fujisawa, norio - Εχειν, Μετέχειν, and idioms of 'paradeigmatism' in plato's theory of...

7/28/2019 FUJISAWA, Norio - , , and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms (Phronesis)P

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, , and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of FormsAuthor(s): Norio FujisawaSource: Phronesis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1974), pp. 30-58Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181924 .

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"EXEaV, ETECXELVand Idiomsof 'Paradeigmatism'nPlato's Theoryf Forms*NORIO FUJISAWA

I n this paper I propose to re-examine Plato's terminology in histheory of Forms and try to focus light upon some aspects ofphilosophicalsignificance in its developmentwith special referenceto such basic problems as the Third-Man argument. Attention willbe paid first to the systematic distinction drawn by Plato in hismiddle dialogues between the use of XeLvand that of eFLTXeZLv, adistinction the significance of which seems not to have been wellbrought out by commentators (sections I and II); then, a generaldevelopment of Plato's conception of the relation between Formsand particulars will be traced and examined (sections III and IV).An observation on the use of 9XeLvand ,>vrLXrnvn Parmenides 133 B-134 E will serve as an introduction to the inquiry.

I. An observationn Parmenides133B-134 EIn his concluding argument against the theory of Forms Parmenidescontends that, since phenomenal correlatives are correlative witheach other and Ideal correlatives are correlative with each other,there can be no relation between the phenomenalworld and the worldof Forms. Thus the Master itself is correlative with the Slave itself,and master correlative with slave; Knowledge itself is a correlateof Truth itself, whereasknowledge n our world can only be correlativewith the particularsof our world. Therefore,we cannot have knowledgeof the Form; and, if divine knowledgeis the most exact Knowledge,it cannot be knowledgeof our world.As to the main line of this argument I agree with Cherniss' viewthat the argument depends upon the substitution of ,p6q in the senseof 'relative' for irp6s n the sense of 'dependent upon', and that here* This is part of a more detailed study in the 'phenomena of infiltration'(as I call it) of Aristotelian logico-ontological conceptions into Platonic philos-ophy in the European philosophical tradition (including the contemporaryPlatonic scholarship). I wish to thank Professor Harold Cherniss for his veryhelpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.30

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Parmenides, despite the fact that phenomena are correlativewithphenomena (7rp6q&?kIXo) ut are at the same time dependent uponthe Forms (np6q& et8&), uppressesthe latter sense of '7rp6q'.1 hat Ipropose here specifically to do is to observe that in this particularpassage Parmenides is using the terms gXe and >ivrkXeLvquite in-discriminately and interchangeably - in such direct violation of therule in Plato's normal terminology that Plato seems purposely tohave made his Parmenides do so; and, if so, I shall consider whatbearing this fact would have on the main line of argument we havejust observed.

We must first confirmthe normaland properuse of these two termsin Plato's theory of Forms. It can be identified in the premiseof thetheory as summarizedby Parmenidesbefore he had begun to criticizeit2:

Have you yourself drawn this distinction and separated apart on the oneside Forms themselves and on the other the things that participate inthem? Do you believe that there is such a thing as Likeness itself apartfrom the likeness that we possess?Here, as Cornford pointed out, the distinction is clearly markedbetween: (1) the separate Form (we shall refer to this as lD); (2)the immanent character, 'the likeness that we have (gxo>cv)' (weshall refer to this as F); (3) the individual thing which participates in(livr&Xyy)he Form and has (gXeL)he character (we shall refer to thisas X).3 Thus we see that IJ.r'UXeL is used of the relation of x to b,while gXev s used of the relation of x to F.This usage is one that has been firmly established in the Phaedo:there the locution, "x participates in D",and the locution, "x has F",are clearly distinguished from each other without the slightest con-1 See Cherniss (1), p. 282-4, with n. 191. (I give references by author's name,followed where necessary by an opus number, followed by a page number:for details see the bibliography, pp. 564.) - I cannot agree with Cornford((1), p. 98), Ross ((2), p. 90), Viastos ((1), p. 258), etc. that Parmenides'argument in this passage turns upon a confusion of the Form with perfectinstances of the Form, nor do I think there is any such confusion at all (for thiscf. Geach, p. 268). This manner of interpretation will itself be an object ofscrutiny in due course in this paper.2 Parmenides 130 B 2-4 (Cornford's translation - as with other quotationsfrom this dialogue in what follows).a As to these symbols (x, F, D) I follow the example of Vlastos (3) (and, morerecently, Evan L. Burge in Phronesis XVI (1971), pp. 1 ff.). I shall use the 'F'indiscriminately to stand for both a character and the corresponding predicate.

