future leadership, old issues,new methods pub274

8/7/2019 Future Leadership, Old Issues,New Methods Pub274

1/130

FUT URE L EADERSH I P, OLD I SSUES,

NEW MET H ODS

Douglas V. J ohn son I I

Ed i tor

J une 2000


2/130


3/130

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

1. IntroductionDouglas V. Johnson I I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Informat ion, Knowledge and Wisdom:Leader Development Impl icationsfor The Army Aft er Next

Kevin J. Bergner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3. Proliferating Decisionmakers:Root Cause of the Next Revolutionin Mi li tary Affair s

Arthur J . Corbett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4. The New Math for Leaders:Useful Ideas fr om Chaos Theory

Glenn W. Mi tchel l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5. Educating Junior Mil i tary Officersfor the Information Age

Andre H. Sayles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

6. A Proposal for Designing Cognit ive Aids

for Commanders in the 21st CenturyLawr ence G. Shattuck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

i i i


4/130

FI GURES AND TABL ES

Chapter 2

Figure 1. Information-Knowledge-WisdomDefinit ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Figure 2. Chess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Figure 3. Tactical-Operational-StrategicRelat ionships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 4. Organizational Strata and Funct ionalDomains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Chapter 5

Figure 1. Information Operations Relationshipsacross Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Figure 2. Information Warfare SystemsEngineer ing at NPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Table 1. Education Requir ements for Mil i taryOfficers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Table 2. Education Opportunit ies for NewOfficers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 6

Figure 1. Major Components of the ArmyTactical Command and ControlSystem (ATCCS) Archi tecture.. . . . . . . . . . . 103

Figure 2. Decision Tree Depict ing the RationalDecisionmaking Model for a Commanderpr ior to the Onset of Host i l it ies . . . . . . . . . . 106

iv


5/130

FOREWORD

Each year, the Army After Next Seminar students are

asked to or ient their St rategy Research Papers on topics thatare potent iall y relevant to future defense programs. Thi r tyyears is a chall enging t ime hor izon for planning. Thi r ty yearsago, the Uni ted States Army was deeply involved in Vietnamand in t he Cold War. Off icers could reasonably expect to serverepetitive tours in Southeast Asia interspersed with toursa long e i ther the Korean Demi l i tar ized Zone or theInter-German Border. The tension between sometimes

guerrilla, sometimes major warfare in the Pacific and theprospects of nuclear war in Europe made any projections of afuture li ke that which we cur rent ly enjoy highly unl ikely. Yetwe are now asking officers to make such prognostications sothat they might be less surprised by whatever future doeseventuate.

The authors of the fol lowing papers have accepted, for sakeof argument, that the future leadership environment will

conform to a paradigm in which time and distance will becompressed while operational scope and information will beenormously expanded. Although there is consensus on thisparad igm, the par t i cu la rs are not we l l -deve loped.Nevertheless, these authors put forward recommendationsthat , alt hough focused on a distant future condi t ion, have asmuch application to today as they do for that future. Careful tomaintain the essential differences between leadership in

business and indust ry and mi l i tary operations, they highl ightsome of the most important and promising developments inleadership education and training. Their papers deserveserious consideration.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Inst i tute

v


6/130

CH APTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Douglas V. J ohn son I I

The monographs here assembled are the work ofstudents in both the AY98 and AY99 Army After NextSeminar at the U.S. Army War College. Their focus is on t heleadership development component of the human andorganizat ional dimension of the Army After Next Program.

While the ultimate shape of the Army After Next isunclear, a consensus has emerged from the broader studiesconducted through the Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) and elsewhere that the future command andleadership challenge will be significant. If a completetransformation of warfare occurs, as some posit, anaccompanying transformation of command and leadershipmay l ikewise be required. This is not to say that the basics of

leading soldiers is l ikely to change, but i t suggests that theart of command, in which leadership is a component, islikely to be significantly transformed. The operatingpremise is that the tempo of operations will increase; thescope of action at each level will expand; the timeconstraints for mission accomplishment will diminish; andthe tools for gaining and obtaining information willprol i ferate and provide near-perfect f r iendly andsignificantly improved knowledge of the enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Bergner s chapter recountsthis premise and examines in detail perceived mismatchesbetween sets of cognitive requirements. If tomorrowsleaders need to know more about more in less time thantoday, something has to change; and those changes, ananswer to the How To? questions, are the basis of

Bergner s a rgument . Among h is mos t in t r igu ingpropositions is our ability to develop tacit knowledge,action-oriented knowledge, acquired without the help ofothers, that subst i tutes for the On the Job Training.

1


7/130

Marine Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Corbett seizes onthe concept of consil ience, the abil i ty to maneuver rapidlyamong cognitive domains"a jumping together" as one

author describes itto produce a useable explanation ofevents. In this chapter, his work connects to Bergnersthrough the need for cognitive development. Corbettsmonograph has a different focus, however, as he suggeststhat t he root cause of the next Revolut ion in Mil i tary Affair s(RMA) will only come about with the proliferation ofdecisionmakers. In one sense this is a mani festation of t heemerging consensus that the only way to manage the

fast-paced, widely-dispersed, simultaneously executedfuture operations is to accept a much flatter, widerhierarchical command structure. The very thought of such achange is unset t l ing, par t ly because some of i ts roots l ie inthe business wor ld. I n that wor ld profi ts are the goal and noso ld ie r shou ld be w i l l i ng , r i gh t l y , t o equa teprofit-generating mechanisms with the life and deathdecisions involved in combat mission accomplishment.

Corbet t takes the reader through a rapid histor ical review ofdispersed military decisionmaking, then reviews thebusiness literature as well. He also touches on the newsciences of chaos and nonlinearity, noting the growingprol i feration of complex adapt ive systems. At this point , hereinforces Bergners depiction of the future warfareenvironment , some aspects of which are already evident incont emporary operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence G. Shattuck is aPermanent Professor in the Department of BehavioralScience and Leadership at the U.S. Mil i tary Academy. H isProposal for Designing Cognitive Decision Aids forCommanders in the 21st Century is based upon hisresearch and personal observations of a series of exercisesconducted in June 1997. His research concluded that

digitization and decisionmaking have a long way to go toachieve maturity. Employing historical examples, hei l lustr ates several decisionmaking models prominent in thel i terature. Shattuck argues that human cogni t ive act ivi ty is

2


8/130

going to require some augmentation in fast-paced futureoperations, and that the Army ought to take the t ime now toful ly invest igate which systems are besteven at the cost of

delayed fielding of some systems.

Math for Leaders is probably enough to scare manyreaders off, and Colonel Glenn Mitchells subtitle, IdeasFrom Chaos Theory, could be fur ther mot ivation to skip thatchapter altogether . The reader who succumbs to those twinfears will be the poorer for doing so. Yes, chaos theory iscomplex and is oft en descr ibed wi th mathemat ical formulae

that make even the best engineer or artilleryman weep indespair. But Mitchells self-appointed task is not only toexplain t he essent ials of chaos theory in r eadable English,but to present that theory as something useful to mi l i tarycommanders. For those who are st i l l skept ical, we st ronglyrecommend Alan D. Beyerchins monograph, Clausewitz,Non-linearity and the Unpredictability of War, mostaccessible in Coping With the Bounds, edited by Tom

Czerwinski (Washington: Institute for National StrategicStudies, National Defense University, 1998). Mitchelldescribes the Newtonian world, with its characteristicl ineari ty, in which we all came to matur ity. He then movesinto the emergence of chaos theory and the Non-linearMilitary Organization. Among his recommendations is astartling proposition that jointness, when carried too far,may stul t i fy by reducing inherent chaos below an essent ial

level of creati vity.Colonel Andre H. Sayles is a Permanent Professor in t he

Department of Electrical Engineering at the U.S. MilitaryAcademy. As one might expect , his concerns are for the basiceducational proficiencies required to ful ly understand andeffectively practice his discipline. His chapter, EducatingJunior Officers for the Informat ion Age, addresses what he

perceives to be a required fundamental competency forfuture military leaders. He lays out a description ofinformation operations and relates their cent rali ty to fut ureoperations to the requirement for technical profi ciency. He

3


9/130

provides a program of instruction throughout a militarycareer that will ensure essential competence in the futureofficer corps.

In sum, these monographs offer a collection of ideas inresponse to a perceived future leadership environment.Some offer solut ions that are avail able r ight now, some forlater , but all of t hem suggest that i t is t ime to focus on t heissues, analyze them, and set to work on overcomingbarriers to progress. One may argue that adoption of allthese suggestions would set leadership education and

t raining on i ts ear. With the except ion of Sayles proposal torevamp and reorient basic and continuing education intomore electronic disciplines, all the proposals could beimplemented today with a solid promise of significantimprovement in officer education across the board. It isworth consider ing.

