AllBoardbusiness,includingvotingonopinions,maybeconductedbytelephone,e-mail,orotherelectroniccommunica-tiondevice.

(c)Boardmembersmayattendmeetingsbytelephoneorotherelectroniccommunicationdevice.

Rule 2. Quorum Requirement Seven(7)membersoftheBoardshallconstituteaquorum.

Rule 2A. Voting Requirements(a)RegularBusiness-Subjecttosub-paragraph(b)below,a

majorityofthemembersoftheBoardpresentandvotingshallberequiredtotransactthebusinessoftheBoard.

(b)PublicationunderBarRule4-403(d)-Theaffirma-tivevoteofnotlessthanfive(5)membersoftheBoardshallberequiredinordertosubmitopinionsforsecondpublicationunderBarRule4-403(d).

Rule 3. Preliminary Determination of Whether Opinion Should Be Drafted WhentheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselreceivesarequestforaFormalAdvisoryOpinion,therequestshallbeforwardedtoeachmemberoftheBoardandplacedontheagendaofthenextmeetingoftheBoardforpreliminarydeterminationofwhetheraproposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionshouldbedrafted.

Rule 4. Assignment of Research and Drafting to Board Members TheChairoftheBoardshallhavecompletediscretioninassign-ingrequestsforFormalAdvisoryOpinionstomembersoftheBoardforresearchinganddraftingproposedopinions.TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiawillprovidestaffassistanceinresearchinganddraftingopinionsuponrequestbytheBoardmembersassignedtodraftaproposedopinion.

Rule 5. Comments(a)AnycommenttoaproposedFormalAdvisoryOpinion

filedpursuanttoRule4-403(c)shallbefiledwiththeBoardthroughtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselwithinthirty(30)daysofthedatethattheproposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionispub-lishedinanofficialpublicationoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(b)ThereshallbefiledaminimumnumberofonecopyofanycommentpursuanttoRule4-403(c)inorderforthecommenttobeconsideredbytheBoard.

(c)AcopyofthepetitionfordiscretionaryreviewfiledwiththeSupremeCourtofGeorgiapursuanttoRule4-403(d)mustbesimultaneouslyservedupontheBoardthroughtheOfficeoftheGeneralCounsel.

(d)AnycommentsubmittedtotheBoardpursuanttoRule4-403(c)isfortheBoard’sinternaluseinassessingproposedopinionsandshallnotbereleasedunlessthecommenthasbeensubmittedtotheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaincompliancewithBarRule4-403(d).

Rule 6. Operating Guidelines(a)UponreceiptofarequestforaFormalAdvisory

Opinion,theOfficeoftheGeneralCounselwillassignafilenum-bertotherequest.

(b)TheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselwilltransmittherequesttotheBoard.

(c)TherequestwillbeplacedontheagendaofthenextBoardmeeting.TheBoardshouldmakeadeterminationatthemeetingastowhetheraformalopinionwillbedrafted.

(d)Atthesamemeeting,orimmediatelythereafter,theBoardwillassigntherequesttoaBoardmemberforthedraftingofaproposedopinion.

(e)ThedraftopinionshouldbepreparedandtransmittedbythedraftertothemembersoftheBoardatleastoneweekpriortothenextscheduledmeetingoftheBoard.AddresslabelswillbesuppliedbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselforthispurpose.

(f)Attheoptionofthedrafter,thedraftopinionwillbedis-tributedbytheOfficeoftheGeneralCounselatleastten(10)dayspriortothenextscheduledmeetingoftheBoard.

(g)Atthemeeting,theBoardwilladopt,reject,orrevisetheopinion.

(h)Uponadoption,theopinionwillbeeditedforstyleandpublishedforcommentasprovidedinBarRule4-403(c).

(i)AslongastheBoardcomplieswithBarRules,itmaytakeanyactionitdeemsnecessarytoensurethattheopinionscontinuetoprovideanaccurateinterpretationoftheBar’sethicalrules.

Rule 7. Confidentiality(a)Thenameofthelawyermakingtherequestwillbeheld

confidentialunlessthelawyerotherwiseelectsasprovidedinBarRule4-403(g).

(b)ThenameoftheBoardmemberwhohasbeenassignedtodraftaproposedopinionwillbeheldconfidentialunlesstheBoardotherwiseelectsbymajorityvote.

(c)AllinquiriesregardingFormalAdvisoryOpinionsbeingconsideredbytheBoardshouldbeforwardedtotheChairorViceChair.

Rule 8. E-Mail Voting Procedure ItisbestthattheBoardmeetsandholdslivediscussionsasoftenaspossible.However,theBoard,initsdiscretion,maydiscussandvoteonmattersregardingformaladvisoryopinionsbye-mail,ratherthanatameetingoftheBoard.MattersshallbeprovidedtoeachmemberoftheBoardbye-mail,alongwithamessagedirectingtheBoardtoparticipateinadiscussionbye-mail.TheBoardChairdetermineswhenthedis-cussionperiodwillendandcallforavoteonthematter.Atanytime,however,anyBoardmemberhas“vetopower,”whichallowshimorhertocallfora“livediscussion.”

Rule 9. Presentations to the Board PresentationstotheBoardshallbeinwritingunlessoralpresenta-tionispermittedinspecificcasesbytheBoard.

Rule 10. Attendance at Board Meetings OnlyBoardmembersandOfficeoftheGeneralCounselstaffshallbepermittedtoattendaFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardmeetingduringthedeliberationsoftheBoard.

INDEXES TO ADVISORY OPINIONS

IMPORTANTNOTE:TheIndexISNOT,andshouldnotberegardedas,ethicsauthority.Itisaguidefortheconvenienceoflawyersresearchingethicsquestions.InmanycasestheOpinionaddressesissuesnotmentionedintheIndexsummary.Beforetakingactioninagivensituation,referenceshouldbemadetothefulltextoftheAdvisoryOpinionmentionedintheIndex.

Referencestoopinionsdesignated“SDBNo.____,”aretoadvisoryopinionsissuedbytheStateDisciplinaryBoardundertheprocessbywhichadvisoryopinionswereissuedpriortothepresentRule4-403beingadopted.

Referencesto“FAONo._____,”aretoformaladvisoryopinionsthatweredraftedbytheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardandissuedeitherbytheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardortheSupremeCourtofGeorgiapursuanttoRule4-403.ReferencethefulltextoftheAdvisoryOpinionmentionedintheIndextodeterminebywhomtheopinionwasissued.

TOPICAL INDEX

ABUSIVE LITIGATION—Notimproperforattorneytofilelawsuitbeforecompletesupportforclaimhasbeenestablishedifthereisreasonablepossibilitythatfactscanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.FAONo.87-1

ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE, Uniform Rule of Superior Court 4.4

ADVANCE FEES,see ATTORNEY’S FEES and RETAINER FEES

ADVERTISING—Nonlawyer’sbusinesscardmustindicatethattheyarenotalawyer.SDBNo.21—Anattorneymaycommunicatetootherattorneyshisorheravailabil-itytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawsolongasthecommunicationisaccurateandnotmisleading.SDBNo.22—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Anattorneydepartingalawfirmmayethicallycontactthoseclientswithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,aslongasthedepartingattorneycomplieswiththeapplicableethicsrules.FAONo.97-3—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,the


ethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintentionofreferringamajorityofthatbusinessouttootherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.FAONo.05-6—Itisnotimproperforalawfirmtoassociateanotherlawyerorlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvicetothefirm’sclientsonspecializedmattersandtoidentifythatlawyerorlawfirmas“specialcounsel”forthatspecializedareaofthelaw.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fiderelationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheout-sideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.FAONo.05-13

ALIMONY—Guidelinesforacceptablecontingencyfeearrangementsinpastduealimonyandchildsupportcases.SDBNo.47

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsofthepoliceimplicatedRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12

ATTORNEY’S FEESAdvance Fees Paid to Attorney—Alawyerisnotrequiredtoplaceattorney’sfeespaidinadvanceintoatrustaccountexceptunderspecialcircumstances.FAONo.91-2—AGeorgiaattorneymaycontractwithaclientforanon-refundablespecialretainersolongasthecontractisnotacontracttoviolatetheattorney’sobligationunderRule1.16(d)anddoesnotviolateRule1.5(a)’srequirementofreasonableness.FAONo.03-1Advance Payment Made by an Attorney to a Client for Certain Expenses—Athirdpartybeneficiaryorhisorherattorneymayadvanceorreim-burseaninsuredforthepurchaseofoptionalPIPcoverage.SDBNo.46—Properforlawfirmtoobtainloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5Collection, seeCOLLECTIONContingency,seeCONTINGENCY FEESDivision of Fees,see FEE SHARING and FEE SPLITTINGFee Collection Program—MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramthatpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcol-lectsthefeesfromtheclient?FAONo.95-1Interest—Attorneysmaychargeinterestonclient’soverduebillsifnoticeisgiventoclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedondelinquentbills.SDBNo.45—Considerationsapplicabletopaymentofinterestchargedonaloanobtainedtocoveradvancesonlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5Paid by Opponent—Ethicalproprietyofattorney’sfeesbeingpaidbyopposingside.SDBNo.30Reasonableness—Ethicalproprietyofincludingattorney’sfeesaspartofasettlementofferinfederalcivilrightscases.SDBNo.39—Alawyermayreferpastdueaccountstoacollectionagency.SDBNo.49—Attorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyonlytosecurereasonableattorney’sfees.FAONo.86-7—Wheredrafterofwillortrustservesasexecutorortrustee,totalcombinedattorney’sfeeandexecutorortrusteefeemustbereasonable.FAONo.91-1—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3—Alawyermaychargeforstandardtimeunitssolongasthisdoesnotresultinafeethatisunreasonable,andsolongasthelawyercommu-nicatestotheclientthemethodofbillingthelawyerisusingsothattheclientcanunderstandthebasisforthefee.FAONo.01-1—AGeorgiaattorneymaycontractwithaclientforanon-refundablespecialretainersolongasthecontractisnotacontracttoviolatetheattorney’sobligationunderRule1.16(d)anddoesnotviolateRule1.5(a)’srequirementofreasonableness.FAONo.03-1Retainers,seeRETAINER FEESSecurity Interest—Attorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyonlytosecurereasonableattorney’sfees.FAONo.86-7Sharing Fees,see FEE SHARINGSplitting Fees,see FEE SPLITTINGUnpaid Fees—Attorneysmaychargeinterestonclient’soverduebillsifnoticeis

giventoclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedondelinquentbills.SDBNo.45—Alawyermayreferpastdueaccountstoacollectionagency.SDBNo.49—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Mayalawyerethicallydiscloseinformationconcerningthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandhisclienttoathirdpartyinanefforttocollectafeefromtheclient?FAONo.07-1Worker’s Compensation Cases —AttorneymustadvisetheirclientofhisorherrighttoindependentcounseliftheattorneyappealsawardoffeesgrantedbytheWorkman’sCompensationBoard.SDBNo.29

ATTORNEY’S LIEN—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBarcomplaintsbytheclientagainsttheattorney.FAONo.96-1

BAD CHECKS—AttorneymaysendstatutorynoticetodrawerofabadcheckpursuanttotheprovisionsofGeorgiaCodeAnn.§26-1704.SDBNo.26

BUSINESS CARD—Nonlawyer’sbusinesscardmustindicatethattheyarenotalawyer.SDBNo.21

CHILD SUPPORT—Guidelinesforacceptablecontingencyfeearrangementsinpastduealimonyandchildsupportcases.SDBNo.47

CITY COUNCIL—RepresentationofprivateclientsbeforetheRecorder’sCourtwhenattorneyisalsoacitycouncilmember.FAONo.89-2—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12

CLIENT FUNDS,alsosee TRUST ACCOUNTS—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5

CLIENT PAPERS,alsosee FILES—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Ethicalobligationofcriminaldefenselawyerstoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-con-victionremedies.FAONo.93-4

CLOSING—Lawyercannotdelegatetoanonlawyerresponsibilityofclosingarealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FAONo.86-5—Ethicalproprietyoflawyerstelephonicallyparticipatinginrealestateclosingsfromremotesites.FAONo.00-3—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1

COLLECTION—Anattorneyshouldnotfurnishhisorherletterheadtoaclientforusebythatclienttocollectadebt.SDBNo.5—Attorneysmaychargeinterestonclient’soverduebillsifnoticeisgiventoclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedondelinquentbills.SDBNo.45—Alawyermayreferpastdueaccountstoacollectionagency.SDBNo.49—MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramwhichpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcollectsthefeesfromtheclient?FAONo.95-1—Mayalawyerethicallydiscloseinformationconcerningthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandhisclienttoathirdpartyinanefforttocollectafeefromtheclient?FAONo.07-1


COMMUNICATION—Anattorneymaycommunicatetootherattorneyshisorheravailabil-itytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawsolongasthecommunicationisaccurateandnotmisleading.SDBNo.22—AttorneymaysendstatutorynoticetodrawerofabadcheckpursuanttotheprovisionsofGeorgiaCodeAnn.§26-1704.SDBNo.26—Ethicalproprietyofattorney’sfeesbeingpaidbyopposingside.SDBNo.30—Ethicalobligationofattorneytoresistdisclosureofnameand/oridentityofhisclient.SDBNo.41—Attorneysmaychargeinterestonclient’soverduebillsifnoticeisgiventoclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedondelinquentbills.SDBNo.45—Improperforplaintiff’sattorneyinapersonalinjurycasetowritealettertotheinsureddefendantwhichmaycontainlegaladvice.FAONo.86-4—Anattorneymayinterviewanemployeeofacorporationwhichisanopposingpartyinpendinglitigationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.87-6—PermissibletosendthenoticerequiredbyO.C.G.A§51-12-14toanunrepresentedadverseparty,butmustspecificallystatethatitisanoticeratherthanadvice.FAONo.88-3—Anattorneymayinterviewaformeremployeeofacorporationrepre-sentedbycounseltoobtaininformationrelevanttolitigationagainstthecorporationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.94-3—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Anattorneydepartingalawfirmmayethicallycontactthoseclientswithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,aslongasthedepartingattorneycomplieswiththeapplicableethicsrules.FAONo.97-3—Astafflawyerforanon-profitlegalservicesgroupmaycontactStateofficialstoexpressconcernsaboutthelegalityoftreatmentofnon-clientsandclients.FAONo.98-3—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Alawyerisaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftopre-pareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatenslegalactionorprovideslegaladviceorboth.FAONo.00-2—Alawyermaychargeforstandardtimeunitssolongasthisdoesnotresultinafeethatisunreasonable,andsolongasthelawyercommu-nicatestotheclientthemethodofbillingthelawyerisusingsothattheclientcanunderstandthebasisforthefee.FAONo.01-1—Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintentionofreferringamajorityofthatbusinessouttootherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.FAONo.05-6—AGeorgiaattorneyservingaslocalcounselcanbedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecoun-selwhenlocalcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorherconduct,andwhenlocalcounselhassupervisoryauthorityovertheout-of-statecounsel.FAONo.05-10

CONFIDENTIALITY—Nodutytodiscloselocationoffugitiveclienttoauthorities,buttheattorneyshouldwithdrawfromrepresentationifthefugitiveinsistsonpursuinganillegalcourseofaction.SDBNo.17—Ethicalproprietyofrevealingconfidencesandsecretsnecessarytodefendagainstchargesofprofessionalmisconduct.SDBNo.27—Ethicalobligationofattorneytoresistdisclosureofnameand/oridentityofhisclient.SDBNo.41—Undercertaincircumstances,anattorneymayrevealaclient’sintenttocommitsuicide.SDBNo.42—MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramthatpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcol-lectsthefeesfromtheclient?FAONo.95-1—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Theobligationofconfidentialityappliesasbetweentwojointlyrep-resentedclients.FAONo.03-2—Ethicalconsiderationsofalawfirminterestedinobtainingaloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9—Mayalawyerethicallydiscloseinformationconcerningthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandhisclienttoathirdpartyinanefforttocollectafeefromtheclient?FAONo.07-1

CONFLICTS OF INTERESTClaims and Complaints—Alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBarcomplaintsbytheclientagainsttheattorney.FAONo.96-1—Alawyershouldnotconditiontherepresentationofaclientuponthewaiverofanyclaimformalpractice.FAONo.05-8Criminal Cases—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3Domestic Relations—Attorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyonlytosecurereasonableattorney’sfees.FAONo.86-7Independent Professional Judgment—Ethicalproprietyofattorney’sfeesbeingpaidbyopposingside.SDBNo.30—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-timesolicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramthatpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcol-lectsthefeesfromtheclient?FAONo.95-1—Whileitmaybepossibletodoso,itwouldbebothethicallyandlegallyperiloustoenterintoa“solicitationagreement”withafinancialinvestmentadviserunderwhichtheattorney,inreturnforreferringaclienttotheadviser,receivesfeesbasedonapercentageofgrossfeespaidbytheclienttotheadviser.FAONo.03-3—Corporatein-housecounselmayenterintoabinding“holdharmless”agreementwiththeiremployerinlieuofmalpracticeinsurance.FAONo.05-2—Properforlawfirmtoobtainloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5—Alawyershouldnotconditiontherepresentationofaclientuponthewaiverofanyclaimformalpractice.FAONo.05-8—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9Insurance Practice—Ethicalconsiderationsofanattorneyrepresentinganinsurancecompanyonasubrogationclaimandsimultaneouslyrepresentingtheinsured.FAONo.05-7—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoanattorneywhowishestodefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultane-ouslyrepresentsacompanyinanunrelatedmatterandthatcompanyclaimsasubrogationrighttoanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient.FAONo.05-11Law Clerks—Alawclerkforasuperiorcourtjudgemaynotwriteappellatebriefsonbehalfofcriminaldefendantsindeathpenaltycases.SDBNo.38—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3Malpractice Claims,see MALPRACTICEMulti-Firm Employment—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2Multiple Representation—Theobligationofconfidentialityappliesasbetweentwojointlyrep-resentedclients.FAONo.03-2—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoanattorneywhowishestodefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultane-ouslyrepresentsacompanyinanunrelatedmatterandthatcompanyclaimsasubrogationrighttoanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient.FAONo.05-11Of Counsel—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4Private Interest v. Public Duty—CountyCommissionermaynotappointhisorherownfirm,orapartnerinhisorherownfirm,asCountyAttorney.SDBNo.16—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-timesolicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3—RepresentationofprivateclientsbeforetheRecorder’sCourtwhenattorneyisalsoacitycouncilmember.FAONo.89-2


—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolsalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3-5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysformseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12Real Estate Transactions—Anin-housecounselforarealestatelendinginstitutionassiststhatentityintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawifheorsheprovideslegalservicestoitscustomerswhichareinanywayrelatedtotheexistingrela-tionshipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer;andsuchconductwouldalsoconstituteanimpermissibleconflictofinterest.FAONo.99-2Referrals—Whileitmaybepossibletodoso,itwouldbebothethicallyandlegallyperiloustoenterintoa“solicitationagreement”withafinancialinvestmentadviserunderwhichtheattorney,inreturnforreferringaclienttotheadviser,receivesfeesbasedonapercentageofgrossfeespaidbytheclienttotheadviser.FAONo.03-3Settlement—Ethicalproprietyofincludingattorney’sfeesaspartofsettlementofferinfederalcivilrightscases.SDBNo.39Temporary/Contract Attorneys—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9Wills and Trusts—Drafterofwillortrustmayserveastheexecutorortrusteeeventhoughthelawyer’sindependentprofessionaljudgmentmaybeaffect-ed,providedtheclientconsentafterfulldisclosure.FAONo.91-1Workers’ Compensation Cases—AttorneymustadvisetheirclientofhisorherrighttoindependentcounseliftheattorneyappealsawardoffeesgrantedbytheWorkman’sCompensationBoard.SDBNo.29

CONSULTANT—Anattorneymaycommunicatetootherattorneyshisorheravailabil-itytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawsolongasthecommunicationisaccurateandnotmisleading.SDBNo.22—Itisnotimproperforalawfirmtoassociateanotherlawyerorlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvicetothefirm’sclientsonspecializedmattersandtoidentifythatlawyerorlawfirmas“specialcounsel”forthatspecializedareaofthelaw.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fiderelationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheout-sideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.FAONo.05-13

CONTINGENCY FEES—Guidelinesforpaymentofexpertwitnessfeesincontingencyfeecases.SDBNo.35—Acontingencyfeearrangementinadivorcecaseisagainstpublicpolicyandisthereforeimproper.SDBNo.36—ItisimproperforanattorneytochargeacontingencyfeeonroutinePIPclaims.SDBNo.37—Guidelinesforacceptablecontingencyfeearrangementsinpastduealimonyandchildsupportcases.SDBNo.47

CORPORATE COUNSEL—Anattorneymayinterviewanemployeeofacorporationwhichisanopposingpartyinpendinglitigationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.87-6—Anattorneymayinterviewaformeremployeeofacorporationrepre-sentedbycounseltoobtaininformationrelevanttolitigationagainstthecorporationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.94-3—Anin-housecounselforarealestatelendinginstitutionassiststhatentityintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawifheorsheprovideslegalservicestoitscustomerswhichareinanywayrelatedtotheexistingrela-tionshipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer;andsuchconductwouldalsoconstituteanimpermissibleconflictofinterest.FAONo.99-2—Corporatein-housecounselmayenterintoabinding“holdharmless”agreementwiththeiremployerinlieuofmalpracticeinsurance.FAONo.05-2—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9

COUNTY ATTORNEY—CountyCommissionermaynotappointhisorherownfirm,orapartnerinhisorherownfirm,asCountyAttorney.SDBNo.16—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3

CRIMINAL PRACTICE—Nodutytodiscloselocationoffugitiveclienttoauthorities,buttheattorneyshouldwithdrawfromrepresentationifthefugitiveinsistsonpursuinganillegalcourseofaction.SDBNo.17

—AttorneymaysendstatutorynoticetodrawerofabadcheckpursuanttotheprovisionsofGeorgiaCodeAnn.§26-1704.SDBNo.26—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-timesolicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3—Ethicalobligationofcriminaldefenselawyerstoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-con-victionremedies.FAONo.93-4—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Theobligationofconfidentialityappliesasbetweentwojointlyrep-resentedclients.FAONo.03-2—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12

DEPARTING ATTORNEY—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Anattorneydepartingalawfirmmayethicallycontactthoseclientswithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,aslongasthedepartingattorneycomplieswiththeapplicableethicsrules.FAONo.97-3

DISCOVERY—Guidelinesforuseofsubpoenas.SDBNo.40—AGeorgiaattorneyservingaslocalcounselcanbedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecoun-selwhenlocalcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorherconduct,andwhenlocalcounselhassupervisoryauthorityovertheout-of-statecounsel.FAONo.05-10

DISQUALIFICATION—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-timesolicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9—Itisnotimproperforalawfirmtoassociateanotherlawyerorlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvicetothefirm’sclientsonspecializedmattersandtoidentifythatlawyerorlawfirmas“specialcounsel”forthatspecializedareaofthelaw.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fiderelationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheout-sideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.FAONo.05-13

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS,seePROSECUTORS

DOMESTIC RELATIONS—Acontingencyfeearrangementinadivorcecaseisagainstpublicpolicyandisthereforeimproper.SDBNo.36—Guidelinesforacceptablecontingencyfeearrangementsinpastduealimonyandchildsupportcases.SDBNo.47—Attorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyonlytosecurereasonableattorney’sfees.FAONo.86-7

DUAL OCCUPATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoalawyerwhoisengagedinboththepracticeoflawandanotherprofessionorbusiness.SDBNo.31—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-time


solicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3—RepresentationofprivateclientsbeforetheRecorder’sCourtwhenattorneyisalsoacitycouncilmember.FAONo.89-2—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12

EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY,see HIRING

ESCROW ACCOUNT,see TRUST ACCOUNTS

EXECUTOR,see WILLS/TRUSTS

EXPERT WITNESS,see WITNESSES

FEE BILLS—Attorneysmaychargeinterestonclient’soverduebillsifnoticeisgiventoclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedondelinquentbills.SDBNo.45—MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramwhichpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcollectsthefeesfromtheclient?FAONo.95-1—Alawyermaychargeforstandardtimeunitssolongasthisdoesnotresultinafeethatisunreasonable,andsolongasthelawyercommu-nicatestotheclientthemethodofbillingthelawyerisusingsothattheclientcanunderstandthebasisforthefee.FAONo.01-1

FEE SHARING—Prohibitionofdivisionoffeeswithnonlawyers.SDBNo.21—Permissibleforattorneyemployeetoshareattorney’sfeeswithhisorherlayorganizationemployerwheretheattorney’sfeesareregardedasstipulatedliquidateddamages.FAONo.88-2—Anydivisionofattorney’sfeeswithalawyerreferralserviceconsti-tutesthesharingoffeeswithanon-lawyer.FAONo.94-1—Thepaymentofamonthlybonusbyalawyertohisnonlawyeremployeesbasedonthegrossreceiptsofhislawofficeinadditiontotheirregularsalaryispermissible.FAONo.05-4—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9

FEE SPLITTING—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9

FIDUCIARY—Alawyerholdingclientfundsand/orotherfundsinafiduciarycapacitymayremoveunclaimedfundsfromthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountanddeliverthefundstothecustodyoftheStateofGeorgiainaccordancewithO.C.G.A.§§44-12-190etseq.FAONo.98-2—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1

FILES—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBarcomplaintsbytheclientagainsttheattorney.FAONo.96-1

FILING LAWSUITS—Notimproperforattorneytofilelawsuitbeforecompletesupportfor

claimhasbeenestablishedifthereisreasonablepossibilitythatfactscanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.FAONo.87-1

FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS—Notimproperforattorneytofilelawsuitbeforecompletesupportforclaimhasbeenestablishedifthereisreasonablepossibilitythatfactscanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.FAONo.87-1

FUGITIVES—Nodutytodiscloselocationoffugitiveclienttoauthorities,buttheattorneyshouldwithdrawfromrepresentationifthefugitiveinsistsonpursuinganillegalcourseofaction.SDBNo.17

GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES,see PUBLIC OFFICIALS and LAW CLERKS

HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS—Corporatein-housecounselmayenterintoabinding“holdharmless”agreementwiththeiremployerinlieuofmalpracticeinsurance.FAONo.05-2

HIRING—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9

IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION,see DISQUALIFICATION

INSURANCE PRACTICE—ItisimproperforanattorneytochargeacontingencyfeeonroutinePIPclaims.SDBNo.37—Athirdpartybeneficiaryorhisorherattorneymayadvanceorreim-burseaninsuredforthepurchaseofoptionalPIPcoverage.SDBNo.46—Improperforplaintiff’sattorneyinapersonalinjurycasetowritealettertotheinsureddefendantwhichmaycontainlegaladvice.FAONo.86-4—Ethicalconsiderationsofanattorneyrepresentinganinsurancecompanyonasubrogationclaimandsimultaneouslyrepresentingtheinsured.FAONo.05-7—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoanattorneywhowishestodefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultane-ouslyrepresentsacompanyinanunrelatedmatterandthatcompanyclaimsasubrogationrighttoanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient.FAONo.05-11

IN HOUSE COUNSEL—Anin-housecounselforarealestatelendinginstitutionassiststhatentityintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawifheorsheprovideslegalservicestoitscustomerswhichareinanywayrelatedtotheexistingrelationshipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer;andsuchconductwouldalsoconstituteanimpermissibleconflictofinterest.FAONo.99-2—Corporatein-housecounselmayenterintoabinding“holdharmless”agreementwiththeiremployerinlieuofmalpracticeinsurance.FAONo.05-2—AGeorgiaattorneyservingaslocalcounselcanbedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecoun-selwhenlocalcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorherconduct,andwhenlocalcounselhassupervisoryauthorityovertheout-of-statecounsel.FAONo.05-10

INTERPLEADER—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoalawyerpayingfundstoothersoveraclient’sobjections.FAONo.94-2

JUDGES—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—RepresentationofprivateclientsbeforetheRecorder’sCourtwhenattorneyisalsoacitycouncilmemberandthecitycouncilappointsRecorder’sCourtjudges.FAONo.89-2—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3

LAW CLERKS—Ethicalconsiderationsregardingactivitiesofnonlawyers.SDBNo.21—Alawclerkforasuperiorcourtjudgemaynotwriteappellatebriefsonbehalfofcriminaldefendantsindeathpenaltycases.SDBNo.38


—Lawyercannotdelegatetoanonlawyerresponsibilityofclosingarealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FAONo.86-5—Alawyerisaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftopre-pareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatenslegalactionorprovideslegaladviceorboth.FAONo.00-2—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3

LAW FIRMS—Ethicalconsiderationsforamulti-statelawwithanofficeinGeorgia.SDBNo.23—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Anattorneydepartingalawfirmmayethicallycontactthoseclientswithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,aslongasthedepartingattorneycomplieswiththeapplicableethicsrules.FAONo.97-3—Properforlawfirmtoobtainloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5—Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenthiringattorneystoworkforthemonatemporarybasis.FAONo.05-9—Itisnotimproperforalawfirmtoassociateanotherlawyerorlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvicetothefirm’sclientsonspecializedmattersandtoidentifythatlawyerorlawfirmas“specialcounsel”forthatspecializedareaofthelaw.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fiderelationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheout-sideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.FAONo.05-13

LEGAL ASSISTANTS, see NONLAWYERS

LETTERHEAD—Anattorneyshouldnotfurnishhisorherletterheadtoaclientforusebytheclienttocollectadebt.SDBNo.5—Nonlawyersuseofalawyer’sletterheadforcorrespondenceregard-inga“legalmatter”signedonlybyanonlawyermaybeimproper.SDBNo.19—Nonlawyer’suseofattorney’sletterheadforroutinecorrespondenceisethicalifsupervisedbytheattorney.SDBNo.21—Ethicalconsiderationsforamulti-statefirmwithanofficeinGeorgia.SDBNo.23—Alawyermayreferpastdueaccountstoacollectionagency.SDBNo.49—Lawyerspracticingsimultaneouslyinmorethanonelawfirm.FAONo.97-2—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4—Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintentionofreferringamajorityofthatbusinessouttootherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.FAONo.05-6

LITIGATION—Notimproperforattorneytofilelawsuitbeforecompletesupportforclaimhasbeenestablishedifthereisreasonablepossibilitythatfactscanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.FAONo.87-1—Anattorneymayinterviewaformeremployeeofacorporationrepre-sentedbycounseltoobtaininformationrelevanttolitigationagainstthecorporationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.94-3—Properforlawfirmtoobtainloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5

LOANS—Properforlawfirmtoobtainloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.FAONo.05-5

LOCAL COUNSEL—AGeorgiaattorneyservingaslocalcounselcanbedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecoun-selwhenlocalcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorherconduct,andwhenlocalcounselhassupervisoryauthorityovertheout-of-statecounsel.FAONo.05-10

MALPRACTICE—Alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBarcomplaintsbytheclientagainsttheattorney.FAONo.96-1

—Corporatein-housecounselmayenterintoabinding“holdharmless”agreementwiththeiremployerinlieuofmalpracticeinsurance.FAONo.05-2—Alawyershouldnotconditiontherepresentationofaclientuponthewaiverofanyclaimformalpractice.FAONo.05-8

MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION,see CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

MULTI-STATE FIRM—Ethicalconsiderationsforamulti-statefirmwithanofficeinGeorgia.SDBNo.23

NONLAWYERS—Anattorneyshouldnotfurnishhisorherletterheadtoaclientforusebythatclienttocollectadebt.SDBNo.5—Nonlawyersuseofalawyer’sletterheadforcorrespondenceregard-inga“legalmatter”signedonlybyanonlawyermaybeimproper.SDBNo.19—Ethicalconsiderationsregardingactivitiesofnonlawyers.SDBNo.21—Lawyercannotdelegatetoanonlawyerresponsibilityofclosingarealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FAONo.86-5—Anydivisionofattorney’sfeeswithalawyerreferralserviceconsti-tutesthesharingoffeeswithanon-lawyer.FAONo.94-1—Alawyerisaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftopre-pareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatenslegalactionorprovideslegaladviceorboth.FAONo.00-2—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1—Thepaymentofamonthlybonusbyalawyertohisnonlawyeremployeesbasedonthegrossreceiptsofhislawofficeinadditiontotheirregularsalaryispermissible.FAONo.05-4

OF-COUNSEL—Becauseanattorneywhoisheldouttothepublicas“ofcounsel”shouldhaveaclose,personalrelationshipwiththeaffiliatedfirm,theethicsrulesapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandasso-ciatesoflawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel.”FAONo.98-4

PARALEGALS, see NONLAWYERS

PARTNERSHIPS—Attorneymaynotformapartnershipwithanonlawyerifanypartner-shipactivityconsistsofthepracticeoflaw.SDBNo.21

PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE—ItisimproperforanattorneytochargeacontingencyfeeonroutinePIPclaims.SDBNo.37—Improperforplaintiff’sattorneyinapersonalinjurycasetowritealettertotheinsureddefendantwhichmaycontainlegaladvice.FAONo.86-4—PermissibletosendthenoticerequiredbyO.C.G.A§51-12-14toanunrepresentedadverseparty,butmustspecificallystatethatitisanoticeratherthanadvice.FAONo.88-3—Ethicalconsiderationsofanattorneyrepresentinganinsurancecompanyonasubrogationclaimandsimultaneouslyrepresentingtheinsured.FAONo.05-7—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoanattorneywhowishestodefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultane-ouslyrepresentsacompanyinanunrelatedmatterandthatcompanyclaimsasubrogationrighttoanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient.FAONo.05-11

PIP COVERAGE—ItisimproperforanattorneytochargeacontingencyfeeonroutinePIPclaims.SDBNo.37—Athirdpartybeneficiaryorhisorherattorneymayadvanceorreim-burseaninsuredforthepurchaseofoptionalPIPcoverage.SDBNo.46

PLEA AGREEMENT—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3

PREPAID FEES,seeATTORNEY’S FEESandRETAINER FEES

PRO HAC VICE, alsoseeADMISSION PRO HAC VICE, Uniform Rule of Superior Court 4.4—AGeorgiaattorneyservingaslocalcounselcanbedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecoun-selwhenlocalcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorher


conduct,andwhenlocalcounselhassupervisoryauthorityovertheout-of-statecounsel.FAONo.05-10

PROSECUTORS—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3

PUBLIC OFFICIALS—CountyCommissionermaynotappointhisorherownfirm,orapartnerinhisorherownfirm,asCountyAttorney.SDBNo.16—Properforlawyertoserveasbothastatelegislatorandpart-timesolicitor,butparticularcasesmayposeconflictswhichthelawyermustresolve.FAONo.86-1—Part-timejudgemayalsoserveasacriminaldefensecounsel.FAONo.86-2—CountyAttorneymayrepresentcriminaldefendantsunlessthereisaviolationofacountyordinancecharged,andtheattorneyissensitivetootherconflictswhichmayarise.FAONo.86-3—RepresentationofprivateclientsbeforetheRecorder’sCourtwhenattorneyisalsoacitycouncilmember.FAONo.89-2—Ethicalproprietyofaprosecutorconditioningapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonthewaiverofdefensecounsel’sfee.FAONo.93-3—Ethicalobligationofcriminaldefenselawyerstoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-con-victionremedies.FAONo.93-4—RepresentationofacriminaldefendantinmunicipalcourtbyamemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.FAONo.05-12

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS—Lawyercannotdelegatetoanonlawyerresponsibilityofclosingarealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FAONo.86-5—Anin-housecounselforarealestatelendinginstitutionassiststhatentityintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawifheorsheprovideslegalservicestoitscustomerswhichareinanywayrelatedtotheexistingrelationshipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer;andsuchcon-ductwouldalsoconstituteanimpermissibleconflictofinterest.FAONo.99-2—Ethicalproprietyoflawyerstelephonicallyparticipatinginrealestateclosingsfromremotesites.FAONo.00-3—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1

REFERRAL AND REFERRAL SERVICES—Anydivisionofattorney’sfeeswithalawyerreferralserviceconsti-tutesthesharingoffeeswithanon-lawyer.FAONo.94-1—Whileitmaybepossibletodoso,itwouldbebothethicallyandlegallyperiloustoenterintoa“solicitationagreement”withafinancialinvestmentadviserunderwhichtheattorney,inreturnforreferringaclienttotheadviser,receivesfeesbasedonapercentageofgrossfeespaidbytheclienttotheadviser.FAONo.03-3—Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintentionofreferringamajorityofthatbusinessouttootherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.FAONo.05-6

RETAINER FEES—Alawyerisnotrequiredtoplaceattorney’sfeespaidinadvanceintoatrustaccountexceptunderspecialcircumstances.FAONo.91-2—AGeorgiaattorneymaycontractwithaclientforanon-refundablespecialretainersolongasthecontractisnotacontracttoviolatetheattorney’sobligationunderRule1.16(d)anddoesnotviolateRule1.5(a)’srequirementofreasonableness.FAONo.03-1

SETTLEMENT—Ethicalproprietyofincludingattorney’sfeesaspartofsettlementofferinfederalcivilrightscases.SDBNo.39—Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoalawyerpayingfundstoothersoveraclient’sobjections.FAONo.94-2

SECURITY INTEREST—Attorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyonlytosecurereasonableattorney’sfees.FAONo.86-7

SIGHT DRAFTS

SMOOT LETTERS—Improperforplaintiff’sattorneyinapersonalinjurycasetowritealettertotheinsureddefendantwhichmaycontainlegaladvice.FAONo.86-4

SOLICITATION,seeADVERTISING

SPECIAL COUNSEL—Itisnotimproperforalawfirmtoassociateanotherlawyerorlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvicetothefirm’sclientsonspecializedmattersandtoidentifythatlawyerorlawfirmas“specialcounsel”forthatspecializedareaofthelaw.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fiderelationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheout-sideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.FAONo.05-13

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—Notimproperforattorneytofilelawsuitbeforecompletesupportforclaimhasbeenestablishedifthereisreasonablepossibilitythatfactscanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.FAONo.87-1

SUBPOENAS—Guidelinesforuseofsubpoenas.SDBNo.40

SUBROGATION,see INSURANCE PRACTICE

SUICIDE—Undercertaincircumstances,anattorneymayrevealaclient’sintenttocommitsuicide.SDBNo.42

TERMINATING REPRESENTATION,see WITHDRAWALTRANSCRIPTS—Ethicalobligationofcriminaldefenselawyerstoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-con-victionremedies.FAONo.93-4

TRUSTS,seeWILLS/TRUSTS

TRUST ACCOUNTS—Alawyerisnotrequiredtoplaceattorney’sfeespaidinadvanceintoatrustaccountexceptunderspecialcircumstances.FAONo.91-2—Alawyerholdingclientfundsand/orotherfundsinafiduciarycapacitymayremoveunclaimedfundsfromthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountanddeliverthefundstothecustodyoftheStateofGeorgiainaccordancewithO.C.G.A.§§44-12-190etseq.FAONo.98-2—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1

TRUSTEE,see WILLS/TRUSTS

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW—Anattorneyshouldnotfurnishhisorherletterheadtoaclientforusebythatclienttocollectadebt.SDBNo.5—Nonlawyersuseofalawyer’sletterheadforcorrespondenceregard-inga“legalmatter”signedonlybyanonlawyermaybeimproper.SDBNo.19—Ethicalconsiderationsregardingactivitiesofnonlawyers.SDBNo.21—Ethicalconsiderationsforamulti-statefirmwithanofficeinGeorgia.SDBNo.23—Lawyercannotdelegatetoanonlawyerresponsibilityofclosingarealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FAONo.86-5—Anin-housecounselforarealestatelendinginstitutionassiststhatentityintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawifheorsheprovideslegalservicestoitscustomerswhichareinanywayrelatedtotheexistingrelationshipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer;andsuchconductwouldalsoconstituteanimpermissibleconflictofinterest.FAONo.99-2—Alawyerisaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftopre-pareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatenslegalactionorprovideslegaladviceorboth.FAONo.00-2—Ethicalproprietyoflawyerstelephonicallyparticipatinginrealestateclosingsfromremotesites.FAONo.00-3—Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingpro-ceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).FAONo.04-1

WAIVER OF LIABILITY—Alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBarcomplaintsbytheclientagainsttheattorney.FAONo.96-1—Alawyershouldnotconditiontherepresentationofaclientuponthewaiverofanyclaimformalpractice.FAONo.05-8


WILLS/TRUSTS—Ethicalconsiderationsforanattorneynamedastheexecutorortrusteeforawillortrustheorsheprepared.FAONo.91-1

WITHDRAWAL—Nodutytodiscloselocationoffugitiveclienttoauthorities,buttheattorneyshouldwithdrawfromrepresentationifthefugitiveinsistsonpursuinganillegalcourseofaction.SDBNo.17—Anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.FAONo.87-5—Ethicalobligationofcriminaldefenselawyerstoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-con-victionremedies.FAONo.93-4—Anattorneydepartingalawfirmmayethicallycontactthoseclientswithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,aslongasthedepartingattorneycomplieswiththeapplicableethicsrules.FAONo.97-3—AGeorgiaattorneymaycontractwithaclientforanon-refundablespecialretainersolongasthecontractisnotacontracttoviolatetheattorney’sobligationunderRule1.16(d)anddoesnotviolateRule1.5(a)’srequirementofreasonableness.FAONo.03-1—Theobligationofconfidentialityappliesasbetweentwojointlyrep-resentedclients.FAONo.03-2—Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkrepresentingaclientbeforeajudgewhoispresentlyemployingthelawclerk.FAONo.05-3

WITNESSES—Attorneyresponsibilitieswithrespecttothepaymentofwitnessfees.SDBNo.35—Guidelinesforpaymentofexpertwitnessfeesincontingencyfeecases.SDBNo.35—GuidelinesforuseofExpertWitnessconsultingservice.SDBNo.48—Anattorneymayinterviewanemployeeofacorporationwhichisanopposingpartyinpendinglitigationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.87-6—Anattorneymayinterviewaformeremployeeofacorporationrepre-sentedbycounseltoobtaininformationrelevanttolitigationagainstthecorporationundercertaincircumstances.FAONo.94-3

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION—AttorneymustadvisetheirclientofhisorherrighttoindependentcounseliftheattorneyappealsawardoffeesgrantedbytheWorkman’sCompensationBoard.SDBNo.29

QUESTION PRESENTED INDEX

SDB No. 5–Proprietyofanattorneypermittingtheuseofhisorherlet-terheadstationerybyaretainerclientwhoiswritingasacreditororasacollectionagencyseekingtocollectanaccountordebtfromtherecipient.

SDB No. 16–ProprietyofanattorneywhoisaCountyCommissionerinaruralcountyappointinghisownfirmasCountyAttorney.

SDB No. 17–Dutyofanattorneyrepresentingafugitiveuponwar-rantsforprobationviolation.

SDB No. 19–ProprietyofamemberoftheStateBarpermittingaparalegalinhisemploytocorrespondconcerning“legalmatters”onthelawfirmletterheadunderhisownsignature.

SDB No. 21–Whataretheethicalresponsibilitiesofattorneyswhoemploylegalassistantsorparaprofessionalsandpermitthemtodealwithotherlawyers,clientsandthepublic?

SDB No. 22–IsitunethicalforalawyertocommunicationtootherlawyershisorheravailabilitytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawwithoutrunningafouloftherequirementsofStandard6andtheprovisionssetforinEC2-6,2-7,and2-8,SelectionofaLawyer:GenerallyandEC2-9,and2-10,SelectionofaLawyer:ProfessionalNoticesandListings?

SDB No. 23–Mayanout-of-statelawfirmopenandmaintainanofficeintheStateofGeorgiaunderthedirectionofafull-timeGeorgiaresidentandamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia?

SDB No. 26–Isitethicallyimproperforalawyertosendastatutorynoticetothedrawerofabadcheckthatstatesthatunlesssaiddrawerpaystheamountofthecheckinfullwithinaspecifiedperiodheorshewillbesubjecttocriminalprosecution?

SDB No. 27–Woulditbeethicallyproperforthelawyertorevealcon-fidencesorsecretsofclients,whichmaybenecessarytothelawyer’sdefenseagainstchargesofprofessionalmisconduct?

SDB No. 29–Doesalawyerwhohasrepresentedaclaimantinaworkers’compensationcasehaveanethicalobligationtoadvisehisorherclientofhisorherrighttoobtainindependentcounseltorepresenttheclientwhenthelawyerdecidestoappealtheamounttheWorkers’CompensationBoardhasapprovedasthelawyer’sfee?

SDB No. 30–Ethicalproprietyofagreementbywhichattorney’sfeesarepaidbyopposingparty.

SDB No. 31–(1)ShouldaGeorgiaattorney,alsopossessingaGeorgiarealestatesalesperson’slicense,whoarrangesarealestatetransactioninhisorhercapacityasarealestatesalespersondeclinetoperformanytitleworkorotherlegalworkinordertoavoidanappearanceofprofes-sionalimpropriety?(2)If,inthecourseofrepresentingaclientinanunrelatedlegalmatter,theclientrequeststheattorney(alsopossessingarealestatesalesperson’slicense)tolocateabuyerorsellerforthecli-ent’srealestate,isitproperfortheattorneytoaccept?

SDB No. 35–Attorney(A)representsClient(C),theplaintiffinacivilsuitfordamages.InthecourseofpreparationforC’scase,Ausestheservicesofanexpertwitness(W);nothingspecificismentionedcon-cerningcompensationofW.Chasnosubstantialassetotherthantheclaimthatisthesubjectofthesuit,andwillbeabletopaythewitnessfeesonlyifheissuccessfulinsecuringarecovery.Bythesametoken,ifAadvancesthefeestoW,AwillhavelittleornochanceofbeingreimbursedbyC,ifCloseshiscase. (1)WoulditbeproperforAtopaythecosts,realizingthathemightneverbereimbursedbyC?(2)WoulditbeproperforAtosaynothingandkeepWwaitingforpaymentuntilsomerecoveryhasbeenhad?(3)Generally,shouldtheStateBarreconsidertheethicalprohibi-tionagainstcontingencyfeesforexpertwitnessesinlightofthepracti-calitiesinvolved?

SDB No. 36–Isitethicallyproperforanattorneytoenterintoacon-tingencyfeeagreementinadivorcecase?

SDB No. 37–Isitethicallyproperforanattorneytotakeacontin-gencyfeefromaclient’sPIPbenefits?

SDB No. 38–MayaLawClerkforaSuperiorCourtJudgeprepareappellatebriefsonbehalfofdefendantsincriminalcaseswherethedeathpenaltyhasbeenimposed?

SDB No. 39–Ethicalproprietyofdefendant’stenderoflumpsumsettlementofferstoplaintiffsinfederalcivilrightsactionswhereinstatutoryattorneyfeesareprovidedforsuccessfulplaintiff.

SDB No. 40–(1)WhetherornotitisaviolationofStandard4oftheDisciplinaryRulesoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforanattorneytoissueasubpoenafortheProductionofDocumentspursuanttoO.C.G.A.§24-10-22(a),directingthewitnesstoappearatalawyer’sofficeorsomeotherlocation,wheninfactnohearingortrialistakingplaceandnonoticeofsuchsubpoenaisserveduponopposingcounsel?(2)WhetherornotitisaviolationofStandard4oftheDisciplinaryRulesoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforanattorneytoissueasubpoenapursuanttoO.C.G.A.§9-11-45whennonoticeofdepositionhasbeenfiledandserveduponallpartiesandwhennodepositionhasinfactbeenscheduled?

SDB No. 41–LawyerXhasreceivedcashfeesfromclientsinexcessof$10,000severaltimesinthepastthreeyears.Allofthesefeeswereforrepresentationincriminalmatters.Eachtime,Xhasdepositedthemoneyineitherhisoperatingaccountorescrowaccount,whenappropriate,andfiledaCurrencyTransactionReport,asrequiredby31C.F.R.§103.22.Subsequently,XreceivedatelephoneinquiryfromarevenueagentwiththeGeorgiaDepartmentofRevenueinquiringintothesourceofthefundsrecordedonthecurrencytransactionreport.LawyerXrefusedtodivulgethenamesofhisclients. TheStateofGeorgiathenissuedaNoticetoProduce,requiringproductionof“...allbooks,records,papersand/ordocumentspertain-ingto[LawyerX’spersonalCorporateGeorgiaIncomeTax]Fortheperiodsindicated[1981-1983].”TheNoticetoProducedidnotnameaspecificpersonasaclientforaninvestigation,butLawyerXwasverballyadvisedbytherevenueagentthatinfact,thepurposeofthisNoticetoProducewastodiscover,atrandom,thenamesoftheclient,andtoauditthelawyer. (1)WillLawyerXviolatetheconfidencesandsecretsprovi-sionoftheCodeofEthicsbycomplyingwiththeNoticetoProduceinrevealingtheidentityoftheclientinthosetransactionsinexcessof$10,000?(2)Additionally,willLawyerXviolatetheconfidencesandsecretsprovisionoftheCodeofEthicsbycomplyingwiththeNoticetoProduceinrevealingtheidentityofallofhisclientsandtheamountoffeespaid,whetherbycase,check,oranyamountaboveorlessthan$10,000?


SDB No. 42–DoesInformalOpinionNo.83-1500oftheABAStandingCommitteeonEthicsandProfessionalResponsibility(June24,1983),whichauthorizedalawyertodisclosetootherpersonsthedefinitethreatofhisclienttotakehisownlifeapplytoasituationwheretheclienthasnotdefinitelyexpressedsuchanintention,but,byhisactions,hasgivenhisattorneyreasontobelievethatheintendstotakehisownlife.

SDB No. 45–(1)Aclientisbilledforservicerenderedandfailstopayafterthirty(30)dayshaveelapsed.Isitpermissibletonotifytheclient,byletter,thatunlesshisaccountispaidinfull,interestwillbechargedonthenextbillontheunpaidbalance?(2)Aclientsignsafeecontractwithanattorneyprovidingforthechargingofinterestonanyunpaidbalance.Isitpermissiblefortheattorneytochargeinterest?(3)Anattorneynotifieshisorherclientbyletterthatinterestwillbechargedunlesstheiraccountsarepaidinfull.Iftheconductdescribedinquestion1isimpermissible,cantheattorneyrectifythesituationbyrebillingtheclientswithanyinterestchargeddeducted,orifinterestwaspaidreturned?

SDB No. 46–(1)Mayaclientorhisattorneyadvancetoaninsured(policyholder)thepremiumamountforoptionalPIPcoverage?(2)Mayandattorneyorhisclientcompensatetheinsuredforhistimeinapply-ingforandobtainingoptionalPIPcoverage?(3).Iftheinsurerrefusestopaythebenefitsandlitigationresults,wouldtheclientbebarredfromcompensatingtheinsuredforhistimeandeffortinpursuingtheclaimincourt,inadditiontowitnessandmileagefeesallowedbystatute?

SDB No. 47–Isitethicaltochargeacontingentfeetocollectpastduealimonyand-orchildsupportpayments?

SDB No. 48–DoestheuseofanexpertconsultingserviceviolateBarRules?

SDB No. 49–Mayalawyerethicallyretainalaycollectionagencytocollectoverdueaccountsforlegalservices?

FAO No. 86-1–Mayalawyerserveasbothalegislatorandapart-timesolicitor?

FAO No. 86-2–Ethicalproprietyofapart-timejudgeservinginajudicialcapacitywhilealsoservingasacriminaldefensecounsel.

FAO No. 86-3–Ethicalproprietyastowhethercountyattorneysortheirpartnersorassociatesmayrepresentcriminaldefendants.

FAO No. 86-4–Ethicalproprietyoftheplaintiff’sattorneyinpersonalinjurycasewritingalettertotheinsureddefendantwhichmaycontainlegaladvice.

FAO No. 86-5–Isitethicallypermissibleforalawyertodelegatetoanon-lawyertheclosingofrealestatetransactions?

FAO No. 86-7–Isitethicallyproperforalawyertotakeasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertytosecurehisorherfeeinadomesticrela-tionscase?

FAO No. 87-1–Arethereethicalprohibitionsagainstfilingsuitwhenthelawyerdoesnotknowwhetherfactsexistwhichwouldconstituteacauseofaction,andtheinformationneededtomakethatdetermina-tioncannotbeacquiredpriortotheexpirationofthepertinentstatuteoflimitations?

FAO No. 87-5–WhataretheethicaldutiesofalawyerunderStandard22(b)withrespecttothereturnofaclient’spapersandpropertywhenthelawyerhasnotbeenpaidinviewofthestatutoryretaininglienauthorizedbyO.C.G.A.§15-19-14(a)(ConflictbetweenStandard22(b)andAttorneys’HoldingLien)?

FAO No. 87-6–Whenisitethicallyproperforalawyertointerviewtheofficersandemployeesofanorganization,whenthatorganizationistheopposingpartyinlitigation,withouttheconsentoftheorganiza-tion’scounsel?

FAO No. 88-2–Ethicalproprietyofanattorney-employeesharingattorney’sfeeswithalayorganization-employer.

FAO No. 88-3–IsitaviolationofStandard48oftheRulesandRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforacorrespondenttocom-plywiththenoticerequirementofO.G.C.A§51-12-14bysendingademandnoticetoanunrepresentedparty?

FAO No. 89-2–Itisethicallyproperforanattorney,whoisalsoamemberofthecitycouncil,torepresentprivateclientsbeforethe

Recorder’sCourt,whenthecitycouncilappointstheJudgesoftheRecorder’sCourt,iftheattorneyabstainsfromvotingonjudicialappointments.

FAO No. 91-1–Isitethicallyproperforalawyertobenamedexecu-torortrusteeinawillortrustherorshehasprepared?

FAO No. 91-2–Whetheralawyermaydepositintoageneraloperatingaccountaretainerthatrepresentspaymentoffeesyettobeearned.

FAO No. 93-3–Isitunethicalforaprosecutortoconditionapleaagreementonanappointedorprobonocounsel’swaiverofanyclaimsforattorney’sfees.

FAO No. 93-4–Arepublicdefendersoranycriminaldefenseattorneyobligatedtoprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecollateralpost-convictionremedies?

FAO No. 94-1–Ethicalproprietyofalawyerreferralservicecollect-ingapercentageoffeesincertaincasesreferredtoparticipatingattor-neysbytheservice.

FAO No. 94-2–Ethicalconsiderationsapplicabletoalawyerpayingfundstoothersoveraclient’sobjections.

FAO No. 94-3–Mayalawyerproperlycontactandinterviewformeremployeesofanorganizationrepresentedbycounseltoobtaininforma-tionrelevanttolitigationagainsttheorganization?

FAO No. 95-1–MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramwhichpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcollectsthefeesfromtheclient?Toparticipateintheprogram,thelawyermustenrollandpayafee;andagreetoassigntheclient’sfeesbillsandshareinformationabouttheclientandtheclient’scasewiththeprogram.

FAO No. 96-1–Thequestionpresentediswhetheranattorneymayrequireaclient,whodesirestodischargethelawyer,toenterintoanagreementreleasingthelawyerforallclaimsbytheclientagainstthelawyer,includinganydisciplinarycomplaintwiththeStateBar,inordertoobtaintheclient’sfilesfromthelawyerandawaiverofanyclaimoflienbythelawyeragainstsuchfiles.

FAO No. 97-2–Mayanattorneypracticeinmorethanonelawfirm?

FAO No. 97-3–Whetheritisethicallypermissibleforadepartingattorneytosendacommunicationtoclientsoftheformerlawfirm?

FAO No. 98-2–Whenalawyerholdingclientfundsand/orotherfundsinafiduciarycapacityisunabletolocatetherightfulrecipientofsuchfundsafterexhaustingallreasonableefforts,maythatlawyerremovetheunclaimedfundsfromthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountanddeliverthefundstothecustodyoftheStateofGeorgiainaccordancewiththeDispositionofUnclaimedPropertyAct?

FAO No. 98-3–Mayastafflawyerforanon-profitlegalservicesgroupcontactStateofficialstoexpressconcernsaboutthelegalityoftreatmentofnon-clients?

FAO No. 98-4–Isitethicallyproperforalawyertorepresentacrimi-naldefendantwhenaco-defendantinthesamecriminalprosecutionisrepresentedbyasecondattorneywhoislistedonletterheadas“ofcounsel”tothesamelawfirm?

FAO No. 99-2–Inatransactioninvolvingarealestatelendinginsti-tutionanditscustomer,maythein-housecounselfortheinstitutionprovidelegalservicestothecustomerrelativetothetransaction?Maytherealestatelendinginstitutionchargethecustomerafeeforanylegalservicesrenderedrelativetothetransaction?

FAO No. 00-2–Isalawyeraidinganon-lawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanon-lawyermemberofhisorherstafftoprepareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatenslegalactionorprovideslegaladviceorboth?

FAO No. 00-3–Ethicalproprietyoflawyerstelephonicallyparticipat-inginrealestateclosingsfromremotesites.

FAO No. 01-1–Isitethicallypermissibleforanattorney,withorwithoutnoticetoaclient,tochargeforastandardtimeunitwithoutregardtohowmuchtimeisactuallyexpended?

FAO No. 03-1–MayaGeorgiaattorneycontractwithaclientforanonrefundablespecialretainer?


FAO No. 03-2–DoestheobligationofconfidentialitydescribedinRule1.6,ConfidentialityofInformation,applyasbetweentwojointlyrepresentedclients?

FAO No. 03-3–Isitethicallypermissibleforanattorneytoenterintoa“solicitationagreement”withafinancialinvestmentadviserunderwhichtheattorney,inreturnforreferringaclienttotheadviser,receivesfeesbasedonapercentageofgrossfeespaidbytheclienttotheadviser?

FAO No. 04-1–Mayalawyerparticipateinanon-lawyerentitycreatedbythelawyerforthepurposeofconductingresidentialrealestateclosingswheretheclosingproceedsreceivedbytheentityaredepositedinanon-IOLTAinterestbearingbanktrustaccountratherthananIOLTAaccount?

FAO No. 05-2–Whetheranattorneyemployedin-housebyacorpora-tionmay enter into an agreement bywhich his or her employer shallhold the attorneyharmless formalpractice committed in the courseofhisemployment.

FAO No. 05-3–Ethicalproprietyofapart-timelawclerkappearingasanattorneybeforehisorherpresentemployer-judge.

FAO No. 05-4–Ethicalproprietyofalawyerpayinghisnon-lawyeremployeesamonthlybonusfromthegrossreceiptsofhislawoffice.

FAO No. 05-5–(1)Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmobtainingaloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.(2)Ethicalconsid-erationsapplicabletopaymentofinterestchargedonloanobtainedbylawfirmtocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.

FAO No. 05-6–Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintentionofreferringamajorityofthatbusinessouttootherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.

FAO No. 05-7–Ethicalconsiderationsofanattorneyrepresentinganinsurancecompanyonasubrogationclaimandsimultaneouslyrepre-sentingtheinsured.

FAO No. 05-8–Thequestionpresentediswhetheranattorneymaystampclientcorrespondencewithanoticestatingthattheclienthasaparticularperiodoftimetonotifythelawyerifhe/sheisdissatisfiedwiththelawyerandthatiftheclientdidnotnotifythelawyerofhis/herdissatisfactionwithinthatperiodoftime,theclientwouldwaiveanyclaimformalpractice.

FAO No. 05-9–Isitethicallypropertoworkonatemporarybasisforotherattorneys?Isitethicallyproperforalawyer,lawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenttohireotherattorneysonatemporarybasis?

FAO No. 05-10–CanaGeorgiaattorney,whohasagreedtoserveaslocalcounsel,bedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyanin-houseorotherout-of-statecounselwhoisnotamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia?

FAO No. 05-11–Mayanattorneyethicallydefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultaneouslyrepresents,inanunrelatedmatter,theinsurancecompanywithasubrogationrightinanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient?

FAO No. 05-1–WhentheCityCouncilcontrolsthesalaryandben-efitsofthemembersofthePoliceDepartment,mayacouncilperson,whoisanattorney,representcriminaldefendantsinmatterswherethepoliceexercisediscretionindeterminingthecharges?

FAO No. 05-13–(1)Whetherthedesignation“SpecialCounsel”maybeusedtodescribeanattorneyand/orlawfirmaffiliatedwithanotherlawfirmforthespecificpurposeofprovidingconsultationandadvicetotheotherfirminspecializedlegalareas.(2)Whethertheethicalrulesgoverningconflictofinterestapplyasifthefirm,theaffiliatedattorneyandtheaffiliatedfirmconstituteasinglefirm.

FAO No. 07-1–Mayalawyerethicallydiscloseinformationconcern-ingthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandhisclienttoathirdpartyinanefforttocollectafeefromtheclient?

GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT INDEX

CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 1.1 - CompetenceFAONo.86-5FAONo.93-3FAONo.00-2FAONo.05-13

Rule 1.2 - Scope of RepresentationSDBNo.17SDBNo.26

SDBNo.39SDBNo.40SDBNo.41FAONo.86-1FAONo.87-1FAONo.94-2FAONo.05-7FAONo.05-10

Rule 1.3 - DiligenceFAONo.87-1FAONo.97-3

Rule 1.4 - CommunicationFAONo.03-2FAONo.03-3FAONo.05-9

Rule 1.5 - Fees SDBNo.21

SDBNo.29SDBNo.36SDBNo.37SDBNo.39SDBNo.45SDBNo.47FAONo.86-7FAONo.91-2FAONo.93-3FAONo.95-1FAONo.01-1FAONo.03-1FAONo.05-5FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-13

Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of InformationSDBNo.17SDBNo.27SDBNo.41SDBNo.42SDBNo.49FAONo.95-1FAONo.97-1FAONo.97-2FAONo.03-2FAONo.03-3FAONo.05-5FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-10FAONo.07-1

Rule 1.7 - Conflict of Interest: General RuleSDBNo.16SDBNo.29SDBNo.30SDBNo.38FAONo.86-1FAONo.86-3FAONo.86-7FAONo.91-1FAONo.93-3FAONo.95-1FAONo.97-2FAONo.98-3FAONo.98-4FAONo.99-2FAONo.03-2FAONo.03-3FAONo.05-3FAONo.05-7FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-11

Rule 1.8 - Conflict of Interest: Prohibited TransactionsSDBNo.35SDBNo.46FAONo.86-1FAONo.86-7FAONo.93-3FAONo.95-1


FAONo.96-1FAONo.97-2FAONo.99-2FAONo.03-3FAONo.05-2FAONo.05-5FAONo.05-7FAONo.05-8FAONo.05-9

Rule 1.9 - Conflict of Interest: Former ClientFAONo.97-2FAONo.03-2FAONo.05-9

Rule 1.10 - Imputed DisqualificationFAONo.86-1FAONo.86-3FAONo.97-2FAONo.98-4FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-13

Rule 1.11 - Successive Government and Private Employment

Rule 1.12 - Former Judge or ArbitratorSDBNo.38FAONo.05-3

Rule 1.13 - Organization as Client

Rule 1.14 - Client Under a Disability

Rule 1.15(I) - Safekeeping Property: General RuleFAONo.94-2FAONo.98-2

Rule 1.15(II) - Safekeeping Property: Trust Account and IOLTA

FAONo.04-1

Rule 1.15(III) - Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification;

Examination of RecordsFAONo.04-1

Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating RepresentationSDBNo.17FAONo.87-5FAONo.93-4FAONo.95-1FAONo.96-1FAONo.97-3FAONo.03-1

Rule 1.17 - Sale of Law PracticeFAONo.05-4

LAWYER AS A COUNSELOR

Rule 2.1 - AdvisorFAONo.00-2

Rule 2.2 - IntermediaryFAONo.86-3FAONo.97-2FAONo.98-4FAONo.99-2FAONo.05-9

Rule 2.3 - Evaluation for Use by Third Persons

LAWYER AS AN ADVOCATE (MATTER BEFORE A TRIBUNAL)

Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and ContentionsFAONo.87-1

Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation

Rule 3.3 - Candor toward the TribunalFAONo.05-10

Rule 3.4 - Fairness to Opposing Party and CounselSDBNo.26SDBNo.35SDBNo.40SDBNo.46SDBNo.48FAONo.05-10

Rule 3.5 - Impartiality and Decorum of the TribunalFAONo.89-2FAONo.05-3FAONo.05-10FAONo.05-12

Rule 3.6 - Trial Publicity

Rule 3.7 - Lawyer as Witness

Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a ProsecutorFAONo.93-3FAONo.98-3

Rule 3.9 - Advocate in Non-adjudicative Proceedings

TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Rule 4.1 - Truthfulness in Statements to OthersFAONo.05-10

Rule 4.2 - Communication with Person Represented by Counsel

FAONo.86-4FAONo.87-6FAONo.88-3FAONo.94-3FAONo.98-3FAONo.05-10

Rule 4.3 - Dealing with Unrepresented PersonFAONo.88-3FAONo.94-3FAONo.05-10

Rule 4.4 - Respect for Rights of Third Persons

LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Rule 5.1 - Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer

FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-10

Rule 5.2 - Responsibilities of a Subordinate LawyerSDBNo.21SDBNo.23

Rule 5.3 - Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants

SDBNo.5SDBNo.19SDBNo.21SDBNo.49FAONo.86-5FAONo.00-2FAONo.05-10

Rule 5.4 - Professional Independence of a LawyerSDBNo.21SDBNo.30SDBNo.49FAONo.86-1FAONo.86-5FAONo.88-2FAONo.93-3FAONo.95-1FAONo.99-2FAONo.05-4FAONo.05-9FAONo.05-10

Rule 5.5 - Unauthorized Practice of LawSDBNo.5SDBNo.19


SDBNo.21SDBNo.23SDBNo.48SDBNo.49FAONo.86-5FAONo.99-2FAONo.00-2FAONo.00-3FAONo.04-1

Rule 5.6 - Restrictions on Right to Practice

Rule 5.7 - Restrictions Regarding Law-related ServicesSDBNo.31

PUBLIC SERVICE

Rule 6.1 - Voluntary Pro Bono Public ServiceFAONo.86-1

Rule 6.2 - Accepting Appointments

Rule 6.3 - Membership in Legal Service Organization

Rule 6.4 - Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

Rule 7.1 - Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Service

SDBNo.19SDBNo.22FAONo.97-2FAONo.97-3FAONo.98-4FAONo.00-2FAONo.01-1FAONo.05-6

Rule 7.2 - Advertising

Rule 7.3 - Direct Contact with Prospective ClientsFAONo.94-1FAONo.97-3FAONo.05-6

Rule 7.4 - Communication of Fields of PracticeSDBNo.22

Rule 7.5 - Firm Names and LetterheadsSDBNo.5SDBNo.19SDBNo.21SDBNo.23FAONo.97-2FAONo.98-4FAONo.05-6

MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

Rule 8.2 - Judicial and Legal Officials

Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct

Rule 8.4 - MisconductSDBNo.40FAONo.87-1FAONo.97-3FAONo.00-2FAONo.03-3FAONo.05-10

Rule 8.5 - Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law

MISCELLANEOUS

Rule 9.1 - Reporting Requirements

Rule 9.2 - Settlement of Claims

Rule 9.3 - Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities

Rule 9.4 - Reciprocal Discipline

Rule 9.5 - Lawyer as a Public OfficialSDBNo.16FAONo.86-1FAONo.93-3

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS

NOTE Regarding State Disciplinary Board Advisory Opinions:Prior to 1986, the State Disciplinary Board was responsible for issuing Formal Advisory Opinions. In 1986, when the ultimate responsibility for issuing Formal Advisory Opinions was entrusted to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board was asked to review all of the opinions issued by State Disciplinary Board. As a result of that review, some of the pre-1986 opinions proved obsolete under the Standards, and were withdrawn for that reason. Those opinions that in 1986 were determined to retain vitality are published in this “State Bar of Georgia Handbook.” The earlier State Disciplinary Board opinions are published with the caution that they were not issued by, nor with the authority of, the Supreme Court of Georgia. Three of those earlier opinions posed issues of continuing importance, yet required rewriting in light of the Standards.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardSeptember 20, 1968ADVISORY OPINION NO. 5(AmendedbytheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardMarch1993)

Propriety of an attorney permitting the use of his or her letterhead stationary by a retainer client who is writing as a creditor or as a col-lection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from the recipient.

Thequestionsubmitted isactually in fivediffering forms,buteachquestioninvolvescertainingredientswhichresultintheadvisoryopinionbeingthesameastoeach.DR3-101(a)provides:“Alawyershallnotaidanonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.”SeealsoStandard24.Itmaywellbethatunderthisrulethevaryingfactualsituationsmaybeproductiveofvaryingconclusions.ThedeterminationofwhatconstitutestheunauthorizedpracticeoflawinGeorgiaisamatterofstatutoryinter-pretation,O.C.G.A.§15-19-50et.seq.,andthisopinionisbasedoneithertheabovestandardorstatutes.

Standard4requires that“Alawyershallnotengageinprofessionalconduct involving dishonest, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresenta-tion.” In lightof theseadmonitions, it isprofessionally improper foralawyertofurnishhisorherletterheadtoaclientforthepurposestated.Alawyerisanofficerofthecourt.Assuch,thelawyerassumescertainresponsibilities,isundercertainobligationsandthelawyer’sconductissubjecttohonoranddignityoftheprofession.SeeEC9-6.Thelawyer’sparticipation in conduct contemplated purely and simply to deceive isincompatiblewiththoseresponsibilitiesandobligations.

Inaddition,alawyerhasbeengivencertainprivilegesbytheState.Becauseoftheseprivileges,lettersofthecharacterstatedinthequestionpurportingtobewrittenbylawyershaveagreaterweightthanthosewrit-tenbylaymen.Itisobviousthatthesolereasonforthepracticeistogivethelettertheweightthatlawyersalonecancontribute.ThatendcanbegainedonlythroughdeceptionwhichismanifestlyoutofharmonywiththeCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.SeeEC3-3.Thelawyercannot,thereforedelegatetoanonlawyer.

Thepracticedescribedisviolativeofboththeletterandspiritoftheethicalcanonsandconstitutesunethicalpractice.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardSeptember 21, 1973ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16

Propriety of An Attorney Who is a County Commissioner in a Rural County Appointing His Own Firm as County Attorney

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-217oftheRulesandRegulationsfor Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, thisStateDisciplinaryBoard,upon requestmade therefore, renders this itsopinionconcerningaproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateofGeorgiaasappliedtoagivenstateoffacts.

Anadvisoryopinionhasbeenrequesteduponthefollowinginquiry:A partner in a three-member law firm has been electedCommissionerinasmallcounty.ThenewCommissioner,whoattimesinthepasthasservedasCountyAttorneyandwhointends


to remainactive in the lawfirm,wishes toappointhis lawfirmasCountyAttorneys.Mayhedosoconsistentwiththeapplicableethicalrules?WouldtheresultbedifferentiftheCommissioner’spartnerwereappointedCountyAttorneyinhisindividualcapac-ityandalllegalfeespaidbytheCountywerepaiddirectlytothispartnerratherthanintothelawfirm’sgeneralaccount?Thereisonly one other active law firm in theCounty; and itsmemberswere closely associated politically with the candidate who wasdefeatedinthelastelectionbythepresentCommissioner.

TheethicalrulespresentlyapplicabletothisinquiryareRule3-108(Canon8):EC8-8,andRule3-109(Canon9):EC9-1andEC9-2.

Canon8provides“ALawyerShouldAssistinImprovingtheLegalSystem.” The ethical considerations under this Canon relevant to thequestionpresentedare:

EC8-8Lawyersoftenserveas legislatorsorasholdersofotherpublic offices.This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquelyqualifiedtomakesignificantcontributionstotheimprovementofthelegalsystem.Alawyerwhoisapublicofficer,whetherfullorpart-time,shouldnotengageinactivitiesinwhichhispersonalorprofessional interests areor foreseeablymaybe inconflictwithhisofficialduties.

DR8-101(A)(1)statesasfollows:

(A)Alawyerwhoholdspublicofficeshallnot:

(1)usehispublicpositiontoobtain,orattempttoobtain,aspecialadvantagein legislativemattersforhimselforforaclientundercircumstanceswhereheknowsoritisobviousthatsuchactionisnotinthepublicinterest;

Canon 9 provides “ALawyer ShouldAvoid Even theAppearanceofProfessionalImpropriety”.TherelevantethicalconsiderationsunderthisCanonare:

EC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are tobe governed by rules of law requires that the people have faiththat justice canbeobtained throughour legal system.A lawyershouldpromotepublicconfidenceinoursystemandinthelegalprofession.

EC9-2Public confidence in law and lawyersmaybe erodedbyirresponsibleorimproperconductofalawyer.Onoccasion,ethicalconductofalawyermayappeartolaymentobeunethi-cal.Inordertoavoidmisunderstandingsandhencetomaintainconfidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform hisclient ofmaterial developments in thematters being handledfor theclient.Whilea lawyer shouldguardagainstotherwiseproper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confi-dence in the legal systemor in the legal profession, his dutytoclientsor to thepublicshouldneverbesubordinatemerelybecausethefulldischargeofhisobligationsmaybeunderstoodormaytendtosubjecthimorthelegalprofessiontocriticism.Whenexplicitethicalguidancedoesnotexist,alawyershoulddetermine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotespublic confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legalsystemandthelegalprofession.

TherearenumerousFormalandInformalOpinionsoftheAmericanBar Association on the subject of the attorney as public official, buttheseopinionsseemtobelargelyuselesstothepresentinquiryastheyconsistentlyaddressthemselvestofactualsituationsinwhichthedutyoftheattorneyasgovernmentofficialcomesintoconflictwithhisdutyascounselororadvocateforhisnon-governmentalclient.Thequestionherepresentedismuchmoresubtlethantheconflict-of-interestcasesandtheauthoritiesprovidelittleguidance.

Putting the first inquiry in its simplest form, theStateDisciplinaryBoardmustanswerthequestion:

WouldtheproposedemploymentoftheCommissioner’slawfirmpresentsuchadangerofpublicsuspicionofself-dealingthatpub-licconfidenceinattorneys,andinourlegalgovernmentalsystem,wouldbeunnecessarilyeroded?

It is obvious that public confidence in the institution of local gov-ernmentwouldbedamagedifthepubliccametoviewlocalpoliticsasmerelyabattlebetweenlawfirmsfor“thelargestclientintheCounty”.Strong support for this view is found in American Bar AssociationFormalOpinionNo.192whichstates:

Manyopinionshavebeenwrittenbythiscommitteeapplyingeachof theseCanons.Opinions16,30,34,77,118and134relate toCanon6, andpass onquestions concerning theproprietyof theconduct of an attorney who is a public officer, in representingprivateinterestsadversetothoseofthepublicbodywhichherep-resents.Theprincipleappliedintheseopinionsisthatanattorneyholdingpublicofficeshouldavoidallconductwhichmightleadthe layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his publicpositiontofurtherhisprofessionalsuccessorpersonalinterests.”(emphasisours)

ThislanguagehasbeencarriedintoEC8-8ofthepresentCodeofProfessional Responsibility,which ethical rulewas cited above. Themere fact that there is anopportunity for aCountyCommissioner toallowhisfirmtochargeexcessivelyortocreatelegalbusinessforhim-selfandforhislawfirmactingasCountyAttorney,doesnot,ofcourse,imply that such improprietywouldnecessarily follow.However, it isvitally important that no situation be allowed to exist which mighttemptthepublictoconcludethattheCounty’sinteresthasbeensubor-dinatedtothatofanylawfirmorattorney.IthaslongbeenthelawinGeorgiathatonewhoisentrustedwiththebusinessofotherswillnotbeallowedtomakeoutofthesameapecuniaryprofittohimselfhoweverhonestandfairthecircumstancesofemployment,andthatthecitizensofGeorgiaareentitledtohavetheirofficialsexercisecloseandtotallyobjectivescrutinyoftheperformanceofthosedoingtheworkofgov-ernment.Montgomeryv.CityofAtlanta162Ga.534(1926);MayorofMaconv.Huff,60Ga.221(1878);Trainerv.CityofCovington,183Ga.759 (1937):Opinionsof theAttorneyGeneral (unofficial),1971,p. 286.Numerous statuteswhich regulate the actions of officers andemployeesofgovernmenthaveastheirgoalthepreventionofanysitu-ationinwhichtheofficial’spersonalinterestandhispublicdutymayconflict.Ga.CodeAnnotated§§2-5606,23-1713,23-1714,26-2306,26-2307, 23-2308, 69-201, 89-103, 89-904, and 89-913 to 918. Thestatutes and cases cited are grounded in strong public policy whichprovides a dependable guide in the premises. In light of the publicpolicyfavoringavoidanceofanyactualorimaginedconflict-of-interestsituationbygovernmentofficials,weconcludethattheonlyeffectiveway to avoid the possibility of public suspicion of self-dealing andconflictsofinterestisfortheCountyCommissioner-attorneytorefrainfrom employing himself asCountyAttorney.ABAFormalOpinions33,49,50,72,103and128 indicate thatnopartnerorassociateofalawfirmmayundertakeanyprofessionalrelationshipwhichanyoneofthe partners or associates, because of adverse influence and conflict-ing interests, could not undertake. Consequently, employment of theCommissioner’sownfirmasCountyAttorneywouldbeinappropriate.TheABAFormalOpinionscitedofknowledgeandfinancialresourcesand thepersonal andprofessional closenesswhich exists in the legalpartnership. It must be remembered, too, that public opinion andappearanceofproprietyareimportantconsiderationsinthisarea,andit ishighlyprobable thatemploymentof theattorney-commissioner’sown firm would have the same basic deleterious impact on publicopinionandpublicconfidenceaswouldhisindividualemploymentasCounty Attorney. Therefore, the State Disciplinary Board holds thattheAttorney-Commissionermay not employ himself or his law firmasCountyAttorney.

The second part of the question before the Board has to dowiththe propriety of the hiring of the Commissioner-Attorney’s partneras CountyAttorney on an individual basis. Again, the public policyconsiderations discussed in Montgomery, Trainer, and Mayor ofMacon provide guidance. The two evils arising from an official’sself-employmentoutlined in thesecases are: (1) the temptation tobedishonest in the collection of monies from the government, (2) theinabilityoftheofficialtohonestly,objectively,andforcefullyexercisecontroloverhimself,ifawaycouldbefoundtoavoidthesedualevils,then the County Commission or the attorney-commissioner mightfreely employ the attorney-commissioner’s partner on an individualbasis. Employment of the partner in his individual capacity and useof contract terms stipulating that theattorney-commissioner shallnotbenefitinanywayfromtheCountyAttorney’sincomewoulddestroyobjectionsbasedonthefirstevil,butwouldnotavoidthosebasedonthesecond.It is truethattheCommissionandattorney-commissionerwillalwaysemployafriendandthat,consequently,theyandhewouldalwaysbelessthantotallyobjectiveinjudgingtheworkoftheCountyAttorney,butitisalsotruethatanattorney-commissionerwhowouldbetheCommissionerbestqualifiedtojudgethequalityoflegalwork,wouldbe less likely toexposeandcriticizepoorworkon thepartofonewho is his law partner than onewhowasmerely a good friend.The temptation tooverlookor conceal the faultsof aprofessionalorbusinesspartnerisonewithwhichnoattorneyorotherpersonchargedwithpublicdutyshouldbefaced.TheBoard,inansweringthesecondpartoftheinquiry,seekstoavoidthepossibilityofsuchtemptationandanswersparttwooftheinquiryinthenegative.


State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardJanuary 18, 1974ADVISORY OPINION NO. 17

Duty of an Attorney Representing a Fugitive Upon Warrants for Probation Violation

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-217oftheRulesandRegulationsfor Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, thisStateDisciplinaryBoard,upon requestmade therefore, renders this itsopinion concerning a proper interpretation of the code of ProfessionalResponsibility of the StateBar ofGeorgia as applied to a given stateoffacts.

Anadvisoryopinionhasbeenrequestedastotheethicaldutyofanattorneywho,duringaprofessionalconsultation,learnsthathisclientisafugitiveuponwarrantsforviolationofhisprobation.Therequestwasmadeintwoparts,asfollows:

“When a personwho is a fugitive uponwarrants for probationviolation approaches an attorney and requests that the attorneyrepresenthiminanyhearingsconcerninghisviolationofproba-tionandwhenthefugitivethusdiscloseshisviolationsandwhere-abouts,must the attorneydisclose thewhereabouts of his clientto the proper authorities? If the attorney advises the fugitive tosurrendertotheauthoritiesandthefugitiverefusestodoso,whatisthepropercourseofactionoftheattorney?”

TheethicalrulespresentlyapplicabletothisinquiryareRule3-102(Canon2);EC2-32,andDR2-110(C)(1)(b)are includedin thatRule;Rule3-104(Canon4);EC4-1,EC4-4,DR4-101(A),DR4-101(B)(1)andDR4-101(C)(2)and(3)areallincludedinthatRule;andRule3-107(Canon7);EC7-1,EC7-5andDR7-102(A)(3),(7)and(8)areincludedunderthatRule.

CanonIIprovides“Alawyershouldassistinmaintainingtheintegrityand competence of the legal profession.” Ethical considerations underCanonIIwhicharerelevanttothequestionpropoundedare:

EC2-32Adecisionbyalawyertowithdrawshouldbemadeonlyonthebasisofcompellingcircumstances...Alawyershouldnotwithdrawwithoutconsideringcarefullyandendeavoringtomini-mizethepossibleadverseeffectontherightsofhisclientandthepossibilityofprejudicetohisclientastheresultofhiswithdrawal.Eventhoughhejustifiablywithdrawsalawyershouldprotectthewelfareofhisclientbygivingduenoticeofhiswithdrawal,sug-gestingemploymentofothercounsel,deliveringtotheclientallpapers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperatingwithcounselsubsequentlyemployed,andotherwiseendeavoringtominimizethepossibilityofharm...

DR2-110(C)states,inpart,asfollows:

(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, alawyermaynot requestpermission towithdraw inmatterspendingbeforeaTribunal,andmaynotwithdrawinothermatters,unlesssuchrequestorsuchwithdrawalsisbecause:

(1)Hisclient(a)...(b)personallyseekstopursueanillegalcourseofconduct

Canon IVprovides“A lawyer shouldpreserve theconfidencesandsecretsofaclient.”RelevantethicalconsiderationsunderthisCanonare:

EC 4-1Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyerandclientandtheproperfunctioningofthelegalsystemrequirethepreservationbythelawyerofconfidencesandsecretsofonewhohasemployedor sought toemployhim.Aclientmust feelfreetodiscusswhateverhewisheswithhislawyerandalawyermust be equally free to obtain information beyond that volun-teeredbyhisclient.Alawyershouldbefullyinformedofallthefactsofthematterheishandlinginorderforhisclienttoobtainthefulladvantageofourlegalsystem.Itisforthelawyerintheexerciseofhisindependentprofessionaljudgmenttoseparatetherelevantandimportantfromtheirrelevantandunimportant.Theobservanceoftheethicalobligationofalawyertoholdinviolatethe confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates thefulldevelopmentoffactsessentialtoproperrepresentationoftheclientbutalsoencourageslaymentoseekearlylegalassistance.

EC4-4Theattorney-clientprivilegeismorelimitedthantheethi-calobligationofalawyertoguardtheconfidencesandsecretsofhis client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege,

existswithoutregardtothenatureorsourceofinformationorthefact thatothers share theknowledge.A lawyer shouldendeavortoactinamannerwhichpreservestheevidentiaryprivilege;forexample,heshouldavoidprofessionaldiscussionsinthepresenceofpersonstowhomtheprivilegedoesnotextend.Alawyerwoesanobligation toadvise theclientof theattorney-clientprivilegeandtimelyasserttheprivilegeunlessitiswaivedbytheclient.

DR4-101states,inpart,asfollows:

DR4-101PreservationofConfidenceandSecretsofaclient

(A)“Confidence”referstoinformationprotectedbytheattorney-clientprivilegeunderapplicablelawand“Secret”referstootherinformationgainedintheprofessionalrelationshipthattheclienthasrequestedbeheldinviolateorthedisclosureofwhichwouldbeembarrassingorwouldbelikelytobedetrimentaltotheclient.(B) Exceptwhen permitted underDR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall notknowingly

(1)revealaconfidenceorsecretofhisclient(2)...

(C)Alawyermayreveal:(1)...(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under DisciplinaryRulesorrequiredbylaworcourtorder;(3)theintentionofhisclienttocommitacrimeandtheinforma-tionnecessarytopreventthecrime;

CanonVIIprovides“Alawyershouldrepresenthisclientzealouslywithintheboundsofthelaw.”

EC7-1Thedutyofa lawyer,both tohisclientand to the legalsystem, is to representhisclientzealouslywithin theboundsofthelaw,whichincludesDisciplinaryRulesandenforceablepro-fessionalregulations.Theprofessionalresponsibilityofalawyerderivesfromhismembershipinaprofessionwhichhasthedutyofassistingmembersofthepublictosecureandprotectavailablelegal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not ofmen,eachmemberofoursocietyisentitledtohavehisconductjudgedandregulatedinaccordancewiththelaw,toseekanylaw-fulobjectivethroughlegallypermissiblemeans,andtopresentforadjudicationanylawfulclaim,issueordefense.

EC7-5Alawyerasadviserfurthers the interestofhisclientbygivinghisprofessionalopinionastowhathebelieveswouldlikelybe theultimatedecisionof thecourtson thematterathandandbyinforminghisclientofthepracticaleffectofsuchdecision.Hemaycontinue in the representationofhisclienteven thoughhisclient has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to theadvice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowinglyassist the client to engage in illegal conduct or take a frivolouslegalposition.Alawyershouldneverencourageoraidhisclienttocommitcriminalactsorcounselhisclientonhowtoviolatethelawandavoidpunishmenttherefore.

DR7-102(A)states,inpart,asfollows:

(A)Inhisrepresentationofaclient,alawyershallnot(1)...(2)...(3)concealorknowinglyfailtodisclosethatwhichheisrequiredbylawtoreveal;...(7)counselorassisthisclientinconductthatthelawyerknowstobeillegalorfraudulent(8)knowinglyengageinotherillegalconductorconductcontrarytoaDisciplinaryRule.

Inthisproblemtheattorney’sdutyofloyaltytohisclientandhisdutyto the legal system,ofwhichhe isan importantpart,come intodirectconflict.TheStateDisciplinaryBoardhasbeenaskedtoresolvethiscon-flictandtheapplicablerulesandadvisoryopinionsofGeorgiaandoftheAmericanBarAssociationreflecthisconflictasthey,too,areinconflict.

AlthoughABAFormalOpinions155and156adviseofthedutyofthe attorney to reveal thewhereabouts of his fugitive client, the StateDisciplinaryBoardbelievesthatthereisnolegalorethicalconsistencyintherationaleofthoseopinionswhichwouldrequireanattorneywhoseclientisafugitivefromamisdemeanorconvictiontonotifytheauthori-tieswhileallowingtheattorneyofamurderertokeeptheconfessionofthemurderersecretandconfidential.

ThelanguageofCanonIVisstrongandclear,andtheimportanceoftheconfidentialitybetweenattorneyandclientintheircommunicationsisparamountinoursystemofjustice.EC4-1,EC4-4.Theexceptionsas


torevelationofsecretsanconfidencesmentionedinDR4-101(C),above,wouldnotseemtoapplyinthissituationsincetheinformationaboutthefugitive’swhereaboutsisprivilegedinGeorgiaandtheattorney’sfailureto report the fugitivewould not, by itself, be a crime. Of course, theattorneyhasadutytoreportanynon-privilegedinformationheknowstotheproperauthorities,andDR7-102(A)(7),and(8)indicateclearlythathecannotcounseltheclienttobreakthelawnormayhetakeanyovertactiontoaidthefugitiveinhisflight.

In light of the historical importance of the concepts embodied inCanonIVtoindividualsinoursociety,theStateDisciplinaryBoardhasdeterminedthattheattorneyofafugitivehasnoethicaldutytoinformtheauthoritiesofthewhereaboutsofthefugitive.However,oncethatdif-ficultdeterminationismade,itmustbequicklypointedthatinthestatedsituationthereisacountervailingdutytooursystemoflawwhichdic-tatesthattheattorneycannotcounselthefugitivetoremaininviolationofthelaw.Theattorneyshould,therefore,advisetheclienttosurrendertotheauthoritiesatanearlydatesothatthechargesagainstthefugitivemaybe heard in a fair hearing.By taking such a course of action theattorneyobservesthespiritoftheconfidentialityrulewhiledemonstrat-ingtheconfidencein,andloyaltyto,oursystemoflaw.

Thesecondpartoftheinquiryaskswhatshouldbedoneiftheclientrefusestheattorney’sadvicetosurrendertotheauthorities.TheethicalconsiderationsandrulesunderCanonII,statedabove,clearlyshowthatinasituationinwhichafugitiveclientrefusestosurrenderhimself,andthusinsistsonanillegalcourseofconduct,theattorneyshouldimmedi-atelywithdrawfromthecase,takingtheprecautionshedeemsnecessarytoprotecthisclient’sinterests.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardJuly 18, 1975ADVISORY OPINION NO. 19

Propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning “legal matters” on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-217oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardafteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandtheapplicablestatutesandcaselawasappliedtoaspecificfactsituation.

AnopinionhasbeenrequestedconcerningtheproprietyofamemberoftheStateBarpermittingaparalegalinhisemploytocorrespondconcern-ing“legalmatters”onthelawfirmletterheadunderhisownsignature.

TheopinionoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiawhichisapplicabletothisinquiryisHuberv.State,234Ga.357at358,216S.E.2d73(1975)whichprovidesasfollows:

“‘(W)eareof theopinion that thepracticeof law...(is)notcon-finedtopracticeinthecourtsofthisState,but(is)oflargerscope,including thepreparationofpleadingsandotherpapers incidenttoanyactionorspecialproceedinginanycourtorotherjudicialbody,conveyancing,thepreparationofalllegalinstrumentsofallkindswherebyalegalrightissecured,therenderingofopinionsastothevalidityorinvalidityofthetitletorealorpersonalproperty,thegivingofanylegaladvice,andanyactiontakenforothersinanymatterconnectedwiththelaw.’Boykinv.Hopkins,174Ga.511,519(162S.E.796).”

Cf.Ga.L.1931,P.191asamendedbyGa.L.1937,p.753(Ga.CodeAnn.§9-401).

TheethicalconsiderationapplicabletothisinquiryisStateBarRule3-103,EC3-6whichprovidesasfollows:

“A lawyer oftendelegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, andotherlaypersons.Suchdelegation isproper if the lawyermaintainsadirectrelationshipwithhisclient,supervisesthedelegatedwork,andhascompleteprofessionalresponsibilityfortheworkproduct.This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal services moreeconomicallyandefficiently.”

ThisdisciplinaryrulewhichisapplicabletothisinquiryisStateBarRule4-102.1,DR3-101(A)whichprovidesasfollows:

“Alawyershallnotaidanonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.”

“Paralegals,”“legalassistants,”“lawclerks,”“paraprofessionals,”“litigation assistants,” etc., are laymen who are not entitled topracticelawandwhoarenotentitledtomembershipintheStateBarofGeorgia.AlthoughtheStateBarmayintercedeinapara-legal’sactivities to theextent that thoseactivitiesmight involvetheunauthorizedpracticeof law,1 ithasnotpower todisciplineparalegalsinthatitsdisciplinaryjurisdictionisexpresslylimitedtoitsmembership.

TheStateisauthorizedtoadviseitsmembersconcerningtheactivi-tiesinwhichtheiremployees,includingparalegals,shouldbeallowedtoengage.Further, ifamemberoftheStateBarallowsaparalegalinhisemploytoperformfunctionsthatamounttotheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw,theBarisauthorizedtodisciplinethememberunderDR3-101(A)ofStateBarRule4-102.1.

AmemberoftheStateBarmayallowaparalegal,ashemayallowany other layman, to assist him in such amanner or to perform suchtasksonhisbehalf asdonotconstitute thepracticeof law.Therefore,ourinquirymustconcern:

(1)ThedefinitionofthepracticeoflawinGeorgia,and(2)Whether the conductwhich is the subject of this inquiry trans-gressesthedefinition.

TheSupremeCourthasdefinedthepracticeoflawintheHubercase,supra.Doescorrespondencebyaparalegalonhisfirm’sletterheadbearinghisownsignatureandconcerning“legalmatters”fallwithintheSupremeCourt’sdefinition?Theanswerdependsuponthepartytowhomthecor-respondenceiswrittenandthesubstanceofthecorrespondence.

We are of the opinion that the phrase “any action taken for othersin anymatter connectedwith the law” in the above quoted definitionis intended to comprehend communication connectedwith any legallyenforceable right or remedy without regard to whether a suit is actu-allypendingbeforeacourt in thisState.Therefore,evenpre-litigationcommunicationfallswithinthedefinitionifitisdirectedtoapotentiallyadverseparty,hisagents,assigns,orbeneficiariesand if it attempts tosuggestorassertanactualorpotentialclaimofrighttolegalorequitablerelief for another upon the condition, either expressedor implied, thatafailuretosatisfysuchsuggestionorassertionmayresultinlitigation.Anysuchcorrespondencewrittenona lawfirm letterhead,by itsverynature, implicitly suggests subsequent legal proceedings and thus con-stitutesthepracticeoflaw.Tothatextent,ifamemberoftheStateBarallowsaparalegalinhisemploytosigncorrespondenceonthelawfirmletterhead,heaidstheparalegalintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawandopenshimselftodiscipline.

We specifically restrict the foregoing opinion to letters directed toadverse or potentially adverse parties, their agents, assigns or benefi-ciaries.UnderEC3-6ofStateBarRule3-103,amembermayethicallyutilizetheservicesofparalegalsinawiderangeofcircumstancessuchasinvestigatingpotentialclaimsandpendingcases,takingstatementsfromclientsandwitnesses,engaginginlegalresearch,preparinglegaldocu-mentsandpleadingsunderdirectsupervisionofthemember,performingadministrativedutieswithinandonbehalfofthelawfirm,andperform-ingsecretarialorclericalduties.Totheextentnecessarytoperformthesefunctions and to the extent that these functions do not fall within theabove-citeddefinitionofthepracticeoflaw,aparalegalmaycorrespondonthelawfirmletterheadinhisownname.

When a paralegal in the employ of a member of the State Bar ispermittedbythemember tocorrespondonthe lawfirmletterhead, themembermustbesurethattheparalegalclearlyidentifieshisstatusbytheuseofanappropriatedesignationsuchas“paralegal,”“legalassistant,”or“lawclerk.”ThefailuretodosocouldeasilymisleadtherecipientofthecorrespondenceandmightconstitutearepresentationonthepartofthememberthattheparalegalinhisemployisamemberoftheStateBarandauthorizedtopracticelawinthisState.__________1Ga.L.1946,p.171(Ga.CodeAnn.§§9-306through9-411).


Guidelines for Attorneys Utilizing Paralegals

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-217oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a properrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.


Question Presented:

Whatare theethical responsibilitiesof attorneyswhoemploy legalassistantsorparaprofessionalsandpermit themtodealwithother law-yers,clientsandthepublic?

TheethicsauthorityapplicabletothisinquiryisRule3-103(CanonIII):EC3-1,EC3-2,ES3-6,DR3-101(A)andDR3-103areallincludedinthatRule.It isalsonotedthat theprovisionsofCanonIIIappearasDisciplinaryStandards24,25and26inPartIV(discipline)oftheRulesoftheStateBar.CanonIIIprovides:

“Alawyershouldassistinpreventingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.”

Ethical Considerations under this Canon relevant to the question pro-poundedare:

“EC3-1Theprohibitionagainstthepracticeoflawbyalaymanisgroundedintheneedofthepublicforintegrityandcompetenceof thosewhoundertake to render legal services.Becauseof thefiduciaryandpersonalcharacterofthelawyer-clientrelationshipandtheinherentlycomplexnatureofourlegalsystem,thepubliccan better be assured of the requisite responsibility and compe-tenceifthepracticeoflawisconfinedtothosewhoaresubjecttothe requirements and regulations imposeduponmembersof thelegalprofession.”

“EC3-2The sensitivevariations in the considerations that bearonlegaldeterminationsoftenmakeitdifficultevenforalawyertoexerciseappropriateprofessionaljudgment,anditisthereforeessentialthatthepersonalnatureoftherelationshipofclientandlawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is theproduct of a trained familiaritywith law and legal processes, adisciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firmethicalcommitment.”

“EC3-6Alawyeroftendelegatestaskstoclerks,secretaries,andother laypersons.Suchdelegation isproper if the lawyermain-tainsadirectrelationshipwithhisclient,supervisesthedelegatedwork and has complete professional responsibility for theworkproduct.Thisdelegationenablesalawyertorenderlegalservicemoreeconomicallyandefficiently.”

“DR3-101AidingUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw.

(A)Alawyershallnotaidanonlawyerintheunauthorizedprac-ticeoflaw.:

“DR3-102DividingLegalFeeswithaNonlawyer.

(A)Alawyerorlawfirmshallnotsharelegalfeeswithanonlawyer,exceptthat:

(1)...(2)...(3)alawyerorlawfirmmayincludenonlawyeremployeesinaretirementplaneventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement.”

“DR3-103FormingaPartnershipwithaNonlawyer.

(A)Alawyershallnotformapartnershipwithanonlawyerifanyoftheactivitiesofthepartnershipconsistofthepracticeoflaw.”

Forpurposesofthisopiniontheterms“legalassistant”,“paraprofes-sional” and “paralegal” aredefined as any layperson, not admitted tothepracticeoflawinthisState,whoisanemployeeof,oranassistantto,anactivememberoftheState,whoisanemployeeof,oranassistantto,anactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaortoapartnershiporprofessionalcorporationcomprisedofactivemembersof theStateBarofGeorgiaandwhorendersservicesrelatingtothelawtosuchmember,partnershiporprofessionalcorporationunderthedirectcontrol,supervi-sionandcompensationofamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Theoverridingconsideration in thisopinionwillbe that thedefini-tionofthepracticeoflawisverywideintheStateofGeorgiaandthatstrictadherencetoaprogramofsupervisionanddirectionofaparalegalisrequiredinordertoavoidanychargesthat theattorneyisaidinghisparalegal in the unauthorized practice of law. Ga. Code Ann. 9-401,9-402.Avoidanceofchargesthattheparalegalisengagingintheunau-thorizedpracticeof lawmaybe achievedonlyby strict observanceofthedirectionfoundinEC3-6,quotedabove,indicatingthatdelegationofactivitieswhichordinarilycomprisethepracticeoflawisproperonlyif the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved,

supervisesanddirectstheworkdelegatedtotheparalegalandassumescompleteultimateprofessionalresponsibilityfortheworkproductpro-ducedbytheparalegal.Supervisionoftheworkoftheparalegalbytheattorneymustbedirectandconstanttoavoidanychargesofaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.

ItistheopinionofthisBoardthatthefollowingmaybedelegatedtononlawyerparalegals,providedthatproperandeffectivesupervisionandcontrolbytheattorneyexists:

(1)Theinterviewofclients,witnessesandotherpersonswithinfor-mationpertinenttoanycausebeinghandledbytheattorney.

(2)Legalresearchanddraftingofpleadings,briefsoflawandotherlegaldocumentsfortheattorney’sreview,approvalanduse.

(3)Draftingandsigningofroutinecorrespondencewiththeclientsoftheattorneywhensuchcorrespondencedoesnotrequiretheapplica-tionoflegalknowledgeortherenderingoflegaladvicetotheclient.

(4) Investigation of facts relating to the cause of a client of theattorney,includingexaminationsoflandrecordsandreportingofhisfindingstotheattorney.

(5)Schedulingoftheattorney’sactivitiesinthelawofficeandsched-uling of his appearance before courts, tribunals and administrativeagencies.

(6)Billingofclientsandgeneralmanagementofthelawfirm’sofficeandnonlegalstaff.

(7)Routinecontactswithopposingcounselontopicsnoteffectingthemeritsofthecauseofactionatissuebetweentheattorneysorrequir-ingtheuseorapplicationoflegalknowledge.

(8)Renderingofspecializedadvicetotheclientsoftheattorneyonscientific and technical topics, provided that such advice does notrequiretheapplicationoflegaljudgmentorknowledgetothefactsoropinionstobediscussedwiththeclient.

ItistheopinionoftheBoardthatthefollowingdutiesshouldnotbedelegatedtoparalegals:

(1)Anycontactwithclientsoroppositecounselrequiringtherender-ingoflegaladviceofanytype.

(2) Any appearance as a lawyer at depositions, hearings, calendarcallsortrialsorbeforeanyadministrativeTribunalunlessotherwisepreemptedbyFederallaworregulation.

(3)Responsibilityformakingfinaldecisionsastotheethicsofactivi-tiesofparalegalemployeesofanattorney.

(4)Drafting,withoutreviewandapprovalbyamemberoftheBar,ofanypleadingorlegaldocument.

(5)Negotiationwithopposingpartiesortheircounselonsubstantiveissuesinexpectedorpendinglitigation.

(6)Contactinganoppositepartyorhiscounselinasituationinwhichlegalrightsofthefirm’sclientwillbeassertedornegotiated.

(7)Signatureofpleadings,briefsorother legaldocuments forpre-sentationtoanycourtorexplanationoflegaldocumentstotheclientofthelawyerortotheoppositepartyinanynegotiationorlitigation.

It istheopinionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardthatthereareotherduties incumbent upon lawyers supervising the work of paralegals asfollows:

(1)(a)Inordertoavoidanyappearancethatthelawyerisaidingtheparalegalintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw,includingunauthor-ized practice by way of “holding out as an attorney” (see Ga.CodeAnn.9-402),anylettersordocumentssignedbythepara-legalshouldclearlyindicatethestatusoftheparalegalandsuchstatusshouldbemadeclearbythenatureofthetypedsignatureorbyexpresslanguageinthetextoftheletterordocument.SeeAdvisoryOpinionNo.19.

(b)Thenameoftheparalegalshouldnotappearontheletterheadorontheofficedoorofanylawyerengagedinprivatepractice.Theparalegalmayhaveabusinesscardcontainingthenameofthefirmbywhichheorsheisemployed,butthecardmustcontaintheword“paralegal”toclearlyconveythattheparalegalisnotalawyer.


(c) In oral communications, either face-to-face or on the tele-phone, theparalegal shouldbegin theconversationwithaclearstatement thatheor she is speakingasaparalegalemployeeofthelawyerorthelawfirm.Suchcommunicationconcerningthestatusoftheparalegalshouldbegivenpriortoalloralcommuni-cationswithclients,oppositeparties,andotherattorneysunlesspreviouscontactswith suchpersonswould justify theparalegalinbelievingthattheirstatuswasclearlyknowntosuchpersons.

(2)AparalegalmaynotbeapartnerinalawfirmnorhaveafinancialinterestthatamountstoapartnershipinterestinsuchfirmotherthanparticipationinaprofitsharingplanallowedunderBarethicsrules.[DR2-102(A)]

(3)Astheparalegalistheagentoftheattorney,theparalegalhasadutytoprotectandpreservetheconfidencesandsecretsofthefirm’sclients.[EC4-2andDR4-102]

(4)Astheparalegalisanagentofthelawyerorlawfirm,itisthedutyofthesupervisinglawyertocarefullyinstructtheparalegalsothattheparalegalwillavoidtakinganyactionwhichtheattorneyhimselfisprohibitedfromtaking,includingavoidanceofsolicitationofcasesorclientsforthelawyerorthelawfirmandavoidinganyotheractivitywhichwould be improper activity if performed by the supervisinglawyerorhisfirm.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardMarch 31, 1978ADVISORY OPINION NO. 22(Amended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board January 14, 1993)

Ethical propriety of a lawyer communicating to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in particular areas of the law.

Thequestionpresentediswhetheritisunethicalforalawyertocom-municatetootherlawyershisorheravailabilitytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawwithoutrunningafouloftherequirementsofStandard6andtheprovisionssetforthinEC2-6,2-7,and2-8,SelectionofaLawyer:ProfessionalNoticesandListings.

ThepolicyconsiderationsuponwhichStandard6andtheotheradvertis-ingandsolicitationrulesarebasedaretheresultofaconcernthatthepublicshouldbeprotectedfrommisrepresentation,fraud,intimidation,undueinflu-ence,andoverreachingintheselectionofalawyer.Theseconcernswouldnotbeapplicabletoalawyercommunicatingwithanotherlawyer.

Anattorneymakingcontactwithothermembersoftheprofessionforthepurposeofadvisinghisorheravailabilitytoactasaconsultantinaparticularareaofthelawisnotinanywayrelievedformmakingcertainthatallrepresentationsarebothaccurateandnotinanywaymisleading.SuchcommunicationisnotinviolationofStandard6.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardMay 19, 1978ADVISORY OPINION NO. 23

Multi-State Law Firm Office Within the State of Georgia

PursuanttoBarRule4-223,theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiarendersthefollowingadvisoryopinionconcerningaproperinter-pretationoftheCanonsofEthicsasappliedtothefollowingstateoffacts:

Mayanout-of-statelawfirmopenandmaintainanofficeintheStateofGeorgiaunderthedirectionofafull-timeassociateofthatfirm,saidassociatebeingafull-timeGeorgiaresidentandamemberof theStateBarofGeorgia?RelevantethicsDR2-102(A)(4);DR2-102(C)and(D),andDR3-101(B).

DR2-102(D)[DisciplinaryStandard11]readsasfollows:

“Apartnershipshallnotbeformedorcontinuedbetweenoramonglawyerslicensedindifferentjurisdictionsunlessallenumerationsofthemembersandassociatesofthefirmonitsletterheadandinotherpermissiblelistingsmakeclearthejurisdictionallimitationsofthosemembersandassociatesofthefirmnotlicensedtoprac-ticeinalllistedjurisdictions.However,thesamefirmnamemaybeusedineachjurisdiction.”

TheprovisionofDR2-102(D)clearlyindicatesthatitisappropriateformulti-statefirmstomaintainhomeorbranchofficeswithintheStateofGeorgiaunderthesameformnameasisusedinotherjurisdictions.However,anexaminationofthevariousethicsrulesapplicabletosuch

anofficeindicatesthataGeorgiaattorneypracticinginsuchanofficeisunderanaffirmativeresponsibilitytotakestepstofullyinformthepublicof limitationson theabilityandqualificationsofout-of-stateattorneystopracticewithintheStateofGeorgiaandtopreventtheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwithinthisState.TheprovisionsofDR2-102(A)(4)andofDR2-102(D)clearlyrequirethattheletterheadofthemulti-statefirmmakeabsolutelyclearthejurisdictionallimitationsonthelegalpracticeofmembersandassociatesofthefirmwhoarenotlicensedtopracticeinalllistedjurisdictions.

DR2-102(C)readsasfollows:

“Alawyershallnotholdhimselfoutashavingapartnershipwithoneormoreotherlawyersunlesstheyareinfactpartners.”

EC2-13readsasfollows:

“In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons withwhomhedeals,alawyershouldbescrupulousintherepresenta-tionofhisprofessionalstatus.Heshouldnotholdhimselfoutasbeingapartnerorassociateofalawfirmifheisnotoneinfact,andthusshouldnotholdhimselfoutasapartnerorassociationifheonlysharesofficeswithanotherlawyer.”

TheprovisionsofEC2-13andDR2-102(C)clearlyindicatesthatanypartner,associateormemberofafirm,whetherfullywithintheStateofGeorgiaorpartofamulti-statefirm,mustdealhonestlywiththeBarandthepublicwithrespecttohisstatuswiththefirm.

DR3-101readsasfollows:

AIDINGUNAUTHORIZEDPRACTICEOFLAW“(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorizedpracticeoflaw.(B)Alawyershallnotpracticelawinajurisdictionwheretodosowouldbe inviolationof regulationsof theprofession in thatjurisdiction.”

EC3-9reads,inpart,asfollows:

“Regulationof thepracticeof lawisaccomplishedprincipallybythe respective states. Authority to engage in the practice of lawconferred in any jurisdiction is not per se, a grant of the right topracticeelsewhereanditisimproperforalawyertoengageinprac-ticewhereheisnotpermittedbylaworbycourtordertodoso...”

TheprovisionsofDR3-101andEC3-9indicatesthatalthoughalocalattorneymaybeamemberofamulti-statelawfirm,hemaynotaidlawyersnotproperlylicensedintheStateofGeorgiatoengageintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawinGeorgia.Additionally,DR3-101(B)clearlyindicatesthatpracticebynonlicensedlawyersinGeorgiawillsubjectthemtodisciplineinGeorgiaand,possibly,intheirhomestateaswell.Consequently,withtheexceptionofthoseareasoflawwhichfallwithinfederalpreemption,onlythoseattorneyswhoarelicensedwithintheStateofGeorgiamaybebasedin,andmayperformdailyservicesamountingtothepracticeoflawin,Georgiabranchofficesofmulti-statelawfirms.Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatanout-of-statememberofthefirmmaynotcooperatewithfullylicensedlocalfirmmembers toadvise firmclientson legalproblemswhich involve thelawofmorethanonestateorthelawofGeorgiaandanyotherjurisdiction.

The establishment of a thorough examination requirement by theSupremeCourt ofGeorgia properly seeks to protect the citizens of theStateofGeorgiabyassuringthemthatanypersonsundertakingtoperformlegal serviceswithin this State hasmet high standards of character andeducation.ThedefinitionofthepracticeoflawfoundinGa.CodeAnn.§9-401,etseq.,isquitebroadandtheresidentassociateoftheout-of-statefirmwouldberesponsibleformakingsurethatnoimproperpracticeoflawresultsfromthepresenceofhisbranchofficewithintheStateofGeorgia.

Special care should be taken by the local associate to ensure that,whereappropriate,fiduciaryfundsareplacedinGeorgiabankaccountsasrequiredbyDR9-102(A).

Theauthoritieshavingbeenreviewed,theBoardanswerstheinquiryintheaffirmative,butnotesthatcertainotherrequirementsmustalsobenetbythelocalassociateoftheout-of-statefirm.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardNovember 21, 1980ADVISORY OPINION NO. 26

Ethical Propriety of Lawyer Sending Statutory Notice to Drawer of Bad Check


PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Question Presented:

Isitethicallyimproperforalawyertosendastatutorynoticetothedrawerofabadcheckthatstatesthatunlesssaiddrawerpaystheamountofthecheckinfullwithinaspecifiedperiodhewillbesubjecttocriminalprosecution?

TheethicsauthorityapplicabletothisinquiryisRule3-107(Canon7),EC-21andDR7-105(A)oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility(Standard49ofRule4-102oftheGeorgiaBarRules).

DR7-105(A)(Standard49)providesasfollows:

“DR7-105-ThreateningCriminalProsecution(A) a lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, orthreatentopresentcriminalchargessolelytoobtainanadvantageinacivilmatter.”

Theethicalconsiderationunderthissectionstatesthefollowing:

“EC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is primarily designedfor the settlement of disputes between parties, while the crimi-nalprocess isdesigned for theprotectionofsocietyasawhole.Threateningtouse,orusing,thecriminalprocesstocoerceadjust-mentofprivatecivilclaimsorcontroversiesisasubversionofthatprocess;further,thepersonagainstwhomthecriminalprocessissomisusedmay be deterred from asserting his legal rights andthustheusefulnessofthecivilprocessinsettlingprivatedisputesis impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, theimproperuseofcriminalprocesstendstodiminishpublicconfi-denceinourlegalsystem.”

AlsoapplicabletothisinquiryisSection26-1704(a)oftheGeorgiaCodeAnnotated,whichprovidesasfollows:

“BadChecks”

(a) A person commits criminal issuance of a bad check when hemakes,draws,utters,ordeliversacheck,draft,ororderforthepay-ment ofmoneyon any bankor other depository in exchange for apresentconsiderationorwages,knowingthatitwillnotbehonoredby the drawee. For the purposes of this section, it is prima facieevidence that the accused knew that the instrument would not behonoredif:

(1)Theaccusedhadnoaccountwith thedraweeat the timetheinstrumentwasmade,drawn,uttered,ordelivered;or

(2)Paymentwas refusedby thedrawee for lackof funds,uponpresentation within 30 days after delivery and the accused, orsomeone for him, shall not have paid the holder thereof theamountduethereon,togetherwithaservicechargenottoexceed$5or fivepercentof the faceamountof the instrument,which-everisgreater,within10daysafterreceivingwrittennoticethatpaymentwasrefuseduponsuchinstrument.Forpurposesofthissubsection(2):

(A)Noticemailed by certified or registeredmail, evidenced byreturn receipt, to the addressprintedon the instrumentorgivenatthetimeofissuanceshallbedeemedsufficientandequivalentto notice having been received by the personmaking, drawing,utteringordeliveringsaidinstrumentwhethersuchnoticeshallbereturnedundeliveredornot.

(B)Theformofnoticeshallbesubstantiallyasfollows:

“Youareherebynotifiedthatacheckorinstrument,numbered_________, issued by you on _____________(date), drawnupon ____________________(name of bank), and payable to______________________, has been dishonored. Pursuant toGeorgia law, you have 10 days from receipt of this notice totenderpaymentofthefullamountofsuchcheckorinstrumentplusaservicechargeof$5.00or5percent,(ofthefaceamountofthecheck),whicheverisgreater,thetotalamountduebeing$_________and________cents.Unless thisamount ispaid infullwithin the specified timeabove, theholderof suchcheck

orinstrumentmayturnoverthedishonoredcheckorinstrumentandallotheravailableinformationrelatingtothisincidenttotheDistrictAttorneyorSolicitorforcriminalprosecution.’

(C)Anypartyholdingaworthlesscheckorinstrumentandgivingnotice in substantially similar form to that provided in subpara-graph (B) shall be immune fromcivil liability for thegivingofsuchnoticeandforproceedingundertheformsofsuchnotice.”

Itshouldbenoted that theStateBardirectoryruleanddisciplinarystandardprovidethatalawyershouldnotthreatencriminalprosecutionsolelytogainadvantageinacivilmatter(emphasisadded).BeforethedrawerofabadcheckdrawnonhisbankcanbefoundinviolationofSection26-1704oftheCriminalCode,hemustbegivenwrittennoticethatpaymentof thecheckwas refusedby thebank.Hemust then failtomakepaymenttotheholderofthebadcheckwithintendaysofthedatehereceivedthewrittennotice.Thus,noticesentpursuanttoSection26-1704oftheGeorgiaCodeAnnotateddoesnotconstituteanabuseofthecriminalprocessinordertogainadvantageinacivilmatter.Rather,thenoticeallowsthedrawerofthebadchecktoavoidcriminalliabilitybymakingthecheckgoodwithintendaysofthedatehereceivesnoticethat the checkwas not honoredby the bank.Thenotice is sent to theissuerofthebadchecktomakehimawarethattheinstrumenthadnotbeenhonoredbythebankandtoallowhimareasonabletimetocorrectwhatcouldbeavalidmistakeinaccountingmadebythedrawerhimselforbythebank.

Accordingly,itistheopinionoftheStateDisciplinaryBoardthatitisnotethicallyimproperforalawyertosentanoticetothedrawerofabadcheckpursuanttotheprovisionsofSection26-1704oftheGeorgiaCodeAnnotated.


Ethical Propriety of Revealing Confidences and Secrets Necessary to Defend Against Charges of Professional Misconduct.

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationand“GovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Facts:

Anattorneyrepresented twodefendantswhoareeachchargedwithcriminaloffensesarisingoutofthesameincident.Bothdefendantswerelaterfoundguiltyofcrimesinthismatter.Subsequently,eachdefendantfiledaMotionfornewtrialbasedon,amongothergrounds,ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.AtthehearingontheMotionfornewtrialtheissueoftheattorney’sprofessionalmisconductisraised.LatertheattorneyischargedbytheStateBarwithviolationsofdisciplinarystandardsarisingoutofthesameevents.

Question Presented:

Woulditbeethicallyproperforthelawyertorevealconfidencesorsecretsoftheseclientswhichmaybenecessarytothelawyer’sdefenseagainstthechargesofprofessionalmisconduct?

The ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is RD 4-101 of theCodeofProfessionalResponsibility(Standard28ofRule4-102of theGeorgiaBarRules).DR4-101providesasfollows:

PreservationofConfidencesandSecretsofClient

(A) “Confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and “secrets” refers to otherinformationgainedintheprofessionalrelationshipthattheclienthasrequested to be held inviolate or the disclosure ofwhichwould beembarrassingorwouldbelikelytobedetrimentaltotheclient.

(B)ExceptwhenpermittedunderDR4-101(C),a lawyershallnotknowingly:

(1)revealaconfidenceorsecretofhisclient:

(2)useaconfidenceorsecretofhisclienttothedisadvantageoftheclient;


(3)use a confidenceor secretofhis client for the advantageofhimselforofa thirdperson,unless theclientconsentsafter fulldisclosure.

(C)Alawyermayreveal:

(1)confidencesorsecretswiththeconsentoftheclientorclientsaffected;

(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under DisciplinaryRulesorrequiredlaworcourtorder;

(3)theintentionofhisclienttocommitacrimeandtheinforma-tionnecessarytopreventthecrime;

(4)confidencesorsecretsnecessarytoestablishorcollecthisfeeor to defend himself or his employees or associates against anaccusationofwrongfulconduct.

(D)A lawyershallexercise reasonablecare topreventhisemploy-ees, associates, andotherswhose servicesareutilizedbyhimfromdisclosingorusing confidencesor secretsof a client, except that alawyermayrevealtheinformationallowedbyDR4-101(C)throughanemployee.

Anotherrelevantconsiderationtothisinquiryistheevidentiaryruleknown as the attorney-client privilege. This rule is stated at GeorgiaCodeAnnotated38-419:

“38-419CommunicationstoAttorneybyClient

Communicationtoanyattorney,orhisclerk,tobetransmittedtotheattorneypendinghisemployment,or inanticipation thereof,shallneverbeheardbythecourt.Sotheattorneyshallnotdisclosethe advice or counsel hemaygive to his client, nor produceordeliver up title deeds or other papers, except evidences of debtleftinhispossessionbyhisclient.Thisrulewillnotexcludetheattorneyasawitnesstoanyfactswhichmaytranspireinconnec-tionwithhisemployment.”

Also it should be noted that EC 4-4 recognizes that “the attorney-clientprivilegeismorelimitedthantheethicalobligationofalawyertoguardtheconfidencesandsecretsofhisclient.”

WiththeserulesinminditappearsthatDR4-101(C)(4)specificallycontrols thesituationpresentedby this inquiry.This ruleholds that“alawyermay reveal the confidencesor secretsnecessary to establishorcollecthisfeeortodefendhimselforhisemployeesorassociatesagainstanaccusationofwrongfulconduct.”(emphasisadded)

The policy considerations applicable to this situation are stated inHydev.State,70Ga.App.823,at827:

“Whereanattorney’sfidelityastoatransactionhasbeenattacked,withtheimputationthathehasbeenunfaithfultotheinterestofhisclient,itwouldbeaharshruletopermittestimonybytheclientinacause, spreadupon thepublic record,of thischaracter, andnottopermittheattorneytoexplain.Theruleissettledbyalltheauthoritiesthatinlitigationbetweentheclientandhisattorney,theattorney,ofcourse,has the right tomakea fulldisclosurebear-inguponthelitigation,forthepurposeofdefendinghispropertyrights;thedefenseofcharacter,wherepubliclyattackedisjustasimportant, and to somemore so, than property rights; it wouldviolate a principal of natural justice and inherent equity to saythat therightof theattorney’sdefenseismergedinaprivilegedcommunicationwhentheclienthimselfmakesapublicaccusation(therelationshipbetweenclientandattorney,havingbeenprivateas to thatparticularmatter,hasbecomepublicby theactof theclient)thespiritoftheruleceaseswhentheclientchargesfraud.Bymakingtheattackinhisunswornstatementuponthecharacterand professional conduct of the attorney, the defendant waivedhisrighttohavetheirtransactionsconsideredasprivileged(Code,38-419), and the attorney was competent to give testimony toshowthathedidnotactbaselyinthetransaction,ashisone-timeclientclaimed.Anditwasnoterrortopermittheattorneytotestifytofactssofarasnecessarytodefendhischaracter,notwithstand-ingtheruleagainstthedisclosureofconfidentialcommunicationsbetweenattorneyandclient.”

Accordingly, the State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that itwould be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal the confidences orsecretsoftheseclientsinanyproceedingsinwhichtheymaybeneces-sarytodefendthelawyeragainstchargesofprofessionalmisconduct.


Guidelines for Disputes with Attorneys’ Fees Set by Workman’s Compensation Board

Pursuant to the provisions of the Rule 4-223 of the Rules andRegulations for theOrganization andGovernment of the StateBar ofGeorgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board ofthe State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders itsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Factual Background:

TheStateBoardofWorkers’CompensationisauthorizedbyGeorgiaLawtoapprovethefeeofattorneyswhorepresentworkers’compensa-tion claimants. Occasionally, theWorkers’ Compensation Board mayapprove an attorney’s fee, which it has determined is reasonable, butwhich is less than the amount the attorney and client (workers’ com-pensation claimant) have agreed upon in the fee contract. The lawyermaythenappealthedeterminationoftheWorkers’CompensationBoardconcerninghisfeetotheSuperiorCourt.Insuchanappeal,theonlyissuebeforetheSuperiorCourtisthedecisionoftheSuperiorCourtinfavoroftheattorneyistoreducetheclient’s/claimant’sshareoftheworkers’compensationawardwhileincreasingproportionatelythelawyer’sshareoftheaward.

Question Presented:

Does a lawyerwhohas represented a claimant in aworkers’ com-pensationcasehaveanethicalobligationtoadvisehisclientofhisrightto obtain independent counsel to represent the clientwhen the lawyerdecides to appeal the amount theWorkers’ Compensation Board hasapprovedasthelawyer’sfee?

A lawyerhas aduty to exercisehis independentprofessional judg-ment at all times on behalf of and for the protection of his client.Wheneverthelawyer’spersonalinterestsortheinterestsofotherscausehimtocompromisehisloyaltyandobjectivitytohisclient,aconflictofinterestexists,anditisimproperforthelawyertoundertakeorcontinuerepresentationoftheclientunderthesecircumstances.

Anassociationmarkedbytrustandintimacydevelopsbetweenaclientand a lawyerwho has represented that client throughout vigorouswork-ers’compensationlitigation,andwhohasobtainedasatisfactoryworkers’compensationawardfortheclient.Ifalawyerdecidesthathewillappealtheattorney’sfeeawardoftheWorkers’CompensationBoardtotheSuperiorCourt, theclientmaynotunderstand that suddenlyheand the lawyerareadversaries,andthelawyerwillnolongerbeactinginhisbestinterest.Thelawyershould,therefore,explaintotheclientthatsinceheisappealingtheamountoffeestheBoardhasapproved,heisseekingtoreducetheamountofmoneytheclientwillreceiveinordertoincreasetheamounthewillreceive.Forthatreason,thelawyershouldtakecaretomakeafulldisclosuretotheclientoftheirrespectivepositionsduringtheappealandadvisetheclientofhis right toobtain independentcounsel toadvisehimduring thisstageofthelitigation.

The Georgia Supreme Court indicated in Arey v. Davis, 233 Ga.951(1975),thatevenwhentheoriginalattorney-clientrelationshiphasended, if a fiduciary relationship continues to exist between a lawyerandclient,thelawyerisrequiredtoadvisetheclienttoseekindependentlegaladvicefromanotherlawyerbeforepursuingacourseofconducttoprotecttheinterestofthelawyerattheexpenseoftheclient.

Itshouldbenotedthatthereisnoconflictofinterestinthosecasesinwhichtheclaimant’sattorneyseeksanassessmentofpunitiveattor-ney’sfeesundertheprovisionsofGa.CodeAnn.114-712(b).Intheseinstances,theemployer-insurerwillberesponsiblefortheadditionalfeesratherthantheclient/claimant.

Conclusion:

In workers’ compensation cases in which the employee-claimant’sattorney seeks to increase his fee by appealing the Board’s fee deter-mination to theSuperiorCourt, the lawyer is involved ina conflictofinterestifhedoesnotgivetheclientafullexplanationconcerningtheirconflictingpositions in the appeal and advise the client of his right toobtainindependent legalcounsel toprotect theclient’s interestsduringthisstageoflitigation.



Ethical Propriety of Agreement by Which Attorney’s Fees are Paid by Opposing Party

Question Presented:

A is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against B which is pending in theNorthern District of Georgia. B is the debtor in a proceeding in theUnited States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas. Inaddition, there is pending in the same Bankruptcy Court in Texas anaction inwhichBis theplaintiffandC,D,andEaredefendants.E isalsoafull-timeemployeeofA.BcontendsthatC,D,andEareormaybeliabletoBforallorpartoftheclaimsbeingassertedagainstBbyAintheGeorgialitigation.

A andB have agreed upon a complete settlement of allmatters incontroversy between them in a settlement agreement which must beapprovedbytheBankruptcyCourt.

ThesettlementagreementprovidesthattheGeorgialitigationwillbedismissedwithprejudice.BwillasktheBankruptcyCourttodismissEasadefendantinthatCourt,withoutprejudicetofurtherproceedingsbyBagainstCandD,andwillgiveEacovenantnottosue;however,theparties recognize that there is a possibility thatC and/orDwill assertclaimsagainstEand/orA, seekingcontribution fromeitherorbothofthem,either in thependingaction in theBankruptcyCourtor insomeotheraction.InordertoprotectbothEandA,Bhasagreedtoindemnifyand hold them harmless from “expenses and costs of defending suchclaims, including reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees,” subjecttoobtainingawrittenopinionfromtheStateBarofGeorgia thatsuchagreementisethicalandisnotaviolationoftheCanonsofEthics.

Opinion:

It is theopinionof theStateDisciplinaryBoardof theStateBarofGeorgia that the foregoing agreement is ethical and is not a violationof theCanonsofEthics,provided thatafulldisclosureofallpertinentfactshasbeenmadetoallpartieswhomaybeaffectedbysuchagree-ment,theygivetheirwrittenconsenttoit;and,providedfurther,thattheattorneysat all timesexercise their independentprofessional judgmentfor their respective clients regardless ofwho is responsible for payingthefeesoftheattorneys.


Dual Occupations: Ethical Considerations Applicable to a Lawyer Who is Engaged in the Practice of Law and Another Profession or Business

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsfor theOrganization and theGovernment of the StateBar ofGeorgia(219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Questions Presented:

(1) Should a Georgia attorney, also possessing a Georgia real estatesalesperson’s license, who arranges a real estate transaction in his orher capacity as a real estate salesperson decline to perform any titleworkorotherlegalworkinordertoavoidanappearanceofprofessionalimpropriety?

(2)If,inthecourseofrepresentingaclientinanunrelatedlegalmatter,theclientrequeststheattorney(alsopossessingarealestatesalesperson’slicense)tolocateabuyerorsellerfortheclient’srealestate,isitproperfortheattorneytoaccept?

TheAmericanBarAssociation stated in FormalOpinionNo. 328,June1972,thatitisnotnecessarilyimproperforalawyersimultaneouslytoholdhimselfoutasalawyerandasamemberofanotherprofessionor business. However, the American Bar Association concluded thata lawyer that is engaged in thepracticeof lawandanotherprofessionwhichiscloselyrelatedtolaw,mustgovernhisconductaccordingtotheprofessionalstandardsofthelegalprofessionwhileengagedinthenon-legalprofessionorbusiness.

Following the rationale of theAmerican Bar Association, it is theopinionof theStateDisciplinaryBoard thataGeorgiaattorneywhoisalsoengagedintherealestatebusinessshouldconformhisbehaviortothestandardsofconductof theStateBarofGeorgiawhileengaged inbothprofessions.Accordingly,itwouldnotbeimproperfortheattorneyto perform the work requested in both of your inquiries provided theattorneycomplieswiththeprovisionsofDR2-103,DR2-104,andDR2-105 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility (Standards12,13,14,15,16,17,and18ofRule4-102oftheGeorgiaBarRules).

When an attorney, who is actively practicing law in the State ofGeorgia, is also engaged in a second profession or business closelyrelatedtothepracticeoflaw,alloftheprovisionsoftheGeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityareapplicabletothelawyer’sconductinbothprofessions.


Attorney’s Responsibilities with Respect to the Payment of Witness Fees

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsof theOrganizationandGovernmentof theStateBarofGeorgia (219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproper requestof such, renders itsopinionconcerningtheproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Question Presented:

Attorney (A) represents Client (C), the plaintiff in a civil suit fordamages.InthecourseofpreparationforC’scase,Ausestheservicesofanexpertwitness(W);nothingspecificismentionedconcerningcom-pensationofW.

Chasnosubstantialassetotherthantheclaimthatisthesubjectofthesuit,andwillbeabletopaythewitnessfeesonlyifheissuccessfulinsecuringarecovery.Bythesametoken,ifAadvancesthefeestoW,AwillhavelittleornochanceofbeingreimbursedbyC,ifCloseshiscase.

(1)Would it be proper forA to pay the costs, realizing that hemightneverbereimbursedbyC?

(2)WoulditbeproperforAtosaynothingandkeepWwaitingforpay-mentuntilsomerecoveryhasbeenhad?

(3) Generally, should the State Bar reconsider the ethical prohibitionagainstcontingencyfeesforexpertwitnessesinlightofthepracticalitiesinvolved?

Opinion:

Standard58ofBarRule4-102andDR7-109(c)expresslyprohibitpaymentofcompensationtoawitnesscontingentupontheoutcomeofacase.Standard58doesnot,however,prohibitanattorneyfromadvanc-ing,guaranteeingoracquiescinginthepaymentofexpensesreasonablyincurredbyawitness.

Standard32ofBarRule4-102requires that theclientmust remainultimatelyliableforanyexpensesadvancedorguaranteedbytheattor-ney.EthicalConsideration5-8 (Canon5)explains that it isnotproperforanattorneytohaveafinancialinterestintheoutcomeofhisclient’scase,assuchaninterestmightaffecthisindependentprofessionaljudg-ment;thus,theclientmustremainultimatelyliablefortheexpensesoflitigation.

A(theattorneyinthesetoffactsabove)isnotsurewhatheisethi-callyrequiredtodoinlightofStandards32and58.IfApaysthefeestoWandCloseshiscase,CwillnotbeabletorepayA.Isthis,infact,aviolationofStandard32?

The Board’s answer to this questionmust be that such a situationdoesnotviolateStandard32.WhileitistruethatAmayneverbepaidbyC for theexpensesadvanced toW,C is stillultimately liable toAfor his expenses. A can pursue legal remedy against C andmight bereimbursed at some point in the future. Thus,A’s liability toW is atmostpenultimate.

It should be noted that inBrown andHuseby, Inc. v. Chrietzberg,242Ga. 232, 248 S.E. 2d 631 (1978), the SupremeCourt ofGeorgiaheldanattorneymaybeliableforcourtreporter’sfeesifhepersonally


guarantees payment therefore and the reporter reasonably relies upontheattorneyfortheirpayments.TheCourtstatedthatsuchaholdingdidnotforcetheattorneytoviolateStandard32,astheclientwouldremainultimatelyliabletotheattorney.

AalsowondersifhecansimplymakeWwaituntilthefinaloutcomeof thecase, realizing that, ineffect,Wcanonlycollect fromCifC issuccessful.Afearsthatsuchacourseofaction(orinaction)mightviolateStandard58’sprohibitionagainstcontingencyfeesforwitnesses.

TheBoard,onceagain,findsnoviolationofadisciplinarystandardhere.First,thereisnoactualcontingency.Thetermcontingencyimpliesthatnoliabilitywillarisewithoutthehappeningofacertainevent.Inthiscase,CwillhavealegalobligationtopayWevenifhecannot,infact,payhim.Secondly,AmightberequiredtopayWunderthedoctrineofBrownandHuseby.Ineitherevent,WwillnotberequiredtoawaittheoutcomeofthecasetohaveaclaimagainstCand/orAforrecoveryoftheserviceshehasrendered.

Finally, A thinks that the prohibition against contingency fees forwitnessesisimpracticalandoughttobereconsidered.

It shouldbenoted that rules substantially similar toRule58havemet constitutional challenges (e.g. Pearson v. Association of Bar ofCity ofNewYork, cert. den. 434US924 (1978) ).TheBoard findsthat the problem in A’s case does not stem from any impracticalityinherent in rule58.Rather,A’sproblemarosewhenhe failed todis-cussthedetailsofcompensationwithW,beforeheusedW’sservices.Witnessesshouldknowwhotolooktoforpaymentfor theirservicesfrom theoutset.Anattorney’s failure toappraise thewitnessof suchdetailsmightputhiminA’sseeminglyno-win(financial, rather thanethical)situation.


Contingent Fees in Divorce Cases


Question Presented:

Whetheritisethicallyproperforanattorneytoenterintoacontingen-cy-feearrangementinadivorcecase.

ThequestionpresentedforresolutionbythisBoardinvolvesquestionsof lawaswellasethics. It shouldbenoted that theGeorgiaAppellateCourts have consistently held that contingency fee arrangements indivorcecasesarevoidasagainstpublicpolicy,Evansv.Hartley,57Ga.App.598(1938);Flemingv.Phinizy,35Ga.App.792(1926);andthatsimilararrangementsincasestocollectfuturechildsupportarelikewiseinvalid,Thomasv.Holt,209Ga.133(1952).ThecourtsinGeorgiahavenotconsideredthequestionofwhethercontingencyfeesareproperinanactiontoenforcepastduealimonyorchildsupport.

Theethical rulespresentlyapplicable to this inquiryareDR5-103,EC5-7andDR2-106andEC2-20.

Canon 5,DR 5-103 andEC 5-7 pertain to the ethical propriety ofcontingencyfeesingeneral.Theseethicalguidelinesdiscouragelawyersfromacceptingcasesonacontingencyfeebasistoavoidthepossibilityofanadverseeffectonthelawyer’sindependentprofessionaljudgment.Whilerecognizingthatacontingency-feearrangementgivesalawyerafinancial interest in theoutcomeof thelitigation,EC5-7states that“areasonablecontingencyfeeispermissibleincivilcasesbecauseitmaybetheonlymeansbywhichalaymancanobtaintheservicesofalawyerofhischoice.”ThisRule,however,cautionsalawyertoenterintoacon-tingent feearrangementonly in those instanceswhere thearrangementwillbebeneficialtotheclient.

Thequestionpresentedby this inquiry is directly addressedbyEC2-20. Inpertinentpart, thisEthicalConsiderationprovides thatcontin-gent-fee arrangements in domestic relation cases, are rarely justified“becauseof thehumanrelationships involvedandtheuniquecharacteroftheproceedings.”

Applying theabove-citedauthorities to thequestionpresented, it istheopinionofthisBoardthatacontingentfeearrangementinadivorcecaseisagainstpublicpolicyandisthereforeimproper.ItshouldbenotedthatthisopinionislimitedtothetypeoffeearrangementsprohibitedbytheGeorgiacourtsinthecasescitedabove,anddoesnotaddresstheethi-calproprietyofacontingencyarrangementwherethematter is limitedsolelytothecollectionofaliquidatedamount.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardJanuary 20, 1984ADVISORY OPINION NO. 37

Attorney’s Fees for Collecting PIP Benefits


Question Presented:

Isitethicallyproperforanattorneytotakeacontingentfeefromaclient’sPIPbenefits?

Opinion:

TheapplicableethicalrulesareDR2-106andStandard31(b)ofBarRule4-102.DirectoryRule2-106providesinpart:

DR2-106—FeesforLegalServices.

(A)Alawyershallnotenterintoanagreementfor,charge,orcollectanillegalorclearlyexcessivefee.

(B)A fee is clearly excessivewhen, after a review of the facts, alawyerofordinaryprudencewouldbe leftwithadefiniteand firmconviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors tobe considered asguides indetermining the reasonablenessof a feeincludethefollowing:

(1) thetimeandlaborrequired, thenoveltyanddifficultyof thequestions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legalserviceproperly;(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptanceoftheparticularemploymentwillprecludeotheremploymentbythelawyer;(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legalservices;(4)theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;(5) the time limitations imposedby theclientorby thecircum-stances;(6)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient;(7)theexperience,reputation,andabilityofthelawyer,orlawyersperformingtheservices;(8)whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.

Standard 31(b) allows an attorney to “contract with a client for areasonablecontingentfeeinacivilcase”(emphasisadded).

Under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act(O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 through13) all insurance policiesmust provideforcompensationtoinjuredpersons,withoutregardtofault,formedicalexpenses,lossofwages,someexpensesandburialexpenses.Thisinsur-ance coverage is generally known as PIP coverage. Payments of PIPbenefitsarerequiredtobemadewithinthirty(30)daysaftertheinsur-ancecarrierreceivesreasonableproofofthefactandtheamountofloss.AllthatisneededtofileforPIPbenefitsisasimple,factualclaimform.

Thebasis onwhich attorneys are allowed to take contingency feesis that the claim on which the attorney represents the client is itselfcontingent.BlacksLawDictionarydefinescontingentas“possible,butnowassured.”

Exceptinunusualcircumstances,thebenefitspaidunderPIPcover-ageareassured.ItistheopinionofthisBoardthatthetakingofacon-tingency fee for the fillingoutof routine,undisputedPIPclaim formsisunreasonableandaviolationofDR2-106(B)(1)andStandard31(b).Anattorneymaychargeareasonablefeefortheattorney’stimespentinprocessingaPIPclaim.


InthoseunusualcircumstanceswhenthepaymentofPIPbenefitsisnotassured,thisBoarddoesnotwishtoprohibitcontingencyfeesingeneral.However,theattorneyshouldexaminethefactorssetoutinDR2-106(B)todeterminewhetheracontingentfeearrangementwouldbereasonable.


Law Clerks Preparing Appellate Briefs


Question Presented:

MayaLawClerkforaSuperiorCourtJudgeprepareappellatebriefsonbehalf of defendants in criminal caseswhere the death penalty hasbeenimposedunderthefollowingcircumstances?

1)Thecaseswouldbefromotherjudicialcircuits;

2)BoththeprisonerandjudgeconsenttotheLawClerk’srepresenta-tionafterfulldisclosure;

3)TheworkwouldbeperformedintheLawClerk’ssparetimeandhewouldreceivenocompensation;

4)Nocountyorstatematerialswouldbeused;

5) The LawClerk is paid by the county and serves at the judge’spleasure.

Opinion:

TheapplicableethicalrulesareCanons5and9;ECs5-14,5-15,9-1and9-2;DR5-105;andStandards35and37.

TheLawClerk foraSuperiorCourt Judgeoccupiesauniqueposi-tion.The“client”oftheLawClerkistheStateofGeorgiathroughtheJudgewho supervises theClerk’s activities.While aLawClerk isnotspecifically subject to theCode of JudicialConduct, theClerk is in aclose relationshipwith theJudgewho is subject to thatcode.LawyersandmembersofthepublicviewaLawClerkasanextensionoftheJudgeforwhomtheClerkworks.

For aLawClerk to takeapositionagainst theState representingaprisonerwhohasbeenconvictedintheStateofGeorgia,theClerkwillbe in a conflict of interest situation.On one hand, theClerk is repre-senting thepersonagainst theStatewhileon theotherhand, theClerkrepresentstheStateintheadministrationofjusticethroughtheSuperiorCourtJudge.

Canon9statesthat:

“ALawyerShouldAvoidEventheAppearanceofaProfessionalImpropriety.”

ItistheopinionofthisBoardthataLawClerkrepresentingcriminaldefendantswouldgiverisetotheappearanceofprofessionalimproprietyunder Canon 9 and ECs 9-1 and 9-2. Additionally, Standard 37 (andDR5-105)allowsalawyertorepresentmultipleclientsinaconflictofinterestsituationonlyif“it isobviousthathecanadequatelyrepresenttheinterestofeach”.ItistheopinionthisBoardthataLawClerkcannotadequatelyrepresenttheinterestoftheStateofGeorgiaindeathpenaltycasesandtheinterestofotherprisonersinotherdeathpenaltycases.

TheStateDisciplinaryBoarddoesnotreachthequestionofwhetherornottheLawClerkissubjecttotheCodeofJudicialConductasthatisaproperquestionfortheJudicialQualificationsCommission.


Propriety of Defendant’s Tender of Lump Sum Settlement Offers to Plaintiffs in Federal Civil Rights Actions Wherein Statutory Attorney Fees are Provided for Successful Plaintiffs.

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsof theOrganizationandGovernmentof theStateBarofGeorgia (219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.


In theU.S.DistrictCourt, plaintiff fileshis claimalleging aviola-tion of first and fourteenth amendments as well as 42 USC §1983,etc. Plaintiff’s counsel is typically a corresponding attorney with theAmerican Civil liberties Union. The defendant is typically a privatephysician,privatehospitalordrugrehabilitationfacility.

Relatedstateclaimsarefrequentlyalsoraisedinsuchcases,includingchargesoffalseimprisonment,battery,medicalnegligenceandviolationof state laws regarding involuntary hospitalization, etc. In addition toamountssoughtforcompensatoryandpunitivedamages,thereisalsoaprayerifnotexpresslycontainedinthecomplaintthen,implicitlyundertheU.S.Code,forstatutoryattorney’sfeesunder42USC§1988.

Ifitisdeterminedduringthecourseofthepre-trialdiscoveryprocessthatanoffertosettlethecaseshouldbeextendedtotheplaintiffs,suchanofferwouldtypicallybeintheformofalumpsumwhichwouldrepresentthetotalamounttobepaidbytheinsurancecarrierforcompensatoryandpunitive damages as well as any attorney’s fees. Neither the defendantnortheinsurancecarrierwouldhaveanyinterestastohowthatlumpsumwouldbedividedbetweentheplaintiffandhisattorney,theonlyinterestthereinbeingthatitrepresentedthemaximumextentoftheirexposure.

InacaseinvolvingallegedviolationsofFederalcivilrightsstatutespending theU.S.DistrictCourt inGeorgiawhere the prevailing partywouldbe entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as expensesof the liti-gation, is it unethicalor in anyway improper for thedefendant, in anattempttosettlethecasepriortotrial,toofferadollaramountrepresent-ingthetotalofcompensatoryandpunitivedamagesaswellasattorney’sfeeswhichwouldbereceivedbytheplaintiffandhiscounsel?

If theanswer to the foregoing isyes,could theethicalviolationbecuredbyenteringintoanagreementbetweenplaintiff,hisattorneysandthedefendant,agreeinguponanamountrepresentingcompensatoryandpunitivedamagestobereceivedbytheplaintiffhimselfandaseparateamountrepresentingcompensationforlegalservices?

Opinion:

Itshouldbefirstnotedthattotheextentthattheforegoingquestionsinvolveinterpretationsoffederalorotherlaw,thattheStateDisciplinaryBoardiswithoutauthoritytoconsiderthoseaspectsofthismatter.Thisopinionwill,therefore,addressonlytheethicalaspectsoftheconductinquestionaccordingtotheGeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Furthermore, the State Disciplinary Board recognizes that since thisinquiry arises in a federal setting, a separate body of federal ethicalrulesmayapplyandinresponding,theStateDisciplinaryBoardwillnotundertaketointerpretanyfederalethicalrules.

The State Disciplinary Board is aware of at least one other BarAssociationwhichhasissuedawrittenopinionconcerningasimilar,ifnot identical, fact situation.Having read and consideredOpinionNos.80-94and82-80oftheEthicsCommitteeoftheAssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYork,whichopinionsholdthatit isunethicalforadefendant’scounseltodemandawaiverofstatutoryattorneyfeesfromplaintiffasaconditionforsettlementinfederalcivilrightscasesinvolv-ingstatutoryattorneyfees,wedeclinetoadoptthepositiontakenbythemajorityofthatCommitteeinbothofthosetwoopinions.Brieflystated,those opinions held that defendant’s demands forwaiver of the statu-tory attorney fees “had the effect of placing the plaintiff’s lawyers inconflictwiththeirclientsandundercuttingthepoliciesofthecivilrightsstatuteswhichprovidedforfeesandthataccordinglythedemandswereprejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice.”OpinionNo.82-80.Weareinstead,morepersuadedbythepositiontakenbythedissentinOpinionNo.82-80,whichcitedwithapproval the following languagefromtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinWhitev.NewHampshire,455U.S.445,71L.Ed.2d325,332,n.15(1982),acasewheretheissueoftheethicalpropriety of simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees in federal civilrightsactionswasraised,butnotactuallydecided:

“Inconsideringwhethertoenteranegotiatedsettlement,adefen-dantmayhavegoodreasontodemandtoknowhistotalliabilityfrombothdamagesandfees.Althoughsuchsituationsmayraisedifficultethicalissuesforaplaintiff’sattorney,wearereluctanttoholdthatnoresolutioniseveravailabletoethicalcounsel.”


Although no provisions of the Georgia Code of ProfessionalResponsibility appear to address this issue directly, Standard 45(f) ofBarRule4-102states,inpertinentpart,thatalawyershallnot“settlealegal proceedingor claimwithout obtainingproper authorization fromhis client.” Implicit in this rule is thenotion that attorneysmust com-municatewiththeirclientsconcerningpossiblesettlementofacauseofaction,andofferthebenefitoftheirprofessionaladviceandjudgmentsothat theclient’sdecisiontomakeasettlementoffer isas informedandintelligentachoiceasisreasonablypossible.

Clearly, in appropriate cases, thequestionof a defendant’s liabil-ity for plaintiff’s attorney fees,where so providedby statute, can bea significant factor in reaching a decision as towhether tomake anoffer of settlement.To force a defendant intoproposing a settlementofferwhereinplaintiffs statutoryattorney feesarenotnegotiatedandincorporated into the final settlement offer leaves a defendant in apositionofexposurethatisatbest,uncertain,andatworstsotenuousthatmeaningfulsettlementproposalsmightneverbemade.Suchasitu-ationundeniablyimpedesthesettlementprocessandisinimicaltotheresolution of disputes betweenparties.Accordingly, it is the opinionofthisBoardthatitisnotunethicalfordefendant’scounseltooffertoplaintiff,underthefactspresented,alumpsumsettlementofferpriortotrialforadollaramountrepresentingthetotalamountofdamagesandattorneyfeesforplaintiff’scounsel.

Our resolutionof this firstquestionappears tomakeananswer thesecondquestionunnecessary.


Misuse of Subpoenas

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-217oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a properrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationof theStandardsofConductof theDisciplinaryRulesof theStateBarofGeorgia.

Question Presented:

WhetherornotitisaviolationofStandard4oftheDisciplinaryRulesof theStateBarofGeorgiaforanattorneyto issueasubpoenafor theProductionofDocumentspursuanttoO.C.G.A.§24-10-22(a),directingthewitnesstoappearatalawyer’sofficeorsomeotherlocation,wheninfactnohearingortrialistakingplaceandnonoticeofsuchsubpoenaisserveduponopposingcounsel?

Whether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the DisciplinaryRules of theStateBar ofGeorgia for an attorney to issue a subpoenapursuanttoO.C.G.A.§9-11-45whennonoticeofdepositionhasbeenfiledandserveduponallpartiesandwhennodepositionhasinfactbeenscheduled?

Discussion:

DisciplinaryStandard4oftheStateBarofGeorgiaprovidesasfollows:

Alawyershallnotengageinprofessionalconductinvolvingdis-honesty,fraud,deceitorwillfulmisrepresentation.AviolationofthisStandardmaybepunishedbydisbarment.

A subpoena is a judicial write issued in the name of the court bythe clerk when attendance is required at court. (See Agnor’s GeorgiaEvidence§2-3).InthecaseofWhitev.GulfStatesPaper,119Ga.App.271, 273 (1969), itwas stated that our subpoena statuteswere limitedonly to producing documentary evidence at a hearing or trial. In theWhitedecision,thecourtnotedthattheoldGeorgiaCodeSection38-8and38-9dealtonlywith theproductionofdocumentaryevidenceat ahearingortrialandthatthenewAct(1966whichconstitutesourpresentsubpoenalaw)didnotenlargetheprovisionsoftherepealedlawtoallowuseofaNotice toProduceatdepositions.ThisparticularcasebroughtabouttheamendmenttoRule45oftheCivilPracticeAct.

O.C.G.A.§9-11-45providesthatasubpoenashallissueforpersonssought to be deposed andmay command the person to produce docu-ments.O.C.G.A.§9-11-30(b)(1)requiresnoticetoeveryotherpartyofalldepositions.ReadingRule30andRule45together,itisobviousthatbeforeasubpoenacanbeissued,noticeofthedepositionmustbegiventoallparties.

In consideration of the above, a subpoena issued pursuant toO.C.G.A. §24-10-22(a) shouldonlybe issued for actual hearings andtrials and shouldnotbe requestedwhen in factnohearingor trialhasbeenscheduled.Likewise,asubpoenaissuedpursuanttoRule45oftheCivilPracticeAct shouldbe requestedand issuedonly fordepositionswhich have been actually scheduled by agreement between parties orwhereanoticeofdepositionhasbeenfiledandserveduponallparties,andshouldnotbeissuedwhennodepositionhasbeenscheduled.

TheBoard isconcernedwith themisuseof subpoenasaspresentedinthetwosituationsdiscussedbecausesubpoenasarecourtdocuments.Non-partywitnesseswouldbemisledbysuchcourtprocessintoreleas-ingconfidentialorprivilegedmaterialwithoutthepartyhavingachancetocontesttherelevancy,confidentialityorprivilegeofthematerialcon-tainedinthefilebecausethesubpoenaissentwithoutnoticetoanyotherpartyortheircounsel.NoticeisaconceptembracedbytheCivilPracticeAct.ThereisnoneedfornoticeofasubpoenaissuepursuanttoO.C.G.A.§24-10-22(a)becauseallpartiesreceivenoticeofhearingsandtrials,solongastheyarerealhearingsandrealtrials.

Conclusion:

IntheopinionoftheBoard,theuseofsubpoenasasdescribedhereinisawillfulmisrepresentationtoandfraudupon:

(1)Theissuingcourt;

(2)Theissuingclerk;

(3)Thepersonorentitiestowhomthesubpoenaisdirected;and

(4)Theopposingpartyandcounsel,withthepurviewofDisciplinaryStandard4.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardSeptember 24, 1984, as amended November 15, 1985ADVISORY OPINION NO. 41

Client Confidentiality

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsof theOrganizationandGovernmentof theStateBarofGeorgiastart-ingwithRules andRegulations (219Ga. 873, as amended), the StateDisciplinaryBoard of theStateBar ofGeorgia, after a proper requestofsuch,rendereditsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Question Presented:

LawyerXhas receivedcashfees fromclients inexcessof$10,000several times in the past threeyears.All of these feeswere for repre-sentationincriminalmatters.Eachtime,Xhasdepositedthemoneyineither his operating account or escrowaccount,when appropriate, andfiledaCurrencyTransactionReport,asrequiredby31C.F.R.§103.22.Subsequently,Xreceivedatelephoneinquiryfromarevenueagentwiththe Georgia Department of Revenue inquiring into the source of thefundsrecordedonthecurrencytransactionreport.LawyerXrefusedtodivulgethenamesofhisclients.

TheStateofGeorgia thenissuedaNotice toProduce,requiringpro-duction of “...all books, records, papers and/or documents pertaining to[Lawyer X’s personal Corporate Georgia Income Tax] For the periodsindicated [1981-1983].”TheNotice toProduce did not name a specificpersonasaclientforaninvestigation,butLawyerXwasverballyadvisedbytherevenueagentthatinfact,thepurposeofthisNoticetoProducewastodiscover,atrandom,thenamesoftheclient,andtoauditthelawyer.

(1)WillLawyerXviolatetheconfidencesandsecretsprovisionoftheCodeofEthicsbycomplyingwiththeNoticetoProduceinrevealingtheidentityoftheclientinthosetransactionsinexcessof$10,000?

(2)Additionally,willLawyerXviolatetheconfidencesandsecretsprovisionoftheCodeofEthicsbycomplyingwiththeNoticetoProduceinrevealingtheidentityofallofhisclientsandtheamountoffeespaid,whetherbycase,check,oranyamountaboveorlessthan$10,000?

Opinion:

TheapplicableethicalrulesareCanon4;EC’s4-1through4-6;andStandard28.


It shouldbe firstnoted that thequestionsaddressed in thisopinionpertain only to a generalNotice to Produce seeking information fromanattorney’sfile.Thedollaramountinvolvedinthehypotheticalisnotcontrolling;ratheritisthefactthattheNoticetoProduceisnotaddressedtoaparticularclientorclientsthatisofconcerntotheBoard.

Canon 4 states: “A lawyer should preserve the confidences andsecretsofaclient.”AsEC4-1explains,theobservanceofthelawyer’sethicalobligationtoholdinviolateconfidencesandsecretsofhisclientencourageslaymentoseeklegalassistanceandfacilitatesfulldevelop-mentofthefactsessentialtoproperrepresentationoftheclient.EC4-5directsthatalawyershouldnotusesecretsacquiredinthecourseoftherepresentationofaclienttothedisadvantageoftheclient.Thisobliga-tion continues even after the termination of the lawyer’s employment.(EC4-6)

TheseprinciplesareincorporatedintheDirectorRulesandDisciplinaryStandards.DR4-101andStandard28prohibitalawyerfromrevealingtheconfidencesandsecretsofaclient.AviolationofthisStandardispunish-able by disbarment. A lawyermay reveal confidences and secrets of aclientonly (1) if theclientsconsentsafter fulldisclosure; (2)where theconfidencesorsecretsarepermittedtobedisclosedundertheDisciplinaryRulesor requiredby lawor court order; (3)where the client intends tocommitacrimeandinformationisnecessarytopreventthecrime;or(4)where it is necessary for the lawyer to establish and collect his fee, ordefendhimselfagainsttheaccusationofwrongfulconduct.

Theethicalanddisciplinaryrulesdistinguishbetween“confidences”and“secrets.”Theformerisinformationprotectedbytheattorney/clientprivilegeasdeterminedbyapplicablelaw,andismorelimitedthantheethicalobligationofthelawyertoguardthesecretsofhisclient.Asecret,ontheotherhand,refersto“otherinformationgainedintheprofessionalrelationshipthattheclienthasrequestedtobeheldinviolateorthedis-closureofwhichcouldbeembarrassingorwouldlikelybedetrimentaltotheclient.”(emphasissupplied)[DR4-101(a)andStandard28(c)].

It is theopinionof theStateDisciplinaryBoard that in respondingto a generalNotice to Produce LawyerXmust not voluntarily revealthename/identityofhisclients to theGeorgiaDepartmentofRevenueunlessheobtainstheconsentoftheclientorclientsaffectedafterafulldisclosure.[Standard28(b)(1)]Further,LawyerXmustresistdisclosureuntilacourtordersdisclosure[Standard28(b)(2)]andthereafterhemaypursueallreasonableavenuesofappeal.

ThisdecisionfindssupportintheopinionsofatleastfourotherBarAssociations which have issued opinions concerning a similar, if notidentical, factual situation. Briefly stated, these opinions hold that anattorneymust resist disclosure of the name/identity of his client. TheDistrictofColumbia,PhiladelphiaandBirminghamOpinionsgofurtherand require an attorney to utilize all appellate avenues beforemakingdisclosure.

Opinion No. 124 of the Committee on Legal Ethics the District ofColumbiaBarAssociation(March22,1983);OpinionNo.81-95oftheProfessionalGuidanceCommittee of thePhiladelphiaBarAssociation(undated); Opinion of Professional Ethics of the Birmingham BarAssociation(unnumbered)(January9,1981);andInformalOpinionNo.81-3 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Connecticut BarAssociation(October9,1980).


Attorney’s Disclosure of Client’s Possible Intent to Commit Suicide

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsfor the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia(219Ga.asamended) theStateDisciplinaryBoardof theStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproper interpretationof theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Question Presented:

Attorney (A) represents client (C),who is facing amultiple felonyindictment and substantial possibility of conviction thereon. C hassought advice fromA concerningmatters onewould normally expecttobeconsultedaboutbyaterminallyillpersontryingtoputhisaffairsinorderpriortodeath.AlthoughChasneverdirectlysostatedtoA,byhisactionsandconduct,ChasledAtobelievethatCintendstocommitsuicidepriortohiscriminaltrial.

Ahas inquiredwhetherInformalOpinionNo.83-1500of theABAStanding Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (June24, 1983),which authorized a lawyer to disclose to other persons thedefinitethreatofhisclienttotakehisownlifewouldapplytoasituationwheretheclienthasnotdefinitelyexpressedsuchanintention,but,byhis actions, hasgivenhis attorney reason tobelieve that he intends totakehisownlife.

Opinion:

ForthesamereasonssetforthinABAInformalOpinionNo.83-1500(A copyofwhich is attachedhereto and incorporatedherein by refer-ence), the Board is of the opinion that when an attorney reasonablybelieves his client is contemplating suicide, he should be permitted todisclosesuchinformationasalastresortinalife-or-deathsituationwhenthelawyer’seffortstocounseltheclienthaveapparentlyfailed.

Standing Committee on Ethicsand Professional Responsibility

InformalOp.83-1500 June24,1983DisclosureofClient’sIntenttoCommitSuicide

Thisinquiryinvolvesthesituationinwhichaclientwhohasretainedalawyertodraftherwillconfidestothelawyerthatsheintendstotakeher own life. The client also disclosed that she has been hospitalizedformentalexhaustiononat leastoneoccasionafteraprevioussuicideattempt.Neithersuicidenorattemptedsuicideisacrimeinthejurisdic-tion. The lawyer asks whether the ABAModel Code of ProfessionalResponsibilityprohibitsthelawyerfromdisclosingtoathirdpersontheintentionofhisclienttotakeherownlife.

DR4-101(B)oftheABAModelCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprohibits a lawyer from revealing a confidence or secret of his client.AnexceptionisprovidedinDR4-101(C)(3),whichpermitsalawyertorevealtheintentionofhisclienttocommitacrimeandtheinformationnecessarytopreventthecrime.Aliteralreadingof“crime”inthisprovi-sionrenderstheexceptioninapplicableintheinquiringlawyer’sjurisdic-tion.ThesameconclusionwouldbereachedunderproposedModelRule1.6(b)(1),whichprovidesthatalawyermayrevealinformationrelatingtorepresentationofaclienttotheextentthelawyerreasonablybelievesnecessarytopreventtheclientfromcommittingacriminalactthelawyerbelieveslikelytoresultinimminentdeathorsubstantialbodilyharm.

Ethicscommitteesintwostateshavedealtwithhisproblem.InOpinion486(1978), theCommitteeonProfessionalEthicsof theNewYorkStateBar Association concluded that while suicide had been decriminalizedinNewYork andDR 4-101(C)(3) did not literally apply, the overridingsocial concern for thepreservationofhuman lifepermitted the lawyer todisclose the information. The NewYork committee pointed out that thedecriminalizationofsuicideinthestatewasnotintendedtoeffectanybasicchangeinunderlyingcommonlawandstatutoryprovisionsreflectingdeepconcern for thepreservationof human life and thepreventionof suicide.Accordingly,thecommitteeanalyzedanannouncedintentiontocommitsui-cideinthesamemannerasproposedcriminalconductunderDR4-101(C)(3).AddressingthesameissueinOpinion79-61(1979),theCommitteeonProfessionalEthicsof theMassachusettsBarAssociationdetermined thatalthoughneithersuicidenorattemptedsuicideisinitselfpunishableunderthecriminallawofMassachusetts,bothhaveinotherrespectsbeendeemedtobemaluminseandtreatedasunlawfulandcriminal.

Thatcommitteecited theNewYorkStateBarAssociationOpinion486andreachedthesameconclusion.

WebelievethatinlightofthefollowinglanguageofEC7-12relat-ingtoproperconduct indealingwiththeclientwithadisability, theseCommitteesreachedtheproperconclusion:

Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders himincapable ofmaking a considered judgment on his own behalf,casts additional responsibilities on his lawyer... If the disabilityofaclient,inthelackofalegalrepresentativecompelthelawyertomake decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider allcircumstancesthenprevailingandactwithcaretosafeguardandadvancetheinterestofhisclient....

ThisconceptisalsorecognizedintheABAproposedModelRulesofProfessionalConduct:

A lawyermayseek theappointmentofaguardianor takeotherprotective actionwith respect to a client, onlywhen the lawyerreasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in theclient’sowninterest.


Theinquirermayjustifiablyconcludethathisclientisunabletomakeaconsideredjudgmentonthisultimatelifeordeathquestionandshouldbepermittedtodisclosetheinformationasalastresortwhenthelawyer’seffortstocounseltheclienthaveapparentlyfailed.Thisinterpretationislimitedtothecircumstanceofthisparticularopinionrequestandshouldnotbereliedupontopermit thedisclosureofanyother informationinanyothersituation.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardMarch 15, 1985, as amended November 15, 1985ADVISORY OPINION NO. 45

Charging Interest on Clients’ Overdue Bills



1.Aclientisbilledforservicerenderedandfailstopayafterthirty(30)dayshaveelapsed.Isitpermissibletonotifytheclient,byletter,thatunlesshisaccountispaidinfull,interestwillbechargedonthenextbillontheunpaidbalance?

2. A client signs a fee contract with an attorney providing for thechargingof interestonanyunpaidbalance.Is itpermissiblefor theattorneytochargeinterest?

3.Anattorneynotifieshisorherclientbyletterthatinterestwillbechargedunlesstheiraccountsarepaidinfull.Iftheconductdescribedinquestion1isimpermissible,cantheattorneyrectifythesituationbyrebillingtheclientswithanyinterestchargeddeducted,orifinterestwaspaidreturned?

Opinion:

TheStateDisciplinaryBoardisoftheopinionthatanattorneymayethicallyunilaterallychargeinterestonclient’soverduebills.Alawyermayethicallydosoprovidedthatheorshecomplieswithallapplicablelaw,specificallyO.C.G.A.§7-4-16,theFederalTruthinLendingandFairCreditBillingActs contained inTitle I of theConsumerCreditProtectionActasamended(15USC1601etseq.)andEC2-19,whichstates:

Assoonasfeasibleafteralawyerhasbeenemployed,itisdesir-ablethathereachaclearagreementwithhisclientastothebasisofthefeechargestobemade.Suchacoursewillnotonlypreventlater misunderstanding but will also work for good relationsbetweenthelawyerandtheclient.Itisusuallybeneficialtoreducetowritingtheunderstandingofthepartiesregardingthefee,par-ticularlywhen it iscontingent.A lawyershouldbemindful thatmanypersonswhodesire toemployhimmayhavehad littleornoexperiencewithfeechargesoflawyers,andforthisreasonheshouldexplainfullytosuchpersonsthereasonsfortheparticularfeearrangementheproposes.

TheBoardisoftheopinionthatanattorneycancomplywithEC2-19 and unilaterally charge interestwithout a prior specific agree-ment with a client if notice is given to the client in advance thatinterestwill be charged on fee billswhich become delinquent afterastatedperiodoftime,butnotlessthan30days.TheBoardrecom-mendsthatnoticebeprovidedonthebillatthetimeitissentandthatthenoticebeconspicuousandprintedintypesizenosmallerthanthelargesttypesizeusedinthebodyofthebill.Thenoticemustspecifytheamountofinteresttobechargedandtheperiodoftimeafterwhichitwillbeimposed.

Attorneys should be aware that additional notice and disclosurerequirementsmaybeimposedbylaw,includingthespecificrequirementsofO.C.G.A.§7-4-16and theFederalTruth inLendingandFairCreditBillingActs,supra.Thisopinionrelatesonly to those instanceswhereachargeofinterestisimposedonaclient’soverduebillandhasnoapplica-bilitytotheextensionofcreditortheobtainingofsecuritybyanattorney.

Therefore,thequestionspresentedareansweredasfollows:

1. Yes. An attorney may charge his clients interest provided theattorneycomplieswithEC2-19andallapplicable law,specifically

O.C.G.A.§7-4-16andtheFederalTruthinLendingandFairCreditBillingActs,supra.

2.Seetheanswertoquestion1.

3.Due to theBoard’s answer toquestion1, thisquestionneednotbeaddressed.

State Bar of GeorgiaState Disciplinary BoardMarch 15, 1985ADVISORY OPINION NO. 46

Third Party Advancing or Reimbursing an Insured (Policyholder) for the Latter’s Purchase of Optional PIP Coverage


Factual Background:

Attorney (A) represents Client (C) whose spouse was struck andkilled by a van as he crossed the street. The deceased spouse had noautomobile insurance,while thevandriverwas insuredandhispolicyprovidedonlybasicPIPbenefits.Thesebasicbenefits extended to thedeceased’sfamilyandwerepaidoutbythedriver’sinsurance.

Eventually, a settlement of the liability claim was reached. Aapproachedtheattorney(X)whorepresentedthedriver(Y)andinquiredastowhetherornothisclientwouldbewillingtoapplyforandtenderthepremiumforoptionalPIPcoverageavailableunderformerO.C.G.A.§ 33-34-5(B) (Ga. Code Ann. § 56-34046). X consulted with Y andadvised thatYwouldbewilling todosobutonlyoncondition thatCadvanceYtheamountfortheadditionalpremiumandpayYforhistimeinmakingtheapplicationfortheoptionalcoverage.

According toa recentdecisionby theGeorgiaCourtofAppeals inBaileyv.GeorgiaMutualIns.Co.,168Ga.App.706,309S.E.2d870(1983),“ademandforincreasedcoveragebythepolicyholderisneces-sarybeforethosewhowouldbeincidentalorthird-partybeneficiariesasotherinsuredscanseekoptionalbenefits.”Thus,Candthechildofthedeceasedpedestrian,whowasnotadirectpolicyholder,wouldnothavelegalstandingtoapplyforandobtainthoseoptionalbenefitsaccordingtotheCourtofAppeals’ruling.


1.MayCorAadvance toY thepremiumamount for theoptionalPIPcoverage?

2.MayAorCcompensateYforhistimeinapplyingforandobtain-ingthiscoverage?

3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results,wouldCbebarred fromcompensatingY forhis timeandeffort inpursuingtheclaimincourt, inadditiontowitnessandmileagefeesallowedbystatute?

Opinion:

TheethicalrulespresentlyapplicabletothisinquiryareEC5-8,EC7-28,DR5-103(B),DR7-109(C),andStandards32and58.

TheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiaanswersthequestionspresentedasfollows:

1. C orAmay ethically advance toY the premium amount ofoptional PIP coverage as long as A’s conduct is otherwise inaccordance with the requirements of Standard 32. Standard 32provides:

While presenting a client in connection with contemplated orpendinglitigation,alawyershallnotadvanceorguaranteefinan-cial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advanceor guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs,expensesofinvestigation,expensesofmedicalexaminations,andcosts of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the clientremains ultimately liable for such expenses.A violation of thisstandardmaybepunishedbyapublicreprimand.


2.AorCmayethicallycompensateYforhistimeinapplyingforandobtainingtheoptionalPIPcoverage,aslongasA’sconductisotherwiseinaccordancewiththerequirementsofStandard32citedabove.

3.Iftheinsurerrefusestopaythebenefitsandlitigationresults,CisnotethicallybarredfromcompensatingYforhistimeandeffortinpursuingtheclaimincourt,providedthattherequirementsofStandard58areobserved.Standard58provides:

Alawyershallnotpay,offertopay,oracquiesceinthepaymentofcompensationtoawitnesscontingentuponthecontentofhistestimonyortheoutcomeofthecase.Butalawyermayadvance,guarantee,oracquiesceinthepaymentof:

(a)expensesreasonablyincurredbyawitnessinattendingortestifying;

(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss oftimeinattendingortestifying;

(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of anexpertwitness.

Aviolationofthisstandardmaybepunishedbydisbarment.


Contingency Fees to Collect Past Due Alimony and/or Child Support


Question Presented:

Isitethicaltochargeacontingentfeetocollectpastduealimonyand/orchildsupportpayments?

Opinion:

TheethicalrulespresentlyapplicabletothisinquiryareEC2-23,EC2-20,DR2-106,EC5-7,DR5-103andDisciplinaryStandard31.

Thequestionpresented for resolutionby thisBoard is thequestionspecificallyleftunansweredinFormalAdvisoryOpinion36,whichheldthatcontingentfeearrangementsindivorcecasesandincasestocollectfuturechildsupportareagainstpublicpolicyandarethereforeimproper.

ItistheopinionoftheBoardthatitisethicallypermissibleforalawyerto charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child supportfor the following reasons: Collection of these amounts occurs after thedivorce,i.e.itisapost-judgmentproceeding;asuitforexecutionofajudg-mentonsucharrearagesisneithera“domesticrelations”nora“divorce”case;thehumanrelationshipsinvolvedandtheuniquecharacterofdomes-ticrelationsproceedingswhichgenerallyprohibitcontingentfeesarenotpresentanddonotapplyinthesecases;and,mostimportantly,inmanycir-cumstances,acontingentfeearrangementmaybetheonlymeansbywhichthesevitallegalrightscanbeenforced.Canon2,EC2-20andEC5-7.

Although it isethicallyproper tochargeacontingent fee tocollectpastduealimonyorchildsupport,thelawyershouldstrivetomeetthefollowingcriteria:

1.Acontingentfeearrangementmustbetheonlypracticalmeansbywhichonehavingaclaimforpastduealimonyorchildsupportcaneconomicallyafford,finance,andobtaintheservicesofacompetentlawyertoprosecutetheclaim(EC’s2-20and5-7);

2.Thecontingentfeemustbereasonable.GuidelinesfordeterminingthereasonablenessofafeearesetforthinDR2-106.

DR2-106-FeesforLegalServices.

(A)Alawyershallnotenterintoanagreementfor,charge,orcol-lectanillegalorclearlyexcessivefee.

(B)Afeeisclearlyexcessivewhen,afterareviewofthefacts,a

lawyerofordinaryprudencewouldbeleftwithadefiniteandfirmconvictionthatthefeeisinexcessofareasonablefee.Factorstobeconsideredasguidesindeterminingthereasonablenessofafeeincludethefollowing:

(1)thetimeandlaborrequired,thenoveltyanddifficultyofthequestionsinvolved,andtheskillrequisitetoperformthelegalserviceproperly;

(2)The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the accep-tance of the particular employment will preclude otheremploymentbythelawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similarlegalservices;

(4)theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;

(5) the time limitations imposedby theclientorby thecir-cumstances;

(6)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, orlawyersperformingtheservices;

(8)whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.

(C)Alawyershallnotenterintoanarrangementfor,charge,orcol-lectacontingentfeeforrepresentingadefendantinacriminalcase.

3.Any court-awarded feesmust be credited against the contingentfee.EC2-23.

Thesecriteriashouldbecarefullyfollowed,particularlyincasesseek-ingtocollectpastduechildsupport.

This decision finds support in the opinions of at least eleven otherBarAssociations.Opinion1982-4,LegalEthicsCommitteeof theDallasBar Association (11/22/82); Opinion 80-34, Committee on Ethics of theMaryland State Bar Association, Inc. (undated); Opinion CI-828 andCI-1050U,CommitteeonProfessionalandJudicialEthicsoftheStateBarof Michigan (9/2/82) (10/30/84); Opinion 88, Ethics Committee of theMississippi State Bar (9/23/83); Opinion 405, approved by the VirginiaState Bar Council (9/8/83); Opinion 82-1, Legal Ethics Committee oftheWest Virginia State Bar (6/18/82); Opinion 660, New York CountyLawyers’AssociationCommitteeonProfessionalEthics (5/4/84);FormalEthicsOpinionNo.82-F-26,EthicsCommitteeoftheBoardofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheSupremeCourtofTennessee(2/22/82);Opinion1983-4/2,NewHampshireBarAssociationEthicsCommittee(9/20/83);Opinion67,ColoradoBarAssociationEthicsCommittee(undated).


Expert Witness Consulting Services


Facts:

Aclientasksanattorneytoinvestigateapossiblemedicalmalpracticeclaim.AnappropriateexpertislocatedandtheattorneyadvisestheclientthattheexpertrequiresanhourlyfeeofXdollarsperhourtoreviewtherecordsandthatthefirsthourmustbepaidinadvance.

The client tells the attorney that the client cannot pay the expert’sfee and askswhether there are any possible alternatives. The attorneyisawareofonealternativewhereby theclientcontractswithanexpertwitnessconsultingservicetolocatetheservicesofanappropriatemedi-calexperttoreviewtherecordstodeterminewhetheracauseofactionexists. If theexpertdetermines thatnocauseofactionexists, then theclientwouldbesoadvisedandnofeewouldbeowed.If,ontheotherhand, there appears to be a cause of action, the clientwould agree tocompensate the consulting service on a contingent fee basis from anyrecoverygenerated.


Theconsultingservicewouldcontractdirectlywiththeclient,ratherthantheattorney,andwouldagreetopaytheexpertonanhourlybasisfortimespentbytheexpertincasepreparation,includingresearch,depo-sitionsandtrial.Theexpertisnotanemployeeofthisorganization,how-ever,andwouldworkdirectlywiththeattorneyontheclient’sbehalf.

Uponsuccessfulcompletionofthecase,theconsultingservicewouldreceiveapproximately7%of the recoveryplus reimbursement for anyfeespaidtotheexpertbytheserviceaccordingtotheratespecifiedinthecontract.Theattorneywouldalsosignthecontracttoguaranteepay-mentoftheconsultingserviceonbehalfoftheclientfromtheproceedsintheattorney’spossession.Ifnorecoveryisobtained,theclientwouldonlyberequiredbythecontracttoreimbursetheserviceforanyhourlyfeespaidtotheexpert.

Question Presented:

DoestheproposeduseofsuchanexpertwitnessconsultingserviceviolateBarRules?

Opinion:

TheBoardfirstrecognizestheexistenceofseveralsuchservicesandthatforsomeclients,anarrangementsimilartothatproposedmaybetheonlymeansavailabletoretaintheservicesofanexperttopursueacauseofaction.Sincethereissubstantialuncertaintyabouttheexistenceofacause of action until an appropriate expert offers a favorable opinion,a lawyer may be unwilling or unable to assume the risk of person-allyadvancing thenecessaryexpenses to theclient,particularlywhereit appears likely that the client will not reimburse the attorney if theexpert’sinvestigationrevealsthatthereisnocauseofaction.

Standard58ofBarRule4-102statesasfollows:

“Alawyershallnotpay,offertopay,oracquiesceinthepaymentofcompensationtoawitnesscontingentuponthecontentofhistestimonyortheoutcomeofthecase.Butalawyermayadvance,guarantee,oracquiesceinthepaymentof:

(a)expensesreasonablyincurredbyawitnessinattendingortestifying;

(b)reasonablecompensationtoawitnessforhislossoftimeinattendingortestifying;

(c)areasonablefeefortheprofessionalservicesofanexpertwitness.

Aviolationofthisstandardmaybepunishedbydisbarment.”

Under the proposed arrangement, the lawyer would acquiesce in thepaymentofacontingentfeetotheorganizationthatlocatestheexpertwit-ness,butonlyinthepaymentofafixedfeetotheexpert.Providedthefeepaidtotheexpertbytheconsultingserviceisreasonable,Standard58doesnotappear tobeviolated. It isvery important,however, that theattorneydeterminethattheexperthasabsolutelynoconnectionwiththeconsultingservice,sincethereasonfortheprohibitiononcontingencycompensationtowitnessesistopromotetruthfultestimonyuncoloredbyanfinancialinterestofthewitnessintheproceedings.SeePersonv.AssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYork,554F.2d534(2ndCir.),cert.den.,434U.S.924(1977).Suchimpermissibleinterestscouldrangefromsignificantevidenceofinterestbytheparticularexpertinfuturerepeatedreferralsbytheconsult-ingserviceinexchangeforademonstratedwillingnesstoprovidefavorableopinions,tosometypeoffinancialinterestoftheexpertintheserviceasadirector,officer,shareholderorsomeotherformofprofit-sharing.Thelaw-yeralsocannotpermittheconsultingserviceoritsemployeestoprovideanytestimonyorevidenceeitherdirectlyorindirectlythroughsubstantialtechni-calassistancetotheexpertwhichmightsomehowfundamentallyaffecttheexpert’sopinionandtransformhimintoamere“mouthpiece”fortheservice.Insummary,theexpertandhisopinionmustbecompletelyneutral,detachedandindependentfromtheconsultingservice.

Standard 26 prohibits an attorney from aiding a non-lawyer in theunauthorized practice of law. In this regard, the lawyer should ensurethatthecontractwiththeconsultingservicedoesnotimpairthelawyer’sstrategicandtacticalresponsibilitytodecidewhichwitnessestocallandwhatevidenceandtestimonytopresentonbehalfoftheclient.Solongas theparticipationof theconsultingservice in thecase isconfined tolocatinganappropriateexpertandassumingaportionoftheriskofpros-ecutingthecauseofaction,itwouldnotappearthatthelawyerhasaidedtheconsultingserviceintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.

Finally,thecontractinquestionprovidesforthepaymentofaportionofanyproceedsrecoveredbythelawyertotheconsultingservicewhich

raisestheissueoffeesplittingwithalayorganization.Withcertaininap-plicable exceptions,Standard26prohibits a lawyer fromsharing legalfeeswithanon-lawyer.Inthiscase,however,thecontractdoesnotsplitattorney feeswith the organization since it is the client that contractswiththeorganizationtopayaspecificshareoftheclient’srecoverytotheorganization inexchange for its services.Theattorney isobligatedonly toguarantee theclient’s reimbursementof expenses advancedbytheorganizationand,whereappropriate, thepaymentof theconsultingservice’sshareofanyrecovery.Feeschargedbytheattorney,however,shouldbecomputedandpaidwithout reductionby the feepaid to theconsulting service.Otherwise, thecontractbecomesamere subterfugefor fee splittingbetween theattorneyanda layorganization.Providedtheattorneyinsurestheclientisfullyadvisedoftheseconsequencesofthecontractandtheclientfreelyagreestobesobound,thereappearstobenofeesplittinginvolvedintheproposedarrangement.

Thisopinionfindssupportinsimilaropinionsissuedbythefollowingorganizations:

Informal Opinion 1375 of the ABA Committee on Ethics andProfessionalResponsibility(1976);

OpinionNos.55and56oftheCommitteeonLegalEthicsoftheDistrictofColumbiaBar(1978);

Formal Opinion 1984-79 of the California State Bar StandingCommitteeonProfessionalResponsibilityandConduct(1984).


Lawyer’s Use of a Lay Collection Agency to Collect Overdue Accounts for Legal Services

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule4-223oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia(219Ga.873,asamended),theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,afteraproperrequestforsuch,rendersitsopinionconcerningtheproperinterpretationofthecodeofProfessionalResponsibilityoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Facts:

LawyerLhasrepresentedanumberofclientswhosecaseshavebeencompleted.Thefeesinthesecaseshavenotbeenfullypaid.LawyerLhasonamonthlybasissubmittedbillstotheclientsrequestingpayment.Afterthirty(30)days,LawyerLhassentaletterdemandingthatimmedi-atepaymentbemadeorthatarrangementsforweeklypaymentsbemade.ThereisnoefforttopayinfullortomakepaymentsbyClientC.

Whentheaccountissixty(60)daysold,LawyerLdesirestoturntheunpaidbillofClientCovertoacommercialcollectionagencyforcollec-tionoftheaccountonacontingencyfeebasis.Thecommercialcollectionagencywillbecallingtheclientanddemandingpaymentandfailingvolun-tarypayment,willemployGeorgiacounselattheirexpensestofilealaw-suittocollecttheaccount.Thefeeis45%foraccountslessthanorequalto120daysdelinquentand50%foraccountsover120daysdelinquent.

Question Presented:

MayLawyerLethicallyretainthecollectionagencyonthetermsstated?

Opinion:

TheaspirationalguidanceofEC2-23suggeststhat“[a]lawyershouldbe zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clientsandshouldattempttoresolveamicablyanydifferencesonthesubject.”Referral to a collection agency, however,much like filing suit againstone’sclient, isameasureof last resortandshouldbeundertakenonlyafterthelawyerissurethatallreasonablealternativeshavebeenpursued,includinganofferbythelawyertovoluntarilysubmitthemattertotheFee Arbitration Program sponsored by the State Bar. See Part IV—ArbitrationofFeeDisputes—RulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernment of theStateBar ofGeorgia.Unfortunately, the goodfaith efforts of an attorney are not always successful, and, this Boardrecognizes that on occasion, a client will absolutely refuse to pay anattorney’s bill despite all reasonable attempts at compromise. Undersuchcircumstances,itswouldappeartobeunfairtodepriveanattorneyofalawfulmeansavailabletootherprofessionsandbusinessesthroughwhichcompensationproperlyearnedcanbecollected.WhiletheBoardisoftheopinionthattheproposedarrangementisethicallypermissible,discussionofcertainadditionalconsiderationsisrequired.


Since a client’s non-payment often stems from a belief that thelawyer’sbill isexcessive,a lawyershould first,before referral, satisfyhimselfthattheunpaidbillisreasonable.Inthisregard,theguidelinesofDR2-106aremostinstructiveandshouldbecarefullyconsideredbythelawyer.ItshouldalsobepointedoutthatalthoughitappearsfromthesefactsthatLawyerLhasmadeareasonableattempttocollecttheseover-duefeesthroughhispersonaleffortsbeforereferral,anarbitrarydeadlineof60dayspastduemaynot, inallcasesbeappropriate.Inreachingadecisionofwhetherornotreferralisappropriate,alawyershouldindi-viduallyconsidereachcaseandnotapplyanarbitrarydeadlinefor thesakeofadministrativeefficiency.Whereitisclear,however,theclient’srefusalisduetowillfulindifferenceandnottoaninabilitytopayortocircumstancesbeyondtheclient’scontrol,andthelawyerissatisfiedthatthenon-paymentconstitutes,inessence,afraudorgrossimpositionbytheclient,thenreferraltoareputablecollectionagencyisproper.

WhileStandard28(b)(4)ofBarRule4-102permitsalawyertoreveal“confidencesandsecretsnecessarytoestablishorcollecthisfee”,alaw-yer shouldexercise thisoptionwithconsiderablecaution.Specifically,Lawyer L should reveal to the collection agency only such minimalbackgroundinformationabouttheclientasisabsolutelynecessaryfortheagencytoproperlyperformitsjob.Additionally,justaswithanyofhisemployees, the lawyerneeds toexercisereasonablecare toensure thatthe agency employees disclose only such client confidences or secretsasarepermittedunderStandard28sinceafailureinthisregardsubjectsthelawyertopotentialdisbarmentunderStandard29ofBarRule4-102.

Finally,briefclarificationofapossibleproblemwithfeesplittingisnecessary.Withcertaininapplicableexceptions,Standard26prohibitsalawyerfromsharinglegalfeeswithanon-lawyer.WhilethefeessoughttobecollectedonbehalfofLawyerLbythecollectionagencyrepresentlegalfeesearnedbythelawyer, thefeeshavealreadybeencompletelyearnedwhenreferredandthecollectionagencyhasnotparticipatedintheactualearningofthefeesinviolationoftheprohibitionagainstalawyeraidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.SeeStandard24.Accordingly,theBoardisoftheopinionthatunderthegivenfacts,thefeesreferredtothecollectionagencyaremoreinthenatureofaccountsreceivable,thesplittingofwhichStandard26isnotintendedtoprevent.

TheBoardfindssupportforitsconclusionthatprovidedtheforegoingconsiderationsaresatisfied,theconductinquestionisethicallyproperinsimilaropinionsissuedbythefollowingjurisdictions:

Opinion82-24of theCommitteeonEthicsof theMarylandBarAssociation(1982);

Opinion82-2oftheEthicsCommitteeoftheStateBarofArizona(1982);Opinion81-3oftheEthicsCommitteeoftheFloridaBar(1981);

OpinionNo.225oftheOregonStateBar(1972);

OpinionNo.20oftheColoradoBarAssociation(1961).

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON DECEMBER 17, 1987FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-1

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct30,pleaseseeRule1.7(a)and(b).

For references to Standard of Conduct 45(e), please see Rule1.2(d)andComment6ofRule1.2.

ThisopinionreliesonStandardsofConduct35-38thatbearuponmattersdirectlyaddressedbyRules1.7,and1.10.

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct39,pleaseseeRule1.8(g).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct40,pleaseseeRule1.8(f).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct41,pleaseseeRule5.4(c).

ThisopinionreliesonEthicalConsideration8-8thatbearsuponmattersdirectlyaddressedbyRules1.7,9.5(b),andComment8ofRule6.1.

Lawyer Serving Simultaneously As State Legislator And Part-Time Solicitor

Correspondentrequestsguidanceastowhetherheorshemayserveasbothalegislatorandapart-timesolicitor.

The proposed dual employment may or may not be prohibited byArt.3,§2, ¦4oftheGeorgiaConstitution,asinterpretedbynumerousopinionsof theAttorneyGeneral.Wedonotaddressthis issue.If it isdeterminedinthefuturebyappropriateauthoritythatthelawsofGeorgiadonotpermitapart-timesolicitoralsotoserveasalegislator,thencon-tinuingtoserveinbothcapacitieswouldbeaviolationofStandard45(c):

“Inhisrepresentationofaclient,alawyershallnot...knowinglyengageinotherillegalconduct.”

Forpurposesofthisopinion,weaddressonlythepossibilitythatthestateddualemploymentcreatesaconflictofinterest.

Under theStandardsofConduct, impermissibleconflictsof interestaredefinedbytheirpotentialforadverselyaffectingtheindependentpro-fessionaljudgmentofanattorneyinhisorherrepresentationofaclient.ThefactsdonotcreateaconflictprohibitedbytheStandards.

First, the Standards of Conduct identify permissible conflicts ofinterestcreatedbyrepresentationofdifferinginterests.Standards35-41.Those provisions are concerned with inconsistent attorney-client rela-tionships, a concern premised upon the lawyer’s unique obligation ofzealous representation to each individual client.Here there is no suchinconsistentlegalemployment.Alegislatorisnotalegalrepresentative,butapoliticalone.

StandardNo.30 isconcernedseparatelywith theeffectof the law-yer’s self-interest upon representation of the client. The guidance ofStandardNo.30is:

Standard30.Exceptwiththewrittenconsentorwrittennoticetohisclientafterfulldisclosure,alawyershallnotacceptorcontinueemploymentiftheexerciseofhisprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfof his clientwill be or reasonablymay be affected by his ownfinancial,business,property,orpersonalinterests.

