Higher Education 21: 49-61, 1991. �9 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Funding, selected issues and trends in Tanzania higher education

JUSTINIAN C.J. GALABAWA Department of Educational Planning and Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, P. O. Box 35048, Dares Salaam, Tanzania

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to discuss the funding constraints as related to higher education in Tanzania. The article discusses also the trend of internal and external efficiency indicators. The funding constraints include: the low growth rate of GDP, balance of payment problems, inflation, devaluation of the shilling, absence of cost-sharing and resources mismanagement. Higher education is characterized by high unit costs, low capacity utilization and high teacher-student ratios and yet private benefits are high as compared to social benefits. Tanzanian higher education remains elitist and continues to serve a well-to-do minority.

I. Introduction

Tanzania's plans for expanding higher education opportunities and, improving its quality are often hampered by the limited financial resources available and the lack of creativity in mobilising and managing extra resources. Given the present sluggish performance of the economy, the financial flows to higher education and the pressures for further expansion may be halted in the near future if government policymakers and educational administrators do not find new sources of funding and contain the costs.

All the efforts in financing higher education development have been carried out by the Central Government. Since there is always competition for financial resources within the education sector and with other sectors, an increase of public expenditure on higher education is not possible without fiscal destabilising effects unless the government's share of Gross National Product (GNP) increases, a situation not envisaged in the near future.

Additional resources will have to be sought from private initiatives. In real terms this means the following: (i) transferring some higher education financial responsi- bilities to other institutions and individual consumers; (ii) a more careful examination of how cost reductions can be introduced without sacrificing higher education quality, access and equity through some cost effective methods of delivery; (iii) balancing future higher education policies with economic realities so as to avoid creating a fiscal crisis; (iv) monitoring higher education efficiency by changing the operation of the system.

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2. Funding constraints

The funding contraints faced by Tanzanian higher education are structural and administrative. These contraints can be solved within the existing social order.

Although the government has a number of sources for its revenue which include taxation and borrowing (loans and grants), over time increased expenditure on education and other social services has involved increased taxation on the whole economy. In particular the government has been levying high taxes on the enterprises and the workers. In reality therefore, increased taxation has overtime meant a reduction on profits for the enterprises and reduced wages and other take home earnings for the people. The overall effect of this unchecked trend has been the reduced surplus for reinvestment in the cases of enterprises, reduced rates of economic growth for the whole economy and reduced social welfare levels in education provision and health services.

The higher education sector is one of the social sectors, that has also been affected by the economic measures undertaken by the Tanzanian government to rectify the longtime ailing economy. The adopted measures included the World Bank advocated policies, especially the National Economic Survival Programmes (NESP), the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). To a large extent these programme measures have focused on attainment of economic efficiency and productivity. In particular, 'so far adjustment programmes have focused almost exclusively on macro economic per- formance indicators, e.g., public sector and trade deficit, reduced areas, increased international reserves, etc'. (Tibaijuka 1988, p. 4).

The burden distribution of the adjustment policies at different levels of the education systems and across groups was uneven because of the way the policies were translated into practice. For example, the government continued to finance higher education from the reduced allocated funds instead of transferring some of the burden to the groups of individuals benefiting most from higher education by introducing new financing formulae. The idea here would be to acquire from the beneficiaries of higher education a much larger share of the real costs of providing these services to supplement public resources.

The major contributors to higher education costs are the costs of food, lodging and student living expenses. During the period 1978/79-1982/84 the average cafetaria per unit costs at the University of Dares Salaam main campus and Sokoine University Campus were Tshs. 11,864 and Tshs. 22,705 respectively (Galabawa 1986). These figures were approximately one third of the total recurrent unit costs. Since these expenses are unrelated to instruction, and must be incurred by the families whether or not students are enrolled in University, there is no justification for public financing of these costs. This is so much so in Tanzania where studies have shown that only a minority (and, nearly always, a well to do minority) is over represented at secondary and University levels (Malekela 1983; Mbilinyi 1973).

The absence of an effective decision making and policy formulation machinery within the government and the party to correct these obvious imbalances, whose

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correction might have raised substantial higher education revenue, poses another funding constraint.

