functionalism

The Pain Role: (i) An internal state, (ii) primarily caused by tissue damage, (iii) which can result from kicking, burning, etc. and (iv) which commonly causes crying, frowning, and whimpering, as well as (v) anger, the desire for it to stop, the belief that one is in pain, etc.

Realizer Functionalism: Mental states are the states that play the associated causal role. Something is in pain only if, and because, it is in the state that plays the pain role.Role Functionalism: Mental states are higher-order states like the state of having some state or other that plays the associated causal role. Something is in pain only if, and because, it is in some state or other that plays the pain role.

1) Pain = R.2) R = c-fiber firing.3) Pain = c-fiber firing.

1) Pain = R.2) In humans, R = c-

fiber firing.3) In humans, pain =

c-fiber firing.

1) Pain = R.2) In squids, R = d-

fiber firing.3) In squids, pain =

d-fiber firing.

The Relativized Identity Theory: Mental states are identical to physical states of the brain. (Something is in human-pain only if, and because, its c-fibers are firing) and (something is in squid-pain only if, and because, its d-fibers are firing) and…

1) Pain = R.2) In humans, R = c-

fiber firing.3) In humans, pain =

c-fiber firing.

1) Pain = R.2) In squids, R = d-

fiber firing.3) In squids, pain =

d-fiber firing.

1) Pain-in-humans = R in humans.

2) R-in-humans = c-fiber firing.

3) Pain-in-humans = c-fiber firing.

1) Pain-in-squids = R in squids.

2) R in squids = d-fiber firing.

3) Pain-in-squids = d-fiber firing.

In the previous chapter we noticed that mental states can be multiply realized. In humans the state which realizes pain is (say) c-fiber firing; in squid it’s (say) d-fiber firing. Multiple realization raises a puzzle: what do old Eight-legs and I have in common when we are both in pain? It can’t be c-fiber firing because Eight-legs has no c-fibers (or so I will assume). And it can’t be d-fiber firing because I have no d-fibers (or so I will assume). In virtue of what, then, is it true that Eight-legs and I are both in pain?

Functionalism provides an answer to this puzzle.Ravenscroft, p.50.

Role Functionalism: Mental states are higher-order states like the state of having some state or other that plays the associated causal role. Something is in pain only if, and because, it is in some state or other that plays the pain role.

Role Functionalism: Mental states are higher-order properties, like the property of having some state or other that plays the characteristic causal role. Something is in pain only if, and because, it is in some state or other that plays the pain role. The Disjunctive Identity Theory: Mental states are physical states of the brain. Something is in pain only if, and because (it’s a human and its c-fibers are firing) or (it’s a squid and its d-fibers are firing) or...

Functionalists have often touted the phenomenon of multiple realization as a basis for the claim that the properties studied by cognitive science are formal and abstract—abstracted from the material compositional details of the cognitive systems. What our considerations seem to show is that cognitive science properties so conceived threaten to turn out to be heterogeneous disjunctions of properties after all. And these disjunctions seem not to be suitable as nomological properties –properties in terms of which laws and causal explanations can be formulated. If this is right, it would disqualify mental properties, construed as second-order properties as serious scientific properties.

-Jaegwon Kim,Mind as a Causal System

The Master Argument

1) If Functionalism is correct, then either (a) Realizer Functionalism is correct, or (b) Role Functionalism is correct.

2) If (a), then the Relativized Identity Theory is correct.

3) The Relativized Identity Theory isn’t correct.4) If (b), then the Disjunctive Identity Theory is

correct.5) The Disjunctive Identity Theory isn’t correct.6) Functionalism isn’t correct.