Aviolationofthisstandardmaybepunishedbydisbarment.

Thereisnothinginherentinthefunctionsofa legislatorwhichwillor reasonablymayaffect the independentprofessional judgmentof thesolicitor in his or her representation of the people of the State. Therearenofunctionsofalegislatorwhichwillorreasonablymaycreateanadverse“financial,business,property,orpersonalinterest.”

The functionsof legislatorsare topropose, study, andvoteon leg-islationand, indoing so, to serve thepublic interest.There is nothingin those functionswhichnecessarilywouldor reasonablymight affectthe independentprofessional judgmentofasolicitor inhisorher legalrepresentationofthepeopleoftheStatethroughtheenforcementofthelawsoftheState.

Thedual functionsof solicitorand legislatorareeasilydistinguish-ablefromthedualfunctionsofsolicitorandcriminaldefenseattorney,thesubjectofconcern inStateBarAdvisoryOpinionNo.44 (January18,1985).TheretheattorneysoughttoserveasthelegalrepresentativeofclientinterestsinoppositiontotheStatewhilemaintaininghisorherpositionasthelegalrepresentativeoftheState’sinterests.Thepotentialfor an adverse effect upon independent professional judgment in thatsituationisinherentinthedifferentfunctions.Georgia Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk,249Ga.543.

Althoughit isethicallyproperfora lawyer toservesimultaneouslyasastatelegislatorandapart-timesolicitor,yetagivencasemayposeconflictswhichtheattorneymustresolve.Solicitors,alongwithallotherattorneys,mustbeconstantlyonguardagainstinterestswhichwillorrea-sonablymayadverselyaffecttheirindependentprofessionaljudgment.Ifsuchinterestsariseinaparticularcase,solicitorsshouldwithdrawfromlegal representation. Consistent with Advisory Opinion No. 44, clientconsent isnotanavailablealternative towithdrawalwhentheclient isthepeopleoftheState.

Thisadvisoryopinionisnecessarilylimitedtotheethicalproprietyofthesolicitor’sconductasalegalrepresentative.Nevertheless,aspartofanattorney’sgeneralobligationtoassistinimprovingthelegalsystem,EthicalConsideration8-8advises:

EC8-8Lawyersoftenserveas legislatorsorasholdersofotherpublic offices.This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquelyqualifiedtomakesignificantcontributionstotheimprovementofthelegalsystem.Alawyerwhoisapublicofficer,whetherfullorparttime,shouldnotengageinactivitiesinwhichhispersonalorprofessional interests areor foreseeablymaybe inconflictwithhisofficialduties.(Emphasisadded.)


STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON AUGUST 23, 1989FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-2

TheadoptionoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductdoesnotrequireachangeinthisopinion,whichisbasedontheCodeof Judicial Conduct and Georgia law. However, the Code ofJudicialConduct andGeorgia lawmayhavebeen revised sincethisopinionwasissued.

Question Presented:

Ethical propriety of a part-time judge also serving as a criminaldefensecounsel.

Opinion:

The Supreme Court of Georgia approves, as amended, ProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.86-2requestinganAdvisoryOpinionastotheethicalproprietyofapart-timejudgeservinginajudicialcapacitywhilealsoservingasacriminaldefensecounsel.

Georgia lawauthorizespart-time Judges topractice law, subject tocertainrestrictions.OCGA§15-7-21providesthatpart-timeStateCourtJudgesmayengageintheprivatepracticeoflawinothercourts,butpro-hibitspracticeintheJudge’sowncourtorappearancesinanymatterastowhichtheJudgehasexercisedanyjurisdiction.OCGA§15-10-22(b)providesthatMagistrateswhoareattorneysmaypracticeinothercourts,butnotintheirowncourts,normaytheyappearinanymatterastowhichtheircourthasexercisedanyjurisdiction.

Inaddition,theCompliancesectionoftheCodeofJudicialConductstates:

A.Part-time Judges.Apart-time judge is a judgewho serves on acontinuingorperiodicbasis,butwhoispermittedbylawtodevotetimetosomeotherprofessionoroccupationandwhosecompensationforthatreasonislessthanthatofafull-timejudge.

Part-timejudges:.....

(2) should not practice law in the court onwhich they serve orinanycourtsubjecttotheappellatejurisdictionofthecourtsonwhichtheyserve,oractaslawyersinproceedingsinwhichtheyhaveservedasjudgesorinanyotherproceedingrelatedthereto.

Fromthis,itisclearthatboththestatutesandtheCanonsauthorizethepracticeoflawbypart-timeJudgesandspellouttherestrictionsonsuchpractice.Forthatreason,representationofadefendantinacriminalcasebyapart-timejudgecannotbesaidtobeperseinappropriateorunethical.

Atthesametime,Canon2admonishesthat:

Judgesshouldavoidimproprietyandtheappearanceofimpropri-etyinalltheiractivities.

For that reason, although such representation isnot in andof itselfinappropriate, the regular or exclusive representation of such defen-dantsbyaJudgewhoseresponsibilitiesincludetheissuanceofcriminalwarrantsor the trialofcriminalcasesmightdestroy theappearanceofimpartialityand integrityessential to theadministrationof justiceand,therefore,beinappropriate.

In reaching this conclusion,we have been aware of the holding inGa. Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, et al., 249 Ga. 543 (291SE2d524)(1982);however,inHudsonv.State,250Ga.479(299SE2d531) (1983), this Court declined to adopt a rule whichwould requiredisqualificationofanypart-timeJudgeservingasanattorneyinacrimi-naldefenseaction.AsJudgeGregorystatedatPage482oftheHudsonopinion:

Further,wedeclinetoadoptthebroadruleproposedbydefendantwhichwouldrequireautomaticdisqualificationofeveryattorneyinacriminaldefenseactionwheretheattorneyissimultaneouslyemployedaseitherastatecourtsolicitororprobatejudge.

Wethereforeconcludedthatpart-timeJudgesarenotprohibitedfromrepresenting defendants in criminal cases, subject to the reservationsspelledoutinthestatutesandtheCanonsasabovesetforth.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON DECEMBER 17, 1987FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-3

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct35,pleaseseeRule1.7(a).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct36,pleaseseeRules1.7(a)and2.2(a).


Ethical Propriety Of County Attorneys Representing Criminal Defendants.

There is no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of countyattorneys from the representation of criminal defendants, unlessthedefendant ischargedwithaviolationofacountyordinance.Anyconflictofinterestraisedbyacountyattorney’srepresenta-tion of clients other than the county should be analyzed in thesamefashionasanyotherconflictarisingfromtherepresentationof differing or potentially differing interests. County attorneysmustbeespeciallysensitive to thepossibilityofconflictcreatedbytheirrole,ifany,asprosecutor.

Correspondent requestsguidanceas towhether countyattorneysortheirpartnersorassociatesmayrepresentcriminaldefendants.

Theprimary issue ispotential conflictof interest.Thepositionofcountyattorneyobviouslycreatesalawyer-clientrelationshipbetweenthe attorney and the county governmental unit. The county attorneyisnotcalleduponbyelectionoroathofofficetoenforcethelawsofthe State. The county attorney is, however, authorized to prosecuteviolationsof countyordinancesonbehalfof the county.Whenheorsheisactinginsuchacapacitythedutytothecountyissimilartothatofasolicitortothestate.BasedonthereasoningofProposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.86-2,itwouldbeethicallyimproperforacountyattorneytorepresentacriminaldefendantchargedwithaviolationofacountyordinance.

Moregenerally,thecountyattorney’sobligationiszealousrepresen-tationofthebestinterestsofhisorherclient.Anyconflictofinterestcre-atedbyacountyattorney’srepresentationofclientsotherthanthecountyshouldbeanalyzedlikeanyotherconflictarisingfromtherepresentationofdifferingorpotentiallydifferinginterests.Thereis,therefore,nobasisforaper seethicaldisqualificationofacountyattorneyorpartnersorassociatesfromtherepresentationofcriminaldefendants.Inthosespe-cificsituationsinwhichsuchrepresentationwouldviolateStandardsNo.35or 36, the representation is obviouslyprohibited.When representa-tionisprohibitedbyStandardNo.35orStandardNo.36,StandardNo.38,asamended,wouldimputethedisqualificationoftheattorneytoallmembersofthefirm.

While no per se disqualification bars county attorneys unless thedefendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance, a givencountyattorneymayneverthelessbeethicallydisqualifiedfromtherep-resentationofcriminaldefendantsinthecounty.Legalrepresentationofcountyprosecutionorlawenforcementagenciesmayaffectadverselytheattorney’sindependentprofessionaljudgment.Allcountyattorneysneedtobesensitivetothepossibilityofsuchpotentialconflict.

Thisadvisoryopinion isnecessarily limited to theethicalproprietyof theconduct inquestion.Weoffernoopiniononeither theconstitu-tional issues of ineffective assistance of counsel or statutory issues ofdisqualification.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON DECEMBER 17, 1987FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-4

ThisopinionreliesonbothDirectoryRulesandStandardsofConductthatbearuponmattersaddressedbyRule4.2.

Ethical Propriety of the Plaintiff’s Attorney in a Personal Injury Case Writing a Letter to the Insured Defendant which may Contain Legal Advice.

It is ethically improper for the plaintiff’s attorney in a personalinjurycase towritea letter to the insureddefendantwhichcon-tainslegaladvice.Theplaintiff’slawyercanproperlywritealettertotheattorneyfortheinsuredandtheinsurermakinganofferofsettlement.Thelettermayproperlyrequestthelawyertoprovide


thisinformationtotheinsuredaswellastheinsurer.Iftheplain-tiff’s lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured’sinsurer,heorshemayproperlywritetheinsuredrequestingthisinformation. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to arequestforthenecessaryinformation.Theplaintiff’sattorneymaynotrenderlegaladvicetotheinsured.

Itisethicallyimproperfortheplaintiff’sattorneyinapersonalinjurycase towritea letter to the insureddefendantwhichmaycontain legaladvice.Theproblemisraisedbylettertoinsuredsnotifyingthemofthepotentialliabilityoftheirinsurersforfailuretosettlewithinpolicylimits.

It is important first to state the applicable rules of law.An insureris normally liableonly for any judgmentwithin thepolicy limits.Theinsuredisnormallyliableforanyjudgmentinexcessofthepolicylimits.Aninsurerhasagoodfaithdutytotheinsured,however,tosettleaclaimwithin the policy limits under the “equal consideration” rule.NationalEmblemInsuranceCo.v.Pritchard,140Ga.App.350,231S.E.2d126(1976);UnitedStatesFidelity&GuarantyCo.v.Evans,116Ga.App.93,156S.E.2d809,aff’d,223Ga.789,158S.E.2d243(1967).Thefailureoftheinsurertofulfillthisgoodfaithdutymaycausetheinsurertobeliableforanyexcessjudgment.StateFarmInsuranceCo.v.Smoot,381F.2d331(5thCir.1967).

Theselegalrulesmakeapparentthereasonaplaintiff’sattorneymaywishtowritetheinsureddirectly.Theletterwilllaythebasisforseekingrecovery against the insurer for the portion of a judgment rendered inexcessofthepolicylimits.Attorneysforplaintiffsmayalsoperceiveanadvantageinhavingtheinsurerknowthattheinsuredisfullyawareofhisorherrights.Thatis,thecommunicationwiththeinsuredisahelpfulpressuretactic.

Suchaletterisimpermissible,regardlessofwhetheritissentbeforeor after the insured is represented by counsel. A lawyer is precludedfromcontactingapersonrepresentedbyalawyerastomattersrelevanttotherepresentationwithoutthewrittenconsentofthatperson’slawyer.Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(1), Standard47. Georgia Advisory Opinion No. 10 (July 18, 1969) held that suchcontactwithaninsureddefendant isnot improper ifundertakenbeforethedefendant is representedbya lawyerandbeforeanaction is filed.Opinion10, however,waswrittenprior to the adoptionofour currentCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityandStandardsofConductandwasbaseduponformerBarRule3-109whichisverysimilartoourcurrentDR7-104(A)(1)andStandard47.ApparentlytherewasnocounterparttoDR7-104(A)(2)andStandard49,whichnowprohibitalawyerfromgivinglegaladvicetoapersonwhoisnotrepresentedbyalawyer,otherthantheadvicetosecurecounsel,whenevertheinterestsoftherecipientareormaybeinconflictwiththeinterestsofthelawyer’sclient.

AdvisoryOpinionNo.10wasimplicitlyoverruledupontheadoptionofDR7-104(A)(2)andStandard48,andisnowexpresslyoverruledtotheextentitconflictswiththatStandard.UnderStandard48,aplaintiff’sattorneymaycommunicatewith theunrepresentedpotentialdefendant,butisprecludedfromrenderinglegaladvice.

ThisisconsistentwithABAInformalOpinion1034(May30,1968);whichheldthatadvisingtheinsuredoftheeffectoftheinsurer’srefusaltosettlewithinpolicy limitsconstitutes“legaladvice.”TheABAthenquotes an earlier opinion, which involved a complaint about two col-lectionletters,butthelanguageisnonethelessrelevantandapplicable.

The adroit wording of the questioned paragraphs avoids anydirectstatementoradviceas towhat thefinalresultsofseekingthe threatened remedieswill be, and no lawyerwould be likelytobemisledbyit.Ineachcase,however,theoveralleffectuponlayrecipientsofsuchlettersprobablywillbe,andprobablywasintendedbythewritertobe,thattheyhadbetter“payuporelse.”Ratherthanstatesimplythatifpaymentisnotmadeasdemanded,his clients will pursue all legal remedies available to them toenforcepayment,thewriterchoosestodescribeinlegaltermsthecollectionsuitsthatwillbefiledandthentothreaten,inaddition,the proceedings [which will be pursued]. The only purpose ofthreatening such additional proceedings, which would have nodirect connectionwith actions to collect debts, appears to havebeen to coerce and frighten the alleged debtors. ABA InformalOpinion1034at219citingABAInformalOpinion734.

Under Standard 48, a lawyer may communicate by letter with anadverseunrepresentedpersoninforminghimofademandonhisinsur-ancecarrierandthatsuitwillbefiledifthedemandisnotmetbyacer-taindate,andthatheshouldseekcounsel,butnomore.UnderStandard47,nocommunicationwitharepresentedadversepartyiswrittenconsentwithoutpermissionofadversecounsel.

Itisobviousthatthelettertotheinsuredismeantfortheinsurer.Itisequallyobviousthattheinsuredhasarighttoinformationnotonlyastohisownlegalrights,butalsothelegaldutiesoftheinsurertohim.Itisnot,however,obviousthattheplaintiff’sattorneyistheproperpersontoinformtheinsuredoftheserightsandduties.Theappropriateattorneyforthispurposeistheinsured’sattorney.Theproblemhere,ofcourse,isthattheattorneyfortheinsuredisalsotheattorneyfortheinsurer.Andgiven the context of the representation, it seems clear that the insurerwouldpreferthattheinsurednotbemadeawareofitsdutytosettletheclaimingoodfaith.

The lawyer representing the insured and the insurer thus facesan apparent dilemma.But the dilemma is only apparent.He or sherepresents the insuredasaclientandhasaduty tokeepthe insuredfullyinformedbyvirtueoftherulesofethics.SeeProposedGeorgiaRules and Disciplinary Standards of Conduct, Rule 1.4; Rogers v.Robson,Masters, Ryan, Brumund&Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407N.E. 2d 47 (1980). The lawyer for the insurer has aduty to inform the insured not only of any offer of settlement; SeeProposedGeorgiaRules andDisciplinaryStandards ofProfessionalConduct,Rule1.2(c),butalsoofthepotentialliabilityoftheinsurerforabadfaithrefusaltoacceptanyreasonableofferwithinthepolicylimits.Id.Rule1.4(b).

To recognize that theplaintiff’s lawyerhasa right tocommunicatedirectlywiththeinsuredastohisorherrightswouldcreatenewprob-lems. Apart from the rules of ethics, to recognize that the plaintiff’slawyerhasarightsotoadvisetheinsuredmaywellcreateadutyonthepartof the lawyer todoso.For if the lawyercanadvise theadversaryclientforthepurposeoflayingapredicatefortheinsurer’sliabilityforanexcessjudgment,butfailstodoso,heorshemaybeliabletothecli-entformalpractice.

Theplaintiff’s lawyercanproperlywritea letter to theattorneyfortheinsuredandtheinsurermakingtheofferofsettlement.Thelettermayproperlyrequestthelawyertoprovidethisinformationtotheinsuredaswellas the insurer.Thefailureof the insured’s lawyer todosowouldbebreachofthelawyer’sdutytokeeptheclientinformedandmaywellsubjectthelawyertoliability.

If the plaintiff’s lawyer needs information as to the name of theinsured’s insurer, he or shemay properlywrite the insured requestingthisinformation.Butthecontentsofthelettershallbelimitedtonomorethanademand,arequestforthenecessaryinformationandasuggestiontoseekcounsel.Theplaintiff’sattorneymaynotrenderlegaladvicetothe insured.Ga.Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,DR 7-104(A)(2)andStandard48.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON MAY 12, 1989FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-5


ForreferencestoRule3-103(CanonIII)pleaseseeRule5.5(a).

ForreferencestoEC3-1,pleaseseeComment2ofRule5.5.

ForreferencestoEC3-2,pleaseseeRule1.1andComment5ofRule1.1.

ForreferencestoEC3-6,pleaseseeRule5.3(b)andComment1ofRule5.3.

ForreferencestoDR3-101(A),pleaseseeRule5.5(a).

ForreferencestoDR3-102(A),pleaseseeRule5.4(a).

ForreferencestoDR3-103,pleaseseeRule5.4(b).

Ethical Propriety of Lawyers Delegating to Nonlawyers the Closing of Real Estate Transactions.

The closing of real estate transaction constitutes the practice oflawasdefinedbyO.C.G.A§15-19-50.Accordingly,itwouldbeethicallyimproperforlawyerstopermitnonlawyerstocloserealestatetransactions.Certaintaskscanbedelegatedtononlawyers,subjecttothetypeofsupervisionandcontroloutlinedinStateBarAdvisoryOpinionNo.21.Thelawyercannot,however,delegatetoanonlawyertheresponsibilityto“close”therealestatetransac-tionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.


Correspondentaskswhetheritisethicallypermissibleforalawyertodelegatetoanonlawyertheclosingofrealestatetransactions.Thisques-tioninvolves,amongotherthings,aninterpretationofStandard24,Rule3-103(CanonIII),EC3-1,EC3-2,EC3-6,DR3-101(A),DR3-102(A),andDR3-103.WiththeexceptionofStandard24,alloftheforego-ingEthicalConsiderationsandDirectoryRulesarecitedandquotedinStateBarAdvisoryOpinionNo.21(attachedhereto).

Standard24providesasfollows:

A lawyershallnotaidanonlawyer in theunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.AviolationofthisStandardmaybepunishedbyapublicreprimand.

Astheroleofnonlawyers(particularlyparalegalsandlegalsecretar-

ies)intheclosingofrealestatetransactionshasexpandedinrecentyears,questionshavearisenastothescopeofdutieswhichcanbedelegatedtononlawyers.Ageneraldiscussionofdutieswhichmayethicallybedel-egatedtononlawyerscanbefoundinStateBarAdvisoryOpinionNos.19and21.Inshort,thoseAdvisoryOpinionsstressthat:

Avoidanceofchargesthattheparalegalisengagingintheunau-thorizedpracticeoflawmaybeachievedonlybystrictobservanceofthedirectionfoundinEC3-6,quotedabove,indicatingthatdel-egationofactivitieswhichordinarilycomprisethepracticeoflawisproperonlyifthelawyermaintainsadirectrelationshipwiththeclient involved,supervisesanddirects theworkdelegatedto theparalegalandassumescompleteultimateprofessionalresponsibil-ity for theworkproductproducedby theparalegal.Supervisionof theworkof theparalegal by the attorneymust bedirect andconstanttoavoidanychargesofaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.StateBarAdvisoryOpinionNo.21.

Thequestiontobeaddressedinthisopinioniswhethertheclos-ing of a real estate transaction constitutes “the practice of law.”This in turn depends upon what it means to “close” a real estatetransaction.Ifthe“closing”isdefinedastheentireseriesofeventsthroughwhichtitletothelandisconveyedfromonepartytoanotherparty, itwouldbe ethically improper for a nonlawyer to “close” arealestatetransaction.

O.C.G.A. §15-19-50 states that the “practice of law” includes“conveyancing,” “the giving of any legal advice,” and “any actiontaken for others in any matter connected with the law.” In GeorgiaBarAssociationv.LawyersTitleInsuranceCorporation,222Ga.657(1966), theGeorgiaSupremeCourtcharacterizes the“closingof realestatetransactionsbetweenapplicantsfortitleinsuranceandthirdper-sons”as the renderingof legal servicesandadvice.Moreover, to theextentthatanylegaladviceisgivenduringanypartoftheclosing,thiswouldconstitute“thepracticeof law”bydefinitionandcouldnotbeethicallydelegatedtononlawyers.

Inlightofalloftheforegoing,itappearsthattheclosingofrealestatetransactionsconstitutesthepracticeoflawasdefinedbyO.C.G.A.§15-19-50.Accordingly,pursuanttoStandard24,CanonIII,andtheEthicalConsiderationsandDisciplinaryRulescitedabove,itwouldbeethicallyimproper fora lawyer toaidnonlawyers to“close”realestate transac-tions.Thisdoesnotmeanthatcertaintaskscannotbedelegatedtonon-lawyers,subjecttothetypeofsupervisionandcontroloutlinedinStateBarAdvisoryOpinionNo.21.Thelawyercannot,however,delegatetoanonlawyertheresponsibilityto“close”therealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON DECEMBER 17, 1987FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 86-7

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct31,pleaseseeRules1.5(a)and1.8(j).



This opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specificallyEthical Consideration 5.7 that bears uponmatters addressed byComment10ofRule1.8.

Ethical Propriety Of A Lawyer’s Acquisition Of A Security Interest In Marital Property To Secure Attorney’s Fees In A Domestic Relations Case.

An attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property tosecure reasonable attorney’s fees in a domestic relations case if thesecurity agreement is fullydisclosedandconsented toby the client inwriting,anddoesnotviolateanycourtorder.Thesecurityinterestmayservenootherpurpose.

Correspondent asks whether it is ethically proper for a lawyer totakeasecurityinterestinmaritalproperty1tosecurehisorherfeeinadomesticrelationscase.

ThequestionpresentedinvolvesaninterpretationofStandardNo.31.

A lawyer shallnot acquireaproprietary interest in thecauseofactionorsubjectmatteroflitigationheisconductingforaclient,exceptthathemay:

(a)acquirealiengrantedbylawtosecurehisfeeorexpenses.

StandardNo.31’srootsareinthecommonlawcrimeofchamperty.It isdesigned topreventattorneys fromacquiringfinancial interests intheoutcomeoflitigationotherthananattorney’sinterestsinreasonableattorneysfees.2StandardNo.31excepts“acquir/ing/a liengrantedbylawtosecure...fee/s/orexpenses.

StandardNo.31 is taken fromDirectoryRule5-103. InterpretativeguidanceforDirectoryRule5-103isfoundintheaspirationalstatementofEthicalConsideration5-7.

Thepossibilityofanadverseeffectupontheexerciseoffreejudg-mentbya lawyeronbehalfofhisclientduringlitigationgener-allymakes itundesirablefor the lawyer toacquireaproprietaryinterest in the causeofhis clientorotherwise tobecome finan-ciallyinterestedintheoutcomeofthelitigation.However,itisnotimproperforalawyertoprotecthisrighttocollectafeeforhisservicesbytheassertionoflegallypermissibleliens,eventhoughbydoingsohemayacquireaninterestintheoutcomeoflitigation.

TheguidanceofEthicalConsideration5-7 is that“liensgrantedbylaw” should be read broadly as the equivalent of “legally permissibleliensratherthannarrowlyasstatutorychargingliensandretainingliensfor the benefit of attorneys.” Such an interpretation is consistentwiththechampertyconcernsunderlyingStandardNo.31,inthatlegallyper-missible liensused tosecureattorneysfeesdonotcreateanyfinancialmotive for the attorney beyond that of collecting reasonable attorneysfees.AsecurityinterestinmaritalpropertyusedtosecureattorneysfeesinadomesticrelationscaseisthereforepermittedbyStandardNo.31.

ItwouldbeimpropertousesuchanarrangementtosecurefeesifitcreatedanimpermissiblefinancialconflictinviolationofStandardNo.30.StandardNo.30wouldbeviolatediftheattorney’ssecurityinterestinthemaritalpropertywould,orreasonablycould,affecttheexerciseoftheattorney’sindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclient.AnexceptionisprovidedunderStandardNo.30whentheclientgiveswrittenconsentafterfulldisclosureoftheconflict’spotentialforaffect-ing the attorney’s independent professional judgment.Accordingly, anattorneymayacquireasecurityinterestinmaritalpropertytosecurehisorher fee inadomestic relationscase if theclientconsents inwritingafterfulldisclosure,solongasthelawyerdoesnotviolateacourtorder.3

Consistentwiththerequirementsofthisopinion,theinterestacquiredbytheattorneymustbeasecurityinteresttosecurereasonableattorneysfees.Anyinterestacquiredinthesubjectmatteroflitigationbeyondthatnecessary tosecure feeswouldbe inviolationofStandardNo.31andcouldviolateStandardNo.33aswell.TheBar iscautioned that thereareethicalopinionsinotherjurisdictionsfindingviolationofDR5-103insituationsinwhichtheinterestacquiredbytheattorneyinthesubjectmatteroflitigationwasnotasecurityinterest.4__________1Marital property is defined inGeorgia as “that property acquired as adirectresultofthelaborandinvestmentofthe/parties/duringthemarriage....”Courtneyv.Courtney,256Ga.97,98(1986),citingWhitev.White,253Ga.267,269(1984).SeealsoMoorev.Moore,249Ga.27 (l982).Thelegalissuesraisedbyusingmaritalpropertyassecurityforattorneyfeesinadomesticrelationscasearenotaddressedinthisadvisoryopinion.2Proprietary interests are prohibitedunderStandardNo. 31. It is pos-sibletointerprettheterm“proprietary”toexcludeinterestswhichserveonlyassecurity for fees.See, forexample,OklahomaBarAssociationAdvisoryOpinionNo.297,May16,1980.Itis,however,notnecessarytoattemptadefinitionof“proprietary”here.3Inaccord,GreaterClevelandBarAssociation,AdvisoryOpinionNo.151(May11,1983).See,also,Gilesv.Russell,222Kan.629,567P.2d845(1977).4See,forexample,ABAInformalOpinionNo.1397.


STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON JANUARY 11, 1989FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 87-1

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct4,pleaseseeRule8.4(a)(4)andComments1and3ofRule8.4.

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct44,pleaseseeRule1.3andComments1,2and3ofRule1.3.

ForreferencestoDR7-102(a)(2),pleaseseeRule3.1(b).

ForreferencestoEC7-4,pleaseseeComment2ofRule3.1.

ForreferencestoEC7-5,pleaseseeRule1.2(d)andComment6ofRule1.2,Comment3ofRule3.1.

Ethical Propriety Of Filing A Lawsuit In Order To Be Within The Statute Of Limitations, But Before Sufficient Information Is Acquired To Determine If A Legitimate Cause Of Action Exists.

Itisnotethicallyimproperforanattorneytofilealawsuitbeforecomplete factual support for the claim has been establishedprovided that the attorneydetermines that a reasonable attorneywould conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that factssupportingthecauseofactioncanbeestablishedafter thefilingoftheclaim;andprovidedfurtherthattheattorneyisnotrequiredbyrulesofprocedure,orotherwisetorepresentthatthecauseofactionhasanadequatefactualbasis.Ifafterfilingitisdiscoveredthatthelawsuithasnomerit,theattorneywilldismissthelawsuitorinthealternativewithdraw.

Question Presented:

Are there ethical prohibitions against filing suit when the lawyerdoes not knowwhether facts exist whichwould constitute a cause ofaction, and the information needed tomake that determination cannotbeacquiredpriortotheexpirationofthepertinentstatuteoflimitations?

Opinion:

It cannot be determined from these factswhether filing of the suitwould constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. §9-15-14, or of the require-mentsofYostv.Torok,256Ga.92 (1986);nor is suchdeterminationwithin the scope of an ethical opinion. This opinion considers onlywhethertheapplicableethicalregulationsproscribefilingsuitinthesitu-ationdescribedbycorrespondent.

ThereisnoStandardofConductdirectlyapplicable.Specifically,noStandardofConductspeakstothesituationinwhichthefactspresentedbyaclientsuggestacauseofaction,butadditionalfactsarenecessaryfortheattorneytomakeaclearassessmentoftheclaim.Accordingly,thefil-ingoftheclaimalonecannotbethebasisfordisciplineinGeorgiaunderthepresentStandardsofConduct.If,however,theattorneyisrequired,byrulesofprocedureorotherwise,torepresentthatthecauseofactionhasanadequatefactualbasis,theattorneycannotmakethatrepresenta-tion in thesituation inquestion.Tomakesucha representation in thissituationwouldconstituteaviolationofStandard4andwould subjecttheattorneytodiscipline.

Ifsucharepresentationisrequired,theeffectoftheproscriptionmaybetopostponethefilingofthesuittobeyondthedateoftheapplicablestatuteof limitations.That isamatter forethical regulationonly if thedelayintheinvestigationpriortothefilingwascausedbytheattorney’s“willfulneglect”(constitutingaviolationofStandard44forwhichdis-ciplineissanctioned).

The absence of Standards of Conduct does not, however, leavethe lawyer without a source of guidance. The canons, ethical consid-erations, and directory rules are helpful in dealing with the questionpresented.

This guidance is found in the Georgia Code of ProfessionalResponsibility:

DR7-102—RepresentingaClientWithintheBoundsoftheLaw.(A)Inhisrepresentationofaclient,alawyershallnot:

(2) knowingly advance a claimor defense that is unwar-ranted under existing law, except that he may advancesuchclaimordefenseifitcanbesupportedbygoodfaithargument for an extension, modification, or reversal ofexistinglaw.

DR7-102(A)(2)createsasubjectivetestbyuseoftheterm“know-ingly.”Itisviolatedwhentheattorneyknowsthattheproposedclaimisunwarranted.Suchknowledgeisnotpresentinthesituationinquestion.

EC7-4 andEC7-5 advise the attorney to avoid “frivolous” claims.Claims may be frivolous because the legal arguments for a cause ofactionarefrivolous,orbecausefactualsupportisclearlylackingforanycause of action. Only the second form of frivolousness is in questionhere. Consistent with the overall structure of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,EC7-4createsanobjectivestandardfortheattorneywhichismore demanding than the subjective standard ofDR 7-102(A)(2). AclaimisfrivolousunderEC7-4whenthereisnoreasonablepossibilityoftheexistenceofthefactualbasisforthecauseofaction.EC7-4doesnotrequirecompletefactualsupportforthecauseofactionpriortothefiling,butdoesrequirethatareasonableattorneywouldconcludethatthereisareasonable possibility that facts supporting the claim can be establishedaftertheclaimisfiled.EC7-4permits,forexample,theuseofdiscoverytodetermineifthefactualbasisofaclaimexistsifthereisareasonablepossibilitythatisdoes.Thisuseisconsistentwithpartofthepurposeofdiscovery,i.e.,torevealfactswhichrequiredismissalofaclaim.

Inthesituationinquestion,theattorneyisactingconsistentwithethicalguidanceifheorshedeterminesthatareasonableattorneywouldconcludethatthereisareasonablepossibilitythatfactssupport-ingthecauseofactioncanbeestablishedafterthefilingoftheclaim.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON SEPTEMBER 26, 1988FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 87-5

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct22(b),pleaseseeRule1.16(d).

Assertion of Attorneys’ Retaining Liens.

Question Presented:

What are the ethical duties of a lawyer under Standard 22(b)withrespect to thereturnofaclient’spapersandpropertywhenthe lawyerhasnotbeenpaid inviewof the statutory retaining lienauthorizedbyO.C.G.A.§15-19-14(a)(ConflictbetweenStandard22(b)andAttorneys’HoldingLien)?

Summary Answer:

Anattorney’sethicalobligationnot tocauseprejudice tohisorherclient is paramount over rights under the lien statute.Accordingly, anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdtheclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.

Opinion:

Section15-19-14(a) of theGeorgiaCodegives attorneys a lien forservicesrenderedontheirclients’papersandmoneysintheirpossession.Specifically,thatstatuteprovidesasfollows:

Attorneysatlawshallhavealienonallpapersandmoneyoftheirclientsintheirpossessionforservicesrenderedtothem.Theymayretainthepapersuntiltheclaimsaresatisfiedandmayapplythemoneytothesatisfactionoftheclaims.

[T]he lien attaches to the fruits of the labor and skill of the attor-ney,whetherrealizedbyjudgmentordecree,orbyvirtueofanaward,or in any other way, so long as they are the results of his exertions.Brothertonv.Stone,197Ga.74,74-75(3)(1943)quotingMiddletonv.Westmoreland,164Ga.324(1-b),329(1927).

Thisdefinitionsuggeststhatanythingtheattorneypreparedorattainsfortheclientcanbesubjecttothestatutorylieniftheclientfailstopaytheattorney’sfee.Bywayofillustrationandnotlimitation,thefollowingitemsareexamplesofclientpaperstowhichalienmayattach:Anythingwhichtheclientgivestotheattorneytouseorconsiderintherepresen-tation;Evidence,includingdemonstrativeevidence,photographs,state-mentsofwitnesses,affidavits,depositionandhearingtranscripts,exhib-itsandphysicalevidence;Expertevidence,includingtests,opinionsandreports;Agreements,contracts,instruments,notesandotherdocumentsusedortobeusedintransactionsofanykind;Corporaterecords,minutebooksandrecordsoforganizations;Wills, trustsandotherestateplan-ningdocuments;andLegalmemorandaandanalyses.

Thepower to exercise this statutory right is notwithout limitation,however,inviewofStandard22(b)oftheStandardsofConductoftheRulesoftheStateBarofGeorgiawhichmandatesasfollows:


Alawyershallnotwithdrawfromemploymentuntilhehastakenreasonablestepstoavoidforeseeableprejudicetotherightsofhisclient,including...deliveringtotheclientallpapersandpropertytowhichtheclientisentitledandcomplyingwithapplicablelawsandrules.

DuetothefacialconflictbetweenthegrantofpowerinthelienstatuteandthelimitationthatStandard22(b)imposesonthatpower,thisopin-ionwilladdresswhetherandwhenanattorneyethicallymayexercisehisorherstatutorylienrightsuponwithdrawalofrepresentation.

As a general rule, an attorney cannot exercise statutory lien rightsto the foreseeable prejudice of the client. Such ethical considerationsmaintainpreeminenceoverlegislativegrantsofpowertoattorneys.Forexample,FirstBank&TrustCo.v.Zagoria,250Ga.844,302S.E.2d676(1983),heldinapplicableincasesofattorneymalpracticetheliabil-ityshieldlegislativelyaffordedbytheprofessionalcorporatestatute.TheSupremeCourt“hastheauthorityandinfactthedutytoregulatethelawpractice.…” Id. at 845, 302 S.E. 2d at 675.Although recognizing therightof the legislature toenact technical rulesgoverningcorporations,Zagoriacautionedthatthelegislature“cannotconstitutionallycrossthegulf separating the branches of government by imposing regulationsuponthepracticeoflaw.”Id.at845-46,302S.E.2dat675.

Despite the existenceof the lien statute, andbecause “[a] lawyer’srelationshiptohisclientisaveryspecialone,”id.at846,302S.E.2dat675,thepowerofattorneystoexercisetheirrightsunderthelienstatutemustgivewaytotheirethicalobligationnottocausetheirclientspreju-dice.Themajorityofjurisdictionsthathaveconsideredthisquestionareinaccord.

Standard22(b)prohibitsattorneysfromholdingtheirclients’papersif such an action foreseeably will cause them prejudice. The right toclaimalieninsuchpapersunderthestatutewillnotprotecttheattorneyin the case of prejudice to the client.Because itwouldbeonly in therarestofcircumstancesthataclientcouldbedeprivedofhisorherfileswithout eventually suffering some prejudice, the better practice is forattorneystoforgoretentionofclientpapersinallbuttheclearestcases.Thispracticewouldavoidthenecessityofspeculatingwhetheranattor-ney’sactionmightcausesomefutureharm.

In accord with certain other jurisdictions, however, we limit thedutytoturnoverclientfilesandpaperstothoseforwhichtheclienthasbeenorwillbecharged,thatis,allworkproductscreatedduring“bill-abletime.”1Formattersthatarehandledunderarrangementsotherthanhourlycharges,anyworkproductintendedforuseinthecasewouldbeincludedin thosedocuments thatshouldbereturnedto theclient.2Forexample, because attorneys do not bill clients for the creation of timerecordsandtheywouldnotbeusedinthecase(absentaclaimforfees),theserecordswouldprobablyberetained.

Despite the obligation to return original documents to their clients,attorneysareentitledtokeepcopiesoftheirclients’files.3Absentaprioragreementthattheclientwillberesponsibleforcopyingcharges,however,theattorneybearsthecostofcopying.4Notably,evenifsuchanagreementexists,intheeventthattheclientrefusestopay,theattorneymustadvancethecostandthenaddthechargetotheclient’soutstandingbill.5

Wedonotendorsethepracticeofsomejurisdictionsofallowingtheattorneytorequiretheclienttopostcomparablesecuritybeforereleas-ingthepapers.6Toallowanattorneytorequiresecurityinabonafidefeedisputewouldbeunfairtotheclientbecauseitmayrequirehimorher to encumber property without justification. However, if the clientoffers to post security for the attorneys’ fees and expenses pendingresolutionofadispute, theattorneymustrelease thepapers.Similarly,wedonotunequivocablyapprove thepracticeofsomejurisdictionsofholdingsummaryhearingsbecausethisislikelytoresultinduplicativeproceedings.7

Therefore,we conclude that an attorney’s ethical obligation not tocauseprejudice tohisorher client isparamountover rightsunder thelienstatute.Accordingly,anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithhold the client’s papers or properties uponwithdrawal as securityforunpaidfees.__________1See,e.g.,SanFranciscoComm.Opin.No.1984-1.2SeealsoMichiganOpin.No.CI-926.3See id. See alsoNew Jersey Sup.Ct.Advis.Comm.Opin.No. 554(May23,1985).4SeeSanFranciscoComm.Opin.No.1984-1.5Seeid.6SeeFoorv.HuntingtonNationalBank,No.85AP-167,slipop.(Feb.11,1986);MichiganOp.No.CI-930(May4,1983).

7SeeFoorv.HuntingtonNationalBank,No.85AP-167,slipop.(Feb.11,1986).

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON JULY 12, 1989FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 87-6

For certain existing Formal Advisory Opinions that were issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia, like this one, it is the opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board that the substance and/or the conclusion reached under the Standards, ECs and/or DRs has changed under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board has redrafted the original opinion. The redrafted opinion includes an interpretation of the same issue(s) addressed in the original opinion and references the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The redrafted opinion has be processed and published in compliance with Bar Rule 4-403(c). The members of the State Bar of Georgia will be notified if the redrafted opinion replaces this opinion in the Georgia Bar Journal and on the State Bar of Georgia’s website. Please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8720 for the current status of this opinion or if you have any questions regarding the redrafted version.

Ethical propriety of a lawyer interviewing the officers and employees of an organization when that organization is the opposing party in litigation without consent of organization.

Anattorneymaynotethically interviewanemployeeofacorpora-tionwhichisanopposingpartyinpendinglitigationwithouttheconsentof the corporation or the corporation’s counselwhere the employee iseither:

1)anofficerordirectororotheremployeewithauthoritytobindthecorporation;or

2)anemployeewhoseactsoromissionsmaybeimputedtothecor-porationinrelationtothesubjectmatterofthecase.

Correspondentaskswhenitisethicallyproperforalawyertointer-view the officers and employees of an organization, when that orga-nization is the opposing party in litigation,without the consent of theorganization’scounsel.

This question involves, among other things, an interpretation ofStandard 47 of Rule 4-102 of the Rules and Regulations of the StateBarofGeorgia[GeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityDR7-104(A)(1)], and the State Bar ofGeorgia Proposed Rules of ProfessionalConduct Rule 4.2. Standard 47 of Rule 4-102 of the Rules andRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaprovidesasfollows:

Duringthecourseofhisrepresentationofaclient,alawyershallnotcommunicateorcauseanothertocommunicateonthesubjectoftherepresentationwithapartyheknowstoberepresentedbyalawyerinthatmatterunlesshehasthepriorwrittenconsentofthe lawyerrepresentingsuchotherpartyor isauthorizedbylawtodoso.Aviolationofthisstandardmaybepunishedbyapublicreprimand.1

TheAmericanBarAssociation has implied that the foregoing pro-hibition applies only to certain employees of the organization. ABAInformalOpinion 1410 (1978) concluded that no communicationwithanofficeroremployeeofacorporationwith thepower tocommit thecorporationintheparticularsituationmaybemadebyopposingcounselunlesshehasthepriorconsentofthedesignatedcounselofthecorpora-tionorunlessheisauthorizedbylawtodoso.

Theconsensusviewinotherjurisdictionsseemstobethatanattorneymayinterviewanemployeeofacorporatedefendantwithouttheconsentofeitherthecorporationoritscounseliftheemployeeisnotthepersonfor whose acts or omissions the corporation is being sued and if thepersonisnotanofficerordirectororotheremployeewithauthoritytobind thecorporation.On theotherhand,anattorneymaynotethicallyinterviewanemployeeof a corporationwhich is anopposingparty inpendinglitigationwithouttheconsentofthecorporationorthecorpora-tion’scounselwheretheemployeeiseither:

1)Anofficerordirectororotheremployeewithauthoritytobindthecorporation;

2)Anemployeewhoseactsoromissionsmaybeimputedtothecor-porationinrelationtosubjectmatterofthecase.2

Iftheemployeedoesnotfallintoeitheroftheforegoingcategories,


an attorneymay contact and interview the employeewithout thepriorconsentofthecorporationoritscounsel.__________1Rule4.2oftheProposedRulesofProfessionalConductstatesasfol-lows:Inrepresentingaclient,alawyershallnotcommunicateaboutthesubject of the representationwith a party or person the lawyer knowsto be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyerhas thewrittenconsentof theother lawyeras tocommunicationswitha party or has the consent of the other lawyer as to communicationswithpersonsrepresentedbyanother lawyer,or isauthorizedbylawtodo so.Thecomment toRule4.2 amplifies theRule as follows: In thecaseofanorganization,thisRuleprohibitscommunicationsbylawyersconcerningthematterinrepresentationwithanyonehavingamanagerialresponsibility onbehalf of theorganization andwith anyother personwhoseactoromission inconnectionwith thatmattermaybe imputedto theorganization for purposes of civil or criminal liability orwhosestatementsmayconstituteanadmissiononthepartoftheorganization,whentheorganizationisknowntoberepresentedbyanotherlawyer.Ifanagentoremployeeoftheorganizationisrepresentedinthematterbyhisorherowncounsel,theconsentbythatcounseltoacommunicationwillbesufficientforpurposesofthisRule.2 See ABA/BNA Lawyer Manual of Professional Conduct, Section71:308.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON NOVEMBER 10, 1988FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 88-2


Ethical Propriety of an Attorney-Employee Sharing Attorney’s Fees with a Lay Organization-Employer.

It is ethically permissible for an attorney-employee to collectattorney’sfeesonanoteorloanwhichfeesaccruetothebenefitoftheattorney’semployer,wheretheattorney’sfeesareregardedasstipulatedliquidateddamagesunderGeorgialaw.

Correspondent asks if it is ethically permissible for an attorney tocollect attorney’s feeswhichwould accrue to the benefit of the attor-ney’s employer, a layorganization, in the following situation:Abankemploysafulltime,licensed,attorneytohandlecollections,foreclosuresandbankruptcies.Contractssignedbythebank’scustomersprovidefor15percentoftheunpaidbalanceasattorney’sfeesiftheloangoesintodefaultandhastobecollectedbyorthroughanattorney.

StandardNo.26provides,inpart,that“alawyerorlawfirmshallnotsharelegalfeeswithanonlawyer....”

The policy behind this prohibition against fee sharing between alawyerandalaymanisthepreservationofalawyer’sindependentpro-fessionaljudgment.Itisfearedthatlaymen,orlayorganizations,sharingafinancialinterestintherepresentationandnotbeingunderprofessionalobligations,may influence the attorney’s judgment against the client’swelfare.

Theconductinquestionhereisnotinviolationofthispolicy.Thelayorganization,withwhomthefeesareshared,istheclient.Noinfluenceonindependentprofessionaljudgmentcontrarytotheinterestsofthecli-entispresent.Thissituationisclearlydistinguishablefromthenumerousadvisory opinions and cases prohibiting fee sharingwith a nonlawyerother than the client.Curran v.Department of theTreasury, 805F.2d1406(1986);NationalTreasuryEmployeesUnionv.UnitedStates,656F.2d848(1981).1

TheCommittee concludes that fee sharingwith the employer bankisnotprohibitedunderStandardNo.26.TheCommitteealsonotesthattheconductdescribedbycorrespondent isnot fee sharing in the senseof that terminStandardNo.26. Incorrespondent’ssituation,statutoryattorney’sfeesareregardedasstipulatedliquidateddamagesforcollec-tioncosts,belongingtotheclient.Theattorneyis thenfreetocontractwiththeclientfortheagreeduponfeeoranyotherfee.2Ryleev.BankofStatham,7Ga.App.489(1918).

TherequirementsofO.C.G.A.§13-1-11,thatcollectioneffortsmustbemade“byandthroughanattorney”inordertoenforcethisstatutoryattorney’s fees provision, have beenmet. See,United States v.Allen,699F.2d1117(1983);InreEastSideInvestors,694F.2d242(11thCir.1982); In re VillageApartment Associates, 9 B.R. 211 (Bkrtcy. N.D.Ga.1981).__________1See,also,MASSACHUSETTSBAROPINION84-1(1984).2See,alsoABAFORMALOPINIONNO157.


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct48,pleaseseeRule4.3(a)and(b).


Ethical Propriety of Sending Notice Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §51-12-14 to an Unrepresented Party.

ItisethicallypermissibletosendthenoticerequiredbyO.C.G.A.§51-12-14 to an unrepresented party. An attorney sending therequired notice, however, must do so in such a manner as toinform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sentmerely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not tobe con-strued as legal advice, and that the attorney sending the noticerepresentstheopposinginterestsinthedispute.

Correspondentasksif it isaviolationofStandard48of theRulesandRegulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforcorrespondenttocom-plywith thenotice requirementofO.C.G.A.§51-12-14by sendingademand notice to an unrepresented party. That statute requires thatwrittennoticeof thedemandforunliquidateddamagesbesent to theperson“againstwhomtheclaimismade”inordertoentitletheclaim-ant to receive twelve (12)percent interest on judgments in excessofunliquidateddamages.1

Standard48provides:

Duringthecourseofhisrepresentationofaclientalawyershallnotgiveadvice toapersonwho isnot representedbya lawyer,other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of suchperson are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflictwiththeinterestsofhisclient.

IninterpretingStandard48inFormalOpinionNo.86-4(86-R7),theBoardconcludedthatitwasethicallyimproperforaplaintiff’sattorneytosendaletterdirectlytoaninsureddefendantwhichwouldnotifythedefendantaboutthepotentialliabilityofhisorherinsurerforfailuretosettlewithinpolicylimits.Theletterwouldbeconsidered“legaladvice”inthatplaintiff’sattorneyimpliedlywouldbeadvisingsettlementwithinpolicylimits.Accord,ABAInformalOpinion734(June16,1964).TheOpinioncorrectlyfocuseduponthepolicybehindStandard48whichisto avoid creating in anunrepresentedparty a false impression that theattorneyisadvisinginaccordancewiththeunrepresentedparty’sinter-estsorisneutralinthedispute.Thepresentsituationisdistinguishable.Whereanattorneysendsaformalnoticewhichisrequiredbylaw,thereismuchlessconcernthatafalseimpressionwillbecreated.

It is ethically permissible to send the notice required byO.C.G.A.§51-12-14,statingspecificallythatit isanoticeratherthanadvice.Anattorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such amannerastoinformtheunrepresentedopposingpartythatthenoticeissentmerelytoestablishaclaimforinterest,thatitisnottobeconstruedaslegaladvice,thattherecipientmayseekhisindependentlegaladviceandthattheattorneysendingthenoticerepresentstheopposinginterestsinthedispute.2__________1ThefulltextofO.C.G.A.§51-12-14isasfollows:

“Procedure for demandof unliquidateddamages in tort actions;wheninterestmayberecovered.

(a)Where a claimant has given written notice by registered orcertifiedmailtoapersonagainstwhomclaimismadeforunliq-uidated damages in a tort action and the person against whomsuchclaimismadefailstopaysuchamountwithin30daysfromthemailingofthenotice,theclaimantshallbeentitledtoreceiveinterestontheclaimedsumif,upontrialofthecaseinwhichtheclaim ismade, the judgment is for an amount not less than thesumclaimed.(b)Thewrittennotice referred to in subsection (a)of thisCodesectionmaybegivenononlyoneoccasionandshallspecifythatitisbeinggivenpursuanttothisCodesection.(c)TheinterestprovidedforbythisCodesectionshallbeattherateof12percentperannumandshallbegintorunfromthethir-tiethday following thedateof themailingof thewrittennoticeuntilthedateofjudgment.(d)Evidenceordiscussionof intereston liquidateddamages,aswellasevidenceof theoffer,shallnotbesubmitted to the jury.


InterestshallbemadeapartofthejudgmentuponpresentationofevidencetothesatisfactionofthecourtthatthisCodesectionhasbeencompliedwithandthattheverdictofthejuryortheawardbythejudgetryingthecasewithoutajuryisequaltoorexceedstheamountclaimedinthenotice.(e) This Code section shall be known andmay be cited as the“UnliquidatedDamagesInterestAct.”(Ga.L.1968,p.1156,§1,Ga.L.1975,p.395,§1;Ga.L.1981,p.681,§1.)”

2Iftheadversepartyisrepresented,thestatutorynoticeneednotcontainthedisclaimersheredescribed,butmustbesent to theadverseparty’sattorneyratherthantheparty.Standard47.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON FEBRUARY 9, 1989FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 89-2

This opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including bothDirectoryRulesandEthicalConsiderationsthatbearuponmattersdirectlyaddressedbyComment2ofRule3.5.

Ethical propriety of an attorney/city council member’s representing private clients before city council-appointed Judges of the Recorder’s Court if the attorney abstains from voting on the appointment.

An attorney, who is also amember of the city council, shouldavoid representing private clients before the Recorder’s CourtwhenthecitycouncilappointsthejudgesoftheRecordersCourt,andshouldnotabstainfromvotingonjudicialappointments.

Correspondentasksifitisethicallyproperforanattorney,whoisalsoamemberofthecitycouncil,torepresentprivateclientsbeforeRecorder’sCourt,whenthecitycouncilappointstheJudgesoftheRecorder’sCourt,iftheattorneyabstainsfromvotingonjudicialappointments.1Correspondentalsoasksifothermembersofhisorherlawfirmwouldbeprohibitedfromsuchrepresentationbyimputeddisqualification.

A full response to this inquiry would go beyond the ethical regu-lations and requires interpretation of Young v. Champion, 142 Ga.App. 687 (1977), in which the Court upheld the disqualification of aCommissionerfromrepresentationbeforeaRecorder’sCourtjudgewhowasappointedbytheCommission.TheAdvisoryOpinionBoard,how-ever,iswithoutauthoritytointerpretcourtopinions.

TherearenoGeorgiaStandardsofConductapplicabletothisparticu-lar situation. TheAdvisoryOpinionBoard is not, however, limited todisciplinaryissuesinitsinterpretationsoftheethicalregulationsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheBoardthereforeoffersethicaladvicebasedontheapplicableethicalregulations.

DirectoryRule8-101(a)(2)provides:

“A lawyer who holds public office shall not use his publicposition to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to actinfavorofhimselforaclient.”Thecitycouncilis,inthesitua-tioninquestion,inthepositionofemployeroftheJudgeoftheRecorder’sCourt.Thereisinherentinfluenceinsuchaposition.An attorney/council member who appears before that Judgeexercises that influence however unintentional the “use” of itmaybeandhoweverdeterminedboththeJudgeandtheattorneymay be to avoid its effect. Even the effort to avoid the effectchanges the nature of the relationship between the Judge andtheattorney.Asamatterofethicaladvice,webelieve that theattorney/councilmembershouldavoidrepresentationbeforetheJudgeoftheRecorder’sCourt.

Correspondent’squestionseekstoavoidtheinherentinfluenceofhisorherpositionbyabstainingfromallvotingontheappointmentof theJudgesof theRecorder’sCourt.Wecannotadviseabstentionas a remedy. The attorney, as noted in Ethical Consideration 8-6,is uniquely qualified to evaluate the qualifications of those seekingappointment to thebench.Lawyershavea“special responsibility toaid in the selection of only those who are qualified.” EC 8-6. Theattorney/councilmember shouldnot avoid thatpublic responsibilityforprivategain.Todosowouldbecounter to theethicaladviceofEthicalConsideration8-8,“Alawyerwhoisapublicofficer,whetherfullorpart-time,shouldnotengageinactivitiesinwhichhispersonalor professional interests are or foreseeablymay be in conflictwithhisofficialduties.”

IfcorrespondentfollowstheadviceofthisOpinionhewilldisqualifyhimselffromrepresentationbeforetheJudgesof theRecorder’sCourt.

Thatdisqualificationispersonalandisnotimputedtotheothermembersofthefirm.Inthiscasetherearenoconcernsofconflictsofinterestorconfidentialityrequiringimputeddisqualification.2__________1Thisopinionwouldnotapplywherecitycouncilmembersdonotpar-ticipateinappointingcityjudges.2TheBoardnotesthatitsopinioninthiscase,andtheholdingofYoungv.Champion,appeartobecontrarytothefollowingAdvisoryOpinionsfromotherjurisdictions:Adv.Opin#5(NewHampshire,10/23/81);Adv.Opin.#84-18(SouthCarolina,undated);Adv.Opin.CI#990(Michigan12/13/83).


This opinion relies on Standard of Conduct 30 and EthicalConsideration 5-6 that bear uponmatters directly addressed byRule1.7.

TheFormNotificationandConsentLetter,whichisanadden-dumtothisopinioncontinuestobeusefulandvalid.

Ethical propriety of drafter of will serving as executor.

It isnotethically improper fora lawyer tobenamedexecutorortrustee in awill or trust heor shehaspreparedwhen the lawyerdoesnot consciously influence the client in thedecision tonamehimorherexecutorortrustee,solongasheorsheobtainsthecli-ent’swrittenconsentinsomeformorgivestheclientwrittennoticeinsomeformafterafulldisclosureofallthepossibleconflictsofinterest.Inaddition,thetotalcombinedattorney’sfeeandexecutoror trustee fee or commissionmust be reasonable and proceduresusedinobtainingthisfeeshouldbeinaccordwithGeorgialaw.

Question Presented:

Isitethicallyproperforalawyertobenamedexecutorortrusteeinawillortrustherorshehasprepared?

Opinion:

DisciplinaryStandardofConductNo.30provides:

Exceptwiththewrittenconsentorwrittennoticetohisclientafterfulldisclosurealawyershallnotacceptorcontinueemploymentiftheexerciseofhisprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofhisclientwillbeorreasonablymaybeaffectedbyhisownfinancial,busi-ness,propertyorpersonalinterests.

Thefinancialinterestsofanexecutorortrusteereasonablymayaffectanattorney’sindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclient.Theconduct inquestions falls clearlywithin thecoverageofStandardNo.30.StandardNo.30,however,providesexceptionsforthistypeofconflict.Theseexceptionstoaconflictofinterestaretheclient’swrittenconsentorwrittennoticetotheclientafterfulldisclosure.Theseexcep-tionsareinquestionhere.

There is no limitation on client consent in StandardNo. 30 unlessthe“appearanceofimpropriety”prohibitionofCanon9oftheGeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitycreatesan implied limitation. It isouropinionthat theconduct inquestiondoesnotnecessarilycreatean“appearanceofimpropriety,”andwenotethatthe“appearanceofimpro-priety”prohibitionisnotincludedintheStandardsofConduct.

Thisopinionfindssupportintheinterpretiveguidanceoftheaspira-tionalstatementinEthicalConsideration5-6.

EC5-6 -A lawyer should not consciously influence a client toname him as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. Inthose cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such,careshouldbetakenbythelawyertoavoideventheappearanceofimpropriety.

TheimplicationofEthicalConsideration5-6isthatthenamingofanattorneyasexecutoror trusteeinawillor trustheorshehasprepareddoes not per se create an appearance of impropriety, but that such anarrangementcreatesariskofappearingtobeimproper,whichmustbeguardedagainstbytheattorney.

Atestator’sorsettlor’sfreedomtoselectanexecutorortrusteeisanimportantfreedom,anditshouldnotberestrictedabsentstrongjustifica-


tion.Foravarietyofreasons,theattorneymaybethemostappropriatechoiceoffiduciaryfortheclient.Theriskthatsomelawyersmaytakeadvantageofalawyer-clientrelationshiptobenefitthemselvesinaman-nernotintheclient’sbestinterestshouldnotoutweighthatfreedom.

Thisriskofself-dealinginsteadcreatestheneedforrestrictionsthatoffer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trusteeis the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney’s fulldisclosure is essential to the client’s informed decision and consent.Disclosure requires notification of the attorney’s potential interest inthearrangement,i.e.theabilitytocollectanexecutor’sortrustee’sfeeandpossiblyattorneys fees.Unlikea realestate transactionwhereanattorneyhasapersonalinterestintheproperty,beingnamedasexecu-tor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in theestate or trust assets other than the fee charged.Waiver ofState lawfiduciaryrequirementsinthedocumentispermissibleaslongaswaiverisordinaryandcustomaryinsimilardocumentsforsimilarclientsthatdonotnametheattorneyasfiduciary.1

Inthelightoftheabove,fulldisclosureinthiscontextshouldincludeanexplanationofthefollowing:

1)Allpotentialchoicesofexecutorortrustee,theirrelativeabilities,competence,safetyandintegrity,andtheirfeestructure;

2)Thenatureoftherepresentationandservicethatwillresultiftheclientwishes toname theattorneyasexecutoror trustee (i.e.,whattheexactroleofthelawyerasfiduciarywillbe,whatthelawyer’sfeestructurewillbeasalawyer/fiduciary,etc.);

3)Thepotentialfortheattorneyexecutorortrusteehiringhimorherselforhisorherfirmtorepresenttheestateortrust,andthefeearrangementanticipated;and

4)Anexplanationofthepotentialadvantagestotheclientofseekingindependentlegaladvice.

Thesedisclosuresmaybemadeorallyorinwriting,buttheclient’sconsentortheattorney’snoticetotheclientshouldbeinwriting.

The client’s consent could be obtained by having the client sign aconsentformthatoutlinestheinformationdescribedabove.

ConsistentwithotherjurisdictionsthathaveaddressedtheissueandtheStandardsandRulesoftheGeorgiaBar,itouropinionthatitisethi-callypermissiblefortestatororsettlortonameasexecutorinawillortrusteeofatrustthelawyerwhohaspreparedtheinstrumentwhenthelawyer:(a)doesnotpromotehimselforherselforconsciouslyinfluencethe client in the decision; (b) fully discloses the conflict as describedabove,and(c)eitherobtainsclientconsent insomeformofwritingornotifiestheclientinwriting.2

AnyexecutorortrusteeisallowedbyGeorgialawtohirelegalcoun-sel,accordingto theneedsof theestateor trustherepresents,andpayreasonablefeesfortheirservices.O.C.G.A.§53-7-10.Anattorneywhohasethicallynamedhimselforherselfasexecutorortrusteeinaninstru-mentheorshehaspreparedmayactasanattorneyfortheestateorhireamemberofhisorherfirmasattorney.Thefiduciaryandtheattorney,however,mustexercisecautiontoavoidactualorperceivedconflictsofinterestinthiscircumstance.

Whenalawyerhasethicallynamedhimselforherselfasexecutorortrusteeinaninstrumentheorshehasprepared,thelawyercanreceivefeesforperformingbothservices.If,however,anycostsofpreparationorexecutionoverlap,theattorneymustseethatthesecostsarechargedonlyonce.Heor shemaynot chargeboth the client and the estateortrustforasingletask.

Asalawyerpreparesawillortrustinstrument,heorsheisperform-ingservicesfor theclient-testator/settlorasa lawyer.It is the lawyer’staskatthistimetomakesuretheclient’swishesforthelaterdispositionanddistributionoftheclient’spropertyareintegratedintoaplanaccept-abletotheclient.

The lawyer acting inhisorher capacity as an executoror trusteeis performing a different function altogether. It is the lawyer’s taskasexecutorortrusteetoeffectivelyimplementtheintegratedplanfordispositionanddistributionof the testator’sorsettlor’sproperty.Notonlyisthelawyer’sfunctiondifferent,thetasksaredifferent.Thelaw-yershouldstillbeappropriatelyandreasonablycompensatedwhetherthe compensation is provided in the instrument or by statute, but anattorneyactingasafiduciaryshouldnotdoubledipfeeschargedtotheclientorestate.

Georgialawprovidesthatanattorneyservingasanadministra-torcannotdoubledipinfees.SeeMcDowv.Corley154Ga.App.575(1980);andDavidsonv.Story,106Ga.799,32S.E.867(1899).Itisrecognizedthatiftheattorneyisservingasbothexecutorortrusteeandaslegalcounsel,itmaybedifficulttosortouteachtaskperformedasoneperformedclearlyinonecapacityortheother.AnyfeesaboveGeorgia’sstatutoryprovisionsforcompensatingexecutorsthatanattorneymayincurinadualroleaslawyerandfiduciarymustbecol-lectedbyfilinganapplicationforextracompensationwiththeProbateCourtunderO.C.G.A.§53-6-150.McDow,154Ga.App.at576;andDavidson,106Ga.at801.InkeepingwithbothGeorgialawandethicalconsiderations,thetotalfeeschargedbyanattorneyinsuchadualroleshouldbereasonable.3

Addendum to Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-R1Form Notification and Consent Letter

[MR.ORMS.FULLNAME][ADDRESS][CITY,STATEZIP]

Dear[MR.ORMS.LASTNAME]:

BecauseyouhaveaskedmetoserveasExecutorandTrusteeunderyourwill,Imustexplaincertainethicalconsiderationstoyouandobtainyour written consent to the potential conflicts of interests that coulddevelop.Thepurposeofthisletteristosummarizeourdiscussionsaboutyournamingmeasfiduciaryinyourwill.

Alawyercannotprepareawillortrustinwhichtheclientnamesthatlawyer as fiduciaryunless thatdecisionoriginateswith theclient.Thelawyershouldneversuggest thathe/shebenamedorpromotehimself/herselftoserveinthatcapacity.

Otherswhomightserveasyourfiduciariesincludeyourspouse,oneormoreofyourchildren,arelative,apersonalfriend,abusinessassoci-ate,abankwithtrustpowers,youraccountant,oraninvestmentadvisor.

Icanserveasexecutorandtrusteeifthatisyourdesire.Thepotentialconflict arises primarily from the probability that I will hire this firmtoserveasattorneys for theestateand trust.Anattorney isentitled tocompensation for legal services performedon behalf of the estate andtrust,andtheexecutorandtrusteearealsoentitledtocompensationforservices in that capacity.When a lawyer has been named as executorandtrusteepursuanttotheethicalrequirementsoftheStateBar,he/shecanreceivefeesforperformingservicesbothasexecutorandtrusteeandasattorneyas longashe/shechargesonlyonceforanysingleservice.Further,thetotalcompensationforservingasbothfiduciaryandattorneymustbereasonable.Ifyounamemeasexecutorandtrusteeinyourwill,Iandtheotherlawyersinmyfirmwillchargeatournormalhourlyratesfor all services performed. [NOTE:Modify the preceding sentence asappropriate.]

Imustalsopointouttoyouthatalawyer’sindependenceiscompro-misedwhenhe/sheactsasbothfiduciaryandaslawyerforthefiduciary.Someofthepotentialconflictsinthisregardare:

1.Thequestionwhetheraparticulartaskis“legal”or“fiduciary”innature;2.Thequestionwhetherservicesbeingperformedarereallynec-essaryinthecircumstances;3.Theproprietyofgivingthefiduciarybroaddiscretionarypow-ersandexemptionfrombond;4.Thelackofindependentreviewofthedocumentbyanattorneyotherthantheonewhodraftedit;and5.Theremaybeotherpotentialconflicts thathavenotoccurredtome.

InaccordancewiththeethicalrequirementsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,itisnecessaryformetoobtainyourstatementthatthepotentialconflictsofinterestshavebeenexplainedtoyou.Inthatregard,pleasereviewthestate-mentofconsentbelow.Ifitissatisfactorytoyou,pleasesignandreturntheenclosedcopytome.Ifyouwanttodiscussanypointfurther,pleasecall.Ifyoudecidenottoexecutetheconsent,pleaseadvisemewhomyouwouldliketoserveasexecutorandtrusteeinsteadofme.

Ifyouhaveanydoubtconcerning the informationcontained in thisletter or the effect of signing the consent, you should discuss it withanotherlawyerofyourchoice.

Sincerely,

________________________Attorney

CONSENT

I, ______________________ (Client) _______________,have voluntarily named as executor and trustee in my will and trust,


______________________ (Attorney) _________________, whoprepared the instrument in his/her capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms.________________ (Attorney) ______________ did not promote him-self/herselforconsciouslyinfluencemeinthedecisiontonamehim/herasexecutorandtrustee.Inaddition,Mr./Ms._____________(Attorney)______________hasdisclosedthepotentialconflictswhichhe/shethinksmightariseasaresultofhis/herservingasbothexecutorandtrusteeandasattorneyfor theestateand trust.Anexplanationof thedifferent rolesas fiduciary and attorney, an explanationof the risks anddisadvantagesofthisdualrepresentation,anexplanationofthemannerinwhichhis/hercompensationwillbedetermined,andanopportunitytoseekindependentlegaladvicewereprovidedtomepriortomysigningthisconsent.

Date__________________ _______________________________ (Signature)__________1 For example, granting broad powers to a fiduciary or relieving thefiduciaryofreturnorbondrequirementsisacommonpractice,cansub-stantiallyreducetheexpenseofadministrationofanestateortrust,anddoesnotrelievethefiduciaryofthedutytoadministertheestateproperlyinor reducesubstantially therightsof thebeneficiaries toenforce thatduty.Ontheotherhand,aprovisionthatattemptedtorelievethefidu-ciaryofnegligencewouldprobablynotbeordinaryandcustomaryandwouldbeimproper.2InPennsylvania,anattorneyethicallymayactasco-executorinawillthat heor sheprepares as long as the attorney advises the client (in awayneverspecified)of thepotentialproblemthat theattorneymayberequired to testify regarding the will if it is challenged. ProfessionalGuidanceOpinion80-2ofthePhiladelphiaBarAssociation.Theattor-neyalsomaynottakeadvantageofhispositionasdraftsmantopromotehimselforherselfor“sell the ideas to theclient.SeealsoProfessionalGuidanceOpinion8-17ofthePhiladelphiaBarAssociation(concerninganattorneynaminghimselfsuccessor-trusteeinawillhedrafted).3 In accord.Okla.Opin.No. 298 (Feb. 28, 1991) (attorney serving asexecutorofestateandasattorneyfortheestatemaychargereasonablefeesforeachsolongaschargesdonotoverlap.);Ala.Opin.No.81-503(undated)(attorneymayserveasadministratorofestateandasattorneyfortheestateandmaychargereasonablefeesforeach);Wis.Opin.No.E-80-14 (Dec. 1980) (a lawyer, appointed as guardian, may serve asattorneyfortheguardian,andmaychargereasonablefeesforperforminginbothcapacities).



This opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specificallyEthicalConsiderationsEC-2-19and2-23,thatbearuponmattersdirectlyaddressedbyComments1and5ofRule1.5.

ADVANCEFEEPAYMENTS

Alawyerneednotplaceanyfeesintoatrustaccountabsentspe-cialcircumstancesnecessary toprotect the interestof theclient.Suchcircumstancesmaybetheagreementoftheparties,thesizeand amount of the fee, and the lengthof time contemplated fortheundertaking.

Question Presented:

Whether a lawyer may deposit into a general operating account aretainerthatrepresentspaymentoffeesyettobeearned.

Opinion:

The question posed by correspondent is not clear. “Fees yet to beearned” are prepaid fees. “Prepaid fees” also include “fixed” or “flatfees,” which are not earned until the task is completed. The terms“retainer”and“prepaidfees”havedifferentmeanings.Forpurposesofclarity,thetermsaredefinedashereused.

A retainer is “...the fee which the client pays when he retains theattorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting for hisadversary.”Black’sLawDictionary(5thed.1979).Thus, retainer feesareearnedbytheattorneybyagreeingtobe“oncall”fortheclientandby not accepting employment from the client’s adversaries.McNulty,George&Hallv.Pruden,62Ga.135,141(1878).

A“flat”or“fixed”feeisonechargedbyanattorneytoperformatasktocompletion,forexample,todrawacontract,prepareawill,orrepre-

senttheclientincourt,asinanuncontesteddivorceoracriminalcase.Suchafeemaybepaidbeforeorafterthetaskiscompleted.

A“prepaidfee”isafeepaidbytheclientwiththeunderstandingthattheattorneywillearnthefeeasheorsheperformsthetaskagreedupon.

Under thesevariousdefinitions,onecanreasonably take theposi-tionthat“retainers”and“flatfees”maybeplacedinthegeneraloperat-ingaccountwhenpaid.Prepaidfeesmaybeplacedinatrustaccountuntilearned.

Terminologyastothevarioustypesoffeearrangementsdoesnotalterthefactthatthelawyerisafiduciary.Therefore,thelawyer’sdutiesastofeesshouldbeuniformandgovernedbythesamerulesregardlessoftheparticularfeearrangement.Thosedutiesareasfollows:

1.Tohaveaclearunderstandingwith theclientas to thedetailsofthe fee arrangementprior toundertaking the representation, prefer-ablyinwriting.2.Toreturntotheclientanyunearnedportionofafee.3. To accept the client’s dismissal of him or her (with or withoutcause)withoutimposinganypenaltyontheclientforthedismissal.4.Complywith theprovisionsofStandard31as to reasonablenessofthefee.

Thelawiswellsettledthataclientcandismissalawyerforanyreasonorfornoreason,andthelawyerhasadutytoreturnanyunearnedportionofthefee.IntheMatterofCollins,246Ga.325,271S.E.2d473(1980).

Theexerciseoftherighttodischargeanattorneywithorwithoutcausedoesnotconstituteabreachofcontractbecauseitisabasictermofthecontract,impliedbylawintoitbyreasonofthenatureof the attorney-client relationship, that the clientmay terminatethatcontractatanytime.

Henry,Walden&Davis v.Goodman, 294Ark. 25, 741 S.W. 2d 233(1987).

Theclient,ofcourse,maynotbepenalizedforexercisingtherighttodismissthelawyer.Id.Inviewoftheseduties,alawyerneednotplaceanyfees intoa trustaccountabsentspecialcircumstancesnecessary toprotecttheinterestoftheclient.Suchcircumstancesmaybetheagree-mentoftheparties,thesizeandamountofthefee,andthelengthoftimecontemplatedfortheundertaking.1__________1 A fee paid for retainer of the attorney, as narrowly defined in thisopinion, illustrates the importance of an agreement or understandingin writing outlining, among other things: geographic area involved,duration, scopeofproposed legal services, feesandexpenses for legalservices rendered, and due date of future retainer fees covered by theretaineragreement.Theagreementshouldalsocontainspecifictermsastorefundsofanyportionofthefeeshouldtheagreementbeterminatedpriortoitsexpirationdate.SeeEthicalConsiderations2-19and2-23.


This opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including bothDirectoryRulesandEthicalConsiderations, thatbearuponmat-tersaddressedbyRules3.8(b),1.7(a)(seeespeciallyComments6and10),1.1,1.5(a),1.8(d)and(f)(2),5.4(c),and9.5.

Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel’s fee.

Thequestionpresentediswhetheritisunethicalforaprosecutortoconditionapleaagreementonanappointedorprobonocounsel’swaiverofanyclaimsforattorneys’fees.

Inordertoanswerthisinquiry,wemustconsidertheuniquenatureoftheAmericanadversarialsystem,especiallyincriminallitigation.Lawyerstypicallyoccupythethreekeyrolesinoursystem,asprosecutor,defenseattorney,andjudge.Eachparticipanthasadistinctroletoplay,andit isthecarefullycraftedbalanceofthepublic,ethicalandprofessionalrespon-sibilitiesof theplayers thatmakethesystemoperateinaccordancewithConstitutionalguaranteesandtherightfulexpectationsofthepopulace.AsthePreambletoourCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitystates:

[I]t is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing anddispensing justice be so maintained that the public shall haveabsoluteconfidenceintheintegrityandimpartialityofitsadminis-


tration...Itcannotbesomaintainedunlesstheconductandmotivesofthemembersofourprofessionaresuchastomeritapprovalofalljustmen.

Thefirstparticipant, theprosecutor, isanadvocatelikeall lawyers,butheor shealsohasaunique responsibilityas lawyer for the sover-eign.1“Theresponsibilityofapublicprosecutordiffersfromthatoftheusualadvocate;hisdutyistoseekjustice,notmerelytoconvict.”2Whileoperatingwithin the adversarial system, the prosecutor’s obligation isto protect the innocent aswell as convict the guilty, and to guard therightsof theaccusedaswellasenforce the rightsof thepublic.Thus,theprosecutoractsalmostasa“ministerofjustice,”occupyingaquasi-judicialposition.3

TheEC’sseektobalanceaprosecutor’sdutytoactinthebestinter-estsoftheclient(thestate)withthedutytoavoidanunjustresult.Forinstance,theprosecutor:

should make timely disclosure to the defense of available evi-dence...thattendstonegatetheguiltoftheaccused,mitigatethedegreeoftheoffense,orreducethepunishment.Further,apros-ecutorshouldnot intentionallyavoidpursuitofevidencemerelybecause he believes itwill damage the prosecutor’s case or aidtheaccused.4

Becauseoftheprosecutor’suniquepositionandresponsibilities,con-ductthatistolerableonthepartofaprivatepersonmaybeintolerablewhendonebytheprosecutoronbehalfofthestate.5

The second participant in the system, the defense attorney, playsanotherrolewithmarkedlydifferentresponsibilities.Thedefenseattor-ney’sprimaryallegiance is to the client, theoverridinggoalbeing theachievementof thatwhich is in theclient’sbest interests,as theclientperceives them.6 The principal duty the defense attorney owes to theadministration of justice is “to serve as the accused’s counselor andadvocatewithcourage,devotion,andtotheutmostofhisorherlearningandabilityandaccordingtothelaw.”7

Thesedutiesdevolveuponthedefenseattorneybothasamemberofthelegalprofessionandasapartywithacontractualrelationshipwiththe defendant. Even more importantly, however, these responsibili-tiesareanoutgrowthof thedefendant’s right to“effectiveassistanceofcounsel”guaranteedby theSixthAmendment to theUnitedStatesConstitution8theFourteenthAmendmenttotheGeorgiaConstitution9andcourtrule.10

Thethirdparticipantintheadversarialsystemisthejudge.AsstatedintheCodeofJudicialConduct:

Ourlegalsystemisbasedontheprinciplethatanindependent,fairandcompetentjudiciaryiscentraltoAmericanconceptsofjusticeandtheruleoflaw...Thejudgeisanarbiteroffactsandlawfortheresolutionofdisputesandahighlyvisiblesymbolofgovern-mentundertheruleoflaw.11

Asarbiter,thejudgemustofcourseremainneutralandimpartial.Atthesametime,however,judgesarealsoresponsibleforguaranteeingthatdefendantsreceivefairtrialsandeffectiverepresentation.

Theprosecutorwhoconditionsapleaagreement inacriminalcaseonwaiver of attorneys’ fees upsets the delicate balance of the adver-sarialsystembyinterferingwithboththedefendant’srighttoeffectiveassistance of counsel and the people’s right tomaintain a fair systemof justice, andby sullying the judicial system’s reputation for fair andethicaltreatmentofallpersons.Itdoesthisinseveralimportantways.

First, such a condition creates a conflict of interest for the defenseattorney,whoistornbetweentheneedtoreceivecompensationforhisorherworkandthedutytoprotectthefreedom,sometimeseventhelife,oftheclient.Thisconflictsubstantiallyinterfereswiththeright,guaranteedbyConstitutionalmandateandcourtrules,tobeassistedbycompetent,conflict-freecounsel.12

Standard30provides:

Exceptwiththewrittenconsentofhisclientafterfulldisclosure,alawyershallnotacceptorcontinueemploymentiftheexerciseofhisprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofhisclientwillbeorreason-ablymaybeaffectedbyhisownfinancial,business,property,orpersonalinterests.13

Aprosecutor’sconditionsuchastheonediscussedherecreatessuchaconflict.“[A]dequatecompensationisnecessaryinordertoenablethelawyertoservehisclienteffectivelyandtopreservetheintegrityofthe

profession.”14 “Whenmembers of theBar are induced to render legalservicesforinadequatecompensation,asaconsequencethequalityoftheservicerenderedmaybelowered, thewelfareof theprofessioninjuredand the administration of justice made less efficient.”15 The defenseattorneyinthesituationpositedherewouldnotreceiveadequate,orevenany,compensationwhentheprosecutorconfrontshimwithapleaagree-mentbasedonthewaiverofhisfees.

Theriskofinadequaterepresentationexistsnotonlyincaseswhereindividuallawyersareunpaidorareunsureabouttheprospectsofpay-ment.Thepotentialriskwillpervadeeverycriminalprosecutionunlessaclearsignalissentthatthissortofbargainisunacceptableinanycircum-stance.Thus,theprosecutorputsthedefenseattorney,andthroughhimthe defendant, in an impossible position. Certainty regarding paymentinrepresentationofthedefendantisneededsothatdefensecounselcanproperlybalancehisworkload.Withuncertaintyintheprocess,defensecounselmaydothatwhichisonlyhuman—devotelesstimeandenergytothatwhichislesslikelytoresultinadequateremuneration.

Standard30doespermitanattorneytoacceptorcontinuerepresenta-tioninthefaceofpersonalconflictwithwrittenconsentornoticetotheclientafterfulldisclosure.DespitetheliterallanguageoftheStandard,aclient’swrittenconsentcannotwaivethiskindofpersonalconflict.Thisistrueforatleasttworeasons.First,conflictsshouldberesolvedbeforerepresentationbegins.This avoids harmful uncertainty, andprevents alatewithdrawalofcounsel thatwouldbedetrimental toboth theclientandthecauseofjustice.Second,aslongasthistoolremainsanoption,itisneverclearwhentheprosecutormayuseit.Thefearthataprosecutorwill use it may cause defense attorneys to stop taking the cases alto-gether16ortojealouslyguardtheirtimewhilerepresentingadefendantinthefearthattheywillultimatelyhavetoyieldtheirfees.

It should be noted that blanket proscriptions aimed at preventingconflictsincriminalcasesarenothingnew.Standard34,whichissand-wiched between other Standards dealingwith impermissible conflicts,states:

Priortotheconclusionofallaspectsofthemattergivingrisetohisemployment,alawyershallnotenterintoanyarrangementorunderstandingwith a client or a prospective client bywhich heacquiresaninterestinpublicationrightswithrespecttothesubjectmatterofhisemploymentorproposedemployment.17

ThereasoningbehindthisStandard,forwhichthereisnoconsentexception, isobvious—actionswhichareappropriateornecessaryintherepresentationoftheclientmaydetractfromthepublicationvalueof a description of the representation.18Thus, there is precedent foradoptionofprophylacticruleslimitingboththelawyer’sandclient’soptions,inordertoprotecttheclient’sinterestincompetentandzeal-ousrepresentation.

The second reason why the prosecutor’s condition is improper isthat it jeopardizes the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. TheConstitutiondemandsthat“Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshallenjoytheright...tohavetheassistanceofcounselforhisdefense.”19This amendment guarantees effective and conflict free representation.The Courts have already held that some conflictsmay not bewaivedunder any circumstances, especially in death penalty cases.20Creatingconflictsofinterestandinterferingwitheffectiveassistanceofcounselisinconsistentwiththeprosecutor’sdutyasa‘ministerofjustice’21toseekjustice,andnotmerelyconvict.22

Third, theprosecutor’scondition imperils the interestof thepeopleinmaintainingasystemthatoperatesfairlyandinthestate’sbestinter-ests.23 Justice is imperiled in several ways: first, the mere possibilitythatcounselwillnotbepaidwilldecreasethelikelihoodthatcompetentcounselwillcomeforward to represent thedefendant; second,counselwhodoes come forward cannot safely devote his undivided loyalty tothe best interests of the defendant, for fear that uncompensated workwilldivertattentionfrompayingwork;third,theconflictcreatedbytheprosecutor’sactualorpossibleconditioningofthereducedsentenceonthewaiveroffeeswillincreasethelikelihoodthatdefendantswilllaterseektosetasideconvictionsorguiltypleasonthegroundthattheywerenot represented by conflict-free counsel; and fourth, if the crime forwhichthedefendantisbeingprosecutedreallyshouldcarryaparticularsentenceunderstatelaw,itisinappropriateforthatinteresttobeignoredsolelyforthepurposeofsavingmoney.

Finally, theactionsof theprosecutorconflictwithhisobligation to“avoideventheappearanceofprofessionalimpropriety.”24AstheEC’sinCanon9provide:

ContinuationoftheAmericanconceptthatwearetobegovernedbyrulesoflawrequiresthatthepeoplehavefaiththatjusticecan


beobtained throughour legalsystem.A lawyershouldpromotepublicconfidence inour systemand in the legalprofession . . .Publicconfidenceinlawandlawyersmaybeerodedbyirrespon-sibleorimproperconductofalawyer....Whenexplicitethicalguidancedoesnotexist,alawyershoulddeterminehisconductbyactinginamannerthatpromotespublicconfidenceintheintegrityandefficiencyofthelegalsystemandthelegalprofession.25

Allofthisisespeciallytrue,ofcourse,ofaprosecutor.Publiccon-fidence in the legal system iscertainlynotpromotedbyactionswhichhave the effect of discouraging competent counsel from representingcriminaldefendants, interferingwithrightsguaranteedbythestateandFederal constitutions, and sacrificing the best interests of the state forpurelymonetaryreasons.

Forthesereasons,weconcludethatitisunethicalforaprosecutortoconditionapleaagreementinacriminalcaseonappointedorprobonocounsel’swaiverofanyclaimsforattorneys’fees.__________1 The prosecutor is bound by the Standards of Conduct (hereinafter“Standards”)andtheaspirationalDirectoryRules(hereinafter“DR”)andEthicalConsiderations(hereinafter“EC”).SeeStandard70(a).2EC7-13.3 SeeDR 7-103 and EC’s 7-13 and 7-14;Model Rule 3.8; andABAStandardsforCriminalJustice(hereinafter“JusticeStandards”)3-1.1.4EC7-13.5Freedman,UnderstandingLawyers’Ethics214(1990).6SeeTheAmericanLawyer’sCodeofConduct,Rule3.1(1982).7 Criminal Justice Standard 4-1.1(b); See EC 7-19, stating that “Thedutyof a lawyer to his client andhis duty to the legal systemare thesame: to represent his client zealouslywithin the bounds of the law.”SeealsoDR7-101;ModelRule1.3(Diligence),comment.AlsoseeTheAmericanLawyer’sCodeofConduct,Rule3.1,whichstates,“Alawyershallusealllegalmeansthatareconsistentwiththeretaineragreement,and reasonable available, to advance a client’s interests as the clientperceivesthem.”8 See United States Constitution, amend. VI, which provides, “In allcriminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . .to havethe assistance of counsel for his defense.” Also see Strickland v.Washington,446U.S.668(1984).9SeeGeorgiaConstitution,Art.1,§1,~14oftheGeorgiaConstitution,stating“Everypersonchargedwithanoffenseagainst the lawsof thisstate shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel . . . . “Also seeAustinv.Carter,248Ga.774(1982).10SeeUniformSuperiorCourtRule29.8(C),whichprovidesthat“Moredifficult cases shall be assigned to attorneys with sufficient levels ofexperience and competence to afford adequate representation.” Alsosee Rules 29.8(D), providing that “Less experienced attorneys shouldbe assigned caseswhich arewithin their capabilities. . .” and 29.8(E)providing,“Casesinwhichthedeathpenaltyissoughtshallbeassignedonlytoattorneysofsufficientexperience,skill,andcompetencetorendereffectiveassistanceofcounseltodefendants....”11ABACodeofJudicialConduct,Preamble(1990).12SeeCuylerv.Sullivan,446U.S.335(1980)andWilsonv.State,257Ga.352(1987).13(emphasissupplied).DR5-101statesessentiallythesamerule,butinaspirationalform.TheDR,however,doesnotrequirethattheconsentofaclientbewritten.14EC2-17.15ABAOpinion302(1961).16 The EC’s encourage lawyers to do pro bono work (See EC 2-25,stating “[E]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominenceor pro-fessionalworkload,shouldfindtimetoparticipateinservingthedisad-vantaged...““Whenalawyerisappointedbyacourtorrequestedbyabarassociationtoundertakerepresentationofapersonunabletoobtaincounsel,...heshouldnotseektobeexcusedfromundertakingtherep-resentationexceptforcompellingreasons.”EC2-29.

At the same time, lawyers are not expected to unselfishly offerunlimitedtimeforinadequatepay.InOpinion87-3,theNebraskaStateBarCommittee onEthics found that a “compelling reason” to declineappointment to represent an indigent in a criminal defense matter isthat“[a]cceptancewouldimposeunreasonablefinancialhardshiponthelawyer.”17DR5-104(B)statesthesamerule,butinaspirationalform.18 See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.denied,451U.S.938(1981),inwhichtheCourtnotedthatthepublica-tionagreementaffectedcounsel’stacticalchoices.Toenhancethesensa-tionalismofthetrial,hefailedtoadequatelyinvestigate,seekacontinu-ance,orrequestachangeofvenue;healsoputdefendantonthestand.19U.S.Const.amend.VI.20Flemingv.State,246Ga.90(1980)(deathpenaltyappealinvokingtheStateSupremeCourt’s“supervisoryroleofthebar”).21CriminalJusticeStandards,supra.

22SeeEC7-13.23 EC 7-13 states, “[H]is duty is to seek justice . . . during trial theprosecutorisnotonlyanadvocatebuthealsomaymakedecisionsnor-mallymadebyanindividualclient,andthoseaffectingthepublicinterestshouldbefairtoall....”Incriminallitigation,itistheprosecutorwhostandsintheshoesofthepeople,anditishisresponsibilitytomakesurethatbothfairnessandjusticearepursued.24Canon 9 provides, “A lawyer should avoid even the appearance ofprofessionalimpropriety.”25EC9-1,9-2.



ForreferencestoStandardsofConduct22,pleaseseeRule1.16.

For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see Rule1.16(d).

Ethical Obligation of Criminal Defense Lawyers to Provide Indigent Clients with Copies of Transcripts Needed to Pursue Collateral Post-Conviction Remedies.

Standard 22(b) requires a criminal defense attorney to providecopiesoftranscriptstoindigentclients,withoutcosttotheclients,whenever that isnecessary toavoid foreseeableprejudice to theclientsuponterminationoftherepresentationoftheclientsbythedefenseattorney.

Correspondent asks if public defenders are ethically obligated toprovideindigentclientswithcopiesoftranscriptsneededtopursuecol-lateralpost-convictionremedies.Apparently,thepublicdefenderofficedoes not provide representation on collateral post-conviction remediesyetwishestoretainthepauperedtranscriptinitsfileforitsownpurposes.Makingadditionalcopiesoftranscriptsforindigentclientswillimposeafinancialburdenuponthepublicdefender.

Standard22(b)requiresthepublicdefenderoranycriminaldefenseattorneytoprovidecopiesoftranscriptstoindigentclients,withoutcosttotheclients,wheneverthatisnecessarytoavoidforeseeableprejudicetotheclientuponterminationof therepresentationof theclientbythepublicdefender.Standard22(b),initspertinentpart,provides:

Alawyershallnotwithdrawfromemploymentuntilhehastakenreasonablestepstoavoidforeseeableprejudicetotherightsofhisclient,including...deliveringtotheclientallpapersandpropertytowhichtheclientisentitled.While,byitsownterms,Standard22(b)appliesonlyuponwithdrawal,thepurposeofStandard22(b)is invoked whenever there is a termination of a lawyer-clientrelationship.1

Apauperedtranscriptisa“paper...towhichtheclientisentitled.”ThatphrasemustbeinterpretedinlightofthepurposeoftheStandardwhichistoavoidprejudicetoaclient’srights.Therecanbenodoubtthatthe lackofa transcriptcanprejudice theassertionof rightsby thecli-entinacollateralpost-convictionreliefmatter.Inaddition,theattorneyobtained the paupered transcript under a claimof rightwhich belongsto the client not to the attorney. Standard 22(b) obligates attorneys todelivertranscriptsandanyothercourtdocumentswhichwouldbeusefulintheclient’spursuitofrights.2

TheobligationcreatedbyStandard22 is limited to thosesituationsin which the client would be prejudiced by the failure to deliver thetranscript. Ifanadditionalcopyofapauperedtranscript isavailable totheclientfromthecourtforuseincollateralpost-convictionproceedings,the clientmaynot be prejudiced by a refusal to deliver the transcript.Whetheradditionalcopiesofpauperedtranscriptsareorshouldbeavail-ablefromthecourtisnotamatterforthisopinion.

As we stated in Advisory Opinion 87-5, attorneys are entitled tokeepcopiesofpapersintheirclientfiles,but,absentaprioragreementas tocosts,asituation inapplicablehere, theattorneybears thecostofcopying.3 It would be completely inconsistent with the nature of therelationshipbetweenthepublicdefenderorotherdefensecounselandtheindigentcriminaldefendanttoconditionreleaseofdocumentsessentialtofurtherappealsuponthepaymentofcostsofcopying.

Incaseswherethecriminaldefenselawyerdoesnothavethetranscriptavailablethroughnofaultofhisown,hehasnoobligationtoprovideit.


__________1 Standard 21 makes the withdrawal rules applicable to cases of dis-chargebytheclientaswell:“A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permissionif requiredby its rules,shallwithdrawfromemploymentanda lawyerrepresentingaclientinothermattersshallwithdrawfromemployment,ifheisdischargedbyhisclient.”2Inaccord,ABAInformalOpinion1376.3Inaccord,MichiganOpin.No.CI-926.


OnJune9,2004,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiaamendedGeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct7.3.Asaresult,thisformaladvisoryopinionnolongerprovidesanaccurateinterpretationoftheethicalrules.PleaseseeRule7.3 (c)(2)whichadequatelyaddresses theissuediscussedinthisopinion.

Ethical Propriety of Lawyer Referral Service Collecting a Percentage of Fees in Certain Cases Referred to Participating Attorneys by the Service

Any division of attorney’s fees with a lawyer referral serviceconstitutes the sharing of feeswith a nonlawyer in violation ofStandard26ofBarRule4-102.

Correspondentrepresentsalocalbarassociationthatoperatesanon-profitlawyerreferralservice.Theinquiryconcernstheethicalproprietyof the lawyer referral servicecollectingapercentageof fees incertaincasesreferredtoparticipatingattorneysbytheservice.

Standard26ofBarRule4-102providesinpertinentpartthatalawyerorlawfirmshallnotsharelegalfeeswithanonlawyer.

While themembership of the local bar association is composed oflawyerswhoarelicensedtopracticelawinthestate,thelocalbarasso-ciation,inandofitself,hasnoauthoritytoengageinthepracticeoflaw.Therefore,anydivisionofattorney’sfeeswithalawyerreferralservicewould constitute the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation ofStandard26ofBarRule4-102.

Moreover,“[a]lawyershallnotcompensateorgiveanythingofvaluetoapersonororganization...asarewardforhavingmadearecommenda-tionresultinginhis[orher]employmentbyaclient.”Thelawyermaypayonly“theusualandreasonablefeesordueschargedbyabonafidelawyerreferralserviceoperatedbyanorganizationauthorizedbylaw....”Standard13(b).


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct45,pleaseseeRules1.15(I)and1.2.

Ethical Considerations Applicable to a Lawyer Paying Funds to Others Over a Client’s Objections

Inthosecaseswhereitisnotpossibletoascertainwhoisentitledtodisputed fundsheldby the lawyer, the lawyermayholdsuchdisputedfundsinthelawyer’strustaccountforareasonableperiodoftimewhileendeavoringtoresolvethedispute.Ifaresolutioncannotbereached,itwouldbeappropriateforalawyertointerpleadsuchdisputedfundsintoacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.

Ineverycasealawyerhasadutytorepresenttheclientandthecli-ent’s interest. The client’s instructions should be followed wheneverpossiblewithintherestrictionsprovidedintheStandards,including,butnotlimitedto,Standard45,andapplicablelaw.