4


10/130

CH APTER 2

I NFORMATI ON, K NOWL EDGE AND WI SDOM:L EADER DEVEL OPMENT I MPL I CATIONS

FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

K evi n J . Ber gner

There is an evolving mismatch i n t he U.S. Army betweenthe strategic environment and insti tut ional leaderdevelopment . To prepare soldiers to lead in the Army Aft er

Next, the developmental process must be accelerated andenriched through utilization of emerging technology andperformance enhancement techniques.

TH E HUM AN DI MENSI ON OF THE ARMY AFTERNEXT

As the Army r apidly progresses into the informat ion age,

the professional dialogue concerning how to harness theenormous potent ial of i nformat ion becomes more int ense. I tis too frequently centered on equipment/technologysolutions as opposed to human performance solutions. TheArmy After Next initiative is a rare example where ahealthy balance between equipment -technology and humanperformance is emerging. Maintaining this focus isbecoming ever more chal lenging as the al lure of high-payoff,

high-technology equipment and digitization overshadowthe more touchy-feely explorations of human behavioralscience and leadership.

Recent operat iona l exper ience re in forces thefundamental importance of the human dimension,par t icularl y to leadership. There is l i t t le disagreement thatleader development played a central role in the Armysdecisive combat victories in Panama and the Gulf War, aswell as in the military operations other than war in Haitiand Bosnia. Indeed, most senior military leaders point tothe Armys institutional commitment to leader develop-

5


11/130

ment since 1973 as a central component in this series ofoverwhelming successes.

1

Another consideration which compels an endur ing focuson leader development is that the human dynamics of theArmy of Excellence culture (1986-present) will notnecessarily remain constant as we move further into theinformat ion age. In that regard, there alr eady are gl impsesof the potential effect that at least one institutionthemediamay have on the learning patterns and valuesformulation of future soldiers and leaders.

For example, the average number of shift s in at tent ionrequired of a viewer during a typical hour of televisionprogramming exceeds 800. That is more than 13 shi ft s perminute. One resul t among students is d i f f icu l tyconcent rating in classrooms and impatience wi th analysisof issues and ideas beyond a few minutes.

2Clearly, that

raises concern for future Army leader development t rainingand education. Alternately, it may suggest positiveimplications for leader capacity to rapidly processincreasing amounts of informat ion.

By age 18, young people now entering the Army havespent 11,000 hours in the classroom and 22,000 hourswatching television. They have seen more than 750,000commercials, each crafted to short-circuit judgment andstimulate irrationality and gullibility to buy something.

3

These are troubling implications for developing the sound,intuitional judgment, character and values that futureArmy soldiers must have if they are to be members of avalues-based organization.

These facts represent just the t ip of t he informat ion ageiceberg. They also illustrate that human performance isvulnerable to a variety of influences. By inference, leader

development for the Army After Next is no less suscept ibleto changes in the st rategic envi ronment .

6


12/130

THI NKI NG AND OPERATI NG: EVOL VI NGM I SMAT CH ES WI TH L EADER DEVEL OPMENT

Throughout this century and particularly during theArmy of Excel lence era, the Army made a concerted effor t tomatch leader knowledge and exper ience to the appropr iatelevel of operati onal responsibil i ty. A junior l ieutenant wasresponsible for direct ing and execut ing tasks in a relativelywell-bounded tactical environment, consistent with hislevel of training and experience. A colonel, on the otherhand, was generally performing in a more abstract and

complex environment, consistent with 20(+) years ofexperience and education. A robust leader and trainingdevelopment program emerged in the late 1970s thatprovided leaders a progressive and sequential educationalsystem to prepare them first for the tactical, thenoperat ional , and ul t imately the strategic level ofresponsibil i ty. The resul t was a fair ly st rong match betweenlevel of thought, level of war, and level of institutional

training and leader development. Today, there aregl immers of change in two areas which, i f l eft unattended,may dramatically alter the relevance and hence theeffect iveness of the Armys leader development system now,and even more profoundly, by 2025 for the Army After Next .

The first change is a shift in leader focus frominformation gather ing to rapid learning. I t is dri ven by the

broad appli cation of informat ion t echnology and resul ts ininformat ion over load. The most direct impl ication for leaderdevelopment is an increasing need to focus on how tothink , as opposed to what t o think , and to accelerate thedevelopment of rapid learning ski l ls.

The second area of change is as a shi ft fr om a l inear andcompartmented relationship between tact ical, operational,and strategic levels of war to a more over-lapping andinter-connected relationship. Leader decisions at thetactical level now may have direct consequences at thestrategic level. This change is driven by the increasingcomplexity of operations such as peace implementation in

7


13/130

Bosnia and broader access by the media. The most directimplication for leader development is the need topurposeful ly nur ture st rategic savvy earl ier in professional

development, as opposed to waiting until the 20th year ofservice.

These indications of mismatch between leaderdevelopment and the emerging operational environmentare defined principally by a universally broader access toinformation and a more complex operating environment.For the purposes of fur ther discussion and examinat ion, the

terms cogni t ive mismatch and operational mismatch wi l l beused to descr ibe these two chal lenges for Army After Nextleader development.

COGNI TI VE M I SMATCH:INFORMATION-KNOWLEDGE-WISDOM

Army Af ter Next Leaders wi l l have access to moredecision-relevant informati on than ever before, but there wi l l be

too l it t le time to consider i t sufficient ly.

Br igadier General Huba Wass de Czege(U.S. Army Ret ired)

The evolut ion of the Encyclopedia Br itannica provides auseful start point in examining the differences betweeninformation, knowledge, and wisdom in the information

age. In 1768, the 3-volume encyclopedia was limi ted, not bythe information avai lable, but by the print ing and bindingtechnology. Today the 32-volume Encyclopedia cont ains 44mi l l ion words and 23,000 il lust rations. In computer terms,i t equals a gigabit of data that can now be t ransmi t ted overfi ber-opt ic l ines in about a second.

4No matter how fast i t can

be t ransmit ted though, it is st i l l more informationthan anyone person could ever know, because the human abil i ty to

test , learn, or memor ize i t is inadequate.The eno rmous amoun t o f i n fo rma t ion i n the

Encyclopedia Britannica and the capability to access itquickly is symbolic of the informat ion envi ronment evolving

8


14/130

for Army After Next leaders. A mismatch i s being created byan overload of information available to the leader withoutan accompanying improvement in human thinking and

learning ski l ls. Ful ly understanding this challenge requir esa more detailed examinat ion of the cognit ive process and therelationship between informat ion, knowledge, and wisdom.

As leaders mature , they p rogress th roughdevelopmental stages that reflect the increasing complexi tyof thinking processes.

5These stages are not determined

solely by the increased sophist ication of a leader s cognit ive

processes, but are deeply affected by t he depth, breadth, andcomplexity of the information the leader is processing.6

Inthe simplest terms, Figure 1 shows a cognitive hierarchyconsisting of information, knowledge, and wisdom.

The relevance of this hierarchy to leader developmentcan be i l lust rated simply by relating it to the game of chess.

9

In format ion

Data collected from the environment and processed into a useableform. (FM 100-6)

Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in theproduction of intelligence. The meaning a human assigns to data . . .(Joint Pub 1-02)

Knowledge

Information that has been tested and accepted as factual.(FM 100-6)

Facts, including procedures, that have been learned and can be

reproduced fr om memory. (Jacques, Requisit e Organizat ion)

Wisdom

Use of judgment to give knowledge relevance within a specificsi tuat ional cont ext . (FM 100-6)

Soundness of judgment about the nature of people and the world.(Jacques, Requisite Organization)

Fi gur e 1. I nf or mat i on-Kn owl edge-Wisdom Defi ni t i ons.


15/130

Informationabout chess is interest ing in a limi ted way, butis only useful i f your intent is to play the game compet it ively

or develop a mastery of the game. That requires practice,memorization, and experiential learning to develop therequisite knowledgeand wisdomdescr ibed in Figur e 2.

The point is that enormous amounts of informationabout chess will not, in and of themselves, create a chessmaster . However, unfet tered access to informat ion, coupledwith rapid learning and experiential growth, offer anopportunity to develop a tremendous knowledge andwisdom advantage.

7The same is true for the Army After

Next. Leaders can have broad access to vast amounts ofinformation, but without rapid learning and experientialgrowth, they will not have the knowledge and wisdom toexploit the information advantage.

The information age clearly demands redefining leaderthink ing requirements. The challenge for leaders is to shi ftfrom information deficit to information overload; to know

how to use that abundance of information and have thewisdom to relate it to an increasingly complex operatingenvironment. The Army must shift focus from teachingwhat to think, to how to think, and adopt rapid learning

10

Fr om anIn format ion per specti ve, chess i s . . .

A game of st rategy i n which var ious pieces are moved in combinat ionto at tempt to captur e the opponent s pieces.

Fr om aKnowledge per specti ve, chess i s . . .

Memorizing which pieces can be moved according to the rules of thegame and some understanding of how an opponent wi l l approach t hegame.