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fusion.4 And we can see the basic reasonwhy Plato in this way assigneda different function to each of these two terms. "bo A yX '6 B"suggests or implies the presenceof B itself in A; hence this locution isequivalent to "zr6B gve=t &v j- A" (as it is seen in the above-citedpassages of the Phaedo)5or to "'r6B noapea'L or t7re=t) tcjdA", sothat it is suitable to express the relation between x and F (i.e. theimmanent character). On the other hand, "TbA ,LvSXeeLoU B" doesnot imply the presence of B itself in A or rather would deny such apresence; hence this locution is fit for describing the relation of xto (D (i.e. the transcendentForm) and must for this very reason bestrictly kept apart from the other kind of locution.6Bearing this in mind let us now turn to the Parmenidespassage(133 B-134 E), where we find the following:

(i) 133 C 9-D 2: ... &uX)'o6 7p6; rak 7crp'p Ltv ecfe 4LOOim.tra cTr 6nn 84&ocu,r&r[,e-rct, &v t,>el; ,uErX ov-XX elvxct xxaccra novo,uo46[1e,&M.According to the normal basic distinction, we should have here a'IXovsrg nstead of div perC'XoVxs,f the antecedent of the relativepronoun s rLx7txp' Zvctre o6LotLxpa'rawLx.,as it seemsgrammatically,if not semantically, natural to take it to be; for the relation then in-volved is not that of x to (Dbut that of x ('we') to F ('"T 7rcxp'rtv xr.').As it stands, Cornford had to translate 6v ... ,>eTezov-seas 'whichwe possess' (=xopv), commenting that tLeUreX'wwith genitive heremeans 'have as our share' and such a use of tere'yctvis, though notunparalleled, abnormal or unusual.7 Alternatively, 0. Apelt, J.Moreau and H. Chernisstook Jivto be equivalent to ?xsLvwv6v andits antecedent to be 6acLTCovBeCov 'von denjenigen Wesenheiten....an denen wir teilhaben etc.', Apelt), not 'a' -nap' LLv etre o0.oxt'[craxs,rX84 "x participates in V": 100 C 5, 101 C 3-5, 102 B 2; "x has F": 102 C 2, 4, 7,103 B6.5 Phaedo 102 B 5, 103 B 8 (cf. also such expressions as t6 &v X,utvFdyeto;,'r6 a 'mp6v Ev tViv, etc. in the same context).S For the statement by Socrates at Phaedo 100 D 5-7, which has been a pitfallfor commentators, see below section III (pp. 44-45).7 Cornford (1), p. 96, n. 1, p. 84, n. 3, p. 85, n. 2.8 Apelt, p. 63; Moreau, p. 203; Cherniss (1), n. 101, n. 102, (3), p. 364 with n. 1.Most interpreters (Taylor, Cornford, Di6s, Owen (2), p. 302, n. 1, etc.) takethe antecedent of iv to be 'r& ap' [tv cf-rekLotto4arma x'X., as it seems grammat-ically natural so to take it since the phrasing here is grammatically parallelwith 130 E 5-6: d87j &'r'rax, 5v -ragcvr &XXau 3&aBaPavovxar&q &rcovu^.doc4m&rcvaXELv. Campbell (p. 313, n. 1) recognized here two stages in the descent32



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Consideringthis use of ,ueXeCLvhere together with (ii) and (iii)below, however, it is possible and indeed, I think, probable thatPlato here consciously makes his Parmenides say Jv ... ,tex?xovss(with sx 7tp' ,uZv ette o, 'a xAk.as its antecedent) in place ofthe proper locution, & ... gXov'eq,so that the normal distinctioin be-tween ,Lsyetv and gXeLvmay be obscured and thus the special job ofthe term li?XEeLvo express the relation of x to (Dmay tend to beignored.

(ii) 134 B 3-13: But ... we do not possess (fxo>?cv) he Forms themselves,nor can they exist in our world. - No. - And presumably the Forms,just as they are in themselves, are known by the Form of Knowledgeitself? - Yes. - The Form which we do not possess(IxoiLv). - True. -Then none of the Forms is known by us, since we have no part in (tLerkxotLev)Knowledge itself.