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct47,pleaseseeRule4.2.

ThisopinionalsodiscussesissuesaddressedbyRule4.3.

Question Presented:

May a lawyer properly contact and interview former employees ofanorganizationrepresentedbycounseltoobtaininformationrelevanttolitigationagainsttheorganization?

Summary Answer:

A lawyermayproperlycontact and interview formeremployeesofanorganization that is representedbycounsel toobtainnon-privilegedinformationrelevanttolitigationagainsttheorganizationprovidedthat:(1) thelawyermakesfulldisclosureas totheidentityofhis/herclient;and(2)theformeremployeeconsents.

Opinion:

Thequestionpresented involvesattempts toobtain information fromformer employees of an organization represented by counsel and is anaspectoftheperennialproblemofinformationcontrolbylawyersengagedin litigation.Lawyers do notwant their adversary colleagues to contactand interview employees of their client organization for the purpose ofobtaininginformationthatmaybeusedagainsttheorganization.Butaruleprohibitingsuchcontactwithoutconsentoftheorganization’slawyergivesthatlawyerarightofinformationcontrol,arightthatiseasilysubjecttoabuse.Therefore,strongpolicyreasonsmustsupportsucharule.

Theproblemisanoutgrowthoftherulethatalawyershallnotcom-municate about the subject of the representation with a person repre-sentedbyalawyerwithoutthepriorconsentofthelawyer.Standard47,Ga.BarRule4-102.Thisrulehasbeenwidelyadopted,see,e.g.,Rule4.2, ABAMRPC, and is deemed to represent sound policy. Lawyersshouldnotbeabletocontactandattempttomanipulatetheclientsoffel-lowmembersofthebar,especiallywhenthelawyer’spurposeindoingsoistoservehisorherownself-interestindisregardofthewelfareoftheotherlawyer’sclient.

This policy explainswhy Standard 47 applies to the employees oforganizationclientswhen thoseemployeeshave thepower tobind theorganizationbywhattheysayordo.FormalAdv.Op.87-6(July1989).The words of a former employee can provide only information, andthosewordscannothaveabindingeffectontheformeremployer.Sinceneitherwordsnoractionsofaformeremployeecanbindtheorganiza-tion, thepolicyreliedon inFormalAdv.Op.87-5 isnotapplicable toformeremployees.Whenthepurposeoftheruleends,theruleitselfends.Therefore,alawyermaycontactandinterviewtheformeremployeesofanorganizationtoobtainnon-privilegedinformationtouseagainstthatorganizationinadispute.

That,however,doesnotconcludethematter.Justasaruleprohibitingsuchcontactwouldbeanexampleof informationcontrolunsupportedbyanyvalidpolicyconsiderations,sothelawyer’scontactandinterviewwithoutinformingtheemployeeofthepurposewouldbeanexampleofinformationcontrol in thesamecategory.Aformeremployeemaynotwish togive informationagainst the formeremployer,andsinceheorsheisentitlednottodoso,itwouldbeunethicaltousedeceitandfalsepretensestodenytheformeremployeehisorherright.Consequently,theformeremployeeisentitledtoknowtheidentityofthelawyer’sclient,the reason for the contact, the purpose of the interview and any otherinformation necessary under the circumstances to make the interviewnotmisleading.Arefusaloftheformeremployeetogranttheinterviewmeansonlythatthelawyermustresorttothenormaldiscoveryprocessesandwitnessprocedures.

Itfollows,then,thatwhilealawyermaycontactaformeremployeeofanorganization for thepurposesofan interview,beforeproceedingwiththeinterview,thatlawyermustmakefulldisclosureandobtaintheconsentoftheformeremployee.

While this opinion has not dealt with the situation in which theorganizationisnotrepresentedbyalawyer,itiswelltonotetwothings.First,thereisnoruleofethicsprohibitingthecontactinsuchasituation;second, even when there is no lawyer representing the organization,theformeremployeestillhasarighttoknowthereasonforthecontactandthepurposeoftheinterview.Therefore,itwouldbeunethicalforalawyer toattempt toobtain informationwithout fulldisclosure. In thiscontextasinothers,alawyer’sattempttoobtaininformationunderfalsepretensesorbytheuseofdeceitisunethical.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON OCTOBER 4, 1995FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 95-1


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct23,pleaseseeRule1.16(d).


For references toStandard ofConduct 28, please seeRules 1.6and1.8(b).


For references to Standard of Conduct 31(a), please see Rule1.5(a).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct40,pleaseseeRule1.8(f).

Question Presented:

MayalawyerpracticinglawinGeorgiaethicallyparticipateinafeecollectionprogramwhichpurchasesclientfeebillsfromlawyersandcol-lectsthefeesfromtheclient?Toparticipateintheprogram,thelawyermustenrollandpayafee;andagreetoassigntheclient’sfeesbillsandshareinformationabouttheclientandtheclient’scasewiththeprogram.

Summary Answer:

Becausethelawyer’sparticipationwillresultinaviolationofoneormoredisciplinaryStandards,membersoftheStateBarofGeorgiacannotethicallyparticipateintheprogram.

Opinion:

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A fee collection program purchases client fee bills from lawyersandcollectsthefeesfromtheclient.Toparticipateintheprogram,thelawyermustenrollandpayafee;andagreetoassigntheclient’sfeesbillsandshare informationabout theclientandtheclient’scasewiththeprogram.

Iftheclientiscreditworthy,theprogramwillpaytheclient’sbillandthenproceedtocollectthefeesfromtheclientonaninstallmentbasis,charginginterestaccordingtothecreditworthinessof theclient; if theclientisnotcreditworthy,theprogramwillproceedtocollectthefeesforthelawyer,butwithoutanyadvancepayment,remittingonly80%oftheamountofthefeescollected.

The lawyer is required by the program’s Participation Agreementto grade clients according to their legal needs and ability to pay. TheParticipationAgreementcontainsthefollowingprovisions:

Thelawyermust“discloseeventsorcircumstancesmateriallyaffect-ing...creditworthiness”of theclient.Thelawyerisrequiredtowarrantand covenant, among other terms, the following: that the application,creditagreementandvoucher“havebeensignedbyeithertheClient,apersonauthorizedtosignontheClient’sbehalf,orthepersonwhowillberesponsibleforrepayingthecreditextendedundertheProgram,andsuchClientorpersonhasbeenidentifiedbyavaliddriver’s licenseorstate identification card”; “the Voucher accurately describes and evi-dencesthetypeofservicewhichhasbeenprovidedtotheClient”;“theClient is not in defaultwith respect to any agreement betweenClientand Participant (lawyer), other than regarding accounts receivable”;and“Participanthasnoknowledgeofanyfactswhichmayresultintheuncollectabilityand/orunenforceabilityoftheCreditAgreement”.

Thustoparticipateintheprogram,thelawyermustprovideinforma-tionabouttheclientthatmaywellviolatetheclient’srightofconfiden-tiality.Moreover, theclientmustsignthelawyer’svoucherwarrantingthesatisfactorynatureofthelawyer’sservices,acknowledgingthatthefeesarereasonable,andagreeing topayfinancecharges inaddition tothereasonablefee.

II. THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PROGRAM.

Preliminarily, it should be noted that a client’s use of a programvoucher is not analogous to a client’s useof all-purpose credit cardsto pay for services of a lawyer. Rather, the program is essentially afinancecompanydesignedtoprovideaserviceexclusivelyforlawyersandclients.

InGeorgia,lawyersareofficersoftheCourt,Platenv.Byck,50Ga.245, 248 (1873); BibbCounty v.Hancock, 211Ga. 429, 438 (1955);Samsv.Olah,225Ga.497,504(1969),and,asmembersoftheStateBar,aremembers of the administrative armof theGeorgiaSupremeCourtengagedintheadministrationofjustice.

The office of attorney is indispensable to the administration ofjusticeandisintimateandpeculiarinitsrelationto,andvitaltothewell-beingof,thecourt.

Samsv.Olah,supra,at504.Thus, the lawyer is“‘anofficerof thestate,withanobligation to thecourtsandto thepublicno lesssignifi-cantthanhisobligationtohisclient,’”id.,andthelegalprofession“[d]emands adherence to the public interest as the foremost obligation ofthepractitioner.”FirstBank&TrustCo.v.Zagoria,250Ga.844,845(1983).

Thebasicviceof theprogram is that itviolatesboth the spirit andthe letterof thesepreceptsby requiring the lawyer todilutehisorherroleas fiduciary.Forexample, the lawyer requires theclient to signawarranty as to the services rendered,which purports to contract awaythe client’s legal right to complainor to dismiss the lawyer.A funda-mentalruleapplicabletothelawyerasfiduciaryisthat“aclienthastheabsoluterighttodischargetheattorneyandterminatetherelationatanytime,evenwithoutcause.”Whitev.Aiken,197Ga.29(1943).(SeealsoStandard26).

The dilution of the lawyer’s fiduciary role is further indicated bythefactthatalawyer’sparticipationintheprogramentailsthepossibleviolationofatleastsixstandardsoftheStateBarofGeorgia:Standards23,26,28,30,31(a),and40.

Standard23requiresalawyerwhowithdrawsfromemploymentto refund any unearned fees. Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer fromsharinglegalfeeswithanon-lawyer.Standard28prohibitsalawyerfrom revealing the confidences or secrets of a client. Standard 30prohibitsrepresentationwherethelawyer’sexerciseofprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofaclientmaybeaffectedbyhisownfinancial,business, property or personal interest. Standard 31(a) prohibitsthe lawyer from charging a clearly excessive fee. And Standard40prohibitsalawyerfromacceptingcompensationfromoneotherthan the client for representation of the clientwithout the consentoftheclient.

Becausethelawyer’sparticipationwillresultinaviolationofoneormoreof theseStandards,membersof theStateBarofGeorgia cannotethicallyparticipateintheprogram.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON JANUARY 25, 1996FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 96-1

This opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including bothDirectoryRulesandEthicalConsiderations, thatbearuponmat-tersdirectlyaddressedbyRule1.8(h).Theconduct,whichisthesubjectofthisFormalAdvisoryOpinion,isnowspecificallyandclearlyprohibitedbyRule1.8(h).

For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see Rule1.16(d).

Question Presented:

Thequestionpresentediswhetheranattorneymayrequireaclient,whodesirestodischargethelawyer,toenterintoanagreementreleasingthelawyerforallclaimsbytheclientagainstthelawyer,includinganydisciplinarycomplaintwiththeStateBar,inordertoobtaintheclient’sfiles from the lawyer andawaiverof anyclaimof lienby the lawyeragainstsuchfiles.

Summary Answer:

Alawyershouldrepresentaclientcompetentlyandshouldexerciseindependent professional judgment on behalf of the client by puttingthe interests of a client ahead of the lawyer’s own personal interests.Therefore,alawyershouldnotconditionthereturnofaformerclient’sfilesupontheexecutionofareleaseofclaimsandareleaseofStateBardisciplinarycomplaintsbytheclientagainstthelawyer.

Opinion:

It has been brought to the attention of theStateBar’sDisciplinaryBoard that lawyers are following a practice of requiring a client,whodesires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement releasing thelawyerfromanyliabilityforclaimsrelatingtothelawyer’srepresenta-tionof theclient inorder for theclient toobtain thepapersanddocu-mentsthatconstitutetheclient’sfile.Onesuchagreementincludesthefollowingprovision:


...itisherebyagreedthat[theclient]herebyreleasesandforeverdischarges [the lawyers]...from all...claims,...including any dis-ciplinary complaint with the State Bar of Georgia...which [theclient]everhadormayhave[against thelawyers] includingbutnot limited to [the lawyers] representation of [the client] in theabovestatedmatter....[Thelawyers]...waiveanyclaimoflienthattheyhaveinsaidmatter.

It is apparent from reviewing this provision that the lawyer beingdischargedisattemptingtoconditionthereleaseoftheclient’sfilesuponthewaiverofanyclaims,includingclaimsformalpracticeandStateBardisciplinarycomplaints,bytheclientagainstthelawyer.ThisattemptbythelawyertolimithisorherliabilityformalpracticeconstitutesafailuretocomplywithCanon6oftheCanonofEthics,whichprovidesthatalawyer should represent a client competently. As clearly explained inEthicalConsideration6-6:

Alawyershouldnotseek,bycontractorothermeans,tolimithisindividualliabilitytohisclientforhismalpractice.Alawyerwhohandles theaffairsofhis clientproperlyhasnoneed toattemptto limit his liability for his professional activities and onewhodoesnothandletheaffairsofhisclientproperlyshouldnot[be]permittedtodoso.

The provisions of this Ethical Consideration are emphasized byDirectoryRule6-102:

(A)Alawyershallnotattempttoexoneratehimselffromorlimithisliabilitytohisclientforhispersonalmalpractice.

Clearly, thepracticeof requiringa client,whodesires todischargethelawyer,toexecuteanagreementasdescribedhereinbeforereleasingtheclient’s files is anattempt to exonerate the lawyer from individualliabilitytohisorherclient.Assuch,thispracticeconstitutesaviolationofCanon6oftheCanonsofEthics.

Furthermore, Canon 5 of the Canons of Ethics provides that a “alawyershouldexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofaclient.”AsexplainedinEthicalConsideration5-1:

Theprofessionaljudgmentofalawyershouldbeexercised,withintheboundsofthelaw,solelyforthebenefitofhisclientandfreeofuncompromisinginfluencesandloyalties.Neitherhispersonalinterests,theinterestsofotherclients,northedesiresofthirdper-sonsshouldbepermittedtodilutehisloyaltytohisclient.

Byattemptingtolimithisorherliabilityformalpracticeasacon-ditionofreleasingtheclient’sfiles,thelawyerputshimselforherselfintoanadversarialrelationshipwiththeclient.Bypurposefullywith-holdingpapers,documents,andevidenceintheclient’sfileuntiltheclientagreestoexecuteanagreementreleasingthelawyerfromanyliabilityforclaimsormalpractice,thelawyer’spersonalinterestsareplacedaheadoftheinterestsoftheclient.Thisconductamountstoafailuretoexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclient inviolationofCanon5of theStateBarofGeorgia’sCanonsofEthics.

In addition, by conditioning the return of a client’s files and thewaiverofanylienthatthelawyermighthaveagainstsuchfilesupontheexecutionof a releaseof claims formalpractice and complaints to theStateDisciplinaryBoard,thelawyerhaspotentiallycausedprejudicetotheclientinviolationofStandard22(b)oftheStandardsofConductfortheStateBarofGeorgiawhichprovidesasfollows:

Alawyershallnotwithdrawfromemploymentuntilhehastakenreasonablestepstoavoidforeseeableprejudicetotherightsofhisclient,includingdeliveringtotheclientallpapersandpropertytowhich the client is entitled and complyingwith applicable lawsandrules.

By such conduct, the lawyer has also potentially caused prejudiceto the client inviolationofFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo. 87-5whichprovidesasfollows:

Anattorney’sethicalobligationnottocauseprejudicetohisorherclientisparamountoverrightsunderthelienstatute.Accordingly,anattorneymaynottotheprejudiceofaclientwithholdtheclient’spapersorpropertiesuponwithdrawalassecurityforunpaidfees.

In summary, the practice of requiring a client, that desires to dis-chargealawyer,toexecuteanagreement,suchasdescribedherein,isanattemptbythelawyertoeitherexoneratehimselforherselffromclaims

formalpracticeorlimithisorherliabilitytotheclientforactsofmal-practice,andsuchconductisimproper.


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct9(c),pleaseseeComment[1]ofRule7.5.

For references toStandardofConduct10, please seeRule1.10Comments.

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct11,pleaseseeRule7.5(b).

For references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see Rules 7.1and7.5(a).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct9(a)(tradenames),pleaseseeRules7.1,7.5(a),and7.5(e).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct9(a)(lawyerspracticingtogetherunderfirmname),pleaseseeComments[1]and[6]ofRule1.10andComment[2]ofRule7.5(e).

ForreferencetoStandardofConduct9(b)(useofnameoflawyer-pubicofficialinfirmname),pleaseseeRule7.5(c).



For references toStandardsofConduct 35-38, please seeRules1.7,1.8(c),1.9,and2.2.

Question Presented:

Mayanattorneypracticeinmorethanonelawfirm?

Summary Answer:

An attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firmso long as those firms represent different ownership, the public andindividual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to allrequirementsoftheStandardsgoverningconflictsofinterestandclientconfidencesandsecrets.

Opinion:

Correspondentaskswhetheranattorneymaypracticeinmorethanonelaw firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, includingfirmswithoverlappingpartners,firmswithdifferentassociates,andfirmsformedfordifferentclientsordifferentpurposes.EachpotentialstructureraisesdifferentproblemsundertheGeorgiaStandardsofConduct.Inaddi-tiontothestructuralconcernsraisedbyCorrespondent,overlappingfirmscreatespecialproblemsofconflictofinterestandclientconfidentiality.

Standard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: “A law firm shall notsimultaneously practice law under more than one name.” Thus firmscomposed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for thepractice of law,whether by using different associates, or for differentpracticeareasordifferentclients.

Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same “lawfirm,” however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm fromjoiningwithdifferentprincipalssimultaneouslyinadifferentpracticeorpractices.OtherStandardsrecognizeandacceptnontraditionalpracticeforms.Standard10 recognizes that “[a] partnership for the practice oflawmaybecomposedofoneormore individualprofessionalcorpora-tions.”Standard11dealswith interstate law firms inwhichpersonnelandadmissionstopracticearedistinctfromstatetostate.

Theprincipalproblemcreatedbydistinctbutoverlappingpracticefirmsis actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformlyprotectagainstanyfirmstructureordesignationwhichcreatesthatpossibil-ity.Standard8 (firmnames, printing andpublications) andStandard9(a)(tradenames)forbidany“false,fraudulent,deceptiveormisleading”usage.Standard9(a)tiestheseconcernstoclientunderstandings“astothelawyerorlawyerspracticingunderthatnameortothetypeofpracticeinwhichthelawyerorlawyersareengaged.”SeealsoEC2-11(sameconcernmoregen-eral).Standard10addsthat“[a]lawyershallnotholdhimselfoutashavingapartnershipwithoneormoreotherlawyersunlesstheyare ...partners.”


SeealsoFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.93-1(“specialcounsel”relationship“mustbe...identifiedcorrectlysothatclientsandpotentialclientsarefullyaware”). Inaddition,Standard9(b)prohibitsusing thenameofa lawyer-publicofficial“notactivelyandregularlypracticingwiththefirm.”SeealsoEC2-11(sameconcernmoregeneral);AdvisoryOpinionNo.23(disclosurerequirementsforofficeofmultistatefirm).

Inshort,alawyer’sengaginginmultiplepracticeswithdistinctown-ershipisnotprohibitedbytheStandards,solongasneitherthegeneralpublicnoranyindividualclientisormaybemisledthereby.

Theprecise stepswhicheach firmmust take toavoidbeing“false,fraudulent,deceptiveormisleading”arebeyondthescopeofthisopin-ion.Ifalawyerpracticesinmorethanoneactivefirm,heorshemayberequiredtoidentifythosefirmsinallcommunicationstothegeneralpub-lic, togetherwithappropriatedistinctionsbetweenoramongthem;andmayneedtoexplaintoeachclientorpotentialclientat theoutsethowthatclientwillorwouldbeserved.Theclientneedstounderstandwhoisofferingtoperformorwillperformservices,andtowhomtheclientshouldlookforanswersorredressincaseofanyproblem.

Participation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns forconflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising fromthe overlapping lawyer’s or lawyers’ work in another firm or firms.The relevantStandardsapplywith full force to interrelatedpractices.Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where theywere obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherevertheygo.Standard38vicariouslydisqualifieseachfirmincaseofanyindividualdisqualificationunderStandards35-37,regardlessofwhichfirm’sworkgives rise to individualdisqualification.SeealsoFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similarcontextof“specialcounsel”).


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct4,pleaseseeRule8.4(a)(4).

ForreferencestoStandardsofConduct5,pleaseseeRules7.1(a).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct6,pleaseseeRule7.3(b).


ForreferencestoStandardsofConduct44,pleaseseeRule1.3.

For references to Standard of Conduct 45(b), please see Rule7.1(a)(1).

Question Presented:

Whetheritisethicallypermissibleforadepartingattorneytosendacommunicationtoclientsoftheformerlawfirm?

Opinion:

No Standard prohibits a departing attorney from contacting thoseclientswithwhomtheattorneypersonallyworkedwhileatthelawfirm.Aclientisnotthepropertyofacertainattorney.Themainconsiderationunderlying ourCanons of Ethics is the best interest and protection oftheclient.

Anattorneyhasadutytokeepaclientinformed.Thisdutyflowsin part from Standard 22 which provides that a lawyer shall notwithdraw from employment until that lawyer has taken reasonablesteps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client including givingdue notice to the client of the lawyer’s withdrawal, allowing timefor employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papersand property to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Furthermore, Standard 44 prohibits anattorney’swillfulabandonmentordisregardofa legalmatter to theclient’sdetriment.Therefore, to theextent thata lawyer’sdeparturefromthefirmaffects theclient’s legalmatters, thisclientshouldbeinformedoftheattorney’sdeparture.Thefactorcircumstancesofanattorney’sdeparturefromalawfirmshouldnotbemisrepresentedtothefirm’sclients.SeeStandard4(whichprohibitsanattorneyfromengaginginprofessionalconductinvolvingdishonesty,fraud,deceit,orwillfulmisrepresentation);andStandard45(b)(whichprohibitsanattorney fromknowinglymakinga false statementof lawor fact inhisrepresentationofaclient).

Ifthedepartingattorneyeitherhadsignificantcontactwithoractivelyrepresentedaclientontheclient’slegalmatters,theattorneymaycom-municate with the client, in either written or oral form, to advise theclient of the attorney’s departure from the firm. An appropriate com-municationmayadvisetheclientofthefactoftheattorney’sdeparture,theattorney’snew location, theattorney’swillingness toprovide legalservicestotheclient,andtheclient’srighttoselectwhohandlesthecli-ent’sfuturelegalrepresentation.

Assuming thedepartingattorneyeitherhadsignificantcontactwithoractivelyrepresentedtheclient,thewrittencommunicationtotheclientdoesnotneed tocomplywith theprovisionsgoverningadvertisementscontained in Standard 6, because it would not constitute “a writtencommunication to a prospective client for the purposes of obtainingprofessionalemployment”ascontemplatedbyStandard6(i.e.thewrit-ten communication is not required to be labeled an “advertisement”).Of course, any written communication regarding a lawyer’s servicesmustalsocomplywithStandard5,whichprohibitsanyfalse,fraudulent,deceptiveormisleadingcommunications;andwithanyotherapplicablestandardsofconduct.

A similar analysis should also apply to an oral communication bythedepartingattorneytoaclientwithwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationonlegalmatterswhileatthefirm.Ifthedepartingattorneycontactssuchaclientorally,thatattorneyshouldonlyprovideinformationthatisdeemedappropriateinawrittencommunica-tionassetforthabove.

Withrespecttothetimingofthedisclosureoftheattorney’sdepartureto theclient, theultimateconsideration is theclient’sbest interest.Totheextentpractical,ajointnotificationbythelawfirmandthedepartingattorneyto theaffectedclientsof thechangeis thepreferredcourseofactionforsafeguardingtheclient’sbestinterests.However,theappropri-atetimingofanotificationtotheclientisdeterminedonacasebycasebasis.Dependingonthenatureofthedepartingattorney’sworkfortheclient,theclientmayneedadvancenotificationofthedeparturetomakeadeterminationastofuturerepresentation.

Thedepartingattorneymayalsoowecertaindutiestothefirmwhichmay require that the departing attorney should advise the firm of theattorney’sintentiontoleavethefirmandtheattorney’sintentiontonotifyclientsofhisorherimpendingdeparture,priortoinformingtheclientsofthesituation.Specifically,thedepartingattorneyshouldnotengageinprofessionalconductwhichinvolves“dishonesty,fraud,deceit,orwillfulmisrepresentation”withrespecttotheattorney’sdealingswiththefirmassetforthinStandard4.

In conclusion, as long as the departing attorney complieswith theStandards governing advertisements, solicitation, and general profes-sional conduct, the attorney may ethically contact those clients withwhomtheattorneyhadsignificantcontactoractiverepresentationattheformerlawfirm,soastoadvisetheclientsoftheattorney’sdepartureaswellastheclient’srighttoselecthisorherlegalcounsel.Legalissueswhichmayarisefromaparticularsetoffactsinvolvingadepartingattor-ney including,butnot limited to,contractor tortious interferencewithcontract,arebeyondthescopeofthisformaladvisoryopinion.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON JUNE 1, 1998FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 98-2

ThisopinionreliesonStandardsofConduct61,62,63,and65thatbearuponmattersdirectlyaddressedbyRule1.15(I).

Question Presented:

Whenalawyerholdingclientfundsand/orotherfundsinafiduciarycapacity is unable to locate the rightful recipient of such funds afterexhaustingallreasonableefforts,maythatlawyerremovetheunclaimedfundsfromthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountanddeliverthefundstothecustody of theState ofGeorgia in accordancewith theDisposition ofUnclaimedPropertyAct?

Summary Answer:

A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciarycapacitymay remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer’s escrow trustaccountanddeliverthefundstothecustodyoftheStateofGeorgiainaccordancewiththeDispositionofUnclaimedPropertyActonlyifthelawyer,prior todelivery,hasexhaustedall reasonableefforts to locatetherightfulrecipient.


Opinion:

ManymembersoftheBarhavecontactedtheStateBarofGeorgiaforguidanceonhowtomanageclientfundsand/orotherfundsheldinafiduciarycapacityinthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountwhenthelawyerisunable to locate the rightful recipientof the fundsand the rightfulrecipientfails toclaimthefunds.Morespecifically, thelawyershaveaskedwhether theycouldethicallyremove theunclaimedfundsfromthelawyer’sescrowtrustaccountanddisbursethefundsinaccordancewith O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of UnclaimedPropertyAct.

Inthosecaseswherealawyerisholdingclientfundsand/orotherfundsinafiduciarycapacity,thelawyermustdosoincompliancewithStandards61,62,63and65.Whenthefundsbecomepayableordistributable,Standard61speakstothelawyer’sdutytodeliverfunds:“Alawyershallpromptlynotifyaclientofthereceiptofhisfunds,securitiesorotherpropertiesandshallpromptlydeliversuchfunds,securitiesorotherpropertiestotheclient.”ImplicitbothinthisStandard,andthelawyer’sresponsibilitytozealouslyrepresenttheclient,isthelawyer’sdutytoexhaustallreasonableeffortstolocatetherightfulrecipientinordertoensuredelivery.

Whenalawyerholdingfundsattemptstodeliverthosefundsincom-pliancewithStandard61butisunabletolocatetherightfulrecipient,thelawyerhasadutytoexhaustallreasonableeffortstolocatetherightfulrecipient.AfterexhaustingallreasonableeffortsandtheexpirationofthefiveyearperioddiscussedintheAct,ifthelawyerisstillunabletolocatetherightfulrecipientandtherightfulrecipientfailstoclaimthefunds,thefundsarenolongerconsideredclientfundsorfundsheldinafiduciarycapacity,butrather,thefundsarepresumedtobeabandonedasamatteroflaw,exceptasotherwiseprovidedbytheAct,andthelawyermaythendelivertheunclaimedfundstotheStateofGeorgiainaccordancewithO.C.G.A.§§44-12-190etseq., theDispositionofUnclaimedPropertyAct.A lawyerwho disburses the unclaimed funds as discussed aboveshallnotbeinviolationoftheStandards.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAON JUNE 1, 1998FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 98-3

ForreferencetoStandardofConduct47,pleaseseeRule4.2(b)(1).

ForreferencetoStandardofConduct48,pleaseseeRule1.7(a).

ForreferencetoDR7-103,pleaseseeRule3.8(a).

Question Presented:

Mayastafflawyerforanon-profitlegalservicesgroupcontactStateofficialstoexpressconcernsaboutthelegalityoftreatmentofnon-clients?

Summary Answer:

Astafflawyerforanon-profitlegalservicesgroupmaycontactStateofficialstoexpressconcernsaboutthelegalityoftreatmentofnonclientsandclientsalikebecausesuchcommunicationisauthorizedbylawandbecausetheStateisnotanadversepartyinthatsituation.

Opinion:

I.FactualScenario:

A staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group (hereinafter“lawyer”) receives information that a state prison inmate is denied aconstitutionally protected right by the housing institution. The lawyercontactstheWardenoftheinstitutioninwriting,notifyingtheWardenofthesituationfromtheperspectiveoftheinmate.Inaddition,thewrit-ing cites legal authority and argues that the institution has denied theinmate’sconstitutionallyprotectedrights. Inconclusion, the letteraskstheWarden to conform to the inmate’s demands in light of the legalauthoritycitedintheletter.

ThelawyerknowsthattheWardenisastateofficialwithmanagerialresponsibilities.ThelawyeralsoknowsthattheStateisrepresentedbytheAttorneyGeneral of theState.The lawyer does not seek approvalfromtheAttorneyGeneral’sofficepriortohiscorrespondence.

II.EthicalandLegalConsiderations

The factual scenario raises questions about the application ofStandard47.1Moreparticularly, thequestionsat issuearewhether thegovernmentisa“party”ascontemplatedbyStandard47andwhetherthe

communicationdescribedfallswithinthe“authorizedbylaw”exceptiontoStandard47.

Standard47Duringthecourseofhisrepresentationofaclient,alawyershallnotcommunicateorcauseanothertocommunicateonthesubjectoftherepresentationwithapartyheknowstoberepresentedbyalawyerinthatmatterunlesshehasthepriorwrittenconsentofthelawyerrepresentingsuchotherpartyor isauthorizedby law todoso.Aviolationofthisstandardmaybepunishedbyapublicreprimand.

The factual scenario describes a lawyer’s communication with agovernmentagencyheknowstoberepresentedbyalawyer,withoutthepriorwrittenconsentofthelawyerrepresentingthegovernmentagency.While the question presented refers to a “non client,” the factual sce-nariodescribesasituationwherethelawyerisofferinglegalassistanceon behalf of a person who presumably requested the assistance. SeeHuddlestonv.State,259Ga.45(1989)andLegacyHomesv.Cole,205Ga.App.34(1992)foradescriptionoftheformationoftheattorney-cli-entrelationship.Thus,thecommunicationisthesubjectofthelawyer’srepresentationofaclient.

Because the government is not an adverse party in this situation andbecause the communication described is authorized by law, Standard47 does not apply to the factual scenario presented. The communicationprohibitedbyStandard47protectsanadversepartyfromoverreachingbyopposingcounsel,protectstheattorney-clientrelationship,andreducesthelikelihoodthatclientswilldiscloseprivilegedinformationthatcouldharmtheirinterests.SeeABAFormalAdvisoryOpinion95-396foradescriptionofthehistoryandpurposeofsimilarrulesprohibitingsuchcommunication.

Standard 47 contemplates a situation where a party might takeadvantage of another with an adverse interest, through unauthorizedcommunication. However, the factual scenario described above is notsuchasituation.Thepurposeofthegovernmentistoprotectitspeople,including those it has taken into custody.This fundamental concept iswellrepresentedinourlaws,includingourBarRules.

Thepetition clauseof theFirstAmendment is directlyonpointinthisregard:

Congressshallmakenolaw...abridging...therightofthepeople...topetitiontheGovernmentforaredressofgrievances.

The government has a duty to make itself available to those whohave legitimate grievances. If a person, even a lawyer representing apersonincarceratedbytheState,hasreasontobelievethat theState isactinginanoppressivemanner,thatpersonhasarighttocommunicatethisgrievancedirectlytothegovernmentagencyinvolved.TodosoisaConstitutionallyprotectedrightandthusfallswithinthe“authorizedbylaw”exceptiontoStandard47.

EvenwhereStateofficials initiate a clearly adversarial proceeding,lawyersfortheStateareobligatedtoprotecttheinterestsoftheaccused.ThisconceptisreflectedinDirectoryRuleDR7-103:

(A)Apublicprosecutororothergovernmentlawyershallnotinsti-tuteor cause tobe institutedcriminal chargeswhenheknowsoritisobviousthatthechargesarenotsupportedbyprobablecause.

While the First Amendment and DR 7-103 contemplate differentsituations, theyboth incorporate thenotionthat thegovernmenthasaninterest inprotecting its citizens that is aparamount toany interests ithas inbeingprotectedfromthem.Inthefactualscenarioprovided, thegovernmentagencyhasaninterestinaddressingtheconcernsraisedbythe lawyer.While the governmentmay have competing interests, thatalonedoesnotmakethegovernmentanadverseparty.

Insummary,astafflawyerforanon-profitlegalservicesgroupmaycontact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treat-mentof clientsbecause suchcommunication is authorizedby lawandbecausetheStateisnotanadversepartyinthatsituation.Regardlessoftheadversarialnatureofthesituation,alawyershouldalwaysstrivetomaintaintheintegrityoftheprofession(Canon1)whilerepresentingthebest interest of his client, and should consider providing copiesof thecommunicationtotheStatelawyer.__________1ThisopiniondoesnotaddressStandard48whichprohibitsalawyersadvicetoapersonwhoisnotrepresentedbyalawyerwheretheinterestsofthepersonareorhaveareasonablepossibilityofbeinginconflictwiththeinterestsofhisclient.Inthefactualscenariodescribedinthisopinion,thelawyerknowsthatthestateinstitutionisrepresentedbytheAttorneyGeneralfortheState.



ForreferencestoStandardofConduct8,pleaseseeRule7.5(a);(incorporatingRule7.1).

For references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see Rules 7.1,7.5(a),7.5(e),7.5(e)(1),and7.5(e)(2).





ForreferencestoEC2-11,pleaseseeRule7.5(a)(incorporatingRule7.1),Rule7.5(e)(1)andComment[2]ofRule7.5.

ForreferencestoEC2-13,pleaseseeRule7.5(d)andComment[1]ofRule7.5.

ForreferencestoDR5-105(B),pleaseseeRule1.7(a).

For references to DR 5-105(C), please see Rule 1.7(b), whichincludesadditionalproceduralrequirements.

ForreferencestoDR5-105(D),pleaseseeRule1.10(a).

Question Presented:

Is it ethicallyproper fora lawyer to representacriminaldefendantwhenaco-defendantinthesamecriminalprosecutionisrepresentedbyasecondattorneywhoislistedonletterheadas“ofcounsel”tothesamelawfirm?

Summary Answer:

Because an attorneywho is held out to the public as “of counsel”should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliatedfirm,thestandardsofconductapplicabletomultiplerepresentationsbypartnersandassociatesof lawfirms,shouldalsoapplyto“ofcounsel”attorneys.Accordingly,whenan“ofcounsel”attorneywouldberequiredto decline or withdraw frommultiple representations under Standards35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other“ofcounsel”attorneyoftheprincipalfirmmayacceptorcontinuesuchemployment.

Opinion:

I. USE OF THE TERM “OF COUNSEL” ON MATERIALS INTENDED FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION.

The use of the term “of counsel” to denote relationships betweenattorneysandlawfirmshasincreasedinrecentyears.Traditionallythetermwasusedtodesignatesemi-retiredlawyerswhodesiredtomaintainaregularassociationwitha lawfirmforwhichtheywerepreviouslyafull-time attorney. Today, the term “of counsel” is used to describe awide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires orattorneyswhoare in-between associate andpartnership classifications.While theprimarypurposeof thisopinion isnot to limitordefine thetermsofsuchrelationships,theBoarddoesbelievethatsomeclarifica-tionisnecessarytoprotectmembersofthepublicwhomayrelyuponthe“ofcounsel”designationinselectinglegalrepresentation.

AlthoughtheGeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitydoesnotdefinetheterm“ofcounsel”, theAmericanBarAssociationhasissuedaformalopinionwhichdescribesthecorecharacteristicsofthetermasfollows:

...Aclose,regular,personalrelationship;butarelationshipwhichisneitherthatofapartner(oritsequivalent,aprincipalofapro-fessionalcorporation),withthesharedliabilityand/ormanagerialresponsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, thestatus ordinarily conveyed by the term ‘associate’, which is tosayajuniornon-partnerlawyer,regularlyemployedbythefirm.

(Emphasis added). ABA FormalAdvisoryOpinion 90-357 (1990).TheABAalsocontinuestoadheretoaspectsofitsearlieropinionwhichprohibited the use of the term “of counsel” to designate the follow-

ing relationships: (1) a relationship involvingonly a single case, (2) arelationshipofforwarderorreceiveroflegalbusiness,(3)arelationshipinvolvingonlyoccasionalcollaborativeefforts,and(4)relationshipofanoutsideconsultant.SeeABAFormalOpinion90-357(1990)(reaffirm-inginpartABAFormalOpinion330(1972)).OtherjurisdictionswhichhaveconsideredthisissuehaveadheredtotheABA’sdescriptionofthe“of counsel” relationships. See Florida Professional EthicsCommitteeOpinionNos.94-7(1995);StateBarofCaliforniaStandingCommitteeonProfessionalResponsibilityandConduct,FormalOpinionNo.1993-129andtheNewYorkStateBarAssociationCommitteeonProfessionalEthicsOpinionNo.262(1972).

TheBoardisoftheopinionthattheuseoftheterm“ofcounsel”onletterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended forpublicdistributionshoulddenotemorethancasualcontactsuchasmereoffice-sharingarrangementsandthatrequiringaclose,regular,personalrelationshipbetweenthe“ofcounsel’attorneyandtheprincipalfirmisinaccordancewiththereasonableexpectationsoftheconsumingpublic.Requiring attorneyswho are held out to the public as “of counsel” tohave a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm isalso in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiringlawyerstobescrupulousintherepresentationoftheirprofessionalstatusandprohibitingattorneysfrompracticingunder tradenameswhicharefalse,fraudulent,deceptiveorthatwouldtendtomisleadlaypersonsastotheidentityoflawyersactuallypracticinginthefirm.SeeStandardsofConduct8and9andEC2-11andEC2-13.

II. CONFLICTS ANALYSIS FOR “OF COUNSEL”RELATIONSHIPS.

Theissueastowhetherornotamemberofalawfirmmayrepresentadefendantwhopotentiallyhasanadverseinteresttoaco-defendantinthesamecriminalprosecutionandwhoissimultaneouslybeingrepresentedbyan“ofcounsel”attorneytothesamefirmmustbeanalyzedinlightoftherequirementthatsuchan“ofcounsel”relationshipbe“close,regularandpersonal”.TheBoardbelievesthattheprudentandethicalcourseisfortheattorneysinvolvedtoapplythesamestandardsinanalyzingthispotentialforconflictofrepresentationaswouldbeappliedinmoretra-ditionalrelationshipsexistingbetweenassociatesandpartnerswithotherattorneysintheirlawfirms.

Undertheselong-standingrules,anattorneyisprohibitedfromcontinu-ingmultipleemployment if theexerciseofhis independentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofaclientwillbe,orislikelytobe,adverselyaffectedbyhisrepresentationofanotherclient.SeeStandardsofConduct35and36andDR5-105(B).Ifthelawyerisrequiredtodeclineorwithdrawfromemployment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then nopartnerorassociateofhisfirmmayacceptorcontinuesuchemployment.SeeStandardofConduct38andDR5-105(D).Thestandardsdoprovideforanexceptionifitisobviousthatthelawyercanadequatelyrepresenttheinterestofeachoftheclientsandeachclientconsentstotherepresentationafter full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on theexerciseof the lawyer’sprofessional judgmentonbehalfof eachclient.SeeStandardofConduct37andDR5-105(C).

Inadditiontoassociatesandpartnersoflawfirms,theBoardbelievesthat these are sound principles for “of counsel” attorneys to follow aswell.Thisisespeciallytrue,giventherequirementthatattorneyslistedas“ofcounsel”onletterheadandothermaterialsdistributedtothepub-lichaveaclose, regular,personal, relationshipwith theprincipal firm.Accordingly,whenan“ofcounsel”attorneywouldberequiredtodeclineorwithdraw frommultiple representationsunderStandards35,36and37,then,underStandard38,nopartner,associateorother“ofcounsel”attorneyoftheprincipalfirmmayacceptorcontinuesuchemployment.This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictionswhich have addressed this issue. SeeStateBar ofCaliforniaStandingCommitteeonProfessionalResponsibilityandConductFormalOpinionNo. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7(1995);andOpinion72-41(1973).





ForreferencestoCanon3,pleaseseeRule5.5.


ForreferencestoEC3-1,pleaseseeRule5.5.

ForreferencestoEC3-8,pleaseseeRule5.4(a),(b),and(d).

ForreferencestoDR3-101,pleaseseeRule5.5.

ForreferencestoCanon5,pleaseseeRules1.7and1.8.

ForreferencestoEC5-14,pleaseseeRule1.7(a).


ForreferencestoDR5-105,pleaseseeRule1.7.

Question Presented:

Inatransactioninvolvingarealestatelendinginstitutionanditscus-tomer,maythein-housecounselfortheinstitutionprovidelegalservicesto thecustomerrelative to the transaction?Maytherealestate lendinginstitutionchargethecustomerafeeforanylegalservicesrenderedrela-tivetothetransaction?

Summary Answer:

Theanswertobothquestionsis“no”.Anin-housecounselforarealestate lendinginstitutionassists thatentity in theunauthorizedpracticeof lawinviolationofStandard24, ifheorsheprovides legalservicesto its customerswhich are in anyway related to the existing relation-shipbetweentheinstitutionanditscustomer.Suchconductwouldalsoconstitutean impermissibleconflictof interestunderStandards35and36.Thisprohibitiondoesnot,however,prevent in-housecounsel fromattendingclosingsasattorneyfortheinstitutionandpreparingthedocu-mentsnecessarytoeffectuatetheclosingincludingthosedocumentsthatmustbesignedbythecustomerandthatmaybenefitboththeinstitutionandthecustomer.Nordoestheprohibitionpreventtheinstitutionfromseekingreimbursementforthelegalexpensesincurredinthetransactionby including them in the cost of doing businesswhen determining itscharge to itscustomer.Thecharge,however,maynotbedenominatedasalegalorattorneyfeebutmustbeincludedinthechargebeingmadebytheinstitution.Thereisinherentriskofconfusiononthepartofthecustomer regarding the role of in-house counsel. Prudent lawyerswillacton theassumption thatcourtswillhonor thecustomer’sreasonableexpectationofin-housecounsel’sdutiescreatedbytheclosingattorney’sconductattheclosing.

Opinion:

Standard 24, proscribing assistance in the unauthorized practiceof law, prohibits in-house counsel for a real estate lending institutionfromproviding legalservices to itscustomers.Seealso,GeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,Canon3;GeorgiaCodeofProfessionalResponsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-1 & 3-8; Georgia Code ofProfessional Responsibility, Directory Rule 3-101, and ABA ModelRulesofProfessionalConduct,ModelRule5.4(d).Standards35and36prohibitsuchconductiftheabilitytoexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgment on behalf of one client will be or is likely to be adverselyaffectedby theobligation toanotherclient.Seealso,GeorgiaCodeofProfessional Responsibility, Canon 5; Georgia Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-14 - 5-20; Georgia Code ofProfessional Responsibility, Directory Rule 5-105, and ABA ModelRulesofProfessionalConduct,ModelRule1.7.Specifically, in-housecounselmay not provide legal services at a closing or elsewhere to acustomerborrowing from the lending institutionandarisingoutof theexisting relationship between the customer and the institution. This istruewhetherornotthecustomerischargedfortheseservices.Theroleof employee renders the actions of in-house counsel the action of theemployer.Theemployer,notbeingalawyer,isthusbeingassistedinandisengagingintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.Thein-housecounselbyvirtueoftheexistingemployer/employeerelationshipanditsaccompa-nyingobligationofloyaltytotheemployercannotexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfofthecustomer.

This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel fromattendingtheclosingastheinstitution’slegalrepresentativeandprepar-ing thosedocumentsnecessary to effectuate the closing.This includesthosedocumentsthatmustbesignedbythecustomer.Insuchasituation,in-house counsel is providing legal services directly to the institutioneventhoughothers,includingthecustomer,maybenefitfromthem.

Theprohibitiononassistingintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawdoesnotpreventthelendinginstitutionfromincludingtheexpenseofin-housecounselinthecostofdoingbusinesswhendeterminingthefeetochargeits customer. The lending institution may, in other words, recoup theexpensesofthetransactionincludingthecostoflegalservices.Thiscon-

ductdoesnotinandofitself,createadutytothecustomeronthepartofthein-housecounselnordoesitconstituteaviolationoftheprohibitionagainstthesharingoflegalfeeswithanon-lawyer.Ontheotherhand,chargingthecostoflegalservicestothecustomer(1)islikelytocreateanunintendedexpectationinthemindofthecustomer,(2)constitutesanon-lawyer receiving the fee for legal services rather thananattorney,(3)constitutesalawyersplittingafeewithanon-lawyer,or(4)directlyinvites the unauthorized practice of law. It is accordingly prohibitedeveniflimitedtoactualcosts.Thecustomercannotbemadeapartoftheattorney/client,employer/employeerelationship.

Thesituationinwhichin-housecounselattendsclosingsasattorneyfor the lending institution and prepares the documents necessary toeffectuatetheclosingisfraughtwithbothlegalandethicalrisksbeyondassistance in theunauthorizedpracticeof lawandconflictof interests.Even though the above analysis (1) requires that in-house counsel’slawyer-client relationship be restricted to the lending institution, and(2) prohibits the direct billing for legal services by the institution, thefactremainsthatthecustomermaybenefitfromtheactionsofin-housecounsel.Thustheriskofconfusionabouttheroleofin-housecounselattheclosingwillbehigh.Prudentin-housecounselshouldanticipatethatcourtsmay treat the reasonable customer expectations regarding theselegal servicesascreatingdutieseven in theabsenceofa lawyer-clientrelationship.TheRestatement(Second)ofTortsreportsthatanattorneywhorepresentsonlythelendermaystillbeheldliableinnegligencetoaborrower.See,e.g.,Seiglev.Jasper, 867S.W.2d476(Ky.Ct.App.1973).Asimilarresultmayobtainundertraditionalcontractoragencyprinciplesregardingthirdpartybeneficiaries.ThispositionissupportedbytheRestatementoftheLawofLawyering.WhiledeclaringthecurrentstateofGeorgialawonthisissuewouldbeinappropriateandbeyondthescopeofthisFormalAdvisoryOpinion,itisclearthatprudentin-housecounselwillnot ignoretheserisksbothinadvisingthelendinginstitu-tionandinhisorherconducttowardthecustomerasamatterofgoodlawyering.


ForreferencestoStandardofConduct4,pleaseseeRule8.4(a)(4).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct5,pleaseseeRules7.1(a)and(c).

ForreferencestoStandardofConduct24,pleaseseeRule5.5(a)andComments[1]and[2]ofRule5.5.



Forreferences toEC3-6,pleaseseeRule5.3andComment[1]ofRule5.3.

Question Presented:

Is a lawyer aidinganonlawyer in theunauthorizedpracticeof lawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftoprepareandsigncorrespondencewhichthreatens legalactionorprovides legaladviceorboth?

Summary Answer:

Yes,alawyerisaidinganonlawyer1intheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerallowsanonlawyermemberofhisorherstafftoprepareandsigncorrespondencewhich threatens legalactionorpro-vides legaladviceorboth.Generally,a lawyer isaidinganonlawyerin the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectivelysubstitutesthelegalknowledgeandjudgmentofthenonlawyerforhisorherown.Regardlessofthetaskinquestion,alawyershouldneverplace a nonlawyer in situations inwhich he or she is called upon toexercisewhatwouldamounttoindependentprofessionaljudgmentforthelawyer’sclient.Nothinginthislimitationprecludesparalegalrep-resentationofclientswith legalproblemswheneversuchisexpresslyauthorizedbylaw.2

Inordertoenforcethislimitationinthepublicinterest,itisnecessarytofindaviolationoftheprovisionsprohibitingaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeof lawwhenevera lawyercreates thereasonableappearancetoothersthatheorshehaseffectivelysubstitutedthelegalknowledgeandjudgmentofthenonlawyerforhisorherownintherep-resentationofthelawyer’sclient.


Asappliedtothespecificquestionspresented,alawyerpermittinganonlawyertogivelegaladvicetothelawyer’sclientbasedonthelegalknowledgeandjudgmentofthenonlawyerratherthanthelawyer,wouldbeinclearviolationofStandardsofConduct24,4,and5.Alawyerper-mittinganonlawyer toprepareandsign threateningcorrespondence toopposingcounselorunrepresentedpersonswouldbeinviolationoftheseStandardsofConduct becausedoing so creates the reasonable appear-ancetoothersthatthenonlawyerisexercisinghisorherlegalknowledgeandprofessionaljudgmentinthematter.

Opinion:

This request for a FormalAdvisoryOpinionwas submitted by theInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardalongwithexamplesofnumerousgrievancesregardingthisissuerecentlyconsideredbythePanel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory OpinionBoardtoreturntopreviouslyissuedadvisoryopinionsonthesubjectoftheuseofnonlawyerstoseeiftheguidanceofthosepreviousopinionsremainsvalidforcurrentpractice.3

Theprimarydisciplinarystandardinvolvedinansweringthequestionpresented is:Standard24, (“A lawyershallnotaidanonlawyer in theunauthorized practice of law.”)Aswill become clear in thisOpinion,however,Standard4(“Alawyershallnotengageinprofessionalconductinvolving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.”) andStandard5(“Alawyershallnotmakeanyfalse,fraudulent,deceptive,ormisleadingcommunicationsaboutthelawyerorthelawyer’sservices.”)arealsoinvolved.

In interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the ques-tionpresented,weareguidedbyCanon3of theCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,“ALawyerShouldAssistinPreventingtheUnauthorizedPractice of Law,” and, more specifically, the following EthicalConsiderations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5,andEthicalConsideration3-6.

InAdvisoryOpinionNo.19,anOpinion issuedbefore thecreationof the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisoryopinionsbytheSupremeCourt,theStateDisciplinaryBoardaddressedthe propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees tocorrespond concerning “legal matters” on the law firm’s letterheadunder the nonlawyer’s signature. The Board said that in determiningtheproprietyof this conduct itmust firstdefine thepracticeof law inGeorgia. Indoingso, it reliedupon theverybroad languageofa thenrecent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State, 234 Ga. 458(1975),whichincludedwithinthedefinitionofthepractice“anyactiontakenforothersinanymatterconnectedwiththelaw,”toconcludethattheconduct inquestion, regardlessofwhethera lawsuitwaspending,constitutedthepracticeof law.4Anylawyerpermittinganonlawyertoengage in this conductwouldbeassisting in theunauthorizedpracticeof law inviolationofStandard24, theBoard said.TheBoard specifi-callylimitedthisprohibition,however,tolettersaddressedtoadverseorpotentiallyadversepartiesthat,inessence,threatenedorimpliedathreatoflitigation.Furthermore,theBoardnotedthattherewasabroadrangeofactivities,includinginvestigating,takingstatementsfromclientsandother witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents(under“directsupervisionofthemember”),andperformingadministra-tive,secretarial,orclericaldutiesthatwereappropriatefornonlawyers.Inthecourseofperformingtheseactivities,nonlawyerscouldcorrespondonthefirm’sletterheadundertheirownsignature.Thiswaspermittedaslongasthenonlawyerclearlyidentifiedhisorherstatusasanonlawyerinamannerthatwouldavoidmisleadingtherecipientintothinkingthatthenonlawyerwasauthorizedtopracticelaw.

Whateverthemeritsoftheanswertotheparticularquestionpresent-ed, thisOpinion’sgeneralapproach to the issue, i.e.,does theconductofthenonlawyer,consideredoutsideofthecontextofsupervisionbyalicensed lawyer, appear to fit thebroad legaldefinitionof thepracticeoflaw,wouldhaveseverelylimitedtheroleoflawyer-supervisednon-lawyerstowhatmightbedescribedasin-houseandinvestigatoryfunc-tions.ThisOpinionwasfollowedtwoyearslater,however,byAdvisoryOpinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Boardadoptedadifferentapproach.

The specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was:“What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legalassistantsorparaprofessionalsandpermitthemtodealwithotherlawyers,clients, and the public?”After noting the very broad legal definition ofthepracticeof lawinGeorgia, theBoardsaidthat theissuewasinsteadone of “strict adherence to a programof supervision and direction of anonlawyer.”

Thisinsight,aninsightwereaffirminthisOpinion,wasthatthelegalissueofwhatconstitutesthepracticeoflawshouldbeseparatedfromthe

issueofwhendoesthepracticeoflawbyanattorneybecomethepracticeoflawbyanonlawyerbecauseofalackofinvolvementbythelawyerintherepresentation.Underthisanalysis,itisclearthatwhilemostactivitiesconductedbynonlawyersforlawyersarewithinthelegaldefinitionofthepracticeoflaw,inthattheseactivitiesare“action[s]takenforothersin...matter[s]connectedwiththelaw,”lawyersareassistingintheunauthor-ized practice of law onlywhen they inappropriately delegate tasks to anonlawyerorinadequatelysuperviseappropriatelydelegatedtasks.

Implicitlysuggestingthatwhetherornotaparticulartaskshouldbedelegatedtoanonlawyerwastoocontextualamatterbothforeffectivediscipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list ofspecifictasksthatcouldbesafelydelegatedtononlawyers“providedthatproperandeffectivesupervisionandcontrolbytheattorneyexists.”TheBoardalsoprovidedalistoftasksthatshouldnotbedelegated,apparent-lywithoutregardtothepotentialforsupervisionandcontrolthatexisted.

Werewe todetermine that the listsofdelegableandnon-delegabletasksinAdvisoryOpinionNo.21fullygovernedthequestionpresentedhere, itwouldbeclear thata lawyerwouldbeaiding theunauthorizedpracticeifthelawyerpermittedthenonlawyertoprepareandsigncorre-spondencetoclientsprovidinglegaladvice(becauseitwouldbe“contactwith clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permittedthenonlawyertoprepareandsigncorrespondencetoopposingcounselorunrepresentedpersons threatening legalaction (because itwouldbe“contactinganoppositepartyorhiscounselinasituationinwhichlegalrightsofthefirm’sclientswillbeassertedornegotiated”).Itisouropin-ion,however, that applying the listsof tasks inAdvisoryOpinionNo.21inacategoricalmannerrunsrisksofbothoverregulationandunderregulationoftheuseofnonlawyersand,thereby,risksboththelossoftheefficiencynonlawyerscanprovideandthelossofadequateprotec-tionofthepublicfromunauthorizedpractice.Ratherthanbeingappliedcategorically,theselistsshouldinsteadbeconsideredgoodgeneralguid-anceforthemoreparticulardeterminationofwhethertherepresentationof theclienthasbeenturnedover,effectively, to thenonlawyerbythelawyerpermittingasubstitutionofthenonlawyer’slegalknowledgeandjudgmentforthatofhisorherown.Ifsuchsubstitutionhasoccurredthenthe lawyer isaiding thenonlawyer in theunauthorizedpracticeof lawwhetherornottheconductisproscribedbyanylist.

Thequestionofwhether the lawyerhaspermitted a substitutionofthenonlawyer’slegalknowledgeandjudgmentforthatofhisorherownisadequate,webelieve, forguidance toattorneys indeterminingwhatcanandcannotbedelegatedtononlawyers.Ourtask,here,however,isbroader than justgivingguidance.Wemustalsobeconcerned in issu-ing this opinionwith the protection of the public interest in avoidingunauthorizedpractice,andwemustbeawareoftheuseofthisopinionbyvariousbarorganizations,suchastheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoard,fordeterminingwhentherehasbeenaviolationofaStandardofConduct.

For the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is notadequatetosaythatsubstitutionofthenonlawyer’slegalknowledgeandjudgmentforthatofhisorherownconstitutesaviolationoftheappli-cableStandards.Theinformationfordeterminingwhatsupervisionwasgiventothenonlawyer,thatis,whatwasandwasnotasubstitutionoflegalknowledgeandjudgment,willalwaysbewithinthecontroloftheattorneyallegedtohaveviolatedtheapplicableStandards.Torenderthisguidanceenforceable,therefore,itisnecessarytofindaviolationoftheStandardsprohibitingaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwheneveralawyercreatesthereasonableappearancetoothersthatheorshehaseffectivelysubstitutedthelegalknowledgeandjudgmentofthenonlawyerforhisorherown.

Thus,alawyerisaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwheneverthelawyercreatesareasonableappearancetoothersthatthelawyerhaseffectivelysubstitutedthelegalknowledgeandjudgmentof the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in ques-tion, lawyersshouldneverplacenonlawyers insituations inwhich thenonlawyeriscalledupontoexercisewhatwouldamounttoindependentprofessionaljudgmentforthelawyer’sclient.Norshouldanonlawyerbeplacedinsituationsinwhichdecisionsmustbemadeforthelawyer’scli-entoradvicegiventothelawyer’sclientbasedonthenonlawyer’slegalknowledge,ratherthanthatofthelawyer.Finally,nonlawyersshouldnotbeplacedinsituations inwhich thenonlawyer, rather than the lawyer,iscalledupontoarguetheclient’sposition.Nothingintheselimitationsprecludesparalegalrepresentationofclientswithlegalproblemswhen-eversuchisexpresslyauthorizedbylaw.5

Inadditiontoassistingintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawbycreatingthe reasonable appearance to others that the lawyerwas substituting anonlawyer’slegalknowledgeandjudgmentforhisorherown,alawyerpermittingthiswouldalsobemisrepresentingthenatureoftheservicesprovidedandthenatureoftherepresentationinviolationofStandardsof


Conduct4and5.Inthosecircumstanceswherenonlawyerrepresentationisspecificallyauthorizedbyregulation,statuteorruleofanadjudicatorybody,itmustbemadecleartotheclientthattheywillbereceivingnon-lawyerrepresentationandnotrepresentationbyalawyer.

Applyingthisanalysistothequestionpresented,ifby“prepareandsign”itismeantthatthelegaladvicetobegiventotheclientisadvicebased upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it isclear that the representation would effectively be representation by anonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting anonlawyertodothiswouldbeinviolationofStandardsofConduct24,4,and5.Alawyerpermittinganonlawyertoprepareandsignthreaten-ingcorrespondencetoopposingcounselorunrepresentedpersonswouldalsobeinviolationoftheseStandardsofConductbecausebydoingsoheorshecreatesthereasonableappearancetoothersthatthenonlawyeris exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment inthematter.

For public policy reasons it is important that the legal professionrestrictitsuseofnonlawyerstothoseusesthatwouldimprovethequal-ity, includingtheefficiencyandcost-efficiency,of legalrepresentationrather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation.Lawyers,asprofessionals,areultimatelyresponsibleformaintainingthequalityofthelegalconversationinboththepreventionandtheresolutionofdisputes.Thisprofessionalresponsibilitycannotbedelegatedtootherswithoutjeopardizingthegoodworkthatlawyershavedonethroughouthistoryinmeetingthisresponsibility.__________1Theterm“nonlawyer”includesparalegals.2Seefootnote5infra.3 Inaddition to thoseopinionsdiscussed in thisopinion, thereare twoother Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting theunauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the StateDisciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could openandmaintainanoffice in theStateofGeorgiaunder thedirectionofafull-timeassociateof that firmwhowasamemberof theStateBarofGeorgia.Indeterminingthatitcould,theBoardwarnedaboutthepos-sibilitythatthelocalattorneywouldbeassistingthenonlicensedlawyersin the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal AdvisoryOpinionNo.86-5,anOpinionissuedbytheSupremeCourt,theBoardwasaskedifitwouldbeimproperforlawyerstopermitnonlawyerstocloserealestatetransactions.TheBoarddeterminedthatitwouldbeiftheresponsibilityfor“closing”wasdelegatedtothenonlawyerwithoutparticipationbytheattorney.WeviewtheholdingofFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.86-5asconsistentwiththeOpinionissuedhere.4 The language relied upon fromHuber v. Statewas later codified inO.C.G.A.§15-19-50.5 For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employedas a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such asthe Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, torepresent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation ispermitted by law, as itwould be if the representationwere on a foodstampproblematanadministrativehearing,orbeforetheSocialSecurityAdministration,or inothercircumstanceswhereastatuteortheautho-rizedrulesof theadjudicatorybodyspecificallyallowforandregulaterepresentation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must bemadeclear totheclients,ofcourse, thatwhat theywillbereceivingisparalegalrepresentationandnotrepresentationbyalawyer.Nothinginthisopinionisintendedtoconflictwithregulation,bystatuteorruleofanadjudicatorybody,ofuseofnonlawyersinsuchauthorizedroles.



Question Presented:

Ethicalproprietyoflawyerstelephonicallyparticipatinginrealestateclosingsfromremotesites.

Summary Answer:

Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 explains that a lawyer cannotdelegatetoanonlawyertheresponsibilityto“close”therealestatetrans-actionwithouttheparticipationofanattorney.FormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.86-5alsoprovidesthat“Supervisionoftheworkoftheparalegalbytheattorneymustbedirectandconstanttoavoidanychargesofaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeof law.”The lawyer’sphysicalpresenceataclosingwillassurethatthereissupervisionoftheworkoftheparalegalwhichisdirectandconstant.

Opinion:

FormalAdvisoryOpinionNo. 86-5 (86-R9) issued by the SupremeCourtstatesthattheclosingofrealestatetransactionsconstitutestheprac-ticeof lawasdefinedbyO.C.G.A.§15-19-50.Therefore, it is ethicallyimproperforlawyerstopermitnonlawyerstocloserealestatetransactions.Correspondentinquireswhetheritisethicallypermissibletoallowapara-legaltobephysicallypresentataremotesiteforthepurposeofwitnessingsignaturesandassuringthatdocumentsaresignedproperly.Theparalegalannouncestotheborrowerthattheyaretheretoassisttheattorneyintheclosingprocess.Thelawyeriscontactedbytelephonebytheparalegaldur-ingtheclosingtodiscussthelegalaspectsoftheclosing.

Thecriticalissueinthisinquiryiswhatconstitutestheparticipationoftheattorneyintheclosingtransaction.Thelawyermustbeincontrolof the closing process from beginning to end. The supervision of theparalegalmustbedirectandconstant.

FormalAdvisoryOpinionNo. 86-5 states that “If the ‘closing’ isdefined as the entire series of events throughwhich title to the landis conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethicallyimproper for a nonlawyer to ‘close’ a real estate transaction.”Underthecircumstancesdescribedbythecorrespondent,theparticipationofthelawyerislessthanmeaningful.Thelawyerisnotincontroloftheactualclosingprocessingfrombeginningtoend.Thelawyerisbroughtinto the closing process after it has already begun. Even though theparalegalmaystatethattheyarenotalawyerandisnotthereforthepurpose of giving legal advice, circumstances may arise where oneinvolvedinthisprocessasapurchaser,sellerorlenderwouldlooktothe paralegal for advice and/or explanations normally provided by alawyer.Thisisnotpermissible.

FormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.86-5providesthat“Supervisionoftheworkoftheparalegalbytheattorneymustbedirectandconstanttoavoidanychargesofaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.”Byallowingaparalegaltoappearatclosingsatremotesitesatwhichlawyersarepres-entonlybytelephoneconferencewillobviouslyincreasethelikelihoodthat theparalegalmaybeplaced in circumstanceswhere theparalegalis actually providing legal advice or explanations, or exercising inde-pendentjudgmentastowhetherlegaladviceorexplanationisrequired.

Standard24isnotmetbythe lawyerbeingcalledonthe telephoneduringthecourseoftheclosingprocessforthepurposeofrespondingtoquestionsorreviewingdocuments.Thelawyer’sphysicalpresenceataclosingwillassurethatthereissupervisionoftheworkoftheparalegalwhichisdirectandconstant.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON MAY 3, 2001FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 01-1

Question Presented:

Is itethicallypermissible foranattorney,withorwithoutnotice toaclient,tochargeforastandardtimeunitwithoutregardtohowmuchtimeisactuallyexpended?

Summary Answer:

Alawyermaychargeforstandardtimeunitssolongasthisdoesnotresult ina fee that isunreasonable,andso longas the lawyercommu-nicatestotheclientthemethodofbillingthelawyerisusingsothattheclientcanunderstandthebasisforthefee.

Opinion:

Giventheproperresources,equipmentandeffort,timecanbemea-suredwithinfinitesimalprecision.Asapracticalmatter,however,clientsroutinely requireonly sufficientprecision in attorneybillings todeter-mine reasonableness and fairness, and thiswould not normally neces-sitatealevelofprecisioninrecordingthetimeexpendedbyanattorneythat would require hair-splitting accuracy. It is the practice of manyattorneystobillonatime-expendedbasis,andtobillfortimeexpendedbyroundingtostandardunitsoffrom6to15minutes.Thisgivesrisetothepossibilitythatalawyercouldspendoneminuteonaclientmatter,andbill theclient for15minutes.While“roundingup” ispermissible,see,e.g.,ABAFormalOpinion93-379(December6,1993),repeatedlyroundingupfromoneminutetofifteenminutesisquestionableatbestandwouldraisesubstantialissuesastowhetherthefeewasreasonableunderRule1.5(a),GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.SeealsoRule1.5(a)ABAModelRulesofProfessionalConduct.Alawyercouldavoidachallengetoroundedupfeesasexcessivebyusingasmallerminimum


unit(asixminuteunitispreferable),andonlyroundingupifmorethanhalf that time was actually expended. See Ross, The honesT hour: The eThics of Time-Based Billing By aTTorneys(CarolinaAcademicPress:1996),p.169.

Itmustbenotedthateventhispractice,billinginsixminuteunitsbutonlybillingaunitifmorethanthreeminuteswasexpended,resultsintheattorneybillingfortimenotactuallyexpendedontheclientmatter.Rule1.5(b),GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,provides:

Whenthelawyerhasnotregularlyrepresentedtheclient,thebasisorrateofthefeeshallbecommunicatedtotheclient,preferablyinwriting,beforeorwithinareasonabletimeaftercommencingtherepresentation.

In order to complywithRule 1.5(b), the lawyermust take care toclarify to theclient thebasis for thebilling.Tosimply informaclientthatthelawyerwouldbillonatimeexpendedbasis,withoutexplaininganystandardunitbillingpractice,wouldnotbeaclearcommunicationofthebasisforthefee.

Inaddition,wenotethatRule7.1(a)(1),GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,governs“CommunicationsConcerningaLawyer’sServices”,andprovides:

[A]communication is false, fraudulent,deceptiveormis-leadingitif:

(1)...omitsafactnecessarytomakethestatementconsideredasawholenotmateriallymisleading.

Comment1 toRule7.1provides thatRule7.1 to applies to “all com-municationsaboutalawyer’sservices....”

Tosimplyinformaclientthatthelawyerwouldbillonatimeexpend-ed basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, wouldomit a factnecessary tomake the statement as awholenotmateriallymisleading,andwouldviolateRule7.1(a).

Toensureaclearunderstandingbetweentheattorneyandtheclient,theattorneyshouldprovidetheclientwithanexplanationinwritingofthebasisforthefee.Rule1.5(b),GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.SeealsoRule1.5(b)ABAModelRulesofProfessionalConduct.InordertocomplywithRule1.5(b),theattorneymustcommunicatethebasisforthefeetotheclient,andinordertocomplywithRule7.1(a),thecommu-nicationmustincludeanexplanationofanystandardunitbillingpractice.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARDPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2003FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-1

Question Presented:

MayaGeorgiaattorneycontractwithaclient foranon-refundablespecialretainer?

Summary Answer:

AGeorgiaattorneymaycontractwithaclientforanon-refundablespecialretainersolongas:1)thecontractisnotacontracttoviolatetheattorney’sobligationunderRule1.16(d)torefund“anyadvancepaymentoffeethathasnotbeenearned”uponterminationoftherepresentationbytheattorneyorbytheclient;and2)thecontractedforfee,aswellasanyresultingfeeupontermination,doesnotviolateRule1.5(a)’srequire-mentofreasonableness.

Opinion:

This issue is governed primarily by Rule of Professional Conduct1.16(d)whichprovides:“Upon terminationof representation,a lawyershalltakestepstotheextentreasonablypracticabletoprotectaclient’sinterestssuchas...refundinganyadvancepaymentoffeethathasnotbeenearned.”

Aspecialretainerisacontractforrepresentationobligatingaclienttopayfeesinadvanceforspecifiedservicestobeprovidedbyanattorney.Thisdefinitionappliesregardlessofthemannerofdeterminingtheamountof the feeor the terminologyused todesignate the fee,e.g.,hourly fee,percentagefee,flatfee,fixedfees,orminimumfees.Generally,feespaidinadvanceunderaspecialretainerareearnedasthespecifiedservicesareprovided.Someservices,forexample,theservicesoftheattorney’scom-mitment to the client’s case and acceptanceof potential disqualification

fromotherrepresentations,areprovidedassoonasthecontractissigned.1Theportionofthefeereasonablyallocatedtotheseservicesis,therefore,earnedimmediately.Thesefees,andanyotherfeesthathavebeenearnedbyprovidingspecifiedservicestotheclient,neednotberefundedtotheclient.Inthissense,aspecialretainercanbemadenon-refundable.

Informal advisory opinion91-2(fao 91-2),wesaid:

“Terminologyas to thevarious typesof fee arrangementsdoesnotalterthefactthatthelawyerisafiduciary.Therefore,thelawyer’sdutiesastofeesshouldbeuniformandgovernedbythesamerulesregardlessof theparticular feearrangement.Thosedutiesare . . . :1)Tohaveaclearunderstandingwith theclientas to thedetailsof the feearrange-mentpriortoundertakingtherepresentation,preferablyinwriting.2)Toreturntotheclientanyunearnedportionofafee.3)Toaccepttheclient’sdismissal of himor her (withorwithout cause)without imposing anypenaltyontheclientforthedismissal.4)TocomplywiththeprovisionsofStandard31astoreasonablenessofthefee.”

ThesameFormalAdvisoryOpinioncitingIn the Matter of Collins,246Ga.325(1980),states:

“The law iswell settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for anyreasonorfornoreason,andthelawyerhasadutytoreturnanyunearnedportionofthefee.”2

Contracts to violate the ethical requirements upon which FAO91-2wasbasedarenotpermitted,because thoserequirementsarenowexpressed inRule1.16(d)andRule1.5(a).Moreover,attorneysshouldtakecaretoavoidmisrepresentationconcerningtheirobligationtoreturnunearnedfeesupontermination.

The ethical obligation to refund unearned fees, however, does notprohibitanattorneyfromdesignatingbycontractpointsinarepresenta-tion atwhich specific advance fees payments under a special retainerwillhavebeenearned,so longas this isdoneingoodfaithandnotasanattempt topenalizeaclient for terminationof the representationbyrefusingtorefundunearnedfeesorotherwiseavoidtherequirementsofRule1.16(d),andtheresultingfeeisreasonable.Nordoesthisobligationcallintoquestiontheuseofflatfees,minimumfees,oranyotherformofadvancefeepaymentsolongassuchfeeswhenunearnedarerefundedtotheclientuponterminationoftherepresentationbytheclientorbytheattorney. It alsodoesnot require that feesbedeterminedonanhourlybasis.Nor need an attorney place any fees into a trust account absentspecialcircumstancesnecessarytoprotecttheinterestoftheclient.SeeGeorgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2. Additionally, this obligationdoesnotrestrictthenon-refundabilityoffeesforanyreasonotherthanwhethertheyhavebeenearnedupontermination.Finally,thereisnoth-inginthisobligationthatprohibitsanattorneyfromcontractingforlargefeesforexcellentworkdonequickly.Whenthecontractedforwork isdone,howeverquicklyitmayhavebeendone,thefeeshavebeenearnedandthereisnoissueastotheirnon-refundability.Ofcourse,suchfees,likeallfeeagreements,aresubjecttoRule1.5,whichprovidesthatthereasonablenessofafeeshallbedeterminedbythefollowingfactors:

(1) thetimeandlaborrequired, thenoveltyanddifficultyof thequestions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legalserviceproperly;

(2)thelikelihoodthattheacceptanceoftheparticularemploymentwillprecludeotheremploymentbythelawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legalservices;

(4)theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;

(5) the time limitations imposedby theclientorby thecircum-stances;

(6)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient.

(7)theexperience,reputation,andabilityofthelawyerorlawyersperformingtheservices;and

(8)Whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.

The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of


Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.__________1The“likelihoodthattheacceptanceoftheparticularemploymentwillprecludeotheremploymentbythelawyer”isafactortheattorneymustconsiderindeterminingthereasonablenessofafeeunderRule1.5.Thispreclusion,therefore,shouldbeconsideredpartoftheservicetheattor-neyisprovidingtotheclientbyagreeingtoenterintotherepresentation.2GeorgiaFormalAdvisoryOpinion91-2.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARDPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2003FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-2

Question Presented:

Does the obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6,ConfidentialityofInformation,applyasbetweentwojointlyrepresentedclients?

Summary Answer:

TheobligationofconfidentialitydescribedinRule1.6,Confidentialityof Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients.Anattorneymusthonoroneclient’s request that informationbekeptcon-fidentialfromtheotherjointlyrepresentedclient.Honoringtheclient’srequest will, in most circumstances, require the attorney to withdrawfromthejointrepresentation.

Opinion:

Unlike the attorney-client privilege, jointly represented clientsdo not lose the protection of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6,ConfidentialityofInformation,astoeachotherbyenteringintothejointrepresentation. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, OpinionNo.296(2000)andCommitteeonProfessionalEthics,NewYorkStateBar Association, Opinion No. 555 (1984). Nor do jointly representedclients impliedly consent to a sharing of confidences with each othersinceclientconsent to thedisclosureofconfidential informationunderRule1.6requiresconsultation.Id.Consultation,asdefinedintheRules,requires “the communication of information reasonably sufficient topermittheclienttoappreciatethesignificanceofthematterinquestion.”Terminology,GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.

Whenoneclientinajointrepresentationrequeststhatsomeinforma-tionrelevanttotherepresentationbekeptconfidentialfromtheothercli-ent,theattorneymusthonortherequestandthendetermineifcontinuingwiththerepresentationwhilehonoringtherequestwill:a)beinconsistentwith the lawyer’s obligations to keep the other client informed underRule1.4,Communication;b)materiallyandadverselyaffecttherepre-sentationoftheotherclientunderRule1.7,ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule;orc)both.

The lawyerhasdiscretion tocontinuewith therepresentationwhilenotrevealingtheconfidentialinformationtotheotherclientonlytotheextentthatheorshecandosoconsistentwiththeserules.IfmaintainingtheconfidencewillconstituteaviolationofRule1.4orRule1.7,as itmostoftenwill,thelawyershouldmaintaintheconfidenceanddiscon-tinuetherepresentation.

Consent toconflicting representations,ofcourse, isoftenpermittedunderRule1.7.Consent to continued joint representation in these cir-cumstances,however,ordinarilywouldnotbeavailableeitherbecauseit would be impossible to conduct the consultation required for suchconsentwithout disclosing the confidential information in question orbecause consent is not permitted underRule 1.7 in that the continuedjoint representationwould “involve circumstances rendering it reason-ablyunlikelythatthelawyerwillbeabletoprovideadequaterepresenta-tiontooneormoreoftheaffectedclients.”Rule1.7(c)(3).

Whetherornottheattorney,afterwithdrawingfromtherepresenta-tionoftheotherclient,cancontinuewiththerepresentationoftheclientwho insisteduponconfidentiality isgovernedbyRule1.9:ConflictofInterest:FormerClientsandbywhetherornottheconsultationrequiredfortheconsentofthenowformerclientcanbeconductedwithoutdis-closureoftheconfidentialinformationinquestion.

The potential problems that confidentiality can create betweenjointly represented clients make it especially important that clientsunderstandtherequirementsofajointrepresentationpriortoentering

intoone.Whenanattorneyisconsideringajointrepresentation,con-sultationandconsentoftheclientsisrequiredpriortotherepresenta-tion“ifthereisasignificantriskthatthelawyer’s...dutiesto[eitherof the jointly represented clients] . . . will materially and adverselyaffect the representation of [the other] client.” Rule 1.7.Whether ornotconsultationandconsent is required,however,aprudentattorneywill alwaysdiscusswithclientswishing tobe jointly represented theneed for sharing confidences between them, obtain their consent tosuch sharing, and inform themof the consequences of either client’snevertheless insistingon confidentiality as to the other client and, ineffect, revoking the consent. If it appears to the attorney that eitherclientisuncomfortablewiththerequiredsharingofconfidentialinfor-mationthatjointrepresentationrequires,theattorneyshouldreconsiderwhether joint representation is appropriate in the circumstances. If aputative jointly representedclient indicates aneed for confidentialityfromanotherputative jointly representedclient, then it isvery likelythat joint representation is inappropriateand theputativeclientsneedindividualrepresentationbyseparateattorneys.

Theaboveguidelines,derivedfromtherequirementsoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductandconsistentwiththeprimaryadvisoryopinionsfromotherjurisdictions,aregeneralinnature.Thereisnodoubtthat their application in some specific contexts will create additionalspecificconcernsseeminglyunaddressedinthegeneralethicalrequire-ments.Weare,however,withoutauthoritytodepartfromtheRulesofProfessionalConductthatareintendedtobegenerallyapplicabletotheprofession.Forexample,thereisnodoubtthattheapplicationoftheserequirements to the joint representation of spouses in estate planningwill sometimes place attorneys in the awkward position of having towithdrawfromajointrepresentationofspousesbecauseofarequestbyonespousetokeeprelevantinformationconfidentialfromtheotherand,bywithdrawing,notonlyendingtrustedlawyer-clientrelationshipsbutalso essentially notifying theother client that an issueof confidential-ity has arisen. See, e.g., Florida StateBarOpinion 95-4 (1997) (“Theattorneymaynot reveal confidential information to thewifewhen thehusbandtellstheattorneythathewishestoprovideforabeneficiarythatisunknowntothewife.Theattorneymustwithdrawfromtherepresen-tationofbothhusbandandwifebecauseoftheconflictpresentedwhentheattorneymustmaintainthehusband’sseparateconfidencesregardingthejointrepresentation.”)Alargenumberofhighlyvariedrecommenda-tionshavebeenmadeabouthowtodealwiththesespecificconcernsinthisspecificpracticesetting.See,e.g.,Pearce,FamilyValuesandLegalEthics:CompetingApproachestoConflictsinRepresentingSpouses,62fordham l. rev.1253(1994);and,Collett,AndTheTwoShallBecomeAsOne...UntilTheLawyersAreDone,7 noTre dame J. l. eThics & puBlic policy101(1993)fordiscussionoftheserecommendations.Which recommendations are followed, we believe, is best left to thepracticalwisdomofthegoodlawyerspracticinginthisfieldsolongasthegeneralethicalrequirementsoftheRulesofConductasdescribedinthisOpinionaremet.

The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARDPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JANUARY 6, 2004FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-3

Question Presented:

Isitethicallypermissibleforanattorneytoenterintoa“solicitationagreement”withafinancialinvestmentadviserunderwhichtheattorney,in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees basedon apercentageofgrossfeespaidbytheclienttotheadviser?

Summary Answer:

While it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement tocomplywithethicalrequirements,itwouldbebothethicallyandlegallyperiloustoattempttodoso.Inadditiontonumerousotherethicalcon-cerns,Rule1.7Conflictsof Interest:GeneralRule,would require at aminimum that a “solicitation agreement”providing referral fees to theattorneybe disclosed to the client inwriting in amanner sufficient topermit theclient togiveinformedconsent tothepersonal interestcon-


flict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consultwithindependentcounsel.Comment6toRule1.7provides:“Alawyermaynot allow relatedbusiness interest to affect representationby, forexample, referring clients to an enterprise inwhich the lawyer has anundisclosedbusiness interest.”Additionally, the termsof the“solicita-tion agreement”must be such that the lawyerwill exercise his or herindependentprofessional judgment indecidingwhether or not to referaparticularclienttothefinancialinvestmentadviser.Prudentially, thiswouldrequirethelawyertodocumenteachreferralinsuchawayastobeable todemonstrate that the referral choicewasnotdictatedby thelawyer’sfinancialinterestsbutbythemeritsoftheinstitutiontowhomthe client was referred. The agreementmust not obligate the attorneyto reveal confidential information to the adviser absent the consent oftheclient;thefeespaidtotheattorneyundertheagreementmustnotbestructuredinsuchawayas tocreateafinancial interestadverse to theclientorotherwiseadverselyaffect theclient, and theagreementmustitselfbeincompliancewithotherlawstheviolationofwhichwouldbeaviolationofRule8.4Misconduct,especiallythoselawsconcerningtheregulation of securities enforceable by criminal sanctions. This is notanexhaustivelistofethicalrequirementsinthatthetermsofparticularagreementsmaygenerateotherethicalconcerns.

Opinion:

“Anytimealawyer’sfinancialorpropertyinterestscouldbeaffectedby advice the lawyer gives a client, the lawyer hadbetterwatchout.”aBa/Bna lawyers manual on professional conducT51:405.Inthecircumstancesdescribedin theQuestionPresented,a lawyer,obligatedto exercise independent professional judgment onbehalf of a client indecidingifareferral isappropriateanddecidingtowhomtomakethereferral,wouldbe in a situation inwhichhis or her financial interestswouldbeaffectedbytheadvicegiven.Thisconflictbetweentheobliga-tion of independent professional judgment and the lawyer’s financialinterestisgovernedbyRuleofProfessionalConduct1.7whichprovides,inrelevantpart,that:

(A) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a clientif there isasignificantrisk that the lawyer’sowninterests . . .willmateriallyoradverselyaffecttherepresentationoftheclient....

TheCommitteeisguidedinitsinterpretationofthisprovisioninthesecircumstancesbyComment6toRule1.7:

A lawyermaynot allow relatedbusiness interests toaffect rep-resentation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise inwhichthelawyerhasanundisclosedinterest.

UnderRule1.7,clientconsenttosuchapersonalinterestconflictispermissibleafter:“(1)consultationwiththelawyer,(2)havingreceivedin writing reasonable and adequate information about the materialsrisksof the representation, and (3)havingbeengivenanopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.”Thus,ataminimum,a“solicita-tionagreement”providingreferral fees to theattorneywouldhave tobe disclosed to the client inwriting in amanner sufficient to permitthe client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflictcreatedbytheagreementafterhavingtheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.

Inaddition to thisminimumrequirement, therearenumerousotherethical obligations that would dictate the permitted terms of such anagreement.Thefollowingobligationsareofferedasanon-exhaustivelistofexamples for the termsofparticularagreementsmaygenerateotherethicalconcerns.

1)Theagreementmustnotbindtheattorneytomakereferralsortomakereferralsonlytotheadviserforsuchanobligationwouldbeincon-sistent with the attorney’s obligation to exercise independent profes-sionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclientindeterminingwhetherareferralisappropriateandtowhomtheclientshouldbereferred.Bothdetermi-nationsmustalwaysbemadeonly inconsiderationof theclient’sbestinterests.Prudentially, thiswouldrequire the lawyer todocumenteachreferralinsuchawayastobeabletodemonstratethatthereferralchoicewasnotdictatedbythelawyer’sfinancialinterestsbutbythemeritsoftheinstitutiontowhomtheclientwasreferred.Inordertobeabletodothiswellthelawyerwouldneedtostayabreastofthequalityandcostofservicesprovidedbyothersimilarfinancialinstitutions.

2)Theagreementcannotrestricttheinformationtheattorneycanpro-videtheclientconcerningareferralbyrequiring,forexample,theattorneytouseonlymaterialspreparedorapprovedbytheadviser.Sucharestric-tion is not only inconsistent with the attorney’s obligations to exerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentbutalsowiththeattorney’sobligationsunderRule1.4Communications concerning the attorney’sobligation toprovideinformationtoclientssufficientforinformeddecisionmaking.

3)Theagreementcannotobligatetheattorneytoprovideconfidentialinformation,asdefinedinRule1.6Confidentiality,totheadviserabsentclientconsent.

4)Thefeespaidtotheattorneyforthereferralcannotbestructuredinsuchawayastocreateafinancialinterestorotherinterestadversetotheclient.Rule 1.8Conflicts of Interest: ProhibitedTransactions provides“.. .norshallthelawyerknowinglyacquireanownership,possessory,security,orotherpecuniaryinterestadversetoaclient...”

5)Finally,anysuchagreementwouldhavetobeincompliancewithotherlawstheviolationsofwhichcouldconstituteaviolationofRule8.4Misconduct.Forexample,theagreementmaynotviolateanyofthelegaloradministrativeregulationsgoverningtradinginsecuritiesenforceablebycriminalsanctions.

Thus,whileitmaybepossibletostructureasolicitationagreementtocomplywithethicalrequirements,itwouldbebothethicallyandlegallyperiloustoattempttodoso.

The second publication of this opinion appeared in the December 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about December 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on December 15, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accor-dance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1Approved And Issued On February 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With CommentsSupreme Court Docket No. S05U1720

COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

WegrantapetitionfordiscretionaryreviewbroughtbytheStateBarof Georgia to consider the proposed opinion of the Formal AdvisoryBoard1(hereinafter“Board”) that, ifanattorneysupervises theclosingofarealestatetransactionconductedbyanon-lawyerentity,theattorneyisafiduciarywithrespect to theclosingproceedsandtheclosingpro-ceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewiththetrustaccountandIOLTAprovisionsofRule1.15(II)ofBarRule4-102(d)of theGeorgiaRulesof Professional Conduct. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1 (August6,2004).SeeStateBarRule4-403(d)(authorizingthisCourttograntapetitionfordiscretionaryreview).2Forthereasonssetforthbelow,weagreewiththeBoardthatalawyerdirectingtheclosingofarealestatetransactionholdsmoneywhichbelongs toanother (eitheraclientorathird-party)asanincidenttothatpractice,andmustkeepthatmoneyinanIOLTAaccount.WefurtheraddthatiftheproceedsarenotsubjecttotherulesofIOLTAsubsection(c)(2),thenthefundsmustbedepositedinaninterest-bearingaccountfortheclient’sbenefit.Rule1.15(II)(c)(1).Undernocircumstancesmaytheclosingproceedsbecommingledwithfundsbelongingtothelawyer,thelawoffice,oranyentityotherthanasexplicitlyprovidedintheRule.

ThemattercamebeforetheBoardpursuanttoarequestforanadvi-soryopiniononthefollowingquestion:

May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by thelawyerforthepurposeofconductingresidentialrealestateclos-ingswheretheclosingproceedsreceivedbytheentityaredepos-ited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account ratherthananIOLTAaccount?

TheopinionfirstappearedintheJune2004issueoftheGeorgiaBarJournal. In response, theBoard received comments both in support ofandinoppositiontotheopinion.ThemodifiedopinionappearedintheOctober2004GeorgiaBarJournal,andtheStateBar thereaftersoughtdiscretionaryreview.

The closing of a real estate transaction in thisState constitutes thepracticeoflaw,and,ifperformedbysomeoneotherthanaduly-licensedGeorgiaattorney,resultsintheprohibitedunlicensedpracticeoflaw.InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277Ga.472(588SE2d741)(2003).Theattorneyparticipatingintheclosingisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosing proceeds,whichmust be handled in accordancewith the trustaccount and IOLTAprovisions inRule 1.15(II).3Specifically,when alawyerholdsclientfundsintrust,thelawyermustmakeaninitialdeter-


minationwhetherthefundsareeligiblefortheIOLTAprogram.Closingproceedsfromarealestatetransactionwhicharenominalinamountoraretobeheldforashortperiodoftime(i.e.,fundsthatcannototherwisegeneratenetearningsfortheclient)mustbedepositedintoanInterestonLawyer’sTrustAccount(IOLTAAccount).Fundsthatarenotnominalinamountorfunds,nomatterwhatamount,thatarenottobeheldforashortperiodoftime,areineligibleforplacementinanIOLTAaccountandmustbeplacedinaninterest-bearingaccount,withthenetinterestgeneratedpaid to theclient.Rule1.15(II)(c).SeealsoBrownv.LegalFoundationofWashington,538U.S.216(155LE2d376,123SC1406)(2003).Undereithercircumstance,Rule1.15(II)instructsthatalawyerinvolvedinaclosinghasastrictfiduciarydutytodepositaclient’srealestateclosingproceedsinaseparateIOLTAornon-IOLTAinterestbear-ingtrustaccount.

The Board’s recognition that, under all circumstances, the inter-est generated on the client’s closing funds is governed by Rule1.15(II),ensuresfullcompliancewhererealestateclosingsareinvolved.Accordingly,weadoptFormalAdvisoryOpinion04-1totheextentitisinaccordwiththerulethatattorneysmustplaceclientclosingproceedsthatarenominalorheldforashortperiodoftimeinanIOLTAaccount.Weclarifythatclosingproceedsthataremorethannominalinamountor thatwillbedeposited formore thana shortperiodof timemustbeplacedinanon-IOLTAinterestbearingaccountwithinterestpayabletotheclient.Rule1.15(II)(c)(1).

Formal Advisory Opinion approved, as modified. All the Justicesconcur.__________1StateBarRule4-403(a)authorizestheFormalAdvisoryOpinionBoardtodraftproposedFormalAdvisoryOpinionsconcerningtheproperinter-pretationoftheRulesofProfessionalConduct.2 Formal Advisory Opinion Board opinions, which are approved ormodifiedbythisCourt,are“bindingonallmembersoftheStateBar.”StateBarRule4-403(e).3Thesoleissueaddressedintheproposedopinioniswhetheranattorneymayparticipateinanon-lawyerentitywhichtheattorneycreatedforthepurposeofconductingresidentialrealestateclosingswithoutdepositingtheclosingproceedsinanIOLTAaccount.

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1

Question Presented:

Mayalawyerparticipateinanon-lawyerentitycreatedbythelawyerfor thepurposeofconductingresidentialrealestateclosingswheretheclosingproceeds receivedby the entity aredeposited in anon-IOLTAinterestbearingbanktrustaccountratherthananIOLTAaccount?

Summary Answer:

Theclosingofarealestatetransactionconstitutesthepracticeoflaw.Ifanattorneysupervisestheclosingconductedbythenon-lawyerentity,thentheattorneyisafiduciarywithrespecttotheclosingproceedsandclosingproceedsmustbehandledinaccordancewithRule1.15(II).Ifthe attorney does not supervise the closings, then, under the facts setforth above, the lawyer is assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorizedpracticeoflaw.

Opinion:

Theclosingofa realestate transaction in thestateofGeorgiacon-stitutes thepracticeof law.See, In reUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E. 2d 741 (Nov. 10, 2003), O.C.G.A. §15-19-50andFormalAdvisoryOpinionsNos.86-5and00-3.Thus,totheextentthat a non-lawyer entity is conducting residential real estate closingsnotunderthesupervisionofalawyer,thenon-lawyerentityisengagedinthepracticeoflaw.Ifanattorneysupervisestheresidentialclosing,1thenthatattorneyisafiduciarywithrespectstotheclosingproceeds.Iftheattorneyparticipatesinbutdoesnotsupervisetheclosings,thenthenon-lawyerentityisengagedintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.Insuchevent, the attorney assisting the non-lawyer entity would be doing soinviolationofRule5.5oftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.2

Whenalawyerissupervisingarealestateclosing,thelawyerispro-fessionallyresponsibleforsuchclosings.Anyclosingfundsreceivedbythelawyerorbypersonsorentitiessupervisedbythelawyerareheldbythelawyerasafiduciary.Thelawyer’sresponsibilitywithregardtosuchfundsisaddressedbyRule1.15(II)oftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductwhichstatesinrelevantpart:

SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL

(a) Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said

lawyerpracticesasasolepractitioner,orasamemberofafirm,association,orprofessionalcorporation,andwhoreceivesmoneyorpropertyonbehalfofaclientorinanyotherfiduciarycapac-ity,shallmaintainorhaveavailableatrustaccountasrequiredbytheseRules.Allfundsheldbyalawyerforaclientandallfundsheldbyalawyerinanyotherfiduciarycapacityshallbedepositedinandadministeredfromsuchaccount.

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(c)Allclient’sfundsshallbeplacedineitheraninterest-bearingaccountwith the interest beingpaid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being paid to theGeorgiaBarFoundationashereinafterprovided.

(1)With respect to fundswhich are not nominal in amount,orarenottobeheldforashortperiodoftime,alawyershall,with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearingtrustaccountinanapprovedinstitutionasdefinedbyRule1.15(III)(c)(1),withtheinterest tobepaidtotheclient.Noearningsfromsuchanaccountshallbemadeavailabletoalawyerorlawfirm.