Continuing inflation which has been at an annual rate of around 30% for the period 1986-87, has decreased the budget to higher education in real terms. The budget to University education declined between 1978/79 and 1989/90. In nominal terms the University budget for the periods 1978/79 and 1989/90 were Tshs. 123,048,451 and Tshs. 1,302,701,900, respectively. However, in real terms these figures when deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) were Tshs. 123,0489,451 and Tshs. 79,930,361 for the respective periods. In other words in real terms the University budget for 1989/90 is 35% less than it was in 1978/79 (UDASA 1990).

Another major contributor to the high costs of higher education are the teachers' salaries; a characteristic feature of most Universities because teachers who are usually highly educated and scarce, command higher salaries compared with their lower level counterparts. On the other hand the purchasing power of these teachers' salary earnings has declined overtime. Consequently the teachers' quality and dignity has eroded. The teachers' pressure and demands to increase their salaries in the light of high costs poses a major constraint to the government's effort directed at containing expenditures. And in a situation of declining purchasing power of teachers it is difficult to imagine how higher educational quality can be improved without improving the conditions of teachers, so as to strengthen their motivation and increase their effectiveness.

Funding higher education involves the use of foreign exchange. Foreign exchange is needed to procure equipment and materials, building materials, chemicals and textbooks which are not readily available domestically. Tanzania has always experienced balance of payment problems; thus, even if internal funds were available, the problem would still be there with regard to essential books, laboratory and other materials that cannot be obtained within the country.

Although Tanzania has the largest paper mill in Eastern and Southern Africa, the locally produced paper is very expensive as compared to the imported one because of government imposed highduties on it and because of high production costs. The few reading materials and books that are produced and marketed locally have therefore become tremendously expensive; sometimes more than three times the price of the same article obtained outside the country. The result is that the universities have spent much money to purchase the few textbooks and materials available in the country.

Foreign assistance to higher education comes not only in monetary terms but also in the form of experts, equipment, buildings and staff-development. By 1984 foreign dependency on development expenditure for education in general was between 75% and 80%. But, a major constraint on this source of funding is the fact that the donor agencies are re-evaluating their efforts so far. Recent World Bank and Unesco reports do indicate inadequate management and utilization of foreign assistance; a situation not peculiar to higher education but which reflects nation wide management deficiencies in public administration. Their opinion is that donor support is being poured into a bottomless pit of inefficiency and mismanagement of funds.

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At the University level managerial competence is a mirror image of the situation at the Ministry of Education (MoE) headquarters. Since the vast majority of University management officers and heads of servicing units have learned on the job that there is no reason to believe that this cadre is an exception to the large unskilled or semiskilled pool of managers that exist nationwide. Thus if policy reforms are not made higher education stands to experience a reduction of external funds to development expenditure.

Yet, the major constraints to funding higher education are the unchanging attitudes and beliefs of some people on how education should be f'manced. There is inertia to change things for the better. Among technocrats, politicians and academicians there is a strong but unwise reluctance to accept new financing formulae, especially those formulae which advocate cost-sharing or institutional autonomy and control. It is this culture which rejects most expert opinion. The absence of effective decision making and policy formulation machinery to correct this culture whose correction might have helped to raise more revenue or instill some cost consciousness poses a funding constraint.

3. Public expenditure on higher education

The Central government funds to higher education are channelled through the Ministry of Education (MoE). These Central government funds cater both for recurrent and development expenditures. The MoE funds higher education through block grants paid to the two universities (Dar es Salaam and Sokoine) and to individual students (fees and allowances) who are sponsored by the Government. The trends of recurrent expenditure in constant prices by education sector (in absolute figures), show that higher education ranked second to primary education in 1987/88. The trends for development expenditure indicate that the allocation to higher education has increased markedly over the period 1983/84-1987/77; whereas the allocation to secondary has fallen (Anderson and Rosegart 1987).

Tanzanian higher education is 'characterised by extremely high operation costs attributable to the way it is organised' (UNESCO 1989, p. 34). In 1982/83-1987/88 it consumed 13.1% of the recurrent budget. During the same period the share of capital budget increased from 10.7% to over 20%. Yet the 1989 Unesco report observed further that 'the existing teacher: student ratio is 1 : 3.8 and the academic: non-academic staff ratios are 1 : 1, whereas the average ratios for 15 sub-Saharan Universities are 1 : 8.2 and 1 : 4 respectively'.

As compared with other sectors, higher education has high unit expenditures. For example, during the year 1988/89 the unit recurrent expenditures for primary and secondary were Tshs. 857 and Tshs. 17,409 respectively, while that for higher education was Tshs. 160,712 (MoE 1989).