Here, after {otv has properly been used twice (at B 3 and B 9),it is inadvertently replaced with '*,-rZotLevat B 12), so that Parme-nides can substitute the (false) denial of the Vxe',Xyvw-relationor the(true) denial of the gXeLv-relationetween 'we' and Forms.9(iii) And if anything has a part in (t?c;Xet) this Knowledge itself, youwould agree that a god has a better title than anyone else to possess (fxev)the most perfect knowledge?

Here again, in a single conditional sentence, [LeXeeLV n protasis iseasily replaced with 9XeLvn apodosis, as if these two terms had boththe samemeaningand function.From all these observations I think we have good reason to con-clude that the treatment of SXeLvnd 'LvCiXetvn (i), (ii) and (iii),though it is admittedly not the main instrument of Parmenides'argumentin this passage, can surely be said to have the effect of sup-porting or even promoting Parmenides' contention that there can beno connection between the world of Forms and the phenomenalworld;for, whereas their normal and properuse couldhave expressedthe factthat we do not have (gXotiev)he Form of Master, Slave, Knowledge,etc. but we can and do participate in ([eTXo[Lev) these Forms10, thisfrom the ideas to individuals, (1) 6[LoEmgG, subsisting between the idea and its6LoEw,uaor concrete type, and (2) ,&e,tq -ro5O,uOLW, Tro;.(!)9 Cornford ((1), p. 99) paid attention to this substitution of Vx-ckxo,Levt B 12for lxo,[ev. But since he sees here again 'the same confusion of the Form,Knowledge, with the perfect instance of knowing' (p. 98, cf. n. 1 supra), hiscomment on it is different from ours (so with (iii) infra).10 Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, col. 934.2-6 (Cousin).

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fact cannot be expressed here, because the normal function of theterm pvreX'LVis nullified by being confused with that of eZev, theterm describing the relation within the phenomenal world itself.Or, to put the same thing in the language in which we found describedthe main line of the argument above, I mean that with Parmenides'suppression of 7tpo6 -L in the sense of 'dependent upon' (tp6o toceta-) (by means of Ipts s in the sense of 'relative', 7p6o &"XX9~ex)goes the suppression of the proper sense of ,tvexLv, and the latterserves the former suppression, pere6xszvbeing the word to expressthe very fact that the phenomena are dependent upon the Form(7rp6 0-a e3t .

II. A certain way of interpreting PlatoThe above observations on the use of ,tvre'vv and 'xrev n the Parme-nides (133 B-134 E), in contrast with the usage in the Phaedo (100 C-103 B), strongly suggest that Plato himself regarded sufficient atten-tion to the proper use of these two terms as important or crucial forunderstanding his theory of Forms. Indeed Parmenides' first objectionto the conception of 'participation' (131 A-E) too, in which, as Proclusremarks11, difficulties arise from talking about a Form as if it were aconcrete thing, may be seen from the same terminological point ofview; for we see Parmenides there interpreting the notion of 'partici-pation' in terms of 1vocaLv or evoccLL2, and in this respect his argumentcan be said basically to turn upon his substitution of "D is in x" or"(D is on x" for "x participates in (petocXctx3ovet)ED",the formerlocutions being equivalent to "x has (exs?) FD"as we have seen.We may guess that such assimilation or confusion of pxLre6yev or4o&ve?.vwith `Zv as observed in these passages (133 B-134 Eand 131 A-E) of the Parmenides were, in fact, often being made bystudents of the Academy in their discussions on Forms, and it is verylikely that Plato in these passages was warning them to be wary ofthis kind of misinterpretation.In our time too, in a somewhat different way, there seems to be astrong tendency to make light of the distinction between the twolocutions, "x has F" and "x participates in D", a tendency whichcan be seen in such statements as:11 In Parm. col. 934.19-20 (Cousin).12 ?IVoL Ev: 131 A 8, B 1-2, B 5, C 6; ?lvoL e7r: 131 B 9, C 2.34



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The Idea of Y-ness is almost the same as what we should call the attributeY-ness, and to participate in that Idea is almost the same as having thatattribute.'5The locution 'to have a character' is of course synonymous with the locution'to partake of a Form'.14

What type of interpretation of Plato's philosophy, then, is such atendency related to? To see this, we must first confirm a little morefully the points established concerning the use of these terms in theabove-mentioned passage of the Phaedo (100 C-103B). They maybe described as follows:(a) As far as the relation between x and F and that between x andbD are concernedl', I think general agreement among commentatorscan be expected on what the theory asserts, except perhaps in somedetails. We may state them briefly, taking 100 C-101 C and 102 B-Ctogether:"x is F" (or, x is named after 4D)means that x has (xeL) F; and x is F,or x has F, because x participates in (,u'iXaL) D."