(2)Withrespecttofundswhicharenominalinamountoraretobeheld fora shortperiodof time,a lawyer shall,withorwithout notice to the client, create andmaintain an interest-bearing,governmentinsuredtrustaccount(IOLTA)incompli-ancewiththefollowingprovisions:

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AssetoutinSubsection(c)(2)above,thisRuleappliestoallclientfundswhich are nominal or are to be held for a short period of time.Asclosingproceedsarenotnominal inamount,butare tobeheld foronlya shortperiodof time, theyare subject to the IOLTAprovisions.Therefore,thefundsreceivedinconnectionwiththerealestateclosingconductedby the lawyeror thenon-lawyerentity in thecircumstancesdescribedabovemustbedepositedintoanIOLTAcompliantaccount.__________1Adequate supervisionwould require the lawyer to be present at theclosing.SeeFAO....etc.2Rule5.5statesinrelevantpartthat:UNAUTHORIZEDPRACTICEOFLAWAlawyershallnot:******(b)assistapersonwhoisnotamemberofthebarintheperformanceofactivitythatconstitutestheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.ThemaximumpenaltyforaviolationofthisRuleisdisbarment.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-2Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 90-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0791

Question Presented:

“Hold Harmless” Agreements Between Employers and TheirIn-HouseCounsel.

Whetheranattorneyemployedin-housebyacorporationmayenterintoanagreementbywhichhisorheremployershallholdtheattorneyharmlessformalpracticecommittedinthecourseofhisemployment.

Summary Answer:

“Hold harmless” agreements between employers and attorneysemployedin-houseareethicaliftheemployerisexercisinganinformedbusiness judgment in utilizing the “hold harmless” agreement in lieuofmalpracticeinsuranceontheadviceofcounselandtheagreementispermittedbylaw.

Opinion:

Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) offers the followingdirection:

“A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limitingthelawyer’sliabilitytoaclientformalpracticeunlesspermittedbylawandtheclientisindependentlyrepresentedinmakingtheagreement....”


Thisruleseeks topreventattorneysfromtakingadvantageofclientsandavoidingtheremovalofnegativeconsequencesformalpractice.See,Opinion193(D.C.1989).Neitherofthesepolicieswouldbewellservedbyprohibitingtheuseof“holdharmless”agreementsbetweenemployersandattorneysemployedinhouseiftheemployerisexercisinganinformedbusiness judgment inutilizing the “holdharmless” agreement in lieuofmalpracticeinsuranceanddoingsoontheadviseofanycounselotherthanthecounselbeingemployed.Consultationwithin-housecounselsatisfiestherequirementof therule.First, thepositionof theclientasemployer,andthesophisticationofthosewhoemployinhousecounsel,eliminatesalmostalloverreachingconcerns.Secondly,thelawyerasemployeedoesnotavoidthenegativeconsequencesofmalpracticebecauseheorsheissubjecttobeingdischargedbytheemployer.Apparently,dischargeispre-ferredbyemployersofinhousecounseltomalpracticesuitsasaremedyfornegligentperformance.See,Opinion193(D.C.1989).

Accordingly,weconcludethat“holdharmless”agreementsareethi-calwhenanemployerofinhousecounselmakesaninformedbusinessjudgmentthatsuchanagreementispreferabletoemployeemalpracticeinsurance,isdoneontheadviceofcounsel,andispermittedbylaw.Thedeterminationofwhether suchagreements arepermittedby law isnotwithinthescopeofthisOpinion.Finally,wenotethattheproposed“holdharmless”agreementdoesnotlimitliabilitytothirdpartiesaffectedbyinhousecounselrepresentation.Instead,theagreementshiftstheresponsi-bilityforemployeeconductfromaninsurancecarriertotheorganizationasaselfinsurer.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-3Approved And Issued On April 26, 2006Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 90-2Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0795

Question Presented:

Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk appearing as an attorneybeforehisorherpresentemployer-judge.

Summary Answer:

Therepresentationofclientsbyalawclerkbeforeapresentemploy-er-judgeisaviolationofRule1.7oftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.

Opinion:

ThisquestioninvolvesanapplicationofRule1.7governingpersonalinterestconflicts.Rule1.7provides:

(a)Alawyershallnotrepresentorcontinuetorepresentaclientifthereisasignificantriskthatthelawyer’sowninterestsorthelawyer’sdutiestoanotherclient,aformerclient,orathirdpersonwillmateriallyandadverselyaffecttherepresentationofthecli-ent,exceptaspermittedin(b).

(b)Ifclientconsentispermissiblealawyermayrepresentaclientnotwithstandingasignificantriskofmaterialandadverseeffectifeachaffectedorformerclientconsents,preferably inwriting, totherepresentationafter:(1)consultationwiththelawyer,(2)hav-ingreceivedinwritingreasonableandadequateinformationaboutthematerialrisksoftherepresentation,and(3)havingbeengiventheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.

(c)Client consent isnotpermissible if the representation: (1) isprohibitedbylawor theserules; . . . (3) involvescircumstancesrenderingitreasonablyunlikelythatthelawyerwillbeabletopro-videadequaterepresentationtooneormoreoftheaffectedclients.

There are two threats to professional judgment posed when a lawclerk undertakes to represent a client before the judge by whom thelaw clerk is also currently employed. The first is that the lawyerwillbeundulyrestrainedinclientrepresentationbeforetheemployer-judge.Comment[6]toRule1.7statesthat“thelawyer’spersonaloreconomicinterestshouldnotbepermittedtohaveanadverseeffectonrepresenta-tionofaclient.”AndComment[4]explainsthat:

“loyalty to a client is also impairedwhen a lawyer cannot con-sider,recommendorcarryoutanappropriatecourseofactionfortheclientbecauseofthelawyer’sothercompetingresponsibilitiesorinterest.Theconflictineffectforeclosesalternativesthatwouldotherwisebeavailabletotheclient.”

Becauseofthisrisk,therepresentationofclientsbyalawclerkbeforean employer-judge is a violation of Rule 1.7. Moreover, the GeorgiaSupremeCourthas ruled that for a full-time lawclerkconcurrently toserveasappointedco-counselforacriminaldefendantbeforeoneofthejudgesbywhomthelawclerkisemployedconstitutesanactualconflictof interest depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right ofcounsel.1

Rule1.7permitsclientwaiverofpersonalinterestconflictsthroughclientconsultationwith the lawyer,providing reasonableandadequatewritteninformationaboutthematerialrisksoftherepresentationtotheclient,andgivingtheclienttheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel. This waiver provision must be read consistently with otherguidancefromtheprofession.Becauseofasecondthreattoprofessionaljudgment,clientwaiverisimpermissibleinthissituation.Clientwaiveris inconsistentwith the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) of theGeorgia Rulesof ProfessionalResponsibility,which prohibits a lawyer from seekingtoinfluenceajudge,juror,prospectivejurororotherofficialbymeansprohibitedbylaw.(Thereisanimplicationofimproperinfluenceintheveryfactoftheemploymentoftheattorneyforoneofthepartiesasthejudge’scurrentlawclerk.ItisalsoinconsistentwiththeguidanceofRule3.5(a)Comment[2]whichstates,

“Ifwearetomaintainintegrityofthejudicialprocess,itisimpera-tivethatanadvocate’sfunctionbelimitedtothepresentationofevidenceandargument,toallowacausetobedecidedaccordingtolaw.Theexertionof improperinfluenceisdetrimental tothatprocess.Regardless of an advocate’s innocent intention, actionswhichgivetheappearanceoftamperingwithjudicialimpartialityaretobeavoided.TheactivityproscribedbythisRuleshouldbeobservedbytheadvocateinsuchacarefulmannerthattherebenoappearanceofimpropriety.

Accordingly,apart-timelawclerkshouldnotseekclientwaiverofthe conflict of interest created by representation of clients before theemployer-judge.2

ArelatedruleisfoundinRule1.12(b),whichstates:

A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any personwhoisinvolvedasapartyoraslawyerforapartyinamatterinwhichthelawyerisparticipatingpersonallyandsubstantiallyasajudgeorotheradjudicativeofficerorarbitrator.Alawyerservingasa lawclerk toa judge,otheradjudicativeofficerorarbitratormay negotiate for employmentwith a party or lawyer involvedinamatterinwhichtheclerkisparticipatingpersonallyandsub-stantially,butonlyafter the lawyerhasnotified the judge,otheradjudicativeofficerorarbitrator. Inaddition, the lawclerkshallpromptlyprovidewrittennoticeofacceptanceofemploymenttoallcounselofrecordinallsuchmattersinwhichtheprospectiveemployerisinvolved.

Rule 1.12(b) allows a law clerk for a judge to accept employmentwith a party or lawyer involved in amatter inwhich the clerk is par-ticipating personally and substantially with the approval of the judgeandpromptwrittennotice toall counselof record inmatters inwhichthe prospective employer of the law clerk is involved. Rule 1.12 (b)addressesfutureemploymentbyajudge’s lawclerkandshouldnotbereadtoallowalawclerktorepresentapartybeforethejudgewhomheiscurrentlyemployed.Rule3.5(a)andComment[2]tothatRulewouldprohibit theappearanceof tamperingwith judicial impartiality that theclose employment relationship between judge and current law clerkwouldinevitablyraise.

Thisopinionaddresses theproprietyof the lawyer’s conductundertheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalResponsibility.Itdoesnotaddresstheethicalproprietyofthesameconductinhisorhercapacityaspart-timeclerk.Wedonote,however,thatmanycourtshavepreventedtheconductinquestionhereasamatterofcourtrulesinaccordwiththisopinion.3Wealsonotethatjudicialclerksareoftentreatedas“otherjudicialoffi-cers”for thepurposeofdeterminingdisqualificationsandotherethicalconcerns.4Underthattreatment,theconductinquestionherewouldbeanalogoustoarequestbyapart-timejudgetopracticebeforehisorherown court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and statutoryprovisions.5SeeO.C.G.A.§15-7-21.6__________1269Ga.446,499S.E.2d897(1998).2 In accord, Advisory Opinion CI-951 (Michigan) (1983). (Part-timelawclerkmaynotworkinanycapacityasprivatecounselonanycasependinginemployer-judge’scircuitandmustgivenoticetoclientsofhisinabilitytoappearinthecircuit.)3Sup.Ct.R.7.(AnemployeeoftheSupremeCourtshallnotpracticeasanattorneyinanycourtwhileemployedbytheCourt.)


4See,eg.,ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct91:4503and cases cited therein; see, also, ABA Model Rules of Professional ConductRule1.12 (1984); andOpinion38 (Georgia1984) (“LawyersandmembersofthepublicviewaLawClerkasanextensionoftheJudgeforwhomtheClerkworks”).5GeorgiaCodeof JudicialConduct. (Part-time judges: (2) should notpracticelawinthecourtonwhichtheyserve,orinanycourtsubjecttotheappellatejurisdictionofthecourtonwhichtheyserve,oractaslaw-yersinproceedingsinwhichtheyhaveservedasjudgesorinanyotherproceedingrelatedthereto.)6O.C.G.A.§15-7-21(b).Apart-timejudgeofthestatecourtmayengageintheprivatepracticeoflawinothercourtsbutmaynotpracticeinhisowncourtorappearinanymatterastowhichthatjudgehasexercisedanyjurisdiction.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4Approved And Issued On March 19, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments Thereby Replacing FAO No. 93-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0797

COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF GEORGIA

WegrantedapetitionfordiscretionaryreviewbroughtbytheStateBar of Georgia asking the Court to adopt an opinion of the FormalAdvisory Opinion Board (“board”). At issue is Formal AdvisoryOpinion (“FAO”) 05-4, which is a redrafted version of FAO 91-3.AlthoughbothFAO91-3andFAO05-4addresstheethicalproprietyofalawyerpayingnonlawyeremployeesamonthlybonusfromthegrossproceedsofthelawyer’sfirm,theboardreachedcontraryconclusionsintheseopinionsbasedonethicalrulesinplaceatthetime.Fortherea-sonswhichfollow,weagreewiththeboardthatundercurrentGeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct5.4,thepaymentofamonthlybonusbyalawyertononlawyeremployeesbasedonthegrossreceiptsofhisorherlawofficeinadditiontothenonlawyeremployees’regularmonthlysalaryispermissible;andthatitisethicallypropertocompensatenon-lawyeremployeespursuanttoaplanthatisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement.

In1990thisCourtissuedFAO91-3addressingthesameissueunderformerStandard26ofBarRule4-102(andidenticalDirectoryRule3-102),which,inpertinentpart,prohibitedalawyerfromsharingfeeswithanonlawyerexcept that“a lawyeror lawfirmmay includenonlawyeremployeesinaretirementplan,eventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingagreement.”FormerStandard26(c).In2000theCourt issued theGeorgiaRules of ProfessionalConduct, effectiveJanuary 1, 2001, to replace the former Standards ofConduct.Rule ofProfessionalConduct 5.4 supercedes Standard 26 (c) and enlarges thecircumstances underwhich a lawyer or law firmmay share legal feeswithanonlawyer.1Inpertinentpart,Rule5.4(a)(3)provides:

(a)Alawyerorlawfirmshallnotsharelegalfeeswithanonlawyer,exceptthat....

(3)alawyerorlawfirmmayincludenonlawyeremployeesinacompensationorretirementplan,eventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement.

The board reviewed FAO 91-3 to determine what impact, if any,applicationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductwouldhaveontheopin-ion and concluded that the substance and conclusions reached in FA091-3arenolongerincompliancewithcurrentethicalconsiderations.Asaresult,theboarddraftedFAO05-4.ThatopinionwaspublishedintheAprilandOctober2005issuesoftheGeorgia Bar Journal; nocommentswerereceivedinresponse to thepublications,seeRuleofProfessionalConduct4-403(c);andtheStateBarsoughtandwasgranteddiscretion-aryreviewbythisCourt.RuleofProfessionalConduct4-403(d).

ThedistinctionbetweenRule5.4(a)(3)andStandard26(c)isthattheformerpermitsanonlawyeremployeetoparticipateinbothacom-pensation and retirement plan,whereasthelatterpermittednonlawyercompensationonlyinthecontextofaretirement plan.WeagreewiththeboardthatthesupportforFAO91-3haschangedduetotheadop-tionoftheRulesofProfessionalConductandthatFAO91-3nolongerprovides an accurate interpretation of the applicable rules of ethics.In contrast,FA005-4 is consistentwith currentRuleofProfessionalConduct 5.4 (a) (3) in that it allows compensation to a nonlawyeremployeeintheformofamonthlybonuspaidfromthegrossreceiptsofthelawfirmundertherulethatanonlawyeremployeemaypartici-pateinacompensationplan,eventhoughbasedinwholeorinpartona

profit-sharingarrangement.Accordingly,weadoptproposedFAO05-4andretractFAO91-3.2

FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-4approved.AlltheJusticesconcur.__________1 Rule 5.4 is now analogous to its counterpart in the American BarAssociation Code of Professional Responsibility. ABADR 3-102 (A)(3).2ByourapprovalofFAO05-4,itbecomes“bindingonallmembersoftheStateBar[ofGeorgia].”RulesofProfessionalConduct4-403(e).


Question Presented:

Ethical propriety of a lawyer paying his nonlawyer employees amonthlybonusfromthegrossreceiptsofhislawoffice.

Summary Answer:

The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyeremployees based on the gross receipts of his law office in additionto their regular monthly salary is permissible under Georgia Rule ofProfessionalConduct5.4.Itisethicallyproperforalawyertocompen-satehisnonlawyeremployeesbaseduponaplanthatisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement.

Opinion:

Correspondentaskswhetheralawyermaypaynonlawyeremployeesamonthlybonuswhichisapercentageofgrossreceiptsofthelawoffice.

GeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct5.4necessitatesthemodifica-tionofFormalAdvisoryOpinionNo.91-3,whichwasbasedlargelyonStandardNo.26ofGeorgiaBarRule4-102.GeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct5.4replacestheformerstandardandprovidesasfollows:

(a)Alawyerorlawfirmshallnotsharelegalfeeswithanonlawyer,exceptthat:

(1) anagreementbyalawyerwiththelawyer’sfirm,partner,orassociatemayprovideforthepaymentofmoney,overareason-ableperiodoftimeafterhisdeath,tothelawyer’s estateortooneormorespecifiedpersons;

(2)alawyerorlawfirmwhopurchasesthepracticeofadeceased,disabled,ordisappearedlawyermay,pursuanttotheprovisionsofRule1.17,paytotheestateorotherrepresentativeofthatlawyertheagreed-uponpurchaseprice;

(3)alawyerorlawfirmmayincludenonlawyeremployeesinacompensationorretirementplan,eventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement;and

(4)alawyer whoundertakestocompleteunfinishedbusinessofadeceasedlawyermaypaytotheestateofthedeceasedlawyerthatproportionof the total compensationwhich fairly represents theservicesrenderedbythedeceasedlawyer.

Georgia’sRuleofProfessionalConduct5.4isanalogoustoitscoun-terpart in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1980, theABAamendedDR3-102(A)toaddanadditionalexceptionregardingthesharingoffeeswithnonlawyeremployees:“Alawyerorlawfirmmayincludenonlawyeremployeesinacompensationorretirementplaneventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofitsharingarrange-ment.”(emphasisadded).ABADR3-102(A)(3).TheGeorgiaRulesofProfessional Conduct are consistent with the ABA’s principles of feesharingwithnon-attorneys.

AstheCommenttotheModelRule5.4oftheABAModelRulesofProfessionalConductstates,thepolicyunderlyingthelimitationonthesharingoffeesbetweenlawyerandlaypersonseekstoprotectthelaw-yer’sindependentprofessionaljudgment.TheCommentcautionsthatifalayperson,notguidedbyprofessionalobligations,sharesaninterestintheoutcomeoftherepresentationofaclient,thepossibilityexiststhatheorshemayinfluencetheattorney’sjudgment.

In light of all of the foregoing,we conclude that thepayment of amonthlybonuspayabletononlawyeremployeesbaseduponaplanthatis inwholeor inpartonaprofit-sharingarrangementdoesnotconsti-tutesasharingoflegalfeesinviolationofGeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct5.4.


STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-5Approved And Issued On February 13, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 92-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0798

Question Presented:

1)Ethicalproprietyofalawfirmobtainingaloantocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses;

2)Ethical considerations applicable to payment of interest chargedonloanobtainedbylawfirmtocoveradvancestoclientsforlitigationexpenses.

Opinion:

Correspondentlawfirmasksifit isethicallypermissibletoemploythefollowingsystemforpaymentofcertaincostsandexpensesincon-tingentfeecases.Thelawfirmwouldsetupadrawaccountwithabank,with theaccountsecuredbyanotefromthefirm’s individual lawyers.When it becomes necessary to pay court costs, deposition expenses,expertwitness fees,orotherout-of-pocket litigationexpenses, the lawfirmwouldobtainanadvanceunder thenote.The firmwouldpay theinterestchargedbythebankasitisincurredonamonthlyorquarterlybasis.Whenaclientmakesapaymenttowardexpensesincurredinhisorhercase,theamountofthatpaymentwouldbepaidtothebanktopaydownthebalanceowedonhisorhershareofexpensesadvancedunderthenote.Whenacaseissettledorverdictpaid,thefirmwouldpayofftheclient’sshareofthemoneyadvancedontheloan.Ifnoverdictorsettle-mentisobtained,thefirmwouldpaythebalanceowedtothebankandbilltheclient.Someportionoftheinterestcostsincurredinthisarrange-mentwouldbechargedtotheclient.Thecontingentfeecontractwouldspecify theclient’sobligations topayreasonableexpensesand interestfeesincurredinthisarrangement.

The first issue iswhether it is ethically permissible for lawyers toborrowfundsforthepurposeofadvancingreasonableexpensesontheirclients’behalf.Ifso,wemustthendeterminetheproprietyofchargingclientsinteresttodefraypartoftheexpenseoftheloan.

Inaddressingthefirstissue,lawyersaregenerallydiscouragedfromprovidingfinancialassistancetotheirclients.Rule1.8(e)states:

Alawyershallnotprovidefinancialassistancetoaclientinconnec-tionwithpendingorcontemplatedlitigation,exceptthat:

(1)a lawyermayadvancecourt costsandexpensesof litigation, therepaymentofwhichmaybecontingentontheoutcomeofthematter;or

(2) a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs andexpenses of litigationmay pay those costs and expenses on behalfoftheclient.

Despite that general admonition, contingent fee arrangements arepermittedbyRule1.5(c),whichstates:

(1)Afeemaybecontingentontheoutcomeofthematterforwhichtheserviceisrendered,exceptinamatterinwhichacontingentfeeisprohibitedbyparagraph(d)orotherlaw.Acontingentfeeagreementshallbeinwritingandshallstatethemethodbywhichthefeeistobedetermined,includingthepercentageorpercentagesthatshallaccrueto the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigationandother expenses to be deducted from the recovery, andwhethersuchexpensesare tobedeductedbeforeorafter thecontingent feeiscalculated.

(2)Uponconclusionofacontingentfeematter,thelawyershallpro-videtheclientwithawrittenstatementstatingthefollowing:

(i)theoutcomeofthematter;and,

(ii)ifthereisarecovery,showingthe:

(A)remittancetotheclient;(B)themethodofitsdetermination;(C)theamountoftheattorneyfee;and(D) if the attorney’s fee is dividedwith another lawyerwhoisnotapartnerinoranassociateofthelawyer’sfirmorlawoffice,theamountoffeereceivedbyeachandthemannerinwhichthedivisionisdetermined.

Thecorrespondent’sproposedarrangementcoversonlythoseexpens-es which are permitted under Rule 1.8(e). Paragraph (e) of Rule 1.8eliminatestheformerrequirementthattheclientremainultimatelyliableforfinancialassistanceprovidedbythelawyerandfurtherlimitspermit-tedassistancetocovercostsandexpensesdirectlyrelatedto litigation.SeeComment(4)toRule1.8.

The arrangement alsoprovides thatwhen any recovery ismadeontheclient’sbehalf,therecoverywouldfirstbedebitedbytheadvancesmadeunder thenote,withpayment for thoseadvancesbeingmadebythefirmdirectlytothebank.Theclientthusreceivesonlythatrecoverywhichremainsafterexpenseshavebeenpaid.Theclientisinformedofthis in correspondent’s contingent fee contract, which states that “allreasonableandnecessaryexpensesincurredintherepresentationofsaidclaimsshallbedeductedafterdivisionashereinprovidedtocompensateattorneyforhisfee.”

In the case where recovery is not obtained, however, the lawyersthemselvesarecontractuallyobligatedtopaytheamountoweddirectlytothebank.Correspondent’sproposedcontractasoutlinedintherequestforthisopiniondoesnotinformtheclientastopossibleresponsibilityforsuchexpenseswherethereisnorecovery.ItistheopinionofthisBoardthatRules1.5(c)and1.8(e), taken together, require that thecontingentfeecontractinformtheclientwhetherheisorisnotresponsiblefortheseexpenses,evenifthereisnorecovery.

Although the client may remain “responsible for all or a portionof these expenses,” decisions regarding the appropriate actions to betaken to deal with such liability are entirely within the discretion ofthe lawyers. Since this discretion has always existed, the fact that thelawyers have originally borrowed the money instead of advancing itout-of-pocketwouldseemtobeirrelevant,andthearrangementisthusnotimpermissible.

Thebank’sinvolvementwouldberelevant,however,wereitallowedtoaffecttheattorney-clientrelationship,suchasifthebankweremadeprivytoclients’confidencesorsecrets(includingclientidentity)orper-mittedtoaffectthelawyer’sjudgmentinrepresentinghisorherclient.Seegenerally,Rule1.6.Thus,thelawyermustbecarefultomakesurethatthebankunderstandsthatitscontractualarrangementcaninnowayaffect or compromise the lawyer’s obligations to his or her individualclients.

Theremainingissueiswhetheritisethicallypermissibleforlawyersto charge clients interest on the expenses and costs advanced via thisarrangementwiththebank.Asinthefirstissue,thefactthattheexpensesoriginatedwithabankinsteadofthelawfirmitselfisirrelevant,unlesstherelationshipbetweenlawyerandbankinterfereswiththerelationshipbetweenlawyerandclient.Assumingitdoesnot,thequestioniswhetherlawyersshouldbepermittedtochargetheirclientsinterestonadvances.

InAdvisoryOpinionNo.45(March15,1985,asamendedNovember15,1985),theStateDisciplinaryBoardheldthatalawyermayethicallychargeinterestonclients’overduebills“withoutapriorspecificagree-mentwithaclientifnoticeisgiventotheclientinadvancethatinterestwillbechargedonfeebillswhichbecomedelinquentafterastatedperiodof time,butnot less than30days.”Thus, theBoard foundnogeneralimpropriety incharging interestonoverduebills.There isnoapparentreasonwhy advanced expenses forwhich a clientmay be responsibleunderacontingentfeeagreement(whether theyarebilled to theclientordeductedfromarecovery)shouldbetreatedanydifferently.Thus,wefindnoethicalimproprietyincharginglawfulinterestonsuchamountsadvancedontheclient’sbehalf.1

In approving the practice of charging interest on overdue bills, theBoardheldthatalawyermustcomplywith“allapplicablelaw1...andethicalconsiderations.”

TheobviousintentofRule1.5(c)istoensurethatclientsareadequatelyinformedofallrelevantaspectsofcontingentfeearrangements,includingallfactorstakenintoaccountindeterminingtheamountoftheirultimaterecovery.SinceanyinterestchargedonadvancescouldaffecttheultimaterecoveryasmuchasotherfactorsmentionedinRule1.5(c), itwouldbeinconsistenttopermitlawyerstochargeinterestontheseadvanceswithoutrevealingtheintenttodosointhefeecontract.Thus,weconcludethatitispermissibletochargeinterestonsuchadvancesonlyif(i)theclientisnotifiedinthecontingentfeecontractofthemaximumrateofinterestthelawyerwill ormay charge on such advances; and (ii) thewritten state-mentgiventotheclientuponconclusionofthematterreflectstheinterestchargedontheexpensesadvancedinthematter.__________1TheopinionmakesspecificmentionofO.C.G.A.7-4-16, theFederalTruthinLendingandFairCreditBillingActsinTitleIoftheConsumer


CreditProtectionActasamended(15USC1601et seq.).Westatenoopinionastotheapplicabilityoftheseactsorotherstothematterathand.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-6Approved and Issued On May 3, 2007Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 92-2Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0799

Question Presented:

Ethicalproprietyofalawyeradvertisingforlegalbusinesswiththeintention of referring amajority of that business out to other lawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisement.

Summary Answer:

It is ethically improper for a lawyer to advertise for legal businesswith the intention of referring amajority of that business out to otherlawyerswithoutdisclosingthatintentintheadvertisementandwithoutcomplyingwiththeGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductapplicabletolawyerreferralservices.

Opinion:

Correspondent seeks ethical advice for a practicing attorney whoadvertises legal servicesbutwhoseadsdonotdisclose thatamajorityof the responding callers will be referred to other lawyers. The issueiswhether thefailure to include informationabout the lawyersreferralpractices in the ad ismisleading in violation of theGeorgia Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Rule 7.1 of the Georgia Rules of ProfessionalConductgoverningthedisseminationoflegalservicespermitsalawyerto“advertisethroughallformsofpublicmedia...solongasthecommuni-cationisnotafalse,fraudulent,deceptive,ormisleadingcommunicationaboutthelawyerorthelawyer’sservices.”Acommunicationisfalseormisleadingifit“[c]ontainsamaterialmisrepresentationoffactorlaworomitsafactnecessarytomakethestatementconsideredasawholenotmateriallymisleading,”Rule7.1(a)(1).

Theadvertisementof legalservices isprotectedcommercialspeechunder the First Amendment. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.350(1977).Commercialspeechservestoinformthepublicoftheavail-ability,natureandpricesofproductsandservices.Inshort,suchspeechservesindividualandsocietalinterestsinassuringinformedandreliabledecision-making. Id. at364.Thus, theCourthasheld that truthful adsincludingareasofpracticewhichdidnotconformtothebar’sapprovedlistwereinformativeandnotmisleadingandcouldnotberestrictedbythestatebar.InreR.M.J.,455U.S.191(1982).

Although actually or inherentlymisleading advertisementsmay beprohibited,potentiallymisleadingadscannotbeprohibitediftheinfor-mationintheadcanbepresentedinawaythat isnotdeceiving.GaryE. Peel v.AttorneyRegistration andDisciplinaryComm’n of Illinois,496U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-2289 (1990). Requiring additionalinformationsoastoclarifyapotentiallymisleadingcommunicationdoesnot infringeon the attorney’sFirstAmendment.Zaudererv.OfficeofDisciplinaryCounsel,471U.S.626,651(1985).

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct balance the lawyer’s FirstAmendmentrightswiththeconsumer’sinterestinaccurateinformation.In general, the intrusion on the FirstAmendment right of commercialspeech resulting from rationally based affirmative disclosure require-mentsisminimal.

Atruestatementwhichomitsrelevantinformationisasmisleadingasafalsestatement.So,forexample,whencontingencyfeesarementionedin thecommunication, the feesmustbeexplained.Rule7.1(a)(5).TheRules prohibit communications which are likely to create an unjusti-fiedexplanationaboutresultsthelawyercanachieveorcomparisonofserviceunlessthecomparisoncanbesubstantiated.Rule7.1(a)(2),(3).

TheRulesevidenceapolicyoffulldisclosureenablingtheclienttoinvestigate theattorney(s)and the servicesoffered.Anyadvertisementmust be clearlymarked as an ad, unless it is otherwise apparent fromthecontextthatitissuchacommunicationandatleastoneresponsibleattorney’snamemustbeincluded.Rule7.1(a)(4),(6)(b).Lawfirmsprac-ticingunder a trade namemust includenamesof practicing attorneys.Thefirm’stradenamecannotimplyconnectionstoanorganizationwithwhich it has no connection. Rule 7.5(a)(2). An attorney is prohibitedfrom implying associations with other attorneys when an associationdoesnotexistandmaystateorimplypracticeinapartnershiporotherorganizationsonlywhen that is the fact.Rule7.5(d).Thesedisclosure

requirements assure that the public receives accurate information onwhichtobasedecisions.

Similarly, other jurisdictions have required disclosure of attorneynamesandprofessionalassociationsintheadvertisementofeitherlegalservicesorreferralservices.Agroupofattorneysandlawfirmsin theWashington,D.C.areaplannedtocreateaprivatelawyerreferralservice.Thereferralservice’sadvertisingcampaignwastobehandledbyacor-porationentitled“TheLitigationGroup.”Adswouldstatethat lawyersinthegroupwerewillingtorepresentclientsinpersonalinjurymatters.Thepersonansweringthetelephonecallsgeneratedbytheadwouldreferthecallertooneofthememberlawfirmsorlawyers.

TheVirginiaStateBarStandingCommitteeonLegalEthics foundthenamemisleadingbecauseitimpliedtheentitywasalawfirmratherthansimplyareferralservice.TheCommitteerequiredtheadincludeadisclaimerexplaining that“TheLitigationGroup”wasnota law firm.VirginiaStateBarStandingCommitteeon legalEthics,Opinion1029,2/1/88.

TheMarylandStateBarAssociationCommitteeonEthicswaspre-sentedwithfactsidenticaltothosepresentedinVirginia.TheMarylandCommittee also required additional information in the ad to indicatethegroupwasnota law firmor singleentityproviding legal services.MarylandStateBarAssociationCommittee onEthics,Opinion88-65,2/24/88.

Similarly, an opinion by the New York Bar Association prohibitedan attorney from using an advertising service which published ads forgenericlegalservices.Adsforlegalserviceswererequiredtoincludethenamesandaddressesofparticipatinglawyersanddisclosetherelationshipbetweenthelawyers.NewYorkBarAssociation,Opinion597,1/23/89.

The situations presented to the Virginia,Maryland andNewYorkcommittees are analogous to the facts presented here. The advertiserinallthesecasesrefersamajorityofthebusinessgeneratedbythead,withoutdisclosure.Theadheredoesnotdiscloseanyassociationwithotherattorneys.

Theadvertisementatissueconveysonlytheofferoflegalservicesby the advertising attorney and no other service or attorney. The addoes not accurately reflect the attorney’s business. The ad conveysincomplete information regarding referrals, and the omitted informa-tion is important to those clients selecting an attorney rather than anattorneyreferralservice.

Furthermore, the attorneymaking the referralsmaybe circumvent-ing the regulations governing lawyer referral services. Attorneysmaysubscribe to and accept referrals from a “a bona fide lawyer referralserviceoperatedbyanorganizationauthorizedandqualifiedtodobusi-nessinthisstate;provided,however,suchorganizationhasfiledwiththeStateDisciplinaryBoard,atleastannuallyareportshowingitsterms,itssubscription charges, agreementswith counsel, the number of lawyersparticipating,andthenamesandaddressesoflawyersparticipatingintheservice.”Rule7.3(c)(1).Theseregulationshelpclientsselectcompetentcounsel. If the attorney is not operating a bona fide lawyer referral inaccordancewiththeRules,theclientisdeprivedofallofthisinforma-tion. The attorneys accepting the referrals also violate Rule 7.3(c) byparticipatingintheillicitserviceandpayingforthereferrals.

Assumingthattheadvertisementsatissueoffersonlytheadvertisingattorneys services and that the attorney accepts cases from the callers,theadisnotfalseorinherentlymisleading.However,whereamajorityoftherespondingcallersarereferredout,thisbecomesalawyerreferralservice.TheRulesrequiredisclosureof thereferralaswellascompli-ancewiththeRulesapplicabletoreferralservices.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-7Approved And Issued On November 26, 2007Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 93-2Supreme Court Docket No. S08U0023 Question Presented:

Ethicalconsiderationsofanattorneyrepresentinganinsurancecom-panyonasubrogationclaimandsimultaneouslyrepresentingtheinsured.

Summary Answer:

Alawyerrepresentinganinsurancecompanyonasubrogationclaimshouldnotundertakethesimultaneousrepresentationof theinsuredon


relatedclaims,unlessitisreasonablylikelythatthelawyerwillbeabletoprovideadequaterepresentation tobothclients,andonly ifboth theinsurancecompanyandtheinsuredhaveconsentedtotherepresentationafterconsultationwith the lawyer,have received inwriting reasonableandadequateinformationaboutthematerialrisksoftherepresentation,andhavebeengiventheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.Rule1.7,ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule.

Opinion:

This inquiryaddresses severalquestionsas toethicalproprietyandpossibleconflictsbetweentherepresentationoftheclient,theinsurancecompany,anditsinsured.

HypotheticalFactSituation

Theinsurancecompanymakesapaymenttoitsinsuredunderapro-visionofaninsurancepolicywhichprovidesthatsuchpaymentiscon-tingentuponthetransferandassignmentofsubrogationoftheinsured’srightstoathirdpartyforrecoverywithrespecttosuchpayment.

Question 1:Maytheattorneyinstitutesuitagainst the tortfeasor intheinsured’snamewithoutgettingtheinsured’spermission?

PursuanttotheprovisionsofRule1.2(a),alawyermaynotinstitutea legalproceedingwithoutobtainingproperauthorizationfromhiscli-ent.Theordinaryprovisioninaninsurancepolicygivingtheinsurancecompanytherightofsubrogationdoesnotgive the lawyer theright toinstitutealawsuitinthenameoftheinsuredwithoutspecificauthorityfromtheinsured.Thenormalsubrogationagreements,trustagreementsor loan receiptswhichare executedat the timeof thepaymentby theinsurerusuallygivetheinsurancecompanytherighttopursuetheclaimintheinsured’snameanddependinguponthelanguagemaygrantproperauthorizationfromthe insured toproceed insuchfashion.Appropriateauthorizationtobringthesuitintheinsured’snameshouldbeobtainedandtheinsuredshouldbekeptadvisedwithrespecttodevelopmentsinthecase.

Question 2: Does the attorney represent both the insured and theinsurancecompany,and,ifso,wouldhethenhaveadutytoinformtheinsuredofhispotentialcausesofactionsuchasfordiminutionofvalueandpersonalinjury?

The insurancepolicydoesnot create an attorney/client relationshipbetweenthelawyerandtheinsured.Ifthelawyerundertakestorepresenttheinsured,thelawyerhasdutiestotheinsured,whichmustberespectedwithrespecttoadvisingtheinsuredastootherpotentialcausesofactionsuchasdiminutionofvalueandpersonal injury.Rule1.7(b); seealso,Comment10(assuringindependenceofcounsel)andComment12(com-monrepresentationspermissibleevenwithsomedifferencesininterests).

Question 3:Isthereaconflictofinterestinrepresentingtheinsuredastootherpotentialcausesofaction?

Inmostinstancesnoproblemwouldbepresentedwithrepresentingthe insuredas tohisdeductible,diminutionofvalue,etc.Generallyaninsurance company retains the right to compromise the claim, whichwould reasonably result in a pro-rata payment to the insurance carrierandtheinsured.Theattorneyrepresentingtheinsuredmustbecautioustoavoidtakinganyaction,whichwouldprecludetheinsuredfromanyrecovery to which the insured might otherwise be entitled. Rule 1.7,ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule,(b);seealso,Comment10(assuringindependence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representationspermissibleevenwithsomedifferencesininterest.)toRule1.7.

Amuchmoredifficultproblemispresentedintheeventanattorneyattempts to represent both an insurance company’s subrogation inter-estinpropertydamageandaninsured’spersonalinjuryclaim.Inmostcases the possibility of settlementmust be considered.Any aggregatesettlementwouldnecessarilyhavetobeallocatedbetweentheliquidateddamagesofthesubrogatedpropertylossandtheunliquidateddamagesofthepersonalinjuryclaim.Anyaggregatesettlementwouldrequireeachclient’s consent after consultation, and this requirement cannotbemetbyblanketconsentpriortosettlementnegotiations.Rule1.8(g);seealsoComment6toRule1.8.Onlythemostsophisticatedof insuredscouldintelligentlywaivesuchaconflict,andtherefore inalmostallcasesanattorneywouldbeprecludedfromrepresentingboththeinsurerandtheinsuredinsuchcases.

In conclusion, a lawyer representing an insurance company on asubrogationclaimshouldnotundertakethesimultaneousrepresentationof the insuredon related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that thelawyerwill be able to provide adequate representation to both clients,

andonlyifboththeinsurancecompanyandtheinsuredhaveconsentedtotherepresentationafterconsultationwiththelawyer,havereceivedinwritingreasonableandadequateinformationaboutthematerialrisksoftherepresentation,andhavebeengiventheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.Rule1.7(a)and(b).

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD NO. 05-8Approved And Issued On April 4, 2006Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 96-2Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0800

Question Presented:

Thequestionpresentediswhetheranattorneymaystampclientcor-respondencewithanoticestatingthattheclienthasaparticularperiodoftimetonotifythelawyerifhe/sheisdissatisfiedwiththelawyerandthatiftheclientdidnotnotifythelawyerofhis/herdissatisfactionwithinthatperiodoftime,theclientwouldwaiveanyclaimformalpractice.

Summary Answer:

Alawyershallnotmakeanagreementprospectivelylimitingthelaw-yer’sliabilitytoaclientformalpracticeunlesspermittedbylawandtheclientisindependentlyrepresentedinmakingtheagreement.Therefore,in the absence of independent representation of the client, the lawyershouldnotconditiontherepresentationofaclientuponthewaiverofanyclaimformalpracticeandshouldnotattempttocausethewaiverofanyclaimformalpracticebytheinclusionoflanguageamountingtosuchawaiverincorrespondencewithaclient.

Opinion:

AmemberoftheInvestigativePaneloftheStateDisciplinaryBoardhas brought to the attention of the FormalAdvisoryOpinionBoard apracticebylawyersofaddingthefollowinglanguage(byrubberstamp)tocorrespondencewithclients:

ImportantMessageIf you disagree with anything set forth in this communicationor theway I have represented you to date, please notifymebycertifiedmailattheaddresssetforthhereinimmediately.IfIdonothearfromyou,itshallbeanacknowledgmentbyyouperouragreementthatyouaresatisfiedwithmyrepresentationofyoutodateandyouagreewithmystatementsinthiscommunication.

The intendedeffectof this“message” is tocreatea shortperiodoftimewithinwhichtheclientmustdecidewhetherheorsheissatisfiedwith the representation, and if not satisfied, the clientmust notify thelawyer “immediately.” If such notification is not provided “immedi-ately,”theclientwillhaveacknowledgedan“agreement”thattheclientissatisfiedwiththerepresentation.

It is apparent from reviewing this “message” that the lawyer isattemptingtoexoneratehimselforherselffromanyclaimofmalprac-tice or to cause a waiver of any claim formalpractice by the clientagainstthelawyer.Byattemptingtolimithisorherliabilityformal-practiceortocauseawaiverofanyclaimformalpractice,thelawyeris putting himself or herself into an adversarial relationshipwith theclient.Whileprovidingadvicetotheclientontheonehand, thelaw-yer is attempting to limit or excuse his or her liability for claims ofmalpractice resulting from the provision of such advice on the otherhand. Such conduct places the lawyer’s personal interests ahead oftheinterestsoftheclient.ThisconductisexpresslyforbiddenbyRule1.8(h), which provides that “A lawyer shall not make an agreementprospectivelylimitingthelawyer’sliabilitytoaclientformalpracticeunlesspermittedbylawandtheclientisindependentlyrepresentedinmakingtheagreement.”

Insummary,theuseofamessageornotice,suchasdescribedherein,is a violation of Rule 1.8(h), and subjects an attorney to discipline,includingdisbarment.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-9Approved And Issued On April 13, 2006Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 97-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06R0802


Question Presented:

Isitethicallypropertoworkonatemporarybasisforotherattorneys?Isitethicallyproperforalawyer,lawfirm,orcorporatelawdepartmenttohireotherattorneysonatemporarybasis?

Summary Answer:

Yes.Whileatemporarylawyerandtheemployingfirmorcorporatelaw departmentmust be sensitive to the unique problems of conflictsof interest, confidentiality, imputed disqualification, client participa-tion,useofplacementagenciesandfeedivisionproducedbytheuseoftemporarylawyers,thereisnothingintheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductthatprohibitstheuseoftemporarylawyers.

Opinion:

I.ConflictsofInterest

Anattorneyisethicallyobligatedtoavoidconflictsofinterestwithrespect to that attorney’s client. A temporary lawyer represents theclientofafirmwhenthatlawyerworksonamatterforaclient.Thus,atemporarylawyeremployedtorepresentclientsorassistinrepresen-tation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationshipwith thoseparticularclientsasanassociateofthefirm.Accordingly,thegeneralrulespertainingtoallattorneysregardingconflictsofinterestareappli-cabletothetemporarylawyer.Specifically,thetemporarylawyerandtheemployinglawfirmorcorporatelawdepartmentmustcomplywithRules1.7,1.8,1.9, and1.10governingpersonal interests, simultane-ousrepresentation,andsubsequentrepresentationconflictsofinterest,and imputed disqualification. Generally, a temporary lawyer shouldnotrepresentaclientifthereisasignificantriskthatthelawyer’sowninterests or the lawyer’s duties to another client, a former client, ora third personwillmaterially and adversely affect the representationwithoutobtainingtheconsentoftheaffectedclientsinaccordancewiththeconsentrequirementofRule1.7.

Theopportunityforconflictsofinterestisheightenedinthecontextoftheemploymentoftemporarylawyers.Theverynatureofatemporarylawyerinvokesconflictofinterestissues.Obviously,atemporarylawyeris likely tobe employedbymanydifferent firmsor legaldepartmentsduringthecourseofhisorherpractice.Therefore,thepotentialforcon-flictsofinterestisgreat.Asapracticalmatter,thispotentialforconflictimposesupontemporarylawyersandemployinglawfirmsorcorporatelawdepartmentsanobligationofgreatcareinbothrecordkeepingandscreeningforconflicts.Infact, thepotentialforconflict issohighthatlawfirmsorcorporatelawdepartmentsthatemploytemporarylawyerswould be acting unethically if they did not carefully evaluate eachproposed employment for actual conflicting interests and potentiallyconflictinginterests.Additionally,thetemporarylawyershouldmaintainarecordofclientsandmattersworkedoninordertoevaluatepossibleconflicts of interest should they arise.All firms employing temporarylawyersshouldalsomaintainacompleteandaccuraterecordofallmat-tersonwhicheachtemporarylawyerworks.

Oneof themostdifficult issues involvingconflictof interest in theemploymentoftemporarylawyersisimputeddisqualificationissues.Inotherwords,whenwouldthefirmorlegaldepartmentbevicariouslydis-qualifiedduetoconflictofinterestwithrespecttothetemporarylawyer?Sinceatemporaryattorneyisconsideredtobeanassociateoftheparticu-larfirmorcorporatelawdepartmentforwhichheorsheistemporarilyworking, the normal rules governing imputed disqualification apply.Specifically, Rule 1.10(a) provides that if any attorney is individuallyprecludedfromundertakingrepresentationbyRules1.7,1.8(c),1.9,or2.2,thenafirmwithwhomtheattorneyisassociatedisalsoprecludedfrom undertaking that representation. Also, and most importantly inthetemporarylawyercontext,Rule1.9(b)saysthatalawyer“shallnotknowinglyrepresentapersoninthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatterinwhichafirmwithwhichthelawyerformerlywasassociatedhadpre-viousrepresentedaclient:(1)whoseinterestsaremateriallyadversetothatperson;and(2)aboutwhomthelawyerhadacquired[confidential]information...,unlesstheclientconsentsafterconsultation.”Theeffectoftheserulesworkinginconjunctionisthatafirmemployingatempo-rarylawyerwouldbedisqualifiedbyimputeddisqualificationfromanyunconsented to representationmaterially adverse to a former client oftheformerfirmsofthetemporarylawyerinthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatterifthetemporarylawyerhadacquiredconfidentialinforma-tionabouttheformerrepresentation.

II.Confidentiality

Inadditiontoavoidingconflictsofinterest,anattorneyalsoisobli-gated toprotect the client’s confidences.Asnotedabove, a temporarylawyerwhoisinvolvedintherepresentationofclientsorwhoprovides

assistance in the representationof clients enters into an attorney/clientrelationshipwiththoseclients.Therefore,thetemporaryattorneyisobli-gatednottodiscloseclientconfidences.Atemporaryattorneyisrequiredto keep all information gained in the professional relationship with aclientconfidentialinaccordancewithRule1.6.

Furthermore,Rule5.1requires:

(a)Apartnerinalawfirmshallmakereasonableeffortstoensurethat thefirmhas ineffectmeasuresgivingreasonableassurancethat all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules ofProfessionalConduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over anotherlawyershallmakereasonableefforttoensurethattheotherlawyerconformstotheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.

ThisRuleobligatestheemployingfirmorcorporatelawdepartmenttoimposeupon temporary lawyersobligationsofconfidentiality identicalto those requirements imposedonanassociateoranyotheremployee.Thisobligationofconfidentialityincludesallinformationregardingtherepresentation of all clients of the firm or departmentswhen the tem-porarylawyeracquiresthatinformationduringhisorherengagement.

To protect confidentiality and to avoid excessive risks of imputeddisqualificationitisaprudentpracticeforalllawfirmsandcorporatelawdepartments,totheextentpracticable,toscreeneachtemporarylawyerfromaccesstoanyinformationrelatingtoclientsthatisnotrelatedtothetemporarylawyer’sassignment.Moreover,atemporarylawyerworkingforseveralfirmsshallmakeeveryefforttoavoidexposurewithinthosefirmstoanyinformationrelatingtoclientsonmattersnotassignedtothetemporaryattorney.

III.UseofPlacementAgencyforTemporaryAttorneys

Placementagenciesparticipateinabusinessthatfurnisheslawfirmsandcorporatedepartmentswiththeservicesoflawyersdesiringtoobtainpart-timeor temporaryemployment.Firmsandcorporate legaldepart-mentslooktotheseagenciestofindtemporaryattorneys.InaccordancewithABAFormalOpinion88-356(1988),afirmdoesnotviolateethicalregulationsbyutilizingaplacementagency.However,therearecertainguidelines that should be followed to ensure that no ethical violationsoccur.Firstofall, thefirmorcorporate legaldepartmentmustpreventanythirdpartyfromexertinganycontrolastotheclientrepresentation.SuchcontrolwouldbeaviolationofRule5.4(c).Forexample,anagencymayhaveaninterestinanattorney’stakingadditionaltimeonaprojectsothatitwillresultinhigherfees.Thesolutionistopreventanycontrolbytheagencyoftheattorney’stime.

Furthermore, there is an increased risk of disclosure of confiden-tial informationeven though theremustbe compliancewith theRulesrelating to confidential information and conflicts of interest. This riskofdisclosuremaybe lessenedby thescreeningof temporaryattorneysby thefirmthat,asdiscussedabove, insures the temporary lawyersdonotobtainunnecessaryinformation.Moreover,aclientisentitledtobeinformed that a temporary attorney is being used.A client reasonablyassumesthatonlyattorneyswithinthefirmaredoingworkonthatcli-ent’scase,and thus,aclient shouldbe informed that the firm isusingatemporaryattorneytodothefirm’swork.Becausethereissomeriskof thirdparty interferencewith the representation, theclient shouldbeadvisedofthatrisk.CompliancewithRule5.4(c),whichprohibitsthirdpartycontrolof theclient representation requires fulldisclosure to theclientofthearrangement.

IV.FeeArrangements

The last consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriatemanner inwhich tohandle the feearrangement. Inaccordancewith therationalecontained inABAFormalOpinion88-356,a feedivisionwithatemporaryattorneyisallowed.Ifatemporaryattorneyisdirectlysuper-visedbyanattorney ina lawfirm, thatarrangement isanalogous tofeesplittingwithanassociateinalawfirm,whichisallowedbyRule1.5(e).Thus, in that situation there is no requirement of consent by the clientregardingthefee.Nevertheless,theethicallyproperandprudentcourseistoseekconsentofaclientunderallcircumstancesinwhichthetemporarylawyer’sassistancewillbeamaterialcomponentoftherepresentation.Thefeedivisionwithatemporaryattorneyisalsoallowedevenifthereisnodirectsupervisionifthreecriteriaaremet:(1)thefeeisinproportiontotheservicesperformedbyeachlawyer;(2)theclientisadvisedofthefeesplit-tingsituationandconsents;and(3)thetotalfeeisreasonable.Rule1.5(e).

Inthattheagencyprovidingthetemporarylawyerisnotauthorizedto practice law, any sharing of feeswith such an agencywould be inviolationofRule5.4(a).Therefore,while it isperfectlypermissible to


compensateanagencyforprovidingatemporarylawyer,suchcompen-sationmustnotbebasedonaportionofclientfeescollectedbythefirmorthetemporarylawyer.

Insummary,employmentasa temporarylawyeranduseof tempo-rary lawyers are proper when adequate measures, consistent with theguidanceofferedinthisopinion,areemployedbythetemporarylawyerand the employing firm or corporate law department. Thesemeasuresrespondtotheuniqueproblemscreatedbytheuseoftemporarylawyers,includingconflictsof interest, imputeddisqualification,confidentiality,fee arrangements, use of placement agencies, and client participation.Generally, firms employing temporary lawyers should: (1) carefullyevaluateeachproposedemploymentforconflictinginterestsandpoten-tially conflicting interests; (2) if conflicting or potentially conflictinginterests exist, then determine if imputed disqualification rules willimputetheconflict to thefirm;(3)screeneachtemporarylawyerfromallinformationrelatingtoclientsforwhichatemporarylawyerdoesnotwork,totheextentpracticable;(4)makesuretheclientisfullyinformedas toallmatters relating to the temporary lawyer’s representation;and(5)maintaincompleterecordsonallmattersuponwhicheachtemporarylawyerworks.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-10Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 98-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0803

Question Presented:

Can aGeorgia attorney,who has agreed to serve as local counsel,bedisciplinedfordiscoveryabusescommittedbyan in-houseorotherout-of-statecounselwhoisnotamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia?

Summary Answer:

A Georgia attorney, serving as local counsel, can be disciplinedunderRule 5.1(c) for discovery abuses committed by an out-of-statein-housecounselorotherout-of-statecounselwhenthe localcounselknowsoftheabuseandratifiesitbyhisorherconduct.Knowledgeinthis situation includes“willfulblindness”by the localcounsel.Localcounsel canalsobedisciplined fordiscoveryabusecommittedbyanout-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when thelocal counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counselalsoinaccordancewithRule5.1(c).Finally,theroleoflocalcounsel,asdefinedbythepartiesandunderstoodbythecourt,maycarrywithitaffirmativeethicalobligations.

Opinion:

Aclienthasaskedin-houseorotherout-of-statecounsel,whoisnotamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,torepresenthimasleadcounselinacasevenuedinGeorgia.Leadcounselassociateslocalcounsel,whoisamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,toassistinthehandlingofthecase.Localcounselmovestheadmissionofleadcounselprohacvice,andthemotionisgranted.Duringdiscovery,leadcounselengagesinsomeformofdiscoveryabuse.

Disciplineoflocalcounselforthediscoveryabuseofleadcounselwould,inallcases,belimitedtodiscoveryabusethatisinviolationofaparticularRuleofProfessionalConduct.IfthediscoveryabuseisaviolationofaRuleofProfessionalConduct,forexample,thedestruc-tionof documents subject to amotion toproduce,Rules5.1(c) and3.4(a) defines local counsel’s responsibility for the abuse. BecauseRule5.1(c) is entitled “Responsibilities of aPartner orSupervisoryLawyer” itmaynotbeobvious toallattorneys that the languageofthisstatuteappliestothequestionsregardingethicalresponsibilitiesbetween lead and local counsel. Nevertheless, the language of theRule clearly applies and is in accord with common principals ofaccessoryculpability:

Alawyershallberesponsibleforanotherlawyer’sviolationoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductif:(1)The...supervisorylawyerorders,orwithknowledgeofthespecificconduct,ratifiestheconductinvolved;....

UnderthisRuletheextentoflocalcounsel’saccessoryculpabilityfor lead counsel’s discovery abuse is determined by the answers totwoquestions: (1)What constitutes knowledgeof the abuseby localcounsel? (2)What constitutes ratificationof theviolative conductbylocalcounsel?

Actual knowledge, of course, would always be sufficient to meettheknowledgerequirementofthisRule.Consistentwiththedoctrineof“willful blindness” applied in other legal contexts, however, sufficientknowledge could be imputed to local counsel if he or she, suspiciousthatleadcounselwasengaginginorwasabouttoengageinaviolationofethicalrequirements,sought toavoidacquiringactualknowledgeoftheconduct.Thedoctrineof“willfulblindness”appliesinthesecircum-stances because local counsel’s conduct in avoiding actual knowledgedisplaysthesamelevelofculpabilityasactualknowledge.

Thus, if local counsel was suspicious that lead counsel was“engag[ing]inprofessionalconductinvolvingdishonesty,fraud,deceit,ormisrepresentation”inviolationofRule8.4(a)(4),localcounselwouldmeet the knowledge requirement of accessory culpability if he or shepurposelyavoidedfurther inquiry.Whatwouldbesufficientsuspicion,ofcourse,isdifficulttodetermineintheabstract.Toavoidtheriskoftheeffectofthedoctrineofwillfulblindness,aprudentattorneyshouldtreatanyreasonablesuspicionassufficienttopromptinquiryofthein-houseorotherout-of-statecounsel.

What constitutes ratification is also difficult to determine in theabstract.Consistentwiththedefinitionofaccessoryculpabilityinotherlegalcontexts,however,anattorneyshouldavoidanyconductthatdoesnot actively oppose the violation. The specific conduct required mayincludewithdrawalfromtherepresentationor,insomecases,disclosureoftheviolationtothecourt.Whichmeasuresareappropriatewilldependupon the particular circumstances and consideration of other ethicalrequirements. In all circumstances, however, we would expect localcounsel to remonstratewith lead counsel and towarn lead counsel oflocalcounsel’sethicalobligationsunderRule5.1(c).

Otherthanaccessoryculpability,anddependinguponhowthepartiesandthecourthavedefineditintheparticularrepresentation,theroleoflocalcounsel itselfmay includeanaffirmativeduty to inquire into theconductof leadcounsel andother affirmative ethicalobligations.Thisis true, for example, if the court understands the role of local counselascarryingwithitanydirectsupervisoryauthorityoverout-of-statein-housecounselorotherout-of-statecounsel.Insuchcircumstances,Rule5.1(c)provides:

A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation ofRules of ProfessionalConduct if: (2) the lawyer . . . has directsupervisoryauthorityovertheotherlawyer,andknowsofthecon-ductatatimewhenitsconsequencescanbeavoidedormitigatedbutfailstotakereasonableremedialaction.

Furthermore, at times lead and local counselmayhavedefined therelationshipsothatitisindistinguishablefromthatofco-counsel.Insuchcases theusualprinciplesofethicalresponsibilityapply.Evenshortofthisco-counselrole,however,typicalactsrequiredoflocalcounselsuchasmovingofadmissionprohacviceorthesigningofpleadings,alwayscarrywiththemaffirmativeethicalobligations.Forexample,inthis,asinallcircumstances,thesigningofpleadingsbyanattorneyconstitutesagoodfaithrepresentationregardingthepleadingsandtheconductofthediscoveryprocedureofwhichthepleadingsareapart.Thereisnothingin the role of local counsel that changes this basic ethical responsibil-ity. Local counsel, if he or she signs the pleadings, must be familiarwiththemandinvestigatethemtotheextentrequiredbythisgoodfaithrequirement.

Finally,thereisnothingintheroleoflocalcounselthatexcusesanattor-neyfromtheusualethicalrequirementsapplicabletohisorherownconductintherepresentation,eitherindividuallyorinconjunctionwithleadcounsel.Iflocalcounselengagesinanyunethicalconduct,itisnodefensetoaviola-tionthattheconductwassuggested,initiated,orrequiredbyleadcounsel.

Generally,Rules1.2(a)and(d);1.6;3.3(a)(1)and(4);3.3(c);3.4(a),(b)and(f);3.5(b);4.1(a);4.2(a);4.3(a)and(b);5.1(c);5.3;5.4(c);8.4(a)(1)and(4)mayapplytotheconductoflocalcounseldependinguponthedegreeoflocalcounsel’sinvolvementinthediscoveryprocess.WhilealltheseRulesmightnotbeapplicableinagivencase,takentogethertheycovertherangeofconductthatmaybeinvolved.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11Approved and Issued On September 22, 2008 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia With Comments Thereby Replacing FAO No. 99-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1854

COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA


PERCURIAM.

WegrantedapetitionfordiscretionaryreviewbroughtbytheStateBarofGeorgiaaskingthisCourttoadoptanopinionoftheFormalAdvisoryOpinion Board (“Board”) and retract an earlier version of the FormalAdvisoryOpinion(“FAO”).AtissueisProposedOpinion05-11,whichisare-draftedversionofFAO99-1.1Bothopinionsaddresstheethicalpro-prietyofanattorneydefendingaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhen the attorney simultaneously represents a company in anunrelatedmatterandthatcompanyclaimsasubrogationrightinanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient.HavingexaminedFAO99-1inlightoftheissuanceoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,weagreethatthenewRulesrequireadifferentresultthanthatreachedinFAO99-1andthatProposedOpinion05-11shouldbeadoptedandFAO99-1retracted.

InFAO99-1,issuedonMay27,1999,theBoardappliedStandards30,35and36andEthicalConsiderations5-14and5-15tothequestionpresentedandconcluded

anattorneymaynotsimultaneouslyrepresentclientsthathavedirect-lyadverseinterestsinlitigationthatisthesubjectmatterofeitheroneoftherepresentations.Whetherornotthisisthecase...dependsuponthenatureoftherepresentationoftheinsurancecompany.

Ifitis,infact,theinsurancecompanythatisthetrueclientintheunrelatedmatter,thentheinterestsofthesimultaneouslyrepre-sentedclientsinthelitigationagainsttheinsuredclientaredirectlyadverseeven though the insurancecompany isnot aparty to thelitigationandtherepresentationsareunrelated.TheconsentbytheclientsprovidedforinStandard37isnotavailableinthesecircum-stancesbecauseit isnotobvious that theattorneycanadequatelyrepresenttheinterestsofeachclient.Thisistruebecauseadequaterepresentation includes a requirement of an appearance of trust-worthinessthatisinconsistentwiththeconflictofinterestbetweenthesesimultaneouslyrepresentedclients.

If,however,asisfarmoretypicallythecase,itisnottheinsur-ancecompanythatisthetrueclientintheunrelatedmatter,butaninsured of the insurance company, then there is no simultaneousrepresentation of directly adverse interests in litigation and theseStandardsdonotapply.Instead,theattorneymayhaveapersonalinterestconflictunderStandard30inthattheattorneyhasafinan-cial interest inmaintaining a goodbusiness relationshipwith theinsurance company. This personal interest conflict may be con-sentedtobytheinsuredclientafterfulldisclosureofthepotentialconflict and careful consideration.TheStandard37 limitationonconsenttoconflictsdoesnotapplytoStandard30conflicts.Suchconsent, however, shouldnotbe soughtby an attorneywhen theattorney believes that the representation of the insured will beadverselyaffectedbyhisorherpersonalinterestinmaintainingagoodbusiness relationshipwith the insurance company for todosowouldbetoviolatetheattorney’sgeneralobligationofzealousrepresentationtotheinsuredclient.

In its 2006 re-examination of the question presented in FAO 99-1,theBoardappliedRule1.7of theRulesofProfessionalConductandComment 8 thereto and concluded that the attorney’s representationof the insured would be an impermissible conflict of interest underRule 1.7(a) if the insurance company is the client in the unrelatedmatter,andthatconsentofbothclientswouldnotbeavailabletocurethe impermissible conflict because the conflict necessarily “involvescircumstancesrenderingitreasonablyunlikelythatthelawyerwillbeabletoprovideadequaterepresentationtooneormoreoftheaffectedclients.”Rule1.7(c)(3).ThiswasthesameresultaswasreachedwhenStandards 35 and 36 were applied in FAO 99-1, though ProposedOpinion05-11clarifiesthattheattorney’ssuccessfulrepresentationoftheinsuredclientwouldreduceoreliminatethepotentialsubrogationclaimoftheinsurancecompanyclient,makingadvocacyonbehalfofone client in these circumstances advocacy against a simultaneouslyrepresentedclient.

In addressing the farmore typical case of the client in the unre-latedmatterbeinganinsuredoftheinsurancecompanyratherthantheinsurancecompanyitself,theBoardinProposedOpinion05-11againechoedFAO99-1initsfindingthattherewouldbenoimpermissibleadvocacyagainstasimultaneousrepresentationclient,buttheattorneymight have a conflict with the attorney’s own interests under Rule1.7(a),sincetheattorneywouldhaveafinancialinterestinmaintaininga good business relationshipwith the non-client insurance company.InadeparturefromFAO99-1, theBoardinProposedOpinion05-11opinesthat“thelikelihoodthattherepresentation[oftheinsured]willbeharmedbythisfinancialinterestmakesthisariskysituationfortheattorney,”notingthatwhileRule1.7(b)permitsthepersonalconflicttobecuredbyconsentofallaffectedclientsundersomecircumstances,consentisnotavailabletocuretheconflictiftheconflicttriggersRule

1.7(c)(3), i.e., the conflict “involves circumstances rendering it rea-sonablyunlikely that the lawyer [would]beable toprovideadequaterepresentationtooneormoreoftheaffectedclients.”Thus,ProposedOpinion05-11correctsanerrorinFAO99-1,whichhadrequiredonlytheconsentof the insuredclient to thepersonal interestconflict, andreplacesthe“warning”containedinFAO99-1(“Noattorney,however,shouldseeksuchconsent[toanattorney’spersonalinterestconflict]ifheorshebelievesthathisorherbusinessinterestwill,infact,adverse-lyaffectthequalityoftherepresentationwiththeinsuredclient”)withtheethicalrequirementofRule1.7(c).

InasmuchasFAO99-1no longerprovides themostcurrentethicalguidancetothemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiasinceitisnotbasedonthecurrentethicalrules,andProposedOpinion05-11interprets thecurrentethicalrules,clarifiesapointmadeinFAO99-1,correctsanerrorinFAO99-1,andrecognizestheconversionofthewarningcontainedinFAO99-1intoanethicalrequirement,weconcludethatitisappropriatetoadoptProposedOpinion05-11andretractFAO99-1.2

FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-11approved.AlltheJusticesconcur.__________1With the issuanceof theGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct, theStandardsofConductwere replacedand theCanonsofEthics, includ-ing Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules, were deleted. At therequestoftheOfficeofGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia,theBoardundertooka reviewof theFAOs issuedby thisCourt thatwerebasedon theStandardsofConductandCanonsofEthics todeterminetheimpact,ifany,oftheissuanceoftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.2 Our approval of FAO 05-11 makes it “binding on all members ofthe State Bar [of Georgia].” Rule 4-403(e) of the Georgia Rules ofProfessionalConduct.


Question Presented:

May an attorney ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurancecontract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelatedmatter,theinsurancecompanywithasubrogationrightinanyrecoveryagainstthedefendantclient?

Summary Answer:

In this hypothetical, the attorney’s successful representation of theinsuredwouldreduceoreliminatethepotentialsubrogationclaimoftheinsurancecompanythatisaclientofthesameattorneyinanunrelatedmatter.Thus,essentially,advocacyonbehalfofoneclientinthesecir-cumstances constitutes advocacy against a simultaneously representedclient.“Ordinarily,alawyermaynotactasanadvocateagainstaclientthe lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matteriswholly unrelated.” See,Rule 1.7,Comment 8. This is true becauseadequate representation of any client includes a requirement of anappearanceoftrustworthinessthatisinconsistentwithadvocacyagainstthatclient.

Thus, if the insurance company, as opposed to an insured of thatcompany,isinfacttheclientoftheattorneyintheunrelatedmatter,thenthisrepresentationwouldbeanimpermissibleconflictofinterestunderRule1.7(a) andconsentofboth clients, as sometimespermittedunderRule1.7tocureanimpermissibleconflict,wouldnotbeavailable.See,Rule1.7(c)(3).

If,however,asisfarmoretypicallythecase,itisnottheinsurancecompanythatistheclientintheunrelatedmatter,butaninsuredoftheinsurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneousrepresentation client and the representation is not prohibited for thatreason.Instead,insuchcircumstances,theattorneymayhaveaconflictwiththeattorney’sowninterestsunderRule1.7(a)inthattheattorneyhasafinancialinterestinmaintainingagoodbusinessrelationshipwiththenon-clientinsurancecompany.Thelikelihoodthattherepresentationwillbeharmedbythisfinancialinterestmakesthisariskysituationforthe attorney.Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permitthispersonalinterestconflicttobecuredbyconsentofallaffectedcli-entsafter compliancewith the requirements forconsent found inRule1.7(b).Consentwouldnotbeavailabletocuretheconflict,however,iftheconflict“involvescircumstancesrenderingitreasonablyunlikelythatthelawyer[would]beabletoprovideadequaterepresentationtooneormoreoftheaffectclients.”See,Rule1.7(c).Thequestionthisasksisnotthesubjectiveoneofwhetherornottheattorneythinksheorshewillbeabletoprovideadequaterepresentationdespitetheconflict,butwhetherotherswouldreasonablyviewthesituationassuch.Theattorneymakesthisdeterminationathisorherownperil.


Opinion:

Correspondentaskswhetheranattorneymayethicallydefendaclientpursuanttoaninsurancecontractwhentheattorneysimultaneouslyrep-resents,inanunrelatedmatter,theinsurancecompanywithasubrogationright inany recoveryagainst thedefendantclient. In thishypothetical,theattorney’ssuccessful representationof the insuredwouldreduceoreliminatethepotentialsubrogationclaimoftheinsurancecompanythatisaclientofthesameattorneyinanunrelatedmatter.

ThissituationisgovernedbyRule1.7,whichprovides:

(a)A lawyer shallnot representor continue to represent a client ifthereisasignificantriskthatthelawyer’sowninterestsorthelaw-yer’sduties toanotherclient,aformerclient,ora thirdpersonwillmateriallyandadverselyaffecttherepresentationoftheclient,exceptaspermittedin(b).

(b) If client consent is permissible a lawyermay represent a clientnotwithstanding a significant risk ofmaterial and adverse effect ifeachaffectedorformerclientconsents,preferablyinwriting,totherepresentationafter:

(1)consultationwiththelawyer;(2)havingreceivedinwritingreasonableandadequateinformationaboutthematerialrisksoftherepresentation;and(3)havingbeengiventheopportunitytoconsultwithindependentcounsel.

(c)Clientconsentisnotpermissibleiftherepresentation:

(1)isprohibitedbylawortheserules;(2)includestheassertionofaclaimbyoneclientagainstanotherclientrepresentedbythelawyerinthesameorsubstantiallyrelatedproceeding;or(3)involvescircumstancesrenderingitreasonablyunlikelythatthelawyerwill be able to provide adequate representation to one ormoreoftheaffectedclients.

Iftherepresentationoftheinsurancecompanyintheunrelatedmatteris,infact,representationoftheinsurancecompany,andnotrepresenta-tionofaninsuredofthecompany,thenwegetadditionalassistanceininterpretingRule1.7fromComment8whichstatesthat:“Ordinarily,alawyermaynotactasanadvocateagainstaclientthelawyerrepresentsinsomeothermatter,eveniftheothermatteriswhollyunrelated.”Thisistruebecauseadequaterepresentationofanyclientincludesarequire-mentofanappearanceoftrustworthinessthatisinconsistentwithadvo-cacyagainstthatclient.ThisprohibitionisnotbecauseGeorgialawyersare not sufficiently trustworthy to act professionally in these circum-stancesbyprovidingindependentprofessionaljudgmentforeachclientunfetteredbytheinterestsoftheotherclient.It is, instead,areflectionoftherealitythatreasonableclientconcernswiththeappearancecreatedby such conflicts could, by themselves, adversely affect thequality oftherepresentation.

Thus, in this situation there is an impermissible conflict of inter-est between simultaneously represented clients under Rule 1.7(a) andconsent tocure thisconflict isnotavailableunderRule1.7(c)becauseit necessarily “involves circumstances rendering it reasonablyunlikelythat the lawyerwill be able to provide adequate representation to oneormoreoftheaffectedclients.”See,generally,ABA/BNALAWYERSMANUALONPROFESSIONALCONDUCT51:104-105andcasesandadvisory opinions cited therein. See, also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495(1982)(lawyermaynotacceptemploymentadverse toexistingclienteven inunrelatedmatter;prohibition applies evenwhen present client employsmost lawyers inimmediategeographicalarea,therebymakingitdifficultforadversarytoretainequivalentcounsel).

If,however,asisfarmoretypicallythecase,itisnottheinsurancecompanythatistheclientintheunrelatedmatter,butaninsuredoftheinsurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneousrepresentation client and the representation is not prohibited for thatreason.Instead,insuchcircumstances,theattorneymayhaveaconflictwiththeattorney’sowninterestsunderRule1.7(a)inthattheattorneyhasafinancialinterestinmaintainingagoodbusinessrelationshipwiththenon-clientinsurancecompany.Thelikelihoodthattherepresentationwillbeharmedbythisfinancialinterestmakesthisariskysituationforthe attorney.Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permitthispersonalinterestconflicttobecuredbyconsentofallaffectedcli-entsafter compliancewith the requirements forconsent found inRule1.7(b).Consentwouldnotbeavailabletocuretheconflict,however,iftheconflict“involvescircumstancesrenderingitreasonablyunlikelythat

thelawyer[would]beabletoprovideadequaterepresentationtooneormoreoftheaffectclients.”See,Rule1.7(c).Thequestionthisasksisnotthesubjectiveoneofwhetherornottheattorneythinksheorshewillbeabletoprovideadequaterepresentationdespitetheconflict,butwhetherotherswouldreasonablyviewthesituationassuch.Theattorneymakesthisdeterminationathisorherownperil.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-12Approved And Issued On July 25, 2006Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 00-1Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1489

Question Presented:

WhentheCityCouncilcontrolsthesalaryandbenefitsofthemem-bersofthePoliceDepartment,mayacouncilperson,whoisanattorney,representcriminaldefendantsinmatterswherethepoliceexercisediscre-tionindeterminingthecharges?

Summary Answer:

Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by amemberoftheCityCouncilwheretheCityCouncilcontrolssalaryandbenefitsforthepoliceimplicatesRule3.5(a),whichprohibitsattorneysfromseekingtoinfluenceofficialsbymeansprohibitedbylaw.Inanycircumstance where the representation may create an appearance ofimproprietyitshouldbeavoided.

Opinion:

This opinion addresses itself to a situationwhere theCityCouncilmembervotesonsalaryandbenefitsforthepolice.Particularlyinsmallmunicipalities,thissituationcouldgiverisetoaperceptionthatapoliceofficer’sjudgmentmightbeaffected.Forexample,apoliceofficermightbereluctanttoopposearequestthatherecommendlesserchargesorthedismissal of chargeswhen the request comes from a councilmemberrepresenting the accused. Situations like the one at hand give rise toinherent influencewhich is present even if the attorneywho is also aCityCouncilmemberattemptstoavoidusingthatpositiontoinfluencetheproceedings.

Rule3.5providesthat“Alawyershallnot,withoutregardtowheth-er thelawyerrepresentsaclient in thematter:(a)seekto influenceajudge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibitedby law....” As a general matter, a police officer is a public official.SeeWhitev.Fireman’sFund Ins.Co., 233Ga.919 (1975);Saulsv.State, 220 Ga. App. 115 (1996). But see OCGA §45-5-6. Where apolice officer exercises discretion as to the prosecution of criminalcharges, the police officer is a public officialwithin themeaning ofRule 3.5(a). By its express terms, Rule 3.5(a) applies only when anattorneyseekstoinfluence,thatiswhereanattorneyhastheintenttoinfluence,anofficialbymeansprohibitedbylaw.Ifanattorneyweretoindicatetoanofficerthatasaresultoftheattorney’spositionasamemberoftheCityCouncilafavorablerecommendationastooneoftheattorney’sclientswouldresultinbenefitsflowingtotheofficer,orthatanunfavorablerecommendationwouldresultinharm,theattorneywould have committed the offense of bribery, OCGA §16-10-2 (a)(1),orextortion,OCGA§16-8-16(a)(4).TheattorneywouldalsohaveviolatedRule3.5(a).

Themerefactofrepresentationofacriminaldefendantbyanattorneywho isamemberof theCityCouncil,when theCityCouncil controlsthe salary and benefits of themembers of thePoliceDepartment, andwhenthepoliceexercisediscretionindeterminingthechargesdoesnot,by itself, establish a violation ofRule 3.5(a).To establish a violation,theremustbea showing that theattorneysought toexercise influenceinamannerprohibitedby law.Wenote,however, thatComment2 toRule 3.5 provides that “The activity proscribed by this Rule shouldbeobservedby theadvocate insuchacarefulmanner that therebenoappearanceofimpropriety.”PursuanttoRule3.5,therefore,anattorneyshouldnotrepresentacriminaldefendantwhereaninferenceofimproperinfluencecanreasonablybedrawn.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-13Approved And Issued On June 21, 2007Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 93-1Supreme Court Docket No. S07U1159


Question Presented:

(1) Whether the designation “Special Counsel” may be used todescribeanattorneyand/orlawfirmaffiliatedwithanotherlawfirmforthe specific purpose of providing consultation and advice to the otherfirminspecializedlegalareas:(2)andwhethertheethicalrulesgovern-ingconflictofinterestapplyasifthefirm,theaffiliatedattorneyandtheaffiliatedfirmconstituteasinglefirm.

Summary Answer:

It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer orlawfirmforprovidingconsultationandadvice to the firm’sclientsonspecializedmatters and to identify that lawyer or law firmas “specialcounsel” for thatspecializedareaof the law.Therelationshipbetweenthelawfirmandspecialcounselmustbeabona fide relationship.Thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyerdoesapplytotheoutsideassociatedlawyerorlawfirm.

Opinion:

Thisopiniondealswiththefollowingquestions:

1.Mayalawfirmwhichassociatesalawyerforprovidingconsulta-tionandadvice to the firm’sclientson specializedmatters identifythat lawyer as being, for example, “Special Counsel for Trust andEstateandIndustrialTaxMatters”?

2.Maya lawfirmwhichassociatesanother lawfirmforprovidingconsultation and advice to the firm’s clients on specializedmattersidentifythatlawfirmasbeing,forexample,“SpecialCounselforTaxandERISAMatters”?

3.ShouldRule1.10,1thevicariousdisqualificationrulerequiringtheadditionaldisqualificationofapartnerorassociateofadisqualifiedlawyer,applytooutsideassociatedlawyersandlawfirms?

Theproblemshouldbeviewedfromthestandpointofclients.Canthelawfirmrenderbetterservicetoitsclientsifitestablishessuchrelation-ships?Iftheanswerisyes,thereisnoreasonsuchrelationshipscannotbecreatedandpublicized.

There is no Rule which would prohibit a law firm from associat-ingeitheranindividuallawyerorlawfirmasspecialcounselandsuchassociation may be required by Rule 1.1.2 While the American BarAssociationhas concluded that one firmmaynot serve as counsel foranother (FormalOpinionNo.330,August1972) this courtdeclines tofollowthatprecedent.Moreover,asubsequentABAopinionrecognizedthatonefirmmaybeassociatedoraffiliatedwithanotherwithoutbeingdesignated “of counsel.” (Formal Opinion No. 84-351, October 20,1984).Intheviewofthiscourt,itisnotimpropertoestablishthetypeofrelationshipproposed.Ifestablished,itmustbeidentifiedandidentifiedcorrectlysothatclientsandpotentialclientsarefullyawareofthenatureoftherelationship.

Finally, the relationship between the law firm and special counsel(whetheranindividuallawyeroralawfirm)mustbeabona fiderelation-shipthatentailstheuseofspecialcounsel’sexpertise.Therelationshipcannot be established merely to serve as a referral source. Any feeschargedbetween special counsel and the law firm, of course,must bedividedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofRule1.5.3

Thefirsttwoquestionsareansweredintheaffirmative.

Thethirdquestionpresentsamorecomplexissue.

TheGeorgiavicariousdisqualificationruleisfoundedonthelawyer’sdutyofloyaltytotheclient.Thisdutyisexpressedintheobligationstoexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclient,andtodeclinerepresentationorwithdrawiftheabilitytodosoisadverselyaffectedbytherepresentationofanotherclient.Recognizingthatthecli-entistheclientofthefirmandthatthedutyofloyaltyextendstoallfirmmembers, itfollowsthat thedutytodeclineorwithdrawextendstoallfirmmembers.Rule1.10.

Identifying an associated firm or lawyer is calculated to raise theexpectation in themindof theclient that the relationship is somethingmorethancasual.Indeeditiscalculatedtoconveytotheclientthattheclient’smatterisbeinghandledbyaunitmadeupoftheassociatingandassociatedfirmorlawyer,sothattheexpertiseofallcanbebroughttobear on the problem.Accordingly, in the situation presupposed in thehypothetical,theclientsoftheassociatingfirmbecome,forthepurposes

ofRule1.10,theclientsoftheassociatedfirmorlawyerandvice versa.Theunitasawholehasadutyofloyaltytotheclientandmustexerciseindependentprofessionaljudgmentonbehalfoftheclientasanentirety.

ReferenceshouldbemadetoGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,Rule1.10, imputeddisqualification;GeneralRule.Rule1.10discusseswhenanimputeddisqualificationcanbarallattorneysatafirmorofficefromrepresentingaparticularclient.

Rule1.10andComment1oftheRulemakeaffiliationsamonglaw-yersorlawfirmslesscomplex.Rule1.10appliestoentitiesotherthanassociatedlawyersandlawfirmstoincludeinadditiontolawyersinaprivate firm, lawyers in the legaldepartmentof a corporationorotherorganization,orinlegalservicesorganizations.

As set forth inComment1,4 twopractitionerswhoshareoffice spaceandwhooccasionallyassisteachotherinrepresentationofclients,maynotregardthemselvesasalawfirm.However,iftheypresentthemselvestothepublicsuggestingthattheyareindeedafirm,theymayberegardedasafirmfor purposes of these Rules. Factors such as formal agreements betweenassociatedlawyers,aswellasmaintenanceofmutualaccesstoinformationconcerning clients, may be relevant in determining whether practitionerswhoaresharingspacemaybeconsideredafirmundertheRule.

The third question is answered in the affirmative. In light of theadoptionofRule1.1, ethical rulesgoverningconflictof interest applytoentitiesandaffiliationsof lawyers inabroader sense thanwhathastraditionallybeenconsidereda“lawfirm.”__________1Rule1.10

(a)Whilelawyersareassociatedinafirm,noneofthemshallknow-inglyrepresentaclientwhenanyoneofthempracticingalonewouldbeprohibitedfromdoingsobyRules1.7:ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule,1.8(c):ConflictofInterest:ProhibitedTransactions,1.9:FormerClientor2.2:Intermediary.

(b)Whenalawyerhasterminatedanassociationwithafirm,thefirmisnotprohibitedfromthereafterrepresentingapersonwithinter-estsmateriallyadversetothoseofaclientrepresentedbytheformerlyassociatedlawyerunless:

(1)thematteristhesameorsubstantiallyrelatedtothatinwhichtheformerlyassociatedlawyerrepresentedtheclient;and(2)anylawyerremaininginthefirmhasinformationprotectedbyRules1.6:ConfidentialityofInformationand1.9(c):ConflictofInterest:FormerClientthatismaterialtothematter.

(c)AdisqualificationprescribedbythisrulemaybewaivedbytheaffectedclientundertheconditionsstatedinRule1.7:ConflictofInterest:GeneralRule.

ThemaximumpenaltyforaviolationofthisRuleisdisbarment.2Rule1.1

Alawyershallprovidecompetentrepresentationtoaclient.CompetentrepresentationasusedinthisRulemeansthatalawyershallnothandleamatterwhichthelawyerknowsorshouldknowtobebeyondthelawyer’slevelofcompetencewithoutassociatinganotherlawyerwhotheoriginallawyerreasonablybelievestobecompetenttohandlethematterinquestion.Competencerequiresthelegalknowl-edge,skill,thoroughnessandpreparationreasonablynecessaryfortherepresentation.

ThemaximumpenaltyforaviolationofthisRuleisdisbarment.3Rule1.5

(a)Alawyer’sfeeshallbereasonable.Thefactorstobeconsideredindeterminingthereasonablenessofafeeincludethefollowing:

(1)thetimeandlaborrequired,thenoveltyanddifficultyofthequestionsinvolved,andtheskillrequisitetoperformthelegalserviceproperly;(2)thelikelihoodthattheacceptanceoftheparticularemploy-mentwillprecludeotheremploymentbythelawyer;(3)thefeecustomarilychargedinthelocalityforsimilarlegalservices;(4)theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;(5)thetimelimitationsimposedbytheclientorbythecircum-stances;(6)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient;(7)theexperience,reputation,andabilityofthelawyerorlaw-yersperformingtheservices;and(8)whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.

(b)Whenthelawyerhasnotregularlyrepresentedtheclient,thebasisorrateofthefeeshallbecommunicatedtotheclient,preferablyinwriting,beforeorwithinareasonabletimeaftercommencingtherepresentation.

(c)(1)Afeemaybecontingentontheoutcomeofthematterforwhichtheserviceisrendered,exceptinamatterinwhichacontingentfeeisprohibitedbyparagraph(d)orotherlaw.Acontingentfeeagree-


mentshallbeinwritingandshallstatethemethodbywhichthefeeistobedetermined,includingthepercentageorpercentagesthatshallaccruetothelawyerintheeventofsettlement,trialorappeal,litigationandotherexpensestobedeductedfromtherecovery,andwhethersuchexpensesaretobedeductedbeforeorafterthecontingentfeeiscalcu-lated.(2)Uponconclusionofacontingentfeematter,thelawyershallprovidetheclientwithawrittenstatementstatingthefollowing:

(i)theoutcomeofthematter;and,(ii)ifthereisarecovery,showingthe:

(A)remittancetotheclient;(B)themethodofitsdetermination;(C)theamountoftheattorneyfee;and(D)iftheattorney’sfeeisdividedwithanotherlawyerwhoisnotapartnerinoranassociateofthelawyer’sfirmorlawoffice,theamountoffeereceivedbyeachandthemannerinwhichthedivisionisdetermined.

(d)Alawyershallnotenterintoanarrangementfor,charge,orcollect:

(1)anyfeeinadomesticrelationsmatter,thepaymentoramountofwhichiscontingentuponthesecuringofadivorceorupontheamountofalimonyorsupport,orpropertysettlementinlieuthereof;or(2)acontingentfeeforrepresentingadefendantinacriminalcase.

(e)Adivisionofafeebetweenlawyerswhoarenotinthesamefirmmaybemadeonlyif:

(1)thedivisionisinproportiontotheservicesperformedbyeachlawyeror,bywrittenagreementwiththeclient,eachlawyerassumesjointresponsibilityfortherepresentation;(2)theclientisadvisedofthesharethateachlawyeristoreceiveanddoesnotobjecttotheparticipationofallthelawyersinvolved;and(3)thetotalfeeisreasonable.

ThemaximumpenaltyforaviolationofthisRuleisapublicreprimand.4Comment1ofRule1.10

[1]ForpurposesoftheseRules,theterm“firm”includeslawyersinaprivatefirm,andlawyersinthelegaldepartmentofacorporationorotherorganization,orinalegalservicesorganization.Whethertwoormorelawyersconstituteafirmwithinthisdefinitioncandependonthespecificfacts.Forexample,twopractitionerswhoshareofficespaceandoccasionallyconsultorassisteachotherordinarilywouldnotberegardedasconstitutingafirm.However,iftheypresentthemselvestothepublicinawaysuggestingthattheyareafirmorconductthem-selvesasafirm,theyshouldberegardedasafirmforthepurposesoftheRules.Thetermsofanyformalagreementbetweenassociatedlawyersarerelevantindeterminingwhethertheyareafirm,asisthefactthattheyhavemutualaccesstoinformationconcerningtheclientstheyserve.Furthermore,itisrelevantindoubtfulcasestoconsidertheunderlyingpurposeoftheRulethatisinvolved.Agroupoflawyerscouldberegardedasafirmforpurposesoftherulethatthesamelaw-yershouldnotrepresentopposingpartiesinlitigation,whileitmightnotbesoregardedforpurposesoftherulethatinformationacquiredbyonelawyerisattributedtotheother.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIAISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARDPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JUNE 15, 2007FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 07-1

Question Presented:

Mayalawyerethicallydiscloseinformationconcerningthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandhisclienttoathirdpartyinanefforttocollectafeefromtheclient?

Summary Answer:

Alawyermayethicallydiscloseinformationconcerningthefinancialrelationship between himself and his client in direct efforts to collecta fee, suchasbringing suit orusing a collectionagency.Otherwise, alawyermaynotreportthefailureofaclienttopaythelawyer’sbill tothird parties, includingmajor credit reporting services, in an effort tocollectafee.

Opinion:

ThisissueisgovernedprimarilybyRule1.6oftheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct.Rule1.6provides,inpertinentpart:

(a)Alawyershallmaintaininconfidenceallinformationgainedin theprofessional relationshipwithaclient, including informa-tion which the client has requested to be held inviolate or thedisclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be

detrimentaltotheclient,unlesstheclientconsentsafterconsulta-tion,exceptfordisclosuresthatareimpliedlyauthorizedinordertocarryout the representation,orare requiredby these rulesorotherlaw,orbyorderoftheCourt.

Comment5toRule1.6providesfurtherguidance:

Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information applies not merely tomatterscommunicatedinconfidencebytheclientbutalsotoallinformationrelatingtotherepresentation,whateveritssource.AlawyermaynotdisclosesuchinformationexceptasauthorizedorrequiredbytheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.

Former Standard 28 limited confidentiality to “confidences andsecretsofaclient.”However,Rule1.6expandstheobligationsbyrequir-ing a lawyer to “maintain in confidence all information gained in theprofessionalrelationship”includingtheclient’ssecretsandconfidences.

Anattorney’s ethicalduty tomaintainconfidentialityof client infor-mation is distinguishable from the attorney-client evidentiary privilegeof O.C.G.A. §§24-9-21, 24-9-24 and 24-9-25. Tenet Healthcare Corp.v.LouisianaForumCorp.,273Ga.206,209-10 (2000).Thus,Rule1.6appliesnotonlytomattersgovernedbytheattorney-clientprivilege,butalsotonon-privilegedinformationarisingfromthecourseofrepresenta-tion.Informationconcerningthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthelawyerandclient,includingtheamountoffeesthatthelawyercontendstheclientowes,maynotbedisclosed,exceptaspermittedbytheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,otherlaw,orderofthecourtoriftheclientconsents.

Rule1.6authorizesdisclosureinthefollowingcircumstances:

(b)(1)Alawyermayrevealinformationcoveredbyparagraph(a)whichthelawyerreasonablybelievesnecessary:...(iii) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer ina controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish adefense to a criminal charge or civil action against the lawyerbased upon conduct in which the client was involved, or torespondtoallegationsinanyproceedingconcerningthelawyer’srepresentationoftheclient.

The comments to Rule 1.6 clarify that such disclosures should bemadeonlyinlimitedcircumstances.WhileComment17toRule1.6pro-videsthatalawyerentitledtoafeeispermittedtoprovetheservicesren-deredinanactiontocollectthatfee,itcautionsthatalawyermustmakeeveryeffortpracticable toavoidunnecessarydisclosureof informationrelated toa representation, to limitdisclosure to thosehaving theneedtoknowit,andtoobtainprotectiveordersormakeotherarrangementsminimizingtheriskofdisclosure.FurthercautionisfoundinComment12,whichprovidesthat“[i]nanycase,adisclosureadversetotheclient’sinterestshouldbenogreaterthanalawyerreasonablybelievesnecessarytothepurpose.”

InGeorgia, it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to retain a col-lectionagencyasameasureof last resort inorder tocollecta fee thathasbeenproperlyearned.AdvisoryOpinionNo.49issuedbytheStateDisciplinary Board. Advisory Opinion 49, however, only applies to areferraltoa“reputablecollectionagency”.AdvisoryOpinion49furtherstatesthatalawyershouldexercisetheoptionofrevealingconfidencesandsecretsnecessarytoestablishorcollectafeewithconsiderablecau-tion.Thus,whileuseofareputablecollectionagencytocollectafeeisethicallyproper,disclosures toother thirdpartiesmaynotbeethicallypermissible. Formal Advisory Opinion 95-1 provides that limitationsexistonalawyer’seffortstocollectafeefromhisclienteventhroughafeecollectionprogram.

Other jurisdictions that have considered similar issues have distin-guishedbetweendirecteffortstocollectanunpaidfee,suchasbringingsuitorusingacollectionagency,fromindirectmethodsinwhichinfor-mationisdisclosedtothirdpartiesinanefforttocollectunpaidfees.Inthesecases,thedirectmethodshavegenerallybeenfoundtobeethical,while more indirect methods, such as reporting non-paying clients tocredit bureaus, have been found to be unethical. South Carolina BarAdvisoryOpinion 94-11 concluded that a lawyermay ethically use acollectionagencytocollectpastdueaccountsforlegalservicesrenderedbut cannot report past due accounts to a credit bureau. The Opinionadvisesagainstreportingnon-payingclientstocreditbureausbecause(1)itisnotnecessaryforestablishingthelawyer’sclaimforcompensation,(2) it risksdisclosureofconfidential information,and (3) it smacksofpunishmentintryingtolowertheclient’screditrating.S.C.EthicsOp.94-11(1994).SeealsoSouthDakotaEthicsOp.95-3(1995)andMass.EthicsOp.00-3(2000)


The Alaska Bar Association reached a similar conclusion when itdeterminedthat“anattorneywholistsaclientwithacreditagencyhasrevealedconfidentialinformationabouttheclientforapurposenotper-mittedbyARPC1.6(b)(2)sincesuchareferral isatmostanindirectattempt to pressure the client to pay the fee.” Alaska Ethics Op. No.2000-3 (2000).TheAlaskaBarEthicsOpinion is basedon thenotionthatlistinganunpaidfeewithacreditbureauislikelytocreatepressureontheclienttopaytheunpaidfeemorefromaninterroremeffectofabadcreditratingthanfromanymerittotheclaim.

TheStateBarofMontanaEthicsCommitteeconcludedthatanattor-neymaynotreportanddiscloseunpaidfeestoacreditbureaubecausesuch reporting “is not necessary to collect a fee because a delinquentfeecanbecollectedwithout it.”Mont.EthicsOp.001027(2000).TheMontanaOpinionfurtherconcluded,“Theeffectofanegativereportisprimarily punitive [and] it risks disclosure of confidential informationabouttheformerclientwhichthelawyerisnotpermittedtorevealunderRule1.6.”SeealsoNewYorkStateEthicsOpinion684(1996)(report-ing client’sdelinquent account to credit bureaudoesnotqualify as anaction “to establishor collect the lawyer’s fee”within themeaningoftheexceptiontotheprohibitionondisclosureofclientinformation).ButseeFloridaEthicsOpinion90-2(1991)(itisethicallypermissibleforanattorneytoreportadelinquentformerclienttoacreditreportingservice,providedthatconfidentialinformationunrelatedtothecollectionofthedebtwasnotdisclosedandthedebtwasnotindispute).