The question of priorities also affects the allocation of resources to the education sector and in some cases the emphasis arising from liberalization are very surprising. In a recent economic survey it has been noted that whereas in 1970/71 13.68% of government expenditure went towards education and 7.05% to the military, in

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1986/87 6.45% went to education with 14.58% going to the military.

4. Student user fees and loans

Fees are not paid directly by individual students. Various government ministries and agencies sponsor students by bearing the costs of their tuition, accommodation, food, transportation, books and a stipend known as the 'higher education allowance' (UNESCO 1989). The sponsored students are supposed to be bonded and work for their sponsor for five years. In practice a good number of students are hired by non-sponsoring employers after graduation.

In 1985 fees were reintroduced at secondary school level following the Finance Minister's Budget Speech for 1984/85. On the other hand the elitist nature and purpose of higher education has not altered and therefore its provision should also depend on the country's financial ability. User fees entail any fees paid for tuition at the primary, secondary and higher education levels, as well as room and board fees at University (Haddad and Demsky 1987).

At its meeting in Dodoma, the National Executive Committee (NEC), of the ruling Party discussed the April 1990 University Strike. The students had complained 'about inadequate allowances given to them, diminishing allocation of funds to universities, low salaries paid to lecturers and lack of employment guarantee after graduation' (Daily News, April 16th 1990). The NEC recommended among other things that before opening the government should reorganise higher education and let students pay for some of the costs.

If some user fees in public higher education were introduced, its implication will have to be addressed since full or partial cost sharing could result in many potential students finding themselves excluded from education because of their families' inability to pay. Some arguments are being put forward as reasons for the introduction of user fees at higher eduction level although the modalities of implementation have not been worked out. These arguments are: i. it is impossible to expand existing services out of general taxation, given the firm

expectation of a relatively low economic growth rate in the future; ii. the distribution of higher education should be done according to needs, ability

to pay, academic ability and individual future benefits obtained; iii. a distribution of higher education services on the ability to pay would increase

efficiency, raise standards and expand existing services by enlisting private contributions;

iv. the central funds allocated to higher education are at present mainly used by economically, socially and culturally better off groups.

On the other hand it has been noted that fees are inequitable and tend to be regressive since as a proportion of personal disposable income they fall most harshly on the poor. Thus 'the writing is now clearly on the wall for a sharpening of the level of social differentiation thereby reinforcing the crisis of ideological legitimation. Only those children whose parents can afford school fees will continue to have access to a formal education in Tanzania. And when parents have to choose which

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children to send to school, invariably the male children get the preference' (Roy-Campbell 1989, p. 3).

The theoretical positions against some user fees do not appear to be supported by research evidence. A case study of a self help secondary school initiative by Galabawa and Ishumi indicated that:

The amount of school fees looks exhorbitant especially when the amount paid is compared with the average local cash income from coffee of Tshs. 12,000/= p.a. (4 bags are 3,000Tshs). However, most of the fees is paid from money transfers earned outside Kanyigo Ward by parents and relatives of students currently working outside the ward. In any case, only three students are known to have dropped out because they could not pay school fees. In fact, those who drop out, do so after paying school fees, and yet the major causes of dropout are social and discipline problems (Galabawa and Ishumi 1990, p. 32).

Yet, another recent study by Komba (1990) though inconclusive did not support user fees counter arguments. The study observed that: i. Some students were cheating the headmasters so as to evade or postpone fees

paying; and attributed the delay in fees payment to laxity by the collectors rather than inability to pay on the part of families.

ii. Fees indebtedness varied significantly with the nature of sponsor characteristics; workers' sons were more indebted (worse off) than farmers' sons and businessmen's sons put together.

iii. There is no conclusive evidence whether or not the fees strategy was efficient or inequitable; rather it is suggested that the administrator variable is a very important one in the whole exercise. The extent to which the fees strategy affected worse off students could not be measured.

Student loans are not used as a means of financing higher education. The student revolving loan scheme which used to operate in the 1960s and 1970s is no longer in use for no apparent reasons other than lack of supervision and commitment to the idea. This interest free loan scheme interest was deducted directly from monthly salaries of graduates for a period of eighteen months after obtaining employment.