Fr om aWisdom per specti ve, chess is . . .

Fi gur e 2. Chess.


16/130

techniques to exploit the knowledge advantage. I t must alsoshift toward more rapid experiential growth in order toexploit a wisdom advantage.

8Institutional reluctance to

make this transition will almost certainly broaden themismatch between cognitive challenges in the futureinformation environment and current leader developmentpreparation.

OPERATI ONAL MI SMATCH:TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC

Army After Next subordinate leaders wi l l need exper ience andexpertise currently enjoyed by their superiors.

Br igadier General Huba Wass de CzegeU.S. Army (Ret ired)

The relationship between tactical, operational, andstrategic levels of mil i tary operations is the second area thatshows an evolving mismatch between leader development

and the future environment .

The chal lenge today, and arguably more so in the future,is that the sequential, progressive approach to leaderdevelopment does not fully prepare junior leaders for thetypes of complex, st rategic circumstances in which t hey areincreasingly finding themselves. In the Cold War, forexample, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war

were separated by echelon of experience. A lieutenantsactions had an impact at the tactical level which was alsowhere the training and leader development system focusedhis preparation.

Today, that l ieutenant s or captains act ions increasinglymay have st rategic impl ications, as seen recent ly in Bosniaand Hait i . For the most par t , however, their inst i tut ionaland leader development training remains consistent withtheir convent ional war f ight ing responsibil i t ies and rank atthe tactical level. General William W. Hartzog describesthis emerging mismatch as a shi ft from a l inear relati onship

11


17/130

between t act ical, operational and st rategic envi ronments toa non-linear r elationship as shown in Figure 3. 9

Behavioral scientist Colonel George B. Forsythe helpsframe this phenomenon in terms of organizational strataand funct ional domains (Figure 4). He confirms the not ionthat cogni t ive requirements increase in complexi ty as onemoves from the production domain (tactical level) to thesystems domain (strategic level). Cognitive requirementsincrease because the tasks at higher levels involve a greater

number of elements, and generally longer t ime spans.10

12

Fi gur e 3. Tact ical-Oper ati onal-St r ategi c Relat ionship s.

ORGANI ZATIONAL STRATA AND FUNCTI ONAL DOMAI NS

St r at um T i me span Fu nct ion al Dom ai n

(vi i ) 4-star level 20 years Systems (St rategic level )- unbounded envir onment , out ward focus- create compl ex systems, envi sion

future- bui ld consensus, create cult ur e

(vi ) 3-star level 10 years - oversee complex systems(v) 2-star level 5 years Organizat ional (Operat ional level)

- exist wi thin bounded open system- manage one complex system

(iv) Br igade CDR 2 years - oversee operat ing sub-systems

(i i i ) Bat tal ion CDR 1 year Product ion (Tact ical Level )- direct one operating sub-system- bounded wit hi n l arger sub-system- face-to-face

(i i) Company CDR 3 mont hs - di rect t ask s

(i ) Troops


18/130

Colonel Forsythes model highlights the increasinglevels of complexity leaders face as a result of advancingthrough higher st rata, generall y associated with rank, level

o f r espons ib i l i t y w i t h i n t he o rgan i za t i on , andapproximation t o a level of war or mi l i tary operation otherthan war (tact ical, operational, and st rategic).

The trend we observe in operations today, however, isincreasing complexi ty and higher levels of responsibil i ty atlower rank and duty positions. For example, an InfantryBattalion Commander implementing peace operations in

Brcko, Bosnia, was arguably operating in an organizationaldomain, but wi th complexity commensurate wi th St rata Vor VI, and with profound strategic implications for hisact ions. His t raining and leader development , however, wasonly consistent with the Strata II I level.

11Likewise, the r i fle

platoon leader patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince,Hait i , before deciding whether to open fire on host i le pol ice,must consider the broad strategic implications for his

tact ical decision.

12

Behavioral science experts suggest that recent successby tactical leaders confronted with strategic implicationshappens, despite the mismatch, because the quality of theindividual allows rapid adaptation. The question, then,becomes Can t he quality of individual leaders be sustainedto assur e success in the increasingly complex circumstancesof the Army After Next? Another way to phrase thequest ion i s to ask how much more effect ive Army After Nextleaders might be if strategic savvy was more purposefullynur tured earl ier in their leader development .

13This is not to

suggest that we can expect captains to develop broadstrategic ski l ls. Rather , it acknowledges that junior leaderstoday and more so in t he future, must have more st rategiccomprehension than the existing leader development

paradigm offers. The challenge is to explore the means toaccelerate and enrich that component of leader develop-ment.

13


19/130

ACCEL ERATING AND ENRICHI NG LEADERDEVELOPMENT

Part of the [leader development] solution will require us asindividuals and the Army as an inst i tut ion to discern and enablenew methods. They may r equire us to alt er or give-up some longheld and cher ished cul tural sent iments.

Br igadier General Huba Wass de CzegeU.S. Army (Ret ired)

Behavioral scient ists also suggest we are enter ing a new

era of previously unthinkable possibil i t ies. There is almostuniversal agreement that, while enduring principles andbasic quali t ies of leadership st i l l appear relevant , there is nosigni ficant impetus in the area of learning new techniquesto st imulate, condi t ion, and develop leadership.

14We appear

to be complacent with current rates and techniques ofdevelopment, and worse, resistant to examining emergingpossibilities that offer profound, if not revolutionary

opportunit ies to enhance leader development .Among other techniques and technologies, there are fi ve

emerging capabilities to accelerate and enrich leaderdevelopment for the Army After Next. In the near-term(1998-2010) performance enhancement techniques, virtualreality technology, and high-fidelity personal performanceassessments offer broad applicability. In the longer term(2010-2025), expanded understanding of tacit knowledge,coupled with bio-technology memory enhancement, willprovide the means to finely tune the learning process andincrease the efficiency of leader development.

Per for mance Enh ancement (U.S. M i l i t ar yAcademy).

For the past 9 years the U.S. Military AcademysPerformance Enhancement Center has driven a focusedeffor t to explore methods of enhancing leader per formanceth rough e f fec t i ve th ink ing , goa l se t t i ng , s t ressmanagement, attention, imagery, and relaxation. In many

14


20/130


21/130

better. And, on the battlefield, quicker and better decisionsequate to engaging t he enemy before he can engage me.

The Performance Enhancement Center is quick to point

out that there are no high-tech bio-feedback systems on t hebat t lefield, but leaders who can learn the art of visuali zingthe kinds of situations they will encounter and mentallypract ice desired per formance, can take that advantage wi ththem where ever they may go.

17

For the Army After Next leader, the environment andthe decisions wil l be infini tely more complex than footbal l or

smal l unit leadership. Nevertheless, improvement of leaderconf idence under pressure, concentrat ion amidstdistraction, and composure during times of stress canclearly be accelerated and enriched through performanceenhancement techniques.

18The acquisition of state of the

art electronic t raining devices, or simi lar technology, shouldalso be considered for improving peripheral awareness,visual concentration, and reaction times. The potential

pay-offs for improving how a leader thinks are becomingincreasingly evident through the data and exper ience of thePerformance Enhancement Center at West Point.

Vi r t ual Real i t y Si mu lat i ons (Resear ch Tr i angleInst i tute) .

The development and fielding of a prototype mission

planning, rehearsal, and training simulation (MPRTS) atFor t Leavenworths Batt le Command Batt le Laboratory isproviding early insights into the war fighting pay-off ofbeing able to visualize plans and alternative courses ofaction before having to conduct combat operations. In itssimplest form, the MPRTS is an interactive, three-dimensional computer representation of the terrain andforce circumstances to be encountered during a military

operation. The capabil i ty for leaders to examine mul t ipleoptions and visually experience the outcomes greatlyenhances the fidelity of the commanders cognitiveanalysis. In many respects, it also allows him to learn

16


22/130

necessary lessons before they happen in the course of theactual operation.

19

Aside from its primary purpose of providing an aid forbat t le command, the MPRTS has another useful appl icationdirect ly r elated to leader development . By providing leadersthe means to vir tual ly exper ience actual circumstances ofpast operations or interpersonal encounters, in aninteractive environment, the potential exists to create thekinds of cr i t ical exper ient ial learning from which importanttacit knowledge emerges. The result is the institutional

capacity to teach tacit knowledge through virtualexperiences. For the Army After Next this equates to anopportunity to accelerate individual leader learning anddevelop knowledge and wisdom-based leader competenciesvi tal for success in t he complex envi ronment s of 2025. Theefficiencies of Virtual Reality learning also offer dramaticimprovements in t ime management . What would normallytake up to 10 classroom days of instruction can be

accomplished in as little as 1.5 days with Virtual Realitymedia.20

Per sonal Per for mance Assessment : St r ategi cM anagement Si mu lat i ons (Penn St ate Un i ver si t y).