(b) What, then, about the Form itself? It is said that "The Formitself is always entitled to its own name" 16 (e.g.) the Form of Beauty(MOU6 xotX6v)is always xBov, just because 'xoX6v's a name whoseprime designate is the Form itself, while other things, particulars,are named afterit.17 That is to say that only the Form, cx&r -6 xocX6v,is always xaX6vn the full sense by virtue of being nothing other thanitself.This (most important and also most controversial) point is strikinglyconfirmed, I think, by a sentence at 100 C4-6, where the principleof participation is formally declared for the first time in this contextof 'hypothesis':

If anything else is beautiful besides Beauty itself (elt rt &La?L&)Xo xaXmv7nXv mu'- X0 xax6v), it is beautiful for no other reason than because itparticipates in that Beauty (8L6TL>CXELXCL XE(VOUTOi XMOX).

's Wedberg, p. 41 (italics mine)."Mills, p. 169 (italics mine).15It is important, and will be relevant later in this paper, that gXevand e-rXeLvare the terms to express the relation of thing (x) to character (F) and to Form(b) respectively. The relation of F to (Dis not mentioned as such within thispassage of the Phaedo; it was described earlier in 74 D-75 B by the expressionthat F (e.g. sr&x 6v ocEa&acov racx)resembles' or 'strives for' 'D (OX'C6 Y,aov).' Phd. 103 E 3-4.17 Cf. Allen (1), pp. 45-46.

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This sentence, which is the locus classicus for the statement of thepnnciple of participation, must surely mean or directly imply, if theitalicized words are not to be ignored, that:

the rule, that it is because x participates in (e.g.) the Beauty itself that x isbeautiful or x has beauty, has no application to the case where the Beautyitself is beautiful: i.e. whereas any particular thing ('rl &Lo) is beautifulbecause it participates in the Form of beauty, this Form itself is beautifulwithout any condition at all, namely, without 'participating in' anythingor (a lortiori) 'having' anything at all.Keeping (a) and (b) in mind, let us now turn to our original question:the tendency to make light of the distinction between the px.etxeLv-and the 9XeLv-locutions related to what type of interpretation ofPlato's philosophy? I shall try to answer by making observations onthe following points.(1) It can be said that the tendency we arespeaking of is intrinsicallyrelated to a type of interpretation which is inclined to think the Pla-tonic Forms to be, properly speaking, the 'characters', 'properties','attributes', or 'universals', which correspondto F rather than eD1'8Indeed, given the above-mentioned proposition extracted from thePhaedo, "x is F, i.e. x has a characterF because x participates in theForm eD",what need would there be of the explanans, "because xparticipates in the Form e" - if 'to participate in a Form eD'and'to have a character F' is really "almostthe same", or, in other words,if the two locutions are "synonymous"'19?In that case 'participating in eD'and thus 'eD' tself would be re-dundant, and the fact that x is F, or x has a character F, would beregarded as subsisting by itself. And we have been accustomed onlytoo well to think that the locution 'to have a character F', as such,can be used without assuming the existence of 'W'.(2) Since, then, the only items to be taken into consideration arex (thing) and F (character,property, attribute, etc.), the distinctionbetween these two 'categories', namely between thing and its attrib-butes, becomes very important and fundamental for those who thinkas (1). Thus, Vlastos can write 2018 This is actually stated in Wedberg's statement quoted above as an exampleof the tendency.19Thus C. C. W. Taylor (p. 47) interprets 'x is q through sharing in the V'as 'x is p through sharing in 9-ness' and writes "one could as well say that 'x is9 because x is cp' tates a necessary and sufficient condition for being p".2 Vlastos (1), p. 252 (italics mine).36



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Instead of asking the simple question, "Is the property, Similarity, distinctfrom any of the things that have that property?" Plato is misled by hisSeparation Assumption to ask the entirely different question, 'Is the prop-erty, Similarity, distinct from the property of Similarity which is exempli-fied in particular instances of Similarity?'Vlastos apparently thinks that, were it not for this latter systematicdualism which is peculiar to Plato's ontology,

it (the Non-identity Assumption) could be stated more simply as, "If x is F,x cannot be identical with F", which I take to be the correct statement of thisfundamental principle. In the absence of the Separation Assumption wewould not need the two symbols, F and I; the latter would be redundant.21(3) In particular,we have seen in the Phaedo that each of the follow-ing propositions states a fact entirely different from each other:

(i) The Form of Beauty (auCt6 6 xoX6v)is beautiful.(ii) This particular thing is beautiful.But those who think in the way of (1) and (2) above also inevitablythink that the proposition (ii) exemplifies the criterionof the meaningof "... is beautiful"; and, since (ii) means that 'this particular thing'has theproperty of beauty, they in the same way take the proposition(i) to mean that the Form of Beauty has the propertyof beauty. And,since a Platonic Form means, for those who think thus, nothingother than a property, character, attribute, etc., this interpretationof the proposition (i) is in turn generalized to mean that a Formwhich is a characterhas that character.22(4) The same type of assimilation or reduction of the meaning of"... is beautiful"of (i) to that of (ii) is seen when it is alleged that (i)and (ii) (ofwhich the latter is to be analysedas "Thisthing participatesin the Form of Beauty") taken together lead to: "Every Form par-ticipatesin itself".23This interpretation as well as (3) above is plainlya direct violation of what we saw is implied in the sentence in thePhaedo (100 C4-6): a Form cannot have any character that its par-ticulars have, nor can it participate in anything in order to be justthat which it is.2421 Ibid. n. 2 (italics mine). Vlastos has here a and F-ness instead of my x and 0respectively.22 Vastos (1), p. 250.23 Wedberg, p. 41. Cf. also Mills, p. 169.24 I am a little emphatic in citing Phaedo 100 C 4-6, partly because, so far as Iknow, the significance of the phrase 'L &Wo ... )tbv au'r rb xa6v seems notto have been fully brought out by the commentators. Republic 597 C ('what is

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(5) It is a well-knownfact that, when a legitimately Platonic prop-osition like (i) is illegitimately interpreted in this way, it is alsocalled 'reification of attributes', 'hypostatization of universals','self-predication', confusionbetweenidea and its perfectinstance',etc.Now, it is quite obvious that to think of Platonic Forms in theseways (i.e. (1)c- (5)) is to think of them in an Aristotelianway; and ageneral and fundamentalreasonwhy a fairly large numberof scholarsdo think in these ways seems to be that their thinking has beenstrongly influencedby Aristotelianlogico-ontologicalterms; conscious-ly or unconsciously, such thinkers tend to put the theory of Formsinto the Aristotelian thought-framework. Indeed, Aristotle's basicposition is such that it well agrees with each of the above ways ofinterpreting Plato:(a) Aristotle denies the separate existence of Forms and positsinstead the immanent forms (& gvvXa e8&) (correspondingto (1)above).(b) He regards the distinction between substance and quality,thing ('ro&8rt) and attribute (7rot6vn), as fundamental and ultimate(corresponding o (2) above).

(c) Connected with this, he has a theory of 'predication' whichembodies a way of looking at things entirely different from that ofPlato. According to this Aristotelian theory, the type of proposition(i) in (3) above must be describedas: "Beauty is predicatedof (xwrryo-petIT'CLx.atr')the Beauty itself"or "Beautybelongso (vnapj7r)theBeauty itself", which no doubt is equivalent to "Beauty itself has(get) the property of beauty".(d) Platonic Formsare to him nothing other than 'eternalsensibles';and he thinks that Platonists "at the same time make the Forms uni-versal and again treat them as separable and as individuals"25 cor-responding to (5) above).It is also obvious that the above mentioned way of interpreting(especially (3) and (4)) is the very basis of the 'ThirdMan'argument(TMA) in Parmenides131 A 1-B 2: for if the Form, the Large itself,is large in the same sense, or in the same way, as a particularthingis large, and if, when anything is large, it cannot be identical withBed', dist. 'what has the character bedness') and Parmenides 158 A-B ('what isone', dist. 'what participates in one or unity') may equally be cited in thisconnection. See Cherniss (3), pp. 370-372. (Vlastos (4) tried to get around thelatter (Parmenides) passage.)I' Metaphysics 997 b 12 and 1086 a 32-34.38