Government sponsored or guaranteed student loan programs, could enable students to borrow to finance tuition fees or living expenses. The major objective and priority for a loan scheme would be to reduce the level of subsidy and therefore substitute loans for grants, scholarships and bursaries, generating extra resources by increasing cost recovery.

Although there is still lack of clear policy, priority and imagination or initiative on the part of planners, several reasons make the loan idea feasible in Tanzania. First, the objectives of the student aid programmes are clear and acceptable. These include the following: satisfaction of demand for higher education manpower, provision of financial assistance for low income students and to encourage academic achieve- ment. Second, a Planning committee of student loans with government guarantees can be formed to include representatives of the newly formed planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, MoE, Universities and the Central Bank. Third, the day to day administration of the loan program may be entrusted to any of the relevant financial institutions with a grassroot network support system. These institutions

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include the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB). The structure of NBC, its responsibilities, coverage and location in every district and some wards, and of course its experience in administering loan programs would make it an ideal institution. Fourth, the National Insurance Corporation (NIC), which is government backed can easily insure the loans as it has been doing with the individually obtained Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) loans. Fifth, although the question of how to administer a means test or to determine financial need is usually difficult, Tanzania has good experience with the last three national censuses; therefore given this background the administration of means surveys should not present considerable problems. The problems with administering the loan system have always been imagined rather than real.

5. Internal efficiency

If there is an area where costs recovery can be achieved by changing the operations of the higher education system it is in the area of internal efficiency. Internal efficiency indicators tend to suggest that there is scope to increase enrolment substantially at an economic cost through adoption of various cost saving measures.

The 1989 Unesco report observes correctly that the majority of the applicants for admission to the two Universities fail to gain access. The UDSM admits only one third of those who apply in Arts and Social Sciences, 23% in Science subjects, 40% in Medicine and 50% in Engineering. The admission rate is high only in Education (70%). In Sokoine University only 47% of applicants gain admission. The overall average macro-capacity utilization of the UDSM is 0.65 (Galabawa 1985).

Some of the reasons for capacity under-utilization are the following: (i) lack of qualified candidates because of low pass rates at secondary school levels; (ii) unrealistic student-academic administrative staff mix-ratios (the UDSM has high administrative staff costs and yet it has a shortage of students and teachers); (iii) lack of efficiency standards to guide employment and work habits (e.g., no staff-work load specifications, student ratios).

No policy initiative has affected the academic performance of higher education institutes like the Musoma Resolution (MR) policy which allowed mature entrants into the University by requiring students to be admitted into the University after work experience of at least two years. A comparative academic achievement trend at the UDSM for pre-MR-period (1970-1975) and the post-MR period (1977-1984) indicated the following trends (Galabawa 1985): i. the post MR period (1977-1984) had experienced a drop in first class (A-grade)

degrees in the faculties of science, law and arts and social sciences; ii. the faculty of science appeared to be the most affected since in this faculty there

was an increase in the failure rate and a decrease in the number of first class degrees awarded;

iii. the faculty of engineering which did not implement the MR-policy (most of the students in the faculty of engineering were direct entrants), was not affected by

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the MR-policy as academic achievement levels tended to be stable. The scarcity of funding for physical assets and non-salary operating expenses at

the UDSM has seriously undermined the quality of education provided. And both research and consultancy activities have a very low operational profile at the Universities. The major reasons for this situation are: (i) inadequate funds; (ii) inadequate means (equipment, transport, etc.); (iii) inefficient use of manpower; (iv) low intake of postgraduate students; and (v) inadequate contacts with industries (Gijzen and Mshigeni 1990).

Wastage ratios have not reached alarming proportions. However, there appears to be an association between dropout rates, gender and type of degree courses. At the UDSM high dropout rates for men are associated with the sciences; while, high dropout rates for women are associated with the arts and law degree courses. In all faculties except the faculty of law, the highest dropout rates were associated with the MR-policy period.

Four major factors could be put forward as causes of wastage, First, in most faculties, the prominent reason appears to be academic since most students who repeat or drop out are the same students who had minimum entry points on admission. Second, the University has lately relaxed the medical examination conditions which used to be applied as a condition before admission, as such a substantial number of students are experiencing health problems during the course of their study. Third, because of economic and financial contraints, married students are finding it difficult to maintain their families with the inadequate student allowances. They spend most of their time trying to raise finances over and above the student allowances. Yet, given the fiscal crisis the country is facing now it may not be possible to increase the student allowances from public revenue, and therefore the family obligations of the applicants need to be looked into before admission. Four, high wastage rates appear to be faculty or course specific, especially so in the faculty of science. In this case there is an internal and external problem which needs re-thinking and evaluation. Externally, science background and competency of students should be sought before admission. Internally, what is going on in the faculty in the form of teaching, learning and other academic interactions relevant to achievement improvement like the unavailability of textbooks or methods should be monitored and improved.