The level of complexity involved in strategic thinking,interpersonal relationships, and decisions arguably

demands specific capabilities not necessarily consistentwi th individual competencies at lower levels of leadership.The challenge is to first accurately gauge an individualspropensity to perform at the strategic level, and thencondition desired responses that transcend any one job orany one task. Dr . S iegfr ied Streufer t s StrategicManagement Simulations are scenario based simulationswhich place leaders in realistic settings that allow

observat ion and analysis of how t hey per form.

21

Not unlikethe Army War Colleges Strategic Crisis Exercise,individuals perform strategic planning and confrontemergencies requir ing more extemporaneous and

17


23/130

immediate responses during the simulations. Throughcomputer-based measurement of various aspects ofperformance, the simulation generates profiles of

effectiveness which are predictive of success.22

The capacity not only to predict individual success, butto condit ion desirable performance dist inguishesStreuferts work from other simulations. In addition, thebreadth of per formance indicators for complex, interact ivesituations, and fluid environments is remarkable,particularly given reliability of the validity coefficients

exceeding .60.

23

As the Army After Next Wargame series continues toexplore the col lect ive dimensions of t ime and knowledge atthe strategic level, the development of a strategicsimulation model to examine the quality of leadercompetence offers a parallel means to enhance strategicleader skills in complex environments. Additionally, theinsights into individual planning and decisionmaking offersan opportuni ty to enhance the fidel i ty of future Army AfterNext wargames.

Taci t K now ledge: (U.S. M i l i t ar y Academy and YaleUnivers i ty) .

Every Army leader learns personal lessons fromexperiences in what we typically refer to as the school of

hard knocks. It is the school of the motor-pool, the nightroad-march, the rifl e range, and count less other exper ienceson the job. Collectively, these lessons amount to anindividuals tacit knowledge or the practical know-hownecessary to succeed.

24

Tacit Knowledge refers to action-oriented knowledge,acquir ed wit hout help from others, that allows individuals

to achieve goals they value.25

It differs from academicknowledge in that it is goal-oriented and acquired withoutdirect teaching. Extensive research proves that tacitknowledge is ext remely relevant in predict ing per formance

18


24/130

in real-wor ld endeavors, more so than intel l igence test ing orclassroom academic performance.

26The study of tacit

knowledge, therefore, offers compelling insights as well as

opportunities for developing leaders for the Army AfterNext.

A 7-year joint study recently completed by the U.S.Mil i tary Academy, Yale University, and the Army ResearchInstitute demonstrates that tacit knowledge can beextracted from individual leaders. It offers some usefulinsights into the ways leaders use tacit knowledge. These

personal lessons are best related as stories, though theactual leadership lessons are frequently difficult toart iculate and must be coached out by ski l led interviewersand t hen converted using a complex set of analyt ical tools.

27

It should be noted that this study specifically focused onleader tacit knowledge as opposed to technical tacitknowledge about specific battlefield operating systems orother subjects. That type of tacit knowledge exists as well,

though is not the focus here.Researchers found that the content of military leader

tacit knowledge varies by organizational level and, perhapsnot surprisingly, the tacit knowledge for a par t icular levelreflects the leadership issues and challenges at that level.For example, at platoon level, establishing credibility andauthor ity over others wi th generall y greater exper ience is acommon theme in their military leadership tacit know-ledge.28

At company level, the emerging need to take aninstitutional perspective is added to the challenge of directleadership. A company commanders increased discretion(as compared to the platoon level) is reflected in his tacitknowledge about directing and supervising others. Theother company level tacit knowledge theme centers on

requirements to balance subordinates needs withsupporting the higher headquarters. In that regard, tacitknowledge about cooperating with others and balancingmission accompl ishment is dominant .

29

19


25/130

At battalion level, systems level thinking is a keydevelopmental change. Tacit knowledge for protecting theorganization and managing organizational change is

characteristic at this echelon. Tacit knowledge forcommunicating is uniquely centered on indirect methodsand systems. Knowledge about dealing with poorper formers is the other dist inguishing aspect of leadershipfor the bat talion commander.

30

Aside from the leadership insights, the real power of t hisbody of research lies in the potential to structure and

organize exper ient ial learning in such a way as to accelerateand enrich those high-payoff opportunities. The studyspecifically focused on leadership knowledge as opposed totechnical knowledge, but there appears to be a similarlyprofound opportunity to enhance experiential learning inthat area as well. Finally, the research also proves thecapabil i ty to export or share tacit knowledge. Interest ingly,the researchers consider this to be the least promising

implication because the real power of tacit knowledge islargely derived from its contextual source, which at thispoint is enormously diffi cul t to repli cate.

31

Corporate and commercial perspectives on exportingand sharing tacit knowledge differ from the militaryresearch conclusions. This is illustrated in at least onesoftware appli cation specifi cally designed for the purpose ofsharing tacit knowledge. The 6DOS Interpersonal L ink ingTechnology is a system based on t he theory of int erpersonall inkages known as the Six Degrees of Separation or 6DOS.It facilitates sharing or exporting tacit knowledge byelectroni cally connect ing people who need answers to thosewho have them. The stated purpose of the software is todiscover, track, and promote the conversion of unspokenexpertise into a form that is useful to customers, vendors

and employees. Its marketing strategy centers on thenotion that tacit knowledge is a tremendously valuablecorporate asset.

32

20


26/130

When considered in isolation, the potential to tap intotacit knowledge for any of the three purposes discussedabove has the potential to broadly enhance and accelerate

the learning of leadership competencies relevant to theArmy After Next. Future studies should couple tacitknowledge with emerging simulations technology,bio-technology memory enhancers, and performanceenhancement strategies, to gain broader understanding ofthe potent ial impact .

Bi o-t echnology Memor y Enh ancement (Mi l i t ar y

H ealt h Ser vi ces Syst em).

The 1997 Mil i tary Health Services Study predicts thatover the next 20 years, biotechnology will take humanhealt h beyond our t radit ional t reatment focus on cur ing orpreventing illness and into the realm of enhancement orimproving human performance. Enhancements tomemory, cognitive processing and physical capacity will

gradually be accepted as normal.33

Biochemical enhancement of memory is one area whereresearch is in full swing. Scientists at Cold Spring HarborLaboratory on Long Island are examining proteins thatunderlie memory and learning, pinpointing genes thatproduce and control those functions. Helicon Therapeuticshas since grown out of that research to pursue a focused

effort to develop drugs to both treat memory loss andenhance normal memory functioning. Their researchsuggests that by the time the Army After Next comes tofrui t ion, the abi l i ty to st imulate specific cogni t ive act ivi ty inthe brain will be mature enough to dramatically improvecer tain human intel lectual per formance.

34

When used in conjunction with advanced strategic orvirtual simulations, and performance enhancementtechniques centered on how to learn, the potential forcognit ive enhancement through biotechnology is profound.They also suggest almost limitless implications for

21


27/130

accelerating and enriching leader development for theArmy After Next.

CONCLUSIONS

Research demonstrates that doing business as usualthreatens to erode the relevance and effectiveness of theexisting leader development system. It also suggests thatthere are viable means to accelerate and enrich leaderdevelopment to compensate for those evolving mismatchescaused by changes in the st rategic environment .

Sophocles said, Wisdom outweighs any wealth. Then,as today, knowledge requires time and experience toevolve.

35Our Armys 25-year inst i tut ional commitment to

leader development yielded extraordinary results and nosmall amount of wisdom at every level. The challenge for thefuture is three-fold. First, and foremost, the Army mustfight to preserve the integrity of the existing, proven

system. Second, to sustain the leader developmentadvantage in the future, the Army must be willing toexamine new technologies and emerging capabil i t ies. And,final ly, the inst i tut ion must exercise the courage to becomemore aggressive in stimulating leader development.

The mismatch between the human capacity to handle amore complex operating environment and the informationrequirements generated by it are troubling. It alsorepresent s a useful catalyst to push the quali ty and pace ofleader development ahead, par t icularly as i t relates to moresenior leader competencies for the Army After Next. Wemust seize the opportunity to develop the possibilities ofimproving leader development and our institutionalcapacity to groom t he leaders of t he Army Aft er Next .

END NOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Walter F. Ulmer , Jr., Mi l i tary Leadership int o the 21st Century:Another Br idge Too Far?," Parameters, Vol. XXVI I I , Spring 1998, p. 23.

22


28/130

2. Vincent R. Ruggiero, Thinking Inst ruct ion in the 21st Century,Speech delivered at the 6th International Conference on Thinking,Massachuset ts Insti tut e of Technology, Cambridge, MA, July 18, 1994.

3. Ibid.

4. Joseph Esposito, Fut ure of K nowledge, Speech deli vered at theSmithsonian I nst i tute, Washington DC, May 10, 1993.

5. Elliott M. Jaques, Requisite Organization: The CEOs guide toCreati ve Str uctur e and Leadership, Ar l ington, VA: Cason Hall , 1989, p.16.