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the Form the Large itself, in which it participates, the regress statedin the Parmenidespassageis unavoidable.26t is impossibleand perhapsuseless here to enter into the details of the debates which have swirledaround this argumentin recent years; but it is or ought to be equallyobvious, at any rate, that such an interpretation, which constitutesthe basis of TMA, is, as we have seen, a direct violation of what Platoactually had laid down in the Phaedo (and elsewhere) and the TMAis thereforenot valid for Plato's own theory of Forms.As to the 'Self-Predication' assumption (SP), which ProfessorVlastos argues is a root of TMA and assumed by Plato himself in histheory of Forms, it is stated by Vlastos as "Any Formcan bepredicatedof itself" or "A Form by participationin which anything has a certaincharactermust itself have that character".27 rom what we have seen,it can be said that a glance at the terminology used of a Form ineither formulation ('be predicated of' = xavrnyopda4&cxt;have' thecharacter = gxev) is sufficient to show that this SP is not Plato's'tacit assumption' but that tacitly assumed by Vlastos and manyother Aristotelian interpreters.So it is also with the 'Non-Identity' assumption (NI), which Vlastosargues is another root of TMA and again assumed by Plato himself.It is stated by Vlastos as "If anything has a given character,it cannotbe identical with the Form in virtue of which we apprehend thatcharacter", or "lf anything has a given character by participating na Form, it cannot be identical with that Form". To this we mustimmediately add the important proviso that "This is true when, andonly when, this 'anything' is a particular thing other than the Formitself (CrLI0o ... nt?cv auo, o' x&o6v, Phaedo 100 C4-5)"1.28 Or, rather,we need merely comment that here the Form itself is of course ex-cepted, since a Form cannot 'have' any character that its particularshave, nor can it 'participate in' any Form in order to be just thatwhich it is.26 Cf. Aristotle's formulation of TMA in terms of 'to be predicated of' (xacnyo-pelabxL) n his Peri Ideon (Alex. In Metaph. 84.21 ff.) and his comments on thisproblem in Metaphysics 1038 b 34 ff. and Soph. El. 178 b 36 ff.27 The two versions quoted are of 1954 (Vlastos (1), p. 236) and of 1969 (Vlastos(2), p. 291) respectively (italics mine). So with the two versions of NI just below.28 I.e. to use Vlastos' notation in 1954, NI in Plato's own theory of Formsmeans necessarily (A 4 a) (i.e. the 'weak' one), not (A 4) simpliciter (i.e. the'full-strength' one). Cf. Bluck, p. 124, who (p. 127) talks of 'a general unwilling-ness to recognize the Non-identity assumption as the sole and obvious fallacyof the TMA as a criticism of Plato's theory'.

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III. Appearanceand disafpipearance tXr LtvIt might be said, however, that Plato's theory of Forms, with itsterminology of tXetv and ,>LetXeevadopted in his middle dialogues,is not resistant enough to the tendency to interpret it in the way wehave seen in the previous section. Specifically, the theory might besaid not to be explicit enough to make the systematic distinction ofthe function of '... is beautiful, large, etc.'. But what we saw in thePhaedo is of course neither the one adopted by Plato from the firstnor is it his final position. From the early to the later dialogues thereis a development of thought, and - despite the frequent denials madeby scholars - I believe there is also a discernible change of terminolo-gy, which I now proposeto examine.Although Sir David Ross' list of the idioms used in the dialoguesto describe the relation between Forms and particulars has not yetproved very fruitful29,it seems likely that a similar investigationwould be useful enough for our purpose if done from a proper pointof view, following a propermethodandwith a greatercare foraccuracy.I shall attempt such an investigation and list the occurrencesof idiomsaccordingto the followingscheme:(1) Sticking to his notion of 'immanence' and 'transcendence',Ross (like many othercommentators)treated le'eXtLvand its congenersas 'immanence' terms and put them, as such, into the same groupasExCLv(and &vdVcLt, apdLv etc.). But, as we have seen, there is surely afundamental difference of function between these two kinds of termand it is rather the distinction of their function that is of real im-portance for the theory of Forms. With this, among other points,in mind, I shall classify the idioms used of the Form/particularre-lation into three groups:30

(I)Ie)XXv, xewrij-&hu; E'YeLIVoclvoct ?"V),noap?dvou ebreZVmL, ropacyty-vealha, 17LY(YVeG,aL; )XMa5L, ey'VCaX*CL, EtaL'vtL.