Figures on the micro-costing of university education at UDSM indicate that traditionally the per-capita cost figures have been very high. During the period of 1960s and 1970s a period characterised by expansionary policies; cost economies showed up. Later, because of the government deliberate policy of restricting entrance at University level, higher education started to be characterised by lack of economies of scale.

The major determinants of costs are the salaries which account for a large share of recurrent expenditures despite the erosion of academic staff purchasing power. This evolution reflects the excessive role played by the government and the limited ability of the university (like other state organs) to manage resources efficiently.

At anytime the amount of costs (recurrent) associated with the administrative staff has always been higher than that associated with academic staff. Mosha and

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Valentine (1981) have shown that during the 1972-1974 academic years the per-student administrative costs were three times the per-student-academic staff costs. By the period 1980-1983 the same unit costs had jumped to more than four times the per student academic staff costs. Yet, Dar es Salaam and Sokoine Universities have the highest and most unfavourable staff-student ratios among Eastern and Southern African Universities (ESAURP, 1987). Infact at UDSM there is considerable scope to achieve economies in the use of academic and non-academic staff and in the staff to student ratio in various departments. In this case Unesco (1989) shows that while the academic staff: student ratio is 1 : 5, the non-academic staff: student ratio is 1 : 1.5.

6. External efficiency and equity

University schooling is an attractive investment alternative for Tanzanian youth, but only limited evidence exists as to the external productivity of the University graduates. Among University graduates, unemployment is very low because there is guaranteed five year bonded employment in one of the public institutions, although this is not an indication of real high level manpower demand in the economy.

The High level Manpower Allocation Committee has recently indicated that UDSM graduates in Arts, Humanities, Social Sciences, Chemistry and Process Engineering may experience slow progress towards job placement. Demand for Sokoine University graduates in the agricultural and forestry sciences has been high although some of the educated elite in Tanzania developed a dislike for manual work and a liking for white collar and administrative jobs despite the fact that about half the farm managers' and engineers' time should be spent on doing work which involves physical rather than mental work. Certainly this is an indication of the limited exposure of the students to different work habits which may enable them to develop desirable attitudes to work (Komba, Mosha and Galabawa 1983).

A major complaint of UDSM and SUA graduates is their under-utilization. As a result of partial 'under-employment' of available skills, those who complete a specific training lack the opportunity to gain experience and confidence. Graduates are 'given junior positions while professional planning jobs are contracted out to professional firms by the Ministries, thus demoralising the new generation of graduates' (Komba et al. 1983, p. 54).

The EASURP (1982) study showed that the social rates of return to selected University degree programmes ranged from 10% to 22% and that 'there are higher social rates of return to the locally trained than to the overseas trained with the exception of secondary school teachers and managers' (p. 269). Table 1 gives the social rates as given in the ESAURP study and the corresponding private rates from a Galabawa (1989) research study. As expected the private rates of return are higher than the social rates. The study by Galabawa indicated further that there were major significant differences between private benefits computed from government pay scale salary earnings and those computed from cross-sectional earnings. While the government pay scale earnings appeared to favour the scarce skills (i.e., medicine,

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Table 1. Social and private rates of return by degree programmes (%)

Degree programme Social rates Cross sectional Pay scale (Esaurp 1982) private rates private rates

(Galabawa 1989) (Galabawa 1989) (2) (3) (4)

B.A. (Ed) 8.64 51.37 32.30 B.A. (Gen.) 13.51 45.16 33.32 B.Sc (Agr.) 16.57 47.31 28.27 LL.B. N.A 48.70 31.81 Med. N.A 30.70, 19.54 B.Sc (Ed) N.A 44.35 29.32 B.Sc (Gen.) N.A 48.62 29.32 B.Sc (Eng.) 22.72 35.64 25.42

engineering, agriculture) the cross sectional data revealed that higher benefits in fact accrued to lawyers and the arts general graduates (the administrative jobs).