6. Ibid., pp. 33-40.

7. Elliott M. Jaques, Executive Leadership: A Practical guide toManaging Complexity, Ar l ington, VA: Cason Hall , 1994, p. 53.

8. Huba Wass De Czege and Jacob Biever, Battle Command andTeamwork: Realizing the Potential of 2020 Technologies, Fort Monroe,VA, 1998, p. 3.

9. General William W. Hartzog, Laying Foundations from ArmyXXI to the Army After Next , Speech del ivered to the Associati on of theUnited States Army, Orlando, FL, February 16, 1998.

10. Ibid.

11. Colonel George B. Forsythe, Cognitive Frames of Referenceand Strategic Thinking, Carl isle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Apri l 5,1989, p. 14.

12. Lieutenant Colonel Steven R. Layfield, U.S. Army, Task Force1-18 Commander, Brcko, Bosnia-Hercegovina. Interview by author,February 24, 1998.

13. General William W. Hartzog, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S.Army Traini ng and Doctr ine Command, Post-Hait i Aft er Act ion Reviewconducted November 1994.

14. Lieutenant Colonel Scott Snook, U.S. Army, Department of

Behavioral Science and Leadership, United States Military Academy,West Point , NY, telephone interview by author, February 23, 1998.

23


29/130

15. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Military Learning: A PractitionersPerspective, in Tacit Knowledge in Professional Practice, Robert J.Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath, eds., Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceEr lbaum Associates, 1998, p. 22.

16. Lieutenant Colonel H. Michael Hughes and StephanieCornelio, Peak Performance Program Fact Sheet, West Point, NY:Center for Enhanced Performance, U.S. Mi l i tary Academy, 1998, p. 1-3.

17. Ibid.

18. Hughes and Corneli o, p. 2.

19. Ibid.

20. Professor Robert F. Helms, Mission Planning and RehearsalTrainer, Research Triangle Institute, http:/ / www.rt i .org/ vr/ w/mprts.html, Int ernet .

21. Professor Robert F. Helms, Virtual Reality, ResearchTriangle Institute, http://www.rti.org/vr.html.

22. Dr. Siegfried Streufert, Strategic Management Simulations,Harr isburg, PA, p. 2.

23. Ibid., p. 12.

24. Ibid., p. 15.

25. Professor Robert J. Sternberg, Testing Common Sense,Amer ican Psychologist, November 1995, pp. 912-927.

26. Ibid.

27. Professor Robert J. Sternberg, For Whom the Bell Curve Tol ls:A Review of the Bell Curve, Psychological Science, Vol. 6, No. 5,September 1995, pp. 257-261.

28. Colonel George B. Forsythe, Experience, Knowledge andMilitary Leadership, in Tacit Knowledge in Professional Practice,Robert J. Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath, eds., Hillsdale, NJ:

Lawrence Er lbaum Associates, 1998, pp. 9-11.

29. Ibid, p. 13.

30. Ibid, p. 14.

24


30/130

31. Ibid, p. 15.

32. Ibid, pp. 24-25.

33. Professor Merrick Furst, Connecting to Tacit Knowledge, p.6DOS, Carnegie-Melon University, http:/ / www.6dos.com.

34. Science Applications International Corporation, White Paper,BiotechnologyMi l i tary Appl ications, Washington DC: The StrategicAssessment Cent er, December 1995, p. 11.

35. Robert Olson, Military Health Services System (MHSS) 2020

Focused Study on Biotechnology and Nanotechnology, Washington DC:U.S. Department of Defense, July 29, 1997, pp. 2-41.

36. Jil l and Stuart Br iscoe, Fami ly Book of Chri sti an Values, Elgin,IL: Chariot Publi shing/Cook Communications, 1995, p. 131.

25


31/130

CH APTER 3

PROL I FERATI NG DECISI ONM AK ERS:ROOT CAUSE OF TH E NEXT

REVOL UTI ON I N MI L I TARY AFFAI RS

Ar th ur J . Cor bet t

INTRODUCTION

In his recent book, Consilience, Edward O. Wilson

asserts, The greatest enterpr ise of t he mind has been andwi l l always be the at tempted l inkage of the sciences and thehumanities.

1Explaining the origin of the apt title for his

book, Wilson defines consilience as a jumping together ofknowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theoryacross disciplines to create a common ground work ofexplanation. This chapter addresses the possibility of arevolution in military affairs (RMA) from the broad

perspect ive of interdisciplinary consil ience. I t is an attemptto expand t he RMA debate beyond i ts cur rent emphasis onnew technologies and innovative concepts, and to focus onthe human dimension of war fare. Fol lowing the admoni t ionof Sun Tsu to first know yourself, we must expand therange of disciplines from which mi l i tary inst i tut ions der iveinsight into human potential if we are to achieve theconsilience of thought required to produce a genuinerevolut ion in mi li tary affair s.

Discerning the character of fut ure war is more a processof intuitive appreciation than logical proof. Consequently,this chapter wi l l embrace a methodology of consil ience fr oma var iety of disciplines to demonst rate the relative direct ionand potent ial velocity of the next RMA. I t wi l l examine theemerging lessons of chaos and complexi ty t heory in l ight of

the theory and nature of war , compare economic systems todiscern the effect of prol i ferating decisionmakers, interpretthe histor ical lessons of previous RMAs, and adapt lessons

27


32/130

learned from contemporary military history to provideinsight on the next revolut ion in mi l i tary affairs.

THESIS

A prol i ferati on of batt lefield decisionmakers wi l l be theproximate cause of the next RMA. The discontinuousadvance in military capability will be harnessed by thenation that first reforms the institutional values andorganizational structures of its military forces to unleashthe full potential of human nature. The next RMA will

initially be dominated by the first nation to capture theessence of the free market dynamic, i.e., the prol i feration oft rusted and empowered decisionmakers, and to incorporatethat dynamic into its military institutions. That nationsforces wi l l develop an ent repreneur ial batt lefield ethos thatvalues ini t iative and tr ust over order and inspect ion; wheresuccess is determined not by a smarter centralizedcoordinator or adherence to a rigid plan, but through

decentralized initiative and timely decisions to exploitfleeting opportunity.

H I STORICAL PRECEDENT

Current ef forts to precipi tate an RMA seek toincorporate emerging technologies into innovativeoperational concepts to produce synergistic military

capability. Numerous historical examples, from blitzkriegand amphibious assault, to the development of carrieraviat ion and nuclear weapons, vali date the effect iveness ofthe conceptual and t echnological method to evolve decisiveforce on the battlefield. Nevertheless, this approach isevolutionary, not revolutionary. While the result of thisevolutionary method may be operationally or strategicallydecisive in the short term, the effects will not compel

adversaries to radically modify their social structures andpoli t ical inst i tut ions in order to field compet it ive capabil i ty.Human ingenui ty being what i t is, the durati on of technicalor operational dominance over an adversary is l imi ted, since

28


33/130


34/130


35/130

produced on the ba t t le f ie ld . He compe l led h iscont emporaries to observe the beneficial operational effectsexhibited by the French and then study their cause.

Conversely, the archi tect of the next RMA must be able tocause or recognize social, political, and economic changesthat may be leveraged to produce enhanced operationaleffects on the battlefield.

One enhancement the Prussians recognized was the useof tirailleur, or skirmisher tact ics, by l ight infant ry forces.Among the members of Scharnhorsts Mi l i ta r i sche

Gesellschaft was a Major Knesebeck, who had observed theFrench in six engagements. He noted that they couldemploy their entire infantry as light forces and withdecided super ior i ty. Knesebeck perceived:

It is here that the education of the individual is of such greatbenefi t to the Republ icans, because situat ions too oft en occurdur ing the combat of light t roops in which the offi cer s cont rolceases completely . . . in which each man acts on his own.6

Scharnhorst was convinced that French militarysuper ior i ty was the direct resul t of a new French social andpoli t ical order and the most signi fi cant sign of these changeswas the greatly enhanced capabil i ty of the common Frenchsoldier and junior offi cer to exploit his natural intel l igenceand independent judgment.