Whilerecognizingthatincollectingafeealawyermayusecollectionagenciesorretaincounsel,theRestatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concludesthatalawyermaynotdiscloseorthreatentodiscloseinformationtonon-clientsnotinvolvedinthesuitinordertocoercetheclientintosettlingandmaynotuseorthreatentactics,suchaspersonalharassment or asserting frivolous claims, in an effort to collect fees.Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41, comment d (2000). TheRestatement has determined that collectionmethodsmustpreservetheclient’srighttocontestthelawyer’spositiononthemerits.Id.Thedirectmethodsthathavebeenfoundtobeethicalinotherjuris-dictions,suchasbringingsuitorusingacollectionagency,allowthecli-enttocontestthelawyer’spositiononthemerits.Indirectefforts,suchasreportingaclienttoacreditbureauordisclosingclientfinancialinforma-tiontoothercreditorsofaclientortoindividualsorentitieswithwhomtheclientmaydobusiness,areinthenatureofpersonalharassmentandare not ethically permissible. Accordingly, a lawyermay not discloseinformation concerning the financial relationship between himself andhisclienttothirdparties,otherthanthroughdirecteffortstocollectafee,suchasbringingsuitorusingacollectionagency.

The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2007 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about August 7, 2007. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 15, 2007. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.

PART VI ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES

PREAMBLE Thepurposeofthisprogramistoprovideaconvenientmecha-nismfor(1)theresolutionofdisputesbetweenlawyersandclientsoverfees,(2)theresolutionofdisputesbetweenlawyersinconnectionwiththewithdrawalofalawyerfromapartnershiporthedissolu-tionandseparationofapartnership,or(3)theresolutionofdisputesbetweenlawyersconcerningtheentitlementtoportionsoffeesearnedfromjointservices.Itisaprocesswhichmaybeinvokedbyeithersideafterthepartieshavebeenunabletoreachanagreementbetweenthemselves.Regardlessofwhetheritisthelawyerortheclientwhotakestheinitiativeoffilingapetitionrequestingarbitrationofthedisputes,thepetitionermustagreetobeboundbytheresultofthearbitration.Thisisintendedtodiscouragethefilingofcomplaintswhicharefrivolousorwhichseektoinvoketheprocesssimplytoobtainan“advisoryopinion”.Iftherespondentalsoagreestobebound,theresultingarbitrationawardwillbeenforceableunderthegeneralarbitrationlawsoftheState. Auniquefeatureofthisprogramprovidesthatwherethepetitionerisaclientwhoseclaimafterinvestigationappearstowarrantahearing,andtherespondentlawyerrefusestobeboundbyanyresultingaward,thematterwillnotbedismissed,butanexpartearbitrationhearingmaybeheld.Iftheoutcomeofthishearingisintheclient’sfavor,theStateBarwillprovidealawyeratnocost,otherthanactuallitigationexpens-es,totheclienttorepresenttheclientinsubsequentlitigationtoadjustthefeeinaccordancewiththearbitrationaward.

CHAPTER 1 COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES

Rule 6-101. Committee. TheprogramwillbeadministeredbytheStateBarCommitteeontheArbitrationofAttorneyFeeDisputes(“Committee”).

Rule 6-102. Membership. TheCommitteeshallconsistofsixlawyermembersandthreepublicmemberswhoarenotlawyers.ThesixlawyermembersshallbeappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBar,andthethreepublicmem-bersshallbeappointedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 6-103. Terms. Initially,twomembersoftheCommittee,includingoneofthepublicmembers,shallbeappointedforaperiodofthreeyears;twomembers,includingtheremainingpublicmembers,foraperiodoftwoyears;andonememberforaperiodofoneyear.Aseachmember’stermofofficeontheCommitteeexpires,hisorhersuccessorshallbeappointedforaperiodofthreeyears.ThePresidentoftheStateBarshallappointtheChairpersonoftheCommitteeeachyearfromamongthemembers.Vacanciesinunexpiredtermsshallbefilledbytheirrespectiveappointingauthorities.

Rule 6-104. Responsibility. TheCommitteeshallberesponsiblefordeterminingjurisdictiontohandlecomplaintswhichitreceives,administeringtheselectionofarbi-trators,theconductofthearbitrationprocess,andthedevelopmentandimplementationoffeearbitrationprocedures.

Rule 6-105. Staff. StateBarstaffshallbeassignedtoassisttheCommittee.ThestaffsoassignedwillhavetheadministrativeresponsibilitiesdelegatedbytheCommittee,whichmayincludethefollowing:

(a)Receiveandreviewcomplaintsanddiscussthemwiththeparties,ifnecessary.

(b)Conductinquiriestoobtainanyadditionalinformationrequired.

(c)MakerecommendationstotheCommitteetodismisscomplaintsortoacceptjurisdiction.

(d)Mailnoticesorarbitrationhearings,arbitrationawards,andotherCommitteecorrespondence.

TheCommitteeshallreviewalloftheavailableevidence,includingtherecommendationsofthestaff,andmakeadeterminationbymajorityvotewhethertodismissacomplaintortoacceptjurisdiction.AlldecisionsoftheCommitteeshallbefinal,subjectonlytoreviewbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheStateBarofGeorgiapursuanttoitspowers,functions,anddutiesundertheRulesgoverningtheStateBar(241Ga.643).

Rule 6-106. Waiting Period. If,followingapreliminaryinvestigationbythestaffandreviewbytheCommittee,theCommitteeconcludesthatithasjurisdictionandthatthepetitioner’sclaimappearstohavemerit,theCommitteeshallnotifythepartiesthatithasassumedjurisdiction.TheCommitteewillthendelayanyfurtherstepsuntiltheexpirationofthirtycalendardaysfol-lowingsuchnoticeduringwhichtimethepartieswillbeurgedtoexerttheirbesteffortstoresolvethedispute.

CHAPTER 2 JURISDICTIONAL GUIDELINES

Rule 6-201. Jurisdiction. TheCommitteemayacceptjurisdictionoverafeedisputeonlyifallofthefollowingrequirementsaresatisfied:

(a)Thefeeinquestion,whetherpaidorunpaid,hasbeenchargedforlegalservicesrenderedbyalawyerwhoisorwhoatthetimeofrenditionoftheservicehadbeenlicensedtopracticelawintheStateofGeorgiaorwhobeendulylicensedasaforeignlegalconsultantintheStateofGeorgia.

(b)TheservicesinquestionwereperformedeitherintheStateofGeorgiaorfromanofficelocatedintheStateofGeorgia.

(c)Atthetimethelegalservicesinquestionwereperformedthereexistedbetweenthelawyerandtheclientanexpressedorimpliedcontractestablishingbetweenthemalawyer/clientrela-tionship.Arelativeorotherpersonpayingthelegalfeesoftheclientmayrequestarbitrationofdisputesoverthosefeesprovidedboththeclientandthepayorjoinasco-petitionersorco-respon-dentsandbothagreetobeboundbytheresultofthearbitration.

(d)Thedisputedfee:(1)Exceeds($750)sevenhundredandfiftydollars.(2)Isnotonetheamountofwhichisgovernedbystatute

orotherlaw,noronethefullamountoralltermsofwhichhavealreadybeenfixedorapprovedbyorderofacourt.(e)Apetitionseekingarbitrationofthedisputeisfiledwith

theCommitteebythelawyerortheclientnomorethantwo(2)yearsfollowingthedateonwhichthecontroversyarose.Ifthis


dateisdisputed,itshallbedeterminedinthesamemannerasthecommencementofacauseofactionontheunderlyingcontract.

(f)Theclient,whetherpetitionerorrespondent,agreestobeboundbytheresultofthearbitration.

(g)Thefeedisputeisnotthesubjectoflitigationincourtatthetimethepetitionforarbitrationisfiled.

(h)Thepetitioncontainsthefollowingelements:(1)Astatementofthenatureofthedisputeandthepar-

ticularsofthepetitioner’sposition,includingrelevantdates.(2)Theidentitiesofboththeclientandthelawyerandthe

addressesofboth.(3)Astatementthatthepetitionerhasmadeagoodfaith

efforttoresolvethedisputeandthedetailsofthateffort.(4)Theagreementofthepetitionertobeboundbythe

resultofthearbitration.(5)Thesignatureofthepetitioneranddateofthepetition.(6)Thepetitionshallbefiledonaformwhichwillbesup-

pliedbytheCommittee.Suchpetitionshallbeservedupontheoppositepartyatsuchparty’slastknownaddressbycertifiedmail,returnreceiptrequested.(i)Incaseofdisputesbetweenlawyers,thelawyerswhoare

partiestothedisputeareallmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia,andallthelawyersinvolvedagreetothearbitration.

Rule 6-202. Termination or Suspension of Proceedings. TheCommitteemaydecline,suspend,orterminatejurisdictioniftheclient,inadditiontodisputingthefee,claimsanyotherformofreliefagainstthelawyerarisingoutofthesamesetofcircumstances,includinganyclaimofmalpracticeorprofessionalmisconduct.AnyclaimorevidenceofprofessionalmisconductwithinthemeaningoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitymaybereferredinaseparatereportbythearbitratorsortheCommitteetotheGeneralCounsel’sOfficeforconsiderationunderitsnormalprocedures.

Rule 6-203. Revocation. Afterapetitionhasbeenfiled,jurisdictionhasbeenacceptedbytheCommitteeandtheotherpartyhasagreedinwritingtobeboundbytheaward,thesubmissiontoarbitrationshallbeirrevocableexceptbyconsentofallpartiestothedispute.

CHAPTER 3 SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS

Rule 6-301. Roster of Arbitrators.(a)TheCommitteeshallmaintainarosteroflawyersavail-

abletoserveasarbitratorsonan“asneeded”basisinappropriategeographicalareasthroughoutthestate.Totheextentpossiblethearbitrationshouldtakeplaceinthesamegeographicalareawheretheservicesinquestionwereperformed,however,thefinaldecisionastothelocationofthearbitrationremainswiththeCommittee.

(b)TheCommitteeshalllikewisemaintainarosterofnon-lawyerpublicmembersselectedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

Rule 6-302. Neutrality of Arbitrators. Nopersonshallserveasanarbitratorinanymatterinwhichthatpersonhasanyfinancialorpersonalinterest.Eacharbitratorshalldis-closetotheCommitteeanybiasthatheorshemayhaveinregardtothedisputeinquestion,oranycircumstanceslikelytocreateanappearanceofbiaswhichmightdisqualifythatpersonasanimpartialarbitrator.Eitherpartymaystateanyreasonwhyheorshefeelsthatanarbitratorshouldwithdraworbedisqualified.

Rule 6-303. Selection of Arbitrators. ExceptunderspecialproceduresoutlinedinChapter6,arbitratorsshallbeselectedasfollows:

(a)Thelawyerarbitratorsshallbeselectedbythefollowingprocess:theCommitteeshallfurnishthepetitioneralistofthenamesoffour(4)possiblelawyerarbitratorsfromwhichthepeti-tionershallstrikeone(1)name;theCommitteeshallthensupplytherespondentwithalistofthethree(3)remainingnamesfromwhichtherespondentshallstrikeone(1);thetwopersonswhosenamesremainwillbethelawyermembersofthearbitrationpanel.

(b)Thenon-lawyerpublicmembersshallbeselectedbythefollowingprocess:theCommitteeshallfurnishalistofthenamesofthree(3)possiblenonlawyerpublicarbitratorsfromwhichthepetitionershallstrikeone(1)name;theCommitteeshallthensup-plytherespondentwithalistofthetwo(2)remainingnamesfromwhichtherespondentshallstrikeone(1);thepersonwhosenameremainswillbethenon-lawyermemberofthearbitrationpanel.

(c)Ifeitherpartyfailstoexercisetheforegoingstrikes,theCommitteeisauthorizedtoestablishprocedurestostrikeforthatparty.

(d)Petitionerandrespondentbymutualagreementshallhavetherighttoselectthethree(3)arbitrators;andalsomutuallymay

agreetohavethedisputedeterminedbyasolearbitratorjointlyselectedbythem,providedanysuchsolearbitratorshallbeone(1)ofthepersonsontherosterofarbitratorsorshallhavebeenapprovedinadvancebytheCommitteeuponthejointrequestofpetitionerandrespondent.

Rule 6-304. Qualifications. Thelawyerarbitratorsshall,inadditiontobeingimpartial,havethefollowingqualifications:

(a)Havesomeexperiencein,orknowledgeof,thefieldoflawinvolvedinthedispute.

(b)Havepracticedlawactivelyforatleastfive(5)years.(c)BeanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 6-305. Compensation. Allarbitratorsshallservevoluntarilyandwithoutfeeorexpensereimbursement.Provided,however,thatarbitratorsselectedtoserveindisputesinwhichallthepartiesarelawyersmayatthediscretionoftheCommitteebecompensatedwithsuchcompensationtobepaidbythelawyerpartiesasdirectedbytheCommittee.

CHAPTER 4 RULES OF PROCEDURE

Rule 6-401. Time and Place of Hearing. Thearbitratorsshallelectachairpersonandthenshallfixatime[whichshallbenomorethansixty(60)daysaftertheappointmentofthelastarbitrator]andplaceforeacharbitrationhearing.Atleastten(10)calendardayspriorthereto,theCommitteeshallmailnotices,certi-fiedmailreturnreceipt,ofthetimeandplaceofthehearingtoeachparty.

Rule 6-402. Attendance at Hearing. Ifalawyerwillnotagreetobeboundbythearbitrators’decision,thelawyerwaivestherighttoparticipateinthehearing.Thelawyershallhavetherighttoattendthehearing.However,heorshemaynotparticipateinitwithouttheexpressconsentofthearbitrators. Itistheindividualresponsibilityofeachpartytoarrangefor,attheirownexpense,theattendanceofthemselves,theirwitnessesand,ifdesired,theircounsel.

Rule 6-403. Counsel. Partiesmayberepresentedatthehearingbycounselattheirownexpense,ortheymayrepresentthemselves.

Rule 6-404. Stenographic Record. AnypartymayrequesttheCommitteetoarrangeforthetakingofastenographicrecordoftheproceeding.Ifsucharecordisstipulatedtobetheofficialrecordoftheproceedingsbytheparties,orinappropriatecasesdeterminedtobesuchbythearbitrators,itmustbemadeavailabletothearbitratorsandtotheotherpartyforinspectionatatimeandplacedeterminedbythearbitrators.Thetotalcostofsucharecordshallbesharedequallybythosepartieswhoorderedcopies.However,itshallnotbenecessarytohaveastenographicrecordofthehearing.

Rule 6-405. Death, Disability, or Resignation of Arbitrator. Ifanarbitratordies,resigns,orbecomesunabletocontinuetoactwhileamatterispending,theCommitteeoritsdesigneeshallmakeadeterminationastothecourseoffurtherproceedingsandmayappointasubstituteorreplacementarbitrator,orbyagreementoftheparties,mayproceedwithone(1)arbitrator.Two(2)arbitratorsshallnotattempttoconductthearbitration.

Rule 6-406. Discovery and Witnesses. Discoveryislimitedintypeandscopetothatdeemednecessarybythearbitratorsintheirsolediscretionupontheirownmotionorthewrittenrequestofeitherparty.Personshavingadirectinterestinthearbitrationshallbeentitledtoattendthehearing.Thearbitratorsshallhavethepowertorequiretheretirementofanywitnessduringthetesti-monyofotherwitnesses.Itshallbediscretionarywiththearbitratorstodeterminetheproprietyoftheattendanceofanyotherpersons.

Rule 6-407. Adjournments. Thearbitratorsforgoodcauseshownmayadjournthehearingupontherequestofeitherpartyoruponthearbitratorsowninitiative.

Rule 6-408. Oaths. Beforeproceedingwiththehearing,thearbitratorsshalltakeanoathofoffice.Thearbitratorshavethediscretiontorequirewitnessestotestifyunderoathoraffirmation,andifrequestedbyeitherparty,shallsorequire.

Rule 6-409. Order of Proceedings.(a)Thehearingshallbeopenedbythefilingoftheoathof

thearbitratorsandbytherecordingoftheplace,time,anddateofthehearing,thenamesofthearbitratorsandparties,andofwit-nessesorcounselifanyarepresent.


(b)Thenormalorderofproceedingsshallbethesameasinatrialwiththepetitionerfirstpresentinghisorherclaim.However,thearbitratorsshallhavethediscretiontovarythenormalorderofproceedingsand,inanycase,shallaffordfullandequalopportu-nitytoallpartiesforpresentationofrelevantproofs.

(c)Thepetitionershallhavetheburdenofproofbyaprepon-deranceoftheevidence.

Rule 6-410. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party. Thearbitrationmayproceedintheabsenceofaparty,who,afterduenotice,failstobepresent.Anawardshallnotbemadesolelyonthedefaultofaparty;thearbitratorsshallrequiretheotherpartytopresentsuchevidenceasthearbitratorsmayrequireforthemakingofanaward.

Rule 6-411. Evidence.(a)Thepartiesmayoffersuchevidenceastheydesireand

shallproducesuchadditionalevidenceasthearbitratorsmaydeemnecessarytoanunderstandinganddeterminationofthedispute.Thearbitratorsareauthorizedtosubpoenawitnessesanddocu-mentsandmaydosoeitheruponthearbitrators’owninitiativeorupontherequestofaparty.Thesesubpoenasshallbeservedand,uponapplicationtotheSuperiorCourtinthecountywhereinthearbitrationispendingbyapartyorthearbitrators,enforcedinthesamemannerprovidedbylawfortheserviceandenforcementofsubpoenasinacivilactionprovidedthattheCourtshallnotenforcesubpoenasintheeventthatitdeterminesthattheeffectofsuchsubpoenaswouldbeundulyburdensomeoroppressivetoanypartyorperson.Thearbitratorsshallbethejudgeoftherelevancyandmaterialityoftheevidenceoffered.Therulesofevidenceshallbeliberallyinterpretedandhearsaymaybeutilizedatthediscre-tionofthearbitratorsandgivensuchweightasthearbitratorsdeemappropriate.

(b)Exhibits,whenofferedbyeitherparty,maybereceivedinevidencebythearbitrators.Thenamesandaddressesofallwit-nesses,andalistingofallexhibitsintheorderinwhichtheywerereceived,shallbemadeapartoftherecord.

(c)Thearbitratorsmayreceiveandconsidertheevidenceofwitnessesbyaffidavit(copiesofwhichshallbeservedontheopposingpartyatleastfive(5)dayspriortothehearing),butshallgivesuchevidenceonlysuchweightasthearbitratorsdeemproperafterconsiderationofanyobjectionsmadetoitsadmissions.

(d)Thepetition,answer,otherpleadings,andanydocumentsattachedtheretomaybeconsideredasevidenceatthediscretionofthearbitratorsandgivensuchweightasthearbitratorsdeemappropriate.

(e)Thereceiptoftestimonybywritteninterrogatories,conferencetelephonecalls,andotherproceduresarewithinthediscretionofthearbitratorsupontheirownmotionorthewrittenrequestofeitherparty.

Rule 6-412. Written Contract. Noarbitratorshallhaveauthoritytoenteranawardcontrarytotermsofanexecutedwrittencontractbetweenthepartiesexceptonthegroundsoffraud,accident,mistake,orasbeingcontrarytothelawsofthisstategoverningcontracts.

Rule 6-413. Closing of Hearings. Priortotheclosingofthehearing,thearbitratorsshallinquireofallpartieswhethertheyhaveanyfurtherproofstoofferoradditionalwitnessestobeheard.Iftheyhavenone,thearbitratorsshalldeclarethehearingclosedandmakearecordofthatfact.

Rule 6-414. Reopening of Hearings. Thehearingmaybereopenedbythearbitratorseitherupontheirownmotion,oruponthemotionofeitherpartyforgoodcauseshown,atanytimebeforeanawardismade.However,ifthereopeningofthehearingwouldpreventthemakingofanawardwithinthetimeprovidedbytheserules,themattermaynotbereopened,unlessbothpartiesagreeupontheextensionofsuchtimelimit.

Rule 6-415. Waiver of Rules. Anypartywhoproceedswiththearbitrationafterknowledgethatanyprovisionsorrequirementoftheseruleshasnotbeencompliedwith,andwhofailstostateanobjectionontherecordorinwritingpriortotheclosingofthehearing,shallbedeemedtohavewaivedanyrighttoobject.

Rule 6-416. Waiver of Oral Hearings. Thepartiesmayprovidebywrittenagreementforthewaiveroforalhearings.

Rule 6-417. Award. Ifbothpartieshaveagreedtobeboundbythearbitration,theawardofthearbitratorsisfinalandbindinguponthemandmaybeenforcedasprovidedbythegeneralarbitrationlawsofthestate.

Rule 6-418. Time of Award. Theawardshallberenderedpromptlybythearbitratorsnotlaterthanthirty(30)daysfromthedateoftheclosingofthehearing,unlessotherwiseagreeduponbythepartieswiththeconsentofthearbitratorsoranextensionisobtainedfromtheCommitteeoritsChair.Iforalhear-inghasbeenwaived,thenthetimeperiodforrenderingtheawardshallbegintorunfromthedateofthereceiptoffinalstatementsandproofsbythearbitrators.

Rule 6-419. Form of Award. Theawardshallbeinwritingandshallbesignedbythearbitratorsorbyaconcurringmajority.Thepartiesshalladvisethearbitratorsinwritingpriortothecloseofthehearingiftheyrequestthearbitratorstoaccompanytheawardwithanopinion.

Rule 6-420. Award Upon Settlement. Ifthepartiessettletheirdisputeduringthecourseofthearbitrationproceeding,thearbitrators,theCommittee,ortheCommittee’sdesig-nee,uponthewrittenconsentofallparties,maysetforththetermsofthesettlementinanaward.

Rule 6-421. Delivery of Award to Parties. Thepartiesshallacceptaslegaldeliveryoftheawardtheplac-ingoftheawardoratruecopythereofinthemailbytheCommitteeaddressedtoeachpartyatitslastknownaddressbycertifiedmailwithreturnreceiptrequestedortoitscounsel,orpersonalserviceoftheaward,orthefilingoftheawardinanymannerwhichmaybeprescribedbylaw.

Rule 6-422. Communication with Arbitrators. Thereshallbenoexpartecommunicationbetweenthepartiesandthearbitrators.

Rule 6-423. Interpretation and Application of Rules. Thearbitratorsshallinterpretandapplytheserulesinsofarastheyrelatetothearbitrators’powersandduties.Anydisputeamongthearbitratorsonapanelshallbedecidedbyamajorityvote.Ifthedisputecannotbesoresolved,eitherthearbitratorsorapartymayreferthequestiontotheCommitteeforitsdetermination.AllotherrulesshallbeinterpretedandappliedbytheCommittee,anditsdecisionshallbefinal,subjectonlytoreviewbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheStateBarofGeorgiapursuanttoitspowers,function,anddutiesundertheRulesgoverningtheStateBar.

CHAPTER 5 POST DECISION ACTIVITY

Rule 6-501. Where Both Parties Agree. Incaseswherebothpartiesagreedtobeboundbytheresultofthearbitrationandtheawardisnotsatisfiedwithinthirty(30)daysafterthedateofitsmailingorotherservicebytheCommittee,eitherpartymayrequestthefilingoftheawardontherecordsoftheSuperiorCourtofthecountyofresidenceofthepartywhohasfailedtosatisfytheaward.IfnotaGeorgiaresident,theawardshallbeenteredinthecountywheretheawardwasmade.Thesaidrequestshallbeinwritingwithacopymailedtotheopposingparty,shallbeaccompaniedbyallfilingfees,andshalldesignatetheappropriatecountyinwhichtheawardistobeentered.TheCommitteeshallthenmailtheoriginalawardtotheClerkoftheSuperiorCourtofthedesignatedcountywhoshallfileitinthesamemannerasthecommencementofanewcivilactionandshallserveacopybearingthecivilactionnumberandjudgeassignmentbycertifiedmailonallparties,withnoticethatifnoobjectionunderoath,includingfactsindicatingthattheawardwastheresultofaccident,ormistake,orthefraudofsomeoneorallofthearbitratorsorparties,orisotherwiseillegal,isfiledwithinthirty(30)days,theawardshallbecomefinal.Uponapplicationofthepartyfilingtheaward,theClerkoftheSuperiorCourtshallissueaWritofFiFa.TheFiFamaythenbeenteredonthegeneralexecutiondocketinanyjurisdiction. Allfilingfeesshallbefurnishedbythepartyorpartieswhorequestedthattheawardbesoentered. Intheeventanobjectionisproperlyfiled,theSuperiorCourtshallcauseanissuetobemadeupwhichissueshallbetriedbythecourtsittingwithoutajuryunderthesamerulesandregulationsasarepre-scribedforthetrialsofappeals.Thus,theSuperiorCourtshallrenderitsdecisionfromtherecordwithoutadenovotrialonthemeritsandshallaffirmtheaward,vacatetheaward,orreturntheawardtothearbitratorswithspecificdirectionsforfurtherconsideration.ThedecisionoftheSuperiorCourtshallbefinalandnotsubjecttoappeal. TheGeneralCounseloranAssistantGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgia,orothervolunteerlawyermayrepresent,assist,oradviseanypartyinthecollectionofafinaljudgementorintheSuperiorCourt’sreviewofawards.

Rule 6-502. Where Lawyer Refuses to be Bound. Ifanawardismadetotheclientandtherespondentlawyerrefusestobeboundthereby,theStateBarwillprovidetheGeneralCounsel,


AssistantGeneralCounsel,orothervolunteerlawyeratnocost,otherthanactuallitigationexpenses,totheclienttorepresenthimorherinanylitigationnecessarytoadjustthefeeinaccordancewiththeaward.

(a)Insuchcases,theawardrenderedwillbeconsideredasprimafacieevidenceofthefairnessoftheawardandtheburdenofproofshallshifttothelawyertoproveotherwise.

(b)Insuchcases,anawardmadeinfavoroftheclientwillterminatetherightofthelawyertoopposethesubstitutionofanotherlawyerdesignatedbytheclientinanypendinglitigationpertainingtothesubjectmatterofthearbitration.

CHAPTER 6 SPECIAL PROCEDURES

Rule 6-601. Special Case Procedure. Afterconsideringthecomplexityoftheissues,theamountincontroversy,thelocationofthearbitration,andallotherfactors,theCommitteemay,uponitsownmotionortherequestofeitherparty,assignanycasetobearbitratedbythefollowingspecialprocedure:

(a)ThewaitingperiodofRule6-106,thearbitratorselectionprocessofRule6-303,andthearbitratorqualificationsofRule6-304,shallnotapply.

(b)ThearbitratorpanelshallbeselectedbytheCommitteeoritsstaff,and

(1)incasesinvolvingamountsindisputeover$2,500shallconsistoftwo(2)attorneyswhohavepracticedlawactivelyforatleastfive(5)yearsandone(1)non-lawyerpublicmember.

(2)incasesinvolvingamountsindisputeof$2,500orless,thearbitrationpanelmayconsistonearbitratorwhoshallbealawyerwhohaspracticedlawactivelyforatleastfive(5)years.(c)AllotherrulesoftheFeeArbitrationprogramshallapply

asinanyothercase.

CHAPTER 7 CONFIDENTIALITY

Rule 6-701. Confidentiality. Withtheexceptionoftheawarditself,allrecords,documents,files,proceedings,andhearingspertainingtoarbitrationsofanyfeedisputeundertheserulesinwhichboththecomplainantandtheattorneyhaveconsentedtobeboundbytheresult,shallnotbeopenedtothepub-licoranypersonnotinvolvedinthedisputewithoutthewrittenconsentofbothpartiestothearbitration.However,theCommittee,itsstaff,orrepresentativemayrevealconfidentialinformationinthosecircumstanc-esinwhichtheOfficeofGeneralCounselisauthorizedbyRule4-221(d)todoso.

PART VII LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

PREAMBLE ThepurposeoftheLawyerAssistanceProgramistoconfiden-tiallyidentifyandassistBarmemberswhoareexperiencingproblemswhichnegativelyimpacttheirqualityoflifeandtheirabilitytofunctioneffectivelyasmembersoftheBarthrougheducation,intervention,peersupportandprofessionalclinicaltreatment.

CHAPTER 1 LAWYER ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

Rule 7-101. Committee. TheprogramwillbeadministeredbytheStateBar’sLawyerAssistanceCommittee(“Committee”).TheCommitteeshallmoni-torandrenderadvicetothestaff,ExecutiveCommittee,andBoardofGovernorswithrespecttotherules,procedures,policiesandoperationofaLawyerAssistanceProgram(“LAP”).

Rule 7-102. Membership. TheCommitteeshallbeappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBarinaccordancewithArticleVIII,Section1,ofthebylawsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Inaddition,thePresident,athisorherdiscretion,mayappointuptofournon-lawyerstoserveontheCommittee,pro-videdthatsuchnon-lawyersarelicensed,certifiedaddictioncounselors,certifiedemployeeassistanceprofessionals,licensedtherapists,orotherpersonswhohaveexperienceinconductingalcoholanddrugrehabilita-tioninterventionprogramsormentalhealthassistanceprograms.Thetermofsuchnon-lawyerappointmentshallbeoneyear.AnymemberoftheCommitteewhoisarecoveredchemicaloralcoholdependentpersonmusthaveaperiodofsobrietyofatleastfiveyears.

Rule 7-103. Responsibility. TheCommitteeshallberesponsibleforimplementinganimpair-mentprogramthatprovideseducation,referralandintervention.

Rule 7-104. Funding. TheworkoftheCommitteeandanytreatmentproviderselectedtoassisttheCommitteeincarryingouttheworkoftheprogramshallbefundedfromthegeneralbudgetoftheStateBarand/orthroughdona-tionsandgrantsfromtheGeorgiaBarFoundationorotherpublicorprivatesources.

CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION

Rule 7-201. Education, Information and Awareness. TheCommitteeshallpromoteandimplementprocedurestocom-municatetoimpairedattorneysandtheBaringeneralthefactthatthereisaprogramavailableandreadytoassistinhelpingtheimpairedattor-neystoovercometheirproblem.

Rule 7-202. Volunteers. TheCommitteemayestablishanetworkofattorneysandlaypersonsthroughoutthestateofGeorgia,experiencedortrainedinimpairmentcounseling,treatmentorrehabilitation,whocanconducteducationandawarenessprogramsandassistincounselingandinter-ventionprogramsandservices.

Rule 7-203. Intervention and Counseling. ThemembersoftheCommitteeshallestablish,designandimple-mentallproceduresnecessarytoreceiveinformationconcerningimpairedattorneys.Uponadeterminationthatanattorneyisimpaired,theCommitteeshallimplementsuchresourcesastotheCommitteeappearappropriateineachindividualcase.Incarryingoutitsdutiesunderthisrule,theCommittee,subjecttotheapprovaloftheExecutiveCommittee,isauthorizedtooutsourcetheclinicalportionoftheLawyerAssistanceProgramtoprivatesectorhealthcareprofessionals.Suchhealthcareprofessionalsandtheirrelatedstaff,consultantsandotherdesigneesshallbeauthorizedtocommunicatewitheachotherandwiththeCommitteeregardingtheprogramorpersonsreferredtotheprogrambytheCommittee.Saidcommunicationsshallnotconstituteaviolationoftheconfidentialityrulesestablishedherein.

Rule 7-204. Definitions.(a)Attorney,asusedinthisPartVII,shallincludeactive,

inactive,emeritusandforeignlawconsultantmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(b)Animpairedattorneyisanattorneywho,intheopinionofthemembersoftheCommittee,theStateDisciplinaryBoard,theSupremeCourtofGeorgia,orthemembersoftheprofes-sionalhealthcareproviderselectedinaccordancewithRule7-203above,whosuffersfromapsychological,emotional,orstress-relateddiseaseorproblem,orwhoisactivelyabusingalcoholorotherchemicalsubstances,orhasbecomedependentuponalcoholorsuchsubstances,suchthattheattorneyposesasubstantialthreatofharmtotheattorneyortheattorney’sclients,orthepublic.

CHAPTER 3 PROCEDURES

Rule 7-301. Contacts Generally. TheCommitteeshallbeauthorizedtoestablishandimplementprocedurestohandleallcontactsfromorconcerningimpairedattorneys,eitherthroughitschosenhealthcareprofessionalsource,thestatewidenetworkestablishedpursuanttoRule7-102,orbyanyotherprocedurethroughwhichappropriatecounselingorassistancetoanimpairedattor-neymaybeprovided.

Rule 7-302. Referrals from the State Disciplinary Board. UponthereferralofanycasetotheCommitteebytheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgia,theCommitteeshallprovideassistancetotheimpairedattorneyreferredbytheDisciplinaryBoardasotherwiseauthorizedbytheserules.TheCommitteeshallreporttotheBoard,fromtimetotime,theprogressorlackofprogressoftheattorneysoreferred.

Rule 7-303. Confidentiality. ExceptasprovidedinBarRule4-104(b),BarRule4-104(c)andBarRule4-108,andBarRule7-203,allproceedingsandrecordsoftheCommittee,itsmembers,staff,consultantsandotherdesigneesshallbeconfidentialunlesstheattorneywhoisthesubjectoftheproceedingsandrecordsotherwiseelects.

Rule 7-304. Reports. TheCommitteeshallimplementanddesignsuchreportsanddocu-mentationasitdeemsnecessaryorasisrequestedbythepresidentoftheStateBar,subjecttotheconfidentialityprovisionsofRule7-303.

Rule 7-305. Emergency Suspension. Uponreceiptofsufficientevidencedemonstratingthatanimpairedattorney’sconductposesasubstantialthreatofimmediateorirreparable


harmtotheattorney’sclientsorthepublic,orifanimpairedattorneyrefusestocooperatewiththeCommitteeafteranauthorizedinterventionorreferral,orrefusestotakeactionrecommendedbytheCommittee,andsaidimpairedattorneyposesasubstantialthreattotheattorney,theattorney’sclients,orthepublic,theCommitteemayrequestthattheOfficeofGeneralCounselpetitiontheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaforthesuspensionoftheattorneypursuanttoBarRule4-108.Allproceed-ingsunderthispartwhichoccurpriortothefilingofapetitionintheSupremeCourtofGeorgiapursuanttothisruleshallremainconfiden-tialandshallnotbeadmissibleagainsttheattorneybeforetheStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheState.

Rule 7-306. Immunity. TheStateBar,itsemployees,andmembersoftheCommitteeanditsselectedclinicaloutsourceprivatehealthcareprofessionalsshallbeabsolutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityforallactstakeninthecourseoftheirofficialdutiespursuanttothispart.

PART VIII CONTINUING LAWYER COMPETENCY

CHAPTER 1 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUING LEGAL

EDUCATION

Rule 8-101. Purpose. ItisofutmostimportancetomembersoftheBarandtothepublicthatattorneysmaintaintheirprofessionalcompetencethroughouttheiractivepracticeoflaw.Tothatend,theserulesestablishtheminimumrequirementsforcontinuinglegaleducation.

Rule 8-102. Definition.(a)“Accreditedsponsor”shallmeananorganizationwhose

entirecontinuinglegaleducationprogramhasbeenaccreditedbytheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency.Aspecific,individualcontinuinglegaleducationactivitypresentedbysuchasponsorconstitutesanapprovedlegaleducationactivity.

(b)“Activemember”shallincludeanypersonwhoislicensedtopracticelawintheStateofGeorgiaandwhoisanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgia,butshallnotincludetheGovernor,LieutenantGovernor,SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,otherConstitutionalExecutiveOfficerselectedstatewide,membersoftheGeorgiaSenateandtheGeorgiaHouseofRepresentatives,UnitedStatesSenatorsandRepresentatives,andshallnotincludejudgeswhoareprohibitedbylaw,statute,orordinancefromengaginginthepracticeoflaw.

(c)“Commission”shallmeantheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency(CCLC).

(d)“Inactivemember”shallmeanamemberoftheStateBarwhoisoninactivestatus.

(e)“SupremeCourt”shallmeantheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(f)“Year”shallmeanthecalendaryear.

Rule 8-103. Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. (A)Membership,AppointmentandTerms: ThereisestablishedapermanentcommissionoftheStateBarofGeorgiaknownastheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency.TheCommissionshallconsistofsixteen(16)members,six(6)ofwhomshallbeappointedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaandsix(6)bytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,one(1)shallbedesig-natedbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheStateBarofGeorgia,one(1)shallbethechairoftheBoardofTrusteesoftheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducationinGeorgiaorhisorherdesignee,one(1)shallbedes-ignatedbytheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,andone(1)shallbedesignatedbythePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia.MembersshallbemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.MembersoftheCommissionappointedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaandbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarshallbeappointedforstaggeredthree(3)yeartermsanduntiltheirsuccessorsareappointed,exceptthattheinitialappointedmembersoftheCommissionshallconsistoffour(4)membersappointedforatermofone(1)year,four(4)membersappointedforatermoftwo(2)years,andfour(4)membersappointedforatermofthree(3)years.Theappointedmem-bersoftheinitialCommissionshallbeappointedhalfbytheSupremeCourtandhalfbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.NomemberappointedbytheSupremeCourtortheBoardofGovernorsmayservemorethantwo(2)consecutivetermsasamemberoftheCommission,andnosuchmembermaybereappointedotherwisetotheCommissionuntilheorshehasbeeninactiveasaCommissionmemberforthree(3)consecutiveyears.MembersoftheCommissiondesignatedbytheExecutiveCommittee,thechairoftheBoardofTrusteesoftheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducation,theChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,andthePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionshalleachserveforatermofone(1)year.NopersonsodesignatedtotheCommissionmayservemorethanthree(3)consecutivetermsasa

memberoftheCommission,andnosuchmembermayberedesignatedotherwisetotheCommissionuntilheorshehasbeeninactiveasaCommissionmemberforthree(3)consecutiveyears. TheCommissionshalldesignateeachyearoneofitsmemberstoserveasChairperson.TheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarofGeorgia,theExecutiveDirectoroftheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducationofGeorgia,theExecutiveDirectoroftheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,andtheExecutiveDirectoroftheCommissionshallserveasex-officiomembersoftheCommission,butshallhavenovote.TheExecutiveDirectoroftheCommissionshallserveasSecretaryoftheCommission.

Regulations(1) Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quo-

rum of the CCLC.(2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by

majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calen-dar year.

(3) Vice Chair. The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each cal-endar year.

(4) Executive Committee. The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary busi-ness of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC.

(5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission.

(6) Other Committees. The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable.

(7) Vacancy. A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected.

(B)PowersandDutiesoftheBoard:(1)TheCommissionshallhavegeneralsupervisoryauthority

toadministertheseRules.(2)TheCommissionshallhavespecificdutiesandrespon-

sibilities:(a)Toapproveallorportionsofindividualcoursesand

programsofasponsorwhichsatisfytheeducationalrequire-mentsofRule8-106;

(b)Todeterminethenumberofcredithoursallowedforeachcourseoreducationalactivity;

(c)Toencouragecoursesandprogramsbyestablishedorganizations,whetherofferedwithinorwithouttheState;

(d)Toeducatethepublicaboutthelegalprofession;(e)Toadoptrulesandregulationsnotinconsistentwith

theseRules;(f)Toestablishanofficeorofficesandtoemploysuch

personsastheCommissiondeemsnecessaryfortheproperadministrationoftheseRulesandtodelegatetothemappropri-ateauthority,subjecttothereviewoftheCommission;

(g)ToreportatleastannuallytotheStateBarandtotheSupremeCourttheactivitiesandrecommendationsoftheCommissionandtheeffectivenessoftheenforcementoftheseRules;

(h)ToreportpromptlytotheSupremeCourtanyviolationoftheseRules.

Regulations(1) Appeals. The CCLC is the final authority on all mat-

ters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made


by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of author-ity may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal.

(2) Amendments. The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation.

(3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call.

(C)Finances:(1)Purpose.TheCommissionshouldbeadequatelyfunded

toenableittoperformitsdutiesinafinanciallyindependentmanner.

(2)Sources.CostsofadministrationoftheCommissionshallbederivedfromchargestomembersoftheStateBarforcontinu-inglegaleducationactivities.

(a)SponsorsofCLEprogramstobeheldwithintheStateofGeorgiashall,asaconditionofaccreditation,agreetoremitalistofGeorgiaattendeesandtopayafeeforeachactiveStateBarmemberwhoattendstheprogram.Thissponsor’sfeeshallbebasedoneachdayofattendance,withaproportionalfeeforprogramslastinglessthanawholeday.TherateshallbesetbytheCommission.

(b)TheCommissionshallfixareasonablycomparablefeetobepaidbyindividualattorneyswhoeither(a)attendapprovedCLEprogramsoutsidetheStateofGeorgiaor(b)attendun-approvedCLEprogramswithintheStateofGeorgiathatwouldhavebeenapprovedforcreditexceptforthefailureofthesponsortopaythefeedescribedintheprecedingpara-graph.Suchfeeshallaccompanytheattorney’sannualreport.(3)Uses.Fundsmaybeexpendedfortheproperadmin-

istrationoftheCommission.However,themembersoftheCommissionshallserveonavoluntarybasiswithoutexpensereimbursementorcompensation.

Regulations(1) Sponsor Fee. The Sponsor fee, a charge paid directly

by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list in alphabetical order showing the names and Georgia Bar mem-bership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example:

Formula ExampleFee $5.00 $5.00Multiplied by total approved CLE hours x ? x 5.4Multiplied by number of Georgia attendees x ? x 129Equals the total $ ? $3483.00 sponsor fee

(2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no spon-sor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee along with their affidavit before January 31st following the calendar year for which the report is being submitted. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example:

Formula ExampleFee $5.00 $5.00Multiplied by the total approved CLE hours for which the attorney seeks credit but for which sponsor fee was paid. x ? x 3.3Equals the total $ ? $16.50attendee fee

(3) Fee Review. The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner.

(4) Uniform Application. The fee shall be applied uni-formly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee.

(5) Professionalism Fee. The charge for professionalism credit is $15.00 per professionalism hour per attendee. This is in addition to the $5.00 per credit hour per attendee required by the CCLC. Each professionalism hour thus carries a charge per attendee of $20.00. The sponsor shall remit payment for CLE credit as follows:

A check for $5.00 per total CLE hour (including profession-alism) per attendee should be made payable to CCLC and mailed with the attendance list to the CCLC at the State Bar address.A check for $15.00 per professionalism CLE hour per attendee should be made payable to CJCP (Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism) and mailed to the CJCP at the State Bar address.

For example, if the sponsor is paying for 5 attendees who attended a 6-hour seminar including 1 hour of ethics and 1 hour of professionalism, payment should be as follows:

$5 per hour x 6 hours of CLE x 5 attendees = $150 (payable to CCLC)

$15 per Professionalism hour x 5 attendees = $75 (payable to CJCP)

The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit includ-ing professionalism.

Rule 8-104. Education Requirements and Exemptions. (A)MinimumContinuingLegalEducationRequirement. Eachactivemembershallcompleteaminimumoftwelve(12)hoursofactualinstructioninanapprovedcontinuinglegaleducationactivityduringeachyear.Ifamembercompletesmorethantwelve(12)hoursinayear,theexcesscreditmaybecarriedforwardandappliedtotheeducationrequirementforthesucceedingyearonly. (B)BasicLegalSkillsRequirement.

(1)Exceptassetoutinsubsections(a)and(b)below,anynewlyadmittedactivememberadmittedafterJune30,2005,mustcompleteintheyearofhisorheradmissionorinthenextcalen-daryeartheStateBarofGeorgiaTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram,andsuchcompletionoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramshallsatisfythemandatorycontinuinglegaleducationrequirementsforsuchnewlyadmittedactivememberforboththeyearofadmissionandthenextsucceedingyear.

(a)Anynewlyadmittedactivemember,whohaspracticedlawinanotherUnitedStatesjurisdictionotherthanGeorgiafortwoormoreyearsimmediatelypriortoadmissiontopracticeinthisstate,maybeexemptedfromcompletingtheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramuponthesubmission,withinthreemonthsofadmission,ofanaffidavittotheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency.Theaffidavitshallprovidethedateordatesofadmissionineveryotherstateinwhichthememberisadmittedtopracticeandadeclarationthatthenewlyadmittedmemberhasbeenactivelyengagedinthepracticeoflawfortwoormoreyearsimmediatelypriortoadmissioninthisstate.Uponsubmissionofasatisfactoryaffidavit,thenewlyadmittedactivemembershallberequiredtocompletetheannualtwelvehoursofinstructioninapprovedcontinuinglegaleducationactivitybeginningatthestartofthefirstfullcalendaryearafterthedateofadmission.Anynewlyadmittedactivemember,whohaspracticedlawinanotherUnitedStatejuris-dictionotherthanGeorgiafortwoormoreyearsimmediatelypriortoadmissiontopracticeinthisstateandwhodoesnottimelyfiletherequiredaffidavit,shallberequiredtocompletetheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramassetoutabove.

(b)Anynewlyadmittedactivemember,whoisajudiciallawclerkorwhobeginsaclerkshipwithinthreemonthsofadmission,shallnotbesubjecttotherequirementofcomplet-ingtheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramduringtheperiodofthejudicialclerkship.WithinthirtydaysofadmissiontotheStateBarorwithinthirtydaysofthebeginningoftheclerkshipifsaidclerkshipbeginswithinthreemonthsafteradmission,themembershallprovidewrittennoticetotheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencyofthedateofentryintotheclerkshipposition.Judiciallawclerksarerequiredtocomplete


theannualtwelvehoursofregularinstructioninapprovedcontinuinglegaleducationcoursesbeginningatthestartofthefirstfullcalendaryearafterthedateofadmission.Withinthirtydaysofthecompletionoftheclerkship,themembershallpro-videwrittennoticetotheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencyofthedateofsuchcompletion.Themembermustcomplete,intheyeartheclerkshipwasconcluded,orthenextcalendaryear,theGeorgiaTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram.SuchcompletionoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramshallsatisfythemandatorycontinuinglegaleducationrequirementsforsuchmemberforboththeyearofcompletionoftheclerkshipandthenextsucceedingcalendaryear.(2)Eachactivemember,exceptthoseparticipatinginthe

GeorgiaTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram,shallcompleteaminimumofone(1)hourofcontinuinglegaleducationduringeachyearintheareaofethics.Thishouristobeincludedin,andnotinadditionto,thetwelve-hour(12)requirement.Ifamembercom-pletesmorethanone(1)hourinethicsduringthecalendaryear,theexcessethicscreditmaybecarriedforwarduptoamaximumoftwo(2)hoursandappliedtotheethicsrequirementforsucceedingyears.

(3)Eachactivemember,exceptthoseparticipatingintheGeorgiaTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram,shallcompleteaminimumofone(1)hourofcontinuinglegaleducationduringeachyearinanactivityofanysponsorapprovedbytheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalismintheareaofprofes-sionalism.Thishouristobeincludedin,andnotinadditionto,thetwelve-hour(12)requirement.Ifamembercompletesmorethanone(1)hourinprofessionalismduringthecalendaryear,theexcessprofessionalismcreditmaybecarriedforwarduptoamaximumoftwo(2)hoursandappliedtotheprofessionalismrequirementforsucceedingyears.

(4)ConfidentialityofProceedings.(a)Theconfidentialityofallinquiriesto,decisionsof,

andproceedingsbytheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramshallberespected.Nodisclosureofsaidinquiries,decisionsandproceedingsshallbemadeintheabsenceoftheagreementofallparticipating.

(b)Exceptasexpresslypermittedbytheserules,noper-sonconnectedwiththeTransitionsIntolawPracticeProgramoperatedundertheauspicesoftheStandardsoftheProfessionCommitteeoftheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencyshalldiscloseanyinformationconcerningorcom-mentsonanyproceedingundertheserules.

(c)TheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramoper-atedundertheauspicesoftheStandardsoftheProfessionCommitteeoftheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencymayrevealprivaterecordswhenrequirebylaw,courtrule,orcourtorder.

(d)AnyrecordsmaintainedbytheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramoperatedundertheauspicesoftheStandardsoftheProfessionCommitteeoftheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency,asprovidedherein,shallbeavailabletoCounselfortheStateBaronlyintheeventtheStateBaroranydepartmentthereofreceivesadiscoveryrequestorproperlyexecutedsubpoenarequestingsuchrecords.

Regulations(1) Definitions.

(a)NewlyAdmittedActiveMember.A“newlyadmit-tedactivemember”isonewhobecomesanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforthefirsttime.

(b)Bridge-the-Gap.“Bridge-the-Gap”isaprogramorganizedanddefinedbyICLE.Currently,theBridge-the-Gapprogramconsistsoftwodaysofinstruction:thefirstdaybeingaseminarcalledBridge-the-Gapandtheseconddaybeinganyotherapprovedsixhourseminartobeselectedbyeachlawyer.ThisprogramwillbereplacedbytheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramafterOctober1,2005.

(c)TransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram.“TransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram”isaprogramorganizedanddefinedbytheStandardsoftheProfessionCommitteeoftheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetencythatconsistsoftwocomponents:

(i)AttendanceateithertheEnhancedBridge-the-Gapprogram,ortheFundamentalsofLawPracticeprogramoftheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducation,oracomparableprogramapprovedbytheCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency;and

(ii)CompletionofaMentoringPlanofActivitiesandExperiences.(d)EnhancedBridge-the-Gap.“EnhancedBridge-

the-Gap,”isthecontinuinglegaleducationprogramoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramthatisdeliveredby

theInstituteofContinuingLegalEducationinlargegroupsettings.EnhancedBridge-the-Gapconsistsoftwoconsecu-tivedaysofcourseworkthatinformandfacilitatefurtherdiscussioninthementoringcontext.

(e)FundamentalsofLawPractice.“FundamentalsofLawPractice”isthecontinuinglegaleducationprogramoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramthatisdeliveredbytheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducationinsmallgroupsettingstofostercloseinteractionbetweennewlyadmittedactivelawyersandinstructors.FundamentalsofLawPracticeconsistsoftwoconsecutivedaysofcourseworkthatinformandfacilitatefurtherdiscussioninthementoringcontext.

(f)MentoringPlanofActivitiesandExperiences.The“MentoringPlanofActivitiesandExperiences”istheplanthatstructuresandguidesthementoringcomponentoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgram.ThePlanshallbesubmittedtotheProgramintheyearofadmissionorearlyinthenextcalendaryearbythenewlyadmittedactivememberandhisorhermentor.ThePlanmustbecompletedintheyearofadmissionorthenextcalendaryear.

(2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active mem-bers admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005.

(3) Legal Ethics. Legal ethics includes instruction on professional responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as attorney fees, client development, law office economics, and practice systems except to the extent that pro-fessional responsibility is directly discussed in connection with these topics.

(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE require-ment is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; pro-fessionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integ-rity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE require-ment is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The pro-fessionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) vari-ous forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations’ systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law.

(5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program.

(6) Appointment of Mentors; Minimum Qualifications.(a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of

Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors.(b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the

Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfy-ing the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion.

(c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eli-gible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor:

(i) Active Status. Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and,

(ii) 5 Years of Practice. Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and,

(iii) Professional Reputation. Maintain a profes-sional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and,


(iv) Disciplinary Action. Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have volun-tarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplin-ary proceeding in any jurisdiction. During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term “sanctioned” means subjected to disciplinary action. (For example, in Georgia, “sanctioned” cur-rently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final dis-position of the formal complaint (s); and,

(v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action. During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as men-tor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of com-petent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts. A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does notconsti-tute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part. A prospective mentor who is or has within the preced-ing ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the “Commission”) for a waiver of this requirement. After review of the facts and cir-cumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and

(vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equiv-alent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer.

(7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status.

(C)Exemptions.(1)Aninactivemembershallbeexemptfromthecontinuing

legaleducationandthereportingrequirementsofthisRule.(2)TheCommissionmayexemptanactivememberfromthe

continuinglegaleducation,butnotthereporting,requirementsofthisruleforaperiodofnotmorethanone(1)yearuponafindingbytheCommissionofspecialcircumstancesuniquetothatmem-berconstitutingunduehardship.

(3)Anyactivememberovertheageofseventy(70)shallbeexemptfromthecontinuinglegaleducationrequirementsofthisrule,includingthereportingrequirements,unlessthemembernoti-fiestheCommissioninwritingthatthememberwishestocontinuetobecoveredbythecontinuinglegaleducationrequirementsofthisrule.

(4)AnyactivememberresidingoutsideofGeorgiawhoneitherpracticesinGeorgianorrepresentsGeorgiaclientsshallbeexempt,uponwrittenapplicationtotheCommission,fromthecontinuinglegaleducation,butnotthereporting,requirementsofthisruleduringtheyearforwhichthewrittenapplicationismade.Thisapplicationshallbefiledwiththeannualreport.

(5)AnyactivememberoftheBoardofBarExaminersshallbeexemptfromthecontinuinglegaleducationbutnotthereport-ingrequirementofthisRule.

Regulations

(1) Inactive. To be fully exempt, the member must

be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement.

(2) Undue Hardship. Requests for undue hardship exemp-tions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis.

(D)RequirementsforParticipationinLitigation.(1)PriortoappearingassoleorleadcounselintheSuperior

orStateCourtsofGeorgiainanycontestedcivilcaseorinthetrialofacriminalcase,anyparticipantintheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramadmittedtopracticeafterJune30,2005,shallcompletethemandatoryAdvocacyExperiencesoftheTransitionIntoLawPracticeProgramsetforthinRegulation(5)hereunder.ThemandatoryAdvocacyExperiencesshallbecompletedaspartoftheMentoringPlanofActivitiesandExperiences,exceptthatuptothree(3)ofthefive(5)mandatoryAdvocacyExperiencesmaybeobtainedaftercompletionof60%ofthecredithoursrequiredforlawschoolgraduationandpriortoadmissiontopractice.Atleasttwo(2)ofthemandatoryAdvocacyExperiencesmustbecompletedaspartoftheMentoringPlanofActivitiesandExperiences.

(2)EachactivememberwhoappearsassoleorleadcounselintheSuperiororStateCourtsofGeorgiainanycontestedcivilcaseorinthetrialofacriminalcasein1990orinanysubsequentcalendaryear,shallcompleteforsuchyearaminimumofthree(3)hoursofcontinuinglegaleducationactivityintheareaoftrialpractice.AtrialpracticeCLEactivityisoneexclusivelylimitedtooneormoreofthefollowingsubjects:evidence,civilpracticeandprocedure,criminalpracticeandprocedure,ethicsandprofessionalisminlitigation,ortrialadvocacy.Thesehoursaretobeincludedin,andnotinadditionto,the12-hour(twelve)requirement.Ifamembercompletesmorethanthree(3)trialpracticehours,theexcesstrialpracticecreditmaybecarriedforwardandappliedtothetrialprac-ticerequirementforthesucceedingyearonly.

RegulationsTrial MCLE

(1) Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has pri-mary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case.

(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a crimi-nal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule.

(3) Due to the “exclusively limited” requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a mini-mum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The “exclusively limited” requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc.

(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evi-dence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary.

(5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers. The following are examples:

( i) An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action;

(ii) An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court;

(iii) An actual or simulated nonjury trial or eviden-tiary hearing in a state or federal court;


(iv) An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and

(v) An actual or simulated mediation.

Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).

Rule 8-105. Annual Report. TheCommissionshallprovideattheendofeachyeartoallnon-exemptactivemembersanAnnualReportoftheirCLErecordinsuchformastheCommissionshallprescribe. AmemberwhoserecordcontainscreditforunearnedhoursshallreportcorrectionsonorbeforeJanuary31st.AmemberwhoserecordfailstoincludecreditforearnedhoursmayreportcorrectionsonorbeforeJanuary31stinthebylaws.

Rule 8-106. Hours and Accreditation. (A)Hours.TheCommissionshalldesignatethenumberofhourstobeearnedbyparticipation,including,butnotlimitedto,teachingincontinuinglegaleducationactivitiesapprovedbytheCommission.

Regulations(1) Computation Formula. CLE and ethics hours shall be

computed by the following formula:

Sum of total minutes of actual instruction = total hours (round to 60 the nearest 1/10th of an hour)

(2) Actual Instruction. Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.

(3) Teaching. For their contribution to the legal profes-sion, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker’s supervi-sion, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teach-ing credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.

(4) Author. The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise’s content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a rec-ognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the prac-tice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney’s contribution. An attorney request-ing author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.

(5) Organizer. The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attor-neys’ contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.

(6) Active Non-Resident. Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resi-dent state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE affidavit, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia.

(B)AccreditationStandards:TheCommissionshallapprovecon-tinuinglegaleducationactivitiesconsistentwiththefollowingstandards:

(1)Theyshallhavesignificantintellectualorpracticalcon-tent,andtheprimaryobjectiveshallbetoincreasetheparticipant’sprofessionalcompetenceasalawyer;

(2)Theyshallconstituteanorganizedprogramoflearningdealingwithmattersdirectlyrelatedtothepracticeoflaw,profes-sionalresponsibilityorethicalobligationsoflawyers;

(3)Creditmaybegivenforcontinuinglegaleducationactivitieswhere(a)liveinstructionisusedor(b)mechanicallyorelectronicallyrecordedorreproducedmaterialisusedifaquali-fiedinstructorisavailabletocommentandanswerquestions;

(4)Continuinglegaleducationmaterialsaretobeprepared,andactivitiesconducted,byanindividualorgroupqualifiedbypracticaloracademicexperienceinasettingphysicallysuitabletotheeducationalactivityoftheprogram;

(5)Thorough,highquality,andcarefullypreparedwrittenmaterialsshouldbedistributedtoallattendeesatorbeforethetimethecourseispresented.Itisrecognizedthatwrittenmaterialsarenotsuitableorreadilyavailableforsometypesofsubjects;theabsenceofwrittenmaterialsfordistribution,should,however,betheexceptionandnottherule;

(6)TheCommissionmayissuefromtimetotimealistofapprovedaccreditedsponsorsdeemedbyittomeettherequire-mentssetforthinthisRule.AnyothersponsordesiringtobeapprovedforaccreditedsponsorstatusmustfileanapplicationwiththeCommissionwithsuchprogrammaterialandinformationastheCommissionmayrequire;

(7)Anyaccreditedsponsormustkeepandmaintainattendancerecordsofeachcontinuinglegaleducationprogramsponsoredbyit,whichshallbefurnishedtotheCommissionuponitsrequest.

Regulations

(1) Continuing Legal Education. The CCLC shall deter-mine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.

(2) Law School Courses. Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.

(3) Bar Review/Refresher Course. Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attor-neys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.

(4) Approval. CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:

(a) Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and prefer-ably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval;

(b) Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC;(c) Contain all information requested on the form;(d) Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure

that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered;

(e) Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours and professionalism hours.

In addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:

(a) Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order, on magnetic tape if available, of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee;

(b) Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:

This course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for man-datory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will apply in the area of ethics and ______hours will apply in the area of professionalism. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper


credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar num-ber. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.) Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representa-tion concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. The CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approv-al will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.

(5) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional com-petence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most rel-evant to a firm’s own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.

The Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.

These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions:

(a) All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall bedesigned specifically as an organized program of learning.

(b) All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff;

(c) Experienced attorneys must substantially contrib-ute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities;

(d) In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be sched-uled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters.

(e) Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm’s partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.

(6) Facilities. Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activ-ity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facil-ity detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.

(7) Written Materials. Qualifying written materials shall spe-cifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.

Examples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently pre-pared transcripts.

The quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement. It is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a semi-nar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materi-als may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.

(8) Sponsor Records. In addition to the required atten-dance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor’s benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor’s policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a fac-tor bearing on the sponsor’s accreditation.

(9) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee’s professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the pri-mary objective test.

(10) ADR CLE. CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein

(11) Practice Management CLE. (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice includ-ing client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good cli-ent relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar griev-ances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein..

(12) CLE Delivery Formats. In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifi-cally as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 5 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; on-line computer CLE activities, CD-ROM and DVD interactive CLE activities; and written correspondence CLE courses. When attended by an individual attorney, the distance learning activity constitutes Self-Study CLE. Examples of non-qualifying educational activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups, observa-tions of trial and jury duty.

Rule 8-107. Grace Period and Noncompliance. (A)GracePeriod

(1)MemberswhoaredeficientintheirCLE,fees,orotherrequirementsattheendofacalendaryearareentitledtoanauto-maticgraceperioduntilMarch31stofthesucceedingyeartomakeuptheirdeficiency.ThisdoesnotchangetherequirementthatmembersfiletheirannualreportbyJanuary31st.

(2)MemberswhoremaindeficientonApril1stofthesuc-ceedingyearshallpayalateCLEfeeinanamounttobesetbytheCommission.

(B)Noncompliance(1)Notice.MemberswhoremaindeficientintheirCLE,

annualreportfiling,fees,orotherrequirementsonApril1stofthesucceedingyearareinnoncompliance.TheCommissionshallsonotifythemembersbyfirstclassmailtothemember’scurrent


addresscontainedinthemembershiprecordsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.ServiceoractualreceiptisnotaprerequisitetoactionsauthorizedbytheseRules.

(2)Hearing.MembersmaycontesttheirnoncompliancebyrequestingahearingbeforetheCommission.Therequestshouldbeinwriting,containthereasonsfortheircontest,andbemadewithin60daysofthedateofthenoticeofnoncompliancemailedbytheCommission.TheCommissionshallhearthematteratitsnextmeeting.Noactionwillbetakenwhilehearingsarepending.

(3)Report.TheCommissionshallreporttotheSupremeCourtthosememberswhoremaininnoncomplianceafterthetimetorequesthearingshasexpiredoranyrequestedhearingshavebeenheld.

(4)SupremeCourtofGeorgiaAction.UponreceiptfromtheCommissionofareportofnoncompliance,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiashallenteranorderitdeemsappropriateincludinganallowanceofadditionaltimeforcomplianceorsummarysuspen-sionfromthepracticeoflawuntilfurtherorderoftheCourt.

Regulation(1) Late CLE Fees: An attorney who does not complete

the annual, minimum CLE requirement until after March 31st of the following year shall pay a $100 late CLE fee. This fee shall be due April 1st. Thereafter, if the attorney’s CLE deficiency is not corrected by June 30th of the same year, or if the $100 late CLE remains unpaid on that June 30th, an additional $150 late fee shall be due immediately.

Rule 8-108. Reinstatement. AnactivemembersuspendedundertheprovisionsoftheserulesmaybereinstatedbytheCourtuponmotionoftheCommissionanduponashowingthatthedelinquencyhasbeencorrectedandpaymenttotheCommissionofauniformreinstatementfeefixedbytheCommission.

Regulations(1) Reinstatement Fee. The uniform reinstatement fee

is $500 for a member’s first reinstatement, $1,000 for a sec-ond reinstatement by the same member, and $2,000 for all subsequent reinstatements by the same member. This fee must accompany the reinstatement motion. It shall not be waived and is non-refundable in the event reinstatement is not granted.

(2) Policy. Reinstatement will be granted only upon a showing that the member has attended sufficient approved CLE activity to make-up the deficiencies causing the suspension and all deficiencies in subsequent years. Also, the member’s progress toward meeting MCLE requirements in the calendar year in which the reinstatement is requested will be included as information in the CCLC’s motion to the Supreme Court.

(3) Motion. The motion for reinstatement shall list the CLE activities by course number, sponsor, location, dates and hours. It shall be accompanied by proof of attendance, any attendee fee that may be due, and the reinstatement fee.

(4) CCLC Action. If the suspended member is found to be in compliance, the CCLC will file a motion with the Supreme Court of Georgia setting forth the facts along with its recom-mendation which may or may not be that reinstatement be granted. The Supreme Court will make the final decision on reinstatement. If the suspended member is found to not be in compliance, the CCLC will inform him of the curative actions necessary to cure his or her deficiencies.

Rule 8-109. Confidentiality. RecordsoftheCommissionarenotconfidential.

Rule 8-110. Immunity. TheStateBar,itsemployees,theStandardsoftheProfessionCommitteemembersandadvisory,theCommissiononContinuingLawyerCompetency,itsemployees,membersandadvisory,theChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,itsemployees,members,andadvisorsshallbeabsolutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityofallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

Rule 8-111. No longer applicable.

Rule 8-112. Foreign Law Consultants. ForeignlawconsultantmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiashallbesubjecttoandshallcomplywiththeprovisionsofthisPartVIIIinthesamemannerandtotheextentasactivemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

PART IX PROFESSIONALISM

Rule 9-101. Purpose. ThisPartoftheStateBarRulesisadoptedinrecognitionoftheimportanceofprofessionalismastheultimatehallmarkoftheprac-ticeoflaw.ThepurposeofthisPartistocreatewithintheStateBara

Commissiontoidentify,enunciateandencourageadherencetonon-mandatorystandardsofprofessionalconduct.ThesestandardsshouldinvolveaspirationshigherthanthoserequiredbytheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductinPartIV.

Rule 9-102. Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism. (A)Membership,AppointmentandTerms ThereisestablishedapermanentCommissionoftheStateBarofGeorgiaknownastheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism.TheCommissionshallconsistoftwenty-two(22)membersasfollows:(1)theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaorhisorherdesig-neewhoshallserveasChairoftheCommission;(2)TheChiefJudgeoftheCourtofAppealsorhisorherdesignee;(3)onesuperiorcourtjudgedesignatedbytheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudges;(4)onestatecourtjudgedesignatedbytheCouncilofStateCourtJudges;(5)fivelawschoolfacultymembersdesignatedbythedeansoftheaccreditedlawschoolsintheStateofGeorgia,oneofwhommustbeamemberoftheStateBarCommitteeonProfessionalism;provided,however,suchfacultymembersshallnotbefromthesamelawschool;(6)twonon-lawyercitizensfromthepublicatlarge;(7)thePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia;(8)thePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia;(9)oneFederalDistrictJudge;and(10)eightmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgiaactivelyengagedinthepracticeoflaw,oneofwhommustbeemployedbyaunitoffederal,state,orlocalgovernment,onemustbeengagedprimarilyincriminaldefensepractice,onemustbeafederalorstateprosecutor,andonemustbein-housecounsel. Threeofthepracticinglawyersandoneofthenon-lawyercitizensfromthepublicatlargeshallbeappointedbytheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.TheremainingmembersoftheCommission,withtheexceptionofthePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgia,thePresidentoftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarofGeorgia,thesuperiorcourtjudge,andthestatecourtjudge,shallbeappointedbytheSupremeCourt.ThetermsofthemembersoftheCommissionshallbestaggeredandthatshallbeaccomplishedbytheinitialappointmentsbeingasfollows:twoofthepracticinglawyermembersappointedbytheBoardofGovernorsshallserveuntiltheconclusionoftheStateBarAnnualMeetingin1990;thenon-lawyergeneralpublicmembershallserveuntiltheconclusionoftheStateBarAnnualMeetingin1990;thesuperiorcourtjudgemember,onepracticinglawyermemberappointedbytheBoardofGovernorsandonelawfacultymembershallserveuntiltheconclusionoftheStateBarAnnualMeetingin1991.Theremain-ingmembersoftheCommissionshallserveuntiltheconclusionoftheAnnualMeetingoftheStateBarin1992.Thereafter,thesuperiorcourtjudgemembershallserveforatwoyeartermasdesignatedbytheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudges,thestatecourtjudgemembershallserveforatwo-yeartermasdesignatedbytheCouncilofStateCourtJudges,andallothermembersoftheCommissionshallserveforthree(3)yeartermsandnomember(excepttheChiefJustice,thatmemberappointedbytheCourtofAppeals,andthelawschoolrepresentatives)mayservemorethantwo(2)termsontheCommission. (B)PowersandDutiesoftheCommission TheCommission’smajorresponsibilitiesshallbe:

(1)Toconsidereffortsbylawyersandjudgestoimprovetheadministrationofjustice;

(2)Toexaminewaysofmakingthesystemofjusticemoreaccessibletothepublic;

(3)TomonitorandcoordinateGeorgia’sprofessionalismeffortsinsuchinstitutionalsettingsasitsbar,courts,lawschoolsandlawfirms;

(4)TomonitorprofessionalismeffortsinjurisdictionsoutsideGeorgia;

(5)ToconductastudyandissueareportonthepresentstateofprofessionalismwithinGeorgia;

(6)ToplantheyearlyConvocationonProfessionalism;(7)Topromotevariousregionalconvocationsonprofes-

sionalism;(8)ToprovideguidanceandsupporttotheCommissionon

ContinuingLawyerCompetencyinitsimplementationandexecu-tionofthecontinuinglegaleducationprofessionalismrequirement;

(9)TohelpimplementaprofessionalismcomponentintheBridge-the-Gapprogram;

(10)TomakerecommendationstotheSupremeCourtandtheStateBarconcerningadditionalmeansbywhichprofessional-ismcanbeenhanced;

(11)Toreceiveandadministergiftsandgrants;and(12)TheCommissionshallhavenoauthoritytoimpose

sanctionsofanykinduponanymemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(C)Finances FundingfortheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalismshallbeprovidedbyanadditionalsurchargeforeachactiveStateBarmemberwhoattendsacourseinprofessionalismsponsoredbytheInstituteofContinuingLegalEducation(ICLE)orbyanyotherspon-


sorapprovedbytheCommission.TherateshallbesetannuallybytheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,andthesurchargeshallberemitteddirectlytoitbyICLE,byanyothersuchsponsor,or,inanappropriatecase,bytheindividualStateBarmemberwhoattendedacourseinprofessionalismapprovedbytheCommission.

A LAWYER’S CREED

To my clients,Iofferfaithfulness,competence,diligence,andgoodjudgment.IwillstrivetorepresentyouasIwouldwanttoberep-resentedandtobeworthyofyourtrust.

To the opposing parties and their counsel,Iofferfairness,integ-rity,andcivility.Iwillseekreconciliationand,ifwefail,Iwillstrivetomakeourdisputeadignifiedone.

To the courts, and other tribunals,andtothosewhoassistthem,Iofferrespect,candor,andcourtesy.Iwillstrivetodohonortothesearchforjustice.

To my colleagues in the practice of law,Iofferconcernforyourwelfare.Iwillstrivetomakeourassociationaprofessionalfriendship.

To the profession,Iofferassistance.Iwillstrivetokeepourbusinessaprofessionandourprofessionacallinginthespiritofpublicservice.

To the public and our systems of justice,Iofferservice.Iwillstrivetoimprovethelawandourlegalsystem,tomakethelawandourlegalsystemavailabletoall,andtoseekthecommongoodthroughtherepresentationofmyclients.

ASPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM

TheCourtbelievesthereareunfortunatetrendsofcommercial-izationandlossofprofessionalcommunityinthecurrentpracticeoflaw.Thesetrendsaremanifestedinanundueemphasisonthefinancialrewardsofpractice,alackofcourtesyandcivilityamongmembersofourprofession,alackofrespectforthejudiciaryandforoursystemsofjustice,andalackofregardforothersandforthecommongood.Asacommunityofprofessionals,weshouldstrivetomaketheinternalrewardsofservice,craft,andcharacter,andnottheexternalrewardoffinancialgain,theprimaryrewardsofthepracticeoflaw.Inourprac-ticesweshouldrememberthattheprimaryjustificationforwhoweareandwhatwedoisthecommongoodwecanachievethroughthefaithfulrepresentationofpeoplewhodesiretoresolvetheirdisputesinapeace-fulmannerandtopreventfuturedisputes.Weshouldremember,andweshouldhelpourclientsremember,thatthewayinwhichourclientsresolvetheirdisputesdefinespartofthecharacterofoursocietyandweshouldactaccordingly. Asprofessionals,weneedaspirationalidealstohelpbindustogetherinaprofessionalcommunity.Accordingly,theCourtissuesthefollowingAspirationalStatementsettingforthgeneralandspecificaspi-rationalidealsofourprofession.Thisstatementisabeginninglistoftheidealsofourprofession.Itisprimarilyillustrative.Ourpurposeisnottoregulate,andcertainlynottoprovideabasisfordiscipline,butrathertoassisttheBar’seffortstomaintainaprofessionalismthatcanstandagainstthenegativetrendsofcommercializationandlossofcommunity.ItistheCourt’shopethatGeorgia’slawyers,judges,andlegaleducatorswillusethefollowingaspirationalidealstoreexaminethejustificationsofthepracticeoflawinoursocietyandtoconsidertheimplicationsofthosejustificationsfortheirconduct.TheCourtfeelsthatenhancementofprofessionalismcanbebestbroughtaboutbythecooperativeeffortsoftheorganizedbar,thecourts,andthelawschoolswitheachgroupworkingindependently,butalsojointlyinthateffort.

GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS

As a lawyer,Iwillaspire:

(a)Toputfidelitytoclientsand,throughclients,tothecommongood,beforeselfishinterests.

(b)Tomodelforothers,andparticularlyformyclients,therespectduetothosewecallupontoresolveourdisputesandtheregardduetoallparticipantsinourdisputeresolutionprocesses.

(c)Toavoidallformsofwrongfuldiscriminationinallofmyactivitiesincludingdiscriminationonthebasisofrace,religion,sex,age,handi-cap,veteranstatus,ornationalorigin.Thesocialgoalsofequalityandfairnesswillbepersonalgoalsforme.

(d)Topreserveandimprovethelaw,thelegalsystem,andotherdisputeresolutionprocessesasinstrumentsforthecommongood.

(e)Tomakethelaw,thelegalsystem,andotherdisputeresolutionpro-cessesavailabletoall.

(f)Topracticewithapersonalcommitmenttotherulesgoverningourprofessionandtoencourageotherstodothesame.

(g)Topreservethedignityandtheintegrityofourprofessionbymyconduct.Thedignityandtheintegrityofourprofessionisaninheritancethatmustbemaintainedbyeachsuccessivegenerationoflawyers.

(h)Toachievetheexcellenceofourcraft,especiallythosethatpermitmetobethemoralvoiceofclientstothepublicinadvocacywhilebeingthemoralvoiceofthepublictoclientsincounseling.Goodlawyeringshouldbeamoralachievementforboththelawyerandtheclient.

(i)Topracticelawnotasabusiness,butasacallinginthespiritofpublicservice.

SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS

As to clients,Iwillaspire:

(a)Toexpeditiousandeconomicalachievementofallclientobjectives.

(b)Tofullyinformedclientdecision-making.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Counselclientsaboutallformsofdisputeresolution;(2)Counselclientsaboutthevalueofcooperationasameanstowardstheproductiveresolutionofdisputes;(3)Maintainthesympatheticdetachmentthatpermitsobjec-tiveandindependentadvicetoclients;(4)Communicatepromptlyandclearlywithclients;and,(5)Reachclearagreementswithclientsconcerningthenatureoftherepresentation.

(c)Tofairandequitablefeeagreements.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Discussalternativemethodsofchargingfeeswithallclients;(2)Offerfeearrangementsthatreflectthetruevalueoftheservicesrendered;(3)Reachagreementswithclientsasearlyintherelationshipaspossible;(4)Determinetheamountoffeesbyconsiderationofmanyfactorsandnotjusttimespentbytheattorney;(5)Providewrittenagreementsastoallfeearrangements;and(6)ResolveallfeedisputesthroughthearbitrationmethodsprovidedbytheStateBarofGeorgia.

(d)Tocomplywiththeobligationsofconfidentialityandtheavoidanceofconflictingloyaltiesinamannerdesignedtoachievethefidelitytoclientsthatisthepurposeoftheseobligations.

As to opposing parties and their counsel,Iwillaspire:

(a)Tocooperatewithopposingcounselinamannerconsistentwiththecompetentrepresentationofallparties.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Notifyopposingcounselinatimelyfashionofanycan-celedappearance;(2)Grantreasonablerequestsforextensionsorschedulingchanges;and,(3)Consultwithopposingcounselintheschedulingofappearances,meetings,anddepositions.

(b)Totreatopposingcounselinamannerconsistentwithhisorherprofessionalobligationsandconsistentwiththedignityofthesearchforjustice.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Notservemotionsorpleadingsinsuchamanneroratsuchatimeastoprecludeopportunityforacompetentresponse;(2)Becourteousandcivilinallcommunications;(3)Respondpromptlytoallrequestsbyopposingcounsel;(4)Avoidrudenessandotheractsofdisrespectinallmeet-ingsincludingdepositionsandnegotiations;(5)Preparedocumentsthataccuratelyreflecttheagreementofallparties;and(6)Clearlyidentifyallchangesmadeindocumentssubmit-tedbyopposingcounselforreview.

As to the courts, other tribunals,and to those who assist them,Iwillaspire:


(a)Torepresentmyclientsinamannerconsistentwiththeproperfunctioningofafair,efficient,andhumanesystemofjustice.Asapro-fessional,Ishould:

(1)Avoidnon-essentiallitigationandnon-essentialpleadinginlitigation;(2)Explorethepossibilitiesofsettlementofalllitigatedmat-ters;(3)Seeknon-coercedagreementbetweenthepartiesonpro-ceduralanddiscoverymatters;(4)Avoidalldelaysnotdictatedbyacompetentpresentationofaclient’sclaims;(5)Preventmisusesofcourttimebyverifyingtheavailabil-ityofkeyparticipantsforscheduledappearancesbeforethecourtandbybeingpunctual;and(6)Adviseclientsabouttheobligationsofcivility,courtesy,fairness,cooperation,andotherproperbehaviorexpectedofthosewhouseoursystemsofjustice.

(b)Tomodelforotherstherespectduetoourcourts.AsaprofessionalIshould:

(1)Actwithcompletehonesty;(2)Knowcourtrulesandprocedures;(3)Giveappropriatedeferencetocourtrulings;(4)Avoidunduefamiliaritywithmembersofthejudiciary;(5)Avoidunfounded,unsubstantiated,orunjustifiedpubliccriticismofmembersofthejudiciary;(6)Showrespectbyattireanddemeanor;(7)Assistthejudiciaryindeterminingtheapplicablelaw;and,(8)Seektounderstandthejudiciary’sobligationsofinformedandimpartialdecision-making.

As to my colleagues in the practice of law,Iwillaspire:

(a)Torecognizeandtodevelopourinterdependence;

(b)Torespecttheneedsofothers,especiallytheneedtodevelopasawholeperson;and,

(c)Toassistmycolleaguesbecomebetterpeopleinthepracticeoflawandtoaccepttheirassistanceofferedtome.

As to our profession,Iwillaspire:

(a)Toimprovethepracticeoflaw.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Assistincontinuinglegaleducationefforts;(2)Assistinorganizedbaractivities;and,(3)Assistlawschoolsintheeducationofourfuturelawyers.

(b)Toprotectthepublicfromincompetentorotherwrongfullawyering.Asaprofessional,Ishould:

(1)Assistinbaradmissionsactivities;(2)Reportviolationsofethicalregulationsbyfellowlaw-yers;and,(3)Assistintheenforcementofthelegalandethicalstan-dardsimposeduponalllawyers.

As to the public and our systems of justice,Iwillaspire:

(a)Tocounselclientsaboutthemoralandsocialconsequencesoftheirconduct.

(b)Toconsidertheeffectofmyconductontheimageofoursystemsofjusticeincludingthesocialeffectofadvertisingmethods.

(c)Toprovidetheprobonorepresentationthatisnecessarytomakeoursystemofjusticeavailabletoall.

(d)Tosupportorganizationsthatprovideprobonorepresentationtoindigentclients.

(e)Toimproveourlawsandlegalsystemby,forexample:

(1)Servingasapublicofficial;(2)Assistingintheeducationofthepublicconcerningourlawsandlegalsystem;(3)Commentingpubliclyuponourlaws;and,(4)Usingotherappropriatemethodsofeffectingpositivechangeinourlawsandlegalsystem.

PART X CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND

PREAMBLE ThepurposeoftheClients’SecurityFundistopromotepublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjusticeandtheintegrityofthelegalprofessionbyprovidingmonetaryrelieftopersonswhosufferreimburs-ablelossesasaresultofthedishonestconductofmembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 10-101. Fund Established. ThereisestablishedaseparatefundoftheStateBarofGeorgiadesignated“Clients’SecurityFundoftheStateBarofGeorgia”.ThereisalsoestablishedaClients’SecurityFundBoardofTrusteeswhichshallreceive,hold,manageanddisbursefromtheFundsuchmoniesasmayfromtimetotimebeappropriatedtoitbytheStateBarofGeorgia,orreceivedthroughvoluntarycontributions,incomefrominvestmentsorotherfundingsources.

Rule 10-102. Definitions. Forthisrule,thefollowingtermsshallhavethefollowingmeanings: (a)The“Board”meanstheClients’SecurityFundBoardofTrustees. (b)“Claimant”meansonewhofilesaclaimforreimbursementwiththeBoardofTrustees. (c)The“Fund”meanstheClients’SecurityFundoftheStateBarofGeorgia. (d)“Lawyer”meansonewho,atthetimeofthecommencementofhisorherhandlingofthematterinwhichthelossarose,wasaMemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

Rule 10-103. Funding.(a)TheStateBarofGeorgiashallprovidefundingforthepay-

mentofclaimsandthecostsofadministeringtheFund.InanyyearfollowingayearinwhichthegrossaggregatebalanceoftheFundfallsbelow$1,000,000,theBarshallassessandcollectfromeachdues-payingmemberaproratashareofthedifferencebetweentheactualFundbalanceand$1million,providedthatsuchassessmentsshallnotexceed$25inanysingleyear.TheaggregateamountpaidtoclaimantsfromtheFundinanyyearshallnotexceed$350,000.TheBoardofGovernorsmayfromtimetotimeadjusttheFund’sminimumaggregatebalance,maximumannualpayout,ormaximumannualassessmenttoadvancethepurposesoftheFundortopre-servethefiscalintegrityoftheFund.

(b)AllmoniesorotherassetsoftheFundshallconstituteatrustandshallbeheldinthenameoftheFund,subjecttothedirectionoftheBoard.

(c)NodisbursementsshallbemadefromtheFundexceptbytheBoardofTrustees.

Rule 10-104. Board of Trustees.(a)TheBoardofTrusteesshallconsistofsix(6)lawyersand

one(1)non-lawyerappointedbythePresidentoftheStateBar.TheinitialappointmentstotheBoardshallbeofsuchtermsastoresultinthestaggeredexpirationofthetermsofallmembersoftheBoard.Thereafter,theappointmentsshallbeforatermoffive(5)years.

(b)VacanciesshallbefilledbyappointmentofthePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaforanyunexpiredterm.

(c)TheBoardmembersshallselectachairperson,andsuchotherofficersastheBoardmembersdeemappropriate.

(d)AquorumforthetransactionofbusinessatanymeetingoftheBoardshallconsistofthreecurrentmembersinattendance.

(e)TheBoardmayadoptaregulationtoterminateTrusteeswhofailtoregularlyattendmeetingsandmayadoptadditionalregulationsfortheadministrationoftheFundwhicharenotother-wiseinconsistentwiththeserules.

Rule 10-105. Investigations.(a)TheBoardshallrevieweveryclaim,andinitsdiscretion,

willinvestigatetotheextenttheBoarddeemsappropriatethoseclaimswhichappeartomeettherequirementsforpaymentasdescribedintheserules.

(b)TheBoardmayapproveforpaymentfromthefundsuchclaimsasarefound,afterinvestigation,tobemeritoriousandinaccordancewiththeserules.

(c)Applicationsforreliefshallbesubmittedonformspre-scribedbytheBoard.

Rule 10-106. Eligible Claims.(a)Thelossmustbecausedbythedishonestconductofthe

lawyerandshallhavearisenoutofandbyreasonofalawyer-clientrelationship,orafiduciaryrelationship,betweenthelawyerandtheclaimant.

(b)AsusedintheseRules,“dishonestconduct”meanswrongfulactscommittedbyalawyerinthenatureoftheftor


embezzlementofmoneyorthewrongfultakingorconversionofmoney,propertyorotherthingsofvalue.

(c)AcomplaintagainstthelawyerwhocausedorisallegedtohavecausedsuchlossshallhavebeenfiledwiththeStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandfinaldisposi-tionofsuchcomplainthasbeenmaderesultingindisciplinaryactionagainstthelawyerintheformofindefinitesuspension,dis-barment,orvoluntarysurrenderoflicense.

(d)TheclaimshallbefilednolaterthantwoyearsafterthedateoffinaldisciplinaryactionbytheSupremeCourt.Intheeventdisciplinaryactioncannotbeprosecutedduetothefactthattheattorneyiseitherdeceasedorcannotbelocated,theclaimshallbefilednolaterthanfiveyearsafterthedishonestconductwasfirstdiscoveredbytheapplicant;provided,however,theclaimshallbefilednolaterthansevenyearsafterthedishonestconductoccurred.

(e)ExceptasprovidedbySection(f)ofthisRule,thefollow-inglossesshallnotbereimbursable:

(1)Lossesincurredbyspouses,children,parents,grandparents,siblings,partners,associatesandemployeesoflawyer(s)causingthelosses;

(2)Lossescoveredbyanybond,suretyagreement,orinsurancecontracttotheextentcoveredthereby,includinganylosstowhichanybondingagent,suretyorinsurerissubrogated,totheextentofthatsubrogatedinterest;

(3)Lossesincurredbyanyfinancialinstitutionwhicharerecoverableundera“banker’sblanketbond”orsimilarcom-monlyavailableinsuranceorsuretycontract;

(4)Lossesincurredbyanybusinessentitycontrolledbythelawyer,oranypersonorentitydescribedinSection(e)(1)hereof;

(5)Lossesincurredbyanygovernmentalentityoragency;(6)Lossesincurredbycorporationsorpartnerships,

includinggeneralorlimited.(f)Incasesofextremehardshiporspecialandunusualcir-

cumstances,theBoardmay,initsdiscretion,recognizeaclaimwhichotherwisewouldbeexcludedundertheseRulesinordertoachievethepurposeoftheFund.

(g)Incaseswhereitappearsthattherewillbeunjustenrich-ment,ortheclaimantunreasonablyorknowinglycontributedtotheloss,theBoardmay,initsdiscretion,denytheclaim.

(h)TheBoardshallrequiretheapplicanttoexhausthisorhercivilremediesunlesstheBoarddeterminesthatthepursuitofthecivilclaimisnotfeasibleorpractical.

Rule 10-107. Payments.(a)If,inthejudgmentoftheBoard,areimbursablelosshas

beensustainedbyaclaimantandthecircumstanceswarrantrelief,then,aftertakingintoconsiderationtheresourcesoftheFundandtheprioritytobeassignedtosuchapplicationinthediscretionoftheBoard,theBoardmay,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,asamatterofgraceandnotofright,grantmonetaryrelief.

(b)SuchmonetaryreliefshallbeinsuchanamountastheBoardmaydetermineandshallbepayableinsuchamanneranduponsuchconditionsandtermsastheBoardshallprescribe.

Rule 10-108. No Legal Right to Payment. NopersonshallhaveanylegalrighttopaymentorreimbursementfromtheFundwhetherasaclaimant,third-partybeneficiary,orother-wise.

Rule 10-109. Restitution and Subrogation.(a)Alawyerwhosedishonestconductresultsinreimburse-

menttoaclaimantshallbeliabletotheFundforrestitution;theBoardmaybringsuchactionasitdeemsadvisabletoenforcesuchobligation.

(b)Asaconditionofreimbursement,aclaimantshallberequiredtoprovidetheFundwithaprotantotransferoftheclaim-ant’srightsagainstthelawyer,thelawyer’slegalrepresentative,estateorassigns,andtheclaimant’srightsagainstanythirdpartyorentitywhomaybeliablefortheclaimant’sloss.

(c)NopetitionforreinstatementtopracticelawinthestateofGeorgiashallbegranteduntilthepetitionerhasmaderestitutiontotheClients’SecurityFundforallamountspaidbytheFundasaresultofthepetitioner’sconductplusaccruedinterest.

Rule 10-110. Immunity. TheTrustees,employeesandagentsoftheBoardshallbeabso-lutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityforallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.AbsoluteimmunityshallalsoextendtoclaimantsandlawyerswhoassistclaimantsforallcommunicationstotheFund.

Rule 10-111. Confidentiality.(a)Claims,proceedingsandreportsinvolvingclaims

forreimbursementareconfidentialuntiltheBoardauthorizesreimbursementtotheclaimant,exceptasprovidedbelow.After

paymentofthereimbursement,theBoardmaypublicizethenatureoftheclaim,theamountofreimbursement,andthenameofthelawyer.Thenameandtheaddressoftheclaimantshallnotbepub-licizedbytheBoardunlessspecificpermissionhasbeengrantedbytheclaimant.

(b)ThisRuleshallnotbeconstruedtodenyaccesstorel-evantinformationbyprofessionaldisciplineagenciesorotherlawenforcementauthoritiesastheBoardshallauthorize,orthereleaseofstatisticalinformationwhichdoesnotdisclosetheidentityofthelawyerortheparties.

(c)Intheeventalawyerwhoseconductresultedinthepay-mentofaclaimfilesapetitionforreinstatementtothepracticeoflaw,theBoardshallreleaseallinformationpertainingtotheclaimtotheBoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicantsasmaybepertinenttothereinstatementproceeding.

Rule 10-112. Repeal of Resolution. AnyResolutionoftheStateBarofGeorgiacurrentlyinforceandcoveringthesubjectmatteroftheseRules10-101through10-112,shallberepealeduponadoptionoftheseRulesbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

PART XI LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

PREAMBLE

ThepurposeoftheLawPracticeManagementProgramistoprovidelawofficemanagementconsultingservicesandmaterialstothemembersoftheStateBarofGeorgia,andtherebytofacilitateandimprovethedeliveryoflegalservicestothepublic.

CHAPTER 1 CONFIDENTIALITY

Rule 11-101. Confidentiality. InformationobtainedbythestaffoftheLawPracticeManagementProgramshallbeconfidentialunlesstheaffectedattorneyotherwiseelectsorunlesstheinformationclearlyshowstheattorneyintendstoengageincriminalconductinthefuture.

CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

Rule 11-201. Committee. TheadvisoryandoversightresponsibilityforthisprogramwillbevestedintheLawPracticeManagementCommittee(“Committee”).

Rule 11-202. Membership. TheCommitteeshallconsistofninemembers,atleastthreeofwhomshallbemembersoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBaratthetimeoftheirappointment.TheDirectoroftheLawPracticeManagementProgram,theExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBar,orhisorherdesignee,andtheExecutiveDirectoroftheYoungLawyersDivisionoftheStateBarshallbenon-voting,ex-officiomembersoftheCommittee.

Rule 11-203. Terms.(a)Initially,threemembersoftheCommittee,includingat

leastonememberoftheBoardofGovernors,shallbeappointedbytheImmediatePastPresidentforone-yearterms;threemembersoftheCommittee,includingatleastonememberoftheBoardofGovernors,shallbeappointedbythePresidentfortwo-yearterms;andthreemembersoftheCommittee,includingatleastonememberoftheBoardofGovernors,shallbeappointedbythePresident-Electforthree-yearterms.ThePresidentoftheStateBarshallappointthechairpersonoftheCommitteeduringtheinitialyearfromamongthemembers.TheseappointmentsshallbecomeeffectiveJuly1,1995,andshallbemadebythoseservingatthattimeintheofficesofImmediatePastPresident,PresidentandPresident-Elect.

(b)Ineachyearfollowingtheinitialyear,thePresident-Electshallappointthreemembers,atleastoneofwhomshallbeamem-beroftheBoardofGovernorsatthetimeoftheirappointment,tothree-yearterms.

(c)TheCommitteeshallelectachairpersonandsuchotherofficersastheCommitteemembersdeemappropriate.

(d)VacanciesshallbefilledbyappointmentofthePresidentoftheStateBarforanyunexpiredterm.

Rule 11-204. Purpose and Responsibility. TheCommitteeshallmeetforthepurposesofoversightoftheLawPracticeManagementProgram,coordinationoftheProgram’sgoals,andimplementationofdirectivesandresolutionsfromtheBoardofGovernors.Additionally,theCommitteewillfromtimetotimedevel-oprecommendationsforsubmissiontotheExecutiveCommitteeandtheBoardofGovernorswithregardtothefunding,staffing,administration,andoperationoftheprogram,whichmayincludeproposedchangestoBylawsorRulesoftheStateBar.


Rule 11-205. Staff and Funding. TheStateBarmayprovidesuchstaffasitdeemsnecessary,includingaDirectorandsupportstaff.TheworkoftheDirectorandstaffshallbefundedthroughthegeneralbudgetoftheStateBarorthroughdonationsandgrantsfromfoundationsorotherpublicorprivatesources.Theincomegeneratedbythisprogramthroughconsultationfees,salesofmaterials,andothermeansshallberemitteddirectlytotheStateBarbytheDirectorandstaff.

Rule 11-206. Consultation Fees. TheCommitteeshallbeauthorizedtochargeconsultationfeesandcostsformaterialsinconjunctionwithlawpracticemanagementservices.

Rule 11-207. Immunity. TheStateBar,itsemployees,andmembersoftheCommitteeshallbeabsolutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityforallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

PART XII CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

PREAMBLE ThepurposeoftheConsumerAssistanceProgramistorespondtoinquiriesfromthepublicregardingStateBarmembersandtoassistthepublicthroughinformalmethodsincludingtheresolutionofinquirieswhichmayinvolveminorviolationsofthedisciplinarystandardssetforthinPartIVoftheseRules.

Rule 12-101. Consumer Assistance Committee. TheadvisoryandoversightresponsibilityforthisprogramwillbevestedintheConsumerAssistanceCommittee(“Committee”).

Rule 12-102. Consumer Assistance Committee; Membership and Terms.