The twin characteristics of University education namely high private rates of return and high subsidization by the state suggest that it may be possible to argue for a transfer of some of the burden for financing University education to the individual consumers so that resources saved in this way could be transferred to other levels of education which though not as heavily subsidized show high social rates of return. However, since there are two categories of students; those who can afford to finance their schooling and those who cannot, loan payment can be made after getting the job. Even in this case, some formulae will have to be designed so that individual students enrolled in special professions (which have specific social contributions) such as medicine and teaching, pay less of the original loan.

The government pay scales are usually based on an assumed scarcity of skills. These pay scale earnings are then subsidized as a form of encouragement for prospective candidates who might be interested in these skill areas. This procedure may be useful if all graduates are employed in the public government sector. However, a substantial number of graduates are employed in semi-autonomous parastatals and the private sector; their higher earnings tend to reflect real supply and demand conditions. The government employed graduates are underpaid as compared to those working in non-government organisations and as long as this situation is not checked, there has been a movement of skilled labour from government institutions to non-government ones (i.e., internal brain drain). A worse situation of external brain drain has already resulted at the UDSM where since 1977 at least 95 members of the academic staffhave left the university to other institutions outside the UDSM, or the country. (Usually academics who leave the UDSM are among the best trained the most experienced and the most creative) (Sheriff 1990).

The picture on different private benefits by degree programmes caution against the Tanzanian government practice of a narrow approach to high level manpower planning in response to selected predictors. Individuals usually behave rationally by responding to the labour market monetary incentive signals. Their career prefer-

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ences and choices may turn out to be different from government expectations and needs. For example, the Tanzania government has consistently argued for the training of more doctors and science teachers, yet the private monetary benefits for these degree programs were found to be lower than those accruing to arts and law graduates whose skills were not considered scarce by the government (Galabawa 1989).

What emerges from this trend is that government intervention can have un anticipated consequences and therefore perceived social needs should not be the dominant factors in determining labour market incentives. Since Tanzania is not a closed society, loyalty to ideology cannot be sustained indefinitely. The arguments of scarce skills, status and political socialization are not compensating factors as long as individuals are financially impoverished.

7. Access and distribution

Less than 4% of pupils enrolled in primary education will eventually go to University level schooling. University education is for a select few, and its expansion has been justified on high level manpower requirements. The state was more concerned with reproducing itself, training high level bureaucrats to take up administrative positions in the state organs.

Unlike at primary school to secondary levels, where a quota system is used in selection, there is no selection by regional quota at high school to University. As a result, some regions and districts (notably Kilimanjaro and Kagera) are over represented at University. In a 1973 sample survey of undergraduate students at the University of Dares Salaam by geographical origins, Kilimanjaro region had a 21% share of the students, while Kagera region had 15% and Mbeya had 12%, and others had respectively lower percentages (Ishumi 1980, p. 2 la). Although these figures are old, the trend may be worse at the moment given the fact that the number of private secondary schools in Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions has almost doubled those in 1973.

Equal access to educational facilities does not necessarily mean equal use of resources across groups. The factors which facilitate achievement are not distrib- uted equitably across University departments. While some faculties like engineering enjoy good physical facilities others like the faculty of commerce have no infrastructure of their own but are housed in temporary structures. And although few studies have been done in this area, part of the variance in learning output across the departments can be explained by the unequal distribution of the quality of lecturers, teaching and instruction materials.

Women enrolment as a percentage of total enrolment has been going down from 17.4% in 1984 to 16.9% in 1988; and only 5.1% women are in technical fields (MoE 1989). Like other disadvantaged social groups, if girls and rural children are to profit from the education opportunities, they will have to be provided with some additional compensatory educational and social experiences as a compensation for their deficiencies.

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Concluding remarks

This essay has discussed the funding constraints as related to higher education in Tanzania. It was shown that most constraints have to do with the negative performance of the economy as shown by inadequate GDP growth, balance of payment problems, inflation, devaluation of the Tanzania shilling, absence of cost-sharing initiatives or policies and resources mis-management. Though in- conclusive the review tends to suggest that the Tanzania higher education system is internally inefficient as shown by unit costs, capacity utilization and teacher-student ratios. The private benefits are high although it is not clear if socially the graduates are effectively utilized in the labour market. Higher education in Tanzania remains elitist and for a select few; these few usually come from the traditionally favoured districts of Kagera and Kilimanjaro regions.

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