7In contrast to the Prussian

fusil ier , the French tirailleurwas free to think and respondas part of a team. Scharnhorst s biographer, Charles Whitemakes this point emphatically clear in The EnlightenedSoldier:

The real problem here was the social, political, and moralimplications of t raining the third rank of the l ine bat talion tothink and fight as individuals. The advent of the skirmishermarked the beginning of a new epoch in war fare, and his spir itembodied the civil rights of the art of war. No longer couldthe soldier be treated like a mere machine. Now he would

have to be acknowledged as an important part icipant in anytact ical scheme. Thi s is why the French Revolut ion had such atremendous impact on the art of war . I t dest royed the shacklesthat had enslaved the will of the common soldier, and hadreleased a force unprecedented in the history of warfare. In

31


36/130

Prussia, the reali ty of the individual soldier fight ing will inglyfor a cause he bel ieved in was unimaginable to most officers andcivilians . . .for most Prussian officers, skirmishing waspoli t icall y suspect and mil i tari ly unnecessary.8

Scharnhorsts reforms did not end with advocatingskirmisher tactics. He was a vociferous proponent ofcombined arms divisions capable of independentoperations. By providing subordinate commanders wi th al larms, he structured divisions and corps that could fightapart. In creating combined arms divisions, he emulatedNapoleon; but he did Napoleon one better by creating the

Prussian general staff system. Scharnhorst not onlyadvocated the prol i feration of decisionmakers at the tact icallevel; he recommended expanding the number ofdecisionmakers at the operational level as well . In cont rastto Napoleon, who relied on his individual instincts,Scharnhorst s staff system enabled mult iple combined armsforces to disperse and reconcent rate under the direct ion ofseparate commanders, in accordance with a commonly

understood vision. The reforms Scharnhorst ini t iated, andthe staff system he helped to create, eventually broughtabout Napoleons defeat at Leipzig.

Although most of Scharnhorsts reforms have beenuniversally adopted and are commonplace in militaryinsti tut ions today, they generated considerable cont roversyin his own age.

The idea of a soldier or officer who could think or actindependent ly, even without orders, was simply t oo horr i fyingand altogether unprofessional to those reared in the traditionsof Frederick the Great. Such notions would destroy the veryfabric of the Prussian Army.9

But, Scharnhorst persisted. Although it took years forhis ideas to permeate the Prussian Army, his acolyteseventually brought about the end of French imperialism.

Remarkably, and in contrast to the French experience,where a revolution in political affairs brought about anupheaval in the military, it was the revolution in thePrussian mil i tary that prompted a l iberalization of German

32


37/130


38/130

battlefield by liberalizing Prussian society and its values.Had the French not been so quick to capitalize on thesesocial asymmetries for military ends, their military

potent ial may have remained dormant and undiscovered foryears. This begs the obvious question; are there dormantand unexploited social or political changes that haveoccurred since this last true RMA that can provideunrea l ized asymmetr ies for deve lopment by thecontemporary military innovator?

ECONOMICS

The greatest asymmetry among modern nation states isin the realm of economics. Comparative economicsdemonstrates the great difference between free marketsocieties that leverage the will, creativity, initiative, andability to calculate risk by placing the authority fordecisionmaking in the hands of their people, and thosecentra l ized p lanned economies that do not . The

incontestable disparity of wealth produced by the freemarket system compared to any centralized plannedcompetitor is ample evidence of what occurs when peopleare empowered with the authority to make decisionspertaining to their fields of responsibil i ty.

The typical socialist, centralized, planned economy islogical, l inear, hierarchical, and scient i fi c. I f human nature

and activity conformed to Newtonian principles of causeand effect, socialism might merit great accolades forbringing the complexity of economics under rational,organized and predictive control. Assuming near perfectknowledge of resources, means of production, workforce,and population, viastatistics the state itself collected, theequitable distribution of the fruits of national labor wouldseem assured.

11The mystery for the logical, li near t hinker ,

who often views reality through the narrow lens of aNewtonian paradigm, is that such a rati onal and scient i ficprocess can fail so badly. Attempts by centralizedgovernment to impose order on an essentially chaotic

34


39/130

environment and to subst i tute the cont rol of t he few for thewi l l of the many, ut ter ly failed in cont rast to the compet it ionor iented free market system. Al though cent rali zed, planned

economies were obvious failures from the start, theircreators and their successors persisted in maintaining thesystem because it promised control of individuals, even ifthey could not control the economy. In the socialist state,hierarchical order and control was valued over botheffi ciency and effect iveness.

In con t ras t , the f ree marke t sys tem c rea tes

opportunit ies for vast wealt h, as individuals freely choose,create, int eract , and decide across a wide var iety of humanact ivi t ies. Since there is no cent ral coordinating author ity t osynchronize the activity, this decentralization of controlshould, by any linear cause and effect theory, producemassive social incoherence and chaos. Yet the very oppositeoccurs. Bottom-up interactions between individualsgenerate self-organizing, cooperative relationships that

optimize or mutually suffice to promote self-interest withmaximum efficiency. By accepting distributed responsi-bility, and ensuring commensurate decisionmakingauthority, the free market economy engages a naturallychaot ic envi ronment and responds with a flexible, adapti veeconomic order that generates opportunity, wealth, andsocial coherence.

The primary difference between the free market and thecent ral planned economy is in whom the system trusts andempowers to make decisions. The cent ral planned economytrusts the intellectual or experiential elitea few verysmart or experienced individuals who know what to do.The decisions are so vital, and the resul ts so cr i t ical, that theleadership cannot allow the uninitiated to dabble in thecomplex details.

The market economy, on t he other hand, finds the ent iresystem far too difficult for even the most intelligentindividual or group of individuals to comprehend in detail .Knowing the decisions are complex and the consequences

35


40/130

dear, a free market opts to make the decision base as wide aspossible. By empower ing a larger number of int erested, butnot necessarily professional, decisionmakers, the market

economy engages chaos and develops a broad pool ofind iv idua ls exper ienced in per forming wi th in i tscomplexity. These individuals learn from and adapt to themarket envi ronment ; capture fleet ing opportunit ies as theyoccur; act on their own initiative; cooperate with theirneighbors to overcome common problems; take calculatedrisks; and produce synergistic efficiencies in theirsel f- interest and quest for wealth. The col lect ive

intelligence and energy of the many has proven to be fargreater than the refined knowledge of the few. Someindividuals wi l l r isk and fai l , but because the hierarchicalpyramid has been flattened, fewer will be effected.Examples of both the fai led and the successful cont r ibute tothe learning curve and adaptive response of all. Since somany are engaged, the overall system learns and adaptswi th remarkable speed. Mul t iple ent repreneurs, aler t wi th

initiative, are quick to discern and exploit fleetingopportunity.

Despite Americas almost 200 years experience with anonlinear, free market economy, its military servicespersist in seeking battlefield advantage by refining theirinstitutions modeled on centralized, linear, hierarchical,Newtonian principles. As in the army of Frederick the

Great, these pr inciples have served our forces well over theyears; but l ike Freder icks Prussian descendant s, we mightsoon find ourselves studying how we lost our advantage.S im i l a r i t i e s be tween ou r conven t i ona l m i l i t a r yorganizat ion for war and a cent ralized planned economy aredirect and obvious. Both are top down hierarchies relyingupon the cent ralized planning of a few t o direct the energy ofthe many. Execution is decentralized, to some extent, but

initiative outside the established plan is largely suspect.Focus is disproport ionately di rected on generating internalorder and establishing cont rol, rather than on engaging theenemy, generat ing a faster and more cont inuous

36


41/130

operational tempo and seizing fleeting opportunity.Organizational communications are constructed to passinformat ion up and send direct ion down.

Conventional economics provides insight on theimportance of proliferating decisionmakers to leveragehuman nature; the so-called new economics provideexamples of a decent ralized decision process leveraging thenew communications technologies. Kevin Kelly, executiveeditor of Wiredmagazine and author of New Rules For theNew Economy, combines the experience of cutting edge

businesses with wisdom emerging from the biologicalsciences and chaos and complexity theory. He presentsnumerous examples of decentralized decisionmakingprofoundly improving productivity. A particularly aptexample is fr om M exico:

Any process, even the bulkiest, most physical process, can betackled by bottom-up swarm thinking. Take, for example, thedelivery of wet cement in the less-than-digital economy of

rural northern Mexico. Here Cemex (Cementos Mexicanos)runs a ready-mix cement business that is overwhelming itscompetitors and attracting worldwide interest. It used to bethat getting a load of cement delivered on time to aconstruction site in the Guadalajara region was close to amiracle. Traffic delays, poor roads, contractors who werentready when t hey said they would be, all added up to an on-t imedelivery rate of l ess than 35%. In r esponse, cement companiestried to enforce rigid advance reservations, which, whenthings went wrong (as they always did), only made mattersworse (Sorry, we cant reschedule you until next week.).Cemex transformed the cement business by promising todel iver concrete faster than pizza. Using extensive networkingtechnologyGPS real-t ime location signals from every t ruck,massive telecommunications throughout the company, andful l informati on available to drivers and dispatchers, with theauthor i ty to act oni tthe company was able to promise that i fyour load was more than 10 minutes late, you got a 20%discount.