(a)TheCommitteeshallconsistofeightmembersincludingsevenStateBarmembersandonepublicmember.Atleasttwo-thirdsoftheStateBarmembersshallbemembersoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBaratthetimeoftheirappointment.Committeemembersshallservestaggeredthree-yearterms.ThenumberofmembersshallbesubjecttochangebyamajorityvoteoftheBoardofGovernorsbutshallneverbelessthanfive.

(b)ThepublicmembershallbeappointedbytheSupremeCourtforathreeyearterm.AllotherCommitteemembersshallbeappointedbythePresidentoftheBarforthreeyeartermsexcept,initially,twoCommitteemembersshallbeappointedforone-yearterms,twomembersshallbeappointedfortwo-yearterms,andtwomembersshallbeappointedforathree-yearterm.CommitteetermsshallbeginwiththeoperationalyearoftheStateBar.Shouldadditionalmembersbeapproved,theirthree-yeartermsshallbeassignedinsuchfashionastobestmaintainuniformityinthenum-berofmemberstobeappointedeachyear.

(c)TheCommitteeshallelectachairpersonandsuchotherofficersastheCommitteemembersdeemedappropriate.

(d)VacanciesshallbefilledbyappointmentofthePresidentoftheStateBarforanyunexpiredterm.

Rule 12-103. Committee Purpose and Responsibility. TheCommitteeshallmeetforthepurposesofoversightoftheConsumerAssistanceProgram,coordinationoftheprogram’sgoalsandimplementationofdirectivesandresolutionsfromtheBoardofGovernors.TheCommitteeshallhaveauthoritytoadoptadditionalreg-ulationsfortheadministrationoftheprogramwhicharenototherwiseinconsistentwiththeserules.Additionally,theCommitteewilldeveloprecommendationsforsubmissiontotheExecutiveCommitteeandtheBoardofGovernorswithregardtothefunding,staffing,administration,andoperationoftheprogram,whichmayincludeproposedchangestoBylawsandRulesoftheStateBar.

Rule 12-104. Staff and Funding. TheStateBarshallprovidesuchstaffasitdeemsnecessary.TheprogramshallbefundedthroughthegeneralbudgetoftheStateBarand,whenappropriate,throughdonationsandgrantsfromfoundationsandotherpublicandprivatesources.

Rule 12-105. Supervision. TheConsumerAssistanceProgramshalloperateunderthesuper-visionoftheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBar.

Rule 12-106. Procedures. InquiriesconcerningStateBarmembersmaybereceivedbyConsumerAssistancestaffinwriting,inpersonandbytelephone.ConsumerAssistancestaffshallhavetheauthoritytocontacttheattorneyinvolvedandconductotherlimitedinvestigationnecessarytodetermineiftheinquirycanberesolvedinaninformalmethodeitherthroughcommunicationswithConsumerAssistancestafforbyreferraltootherStateBarprogramsincludingbutnotlimitedtoFeeArbitration,

Clients’SecurityFund,LawPracticeManagementProgram,andtheLawyerAssistanceProgram. IftheconductwhichisthesubjectoftheinquiryappearstoviolateoneofthestandardsofconductsetforthinPartIVoftheBarRules,ConsumerAssistancestaffshallhaveindependentauthoritytodeter-minewhetherthemattercaneitherberesolvedinformallyorshouldbereferredtotheOfficeofGeneralCounselforfurtherscreeningunderPartIVoftheBarRules. ConsumerAssistancestaffshallfollowwrittenguidelinesdevel-opedandestablishedbytheConsumerAssistanceCommitteewiththeadviceandcounseloftheGeneralCounselandExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBarandapprovedbytheExecutiveCommitteeandBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBar. RegardlessofanydecisionmadebyConsumerAssistancestaff,anyindividualshallhavetherighttorequestgrievanceformsandfileagrievanceunderPartIVoftheBarRules. IntheeventabarmemberwhoisthesubjectofanyinquirydisagreeswiththevoluntaryresolutionrecommendedbyConsumerAssistancestaff,staffmayreferthemattertotheOfficeofGeneralCounselforfurtherscreeningunderPartIVoftheBarRules.

Rule 12-107. Confidentiality of Proceedings.(a)Allinvestigationsandproceedingsprovidedforherein

shallbeconfidentialunlesstherespondentotherwiseelectsorashereinafterprovidedinthisruleandPartIVoftheBarRules.

(b)Exceptasexpresslypermittedbytheserules,nopersonconnectedwiththeConsumerAssistanceProgramshalldiscloseinformationconcerningorcommentonanyproceedingunderPartXIIoftheserules.

(1)NothingintherulesshallprohibittruthfulandaccuratepublicstatementsoffactaboutaproceedingunderPartXIIoftheserules,providedhowever,thatintheeventofsuchstatementanyotherpersoninvolvedintheproceed-ingmaymaketruthfulandaccuratepublicstatementsoffactregardingtheproceeding,includinginformationotherwiseconfidentialundertheprovisionsofRule4-102(d),Standard28,asmaybereasonablynecessarytodefendthatperson’sreputation; (2)WillfulandmaliciousfalsestatementsoffactmadebyanypersonconnectedwithaproceedingunderPartXIIoftheserulesmaysubjectsuchpersontoruleforcon-temptbytheSupremeCourt.

(c)IntheeventtheconductoftheattorneyappearstoviolateoneormoreofthestandardsofconductsetforthinPartIVoftheBarRules,andConsumerAssistancestaffinitssolediscretionmakesadetermina-tionunderRule12-106thatthemattercannotberesolvedinformally,thentheConsumerAssistancestaffshallinformcallersoftheiroptiontofileagrievanceandshalladvisetheGeneralCounsel’sofficetosendtheappropriateformstothecallers. (d)TheConsumerAssistanceCommitteeandstaffmayrevealconfidentialinformationwhenrequiredbylaworcourtorder.

Rule 12-108. Disclosure. InformationobtainedbytheConsumerAssistanceCommitteeandstaffshallnotbedisclosedtotheOfficeofGeneralCounselunless: (a)theinformationclearlyshowstheattorneyintendstoengageincriminalconductinthefuture; (b)theinformationclearlyshowstheattorneyhasmisappropriatedfundsorengagedincriminalconduct; (c)thecallerfilesagrievanceandtheaffectedattorneyconsentsinwritingtothereleaseoftheinformation;or (d)asotherwiseprovidedbyBarRule12-107.

Rule 12-109. Immunity. TheStateBar,itsemployees,andmembersoftheCommitteeshallbeabsolutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityforallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

PART XIII JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROFESSIONALISM PROGRAM

PREAMBLE ThepurposeoftheJudicialDistrictProfessionalismProgram(hereinafterreferredtoas“JDPP”)istopromoteprofessionalismwithinthelegalprofessionthroughincreasedcommunication,educationandtheinformaluseoflocalpeerinfluence.TheJDPPwillbecomprisedofcommitteesofBoardofGovernorsmembersfromeachofGeorgia’sJudicialDistricts.ThesecommitteesshallbecalledJudicialDistrictProfessionalismCommittees(hereinafterreferredtoas“JDPC”).

Rule 13-101. Voluntary Nature of Program. TheJDPCseekstouselocalpeerinfluenceonaninformalbasistoopenchannelsofcommunicationonavoluntarybasis.NojudgeorlawyerisrequiredtocooperateorcounselwiththeJDPCoranyofitsrepresentatives.Ifthepartyagainstwhomtheinquiryisaddressed


refusestocooperatebyvoluntarilymeetingwithJDPCrepresentatives,theJDPCshalltakenofurtheractionregardingtheinquiry.

Rule 13-102. Privacy of Proceedings.(a)Theprivacyofallinquiriesandproceedingsprovided

hereinshallberespected.TheJDPCandstaffshallnotmakedisclosureofsaidinquiriesandproceedingsintheabsenceoftheagreementofallparticipating.

(b)ExceptasexpresslypermittedbytheseRules,theJDPCandstaffshallnotdiscloseinformationconcerningorcommentonanyproceedingundertheseRules.

(c)TheJDPCandstaffmayrevealprivaterecordswhenrequiredbylaw,courtrule,orcourtorder.

(d)AnyrecordsmaintainedbytheJDPP,asprovidedherein,shallbeavailabletocounselfortheStateBaronlyintheeventtheStateBaroranydepartmentthereofreceivesadiscoveryrequestorproperlyexecutedsubpoenarequestingsuchrecords.

(e)TheJDPPrecordofanyinquiryagainstanylawyerorjudgeundertheseRulesshallnotcontainthenameoftheinquiringorrespondingparty.OnlyinformationforrawstatisticaldatashallbemaintainedbytheJDPPoreachJDPC.

(f)Inordertopreserveprivacy,nolawyerorjudgeshallberequiredtorespondwhenaskedifthereareanyJDPPinquiriesagainstthelawyerorjudge.

Rule 13-103. Immunity. TheStateBar,itsemployees,theJDPCmembers,theChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism,itsemployees,theBenchandBarCommitteemembersandadvisorsoftheJDPCshallbeabso-lutelyimmunefromcivilliabilityforallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

JDPP INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES1. Judicial District Professionalism Program Committees.

(a)TheJudicialDistrictProfessionalismProgram(here-inafter“JDPP”)willbecomprisedofcommitteesofBoardofGovernorsmembersfromeachofGeorgia’sJudicialDistricts.

(b)EachJudicialDistrictProfessionalismCommittee(here-inafter“JDPC”)shallconsistofthecurrentmembersoftheBoard(ofGovernors)oftheStateBar,asdescribedinPartI,Chapter3oftheBarRulesandArticleIIIoftheBylaws,fromaparticularJudicialDistrict.

(c)TheJDPCmembersforeachoftheJudicialDistrictswillselectoneormoreStateand/orSuperiorCourtjudgetoserveasJDPCadvisorswithineachdistrict.

(d)ThelongestservingmemberontheBoard(ofGovernors)withineachJudicialDistrictshallserveasthechairforthatdistrictunlesssaidrepresentativedeclinestoserveoramajorityoftheJDPCmembersvotetohavesomeoneelseserveaschair.

(e)IntheeventthereisatieforthelongestservingBoard(ofGovernors)representative,theJDPCwillelectachairfromamongthemembers.

(f)EachJDPCmayactthroughpanelsorsubcommitteesifitsoelects.

2. Judicial Advisors.(a)Thejudicialadvisorsshallbeselectedtoserveatthe

beginningoftheStateBaryearduringthefirstJDPCmeetingfol-lowingtheBoardofGovernorsmeetingheldinconjunctionwiththeAnnualMeetingoftheStateBar.

(b)Thejudge’sactualinvolvementincounselingwithmem-bersofthebenchandbarwillbedeterminedonacasebycasebasis.Insomesituationswhereappropriate,theJDPCmightdeter-mineitbestforthejudicialadvisortoapproachotherjudgesaboutquestionableconductorpracticeswithouttheinvolvementofotherJDPCmembers.

3. Oversight of the JDPP.(a)TheadvisoryandoversightresponsibilityfortheJDPP

shallbevestedintheBenchandBarCommittee.(b)TheCommitteeshallhaveauthoritytoadoptadditional

operatingproceduresfortheadministrationoftheprogram,whicharenototherwiseinconsistentwiththeRules.

(c)TheJDPPshalloperateunderthesupervisionoftheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBar.

(d)TheBenchandBarCommitteeshallreportasneededtotheBoardofGovernorsregardingtheJDPPandpresentrecom-mendationsregardingitscontinuedoperationormodification.EachJDPCshallfurnishstatisticaldatatotheBenchandBarCommitteetoassistitsevaluationoftheJDPC.

4. Scope of JDPP.(a)TheJDPPshallpromoteprofessionalismwithinthelegal

professionthroughincreasedcommunication,education,andthe

informaluseoflocalpeerinfluencetoalterunprofessionalanduncivilconduct.

(b)TheJDPPshallnotdealwithlawyer/clientdisputes,law-yer/employeedisputes,lawyer/vendordisputes,orwithviolationsoftheCodeofJudicialConductorofPartIV(Discipline)oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheOrganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(c)TheJDPPshouldalsoservethementorfunctionofpro-vidingguidancein“bestpractices”whenapproachedbylawyersandjudges.

(d)ForpurposesoftheseRules,inquiryshallmeananyinquiryconcerningunprofessionalconduct,asdefinedhereinorinanyRulesoroperatingproceduresadoptedbytheBenchandBarCommittee,butshallnotincludeanydisciplinarycharge,ethicsviolation,criminalconduct,oranyothermatterwhichfallsundertheprovisionsofPartIV(Discipline)oftheRulesandRegulationsfortheorganizationandGovernmentoftheStateBarofGeorgiaortheCodeofJudicialConduct.

(e)JDPPcommitteesmayaddressthefollowingconductbyStateBarmembers:

Unprofessional Judicial Conduct

(1)Incivility,biasorconductunbecomingajudge;(2)Lackofappropriaterespectordeference;(3)FailuretoadheretoUniformRules;(4)Excessivedelay;(5)Consistentlackofpreparation;(6)Otherconductdeemedprofessionallyinappropriateby

eachJDPCwiththeadviceofthejudicialadvisors.

Unprofessional Lawyer Conduct

(1)Lackofappropriaterespectordeference;(2)Abusivediscoverypractices;(3)Incivility,biasorconductunbecomingalawyer;(4)Consistentlackofpreparation;(5)Communicationproblems;(6)Deficientpracticeskills;(7)Otherconductdeemedprofessionallyinappropriateby

eachJDPCwiththeadviceofthejudicialadvisors.

(f)InquiriesfromonlylawyersorjudgesshallbereferredtotheJDPP.InquiriesfromclientsorothermembersofthepublicshallbehandledbytheConsumerAssistanceProgramorotherappropriateStateBarprograms.Inquiriesorrequestsforassistancerelatingtopendinglitigationorcurrenttransactionalmattersarebetterlefttothejudicialprocessorthenegotiationsoftheparties;consequently,anyJDPCresponsetosuchrequestsshouldgener-allybedelayeduntiltheconclusionofthematter.

5. Procedures.(a)Inquiriesandrequestsforassistanceshallbedirectedtoa

memberoftheJDPCorstaffwhoshallforwardtheinquirytotheappropriateJDPCchair.

(b)Uponreceivinganinquiry,theJDPCchairshalleithercallacommitteemeetingtoaddresstheinquiryorreferthemat-tertoasubcommitteeappointedbythechairforthepurposeofconsideringtheinquiryanddeterminingwhethertoapproachtheinquiringpartyandthepartyagainstwhomtheinquiryisaddressedinanefforttoresolvethematterinformally.

(c)TheJDPCmembersshallhavetheauthoritytocontactandcounselthelawyerorjudgeinvolvedtodetermineiftheinquirycanberesolvedinaninformalmethodeitherthroughcommunicationswiththeJDPCmembersorbyreferraltootherStateBarprogramsincluding,butnotlimitedto,theConsumerAssistanceProgram,FeeArbitrationProgram,Client’sSecurityFund,LawPracticeManagementProgram,andtheLawyerAssistanceProgramortotheJudicialQualificationsCommission.

(d)EachJDPCshallhaveindependentauthoritytoconsiderwhethertoconsiderandhowtoresolveinquiries.TheJDPCmaydeterminethatcertaininquiriesdonotmeritconsiderationorcounselingwhileothersmaywarrantextensiveconsiderationandcounseling.

(e)TheactionsofeachJDPCastheyrelatetoaspecificinquiryareconfidentialandshallnotbereportedtotheinquiringpartyoranyotherpersonorentity.

(f)JDPCmembersshallfollowwrittenguidelinesdevel-opedandestablishedbytheBenchandBarCommittee,withtheadviceandcounseloftheBarCounselandExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBar,andapprovedbytheExecutiveCommittee,BoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarandExecutiveCommitteeoftheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudges.


6. Inquiries Involving Lawyers and Judges Outside Their Judicial District. AJDPCmayencounterorreceiveaninquiryinvolvinglawyersandjudgesfromoutsidetheirJudicialDistrict.Insuchsituations,localcommitteemembersreceivingtheinquiryshouldreferthemattertotheJDPCchairinthedistrictwherethelawyerorjudgeagainstwhotheinquiryisaddressedmaintainshisorherprincipaloffice.

7. Records. EachJDPCshallmaintainandreportdataaboutthetypesofmat-tersandinquiriesitreceivesandresolvestotheExecutiveDirectoroftheStateBar,thePresidentofItheCouncilofSuperiorCourtJudgesandBenchandBarCommittee.ThepurposeformaintainingsuchrecordsistoidentifyproblemsthatcanbesubjectsofContinuingLegalEducationorContinuingJudicialEducationprogrammingandotherpreventiveprograms.Furthermore,informationontheresultsoftheJDPCseffortswillhelpdeterminetheprogram’seffectiveness.JDPCrecordsshallbekeptforstatisticalpurposesonlyandshallnotcontainthenamesofanypersoninvolvedinaJDPCinquiry.Onlyfilenumbersandrawstatisticaldatashallbemaintained.

8. Promoting Professionalism.(a)TheJDPCmembersshallestablishanannualprofes-

sionalismawardforthememberintheirlocalJudicialDistrictwhodemonstratestheprofessionalismothersshouldstrivetoemulate.

(b)Committeemembersshallalsopromoteprofessional-ismbypreparingandpublishingmemorialtributestolawyersandjudgesintheirlocalareawhopassawayduringthebaryear.Thesetributesshallbepublishedinlocalbarnewslettersand/orfor-wardedtolocalnewspapersrecognizingourdeceasedcolleaguesfortheirpositivecontributionstoourprofession.

(c)TheStateBarCommunicationsDirectorandtheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalismshallworkwitheachJDPCtohelppromotetheiractivities,programsandawards.

9. Training for Judicial District Professionalism Committees. AnorientationprogramshallbedevelopedbytheStateBarandtheChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalismforthepurposeoftrainingBoard(ofGovernor’s)membersonhowtohandleprofessional-isminquiriesfrommembersofthebenchandbar.ThetrainingprogrammaybegiveninconjunctionwithaBoardofGovernorsmeeting,andsubsequentprogramscouldbegiveneachyearfollowingtheannualmeetingforallnewlyelectedBoardmembers.

PART XIV RULES GOVERNING THE INVESTIGATION AND

PROSECUTION OF THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW

14-1. Preamble

RULE 14-1.1 JURISDICTION TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiahastheinherentauthoritytoregu-latethepracticeoflaw.Wallacev.Wallace,225Ga.102,cert.denied,396U.S.939(1969);Samsv.Olah,225Ga.497,cert.denied,397U.S.914(1970);Flemingv.State,246Ga.90,cert.denied,449U.S.904(1980).Thisauthoritynecessarilyincludesjurisdictionovertheunli-censedpracticeoflaw.

RULE 14-1.2 DUTY OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA TheStateBarofGeorgia,asanofficialarmoftheCourt,ischargedwiththedutyofconsidering,investigating,andseekingtheprohibitionofmatterspertainingtotheunlicensedpracticeoflawandtheprosecutionofallegedoffenders.TheCourtherebyestablishesaStandingCommitteeontheunlicensedpracticeoflawandatleastoneDistrictCommitteeonunlicensedpracticeoflawineachjudicialdistrict.

14-2. Definitions

RULE 14-2.1 GENERALLY Wheneverusedintheserulesthefollowingwordsortermsshallhavethemeaninghereinsetforthunlesstheusethereofshallclearlyindicateadifferentmeaning:

(a)UnlicensedPracticeofLaw.Theunlicensedpracticeoflawshallmeanthepracticeoflaw,asprohibitedbystatute,courtrule,andcaselawoftheStateofGeorgia.

(b)NonlawyerorNonattorney.Forpurposesofthischapter,anonlawyerornonattorneyisanindividualwhoisnotanactivememberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.Thisincludes,butisnotlim-itedto,lawyersadmittedinotherjurisdictions,lawstudents,lawgraduates,applicantstotheStateBarofGeorgia,inactivelawyers,disbarredlawyers,andsuspendedlawyersduringtheperiodofsuspension.

(c)ThisCourtortheCourt.ThisCourtortheCourtshallmeantheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.

(d)CounselfortheBar.CounselfortheBarisamemberof

theStateBarofGeorgiaotherthanStaffCounselrepresentingtheBarinanyproceedingsundertheserules.

(e)Respondent.Arespondentisanonlawyerwhoiseitheraccusedofengagingintheunlicensedpracticeoflaworwhoseconductisunderinvestigation.

(f)Judge.AJudgeistheSuperiorCourtJudgewhoconductsproceedingsasprovidedundertheserules.

(g)StandingCommittee.TheStandingCommitteeonUPListhecommitteeconstitutedaccordingtothedirectivescontainedintheserules.

(h)DistrictCommittee.ADistrictCommitteeisalocalunli-censedpracticeoflawDistrictCommittee.

(i)StaffCounsel.StaffcounselisanattorneyemployeeoftheStateBarofGeorgiaemployedtoperformsuchduties,asmaybeassigned.

(j)UPL.UPListheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.(k)TheBoardorBoardofGovernors.TheBoardorBoardof

GovernorsistheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia.(l)ExecutiveCommittee.TheExecutiveCommitteeisthe

ExecutiveCommitteeoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,composedofsuchofficersandmembersoftheBoardofGovernorsasmaybedesignatedinthebylaws,whichshallexercisethepowersanddutiesoftheBoardofGovernorswhenitisnotinsession,subjecttosuchlimitationsasthebylawsmayprovide.

14-3. Standing Committee

RULE 14-3.1 GENERALLY (a)AppointmentandTerms.TheStandingCommitteeshall

beappointedbytheCourt,andshallconsistof23members,11ofwhomshallbenonlawyers.ThenonlawyermembersshouldbegeographicallyrepresentativeoftheState.ThelawyermembersshallbeappointedbytheCourtandshallincludeatleastonememberfromeachjudicialdistrict.TheCourtshallappointachairandatleast1vice-chairoftheStandingCommittee,bothofwhommaybenonlawyers.EightofthemembersoftheStandingCommitteeshallconstituteaquorum.AllappointmentstotheStandingCommitteeshallbeforatermof3years,exceptthatitshallbethegoaloftheinitialappointmentsthatone-third(1/3)ofthetermsofthemembersappointedwillexpireannually.Thememberswhoinitiallyservetermsoflessthan3yearsshallbeeli-gibleforimmediatereappointment.Nomembershallbeappointedtomorethan2fullconsecutiveterms.

(b)Duties.ItshallbethedutyoftheStandingCommitteetoreceiveandevaluateDistrictCommitteereportsandtodeterminewhetherlitigationshouldbeinstitutedinSuperiorCourtagainstanyallegedoffender.TheStandingCommitteemayapprovecivilinjunctiveproceedings,civilorcriminalcontemptproceedings,acombinationofinjunctiveandcontemptproceedings,orsuchotheractionasmaybeappropriate.Inaddition,thedutiesoftheStandingCommitteeshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto:

(1)theconsiderationandinvestigationofactivitiesthatmay,ordo,constitutetheunlicensedpracticeoflaw;

(2)thesupervisionoftheDistrictCommittees,whichshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto:

(A)prescribingrulesofprocedureforDistrictCommittees;

(B)assigningreportsofunlicensedpracticeoflawforinvestigation;

(C)reassigningorwithdrawingmatterspreviouslyassigned,exercisingfinalauthoritytoclosecasesnotdeemedbytheStandingCommitteetothenwarrantfurtheractionbytheStateBarofGeorgiaforunlicensedpracticeoflaw,andclosingcasesproposedtoberesolvedbyaceaseanddesistaffidavitwherestaffcounselobjectstotheclosingofthecaseortheacceptanceofaceaseanddesistaffidavitbytheDistrictCommittee;

(D)joiningwithaDistrictCommitteeinaparticularinvestigation;and

(E)requeststaffinvestigators,staffcounsel,andvol-untarybarcounseltoconductinvestigationsonbehalfoforinconcertwiththeDistrictCommittees;and

(F)suspendingDistrictCommitteemembersandchairsforcauseandappointingatemporaryDistrictCommitteechairwheretherehasbeenasuspension,resignation,orremoval,pendingtheappointmentofareplacementchairbytheCourt;(3)theinitiationandsupervisionoflitigation,including

thedelegationofresponsibilitytostaff,orCounselfortheBartoprosecutesuchlitigation;

(4)thegivingofadviceregardingtheunlicensedpracticeoflawpolicytotheofficers,BoardofGovernors,staff,sections,orcommitteesoftheStateBarofGeorgiaasrequested;and

(5)furnishinganyandallinformation,confidential


records,andfilesregardingpendingorclosedinvestigationsofunlicensedpracticeoflawtoanystateorfederallawenforce-mentorregulatoryagency,UnitedStatesAttorney,DistrictAttorney,Solicitor,theGeorgiaOfficeofBarAdmissionsandequivalententitiesinotherjurisdictions,theStateDisciplinaryBoardoftheStateBarofGeorgiaandequivalententitiesinotherjurisdictionswherethereisormaybeaviolationofstateorfederallawortheRulesofProfessionalConductoftheStateBarofGeorgia,orwhenrequiredbylaworcourtorder.

RULE 14-3.2 STAFF COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR THE BAR (a)StaffCounsel.TheStateBarofGeorgiashallprovide

staffcounselandotheremployeessufficienttoassisttheStandingCommitteeandtheDistrictCommitteeincarryingouttheirresponsibilitiesasprescribedelsewhereintheserules.

(b)AppointmentofCounselfortheBar.ThePresidentoftheStateBarofGeorgiamayappointoneormoreCounselfortheBartoassisttheStateBarofGeorgiainmeetingitsdutiesaspre-scribedin(a)above.

14-4. District Committees

RULE 14-4.1 GENERALLY (a)AppointmentandTerms.EachDistrictCommittee

shallbeappointedbytheCourtandshallconsistofnotfewerthan3members,atleastone-thirdofwhomshallbenonlawyers.Allappointeesshallberesidentsofthejudicialdistrictorhavetheirprincipalofficeinthedistrict.ThetermsofthemembersofDistrictCommitteesshallbefor3yearsfromthedateofappointmentbytheCourtoruntilsuchtimeastheirsuccessorsareappointed,exceptthatitshallbethegoaloftheinitialappoint-mentsthatone-third(1/3)ofthetermsofthemembersappointedwillexpireannually.Thememberswhoinitiallyservetermsoflessthan2yearsshallbeeligibleforimmediatereappointment.Continuousserviceofamembershallnotexceed6years.Theexpirationofthetermofanymembershallnotdisqualifythatmemberfromconcludinganyinvestigationspendingbeforethatmember.AnymemberofaDistrictCommitteemayberemovedfromofficebytheCourt.

(b)CommitteeChair.ForeachDistrictCommitteethereshallbeachairdesignatedbytheCourt.Avice-chairandsecretarymaybedesignatedbythechairofeachDistrictCommittee.ThechairshallbeamemberoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(c)Quorum.ThreemembersoftheDistrictCommitteeoramajorityofthemembers,whicheverisless,shallconstituteaquorum.

(d)Panels.TheChairofaDistrictCommitteemaydividethatCommitteeintopanelsofnotfewerthan3members,1ofwhommustbeanonlawyer.The3-memberpanelshallelect1ofitsmemberstopresideoverthepanel’sactions.Ifthechairorvice-chairoftheDistrictCommitteeisamemberofa3-memberpanel,thechairorvice-chairshallbethepresidingofficer.

(e)Duties.ItshallbethedutyofeachDistrictCommitteetoinvestigate,withdispatch,allreportsofunlicensedpracticeoflawandtomakepromptwrittenreportofitsinvestigationandfindingstostaffcounsel.Inaddition,thedutiesoftheDistrictCommitteeshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto:

(1)closingcasesnotdeemedbytheDistrictCommitteetowarrantfurtheractionbytheStateBarofGeorgia;

(2)closingcasesproposedtoberesolvedbyaceaseanddesistaffidavit;and

(3)forwardingtostaffcounselrecommendationsforliti-gationtobereviewedbytheStandingCommittee.(f)DistrictCommitteeMeetings.DistrictCommitteesshould

meetatregularlyscheduledtimes.Eitherthechairorvicechairmaycallspecialmeetings.DistrictCommitteesshouldmeetasoftenasnecessaryduringanyperiodwhentheCommitteehas1ormorependingcasesassignedforinvestigationandreport.Thetime,dateandplaceofscheduledmeetingsshouldbesetinadvancebyagreementbetweeneachCommitteeandstaffcounsel.MeetingsmaybeconductedbytelephoneconferenceorbyanyothertechnologyavailableandagreeduponbytheCommittee.Anyparticipant,includingstaffcounsel,mayparticipateinthemeetingbytelephoneconferenceoranyothertechnologyagreeduponbytheCommittee.

14-5. Complaint Processing and Initial Investigatory Procedures

RULE 14-5.1 COMPLAINT PROCESSING (a)Complaints.Allcomplaintsallegingunlicensedpractice

oflaw,exceptthoseinitiatedbytheStateBarofGeorgia,shallbeinwritingandsignedbythecomplainantinsuchformasmaybeprescribedbytheStandingCommittee.

(b)ReviewbyStaffCounsel.Staffcounselshallreviewthecomplaintanddeterminewhethertheallegedconduct,ifproven,

wouldconstituteaviolationoftheprohibitionagainstengagingintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Staffcounselmayconductapreliminary,informalinvestigationtoaidinthisdeterminationandmayuseaStateBarofGeorgiastaffinvestigatortoaidinthepre-liminaryinvestigation.Ifstaffcounseldeterminesthatthefacts,ifproven,wouldnotconstituteaviolation,staffcounselmaydeclinetopursuethecomplaint.AdecisionbystaffcounselnottopursueacomplaintshallnotprecludefurtheractionorreviewundertherulesregulatingtheStateBarofGeorgia.Thecomplainantshallbenotifiedofadecisionnottopursueacomplaint.

(c)ReferraltoDistrictCommittee.StaffcounselmayreferaUPLfiletotheappropriateDistrictCommitteeforfurtherinvesti-gationoractionasauthorizedelsewhereintheserules.

(d)ClosingbyStaffCounselandCommitteeChair.IfstaffcounselandaDistrictCommitteechairconcurinafindingthatthecaseshouldbeclosedwithoutafindingofunlicensedpracticeoflaw,thecomplaintmaybeclosedonsuchfindingwithoutrefer-encetotheDistrictCommitteeorStandingCommittee.

(e)ReferraltoStaffCounselforOpening.AcomplaintreceivedbyaDistrictCommitteeorStandingCommitteememberdirectlyfromacomplainantshallbereportedtostaffcounselfordocketingandassignmentofacasenumber.ShouldtheDistrictCommitteeorStandingCommitteememberdecidethatthefacts,ifproven,wouldnotconstitutetheunlicensedpracticeoflaw,theDistrictCommitteeorStandingCommitteemembershallforwardthisfindingtostaffcounselalongwiththecomplaintfornotifica-tiontothecomplainantasoutlinedabove.FormalinvestigationbyaDistrictCommitteemayproceedafterthematterhasbeenreferredtostaffcounselfordocketing.

14-6. Procedures for Investigation

RULE 14-6.1 HEARINGS(a)ConductofProceedings.TheproceedingsofDistrict

CommitteesandtheStandingCommitteewhenhearingsareheldmaybeinformalinnatureandthecommitteesshallnotbeboundbytherulesofevidence.Committeedeliberationsshallbeclosed.

(b)TakingTestimony.CounselfortheBar,Staffcounsel,theStandingCommittee,eachDistrictCommittee,andmembersthereofconductinginvestigationsareempoweredtotakeandhavetranscribedthetestimonyandevidenceofwitnesses.Ifthetesti-monyisrecordedstenographicallyorotherwise,thewitnessshallbeswornbyanypersonauthorizedbylawtoadministeroaths.

(c)RightsandResponsibilitiesofRespondent.Therespon-dentmayberequiredtoappearandtoproduceevidenceasanyotherwitnessunlesstherespondentclaimsaprivilegeorrightproperlyavailabletotherespondentunderapplicablefederalorstatelaw.Therespondentmaybeaccompaniedbycounsel.

(d)RightsofComplainingWitness.Thecomplainingwitnessisnotapartytotheinvestigativeproceedingalthoughthecom-plainantmaybecalledasawitnessshouldthemattercomebeforeaJudge.ThecomplainantmaybegrantedtherighttobepresentatanyDistrictCommitteehearingwhentherespondentispresentbeforethecommittee.ThecomplainingwitnessshallhavenorighttoappealthefindingoftheDistrictCommittee.

RULE 14-6.2 SUBPOENAS(a)IssuancebySuperiorCourt.Uponreceivingawritten

applicationofthechairoftheStandingCommitteeorofaDistrictCommitteeorstaffcounselallegingfactsindicatingthatapersonorentityisormaybepracticinglawwithoutalicenseandthattheissuanceofasubpoenaisnecessaryfortheinvestigationofsuchunlicensedpractice,theclerkoftheSuperiorCourtinwhichthecommitteeislocatedshallissuesubpoenasinthenameofthechiefJudgeoftheSuperiorCourtfortheattendanceofanypersonandproductionofbooksandrecordsbeforestaffcounselortheinves-tigatingDistrictCommitteeoranymemberthereofatthetimeandplacewithinitsdistrictdesignatedinsuchapplication.Suchsub-poenasshallbereturnabletotheSuperiorCourtoftheresidenceorplaceofbusinessofthepersonsubpoenaed.Alikesubpoenashallissueuponapplicationbyanypersonorentityunderinvestigation.

(b)FailuretoComply.FailuretocomplywithanysubpoenashallconstituteacontemptofcourtandmaybepunishedbytheSuperiorCourtthatissuedthesubpoenaorwherethecontemnormaybefound.TheSuperiorCourtshallhavethepowertoentersuchordersasmaybenecessaryfortheenforcementofthesubpoena.

RULE 14-6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS

(a)DistrictCommitteeAction.Uponconcludingitsinves-tigation,theDistrictCommitteeshallforwardareporttostaffcounselregardingthedispositionofthosecasesclosed,thosecaseswhereaceaseanddesistaffidavithasbeenaccepted,andthosecaseswherelitigationisrecommended.AmajorityofthosepresentisrequiredforallDistrictCommitteerecommendations;


however,thevotemaybetakenbymail,telephone,fax,e-mailorothermeansratherthanataformalmeeting.AllrecommendationsforlitigationundertheserulesshallbereviewedbytheStandingCommitteeforfinalapprovalpriortoinitiatinglitigation.

(b)ActionbyStaffCounsel.StaffcounselshallreviewthedispositionreportsoftheDistrictCommittee.IfstaffcounselobjectstoanyactiontakenbytheDistrictCommittee,staffcoun-selshallforwardsuchobjectiontotheDistrictCommitteewithin10businessdaysofreceiptoftheDistrictCommitteereport.StaffcounselshallplacetheactionandobjectionbeforetheStandingCommitteeforreviewatitsnextscheduledmeeting.TheStandingCommitteeshallreviewtheDistrictCommitteeactionandtheobjection,andshallvoteonthefinaldispositionofthecase.OnceacaseisclosedoraceaseanddesistaffidavitisacceptedbytheDistrictCommitteeorbytheStandingCommittee,staffcounselshallinformthecomplainantand,ifcontacted,therespondentofthedispositionofthecomplaint.

14-7. Proceedings Before a Judge

RULE 14-7.1 PROCEEDINGS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF(a)FilingComplaints.InaccordancewithO.C.G.A.§15-19-

58,complaintsforcivilinjunctivereliefshallbebypetitionfiledintheSuperiorCourtinwhichtherespondentresidesorwherevenuemightotherwisebeproperbytheStateBarofGeorgiainitsname.

(b)PetitionsforInjunctiveRelief.Exceptasprovidedinsub-paragraphs(1)through(7)ofthisRule14-7.1(b)suchpetitionshallbeprocessedintheSuperiorCourtinsubstantialcompliancewithGeorgialaw:

(1)Thepetitionshallnotbeframedintechnicallanguage,butshallwithreasonableclaritysetforththefactsconstitut-ingtheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Ademandforreliefmaybeincludedinthepetitionbutshallnotberequired.

(2)TheSuperiorCourt,uponconsiderationofanypeti-tionsofiled,mayissueitsordertoshowcausedirectedtotherespondentcommandingtherespondenttoshowcause,iftherebeany,whytherespondentshouldnotbeenjoinedfromtheunlicensedpracticeoflawalleged,andfurtherrequiringtherespondenttofilewiththeSuperiorCourtandserveuponstaffcounselwithin30daysafterserviceontherespondentofthepetitionandordertoshowcauseawrittenansweradmittingordenyingeachofthematterssetforthinthepetition.TheorderandpetitionshallbeservedupontherespondentinthemannerprovidedforserviceofprocessbyGeorgialaw,andserviceofallotherpleadingsshallbegovernedbytheproceduresappli-cableunderGeorgialaw.

(3)Ifnoresponseordefenseisfiledwithinthetimeper-mitted,theallegationsofthepetitionshallbetakenastrueforpurposesofthataction.TheSuperiorCourtwillthen,uponitsmotionoruponmotionofanyparty,decidethecaseuponitsmerits,grantingsuchreliefandissuingsuchorderasmightbeappropriate.

(4)Ifaresponseordefensefiledbyarespondentraisesnoissueofmaterialfact,anyparty,uponmotion,mayrequestsummaryjudgmentandtheSuperiorCourtmayrulethereonasamatteroflaw.

(5)TheSuperiorCourtmay,uponitsmotionoruponmotionofanyparty,enterajudgmentonthepleadingsorcon-ductahearingwithregardtotheallegationscontainedinthepetition.

(6)Subpoenasfortheattendanceofwitnessesandthepro-ductionofdocumentaryevidenceshallbeissuedinthenameoftheSuperiorCourtuponrequestofaparty.Failureorrefusaltocomplywithanysubpoenashallbecontemptofcourt.

(7)TheGeorgiaRulesofCivilProcedure,includingthoseprovisionspertainingtodiscovery,notinconsistentwiththeserulesshallapplyininjunctiveproceedingsbeforetheJudge.ThepowersandjurisdictiongenerallyreposedintheSuperiorCourtunderthoserulesmayinthisactionbeexercisedbytheJudge.TheStateBarofGeorgiamayineverycaseamenditspetitiononetimeasamatterofright,within60daysafterthefilingofthepetition.AllproceedingsundertheserulesshallbeheardbyaJudgesittingwithoutajury.Thereshallbenorighttoatrialbyjurywithregardtoanyproceedingconductedundertheserules.(c)Judge’sOrder.(1)Attheconclusionofthehearing,theJudgeshall

determineasamatteroffactandlawwhethertherespondenthasengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw,whethertherespondent’sactivitiesshouldbeenjoinedbyappropriateorder,whethercostsshouldbeawarded,andwhetherfurtherreliefshallbegranted.CopiesoftheJudge’sordershallbeserveduponallparties.

(2)TheJudgeshallhavediscretiontorecommendtheassessmentofcosts.Taxablecostsoftheproceedingshallincludeonly:

(A)investigativecosts;(B)courtreporters’fees;(C)copycosts;(D)telephonecharges;(E)feesfortranslationservices;(F)witnessexpenses,includingtravelandout-of-pocketexpenses;(G)travelandout-of-pocketexpensesoftheJudge;and(H)anyothercostswhichmayproperlybetaxedin

civillitigation.(3)Shouldthepartiesenterintoastipulatedinjunction

priortothehearing,thestipulationshallbefiledwiththeJudge.TheJudgemayapprovethestipulationorrejectthestipulationandscheduleahearingasprovidedelsewhereintheserules.(d)ReviewbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.(1)ObjectionstotheorderoftheJudgeshallbefiledwith

theCourtbyanypartyaggrieved,within30daysafterthefil-ingoftheorder.Iftheobjectordesires,abrieformemorandumoflawinsupportoftheobjectionsmaybefiledatthetimetheobjectionsarefiled.Anyotherpartymayfilearesponsivebrieformemorandumoflawwithin20dayofserviceoftheobjec-tor’sbrieformemorandumoflaw.Theobjectormayfileareplybrieformemorandumoflawwithin10daysofserviceoftheopposingparty’sresponsivebrieformemorandumoflaw.Oralargumentwillbeallowedatthecourt’sdiscretion.

(2)UpontheexpirationofthetimetofileobjectionstotheJudge’sorder,theCourtshallreviewtheorderoftheJudge,togetherwithanybriefsormemorandaoflaworobjectionsfiledinsupportoforoppositiontosuchorder.Afterreview,theCourtshalldetermineasamatteroflawwhethertherespondenthasengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw,whethertherespondent’sactivitiesshouldbeenjoinedbyappropriateorder,whethercostsshouldbeawarded,andwhetherfurtherreliefshallbegranted.

IssuanceofPreliminaryorTemporaryInjunction.NothingsetforthinthisruleshallbeconstruedtolimittheauthorityoftheSuperiorCourt,uponproperapplication,toissueapreliminaryortemporaryinjunction,oratanystageoftheproceedingstoenteranysuchorderastheSuperiorCourtdeemsproperwhenpublicharmorthepossibilitythereofismadeapparenttotheSuperiorCourt,inorderthatsuchharmmaybesummarilypreventedorspeedilyenjoined.

14-8. Confidentiality

RULE 14-8.1 FILES(a)FilesArePropertyoftheBar.Allmatters,includingfiles,

preliminaryinvestigationreports,interofficememoranda,recordsofinvestigations,andtherecordsintrialsandotherproceedingsundertheserules,exceptthoseunlicensedpracticeoflawmattersconduct-edinSuperiorCourts,arepropertyoftheStateBarofGeorgia.

(b)LimitationsonDisclosure.AnymaterialprovidedtoorpromulgatedbytheStateBarofGeorgiathatisconfidentialunderapplicablelawshallremainconfidentialandshallnotbedisclosedexceptasauthorizedbytheapplicablelaw.

14-9. Advisory Opinions

RULE 14-9.1 PROCEDURES FOR ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS ON THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW

(a)Definitions.(1)Committee.TheStandingCommitteeasconstituted

accordingtothedirectivescontainedintheserules.(2)Petitioner.Anindividualororganizationseekingguid-

anceastotheapplicability,inahypotheticalsituation,ofthestate’sprohibitionsagainsttheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

(3)PublicNotice.PublicationinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthecountyinwhichthehearingwillbeheldandintheGeorgiaBarJournal.

(4)Court.TheSupremeCourtofGeorgia(orsuchothercourtinthestateofGeorgiaastheSupremeCourtmaydesignate).

(b)RequestsforAdvisoryOpinions.TheCommitteeshallrespondtowrittenrequestsfromallpersonsandentitiesseekingadvisoryopinionsconcerningactivitiesthatmayconstitutetheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.SuchrequestsshallbeinwritingandaddressedtotheStateBarofGeorgia.Therequestforanadvisoryopinionshallstateindetailalloperativefactsuponwhichtherequestforopinionisbasedandcontainthenameandaddressofthepetitioner.

(c)LimitationsonOpinions.Noopinionshallberenderedwithrespecttoanycaseorcontroversypendinginanycourtinthisjurisdictionandnoinformalopinionshallbeissuedexceptasprovidedinrule14-9.1(g)(1).


(d)ServicesofVoluntaryCounsel.TheCommitteeshallbeempoweredtorequestandacceptthevoluntaryservicesofaper-sonlicensedtopracticeinthisstatewhentheCommitteedeemsitadvisabletoreceivewrittenororaladviceregardingthequestionpresentedbythepetitioner.

(e)ConflictofInterest.Committeemembersshallnotpartici-pateinanymatterinwhichtheyhaveeitheramaterialpecuniaryinterestthatwouldbeaffectedbyaproposedadvisoryopinionorCommitteerecommendationoranyotherconflictofinterestthatshouldpreventthemfromparticipating.However,noactionoftheCommitteewillbeinvalidwherefulldisclosurehasbeenmadeandtheCommitteehasnotdecidedthatthemember’sparticipationwasimproper.

(f)Notice,Appearance,andService.(1)Atleast30daysinadvanceoftheCommitteemeeting

atwhichinitialactionistobetakenwithrespecttoapotentialadvisoryopinion,theCommitteeshallgivepublicnoticeofthedate,time,andplaceofthemeeting,statethequestionpresented,andinvitewrittencommentsonthequestion.OntheannounceddatetheCommitteeshallholdapublichearingatwhichanypersonaffectedshallbeentitledtopresentoraltes-timonyandberepresentedbycounsel.OraltestimonybyotherpersonsmaybeallowedbytheCommitteeatitsdiscretion.Atthetimeoforpriortothehearinganyotherpersonshallbeenti-tledtofilewrittentestimonyontheissuebeforetheCommittee.AdditionalproceduresnotinconsistentwiththisrulemaybeadoptedbytheCommittee.

(2)TheCommitteeshallissueeitherawrittenproposedadvisoryopinion,oraletterthatdeclinestoissueanopinion,oraninformalopinionasprovidedinrule14-9.1(g)(1).Nootherformofcommunicationshallbedeemedtobeanadvisoryopinion.

(3)Aproposedadvisoryopinionshallbeinwritingandshallbearadateofissuance.Theproposedopinionshallprominentlybearatitleindicatingthatitisaproposedadvisoryopinionandadisclaimerstatingthatitisonlyaninterpreta-tionofthelawanddoesnotconstitutefinalcourtaction.TheCommitteeshallarrangeforthepublicationofnoticeoffilingtheproposedadvisoryopinionandasummarythereofintheGeorgiaBarJournalwithinareasonabletime.Interestedpartiesshallbefurnishedacopyofthefullopinionuponrequest.(g)ServiceandJudicialReviewofProposedAdvisory

Opinions.(1)Inthecaseofanyproposedadvisoryopinioninwhich

theStandingCommitteeconcludesthattheconductinquestionisnottheunlicensedpracticeoflaw,itshalldecide,byavoteofamajorityoftheCommitteememberspresent,eithertopublishtheadvisoryopinionasprovidedinrule14-9.1(f)(3)asaninfor-maladvisoryopinion,ortofileacopyoftheopinionwiththeCourtasprovidedinrule14-9.1(g)(2).

(2)InthecaseofanyproposedadvisoryopinioninwhichtheStandingCommitteeconcludesthattheconductinquestionconstitutesorwouldconstitutetheunlicensedpracticeoflaw,theCommitteeshallfileacopyoftheopinionandallmaterialsconsideredbytheCommitteeinadoptingtheopinionwiththeclerkoftheCourt.Theadvisoryopinion,togetherwithnoticeofthefilingthereof,shallbefurnishedbycertifiedmailtothepeti-tioner.UnlesstheCourtgrantsreviewasprovidedhereinafter,theopinionshallbebindingonlyontheCommittee,theStateBarofGeorgia,andthepetitioner,andnotontheSupremeCourt,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.

(3)Within20daysofthefilingoftheAdvisoryOpinionorthedatethepublicationismailedtothemembersoftheBar,whicheverislater,theStateBarofGeorgiaorthepetitionermayfileapetitionfordiscretionaryreviewthereofwiththeCourt,copiesofwhichshallbeservedontheCommittee.ThepetitionshalldesignatetheAdvisoryOpinionsoughttobereviewedandshallconciselystatethemannerinwhichthepetitionerisaggrieved.IftheCourtgrantsthepetitionfordis-cretionaryreviewordecidestoreviewtheopiniononitsownmotion,therecordshallconsistofthecommentsreceivedbytheCommittee.TheStateBarofGeorgiaandthepetitionershallfollowthebriefingschedulesetforthinSupremeCourtRule10,countingfromthedateoftheordergrantingreview.TheCommitteemayfilearesponsivebrief,andanyotherinterestedpersonmayseekleaveoftheCourttofileandserveabrief,whetherinsupportoforinoppositiontotheopinion.OralargumentwillbeallowedattheCourt’sdiscretion.TheRulesoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgiashallotherwisegovernthemeth-odsoffiling,service,andargument.ThefinaldeterminationmaybeeitherbywrittenopinionorbyorderoftheSupremeCourtandshallstatewhethertheAdvisoryOpinionisapproved,modified,ordisapproved,orshallprovideforsuchotherfinaldispositionasisappropriate.

(4)IftheCourtdeclinestoreviewtheAdvisoryOpinion,itshallbebindingonlyontheCommittee,theStateBarofGeorgia,andthepetitioner,andnotontheSupremeCourt,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.IftheCourtgrantsreviewanddisapprovestheopinion,itshallhaveabsolutelynoeffectandshallnotconstituteeitherpersuasiveorbindingauthority.IftheCourtapprovesormodifiestheopinion,itshallconstitutebindingprecedentandshallbepub-lishedintheofficialGeorgiaCourtandBarRulesmanual.TheSupremeCourtshallaccordsuchapprovedormodifiedopinionthesameprecedentialauthoritygiventotheregularlypublishedjudicialopinionsoftheCourt.ThereshallbenofurtherreviewoftheopinionexceptasgrantedbytheSupremeCourtinitsdiscretion,uponpetitiontotheSupremeCourt.

14-10. Immunity

RULE 14-10.1 GENERALLY ThemembersoftheStandingCommitteeandDistrictCommittees,aswellasstaffpersonsandappointedvoluntarycounselassistingthosecommittees,including,butnotlimitedto,staffcounsel,CounselfortheBarandinvestigators;andtheStateBarofGeorgia,itsofficersandemployees,membersoftheExecutiveCommittee,andmembersoftheBoardofGovernors,shallhaveabsoluteimmunityfromcivilliabilityforallactsinthecourseoftheirofficialduties.

UPL ADVISORY OPINIONS

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2002-1 IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLawonJuly1,2002.ApprovedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaonJanuary12,2004.InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2002-1,277Ga.521(2004).

QUESTION PRESENTED DebtorincursadebtwithDr.A,asoleproprietor.Dr.Atrans-ferstheaccounttoCollectorCbywritten“assignment.”However,thepurportedassignmentstatesthatthetransferis“forthepurposeofcollectiononly.”CollectorCpaysnothingfortheaccount,buthasanarrangementwithDr.Atoreceiveasetfeeorcontingencyfeeuponcollection.CollectorCisnotanattorney,butfilessuitontheaccountagainstDebtoras“Dr.Abyhistransferee/assigneeCollectorCvs.Debtor.”Intheeventthecaseiscontested,CollectorCalsoattemptstopresentthecaseincourt.IscollectorCengagedintheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw?

SUMMARY ANSWER Yes.Individualsnormallyhavetherighttorepresentthemselveswithregardtolegalmatterstowhichtheyareaparty.Inthescenariosetoutabove,however,CollectorCisnotthetruepartyininterest,butisinsteadtakinglegalactiononbehalfofanotherinexchangeforafee.TheactionsofCollectorCviolateO.C.G.A.§15-19-50etseq.,theGeorgiastatutepertainingtotheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.

OPINION Individualshavetherighttoself-representation.Georgiacorpora-tionshavecertainlimitedrightsofself-representation.Ecklesv.AtlantaTechnologyGroup,267Ga.801(1997);UniformMagistrateCourtRule31.Underthecircumstancessetoutabove,Dr.Aisalwaysfreetotakeactiononhisownbehalfwithinthelimitsofthelaw. Theholderofachoseinactionmayassignhisinteresttoanother.O.C.G.A.§44-12-22.Acreditorcan,forexample,sellanaccountreceivableinexchangeforasumthatisfixedandcertain,suchasapercentageoftheindebtedness.Ifaclaimwerevalidlyassignedinsuchamanner,theassignorwouldrelinquishallright,titleandinteresttotheclaim,andsuchtitleandinterestwouldvestsolelyintheassignee. O.C.G.A.§15-19-50definesthepracticeoflaw,inpart,as“[r]epresentinglitigantsincourtandpreparingpleadingsandotherpapers,”“[t]hepreparationoflegalinstrumentsofallkindswherebyalegalrightissecured,”and“[a]nyactiontakenforothersinanymatterconnectedwiththelaw.”O.C.G.A.§15-19-52statesthatundercertaincircum-stancesnonlawyersmaydrawlegalinstrumentsforothers,“provideditisdonewithoutfeeandsolelyatthesolicitationandtherequestandunderthedirectionoftheperson,firm,orcorporationdesiringtoexe-cutetheinstrument.” Inthesituationsetoutabove,thereisnotatrueassignmentofthedebt,sincethereisnorealtransferoftitleandinteresttotheclaim.Theputativeassignmentstatesthatitexists“forthepurposeofcollec-tiononly.”The“assignment”underthesecircumstancesisinactualitynothingmorethanameansthroughwhichCollectorCisattemptingtorepresentDr.A.CollectorCisengagedintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawnotonlybecauseheisrepresentingathirdparty,butalsobecauseheispreparingpleadingsandotherpapers(presumablythecomplaintandsummons)onbehalfofDr.Ainexchangeforafee.Privateagreements


betweenindividuals--nomatterwhattheirphraseology--cannotservetoundoactsofthelegislatureanddecisionsofGeorgiacourts.

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2003-1 IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLawonMarch21,2003.ApprovedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaonNovember21,2005.InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-1,280Ga.121(2005).

QUESTION PRESENTED Attorneyrepresentingthecreditoronanaccountfilesalawsuitagainstthedebtor.Theattorneyreceivesaletterandagencypowerofattorneyfromacompanystatingthatithasbeenauthorizedtoactastheagentforthedebtorinsettlementnegotiations.Isthecompanyengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw?Istheindividualdirectingthecom-panyengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw?

SUMMARY ANSWER Yes.Underthecircumstancessetoutabove,thecompanyisrepre-sentingoneofthepartiestoalawsuitinsettlementnegotiations.Sincesuchrepresentationcanonlybelawfullyundertakenbyanindividualwhoisdulylicensedtopracticelaw,andcannotlegitimatelyariseoutofanagencypowerofattorney,thecompanyanditspersonnelareengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

OPINION TheCommitteeconductedapublichearingconcerningtheques-tionsetoutabove.Itheardtestimonyfromtheownerofonesuchcompany,whodescribedhisbusinessoperations.Thecompanyrou-tinelyobtainsfromGeorgiacourtdocketsthenamesandaddressesofdebtorsagainstwhomsuithasbeenfiled.Theamountoftheallegedindebtednesstypicallyrangesfrom$500-$8,000.Thecompanycontactsthedebtorsbymeansofadirectmailsolicitation,whichcontainsthefollowingintroductorylanguage:“Dear____:Imayhavesomegoodnewsconcerningyourcivilcase.YouwillsoonbeservedwithaCourt Summons[emphasisinoriginal]andtimeisveryimportant.Pleasecontactmeassoonaspossible….”Whenthedebtorrespondstothesolicitation,heisinformedthatthecompany,ifretained,willcontacttheplaintiffandattempttonegotiateasettlementoftheoutstandingindebt-edness.Ifthedebtoragreestotherepresentation,heexecutesapowerofattorneyinfavorofthecompany,appointingitasthedebtor’s“attorney-in-fact,”withthestatedauthority“[t]omediatecreditor’sclaim(s)andtoeffectareasonablesettlementwith”theplaintiff.Oncethecompanyobtainsthepowerofattorney,itsemployeecontactstheplaintiffor,ifrepresentedbycounsel,theplaintiff’sattorney.Thecompany’semployeeprovidesacopyofthepowerofattorneytotheplaintiff,thenattemptstosettlethelawsuitthroughnegotiation.Thecompanysome-timeschargesthedebtorafeeforitsnegotiationservices,whileatothertimesprovidesitsservicesfreeofcharge.Thedecisionastowhethertochargeafeeisamatterofdiscretion,tobedeterminedbythefinancialplightofthedebtor.Thecompanymakesitcleartoallinvolvedthatitisnotalawfirm,andthatnoneofitsemployeesarelicensedGeorgiaattorneys.Becausethecompany’semployeesarenonlawyers,theyarenotboundbytheGeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConductorotherwisesubjecttodisciplinaryregulationbytheStateBarofGeorgia. Acompanyoperatinginthemannerdescribedaboveisengagingintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Thecompany’sactivitynecessarilyinvolvesthedeliveryoflegalservices,becauseitisadvocatingthelegalpositionofanotherrelativetoapendinglawsuit.O.C.G.A.§10-6-5statesthat“[w]hateveronemaydohimselfmaybedonebyanagent,exceptsuchpersonaltrustsinwhichspecialconfidenceisplacedontheskill,discretion,orjudg-mentofthepersoncalledintoact….”TheCommitteefindsthatnegotiatingasettlementtoalawsuitonbehalfofanotherinvolvespreciselythe“specialconfidence”and“skill,discretion,orjudgment”thatcanonlybelawfullyexercisedbyadulylicensedattorney.Anindividualcannotconferuponanothertherighttopracticelawsimplybyenteringintoaprivateagree-mentthatpurportstoallowtherepresentation.Suchagreements,iftheyhadforceandeffect,wouldallowliterallyanyonetorepresentanotherinalegalmatter,therebycircumventingtherigorousattorneylicensingproceduresestablishedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.Thepotentialforpublicharmundersuchcircumstancesisclear,andthoseinclinedtoenterintosuchagreementsshouldkeepinmindthat“[n]orightsshallarisetoeitherpartyoutofanagencycreatedforanillegalpurpose.”O.C.G.A.§10-6-20. Inadditiontoanyunlicensedpracticeoflawissues,theCommitteenotes,withoutfurthercomment,thatO.C.G.A.§18-5-1etseq.generallyprohibits“thebusinessofdebtadjusting.”

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2003-2 IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLawonApril22,2003.ApprovedbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaonNovember10,2003.InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277Ga.472(2003).

QUESTION PRESENTED Isthepreparationandexecutionofadeedofconveyance(includ-ing,butnotlimitedto,awarrantydeed,limitedwarrantydeed,quitclaimdeed,securitydeed,anddeedtosecuredebt)consideredtheunlicensedpracticeoflawifsomeoneotherthanadulylicensedGeorgiaattorneypreparesorfacilitatestheexecutionofsaiddeed(s)forthebenefitoftheseller,borrowerandlender?

SUMMARY ANSWER Yes.UnderGeorgialaw,thepreparationofadocumentthatservestosecurealegalrightisconsideredthepracticeoflaw.Theexecutionofadeedofconveyance,becauseitisanintegralpartoftherealestateclosingprocess,isalsothepracticeoflaw.Asageneralruleitwould,therefore,betheunlicensedpracticeoflawforanonlawyertoprepareorfacilitatetheexecutionofsuchdeeds.

OPINION Inansweringtheabovequestion,theCommitteelookstothelawassetout“bystatute,courtrule,andcaselawoftheStateofGeorgia.”BarRule14-2.1(a).“Conveyancing,”“[t]hepreparationoflegalinstru-mentsofallkindswherebyalegalrightissecured,”“[t]herenderingofopinionsastothevalidityorinvalidityoftitlestorealorpersonalproperty,”“[t]hegivingofanylegaladvice”and“[a]nyactiontakenforothersinanymatterconnectedwiththelaw”isconsideredthepracticeoflawinGeorgia.O.C.G.A.§15-19-50.Moreover,itisillegalforanonlawyer“[t]orenderorfurnishlegalservicesoradvice.”O.C.G.A.§15-19-51. Therearecertainexceptionstothesestatutoryprovisions.Forexample,“nobankshallbeprohibitedfromgivinganyadvicetoitscustomersinmattersincidentaltobanksorbanking.…”O.C.G.A.§15-19-52.Atitleinsurancecompany“maypreparesuchpapersasitthinksproperornecessaryinconnectionwithatitlewhichitproposestoinsure,inorder,initsopinion,forittobewillingtoinsurethetitle,wherenochargeismadebyitforthepapers.”Id.Nonlawyersmayexaminerecordsoftitletorealproperty,prepareabstractsoftitle,andissuerelatedinsurance.O.C.G.A.§15-19-53.O.C.G.A.§15-19-54allowsnonlawyerstoprovideattorneyswithparalegalandclericalser-vices,solongas“atalltimestheattorneyreceivingtheinformationorservicesshallmaintainfullprofessionalanddirectresponsibilitytohisclientsfortheinformationandservicesreceived.” InadditiontotheactsoftheGeorgialegislature,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiahasmadeitclearthatthepreparationofdeedsconsti-tutesthepracticeoflaw,andistobeundertakenonbehalfofanotheronlybyadulyqualifiedandlicensedGeorgiaattorney.Forexample,theCourthasissuedtheRulesGoverningAdmissiontothePracticeofLawinGeorgia.UnderPartEofthoserules,anindividualcanbelicensedasa“foreignlawconsultant,”andtherebybeauthorizedto“renderlegalservicesandgiveprofessionallegaladviceon,andonlyon,thelawoftheforeigncountryinwhichtheforeignlawconsultantisadmittedtopractice....”SincesuchanindividualhasnotbeenregularlyadmittedtotheStateBarofGeorgia,theCourtprohibitsforeignlawconsultantsfromprovidinganyotherlegalservicestothepublic.Forpurposesofthisdiscussion,itisnoteworthythatPartE,§2(b)statesthataforeignlawconsultantmaynot“prepareanydeed,mortgage,assignment,dis-charge,lease,trustinstrument,oranyotherinstrumentaffectingtitletorealestatelocatedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.” TheCommitteeconcludesthat,withthelimitedexceptionofthoseactivitiesexpresslypermittedbytheGeorgialegislatureorcourts,thepreparationofdeedsofconveyanceonbehalfofanotherwithinthestateofGeorgiabyanyoneotherthanadulylicensedattorneyconstitutestheunlicensedpracticeoflaw. TheCommitteeturnsitsattentiontotheexecutionofdeedsofconveyance.Prosehandlingofone’sownlegalaffairsis,ofcourse,entirelypermissible,andthereisnothinginGeorgialawto“preventanycorporation,voluntaryassociation,orindividualfromdoinganyactoractssetoutinCodeSection15-19-50towhichthepersonsareaparty….”O.C.G.A.§15-19-52.TheCommitteeinsteadfocuseson“notaryclosers,”“signingagents,”andotherswhoarenotapartytotherealestateclosing,butnonethelessinjectthemselvesintotheclos-ingprocessandconduct,forexample,a“witnessonlyclosing.”A“witnessonlyclosing”isoneinwhichanindividualpresidesovertheexecutionofdeedsofconveyanceandotherclosingdocuments,butpurportstodosomerelyasawitnessandnotary,notassomeonewhoispracticinglaw. TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiaperiodicallyissuesadvisoryopinionsrelatingtoattorneyconduct.UnderCourtrule,suchopinionshave“thesameprecedentialauthoritygiventotheregularlypublishedjudicialopin-ionsoftheCourt.”BarRule4-403(e).Itwouldbeproper,then,fortheCommitteetoturntoanyrelevantadvisoryopinionsforguidance. InFormalAdvisoryOpinion86-5,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiainterpretedtheword“conveyancing”assetoutinO.C.G.A.§15-19-50,andconsideredwhatthetermmeantinrelationtotheclosingofarealestatetransaction.TheCourtviewedarealestateclosing“astheentire


seriesofeventsthroughwhichtitletothelandisconveyedfromonepartytoanotherparty….”Thatbeingthecase,theCourtconcluded“itwouldbeethicallyimproperforalawyertoaidnonlawyersto‘close’realestatetransactions,”orforalawyerto“delegatetoanonlawyertheresponsibilityto‘close’therealestatetransactionwithouttheparticipa-tionofanattorney.” InFormalAdvisoryOpinion00-3,theCourtrestateditsviewthattherealestateclosingisacontinuous,interconnectedseriesofevents.TheCourtmadeitclearthat,inorderforanattorneytoavoidpossibledisciplinarysanctionsforaidinganonlawyerintheunauthorizedprac-ticeoflaw,“[t]helawyermustbeincontroloftheclosingprocessfrombeginningtoend.Thesupervisionoftheparalegalmustbedirectandconstant.”TheCourtheldthat“[e]venthoughtheparalegalmaystatethattheyarenotalawyerandisnotthereforthepurposeofgivinglegaladvice,circumstancesmayarisewhereoneinvolvedinthisprocessasapurchaser,sellerorlenderwouldlooktotheparalegalforadviceand/orexplanationsnormallyprovidedbyalawyer.Thisisnotpermissible.”Alawyerwhoaidsanonlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawcanbedisbarred.GeorgiaRuleofProfessionalConduct5.5. TheCommitteefindsthatthosewhoconductwitnessonlyclosingsorotherwisefacilitatetheexecutionofdeedsofconveyanceonbehalfofothersareengagedinthepracticeoflaw.Asnotedabove,“conveyanc-ing”isdeemedtobethepracticeoflaw,andtheverypurposeofadeedistoeffectuateaconveyanceofrealproperty.Inreviewingtheforego-ingopinionsoftheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,theCommitteeconcludesthattheexecutionofadeedofconveyanceissointimatelyinterwovenwiththeotherelementsoftheclosingprocesssoastobeinseparablefromtheclosingasawhole.Itisoneof“theentireseriesofeventsthroughwhichtitletothelandisconveyedfromonepartytoanotherparty.”Toviewtheexecutionofadeedofconveyanceassomethingseparateanddistinctfromtheotherphasesoftheclosingprocess--andthusassomethingotherthanthepracticeoflaw--wouldnotonlybeforcedandartificial,itwouldruncountertotheopinionsoftheCourt.Suchaninterpretationwouldmeanthatanonlawyercouldlawfullypresideovertheexecutionofdeedsofconveyance,yetanattorneywhoallowedanunsupervisedparalegaltoengageinpreciselythesameactiv-itycouldbedisbarred.AninterpretationofCourtopinionsthatleadstosuchanincongruousresultcannotbeproper.Rather,theviewconsistentwiththoseopinionsisthatonewhofacilitatestheexecutionofdeedsofconveyanceispracticinglaw. Accordingly,theCommitteeconcludesthat,subjecttoanyrel-evantexceptionssetoutbytheGeorgialegislatureorcourts,onewhofacilitatestheexecutionofadeedofconveyanceonbehalfofanotherwithinthestateofGeorgiaisengagedinthepracticeoflaw.Onedoesnotbecomelicensedtopracticelawsimplybyprocuringanotaryseal.AGeorgialawyerwhoconductsawitnessonlyclosingdoesnot,ofcourse,engageintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Theremaywellexist,however,professionalliabilityordisciplinaryconcernsthatfalloutsidethescopeofthisopinion. Refinanceclosings,secondmortgages,homeequityloans,con-structionloansandothersecuredrealestateloantransactionsmaydifferincertainparticularsfrompurchasetransactions.Nevertheless,thecen-terpieceofthesetransactionsistheconveyanceofrealproperty.Suchtransactionsare,therefore,subjecttothesameanalysisassetoutabove.

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2004-1 IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLawonAugust6,2004. Note:Thisopinionisonlyaninterpretationofthelaw,anddoesnotconstitutefinalactionbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.UnlesstheCourtgrantsreviewunderBarRule14-9.1(g),thisopinionshallbebindingonlyontheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLaw,theStateBarofGeorgia,andthepetitioner,andnotontheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.

QUESTION PRESENTED IsthepreparationorfilingofalienconsideredtheunlicensedpracticeoflawifitisdonebysomeoneotherthanthelienholderoralicensedGeorgiaattorney?

SUMMARY ANSWER Anonlawyer’spreparationofalienforanotherinexchangeforafeeistheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Theministerialactofphysicallyfilingalienwithacourtisnotthepracticeoflaw.

OPINION Therearetwocomponentstothequestionpresentedabove,viz.,thepreparationofalienandthefilingofalien.Withregardtothelatter,theCommitteeisoftheopinionthatthemereministerialactofphysicallyfilingalienwithacourtdoesnotinitselfconstitutethepracticeoflaw. Asfarasthepreparationofalien,theCommitteelooksinparttoO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3),whichstatesthatthepracticeoflawincludes

“[t]hepreparationoflegalinstrumentsofallkindswherebyalegalrightissecured.”TheSupremeCourtofGeorgiahasrecentlyindicatedthatO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3)continuestoaidthejudiciaryintheperformanceofitsfunctionswithregardtodefiningthepracticeoflawinthisstate.InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277Ga.472,474(2003).SeealsoInreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2002-1,277Ga.521,522(2004). Alienis“‘aholdorclaimwhichonepersonhasonthepropertyofanotherasasecurityforsomedebtorcharge.’”Waldroupv.State,198Ga.144,149(1944).SeealsoMillerv.NewAmsterdamCas.Co.,105Ga.App.174,176(1961).Withregardtorealestate,alienencumberstitle.LincolnLogHomesMktg.,Inc.,v.Holbrook,163Ga.App.592,594(1982).ThereareavarietyofliensavailableunderGeorgialaw.See,e.g.,O.C.G.A.§44-14-320.Theymayvaryastotheparticularsoftheiroperation,butallasserttheperceivedrightsofthelienholder.Alienaffectsthestatusoftitleastotherelevantproperty,andisaninstru-mentdesignedtosecurealegalright.ItfollowsthatunderO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3)thepreparationofalienconstitutesthepracticeoflaw. Duringthepublichearingregardingthismatter,theCommitteeheardapresentationmadebyanonlawyerbusinessentitythatpreparesmechanics’andmaterialmen’sliensforothers.Thecustomerprovidesthecompanywithrelevantbackgroundinformation,andthecompanyperformsatitlesearch,preparesalegaldescriptionoftheproperty,andinsertsthedescriptionintotheliendocument.Thecompanythenprintsthelien,filesitwiththeappropriatecourt,andprovidesnoticetothepropertyowner.Accordingtothecompany,itsemployeesdonotpro-videlegaladvicetothecustomer.Thecompanyclaimsthatthisactivityisnotthepracticeoflaw,notwithstandingtheexistenceofO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3). Thecompanyfirstassertsthatitsactivityisessentiallytantamounttoperformingatitlesearchandpreparinganabstractoftitle,anactiv-ityallowedbyO.C.G.A.§15-19-53.Anabstractoftitle“shouldbeacompleteshowinginmoreorlessabbreviatedformofallinstrumentsappearingofrecordinanywayaffectingthetitle,eitheradverselyorbeneficially….”3Hinkel,Pindar’sGeorgiaRealEstateLawandProcedure,§26-7,p.44(6thed.2004).IntheCommittee’sview,itisnotpropertoequateatitlesearchorabstractoftitlewithalien.Asnotedabove,anabstractidentifiesalien;itisnotitselfalien.Moreover,anabstract,beingahistoryofthetitletoland,isatitscoreaneutral,informationaldocument.Alien,ontheotherhand,assertsalegalclaim.Giventheforegoing,itwouldbeunreasonabletoreadO.C.G.A.§15-19-53asextendingtothepreparationofliens.

Inthealternative,thecompanystatesthatitsactivityisallowedunderO.C.G.A.§15-19-52,whichdoesnotprohibitdraftingalegalinstrumentforanother“provideditisdonewithoutfeeandsolelyatsolicitationandtherequestandunderthedirectionoftheperson,firm,orcorporationdesiringtoexecutetheinstrument.”Thecompanyclaimsthatitcollectsafeefromitscustomersolelyforpreparinganabstractoftitleorprovidingalegaldescriptionoftheproperty,andthatitthenpreparesthelienfreeofcharge.

TheCommitteeviewsthelattercontentionasbeingdisingenuous.AcceptingsuchadeconstructionofthetransactionwouldeffectivelyeviscerateO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3),becausethenonlawyerpreparerofalegaldocumentcouldalwaysclaimtobechargingthefeeforsome-thingotherthanthepreparationoftheinstrument.AninterpretationofO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3)thatleadstosucharesultcannotbeacorrectone.Rather,itseemsmoresensibletoexaminethereasonthecustomercontactedthenonlawyerdocumentpreparer,theexpectationsofthecustomer,andtheultimateproductofthetransaction.Inthesituationdescribedabove,thegoalofthecustomeristoprocurealien,notamereabstractoftitleorlegaldescriptionofproperty.Thecustomerinfactobtainsthelien,andpaysthecompanyforitsservicesinthisregard.Underthecircumstances,thetransactioninvolvesthepracticeoflawassetoutinO.C.G.A.§15-19-50(3),andtheconsequentfurnishingoflegalserviceswithinthemeaningofO.C.G.A.§15-19-51(a)(4).

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2005-1IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeof

LawonJune10,2005.Note:Thisopinionisonlyaninterpretationofthelaw,anddoes

notconstitutefinalactionbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.UnlesstheCourtgrantsreviewunderBarRule14-9.1(g),thisopinionshallbebindingonlyontheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLaw,theStateBarofGeorgia,andthepetitioner,andnotontheSupremeCourtofGeorgia,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.

QUESTION PRESENTEDDoesanonlawyerengageintheunlicensedpracticeoflawwhen

heprepares,foranotherandforremuneration,articlesofincorporation,bylawsorotherdocumentsrelatingtotheestablishmentofacorporation?

SUMMARY ANSWERYes.Theexistenceofacorporationdependsentirelyuponthe

law,andthedocumentsthatbringitintobeingsecurelegalrights.


Consequently,thepreparationofthosedocumentsinvolvestheprac-ticeoflaw.Anonlawyerwhopreparessuchdocumentsforanotherinexchangeforafeeengagesintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

OPINIONAcorporationisalegalperson,having“thesamepowersasan

individualtodoallthingsnecessaryorconvenienttocarryoutitsbusi-nessandaffairs….”O.C.G.A.§14-2-302.Whenproperlyformedandmaintained,itsexistenceislegallyindependentfromthosewhocreatedandownit.Thisindependentstatusrelativetothelawistheraisond’êtreofthecorporation,astheentitycaninsulateitsshareholders,directorsandofficersfromcertainformsofliability.See,e.g.,O.C.G.A.§§14-2-622(b),14-2-830(d),and14-2-842(d).Thecorporationowesitsexistenceentirelytotheoperationofthelaw,as“[a]corporation,consideredinitself….is,infact,amyth,afiction,andhasnoexistencebutintheimaginationofthelaw.”Loudonv.Coleman,59Ga.653,655(1877).Sinceacorporation’sexistenceisutterlytiedtoanddepen-dentuponthelaw,thedocumentsthatbringitintobeinganddefineitsparametersaredocumentsthatservetosecurelegalrights.

ThepracticeoflawinGeorgiaisdefined,inpart,as“[t]heprepa-rationoflegalinstrumentsofallkindswherebyalegalrightissecured”and“[a]nyactiontakenforothersinanymatterconnectedwiththelaw.”O.C.G.A.§§15-19-50(3)and15-19-50(6).SeealsoHuberv.State,234Ga.357,358(1975).Thedocumentsreferencedintheques-tionabovearedesignedtobringacorporationintoexistence.OncetheyarefiledwiththeGeorgiaSecretaryofState,theyconferrightsandimposeobligationsunderapplicablestateandfederallaw.Inviewoftheforegoing,thepreparationofthedocumentsinvolvesthepracticeoflaw.TheCommitteenotesthatitsdeterminationinthisregardisconsis-tentwiththesuperiorcourtordersenteredintotherecordofthehearingconductedinthismatter.

Theprecedinganalysisdoesnotexhausttheissue.Individualshavethegeneralrighttoproserepresentation.Ga.Const.(1983),Art.1,Sec.1,Para.12.Thisrighttohandleone’spersonallegalaffairsextendsbeyondthenarrowconfinesofcourtproceedings.See,e.g.,InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277Ga.472,473n.2(2003).UnderGeorgialaw,thosewhoactontheirownbehalfarefreetopreparethosedocu-mentstheydeemnecessarytoeffectuateaproseincorporation.

O.C.G.A.§15-19-52states,inpart,thatnopersonshall“bepro-hibitedfromdrawinganylegalinstrumentforanotherperson,firm,orcorporation,provideditisdonewithoutfeeandsolelyatthesolicitationandtherequestandunderthedirectionoftheperson,firm,orcorpora-tiondesiringtoexecutetheinstrument.”Accordingly,anonlawyerwhoassistsanotherwithinthescopeofO.C.G.A.§15-19-52doesnotengageintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Moreover,anemployeeofanattorneyactingwithintheambitofO.C.G.A.§15-19-54doesnotengageintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

Duringthehearing,theCommitteeheardtestimonyindicatingthattherearenonlawyerswho,forthirdpartiesandinexchangeforafee,preparedocumentsrelatingtotheestablishmentofGeorgiacor-porations.TheCommitteefindsthatthisactivitydoesconstitutetheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.Asnotedabove,O.C.G.A.§15-19-52allowsanonlawyertoassistanotherwithregardtothedrawingoflegalinstru-ments.Thepermissibledegreeofassistance,however,isnotunlimited,andispartiallypredicatedupontheassistancebeingrenderedonanon-commercialbasis.TheproponentsofsuchactivityhavefailedtodirecttheCommitteetoanyprovisionofGeorgialawauthorizingnonlawyerstodelivercommerciallegalservicestoGeorgiaresidents.TheyhavealsofailedtoexplainwhysuchactivityisnotprohibitedbyO.C.G.A.§§15-19-51(a)(3),15-19-51(a)(4)or15-19-51(a)(8).Incontradistinc-tiontothisfact,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiahas,whendiscussingthedeliveryoflegalservicesinanothercontext,explicitlydistinguishedbetweendeliveringthoseservicesaspartof“aprofessionalservice,”asopposedtotheirdeliverythough“apurelycommercialenterprise.”InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2003-2,277Ga.at473-474(2003).TheCourthasindicatedthatlegalservicesaretobeprovidedbydulylicensedandregulatedGeorgiaattorneys.

“TheSecretaryofStatehasthepowerreasonablynecessarytoperformthedutiesrequiredofhim”regardingtheadministrationofthelawsrelatingtocorporations.O.C.G.A.§14-2-130.Thisopiniondoesnot,ofcourse,inanywayimpingeupontheSecretaryofState’spre-rogativetodisseminateinformationunderO.C.G.A.§14-2-121,oroth-erwiseactinawayconsistentwithhislegaldutiesassetoutbystatute,ruleorapplicablelaw.

UPL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 2010-1IssuedbytheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeof

LawonJune4,2010.Note:Thisopinionisonlyaninterpretationofthelaw,anddoes

notconstitutefinalactionbytheSupremeCourtofGeorgia.UnlesstheCourtgrantsreviewunderBarRule14-9.1(g),thisopinionshallbebindingonlyontheStandingCommitteeontheUnlicensedPracticeofLaw,theStateBarofGeorgia,andthepetitioner,andnotonthe

SupremeCourtofGeorgia,whichshalltreattheopinionaspersuasiveauthorityonly.

QUESTION PRESENTEDAssumingnotraversehasbeenfiledbyanypartyinagarnish-

mentaction,isthecompletion,executionandfilingofananswerinthegarnishmentactionbyanon-attorneyemployeeofthegarnisheeconsid-eredtheunlicensedpracticeoflaw?

SUMMARY ANSWERAnonlawyerwhoanswersforagarnisheeotherthanhimselfina

legalproceedingpendingwithaGeorgiacourtofrecordisengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

OPINION“Thesummonsofgarnishmentshallbedirectedtothegarnishee,

commandinghimtofileananswerstatingwhatmoneyorotherprop-ertyissubjecttogarnishment.”O.C.G.A.§18-4-62(a).The“answermustbefiledwiththecourtissuingthesummons,”and“ifthegarnish-eefailstoanswerthesummons,ajudgmentbydefaultwillbeenteredagainstthegarnisheefortheamountclaimedbyplaintiffagainstthedefendant.”Id.

ThesummonsofgarnishmentformsetoutinO.C.G.A.§18-4-66(2)statesthatthegarnisheeistofilean“answerinwritingwiththeclerkofthiscourt….”Thegarnisheeiswarnedthat“[s]houldyoufailtoanswerthissummons,ajudgmentwillberenderedagainstyoufortheamounttheplaintiffclaimsduebythedefendant.”Id.O.C.G.A.§18-4-82referstothedocumentpreparedbythegarnisheeasan“answer,”asdoesO.C.G.A.§18-4-97(a):“Thegarnisheeshallbeentitledtohisactualreasonableexpenses,includingattorney’sfees,inmakingatrueanswerofgarnishment.”

Aproperlyservedgarnisheeisboundtofileananswerwiththeappropriatecourt.Iftheanswerisnotfiled,thegarnisheefacesadefaultjudgment.Theinescapableconclusionisthatagarnishmentactionisalegalproceeding.Thatbeingthecase,theCommitteeexam-ineswhoispermittedtofileananswertoalegalproceedingthatispendingwithaGeorgiacourt.

“Georgia’scitizens,ofcourse,haveaconstitutionallyprotectedrightofself-representation.”InreUPLAdvisoryOpinion2002-1,277Ga.521,522n.3(2004).Apartytoalegalactioncanalsoberepresentedbyadulylicensedattorneyatlaw.Ga.Const.(1983),Art.I,Sec.1,Para.XII.Asfarascorporateself-representation,“[i]nthisstate,onlyalicensedattorneyisauthorizedtorepresentacorporationinaproceedinginacourtofrecord,includinganyproceedingthatmaybetransferredtoacourtofrecordfromacourtnotofrecord.”Ecklesv.AtlantaTechnologyGroup,267Ga.801,805(1997).TheGeorgiaCourtofAppealsconcluded“thattherationaleandholdingofEcklesshould,anddoes,applytolimitedliabilitycompanies.”Winzerv.EHCADunwoody,LLC,277Ga.App710,713(2006).SeealsoSterling,Winchester&Long,LLCv.Loyd,280Ga.App.416,417(2006).

TheCommitteeconcludesthatanonlawyerwhoanswersforagarnisheeotherthanhimselfinaproceedingpendinginaGeorgiacourtofrecordisengagedintheunlicensedpracticeoflaw.

THE GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

PREAMBLEOurlegalsystemisbasedontheprinciplethatanindependent,fairandcompetentjudiciarywillinterpretandapplythelawsthatgovernus.TheroleofthejudiciaryiscentraltoAmericanconceptsofjusticeandtheruleoflaw.IntrinsictoallsectionsofthisCodearethepreceptsthatjudges,individuallyandcollectively,mustrespectandhonorthejudicialofficeasapublictrustandstrivetoenhanceandmaintainconfidenceinourlegalsystem.

Everyjudgeshouldstrivetomaintainthedignityappropriatetothejudicialoffice.Thejudgeisanarbiteroffactsandlawfortheresolu-tionofdisputesandahighlyvisiblesymbolofgovernmentundertheruleoflaw.Asaresult,judgesshouldbeheldtoahigherstandard,andshouldaspiretoconductthemselveswiththedignityaccordedtheiresteemedposition.

TheCodeofJudicialConductisintendedtoestablishstandardsforethi-calconductofjudges.ItconsistsofbroadstatementscalledCanons,specificrulessetforthinSectionsundereachCanon,aTerminologySection,anApplicationSectionandCommentary.ThetextoftheCanonsandtheSections,includingtheTerminologyandApplicationSections,isauthoritative.TheCommentary,byexplanationandexample,providesguidancewithrespecttothepurposeandmeaningoftheCanonsandSections.TheCommentaryisnotintendedasastate-mentofadditionalrules.Whenthetextuses“shall”or“shallnot,”itisintendedtoimposebindingobligationstheviolationofwhichcan


resultindisciplinaryaction.When“should”or“shouldnot”isused,thetextisintendedasadvisoryandasastatementofwhatisorisnotappropriateconduct,butnotasabindingruleunderwhichajudgemaybedisciplined.When“may”isused,itdenotespermissiblediscretionor,dependingonthecontext,itreferstoactionthatisnotcoveredbyspecificproscriptions.

TheCanonsandSectionsarerulesofreason.Theyshouldbeappliedconsistentwithconstitutionalrequirements,statutes,othercourtrulesanddecisionallaw,aswellasinthecontextofallrelevantcircumstanc-es.TheCodeistobeconstruedsoasnottoimpingeontheessentialindependenceofjudgesinmakingjudicialdecisions,oronjudges’FirstAmendmentrightsoffreedomofspeechandassociation.

TheCodeisdesignedtoprovideguidancetojudgesandcandidatesforjudicialofficeandtoprovideastructureforregulatingconductthroughdisciplinaryagencies.Itisnotdesignedfornorintendedasabasisforcivilliabilityorcriminalprosecution.Furthermore,thepurposeoftheCodewouldbesubvertediftheCodewereinvokedbylawyersformeretacticaladvantageinaproceeding.

ThetextoftheCanonsandSectionsisintendedtogovernconductofjudgesandtobebindinguponthem.Itisnotintended,however,thateverytransgressionwillresultindisciplinaryaction.Whetherdisciplin-aryactionisappropriate,andthedegreeofdisciplinetobeimposed,shouldbedeterminedthroughareasonableandreasonedapplicationofthetextandshoulddependonsuchfactorsastheseriousnessofthetransgression,whetherthereisapatternofimproperactivity,andtheeffectoftheimproperactivityonothersoronthejudicialsystem.TheCodeofJudicialConductisnotintendedasanexhaustiveguidefortheconductofjudges.Theyshouldalsobegovernedintheirjudicialandpersonalconductbygeneralethicalstandards.Themandatoryprovi-sionsoftheCanonsandSectionsdescribethebasicminimalethicalrequirementsofjudicialconduct.Judgesandcandidatesshouldstrivetoachievethehighestethicalstandards,evenifnotrequiredbythisCode.Asanexample,ajudgeorcandidateispermittedunderCanon7,SectionB,tosolicitcampaignfundsdirectlyfrompotentialdonors.TheCommentary,however,makesclearthatthejudgeorcandidatewhowishestoexceedtheminimalethicalrequirementswouldchoosetosetupacampaigncommitteetoraiseandsolicitcontributions.TheCodeisintendedtostateonlybasicstandardswhichshouldgoverntheconductofalljudgesandtoprovideguidancetoassistjudgesinestablishingandmaintaininghighstandardsofjudicialandpersonalconduct.

TerminologyTermsexplainedbelowarenotedwithanasterisk(*)intheSectionswheretheyappear.Inaddition,theSectionswheretermsappeararereferredtoaftertheexplanationofeachtermbelow.“Appropriate Authority”denotestheauthoritywithresponsibilityforinitiationofdisciplinaryprocesswithrespecttotheviolationtobereported.SeeSections3D(1)and3D(2).

“Candidate.” Acandidateisapersonseekingselectionfororreten-tioninjudicialofficebyelectionorappointment.Apersonbecomesacandidateforjudicialofficeassoonasheorsheappointsand/orformsacampaigncommittee,makesapublicannouncementofcandidacy,declaresorfilesasacandidatewiththeelectionorappointmentauthor-ity,orauthorizessolicitationoracceptanceofcontributionsorsupport.Theterm“candidate”hasthesamemeaningwhenappliedtoajudgeseekingelectionorappointmenttonon-judicialoffice.SeePreambleandSections7A(1),7A(2),7B(1),7B(2)and7C.

“Comment”inconnectionwithacasereferstovaluativestatementsjudgingtheprofessionalwisdomofspecificlawyeringtacticsorthelegalcorrectnessofparticularcourtdecisions.Incontrast,itdoesnotmeanthegivingofgenerallyinformativeexplanationstodescribeliti-gationfactorsincludingtheprimafacielegalelementsofcasetypespendingbeforethecourts,legalconceptssuchasburdenofproofanddutyofpersuasionorprinciplessuchasinnocentuntilprovenguiltyandknowingwaiverofconstitutionalrights,variablerealitiesillustratedbyhypotheticalfactualpatternsofaggravatingormitigatingconduct,pro-ceduralphasesofunfoldinglawsuits,thesocialpolicygoalsbehindthelawsubjecttoapplicationinvariouscases,aswellascompetingtheoriesaboutwhatthelawshouldbe.SeeSection3B(9).

“Court personnel”doesnotincludethelawyersinaproceedingbeforeajudge.SeeSections3B(7)(c)and3B(9).

“De minimis”denotesaninsignificantinterestthatcouldnotraiserea-sonablequestionastoajudge’simpartiality.SeeSection3E(1)(c).

“Economic interest” denotesownershipofamorethandeminimislegalorequitableinterest,orarelationshipasofficer,director,advisororotheractiveparticipantintheaffairsofaparty,exceptthat:

(i)ownershipofaninterestinamutualorcommoninvest-mentfundthatholdssecuritiesisnotaneconomicinterestinsuchsecuritiesunlessthejudgeparticipatesinthemanagementofthefundoraproceedingpendingorimpendingbeforethejudgecouldsubstantiallyaffectthevalueoftheinterest;

(ii)servicebyajudgeasanofficer,director,advisororotheractiveparticipantinaneducational,religious,charitable,fraternalorcivicorganization,orservicebyajudge’sspouse,parentorchildasanofficer,director,advisororotheractiveparticipantinanyorganizationdoesnotcreateaneconomicinterestinsecuritiesheldbythatorganization;

(iii)adepositinafinancialinstitution,theproprietaryinterestofapolicyholderinamutualinsurancecompany,ofadepositorinamutualsavingsassociation,isnotaneconomicinter-estintheorganizationunlessaproceedingpendingorimpendingbeforethejudgecouldsubstantiallyaffectthevalueoftheinterest;

(iv)ownershipofgovernmentsecuritiesisnotaneconomicinterestintheissuerunlessaproceedingpendingorimpendingbeforethejudgecouldsubstantiallyaffectthevalueofthesecuri-ties.SeeSection3E(2).

“Fiduciary”includessuchrelationshipsasexecutor,administrator,trustee,andguardian.SeeSections3E(2)and5D.“Invidious discrimination”isanyactionbyanorganizationthatcharacterizessomeimmutableindividualtraitsuchasaperson’srace,genderornationalorigin,aswellasreligion,asodiousorassignifyinginferiority,whichthereforeisusedtojustifyarbitraryexclusionofper-sonspossessingthosetraitsfrommembership,positionorparticipationintheorganization.SeeSection2C.

“Knowingly”, “knowledge”, “known”or“knows”denotesactualknowledgeofthefactinquestion.Aperson’sknowledgemaybeinferredfromcircumstances.SeeSections3D(1),3D(2)and3E(1).

“Law” denotescourtrulesaswellasstatutes,constitutionalprovisionsanddecisionallaw.SeeSections2A,3A,3B(2),3B(7),4A,4B,4C,5C(4),5Fand5G.

“Member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household” denotesanyrelativeofthejudgebybloodormarriage,orapersontreatedbyajudgeasamemberofthejudge’sfamily,whoresidedinthejudge’shousehold.SeeSections3E(1)(c)and5C(4).

“Non-public information” denotesinformationthat,bylaw,isnotavailabletothepublic.Non-publicinformationmayincludebutisnotlimitedto:informationthatissealedbystatuteorcourtorder,impound-edorcommunicatedincamera;andinformationofferedingrandjuryproceedings,pre-sentencingreports,dependencycasesorpsychiatricreports.SeeSection3B(11).

“Political organization”denotesapoliticalpartyorothergroup,theprincipalpurposeofwhichistofurthertheelectionorappointmentofcandidatestopoliticaloffice.SeeSection7A(1).

“Public election.”Thistermincludesprimaryandgeneralelections;itincludespartisanelections,nonpartisanelectionsandmayinclude(ascontextdemands)retentionelections.SeeSections7A(1),7A(2),7B(1),and7B(2).

“Require.”Therulesprescribingthatajudge“require”certainconductofothersare,likealloftherulesinthisCode,rulesofreason.Theuseoftheterm“require”inthatcontextmeansajudgeistoexercisereason-abledirectionandcontrolovertheconductofthosepersonssubjecttothejudge’sdirectionandcontrol.SeeSections3B(3),3B(4),3B(6),3B(9)and3C(2).

“Third degree of relationship.”Thefollowingpersonsarerelativeswithinthethirddegreeofrelationship:great-grandparent,grandparent,parent,uncle,aunt,brother,sister,child,grandchild,great-grandchild,nepheworniece.SeeSection3E(1)(c).

Canon 1Judges shall uphold the IntegrIty and IndependenCe of the JudICIary.An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. Judges shall participate in establishing, maintain-ing, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe such standards of conduct so that the integrity and inde-pendence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.Commentary: Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depends in turn upon their acting


without fear or favor. Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law, including the provisions of this Code. Public confi-dence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law.

Canon 2Judges shall avoId ImproprIety and the appearanCe of ImproprIety In all theIr aCtIvItIes.

A. Judges shall respect and comply with the law* and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Commentary: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irrespon-sible or improper conduct of judges. Judges must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. Judges must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. Judges must therefore accept restrictions on their conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citi-zen, and they should do so freely and willingly.

The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the pro-scription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules, or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibili-ties with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. See also, Commentary under Section 2C.

B. Judges shall not allow their family, social, political or other rela-tionships to influence their judicial conduct or judgment. Judges shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor should they convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence them. Judges should not testify voluntarily as character witnesses.

Commentary: Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of government in which the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative branches. Respect for the judicial office facilitates the orderly conduct of legitimate judicial functions. Judges should distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all of their activities. For example, it would be improper for a judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a personal advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for con-ducting a judge’s personal business.

A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for the advancement of the private interests of others. For example, a judge must not use the judge’s position to gain advantage in a civil suit involv-ing a member of the judge’s family. In contracts for publication of a judge’s writings, a judge should retain control over the advertising to avoid exploitation of the judge’s office. As to the acceptance of awards. See Section 5C (4)(a) and Commentary.

Although a judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of the prestige of office, a judge may, based on the judge’s personal knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of recommendation. However, a judge must not initiate the communication of information to a sentencing judge or probation or corrections officer, but may provide to such person infor-mation for the record in response to a formal request.

Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperat-ing with appointing authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship. See also Canon 7, regarding use of a judge’s name in political activities.

A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness, because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office in support of a party for whom the judge testifies. Moreover, when a judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who regularly appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward position of cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however, testify when properly summoned. Except in unusual circumstances where the demands of justice require, a judge should discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a character witness.

C. Judges shall not hold membership in any organization that prac-tices invidious discrimination*.

Commentary: Membership by a judge in an organization that prac-tices invidious discrimination may give rise to perceptions that the judge’s impartiality is impaired. Section 2C refers to the current prac-tices of the organization. Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question to which judges should be sensitive. The answer cannot be determined from a mere examination of an organization’s current membership rolls, but rather depends on how the organization selects members and other relevant factors, such as whether the organization is dedicated to the preservation of reli-gious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members, or whether it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not be constitution-ally prohibited. Absent such factors, an organization is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to membership. See New York State Club Ass’n. Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d. 474 (1987); Roberts v. United State Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d.462 (1984). Ultimately, each judge must determine in the judge’s own conscience whether an organization of which the judge is a member practices invidious discrimination.

Canon 3Judges shall perform the dutIes of theIr offICe ImpartIally and dIlIgently

A. Judicial Duties in General.

The judicial duties of judges take precedence over all their other activities. Their judicial duties include all the duties of their offices prescribed by law*. In the performance of these duties, the follow-ing standards apply:

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(1)Judgesshallhearanddecidemattersassignedtothem,exceptthoseinwhichtheyaredisqualified.

(2)Judgesshouldbefaithfultothelaw*andmaintainpro-fessionalcompetenceinit.Judgesshallnotbeswayedbypartisaninterests,publicclamor,orfearofcriticism.

(3) Judgesshallrequire*orderanddecoruminproceedingsoverwhichtheypreside.

(4)Judgesshallbepatient,dignified,andcourteoustoliti-gants,jurors,witnesses,lawyers,andotherswithwhomtheydealintheirofficialcapacity,andshallrequire*similarconductoflawyers,andofstaffs,courtofficials,andotherssubjecttotheirdirectionandcontrol.

Commentary: The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Judges can be efficient and business-like while being patient and deliberate.

(5) Judgesshallperformjudicialdutieswithoutbiasorprejudice.Judgesshallnot,intheperformanceofjudicialduties,bywordsorconductmanifestbiasorprejudice,includingbutnotlimitedtobiasorprejudicebaseduponrace,sex,religion,nationalorigin,disability,age,sexualorientationorsocio-economicstatus,andshallnotpermitstaff,courtofficialsandotherssubjecttojudi-cialdirectionandcontroltodoso.

Commentary: Judges must refrain from speech, gestures or other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment and must require the same standard of conduct of others subject to their direction and control. Judges must perform judicial duties impartially and fairly. Judges who manifest bias on any basis in a proceeding impair the fairness of the proceeding and bring the judiciary into disrepute. Facial expression, body language, in addition to oral communication, can give to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and others an appearance of judicial bias. Judges must be alert to avoid behav-ior that may be perceived as prejudicial.

(6) Judgesshallrequire*lawyersinproceedingsbeforethecourttorefrainfrommanifesting,bywordsandconduct,biasorprejudicebaseduponrace,sex,religion,nationalorigin,disability,


age,sexualorientationorsocio-economicstatus,againstparties,witnesses,counselorothers.ThisSection,3B(6),doesnotpre-cludelegitimateadvocacywhenrace,sex,religion,nationalorigin,disability,age,sexualorientationorsocio-economicstatus,orothersimilarfactors,areissuesintheproceeding.

(7) Judgesshallaccordtoeverypersonwhohasalegalinterestinaproceeding,orthatperson’slawyer,therighttobeheardaccordingtolaw*.Judgesshallnotinitiateorconsiderexpartecommunications,orconsiderothercommunicationsmadetothemoutsidethepresenceofthepartiesconcerningapendingorimpendingproceeding,exceptthat:

(a) wherecircumstancesrequire,expartecommunicationsforscheduling,whereadministrativepurposesoremergenciesthatdonotdealwithsubstantivemattersorissuesonthemeritsareauthorized;provided

(i)thejudgereasonablybelievesthatnopartywillgainaproceduralortacticaladvantageasaresultoftheexpartecommunication,and

(ii) thejudgemakesprovisionpromptlytonotifyallotherpartiesofthesubstanceoftheexpartecommunica-tionandallowsanopportunitytorespond.

(b)Judgesmayobtaintheadviceofadisinterestedexpertonthelaw*applicabletoaproceedingbeforethecourt,iftheygivenoticetothepartiesofthepersonconsultedandthesubstanceoftheadvice,andaffordthepartiesreasonableoppor-tunitytorespond.

(c)Judgesmayconsultwithcourtpersonnel*whosefunctionistoaidthemincarryingouttheiradjudicativerespon-sibilities,orwithotherjudges.

(d)Judgesmay,withtheconsentoftheparties,conferseparatelywiththepartiesortheirlawyersinanefforttomedi-ateorsettlemattersbeforethecourt.

(e)Judgesmayinitiateorconsideranyexpartecommuni-cationswhenexpresslyauthorizedbylaw*todoso.

Commentary: The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from law-yers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted.

To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their law-yers shall be included in communications with a judge.

Whenever presence of a party or notice to a party is required by Section 3B(7), it is the party’s lawyer, or if they party is unrepresented, the party, who is to be present or to whom notice is given.

An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the expert to file a brief amicus curiae.

Certain ex parte communication is approved by Section 3B(7) to facilitate scheduling and other administrative purposes and to accommodate emergencies. In general, however, judges must discourage ex parte communication and allow it only if all the criteria stated in Section 3B(7) are clearly met. Judges must disclose to all parties all ex parte communications described in Section 3B(7)(a) and 3B(7)(b) regarding a proceeding pending or impending before them.

Judges must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented.

Judges may request a party to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, so long as the other parties are apprised of the request and are given an opportunity to respond to the proposed findings and conclusions.

Judges must take reasonable efforts, including the provi-sion of appropriate supervision, to ensure that Section 3B(7) is not violated through law clerks or other personnel on their staff.

If communication between the trial judge and the appel-late court with respect to a proceeding is permitted, a copy of

any written communication or the substance of any oral com-munication should be provided to all parties.

(8) Judgesshalldisposeofalljudicialmattersfairly,prompt-ly,andefficiently.

Commentary: In disposing of matters promptly, effi-ciently and fairly, judges must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. Containing costs while pre-serving fundamental rights of parties also protects the interests of witnesses and the general public. Judges should monitor and supervise cases so as to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays and unnecessary costs. Judges should encour-age and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by courts.

(a) Theobligationofajudgetodisposeofmatterspromptlyandefficientlymustnottakeprecedenceoverthejudge’sobligationtodisposeofmattersfairlyandwithpatience.

Commentary: Prompt disposition of the court’s business requires judges to devote adequate time to their duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining mat-ters under submission, and to insist that court officials, litigants and their lawyers cooperate with them to that end.

(9) Judgesshallnot,whileaproceedingispendingorimpendinginanycourt,makeanypubliccomment*thatmightreasonablybeexpectedtoaffectitsoutcomeorimpairitsfairnessormakeanynon-publiccommentthatmightsubstantiallyinterferewithafairtrialorhearing.Judgesshallrequire*similarabstentiononthepartofcourtpersonnel*subjecttotheirdirectionandcon-trol.Thissubsectiondoesnotprohibitjudgesfrommakingpublicstatementsinthecourseoftheirofficialdutiesorfromexplainingforpublicinformationtheproceduresofthecourt.ThisSectiondoesnotapplytoproceedingsinwhichthejudgeisalitigantinapersonalcapacity.

Commentary: The requirement that judges abstain from public comment regarding a pending or impending proceeding continues during any appellate process and until final disposition. This Section does not prohibit judges from commenting on pro-ceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but in cases such as a writ of mandamus where a judge is a litigant in an official capacity, the judge must not comment publicly.

(10) Judgesshallnotcommendorcriticizejurorsfortheirverdictotherthaninacourtorderoropinioninaproceeding,butmayexpressappreciationtojurorsfortheirservicetothejudicialsystemandthecommunity.

Commentary: Commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict may imply a judicial expectation in future cases and may impair a juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.

(11)Judgesshallnotdiscloseoruse,foranypurposeunre-latedtojudicialduties,non-publicinformation*acquiredinajudicialcapacity.

C. Administrative Responsibilities

(1) Judgesshalldiligentlydischargetheiradministrativeresponsibilitieswithoutbiasorprejudice,maintainprofessionalcompetenceinjudicialadministration,andshouldcooperatewithotherjudgesandcourtofficialsintheadministrationofcourtbusiness.

(2) Judgesshallrequire*theirstaffs,courtofficialsandoth-erssubjecttotheirdirectionandcontroltoobservethestandardsoffidelityanddiligencethatapplytothejudgesandtorefrainfrommanifestingbiasorprejudiceintheperformanceoftheirofficialduties.

(3) Judgeswithsupervisoryauthorityforjudicialperfor-manceofotherjudgesshouldtakereasonablemeasurestoassurethepromptdispositionofmattersbeforethemandtheproperper-formanceoftheirotherjudicialresponsibilities.

(4) Judgesshallnotmakeunnecessaryappointments.Judgesshallexercisethepowerofappointmentimpartiallyandonthebasisofmerit.Judgesshallavoidnepotismandfavoritism.Judges


shallnotapprovecompensationofappointeesbeyondthefairvalueofservicesrendered.

Commentary: Appointees of judges include assigned coun-sel, officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers, guardians and personnel such as clerks, secretaries, and bailiffs. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge of the obligation pre-scribed by Section 3C(4).

D. Disciplinary Responsibilities

(1) JudgeswhoreceiveinformationindicatingasubstantiallikelihoodthatanotherjudgehascommittedaviolationofthisCodeshouldtakeappropriateaction.Judgeshavingknowledge*thatanotherjudgehascommittedaviolationofthisCodethatrais-esasubstantialquestionastotheotherjudge’sfitnessforofficeshallinformtheappropriateauthority*.

(2) JudgeswhoreceiveinformationindicatingasubstantiallikelihoodthatalawyerhascommittedaviolationoftheStandardsofConductoftheStateBarofGeorgiashouldtakeappropriateaction.Judgeshavingknowledge*thatalawyerhascommittedaviolationoftheStandardsofConductoftheStateBarofGeorgiathatraisesasubstantialquestionastothelawyer’shonesty,trust-worthinessorfitnessasalawyerinotherrespectsshallinformtheappropriateauthority*.

(3)Actsofjudges,inthedischargeofdisciplinaryresponsibili-ties,requiredorpermittedbySections3D(1)and3D(2)arepartoftheirjudicialdutiesandshallbeabsolutelyprivileged,andnocivilactionpredicatedthereonmaybeinstitutedagainstthesejudges.

Commentary: Appropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed the violation, or other direct action if available, and report-ing the violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or body. Section 3D(1) requires judges to inform the Judicial Qualifications Commission of any other judge’s violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, if the violation raises a substantial question of fitness for office and if the violation is actually known to the reporting judge.

Section 3D(2) also requires judges to report to the State Bar of Georgia any violation by a lawyer of the Standards of Conduct, if the violation raises a substantial question of the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer and, again, if the violation is actually known to the reporting judge.

E. Disqualification

(1) Judgesshalldisqualifythemselvesinanyproceedinginwhichtheirimpartialitymightreasonablybequestioned,includingbutnotlimitedtoinstanceswhere:

Commentary: Under this rule, judges are subject to dis-qualification whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific rules in Section 3E(1) apply. For example, if a judge were in the process of negotiating for employment with a law firm, the judge would be disqualified from any matters in which that firm appeared, unless the disqualification was waived by the parties after disclosure by the judge. Judges should disclose on the record information that the court believes the parties or their lawyers might consider rel-evant to the question of disqualification, even if they believe there is no legal basis for disqualification. The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might he required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In the latter case, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and use reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as possible.

(a)thejudgehasapersonalbiasorprejudiceconcerningapartyoraparty’slawyer,orpersonalknowledge*ofdisputedevidentiaryfactsconcerningtheproceeding;

(b)thejudgeservedasalawyerinthematterofcontro-versy,oralawyerwithwhomthejudgepreviouslypracticedlawservedduringsuchassociationasalawyerconcerningthematter,orthejudgehasbeenamaterialwitnessconcerningit;

Commentary: A lawyer in a government agency does not ordinarily have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of Section 3E(1)(b); judges formerly employed by a governmental agency, however, should disqualify themselves in a proceeding if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of such association.

(c) thejudgeorthejudge’sspouse,orapersonwithinthethirddegreeofrelationship*toeitherofthem,orthespouseofsuchaperson,oranyothermemberofthejudge’sfamilyresid-inginthejudge’shousehold*:

(i) isapartytotheproceeding,oranofficer,director,ortrusteeofaparty;

(ii) isactingasalawyerintheproceeding;

(iii) isknown*bythejudgetohaveamorethandeminimis*interestthatcouldbesubstantiallyaffectedbytheproceeding;

(iv) istothejudge’sknowledge*likelytobeamate-rialwitnessintheproceeding.

Commentary: The fact that a lawyer in a proceed-ing is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge. Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” under Section 3E(1), or that the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be “substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” under Section 3E(1)(c)(iii) requires the judge’s disqualification.

(2)Judgesshallkeepinformedabouttheirpersonalandfiduciary*economicinterests*,andmakeareasonableefforttokeepinformedaboutthepersonalfinancialinterestsoftheirspousesandminorchildrenresidingintheirhouseholds.

F. Remittal of Disqualification.

Judges disqualified by the terms of Section 3E may disclose on the record the basis of their disqualification and may ask the par-ties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other that personal bias or prejudice con-cerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

Commentary: A remittal procedure provides the parties an opportunity to proceed without delay if they wish to waive the disqualification. To assure that consideration of the question of remittal is made independently to the court, judges must not solicit, seek or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of the disqualification, unless the lawyers jointly propose remit-tal after consultation as provided in Section 3F. A party may act through counsel, if counsel represents on the record that the party has been con-sulted and consents. As a practical matter, judges may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign a remittal agreement.

Canon 4Judges may engage In aCtIvItIes to Improve the law, the legal system, and the admInIstratIon of JustICe.Judges, subject to the proper performance of their judicial duties, may not engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in so doing they cast doubt on their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before them;

A. Judges may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other activities concerning the law*, the legal system, and the administra-tion of justice. B. Judges may appear at public hearings before an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning the law*, the legal system, and the administration of justice, and they may otherwise consult with an executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice.

C. Judges may serve as members, officers, or directors of an orga-nization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law*, the legal system, or the administration of justice. They may assist such organizations in raising funds and may participate


in their management and investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising activities. They may make rec-ommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.

Commentary: As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, includ-ing revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that time permits, judges are encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law. Non quasi-judicial, or non law-related, extra-judicial activi-ties are governed by Canon 5.

Canon 5Judges shall regulate theIr extra-JudICIal aCtIvItIes to mInImIze the rIsk of ConflICt wIth theIr JudICIal dutIes.

A. Avocational Activities.

Judges may not engage in such avocational activities as detract from the dignity of their office or interfere with the performance of their judicial duties.

Commentary: Complete separation of judges from extra-judicial activi-ties is neither possible nor wise; they should not become isolated from the society in which they live.

B. Civic and Charitable Activities.

Judges may not participate in civic and charitable activities that reflect adversely upon their impartiality or interfere with the performance of their judicial duties. Judges may serve as officers, directors, trustees, or non-legal advisors of educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not conducted for the economic or political advantage of their members, subject to the fol-lowing limitations:

(1) Judgesshallnotserveifitislikelythattheorganizationwillbeengagedinproceedingsthatwouldordinarilycomebeforethemorwillberegularlyengagedinadversaryproceedingsinanycourt.

Commentary: The changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the law makes it necessary for judges regularly to re-examine the activities of each organization with which they are affiliated to determine if it is proper for them to continue their relationship with it. For example, in many jurisdic-tions charitable hospitals are now more frequently in court than in the past. Similarly, the boards of some legal aid organizations now make policy decisions that may have political significance or imply commitment to causes that may come before the courts for adjudication.

(2) Judgesshallnotsolicitfundsforanyeducational,reli-gious,charitable,fraternalorcivicorganization,oruseorpermittheuseoftheprestigeoftheirofficeforthatpurpose,buttheymaybelistedasofficers,directors,ortrusteesofsuchorganizations.Ajudgeshouldnotbeaspeakerortheguestofhonoratanyorgani-zation’sfundraisingevent,butmayattendsuchevents.

(3) Judgesshallnotgiveinvestmentadvicetosuchanorga-nization,buttheymayserveonitsboardofdirectorsortrusteeseventhoughithastheresponsibilityforapprovinginvestmentdecisions.

Commentary: A judge’s participation in an organization devoted to quasi-judicial, or law-related, extra-judicial activities is governed by Canon 4.

C. Financial Activities.

(1) Judgesshouldrefrainfromfinancialandbusinessdealingswithlawyers,litigants,andothersthattendtoreflectadverselyontheirimpartiality,interferewiththeproperperfor-manceoftheirjudicialduties,orexploittheirjudicialpositions.

(2) Subjecttotherequirementofsubsection(1),judgesmayholdandmanageinvestments,includingrealestateandengageinotherremunerativeactivityincludingtheoperationofabusiness.

(3) Judgesshouldmanagetheirinvestmentsandotherfinan-cialintereststominimizethenumberofcasesinwhichtheyaredisqualified.Assoonastheycandosowithoutseriousfinancialdetrimenttheyshoulddivestthemselvesofinvestmentsandotherfinancialintereststhatmightrequirefrequentdisqualification.

(4) Neitherjudgesnormembersoftheirfamiliesresidingintheirhouseholds*shouldacceptasubstantialgift,bequest,favororloanfromanyoneexceptasfollows:

(a) judgesmayacceptgiftsincidenttoapublictestimo-

nialtothem;bookssuppliedbypublishersonacomplimentarybasisforofficialuse;orinvitationstojudgesandtheirspousestoattendbar-relatedfunctionsoractivitiesdevotedtotheimprovementofthelaw*,thelegalsystem,ortheadministra-tionofjustice;

(b) judgesormembersoftheirfamiliesresidingintheirhouseholdsmayacceptordinarysocialhospitality;agift,bequest,favor,orloanfromarelative;aweddingorengage-mentgift;aloanfromalendinginstitutioninitsregularcourseofbusinessonthesametermsgenerallyavailabletopersonswhoarenotjudges,orascholarshiporfellowshipawardedonthesametermsappliedtootherapplicants.

(c) judgesormembersoftheirfamiliesresidingintheirhouseholdsmayacceptanyothergift,bequest,favor,orloanonlyifthedonorisnotapartyorotherpersonwhoseinterestshavecomeorarelikelytocomebeforethem,andifitsvalueexceeds$100,thejudgesreportitinthesamemannerastheyreportcompensationinCanon6C.

Commentary: This subsection does not apply to con-tributions to a judge’s campaign for judicial office, a matter governed by Canon 7.

(5)JudgesarenotrequiredbythisCodetodisclosetheirincome,debts,orinvestments,exceptasprovidedinthisCanonandCanons3and6.

Commentary: Canon 3 requires judges to disqualify them-selves in any proceeding in which they have a financial interest; Canon 5 requires judges to refrain from financial activities that might interfere with the impartial performance of their judicial duties; Canon 6 requires them to report all compensation they receive for activities involving personal services outside their judi-cial office. Judges have the rights of an ordinary citizen, including the right to privacy in their financial affairs, except to the extent that limitations thereon are required to safeguard the proper performance of their duties. Owning and receiving income from investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge’s duties.

(6) Informationacquiredbyjudgesintheirjudicialcapacityshouldnotbeusedordisclosedbytheminfinancialdealingsorforanypurposenotrelatedtotheirjudicialduties.

D. Fiduciary* Activities.

Judges should not serve as executors, administrators, trustees, guardians, or other fiduciaries, except for the estates, trusts, or per-sons of members of their families and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of their judicial duties. “Member of their families” include a spouse, child, grandchild, par-ent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship. As family fiduciaries, judges are subject to the following restrictions:

(1) Theyshouldnotserveifitislikelythatasfiduciaries,theywillbeengagedinproceedingsthatwouldordinarilycomebeforethem,oriftheestates,trusts,orwardsbecomeinvolvedinadversaryproceedingsinthecourtonwhichtheyserveoroneunderitsappellatejurisdiction.

(2) Whileactingasfiduciaries,judgesaresubjecttothesamerestrictionsonfinancialactivitiesthatapplytothemintheirper-sonalcapacities.

Commentary: Judge’s obligations under this Canon and their obligations as fiduciaries may come into conflict. For exam-ple, a judge should resign as trustee if it would result in detriment to the trust to divest it of holdings whose retention would place the judge in violation of Canon 5C(3).


E. Arbitration.

Judges shall not act as arbitrators or mediators for compensa-tion. This prohibition does not apply to senior judges who serve as judges.

F. Practice of Law.

Judges shall not practice law, unless allowed by law*.

G. Extra-judicial Appointments.

A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental commit-tee, commission, or other position hat is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law*, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if acceptance of such appointment might reasonably cast doubt upon the judge’s impartiality or demean the judge’s office.

Commentary: Valuable services have been rendered in the past to the states and the nation by judges appointed by the executive to undertake important extra-judicial assignments. The appropriateness of conferring these assignments on judges must be reassessed, however, in light of the demands on judicial manpower created by today’s crowded dockets and the need to protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial matters that may prove to be controversial. Judges should not be expected or permitted to accept governmental appointments that could interfere with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.

Canon 6Judges should regularly fIle reports of CompensatIon reCeIved for QuasI-JudICIal and extra-JudICIal related aCtIvItIes.

Judges may not receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities per-mitted by this Code, if the source of such payments gives the appearance of influencing the judge in his judicial duties or oth-erwise gives the appearance of impropriety. Such compensation is subject to the following restrictions:

A. Compensation.

Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount nor should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.

B. Expense Reimbursement.

Expense reimbursement should be limited to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging and other necessary expense reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by their spouses. Any payment in excess of such an amount is compen-sation.

C. Reports.

Except as hereinafter provided to the contrary, full-time judges should report the dates, places, and nature of any activities involv-ing personal services for which they received compensation, and the name of the payor and the amount of compensation so received. Compensation or income of a spouse attributed to the judge by operation of a community property law is not extra-judicial com-pensation to the judge. Judge’s reports for each calendar year should be filed between January first and April fifteenth of the following year in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of a judge’s federal income tax return shall be con-sidered a sufficient compliance with this paragraph. Such report or tax return shall be filed under seal and shall be available for inspec-tion only by the Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

Canon 7Judges shall refraIn from polItICal aCtIvIty InapproprIate to theIr JudICIal offICe.

A. Political Conduct in General.

(1) Ajudgeoracandidate*forpublicelection*tojudicialofficeshallnot:

(a) actorholdhimselforherselfoutasaleaderorholdanyofficeinapoliticalorganization*;

(b) makespeechesforapoliticalorganizationorcandidateorpubliclyendorseacandidateforpublicoffice;

Commentary: A candidate does not publicly endorse another candidate for public office by having his name on the same ticket.

(c) solicitfundsfororpayanassessmentormakeacontribu-tiontoapoliticalorganization,orpurchaseticketsforpoliticalpartydinners,orotherfunctions,exceptasauthorizedinsub-sectionA(2).

(2) Judgesholdinganofficefilledbypublicelection*betweencompetingcandidates*,orcandidatesforsuchoffice,mayattendpoliticalgatheringsandspeaktosuchgatheringsontheirownbehalfwhentheyarecandidatesforelectionorre-election.

B. Campaign Conduct

(1) Candidates*,includinganincumbentjudge,foranyjudicialofficethatisfilledbypublicelection*betweencompetingcan-didates:

(a) shallprohibitofficialsoremployeessubjecttotheirdirec-tionorcontrolfromdoingforthemwhattheyareprohibitedfromdoingunderthisCanonandshallnotallowanyotherpersontodoforthemwhattheyareprohibitedfromdoingunderthisCanon;

(b)shallnotmakestatementsthatcommitthecandidatewithrespecttoissueslikelytocomebeforethecourt;

Commentary: This Canon does not prohibit a judge or a candi-date from publicly stating his or her personal views on disputed issues, see Republican Party V. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). To ensure that voters understand a judge’s duty to uphold the constitution and laws of Georgia where the law differs from his or her personal belief, however, judges and candidates are encouraged to emphasize in any public statement their duty to uphold the law regardless of their personal views.

(c)shallnotuseorparticipateinthepublicationofafalsestatementoffactconcerningthemselvesortheircandidacies,orconcerninganyopposingcandidateorcandidacy,withknowledgeofthestatement’sfalsityorwithrecklessdisregardforthestatement’struthorfalsity;

Commentary: The determination of whether a candidate knows of falsity or recklessly disregards the truth or falsity of his or her public communication is an objective one, from the viewpoint of a “reasonable attorney”, using the standard of “objective mal-ice”. See In re Chmura, 608 N.W. 2d 31 (Mich. 2000)

(d) shallberesponsibleforthecontentofanystatementoradvertisementpublishedorcommunicatedinanymediumbyacampaigncommitteeifthecandidateknewoforrecklesslydisregardedthecontentofsaidstatementoradvertisementpriortoitsrelease;

(e) andexceptwhereastatementoradvertisementispub-lishedorcommunicatedbyathirdparty,shallberesponsibleforreviewingandapprovingthecontentofhisorherstate-mentsandadvertisements,andthoseofhisorhercampaigncommittee.Failuretodosowillnotbeadefensetoacom-plaintforviolationofthisCanon.

(2) Candidates*,includinganincumbentjudge,forajudicialofficethatisfilledbypublicelection*betweencompetingcandidates,maypersonallysolicitcampaigncontributionsandpubliclystatedsupport.Candidates,includingincumbentjudges,shouldnotuseorpermittheuseofcampaigncontribu-tionsfortheprivatebenefitofthemselvesormembersoftheirfamilies.

Commentary: Although judges and judicial candidates are free to personally solicit campaign contributions and publicly stated support, see Weaver Bonner, 309 F 3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002), they are encouraged to establish campaign committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for their campaigns and to obtain public statements of support of their candidacies. The use of campaign committees is encouraged because they may better maintain campaign deco-rum and reduce campaign activity that may cause requests for



recusal or the appearance of partisanship with respect to issues or the parties which require recusal.

C. Applicability

(a) ThisCanongenerallyappliestoallincumbentjudgesandjudicialcandidates*.Asuccessfulcandidate,whetherornotanincumbent,issubjecttojudicialdisciplinebytheJudicialQualificationsCommissionforhisorhercampaignconduct.

(b) Alawyerwhoisacandidate*forjudicialofficeshallcomplywithallprovisionsoftheCodeofJudicialConductapplicabletocandidates*forjudicialoffice.Anunsuccessfullawyercandidate*issubjecttodisciplineforcampaignconductbytheStateBarofGeorgiapursuanttoapplicablestandardsoftheStateBarofGeorgia,andtheJudicialQualificationsCommissionshallimmediatelyreportanysuchallegedconducttotheofficeoftheGeneralCounseloftheStateBarofGeorgiaforsuchactionasmaybeappropriateunderapplicablebarrules.

(c)Anunsuccessfulnon-lawyercandidate*issubjecttodisciplineforcampaignmisconductbytheJudicialQualificationsCommission,andinadditiontoanyothersanctionsauthorizedbytheRulesoftheJudicialQualificationsCommission,theCommission,afterfullhearing,isauthorizedtorecommendthatsuchindividualbebarredfromseekinganyelectiveorappointivejudicialofficeinthisStateforaperiodnottoexceed10years.

applICatIon of the Code of JudICIal ConduCt

Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system performing judicial functions, including an officer such as an administrative law judge of an executive branch agency or of the Board of Worker’s Compensation, an associate judge, special master, or magistrate, or any person who is a candidate for any such office is a judge for the purpose of this Code. All judges shall comply with this Code except as provided below.

A. Part-time judges.

A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but is permitted by law to devote time to some other profes-sion or occupation and whose compensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. Part-time judges:

(1) arenotrequiredtocomplywithCanon5D[fiduciaryactivites],5E[arbitration],5F[practiceoflaw],and5G[extra-judicialappointments],andarenotrequiredtocomplywithCanon6C[annualfinancialreporting].(2) shouldnotpracticelawinthecourtonwhichtheyserve,orinanycourtsubjecttotheappellatejurisdictionofthecourtonwhichtheyserve,oractaslawyersinproceedingsinwhichtheyhaveservedasjudgesorinanyproceedingrelatedthereto.

B. Judge Pro Tempore.

A judge pro tempore is a person who is appointed to act temporar-ily as a judge.

(1) Whileactingassuch,ajudgeprotemporeisnotrequiredtocomplywithCanon5C(3)[financialactivities],5D[fiduciaryactivities],5E[arbitrationandmediation],5F[practiceoflaw],and5G[extrajudicialappointments],andCanon6C[annualfinancialreporting].

(2) Personswhohavebeenjudgesprotemporeshouldnotactaslawyersinproceedingsinwhichtheyhaveservedasjudgesorinotherproceedingrelatedthereto.

C. Time for Compliance.

A person to whom this Code becomes applicable shall comply immediately with all provisions of this Code except Sections 5C(1), 5C(2), 5C(3) [personal and family financial activities] and 5D [fidu-ciary activities], and shall comply with these Sections as soon as reasonably possible and shall do so in any event within the period of one year.

Commentary: If serving as a fiduciary when selected as judge, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in Section 5D, continue to serve, but only for that period of time necessary to avoid serious adverse consequences to the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship, and in no event longer than one year. Similarly, if engaged at the time of judicial selection in a business activity, a new judge may, not withstand-

ing the prohibitions in Section 5C(1), 5C(2), and 5C(3), continue in that activity for a reasonable period, but in no event longer than one year.

D. In addition to the foregoing, the Commission shall have continu-ing jurisdiction over individuals to whom this Code is applicable regarding allegations of misconduct occurring during such individ-ual’s service as an officer of a judicial system if a complaint is filed no later than one (1) year following service of such judicial officer.

This Code shall become effective January 7, 2004.


AABSENCE AND ABSENTEES. Attorneys. Protectionofclient’sinterest,Rule4-105.. 60 Receivers,appointment,Rule4-219.......... 66 BoardofGovernors StandingBoardPolicy300......................... 16ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS. StateBar,powersandduties,Rule1-102........ 2ACQUIRING INTEREST IN LITIGATION. Rule1.8(j)...................................................... 33 Contingentfee,Rule1.8(j)(2)........................ 33ADDRESS. StateBarmember,changeofaddress,

notice,Rule1-207..................................... 3ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Lawyer’sdutytoseek,Preamble................... 26ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND TRIBUNALS. Appearancebefore,Rule3.9(Comment)...... 47ADMIRALTY PRACTICE. Advertising,Rule7.4..................................... 56ADMISSION TO THE BAR. Attorneys,examination,Rule2-101.............. 24 Rule8.1.......................................................... 56ADVANCE FEE PAYMENTS. Proprietyof,Rule1.5(Comment)................. 29ADVERSARY SYSTEM. Dutyoflawyerto,Preamble.......................... 26ADVERSE LEGAL AUTHORITY. Lawyer’sdutytodisclose,Rule3.3(a)(3)..... 43ADVERSE OR PECUNIARY INTEREST. SeeETHICS,ConflictofInterestADVERTISING OR ADVERTISEMENTS. SeealsoDISCIPLINE,ETHICS,SOLICITA-

TION,LETTERHEADS,FIRMNAMES,SPECIALIZATION

Bymail,Rule7.3........................................... 55 Communicationsconcerningalawyer’s

services,generally,Rule7.1................... 54 Comparisonswithservicesofother lawyers,Rule7.1(a)(3)............................... 54 Fieldsofpractice,Rule7.4............................ 56 Permittedforms,Rule7.1.............................. 54 Specialization,Rule7.4................................. 56ADVICE TO CLIENT. Candor,dutyof,Rule2.1............................... 41 Usedtoengageincriminalorfraudulent conduct,Rule1.2(Comment).................... 28 Whenlawyernotcompetentinarea,Rule1.1....27ADVISOR. Lawyeras,Preamble...................................... 26ADVISORY OPINIONS. SeeFORMALADVISORYOPINIONBOARD. SeeOpinionsbeginningonpage85 SeeTopicalIndexbeginningonpage74ADVOCATE. Innonadjudicativeproceedings,Rule3.9...... 47 Lawyeras,Preamble...................................... 26AMENDMENT OF RULES. Duesincreaseordecrease. Specialprocedure,Rule5-104..................... 6 Motions. FilingofMotion,Rule5-101....................... 6 Notice,Rule5-101........................................... 6 Duesincreaseordecrease,Rule5-104......... 6 Objections,Rule5-102.................................... 6 Oralargument,Rule5-103.............................. 6ALCOHOL AND DRUG IMPAIRMENT, COMMITTEE ON. Rule7-101,etseq........................................ 140AMICUS BRIEF.

StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy100... 14APPEAL. advisingclientofpossibility,Rule1.3.......... 28APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY. Rule1.10(Comment)..................................... 34APPOINTED COUNSEL. Acceptingappointments,Rule6.2................. 53 Endorsementofclient’sviews,Rule1.2(b).. 28 Requirementofcompetence,Rule1.1........... 27 Withdrawalby,Rule1.16(Comment).......... 40ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES. Absenceofparty. Arbitrationinabsence,Rule6-410........... 139 Arbitrators Communicationofpartieswith,Rule6-422... 139 Deathordisability. Effect,Rule6-405.................................. 138 Disputesamongarbitrators,Rule6-423... 139 Interpretationandapplicationofrules, Rule6-423............................................. 139 Neutrality,Rule6-302.............................. 138 OathofOffice,Rule6-408....................... 138 Qualifications,Rule6-304........................ 138 Resignation,Rule6-405........................... 138 Rosterofarbitrators,Rule6-301.............. 138 Selection,Rule6-303............................... 138 Servicewithoutfee,Rule6-305............... 138 Award,Rule6-417....................................... 139 Deliverytoparties,Rule6-421................ 139 Form,Rule6-419...................................... 139 Settlementofdisputeincourseof arbitration,Rule6-420........................... 139 Timefor,Rule6-418................................ 139 Committee. Administrationofprogram,Rule6-101... 137 Composition,Rule6-102.......................... 137 Responsibilities,Rule6-104..................... 137 Staff,Rule6-105...................................... 137 Terminationorsuspensionof proceedings,Rule6-202........................ 138 Termsofmembers,Rule6-103................ 137 Confidentialityofinformation,Rule6-701.140 Contracts. Writtencontracts,Rule6-412................... 139 Discovery. Limitations,Rule6-406............................ 138 Evidence,Rule6-411................................... 139 Hearings. Adjournment,Rule6-407......................... 138 Attendanceathearing,Rule6-402........... 138 Closingofhearings,Rule6-413............... 139 Reopeningofhearings,Rule6-414.......... 139 Confidentiality,Rule6-701...................... 140 Evidence,Rule6-411............................... 139 Orderofproceedings,Rule6-409............ 138 Righttocounsel,Rule6-403.................... 138 Stenographicrecord,Rule6-404.............. 138 Timeandplaceofhearing,Rule6-401..... 138 Waiveroforalhearing,Rule6-416.......... 139 Witnesses,Rule6-406.............................. 138 Jurisdiction,Rule6-201............................... 137 Neutralityofarbitrators,Rule6-302........... 138 Oaths. Oathofofficeofarbitrators,Rule6-408.. 138 Postdecisionactivity. Wherebothpartiesagree,Rule6-501...... 139 Whererespondentlawyerrefusestobe bound,Rule6-502.................................. 139 Revocationofsubmissiontoarbitration, Rule6-203................................................ 138 Specialcaseprocedure,Rule6-601............. 140 Terminationorsuspensionofproceedings,

Rule6-202................................................ 138 Waitingperiod,Rule6-106......................... 137 Waiver. Oralhearings,Rule6-416......................... 139 Righttoobjecttoviolationsofrules, Rule6-415............................................ 139 Witnesses,Rule6-406................................. 138ARBITRATORS. Arbitrationoffeedisputes. SeeARBITRATIONOFFEEDISPUTES. Formerarbitratornegotiatingforprivate employment,Rule1.12(b)............................ 36ATTORNEYS AT LAW. Admissiontobar,Rule2-101;Rule4-102(d), Std.1........................................................... 25 Continuinglegaleducation,Rule8-101etseq....141 Discipline. SeeDISCIPLINE. Drugimpairment,educationandrehabilitation, Rule7-101etseq...................................... 140 Educationrequirementsandexemptions, Rule8-104................................................ 142 Fees.SeeFEES. Licensesandpermits. Fees,Rule1-501;1-501.1;1-502................. 5 Multipleviolations,disc.proceedings, Rule4-103............................................... 59 Reprimand. Administration,Rule4-220........................ 66 Resolvingattorney/clientdisputes, seeRule12-101etseq.............................. 151 Appearance,Rule4-109............................. 60ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. Distinguishedfromconfidentialityrule, Rule1.6(Comment)................................... 30 Intermediation,effecton,Rule2.2(a)(1)....... 42ATTORNEY GENERAL. Authorityof,Scope........................................ 25ATTORNEY’S FEES. SeeFEES. Arbitrationoffeedisputes. SeeARBITRATIONOFFEEDISPUTES. Disputes,Rule6-101etseq......................... 137AUDITS. StateBar. Annualauditoffinancialaffairs, Rule1-505................................................. 5AUTHORITY OF LAWYER. Decisionmakingauthority,Rule1.2(a)......... 28 Governmentlawyer,Scope............................ 25AUTONOMY OF LEGAL PROFESSION. Preamble..................................................... 26AWARDS. SeeARBITRATIONOFFEEDISPUTES.

BBAR CENTER. SeeBARFACILITIES.BAR FACILITIES. Assessment,Rule1-507................................... 5BELIEF. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27BELIEVES. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27BOARD OF GOVERNORS. Alterationofpositionson,BylawArt.III, Sec.6............................................................ 9 Attendanceofmembers, StandingBoardPolicy800......................... 17 Budget,BylawArt.III,Sec.12..................... 10 Circuitmembers,BylawArt.III,Sec.2.......... 8 ConflictofInterest,

Index


StandingBoardPolicy600......................... 16 StandingBoardPolicy800......................... 17 Composition,Rule1-302................................. 3 ConfidentialityofInformation, StandingBoardPolicy600......................... 16 StandingBoardPolicy800......................... 17 Conformitytoamendments,BylawArt.III, Sec.1............................................................ 8 DisbursementofFunds,Rule1-503................ 5 DocumentHandling, StandingBoardPolicy700......................... 17 ElectionofMembers,Rule1-304, (tievote,Rule1-306)......................................... 4 ExpendituresandRevenues, StandingBoardPolicy200......................... 16 Generally,Rule1-301etseq........................... 3 GovernmentofStateBarby,Rule1-301........ 3 Honorarymembers,BylawArt.III,Sec.7...... 9 Non-residentmembers,BylawArt.III, Sec.2............................................................ 8 Meetings,Rule1-303;BylawArt.III, Sec.11.................................................... 4,10 Membership,Rule1-302................................. 3 Appointment, StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy300.. 18 Changeingeographicallimitsof judicialcircuits,Rule1-305....................... 4 List,StandingBoardPolicy500................. 16 Retired,StandingBoardPolicy400........... 16 Officers. SeeOFFICERSANDEMPLOYEES. Powersandduties,BylawArt.IIISec.10.... 10 Referendumtoentiremembership, BylawArt.XII,Sec.5................................ 14 Resignationofofficers,BylawArt.XII, Sec.1.......................................................... 14 QualificationsofMembers,Rule1-302.......... 3 Quorum,BylawArt.III,Sec.9..................... 10 Termofoffice,BylawArt.III,Sec.3,4,5....... 9 Vacancyofoffice,Rule1-306;BylawArt.III, Sec.8........................................................ 4,9 Whistleblower/Non-Retaliation, StandingBoardPolicy900......................... 17BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS. BoardofGovernors. SeeBOARDOFGOVERNORS. ChiefJustice’sCommissiononProfessionalism. SeeCOMMISSIONONPROFESSIONALISM. Clients’SecurityFund. SeeCLIENTS’SECURITYFUND. CommissiononContinuingLawyer Competency,Rule8-103.......................... 141 FormalAdvisoryOpinionBoard, Rule4-402.................................................. 73StateDisciplinaryBoard. SeeSTATEDISCIPLINARYBOARD.BONDS, SURETY. StateBar. Personsreceivingordisbursingfunds, Rule1-504........................................................ 5 Officesandfiduciaries,Rule1-504................. 5BUSINESS AFFAIRS OF LAWYER. Dutytoconductincompliancewithlaw, Preamble..................................................... 26BYLAWS. Fiscalyear,BylawArt.XII,Sec.3................ 14 Seal,BylawArt.XII,Sec.4.......................... 14 StateBar,Rule1-601....................................... 5 Amendmentorrepeal,Rule1-602;............. 6 BylawArt.XII,Sec.6............................ 14 Adoption,Rule1-601................................... 5

CCANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL. Requirementsof,Rule3.3............................. 43CASEMAKER.

StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy800... 19CAUSE OF ACTION. ViolationofRulesasbasisfor,Scope........... 26CHEMICAL DEPENDENCE. Attorneys,SeeRule7-101etseq................. 140CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM. SeeCOMMISSIONONPROFESSIONALISM.CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. Totestvalidityofstatute,Rule1.2 (Comment).................................................. 28CIVIL LIABILITY. ViolationofRulesasbasisfor,Scope........... 26CLASS ACTIONS. Noticetomembers,Rule7.2(Comment)...... 54CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP. Existenceofdefinedbysubstantivelaw, Scope........................................................... 26CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND. BoardofTrustees,Rule10-104................... 149 Confidentiality,Rule10-111....................... 150 EligibleClaims,Rule10-106....................... 149 Funding,Rule10-103.................................. 149 Immunity,Rule10-110................................ 150 Participationin,Rule1.15(I)(Comment)...... 38 Payments,Rule10-107................................ 150 RestitutionandSubrogation,Rule10-109... 150 StatuteofLimitations,Rule10-106(d)........ 150CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. GeorgiaCodeofJudicialConduct............... 159COMITY. Noadmissiontobarbycomity,Rule2-101.. 24COMMENTS. Donotexpandlawyer’sresponsibilities, Scope........................................................... 26COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM. MissionoftheChiefJustice’sCommissionon Professionalism...................................................147 Membership,Rule9-102(A)........................ 147 PowersandDuties,Rule9-102(B).............. 147 Purpose,Rule9-101..................................... 147COMMITTEES. SeeEXECUTIVECOMMITTEE. SeeYOUNGLAWYERSDIVISION. Bench&Bar, StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy400...18 Chair&ViceChairperson,Bylaw Art.VIII,Sec.2(d)..................................... 13 Meetings,BylawArt.VIII,Sec.3................. 13 Names,BylawArt.VIII,Sec.1..................... 12 Numberofmembers,BylawArt.VIII, Sec.1.......................................................... 12 OtherCommittees,Rule1-703;....................... 6 SpecialCommittees,BylawArt.VIII, Sec.2.......................................................... 13 SpecialCommittees,Rule1-702; BylawArt.VIII,Sec.2............................ 6,12 StandingCommittees. Staggeredterms,BylawArt.VIII,Sec.1.. 12 Rule1-702;BylawArt.VIII,Sec.1........... 6,12 Vacancies,BylawArt.XI,Sec.3.................. 14COMMUNICATION. Dutytomaintainwithclient,Preamble, Rule1.4(Comment)............................. 26,29 FaxesandE-mail, StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy500...18 Withrepresentedparty,Rule4.2................... 47 Withthirdpersons,Rule4.1.......................... 47 Withunrepresentedpersons,Rule4.3........... 48 Withholdinginformationfromclient, Rule1.4(Comment)................................... 29COMPETENCE. Dutyof,Preamble.......................................... 26COMPETENT REPRESENTATION. Requirementsof,Rule1.1............................. 27COMPLAINT.

Attorneys,disciplinaryproceedings, Rule4-202;................................................ 61 Limitations,Rule4-222................................. 68COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT. Attorneysfees,disputes,Rule6-420........... 139CONFIDENCES OF CLIENT. Corporateclient,Rule1.13(Comment)........ 36 Disclosureof,generally,Preamble, Rule1.6(b)............................................ 26,30 Disclosuretodisciplinaryauthorities, Rule8.1....................................................... 56 Disclosurewhenchargedwithwrongdoing, Rule1.6(b)(2)............................................. 30 Dutytopreserve,Preamble,Rule1.6(a).... 26,30 Evaluation,informationusedinpreparing, Rule2.3(b).................................................. 42 Imputedtomembersoffirm,Rule1.10 Comment)................................................... 34 Maintenanceofservespublicinterest,Preamble, Rule1.6(Comment).............................. 26,30 Perjurybyclient,Rule3.3(b)........................ 43CONFIDENTIAL & PRIVILEGED INFORMATION. Arbitrationoffeedisputes,Rule6-701....... 140 Attorneys. Alcoholordrugimpairment,Rule7-303.... 140 Committeeonlawyerimpairment,referralto, Rule4-104...................................................... 59 Discipline. ConfidentialityofProceedings, Rule4-221(d).......................................... 67 Pleadingsandcommunications privileged,Rule4-221(g).......................... 68 SeeETHICS.CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. SeealsoETHICS Acquiringinterestinlitigation, Rule1.8(j)(2).............................................. 33 Advocate,whenactingas, Rule1.7(Comment)................................... 31 Businessinterestsoflawyer, Rule1.7(Comment)................................... 31 Businesstransactionwithclient, Rule1.8(a).................................................. 32 Consentofclientto,Rule1.7(c)(2);Rule 1.7(b)(2);Rule1.7(Comment)..................... 31 Co-parties,representationof,Rule1.7 (Comment).................................................. 31 Decliningemploymentbecauseof, Rule1.7(Comment)................................... 31 Estateplanningoradministration, Rule1.7(Comment)................................... 31 Existingclient,interestadversetoclient, Rule1.7(a).................................................. 31 Feepaidbyoneotherthanclient,Rule1.7 (Comment)..................................................... 31 Formerclient,Rule1.9.................................. 33 Generalrule,Rule1.7................................. 31 Interestoflawyeradversetoclient, Rule1.7(b).................................................. 31 Legalservicescorporation,lawyerservesas directorof,Rule6.3.................................... 53 “Matter”defined,Rule1.9(Comment)......... 34 Multiplerepresentation,Rule1.7(b)(2)......... 31 Negotiation,Rule1.7(Comment).................. 31 Opposingpartyraises,Rule1.7(Comment). 31 Thirdperson,interestadversetoclient, Rule1.7(b).................................................. 31 Unrelatedmatters,Rule1.7(Comment)........ 31 Withdrawalbecauseof,Rule1.7(Comment)... 31CONSTITUTIONAL LA., Governingauthorityofgovernmentlawyer, Scope........................................................... 26CONSULT. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27


CONSULTATION. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. Rule12-101etseq....................................... 151CONTEMPT. Discipline,Rule4-221(b)............................... 67CONTINGENT FEE. Expertwitness,Rule3.4(Comment)............. 45 Prohibitedrepresentations,Rule1.5(d)......... 29 Requirementsof,Rule1.5(c)......................... 29CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION. Attorneys,Rule8-101etseq....................... 141 Competence,tomaintain,Rule1.1 (Comment).................................................. 27CONTRACTS. StateBar. Powertocontract,Rule1-102...................... 2CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. Attorneys,discipline,Rule4-104.................. 59 ImpairmentProgram,Rule7-101etseq...... 140COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. Rule9.3.......................................................... 58COPYRIGHT. StandingExecutiveBoardPolicy700........... 19CORPORATE REPRESENTATION. SeeORGANIZATION,Representationof.CORPORATION. Communicatingwithemployeesandofficers of,Rule4.2(Comment).............................. 47COURT. Authorityoverlegalprofession,Preamble.... 26 Candor,dutyof,Rule3.3............................... 43 Offeringfalseevidenceto,Rule3.3(a)(4)..... 43CREDITORS OF CLIENT. Claimfundsofclient,Rule1.15(I) (Comment).................................................. 38CRIMINAL CONDUCT. Counselingorassistingaclienttoengage in,Rule1.2(d);Rule3.3(a)(2).............. 28,43 Disclosureofclient’s,Rule1.2(Comment).... 28CRIMINAL REPRESENTATION. Aggregatepleabargainonbehalfofmultiple defendants,Rule1.8(g)............................... 33 Co-defendants,representationof,Rule1.7 (Comment).................................................. 31 Contingentfeefor,Rule1.5(d)(2)................. 29 Decisionmakingauthority,Rule1.2(a)......... 28 Frivolousdefense,Rule3.1........................... 43 Perjurybyclient,Rule3.3(Comment).......... 43

DDEATH. Arbitrator,attorneysfees,disputes, Rule6-405................................................ 138 Attorneys. Receivers,appointment,Rule4-219.......... 66DECEASED LAWYER. Paymentstoestateof,Rule5.4(a)(2)............ 49DEFINITIONS. Discipline,Rule4-110................................... 60DELEGATES TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. Nomination&election,BylawArt.X, Sec.1.......................................................... 13 TermsofOffice,BylawArt.X,Sec.2.......... 14 VacancyofTerm,BylawArt.XI,Sec.1...... 14DERIVATIVE ACTIONS. Rule1.13(Comment)..................................... 36DILATORY PRACTICES. Prohibited,Rule3.2(Comment).................... 43DILIGENCE. Dutyof,Preamble,Rule1.3.................... 26,28DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. Disclosureofclientconfidencesinconnection with,Rule1.6(Comment).......................... 29

Failuretocomplywithrequestsfor information,Rule8.1(b)............................. 56 Jurisdiction,Rule8.5..................................... 57 Reportingprofessionalmisconduct, Rule8.3....................................................... 57DISCIPLINE. Admonition. Lettersofadmonition,Rule4-207............. 63 Righttorejectletterofformaladmonition, Rule4-207............................................... 63 Advisoryopinions,OfficeofGeneralCounsel, Rule4-401............................................... 73 Advisoryopinions,StateDisciplinaryBoard, Rule4-223............................................... 68 Answerofrespondent,Rule4-212................ 65 Appeals. Convictionofcrime,Rule4-106................ 60 ExceptionstoreportofSpecialMaster, Rule4-218............................................... 66 ExceptionstoreportofReviewPanel, Rule4-219............................................... 66 Board.Seewithinthisheading,“State DisciplinaryBoard.” BurdenofProof,Rule4-221......................... 67 Complaints. Filing,Rule4-202....................................... 61 Formalcomplaint,Rule4-211.................... 65 Answer,Rule4-212.................................. 65 Service,Rule4-211.................................. 65 Initialreviewbybarcounsel,Rule4-202.. 61 Preliminaryinvestigation,Rule4-204........ 62 Receiptofcomplaint,Rule4-202............... 61 Rightofrespondentattorneys, Rule4-204............................................... 62 StateDisciplinaryBoard,InvestigativePanel.. Powersanddutiesofboardasto, Rule4-203............................................... 62 Preliminaryinvestigation,Rule4-204..... 62 Conductconstitutingthreatofharm toclientorpublic. Proceedingsupon,Rule4-108.................... 60 Confidentialdiscipline. Contents,Rule4-206.................................. 63 Effectineventofsubsequentdiscipline, Rule4-208............................................... 63 Generally,Rule4-205................................ 63 Confidentialityofinformation. Pleadingsandcommunications privileged,Rule4-221............................... 67 Privateproceedings,Rule4-221................. 67 Contempt,Rule4-221.................................... 67 Death. Investigationofdeathofattorney, Rule4-105............................................... 60 Definitions,Rule4-110.................................. 60 Disappearanceofattorney. Investigationbydisciplinaryboard, Rule4-105;............................................. 60 Disbarment. Convictionofcrime,Rule4-106................ 60 Mentalincapacity,Rule4-104................... 59 Notice,Rule4-220...................................... 66 Reinstatement.Seewithinthisheading, “Reinstatement.” StateDisciplinaryBoard,ReviewPanel. Numberofaffirmativevotesrequired, Rule4-201(b)......................................... 61 DisciplinaryBoard.Seewithinthisheading, “StateDisciplinaryBoard.” Discovery,Rule4-212................................... 65 Dismissalafterformalcomplaint, Rule4-211.1............................................... 65 DocketingofmattersbySupremeCourt, Rule4-209.................................................. 64 Drugaddiction. Groundsforremovalfrompracticeoflaw,

Rule4-104............................................... 59 EmergencySuspension,Rule4-108.............. 60 Evidence,Rule4-221..................................... 67 Felonies. Appealofconviction,Rule4-106.............. 60 Convictionasgroundsfordisbarment, Rule4-104............................................... 59 FindingsbyReviewPanel,Rule4-218......... 66 FormalAdvisoryOpinionBoard, Rule4-402.................................................. 73 Formaladvisoryopinions,Rule4-403.......... 73 HabitualIntoxication. Groundsforremovalfrompractice, Rule4-104............................................... 59 Hearings. Evidentiaryhearing,Rule4-213................. 65 Reinstatement,Rule4-302......................... 72 Venueofhearing,Rule4-221.................... 67 Immunity,Rule4-226.................................... 68 Impairment. Groundsforremovalfrompractice, Rule4-104............................................... 59 Imprisonmentofattorney. InvestigationbyDisciplinaryBoard, Rule4-105............................................... 60 Incapacityofattorney. InvestigationbyDisciplinaryBoard, Rule4-105............................................... 60 Investigations. Complaint. PreliminaryinvestigationbyState DisciplinaryBoard,Rule4-204............... 62 InvestigativePanel,Rule4-201etseq........... 60 Powersandduties,Rule4-203................... 61 Investigations,Rule4-204.......................... 62 Judgments,Rule4-219................................... 66 Notice,Rule4-220...................................... 66 LettersofFormalAdmonition,Rule4-207... 63 LettersofInstruction,Rule4-204.5............... 63 Limitationofactions,Rule4-222.................. 68 Masters.Seewithinthisheading,“Special Masters.” Mentalincapacity. Groundsforremovalfrompracticeoflaw, Rule4-104............................................... 59 Misdemeanors. Convictioninvolvingmoralturpitude. Appealofconviction,Rule4-106............ 60 Multipleviolations,Rule4-103..................... 59 Notice. Punishmentoracquittal,Rule4-220.......... 66 NoticeofDiscipline,Ruless4-208.1-4.... 63,64 Protectiveorders,Rule4-219........................ 66 Reciprocal,Rule9.4....................................... 58 Reinstatementfromdisbarment. SeeRulesGoverningAdmissiontoPractice

Law,PartA:BoardtoDetermineFitnessofBarApplicants,Section10.Availableathttp://www.gabaradmissions.org/.

Reprimand,Rule4-220.................................. 66 Refusalorfailuretoappearforreprimand, Rule4-109............................................... 60 Rightofrejection,Rule4-207.................... 63 ReviewPanel. Findings,Rule4-218.................................. 66 Generally,Rule4-201................................ 60 Serviceofprocess. Complaints. Formalcomplaint,Rule4-211................. 65 Investigation,Rule4-203......................... 61 SpecialMasters. Appointment,Rule4-209........................... 64 Challengesto,Rule4-209.......................... 64 Duties,Rule4-210...................................... 65 Evidentiaryhearing,Rule4-213................. 65 Powers,Rule4-210.................................... 65


Report,Rule4-217..................................... 65 StateDisciplinaryBoard. Chairman,Rule4-201................................ 60 Complaints. Powersanddutiesofboardasto, Rule4-203............................................. 61 Preliminaryinvestigation,Rule4-204..... 62 Composition,Rule4-201............................ 60 Disbarment. Numberofaffirmativevotesrequired, Rule4-201............................................. 60 Duties,Rule4-203...................................... 61 Generally,Rule4-201................................ 60 Oathsofmembers,Rule4-221................... 67 Powers,Rule4-203.................................... 61 Quorum,Rule4-201................................... 60 Suspension. Numberofaffirmativevotesrequired, Rule4-201............................................. 60 Termsofmembers,Rule4-201.................. 60 Vacancies. Filling,Rule4-201................................... 60 Subpoenas,Rule4-221.................................. 67 SuperiorCourtproceedings. Jurytrial,Rule4-215.................................. 65 Transmissionoffindings,Rule4-216........ 65 Suspension. Appealofconvictionofcrime. Suspensionduringappeal,Rule4-106..... 60 Conductconstitutingthreatofharmto clientsorpublic,Rule4-108................... 60 Numberofaffirmativevotesrequired, Rule4-201(b).......................................... 61 Refusalorfailuretoappearforreprimand, Rule4-109............................................... 60 Reinstatement. Seewithinthisheading,“Reinstatement.” Venue. Hearings,Rule4-221.................................. 67 ViolationofRulesasbasisfor,Scope........... 26 Witnesses,Rule4-221................................... 67DISCOVERY. Refusingtocomply,Rule3.4........................ 44 Obstructivetactics,Rule3.4.......................... 44DISCRETION OF LAWYER. WhereRulecastin“may,”Scope................. 26DISQUALIFICATION. Formerjudge,Rule1.12(a)............................ 36 Imputed,SeeIMPUTEDDISQUALIFICATION Vicarious,SeeIMPUTEDDISQUALIFICATION Waiverbyclient,Rule1.9(Comment); Rule1.10..................................................... 34DIVISION OF FEES. Requirementsof,Rule1.5(e)......................... 29 Withnonlawyer,Rule5.4(a).......................... 49DOMESTIC RELATIONS MATTERS. Contingentfeein,Rule1.5(d)(1)................... 29DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE. StateBar,membership,Rule1-205................. 2DRUG ADDICTION. SeeIMPAIRMENT.DUES. Increaseordecrease.Rule5-104..................... 6 SeealsoFEES,licensefees.

EEFFECTIVE DATE OF RULES. Rule5-201........................................................ 7ELECTIONS. Ballots. Distribution,Rule1-304;BylawArt.VII, Sec.6................................................... 4,11 Voterslists;Distributionofballots, BylawArt.VII,Sec.7.............................. 11 BoardofGovernors,Rule1-304..................... 4 Acceptingnominations,BylawArt.VII,

Sec.5....................................................... 11 Circuitshavingmorethanonemember, BylawArt.VII,Sec.3.............................. 11 Members,Rule1-304................................... 4 Nomination,BylawArt.VII,Sec.2........... 11 Acceptingnominations,BylawArt.VII, Sec.5..................................................... 11 NominatingPetition,BylawArt.VII, Sec.4..................................................... 11 Conductofelections,BylawArt.VII, Sec.8.......................................................... 12 Recount,BylawArt.VII,Sec.9............. 12 Run-Off,BylawArt.VII,Sec.12........... 12 Tievotes,Rule1-306;BylawArt.VII, Sec.11....................................................... 4,12 Officers,Nominationof,Rule1-402;............. 4 BylawArt.VII,Sec.1............................... 11 Resultsofelections,Declarationof, BylawArt.VII,Sec.10.............................. 12 Supervisionofelections. ExecutiveCommittee,Rule1-701............... 6 ElectionsCommittee,Rule1-702;............... 6 BylawArt.IX,Sec.3............................... 13ELECTIONS COMMITTEE. StateBar,Rule1-702;BylawArt.IX, Sec.3...................................................... 6,13EMERITUS MEMBERSHIP. StateBar,Rule1-202....................................... 2EMPLOYEES OF LAWYER. Responsibilityfor,Rule5.3........................... 49ESTATE PLANNING. Conflictsofinterestin,Rule1.7(Comment).... 31EVALUATION. Confidentialinformationusedinpreparing, Rule2.3(b).................................................. 42 Thirdperson,preparedatclient’srequestfor, Rule2.3....................................................... 42EVALUATOR. Lawyeras,Preamble...................................... 26EVIDENCE. Arbitrationoffeedisputes,Rule6-411....... 139 Destructionof,Rule3.3(a)............................ 43 Obstructingopposingparty’saccessto,Rule 3.4(a).............................................................. 44 Offeringfalse,Rule3.3(a)(4)........................ 43EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS. Rule3.3(d)..................................................... 43EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. Duties,BylawArt.IV,Sec.2........................ 10 Membersof,BylawArt.IV,Sec.1............... 10 StateBar,Rule1-701....................................... 6EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. Duties,BylawArt.VI,Sec.3........................ 11 Election,BylawArt.VI,Sec.1..................... 11 Salary,duties,term,BylawArt.VI,Sec.2... 11EXHIBITS. Attorneysfees,disputes,hearings, Rule6-411................................................ 139EXPEDITING LITIGATION. Rule3.2.......................................................... 43EXPENSES OF LITIGATION. Client’srighttodetermine,Rule1.2 (Comment).................................................. 28 Indigentclient,payingonbehalfof, Rule1.8(e)(2).............................................. 33 Lawyeradvancingtoclient,Rule1.8(e)(1)... 32EXPERT WITNESS. SeeunderWITNESS.EXPERTISE. Asrelatingtocompetentrepresentation, Rule1.1....................................................... 27

FFAIRNESS. Toopposingpartyandcounsel,Rule3.4...... 44

FALSE STATEMENT. Madetotribunal,Rule3.3(a)(1).................... 43FEES. Acquiringownershipinterestinenterpriseas, Rule1.5(Comment)..........................................29 Advancefeepayments,Rule1.5 (Comment).................................................. 29 Advertisingof,Rule7.2(Comment)............. 55 Arbitrationoffeedisputes. Rule1.5(Comment)................................... 29 SeealsoARBITRATIONOFFEEDISPUTES. Communicationtoclient,Rule1.5(b)........... 29 Contingentfee. Prohibitedrepresentations,Rule1.5(d)...... 29 Requirementsof,Rule1.5(c)...................... 29 Determinationof,Rule1.5(a)........................ 29 Disclosureofconfidentialinformation tocollect,Rule1.6(b)(2)............................ 30 Divisionof,Rule1.5(e)................................. 29 Licensefees. Amendmentofrules. Increaseordecreaseoffees. Specialprocedure,Rule5-104.................. 6 Amount,Rule1-502..................................... 5 Associates,Rule1-502.1............................ 5 Increaseordecrease. Specialprocedureforrulesamendment, Rule5-104............................................. 5 Associates,Rule1.502.1.............................. 5 Delinquency. Penalty,Rule1-501.1................................. 5 Procedureon,Rule1-501........................... 4 Whendueandpayable,Rule1-501............. 4 Paidbyoneotherthanclient. Rule1.7(Comment);Rule1.8(f); Rule5.4(c)...................................31,33,49 Penalties. Delinquency,Rule1-501.1........................... 5FINANCE. Audits,Rule1-505........................................... 5 Bonds,surety. Personsreceivingordisbursingfunds, Rule1-504................................................. 5 Disbursement,Rule1-503............................... 5 LicenseFees. SeeFEES.FIRM. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27 Disqualification,Rule1.10(Comment)......... 34FIRM NAME. Rule7.5(a)...................................................... 56FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS. ContinuingLegalEducationrequirements, Rule8-112................................................ 147 Generally,Rule1-202(c);BylawArt.I, Sec.2........................................................ 2,7FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD. Compositionandtermofmembers, Rule4-402.................................................. 73 Confidentialityoflawyerrequesting opinion,Rule4-403(g)............................... 73 Immunityforboardmembers,Rule4-404.... 73 Opinions. Procedure,Rule4-403................................ 73 Relianceuponasdefensetocomplaint, Rule4-403(e)........................................... 73 StaffsupportfromOfficeofGeneralCounsel, Rule4-403(f)............................................ 73FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONSRulesofConductandProceduresoftheFormal AdvisoryOpinionBoard................................ 74IndexestoAdvisoryOpinions............................ 74 TopicalIndex.............................................. 74 QuestionPresentedIndex........................... 81 GeorgiaRulesofProfessional ConductIndex......................................... 83


Opinions......................................................... 85 AdvisoryOpinion5.................................... 85 AdvisoryOpinion16.................................. 85 AdvisoryOpinion17.................................. 87 AdvisoryOpinion19.................................. 88 AdvisoryOpinion21.................................. 88 AdvisoryOpinion22.................................. 90 AdvisoryOpinion23.................................. 90 AdvisoryOpinion26.................................. 90 AdvisoryOpinion27.................................. 91 AdvisoryOpinion29.................................. 92 AdvisoryOpinion30.................................. 93 AdvisoryOpinion31.................................. 93 AdvisoryOpinion35.................................. 93 AdvisoryOpinion36.................................. 94 AdvisoryOpinion37.................................. 94 AdvisoryOpinion38.................................. 95 AdvisoryOpinion39.................................. 95 AdvisoryOpinion40.................................. 96 AdvisoryOpinion41.................................. 96 AdvisoryOpinion42.................................. 97 AdvisoryOpinion45.................................. 98 AdvisoryOpinion46.................................. 98 AdvisoryOpinion47.................................. 99 AdvisoryOpinion48.................................. 99 AdvisoryOpinion49................................ 100 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-1................ 101 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-2................ 102 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-3................ 102 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-4................ 102 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-5................ 103 FormalAdvisoryOpinion86-7................ 104 FormalAdvisoryOpinion87-1................ 105 FormalAdvisoryOpinion87-5................ 105 FormalAdvisoryOpinion87-6................ 106 FormalAdvisoryOpinion88-2................ 107 FormalAdvisoryOpinion88-3................ 107 FormalAdvisoryOpinion89-2................ 108 FormalAdvisoryOpinion91-1................ 108 FormalAdvisoryOpinion91-2................ 110 FormalAdvisoryOpinion93-3................ 110 FormalAdvisoryOpinion93-4................ 112 FormalAdvisoryOpinion94-1................ 113 FormalAdvisoryOpinion94-2................ 113 FormalAdvisoryOpinion94-3................ 113 FormalAdvisoryOpinion95-1................ 113 FormalAdvisoryOpinion96-1................ 114 FormalAdvisoryOpinion97-2................ 115 FormalAdvisoryOpinion97-3................ 116 FormalAdvisoryOpinion98-2................ 116 FormalAdvisoryOpinion98-3................ 117 FormalAdvisoryOpinion98-4................ 118 FormalAdvisoryOpinion99-2................ 118 FormalAdvisoryOpinion00-2................ 119 FormalAdvisoryOpinion00-3................ 121 FormalAdvisoryOpinion01-1................ 121 FormalAdvisoryOpinion03-1................ 122 FormalAdvisoryOpinion03-2................ 123 FormalAdvisoryOpinion03-3................ 123 FormalAdvisoryOpinion04-1................ 124 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-2................ 125 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-3................ 126 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-4................ 127 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-5................ 128 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-6................ 129 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-7................ 129 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-8................ 130 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-9................ 130 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-10.............. 132 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-11.............. 133 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-12.............. 134 FormalAdvisoryOpinion05-13.............. 134 FormalAdvisoryOpinion07-1................ 136FORMER CLIENT. SeeunderCONFLICTOFINTEREST.FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYER.

“Confidentialgovernmentinformation” defined,Rule1.11(e).................................. 35 “Matter”defined,Rule1.11(d)...................... 35 Successivegovernmentandprivate employmentRule1.11................................ 35FORMER JUDGE. SeeunderJUDGES.FRAUD. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27FRAUDULENT. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. Counselingorassistingclienttoengagein, Rule1.2(d).................................................. 28 Disclosureofclient’s,Rule1.2(Comment).. 28FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS AND DEFENSES. Rule3.1.......................................................... 43FUNDS OF CLIENT. Handlingof,Rule1.15(I)(b).......................... 38 Lawyerclaimsinterestin,Rule1.15(II)(c)... 38

GGIFT. Tolawyerbyclient,Rule1.8(c).................... 32GOVERNMENT AGENCY. Representationof,Rule1.13(Comment)...... 36GOVERNMENT LAWYER. Authorityestablishedbyconstitution,statutes andcommonlaw,Scope................................ 26 Conflictofinterest,Rule1.7(Comment)...... 31 Dutyofconfidentiality,Rule1.6(Comment)30 Representingmultipleclients,Scope............. 26 Subjecttorules,Rule1.11(Comment)......... 35

HHARASS. Law’sproceduresusedto,Preamble............. 26HEARINGS. Arbitrationoffeedisputes. Adjournment,Rule6-407......................... 138 Attendanceathearing,Rule6-402........... 138 Closingofhearings,Rule6-413............... 139 Confidentiality,Rule6-701...................... 140 Evidence,Rule6-411............................... 139 Orderofproceedings,Rule6-409............ 138 Reopening,Rule6-414............................. 139 Righttocounsel,Rule6-403.................... 138 Stenographicrecord,Rule6-404.............. 138 Timeandplaceofhearing,Rule6-401.... 138 Waiveroforalhearing,Rule6-416.......... 139 Witnesses,Rule6-406.............................. 138 Discipline. Evidentiaryhearing,Rule4-213................. 65 Reinstatement,Rule4-302......................... 72 Venueofhearings,Rule4-221................... 67

IIMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT. Duties,BylawArt.V,Sec.4......................... 10 Election. SeeELECTIONS. Succession,BylawArt.V,Sec.4.................. 10IMPAIRMENT. SeeLawyerAssistanceProgramIMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL. Rule3.5.......................................................... 45IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION. Generalrule,Rule1.10.................................. 34 Governmentlawyers,Rule1.11(Comment). 35 Witness,whenmemberoffirmservesas, Rule3.7(b).................................................. 46INCOMPETENT CLIENT. Appointmentofguardianfor,Rule1.14(b)... 37 Representationof,Rule1.14(a)..................... 37INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

Preamble......................................................... 26INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT. Dutytoexercise,Rule2.1;Rule5.4........ 41,49INDIGENT CLIENT. Payingcourtcostsandexpensesonbehalfof, Rule1.8(e)(2)................................................. 33INSANITY. Attorneys,BarRule4-104............................. 59INSURANCE REPRESENTATION. Conflictofinterest,Rule1.7(Comment)...... 31INTERMEDIARY. Betweenclients,Rule2.2.............................. 42 Lawyeras,Preamble...................................... 26 Withdrawalas,Rule2.2(b)............................ 42INTIMIDATE. Law’sprocedureusedto,Preamble............... 26INVESTIGATIONS. Discipline. SeeDISCIPLINE.

JJUDGES. Dutytoshowrespectfor,Preamble............... 26 Expartecommunicationwith,Rule3.5(b).... 45 Formerjudge,disqualification,Rule1.12..... 36 GeorgiaCodeofJudicialConduct............... 159 Improperinfluenceon,Rule3.5(a)................ 45 Misconductby,Rule8.3(b)........................... 57 Statementsabout,Rule8.2............................ 57JUDGMENTS. Discipline,Rule4-219................................... 66JUDICIAL CIRCUITS. Membershipinjudicialcircuit,Rule1-205..... 2 BoardofGovernors. Election,SeeBOARDOFGOVERNORS.JUDICIAL CONDUCT. GeorgiaCodeofJudicialConduct............... 159JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROFESSIONALISM PROGRAM. SeeRule13-101etseq................................ 151JUDICIAL PROCEDURE & ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE. StateBar,Rule1-702....................................... 6JUROR. Improperinfluenceon,Rule3.5(a)................ 45JURY TRIAL. Client’srighttowaive,Rule1.2(a)............... 28

LLAW CLERK. Negotiatingforprivateemployment, Rule1.12(b)................................................ 36LAW FIRM. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27 Nonlawyerassistants,responsibilityfor, Rule5.3....................................................... 49 Responsibilityofpartnerorsupervisory lawyer,Rule5.1.......................................... 48 Subordinatelawyer,responsibilityof, Rule5.2....................................................... 49LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES. Affectingclients’interests,Rule6.4............. 54LAW REVISION COMMITTEE. StateBar,Rule1-702....................................... 6LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. Attorneys. Committeeonalcohol&drugimpairment, Rule7-101etseq..................................... 140 Disbarment,Rule4-104.............................. 59 Educationandrehabilitation,Rule7-101 etseq...................................................... 140 Discipline. Habitualintoxication. Groundsforremovalfrompracticeoflaw, Rule4-104............................................. 59 Judges,education&rehabilitation,


Rule7-101etseq...................................... 140LAWYER AS PUBLIC OFFICIAL. Rule9.5.......................................................... 59LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE. Rule6.1(Comment)....................................... 53 Costsof,Rule7.2(b)...................................... 54LEGAL EDUCATION. Dutytoworktostrengthen,Preamble........... 26LEGISLATION. AdvisoryCommitteeon, StandingBoardPolicy100,Sec.1.04........ 15 BoardofGovernors, StandingBoardPolicy100,Sec.1.02........ 15 DraftingandConsultingServices, StandingBoardPolicy100,Sec.1.05........ 15 ExecutiveCommittee, StandingBoardPolicy100,Sec.1.03........ 15 Generalpolicy, StandingBoardPolicy100,Sec.1.01........ 14LEGISLATURE. Appearancebeforeonbehalfofclient, Rule3.8....................................................... 46LETTERHEADS. Falseormisleading,Rule7.5(a).................... 56 Jurisdictionallimitationsofmembers, Rule7.5(b).................................................. 56 Publicofficials,Rule7.5(c)........................... 56 StateBar, StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy200...18LETTERS OF ADMONITION. SeeDISCIPLINE.LIABILITY TO CLIENT. Agreementslimiting,Rule1.8(h).................. 33LICENSES AND PERMITS. Bar,fees,amount,Rule1-502......................... 5 Fees,StateBar,delinquentpayments, Rule1-501.1................................................. 5 StateBar,Rule1-501....................................... 4 Amount,Rule1-502..................................... 5 Delinquentfees,Rule1-501.1...................... 5 Feesforassociates,Rule1-502.1................. 5LICENSE FEES. SeeFEES.LIEN. Tosecurefeesandexpenses, Rule1.8(j)(1).............................................. 33LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Attorneys. Reinstatement,Rule4-304......................... 72 Discipline,Rule4-222................................... 68LITERARY RIGHTS. Acquiringconcerningrepresentation, Rule1.8(d).................................................. 32LITIGATION. Expedite,dutyto,Rule3.2............................ 42LOYALTY. Dutyoftoclient,Rule1.7(Comment)......... 31

MMALPRACTICE. Limitingliabilitytoclientfor,Rule1.8(h).... 33MEETINGS. BoardofGovernors,Rule1-301..................... 3 Orderofbusiness,BylawArt.II,Sec.3...... 8 Proposedlegislation,BylawArt.II, Sec.6......................................................... 8 Quorum,BylawArt.II,Sec.4..................... 8 Resolutionscommittee,BylawArt.II, Sec.5......................................................... 8 Rulesoforder,BylawArt.II,Sec.2............ 8 StateBar. AnnualMeeting,Rule1-801; BylawArt.II,Sec.1............................. 6,8 AnnualMid-yearmeeting,Rule1-801.1...... 6 Specialmeetings,Rule1-802....................... 6

Noticebymail,Rule1-803........................ 6MEMBERSHIP. StateBar,Rule1-201....................................... 2 Active,Rule1-202;BylawArt.I, Sec.2..................................................... 2,7 ActiveDutyGuardsman/Reservists, BylawArt.I,Sec.8................................... 8 Failingtoregister,BylawArt.I,Sec.4....... 7 GoodStanding,Rule1-204.......................... 2 Listofactivemembers,Bylaw Art.I,Sec.5.............................................. 7 AffiliateandLawStudentMembership, Rule1-206;BylawArt.I,Sec.6............ 2,8 Changeofaddress,Rule1-207..................... 3 Classesofmembers,Rule1-202.................. 2 Emeritus,Rule1-202;BylawArt.I, Sec.7..................................................... 2,8 ForeignLawConsultants,Rule1-202;Bylaw Art.I,Sec.2.........................................................2,7 Inactive,BylawArt.I,Sec.3....................... 7 Failingtoregister,BylawArt.I,Sec.4..... 7 RegistrationofMember,BylawArt.I, Sec.1......................................................... 7MENTALLY DEFICIENT & MENTALLY ILL PERSONS. Arbitrator,attorneyfee,disputes, Rule6-405................................................ 138 Attorneys. Disbarment,Rule4-104.............................. 59 Investigations,Rule4-105.......................... 60 Receivers,appointment,Rule4-219.......... 66MENTAL INCAPACITY. Discipline. Groundsforremovalfrompracticeoflaw, Rule4-104.................................................. 59MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS. Rule3.1.......................................................... 43MILITARY FORCES. StateBar,membership,Rule1-202................. 2MILITARY LAWYERS. Adverseinterests,representationof,Rule1.9(Comment)...................................................... 34MISCONDUCT. Formsof,Rule8.4......................................... 57MISDEMEANORS. SeeDiscipline.MISLEADING LEGAL ARGUMENT. Rule3.3(Comment)....................................... 44MISREPRESENTATION. Inadvertisements,Rule7.1............................ 54 Tocourt,Rule3.3(Comment)....................... 43MORAL TURPITUDE. SeeDiscipline.MOTIONS. Amendmentofrules. Filingofmotion,Rule5-101........................ 6 Objectionto,Rule5-102.............................. 6MULTIPLE CLIENTS. SeeETHICS.MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION. SeeunderCONFLICTOFINTEREST;Seealso INTERMEDIARY.

NNAMES. Changeofnamenotice,Rule1-207................ 3NEGOTIATION. Conflictinginterest,representationof, Rulel.7(Comment).................................... 31 Statementsmadeduring,Rule4.1 (Comment).................................................. 47NEGOTIATOR. Lawyeras,Preamble...................................... 26NOMINATIONS AND ELECTIONS. SeeELECTIONS.

NONLAWYER. Divisionoffeeswith,Rule5.4(a).................. 49 Partnershipwith,Rule5.4(b)......................... 49NONRESIDENTS. Practiceoflaw,Rule1-203............................. 2NOTICE. Amendmentofrules,Rule5-101..................... 6 Duesincreaseordecrease,Rule5-104......... 6 AmendmentofBylaw,Rule1-602.................. 6 Discipline. Punishmentoracquittal,Rule4-220.......... 66 Meetings,Rule1-803....................................... 6

OOATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS. Arbitrationoffeedisputes. Oathofofficeofarbitrators, Rule6-408............................................. 138 Attorneys. Admissiontothebar,Rule2-101............... 24 StateDisciplinaryBoard. Oathsofmembers,Rule4-221................... 67OBJECTIVES OF THE REPRESENTATION. Client’srighttodetermine,Rule1.2(a)......... 28 Lawyer’srighttolimit,Rule1.2(c)............... 28OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES. Bond,BylawArt.V,Sec.8........................... 11 Election. SeeELECTIONS. Generally,Rule1-401;BylawArt.V, Sec.1...................................................... 4,10 ExecutiveDirector,BylawArt.VI............. 11 Ex-OfficioMembers,BylawArt.V, Sec.7....................................................... 11 ImmediatePastPresident,Bylaw Art.V,Sec.4........................................... 10 President,BylawArt.V,Sec.2.................. 10 President-Elect,BylawArt.V,Sec.3........ 10 Eligibility,Rule1-404................................ 4 Secretary,BylawArt.V,Sec.5................. 10 Treasurer,BylawArt.V,Sec.6................. 10 Termsofoffice,Rule1-401............................. 4 YoungLawyersDivision. SeeYOUNGLAWYERSDIVISION. Vacancies. Filling,Rule1-403........................................ 4 SeealsoVACANCIES.OPPOSING PARTY. Communicationswithrepresentedparty, Rule4.2....................................................... 47 Dutyoffairnessto,Rule3.4.......................... 44ORGANIZATION, REPRESENTATION OF. Boardofdirectors,lawyerforservingon, Rule1.7(Comment)................................... 31 Communicationwith,Rule1.4(Comment).. 29 Conflictinginterestsamongofficers andemployees,Rule1.7(Comment)......... 31 Conflictofinterest,Rule1.7(Comment)...... 31 Constituents,representing,Rule1.13(e)........ 36 Identityofclient,Rule1.13(a); Rule1.13(d)................................................ 36 Misconduct,clientengagedin, Rule1.13(b)................................................ 36

PPARTNER. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27PATENT PRACTICE. Advertising,Rule7.4..................................... 56PERJURY. Criminaldefendant,Rule3.3(Comment)..... 43 Disclosureof,Rule3.3(b).............................. 43PERSONAL AFFAIRS OF LAWYER. Dutytoconductincompliancewithlaw, Preamble......................................................... 26


PLEA BARGAIN. Client’srighttoacceptorreject,Rule1.2(a)28PLEADINGS. Verificationof,Rule3.3(Comment)............. 43PRACTICE OF LAW. ActivemembersofStateBar,Rule1-202....... 2 Admissiontothebar,Rule1-201.................... 2 Ethics. SeeETHICS. Nonresidents,Rule1-203................................. 2PRECEDENT. Failuretodisclosetocourt,Rule3.3(a)(3).... 43PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES. Advertisingfor,Rule7.2(Comment)............ 54PRESIDENT. Annualreport,BylawArt.V,Sec.2............. 10 AnnualreporttoSupremeCourt, BylawArt.V,Sec.2................................... 10 ChairmanoftheBoard,BylawArt.V, Sec.2.......................................................... 10 Election. SeeELECTIONS. Dutiesupontakingoffice,BylawArt.V, Sec.2.......................................................... 10 Presidingofficer,BylawArt.V,Sec.2......... 10PRESIDENT-ELECT. Duties,BylawArt.V,Sec.3......................... 10 Election. SeeELECTIONS. Eligibility,Rule1-404..................................... 4PRO BONO PUBLICO SERVICE. Rule6.1.......................................................... 52PROCEDURAL LAW. Lawyer’sprofessionalresponsibilities proscribedby,Preamble............................. 26PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS. Attorneysfees,disputes,hearings, Rule6-411................................................ 139PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS. Defined,Terminology.................................... 27 Formationof,Rule5.4(d).............................. 49PROFESSIONALISM. SeeCOMMISSIONONPROFESSIONALISM.PROMPT. Lawyer’sdutytobe,Preamble...................... 26PROPERTY. Ofclient, Safekeeping,Rule1.15(I);Rule 1.15(II)........................................................ 38 StateBar. Powertoownproperty,Rule1-102............. 2PROSECUTOR. Representingformerdefendant,Rule1.9 (Comment).................................................. 34 Specialresponsibilitiesof,Rule3.8.............. 46PUBLIC CITIZEN. Lawyer’sdutyas,Preamble........................... 26PUBLIC OFFICIAL. Lawyeras,Rule9.5....................................... 59 Lawyer’sdutytoshowrespectfor, Preamble..................................................... 26

RRECEIVERS. Attorneys,Rule4-219.................................... 66RECORD KEEPING. Propertyofclient,Rule1.15(I)(a)................. 38REFERRAL. Whenlawyernotcompetenttohandlematter, Rule1.1....................................................... 27REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. Self-governance,Preamble............................ 26REINSTATEMENT FROM DISBARMENT. SeeRulesGoverningAdmissiontoPractice

Law,PartA:BoardtoDetermineFitnessofBar

Applicants,Section10.Availableathttp://www.gabaradmissions.org/.

RELATIVES OF LAWYER. Representinginterestsadverseto, Rule1.8(h).................................................. 33REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Rule9.1.......................................................... 58REPRESENTATION OF CLIENT. Decisionmakingauthorityoflawyerand client,Rule1.2(a)....................................... 28 Objectives,lawyer’srighttolimit, Rule1.2(c).................................................. 28 Terminationof,Rule1.2(Comment)............ 28REPRIMAND. SeeDISCIPLINE.RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE. Partnershiporemploymentagreement imposes,Rule5.6(a)................................... 51 Settlementimposes,Rule5.6(b).................... 51RETIREMENT AND PENSIONS. StateBaremeritusmembership,Rule1-202... 2

SSALE. Oflawpractice,Rule1.17............................. 40SANCTION. Severityof,Scope.......................................... 26SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION. Rule1.2.......................................................... 28SEALS AND SEALED INSTRUMENTS. StateBar. Powertoadoptanduseofficialseal, Rule1-102................................................. 2SECRETARY. Duties,BylawArt.V,Sec.5......................... 10 Election. SeeELECTIONS.SECTIONS. Creationofothersections,Bylaw Art.IX,Sec.3............................................. 13 Establishmentanddiscontinuanceof, BylawArt.IX,Sec.4,5............................ 13 Reports,BylawArt.IX,Sec.6...................... 13 SeniorLawyersSection,Rule1-705; BylawArt.IX,Sec.2............................. 6,13SENIOR LAWYERS SECTION. Rule1-705;BylawArt.IX,Sec.2............ 6,13SENILITY. Attorneys,disciplinaryproceedings, Rule4-104.................................................. 59SERVICE OF PROCESS. SeeDiscipline.SETTLEMENT. Aggregatesettlementonbehalfofclients, Rule1.8(g).................................................. 33 Client’srighttorefusesettlement, Rule1.2(a).................................................. 28 Informingclientofsettlementoffers, Rule1.4(Comment)................................... 29 Ofclaims,Rule9.2........................................ 58SOLICITATION. Prohibitionon,Rule7.3................................. 55 Bymail,Rule7.3........................................... 55SPECIAL COMMITTEES. StateBar,BylawArt.VIII,Sec.2................. 13SPECIALIZATION. Rule7.4....................................................... 56STANDING COMMITTEES. StateBar,BylawArt.VIII,Sec.1................. 12STATE’S ATTORNEY. Authorityof,Scope........................................ 26STATUTES. Shapelawyer’srole,Scope............................ 26SUBPOENAS. Attorneysfees,disputes,hearings, Rule6-411................................................ 139

Discipline,Rule4-221................................... 67SUBSTANTIVE LAW. Definesexistenceofclient-lawyerrelationship, Scope........................................................... 26 Lawyer’sprofessionalresponsibilities proscribedby,Preamble............................. 26SUPERVISING WORK OF ANOTHER LAWYER. Responsibilities,Rule5.1.............................. 48SUSPENSION. SeeDISCIPLINE.

TTELEPHONES. StateBarmember,changeoftelephone number,notice,Rule1-207.......................... 3THIRD PERSONS. Statementsto,Rule4.1.................................. 47 Respectforrightsof,Rule4.4....................... 48TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENT. SeeTHIRDPERSONS.TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDS. Attorneyfees,disputes,Rule6-404............. 138TREASURER. Deposit&withdrawaloffunds,Bylaw Art.V,Sec.6............................................... 10 Dutiesof,BylawArt.V,Sec.6..................... 10 Election. SeeELECTIONS.TRIAL CONDUCT. Allusiontoirrelevantorinadmissible evidence,Rule3.4(e).................................. 45 Disruptiveconduct,Rule3.5(c)..................... 45TRIAL PUBLICITY. Rule3.6.......................................................... 45TRUST ACCOUNTS. Maintainforclientfunds,Rule1.15(II) (Comment);Rule1.15(III)(Comment)........39,39

UUNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Assistingin,Rule5.5(b)................................ 50 Engagingin,Rule5.5(a)................................ 50 Generally,SDBNos.19,21,23; FAONo.86-5.........................88,88,90,103 InvestigationandProsecution seeRule14-1.1etseq............................... 153

VVACANCIES AND SUCCESSION. BoardofGovernors,Rule1-306;................... 4 BylawArt.III,Sec.8;BylawArtXI, Sec.2...................................................... 9,14 Committee,BylawArt.XI,Sec.3................. 14 Death,disability,orresignationofofficers, ExecutiveCommitteemembers,orABA delegates,BylawArt.XI,Sec.1................ 14 Officers,Rule1-403......................................... 4 StateDisciplinaryBoard,Rule4-201............ 60VENUE. Discipline. Hearings,Rule4-221(c)............................. 67VOLUNTEER. Attorneys,alcohol&drugimpairment, Rule7-101etseq..................................... 140

WWAIVER. Arbitrationoffeedisputes. Oralhearings,Rule6-416......................... 139 Righttoobjecttoviolationsofrules, Rule6-415............................................. 139WEBSITE. StandingExecutiveCommitteePolicy600... 19WITHDRAWAL.


Conflictofinterest,Rule1.7(Comment)...... 31 Discharge,Rule1.16(a)(3)............................. 40 Fromintermediation,Rule2.2(b).................. 42 Givingnoticeoffactof,Rule1.6 (Comment).................................................. 30 Incapacity,Rule1.16(a)(2)............................ 40 Propertyofclient,Rule1.16(d)..................... 40 Whenclientpersistsincriminalorfraudulent conduct,Rule1.2(Comment),Rule1.6 (Comment);.............................................. 28,30 Rule1.13(c);Rule1.16(b)(1)................ 36,40WITNESS. Bribing,Rule3.4(b)....................................... 44 Client’srighttodecidewhethertotestify, Rule1.2(a).................................................. 28 Expenses,paymentof,Rule3.4(Comment). 45 Expert,paymentof,Rule3.4(Comment)..... 45 Lawyeras,Rule3.7....................................... 46WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE. Rulesdonotaffectapplicationof,Scope...... 26

YYOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION. AffiliateUnits. Affiliation,YLDBylawArt.XII,Sec.2.... 24 Qualification/Application,YLDBylaw Art.XII,Sec.1........................................ 24 Terminationof,YLDBylawArt.XII, Sec.3....................................................... 24 Amendments,YLDBylawArt.XIII............. 24 Committees. Meetings,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.4........ 24 Reports,YLDBylawArt.IX,Sec.4......... 24 Special,YLDBylawArt.IX,Sec.2.......... 23 Standing,YLDBylawArt.IX,Sec.1........ 23 Vacancy,YLDBylawArt.VIII,Sec.3..... 23 Directors. Appointment,YLDBylawArt.IV,Sec.3(a)...21 Duties,YLDBylawArt.IV,Sec.3(b)....... 21 TermsofOffice,YLDBylawArt.IV, Sec.4...................................................... 21 Elections. Declarationofresults,YLDBylaw Art.VII,Sec.7(g)................................... 22

DutiesofSecretaryinelections, YLDBylawArt.VII,Sec.4.................... 21 Effectivedate,YLDBylawArt.VII, Sec.1....................................................... 21 ElectionCommittee,YLDBylawArt.IX, Sec.1(e)................................................... 23 Nominatons,YLDBylawArt.VII,Sec.5.... 22 Officesfilledbyelection,YLDBylaw Art.VII,Sec.3........................................ 21 Qualificationsforvotingandmaking nomination,YLDBylawArt.VII, Sec.2....................................................... 21 TimePeriod,YLDBylawArt.VII, Sec.7(i)................................................... 22 ExecutiveCommittee. Composition,YLDBylawArt.IV, Sec.2....................................................... 21 Directors,YLDBylawArt.IV, Sec.3...................................................... 21 Eligibility,YLDBylaw,Art.IV, Sec.5....................................................... 21 PurposeandPowers,YLDBylawArt.IV, Sec.1....................................................... 20 TermsofOffice,YLDBylawArt.IV, Sec.4....................................................... 21 ExecutiveCouncil. Composition,YLDBylawArt.V, Sec.2....................................................... 21 Electionsof,YLDBylawArt.V,Sec.4.... 21 Eligibility,YLDBylawArt.V,Sec.3....... 21 Terms,YLDBylawArt.V,Sec.5............. 21 Vacancies,YLDBylawArt.VIII,Sec.3.... 23 Legislationandpublicity. Legislation,YLDBylawArt.XI,Sec.1..... 24 Publications,YLDBylawArt.XI, Sec.2....................................................... 24 Meetings. Annual,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.1(a)....... 24 Attendanceat,YLDBylawArt.X, Sec.2(b).................................................. 24 ExecutiveCouncil,YLDBylawArt.X, Sec.2....................................................... 24 Midyear,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.1(b)..... 24 Other,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.1(c).......... 24

Quorums,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.6........ 24 Rules,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.8.............. 24 Voting,YLDBylawArt.X,Sec.7............ 24 Membership. Associate,YLDBylawArt.II,Sec.3........ 20 Honorary,YLDBylawArt.II,Sec.2........ 20 Qualification,YLDBylawArt.II,Sec.1..... 20 Rule1-703;BylawArt.XII,Sec.1..... 6,24 Terminationof,YLDBylawArt.II, Sec.4....................................................... 20 Officers. Eligibility,YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.2...... 20 EditorofThe Young Lawyers Division Newsletter; YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.7...................... 20 ElectionsofOfficers,YLDBylawArt.III, Sec.9....................................................... 20 ImmediatePastPresident, YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.8...................... 20 Officers,YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.1......... 20 President,YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.3....... 20 President-Elect,YLDBylawArt.III, Sec.4....................................................... 20 RemovalbyExecutiveCouncil, YLDBylawArt.VII,Sec.1.................... 21 Secretary,YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.6....... 20 TermsofOffice,YLDBylawArt.III, Sec.10..................................................... 20 Treasurer,YLDBylawArt.III,Sec.5....... 20 VacanciesinOffice,YLDBylawArt.VIII, Sec.3....................................................... 23 Purpose,YLDBylawArt.I,Sec.2............... 19

ZZEALOUS REPRESENTATION. Opposingpartywell-represented, Preamble..................................................... 26 Requirementof,Rule1.3(Comment)........... 28

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The Women and Minorities in the Profession Committee

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