Instead of r igidly t rying to schedule everything ahead of t imein an envi ronment of chaos, Cemex let the dri vers themselvesschedule deliver ies ad hoc and in r eal t ime. The dri vers formeda flock of t rucks cr isscrossing the town. I f 3 cont ractors call ed

37


42/130

in an order for 12 yards of mix, the available t ruck closest to thesite at that time would make the delivery. Dispatchers wouldensure customer creditworthiness and guard against omissions,but the agents in the field had permission and the informationthey needed to schedule orders on the fly. Result: On-timedelivery rates reached about 98%, with less wastage ofhardened cement, and much happier customers.12

How a Mexican company decent ralized decisionmakingand solved its problems of just in t ime del ivery cont rastssharply wi th how Joint doctr ine cent ralizes the del ivery ofair ordnance, and speaks volumes about insti tut ional habit s

and proclivities. The Cemex example provides importantinsights on the growing inverse relationship betweencontrol and effectiveness. Kelly does not denigrate theimportant role of leadership in inst i tut ions, but he makes i tclear that:

At present, there is far more to be gained by pushing theboundaries of what can be done at the bot tom than by focusingon what can be done at the top . . . The great benefi ts reaped by

the new economies in the coming decades will be due in largepart to exploring the power of decentralized and autonomousnetworks.13

Despite the vast differences between economic andmartial enterprises, war and economics share the samedriving common denominatorhuman nature. Theor ies ofwar and economics are both designed to explain andmaximize human dynamics in a complex endeavor. What

we learn about allocating decision author ity from businessmodels may not be directly applicable to a battlefieldenvironment, but the consiliance approach compels us toexamine how extraordinary success in one field caninfluence another .

TH EORY AND NATURE OF WAR

Our current military organization for battle fails toexploit the most obvious advantages of our nationalcharacter at the operational and tactical levels of war.Military organizations expend considerable effort to

38


43/130

promote institutional conformity that inadvertentlysuppresses initiative by narrowly allocating decisionauthority along functional lines, and then establishes and

enforces procedures to keep everyone in their designatedlane. Holistic solutions and perspectives are precluded byadministrative compartmentalization. Coordination israrely done between adjacent or supporting units withoutthe interventionand associated frictionof a designatedcoordinating authority. This can lead to economy ofcent ralized management, but oft en at the expense of t imelysupport . Bot tom-up associat ions and solut ions are st i fl ed by

top-down administ ration.

The cur rent system, however, is not wi thout i ts mer its,and ultimately some form of linear process does helporganizational functioning. Some aspects of our world,particularly the physical dimension, are fairly wellrepresented by the linear Newtonian paradigm. However,as our glimpse of comparative economics suggests, many

human interactions, such as commerce and war, are notwell replicated in the Newtonian model. The genius ofClausewi tz was that he comprehended the nonl inear natureof war in an age that was energetically learning andgratuitously applying the emerging theories of Newtonianphysics across a wide variety of discipl ines. A student of t hephysical sciences in his own r ight, Clausewi tz discerned thecritical incongruities between the interactions of warfare

and the cause and effect relationships of the physicalsciences. He strongly resisted the proclivity of his age tosubmit the study of war to reductionist theories. His ownstudy and exper ience suggested that scient i fi c determinismwas incompatible with the unpredictable nature of war.L inearity could not account for his observation t hat combatpower accrued synergistically from both physical andintangible forces, and morale factors were dispropor-

t ionately signifi cant when compared to the physical means.Most signi ficantly, Clausewi tz understood that war was adynamic process between two competing wills thatinteracted in real time within an environment of fear,

39


44/130

fr ict ion, and uncertainty. The react ive nature of t he enemyprecluded predictability and certainty for Clausewitz,causing him to eschew any attempts to reduce war to an

action-reaction concept, such as a chess match. Heunderstood that in warfare, moves are not necessarilysequential, but can become simultaneous.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz was a captive of his age, andmuch of his writing is laced with metaphors heavily ladenwith terminology taken from the physical sciences. In anage enamored with science and Newtons principles,

Clausewi tz lacked an overarching set of scient i fi c pr inciplesor explanations that would provide the terminology andperspective needed to describe those aspects of war thatremained out side of Newt onian bounds. The compl iment aryand emerging sciences of chaos and complexity theoryprovide us with the tools and terminology that, to somedegree, quant i fy Clausewi tzs quali tative insights.

CHAOS AND COMPL EXIT Y

Incorporating chaos and complexity theory into aconsil ience of RMA disciplines provides both an alternat iveconceptual paradigm and a more robust lexicon to descr ibethe nature of war. The essential difference between thelinear and the nonlinear approach to warfare is thecontrasting ways they deal with wars chaos and

uncertainty.The l inear approach seeks to imposeorder on a chaot ic

environment by simplifying complexity through breakingproblems into component par ts. A great deal of at tent ion isfocused internally on organizational doctrine, controlmeasures, coordination techniques, and procedures.Nonl inearity accepts chaos as inherent to war fare and seeksto bet ter adapt to that environment than the adversary. Theenemy is understood not only to be r eact ive as Clausewi tznoted, but potentially interactive. The relative decision-action speed of adversaries engaged in conflict determinesthe ability to generate operational tempo and gain the

40


45/130

ini t iat ive, i .e., reduce the enemy decision cycle to a react ionmode. To achieve this decision cycle dominance, chaos andcomplexity theorists advocate a proliferation of complex

adaptive systems generating multiple decisions, that canbe deliberately out of phase with each other, to provideconstant st imulus to fat igue the cent ralized enemy decisionprocess. Speed of adaptationwi l l form another cycle simi larto the t radit ional observation, or ientation, decision, act ionloop (OODA loop). Focus is on t he adversary; discerning hisintentions and interacting advantageously.

Nonlinear approaches seek to enhance chaos anduncertainty if advantage can be gained, relative to theadversary, by faster decision and adaptation cycles.Complex organizational attempts to control chaos areeschewed in favor of developing resilient organizationalstructures that can accommodate changing combatcircumstances and enemy innovation. Similarly, the enemyis considered as a dynamic, adaptive, and resourceful

opponent, who himself is capable of generating surpr iseand chaos.

Both linear and nonlinear models can be useful indescr ibing, interpret ing, and conceptualizing the nature ofwar and its contemporary character . Arguably, in t he day ofmassed, on-line formations, the linear model was not onlysui table, but opt imized. However, the growing complexi ty ofwar, and knowledge of the inherent truths of the newsciences will shift the paradigm by which we understandhow the world works. More to the point, we will come tobetter understand how complex adaptive systems, likemankind, work in a world that still responds to the linearprinciples of Newtonian physics. Today, the nonlinearpr inciples of chaos and complexi ty have begun to be viewedas a compet ing paradigm wi th l inearity. This perception of

compet it ion wil l t ransit ion t o an understanding of how bothlinear and nonlinear models are compatible, and notmutually exclusive ideas. Eventually both perspect ives wi l lbecome complement ary concepts that wi l l enable those who

41


46/130

can master and aptly employ both to produce synergisticwisdom, wealt h, and national power.

The chaos and complexity model will surpass theNewtonian model as the dominant template for futuremi l i tary organizat ion and innovat ion. Warfare wi l l not bethe first discipline to incorporate the principles of theseemerging theories; war will follow science, economics, andbusiness; where the natural t ruths of chaos and complexi tytheory are already having dramatic effect. Several factorswi l l dri ve this paradigm of i nnovat ion.

First, warfare will grow in complexity. While it hasalways been a compl icated undertaking, in past wars linearmodels were adequate to approximate the comparativelylimited number of battlefield variables. During our ownCivi l War, for example, the adversaries were technologicallymirrored, and attempts to gain technological advantagewere often immediately thwarted, as occurred with thesimultaneous fielding of the evenly matched Monitor andVi rginia ironclads. With t he opposing forces using ident icalweapons and tactics, the terrain became the primarybattlefield inconsistency. Extensive effort went intounderstanding the nature of the terrain, with advantageoft en going to the commander who used i t best . Today, thevar iables include a wide range of t echnological innovat ionsthat are employed not only on land and sea, but in t he airand space as well . These many tangible uncer taint ies, asidefr om t hose int roduced by human fog and fr ict ion, are sure toproduce myriad asymmetries on the future battlefield.

Second, adaptive preparation for future war will alsomarginalize the utility of the centralized linear model oforganizing armies and procur ing equipment. Theabundance of new technological innovations and systemsof systems will open countless technological variables for

the force developer to choose from. Process intenseprocedures for discerning requirements relative to rapidlymutating enemy system capabilities will be far too slow toadapt to dynamic battlefield conditions. The time lag

42


47/130

resu l t ing f rom procedura l iner t ia wi l l be fur thercompounded by the need to select from a wider array oftechnological options. Even advocates of linear models

att empt ing to surmount this problem acknowledge that thenonlinear introduction of emerging technologies willchallenge formal tools like Assumption Based Planning(ABP) and that Genuine intuit ion and experience

judgment may prove jus t as va luab le as formaldecisionmaking t ools, perhaps even more so.

14Connecting

the decisionmaking process for equipment selection anddevelopment down t o the uni t level wi l l field a wider variety

of systems for experimentation in the crucible of battle.With experience gained from battlefield interaction,adequate systems can be introduced until more optimizedsystems evolve. The innovat ion, exper iment at ion, feedbackprocess will be continuous throughout the war. Thisproliferation of innovators would be the biologicalequivalent of expanding the gene pool. Current proceduresare inbred with commensurate results.

Thi rd, the character of warfare wil l cont inue to grow lesspredictable, and the requirements to meet its rapidlymutating chal lenges wil l emerge directly from thebattlefield. The relative advantages and disadvantages ofnew weapons and t echnologies wi l l be largely undetermineduntil they interact on the field of battle with new andinnovat ive enemy systems and concepts opposing them. The

uncerta in number of quant i ta t ive and qual i ta t ivebeginning variables that precedes interaction with theenemy further complicates the existing challenge ofbat t lefield predictabil i ty that l inear planning formulas aredesigned to produce. Linear techniques are designed toident i fy tangible and quant i fiable requir ements that can beused to assure predictable success. Statist ical informat ionon our own organization is rigorously pursued to meet

planning and development schedules. Eventually, acentralized process provides standardized equipmentcommon to all. While some degree of centralizedstandardization is necessary for communications and

43


48/130

interoperability, it can also inhibit rapid technologicaladaptation. Save for what soldiers have on hand fromforaging, captured enemy supplies and their own

expedients, neither the materials nor time are usuallypresent on the bat t lefield to allow adaptation to take placeforward. Nor, traditionally, are the contractors whohabitually produce the weapons employed. The battlefieldinnovation of the Rhino Tank to bust the hedgerows inNormandy was a significant bottom-up technologicalinnovation led by enlisted soldiers. Similarly, thePetersburg crater produced by the Union miners from

Pennsylvania capitali zed on uni t unique nitch knowledgeto potent ial advantage. These event s are atypical examplesof bottom-up initiative that sporadically punctuate thehistory of linear warfare. The limited availability ofexamples of such ini t iat ives demonst rates how successful lylinear military organizations can suppress the innovativecapability of otherwise highly complex adaptive systems.If we choose to build on the nonlinear model, we will

capitalize on the innovative potential that is latent in oursoldiers and make it commonplace on t he future bat t lefield.

COMM AND AND CONTROL

Chaos and complexity theories are relevant to ourinquiry into a potential revolution in military affairs notonly because these theories provide us with an enhanced

model to understand the dynamic nature of war, butbecause they also suggest more optimized models ofcommand, based on realist ic appraisals of human cognit ionand decisionmaking potent ial.

In his anthology of Speculations on Nonlinearity inMil it ary Affair s, enti t led Coping wi th the Bounds, ThomasJ. Czerwinski credits Martin Van Creveld for discerning

th ree dominant methods o f command andcontroldirection, plan, and influence. He notes thatcommand systems are designed to address the pervasiveunderlying commanders quandaryuncertainty and

44


49/130


50/130

main plan, but for the most par t , a t ruly interact ive enemyis to be avoided vi a central ly control led standofftechnologies.

Command by Influence is designed to distributeuncertainty in a manner highly analogous to the freemarket economy. What the commander wishes to influenceis ar t iculated viamission t ype orders that effect ively conveya general concept of operations and commanders intent.Influence replicates the funct ion of Adam Smi ths invisiblehand as the uniting force behind a proliferation of

decisionmakers. Command by influence interacts with,rather than avoids or simplistically reduces complexsituations.

. . . only the outline and minimum goals of an effort areestablished in advance, effect ively i nfl uencing all of t he forcesall of t he t ime. Unlike other command forms, this method takesdisorder in str ide as inevi table and even insofar as i t affectedthe enemy as well, desirable. Great reliance is placed on theini t iative of subordinates based on local si tuat ional awareness,which translates to lowered decision thresholds. It relies onself-contained, joint, or combined arms units capable ofsemi-autonomous action. All of this activity occurs within thebounds established by the concept of operations derived fromthe commander s intent .16

Command by influence is the appropriate adaptation tothe nonl inear, post -Newtonian reali t ies of modern warfare.It is optimized for an environment of uncertainty,

complexity, and unpredictability; where experiencedintui t ion and pat tern recogni t ion are prized over t ransientknowledge; and self-organization at the edge of chaos isfavored over slower, static, hierarchical, centralizedsystems. The ability of decentralized and decisionempowered units to rapidly and advantageously interactwi th more int imate situational awareness is a tremendousadvantage over centralized systems which, however wellconnected by electrons, respond slower. Moderncommunications technologies are useful to leverage thecapabil i t ies of command by influence, but not int egral t o i t .Other technologies, such as missi les in a box, which hold

46


51/130

promise of providing small units integral ordnance for fi resagainst armored, air, and personnel targets, will enhanceself-rel iance, reduce logist ics, and enable greater autonomy

on the battlefield (as did Stinger missiles in the hands ofAfghan and Contra rebels). Since we Americans areaccustomed to decentralized decisionmaking by virtue ofour economic system, we have a st rong cul tural advantageover many potential centralized adversaries; a situationanalogous to the advantage enjoyed by post-revolutionaryFrance over the monarchies of Europe.

Properly, and of necessi ty, a nat ions mi l i taryinst i tut ions are a sub-cul ture of t he dominant cul ture theyare sworn t o protect . Unless the nation i s a mi l i tari st state,this sub-culture status is designed to provide opportunityfor the military to promote those unique personal virtuesand inst i tut ional qual it ies that are required dur ing war, butotherwise divergent from more liberal social values.However, to the degree that the two cultures can share a

common set of basic assumptions on how to maximizehuman potent ial, we can more readily leverage our nat ionalcharacter to military advantage. Currently, the militarysub-cul ture, intent on conformi ty and order , dri l ls out manyof the very qualities our wider culture intrinsically valuesand inculcates into i ts ci t izenry to achieve wealt h. Yet thereare strong indicators, from diverse sources, that these arethe very quali t ies we wi l l want to prol i ferate in the Army

After Next .The essence of command by influence is the interaction

of a clearly articulated commanders intent with highlyautonomous, self-di rect ing, decisionmakers. Focus is not oninternal cont rol, but on external r esul t . Uncertaint y is dealtwith by intuit ive comprehension based on patternrecognit ion and localized sit uat ional awareness, not by ever

expanding and time consuming quests for information.Timely sufficient interactions are preferred over moreoptimized, but delayed solutions. The organizationalvalues of such a force are trust, initiative, intuition, risk,

47


52/130

and adaptabi l i ty. Some internal disorder is tolerated, evenprotected, as a necessary t rade-off for enhanced velocity inthe OODA loop and adaptation cycles. Higher operational

tempo to gain and maintain the initiative is valued overslower more comprehensive efforts. Multiple OODA loopsact ing in concert , but not in phase, compound the confusionof the enemy and render his ability to discern operationalpat terns more diffi cult .

CONCILIANCE

The intersection of chaos and complexity theory,military history, contemporary conflict, theory and natureof war, and economics all point to a future where thedominant force on the battlefield will be the one that bestprol i ferates competent , more autonomous decisionmakers,who freely interact among themselves and the enemy toexploit opportunity, within the bounds established bycommanders intent. These units will be led by trusted,

intui t ive thinkers and r isk takers, who adapt quickl y andinnovatively to the rapidly mut ating condit ions of modernwar . Of course, this consil ience-der ived hypothesis is itselfan intuitive leap, based on broad pattern recognition, tograsp the character of fut ure war. Our contemporary l inearmode ls and Newton ian though t pa t te rns a reself-perpetuating, and will not transition logically to thissame recognit ion. Consequent ly, we may not construct the

Army After Next until we have first encountered theenemy after next .

The popular Prayer of St. Francis asks for t he st rengthto change what may be changed, the perseverance to dealwith what cannot change, and the wisdom to know thedifference. Clausewi tz and Sun Tsu art iculate the essent ialand unchangeable nature of war. Specious arguments that

new technologies and systems will redefine war, or makehigh-minded promises of a more humane form of warfare,are beyond the pale of credibility. The character of war ismutable, but its fundamental nature is as fixed as the

48


53/130

nature of t he men who wage i t . Simi larl y, the real wor ldrepresents a continuum of activity from the static to thedynamic and beyond to the chaotic. Chaos and complexity

theory leads us to understand that as we move closer towardthe edge of the chaotic abysswithout falling inwemaximize the dynamic properties of human nature. Still,many l inear processes wi l l remain par t of t he process of war.The successful force of the future will be that which canmove seamlessly between both linear and nonlinearconcepts, utilizing each in the most effective manner.Wisdom l ies wi th t he force that can make these dist inct ions.

Ever more important in future war will be thoseintangible factors that elevate the soldier to the status ofwarrior. The proliferation of authority and responsibilitydownward t o small uni t leaders wi l l make strong demandson character and leadership. The lack of elbow touchingthat has t radit ionally provided sol idar i ty on t he batt lefieldmust be accounted for by greater effort in training to

develop cohesion. The moral and organizational values ofthe force wi l l remain of pr imary import

future leadership, old issues,new methods pub274

Documents