(JI) VerkXstv, t1?eLg, CXXOX[PM?VLV, [L'ra?emq.(III) 7rap'c8LygLy - e&CXv idioms.(2) I shall try to restrict myself to those passages in the dialogueswhich are clearly and definitely concerned with the Platonic Forms29 Ross (2), pp. 228-230. For criticisms of this list see D. J. Allan in Phil.Quart. 2 (1952), p. 370, Cherniss (3), p. 363, and Allen (2), p. 146.80 The meaning of the notation (I') will later be explained where relevant (n. 42).Terms of my (III) are roughly the same as those of Ross' (II), excepting his(b) and (e) and adding the words ctX\oov and axtLc.40



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and, in its early stages, the 'X' of the (Socratic) 'Vhat is X?' question.As a result of this restriction, many of the occurrencescited in Ross'list are excluded as not being related in any sense to the Form/particular relation, and, on the other hand, some passages are newlycited as clearlydealingwith that relationship.3'It must be emphasizedat this point that such a restriction is veryimportant for obtaining results which are of any significance. For,since all expressions of (I), (II) and (III) admittedly belong to or-dinary language and are, as such, used quite neutrally and frequentlyin Plato's dialogues, it is necessary to consider, in so far as possible,only those passagesin which Plato seemsto be quite consciouslytalkingabout the Forms and to see what kind of expressionhe uses on suchspecific occasions, though it may sometimes be difficult to decidewith total confidence whether a passage is of such a nature or not.(3) I often cite entire passages (for instance, the passages of thesimile of 'the Divided Line' and 'the Cave' in the Republic, the pas-sage on 'the Receptacle' in the Timaeus, etc.) rather than each andevery occurrenceof the idiom concernedwithin a particular passage;what is most important, that is, is the possible identification of somegeneral growth and development of thought, rather than merelythe counting of occurrences and the charting of their comparativefrequency.32(4) The 'first part' of the Parmenides s omitted for the same reasonas Ross gives: "because Plato is there not expressing his view butdiscussing it". (I think it is noteworthy and will be relevant later,however,that it is a theory of Forms stated almost exclusively in termsof the group-(II) idioms which is put forward there by young Socratesand is the target of subsequent criticism by Parmenides.) The partof the Sophistes in which the 'communion of kinds' is discussed isomitted for the same reason again as Ross gives: "because the re-lation of Ideas to one another is a different matter from their relationto particulars". (The 'second part' of the Parmenidesis omitted ac-31 In fact I cannot see how Ross could have included in his list such passagesas Symposium 204 C 6, Phaedrus 237 D 6, Sophistes 228 C 1 or Philebus 25 B 6,and how he could have omitted a typical use of 'paradeigma' idiom in Politicus285 D 10-286 A 7.32 Cherniss is right, I think, in saying of Ross' list that "it is perverse to count asthree scores for 'immanence' Plato's assertion that it is irrelevant whether thecausal relation of ideas to phenomena be called 'presence' or 'communion' orany term whatever" (3), p. 363.

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[Ixetv, &vCLvmt,etc.] [(ie'rkXeLv,etc.] [7rmpm&LyFx, etc.]Charmides (158 E-159 A)Lysis (217 B-218 C)Laches 191E-192BEuthyphro 5D1-5 (6 E 3-6)Gorgias (503 E 4) (503 E-504 D)Hipp. Mai. 289 D 2-4, al.,293 E 11-294 A 2,300 A 9-B 1, al.Euthydemus (301 A 4)Meno 72 C-DCratylus 389 B 9-C 1, E 3-4, (389 A-B)390 B 1-2,(413 C 3).................................................... ................................................. . . . . . . .... . . .. . . .. . . . ....... ............... . . . . . . .

Symposium 211 B 1-5 212 A4-5Phaedo (100 D 5-6) lOOC-IOiC 74D-75B(I') 102 B-103 B 102 B 1-2(I') 105 B-CRepublic (402 C 5) (402 C 6)(I') 597 C 8 472 C 2 (472 C 4, D 1),476D1-2 476C6-7(484 C 8), (500 E 3),509E-511A (the Line),514A-516E (the Cave),520 C 4-5,

(540 A 9), (592 B 2),(596 B 7 sqq.)Phaedrus ((I')251 E 2-3), 250 A-B, C-D,((I')252 A 7-8) 251 A 3

Parmenides Subjected tocriticismTheaetetus (176 E)Sophistes (247 A) Applied tocrulinXox'2,rv st3vPoliticus 285 D-286 ATimaeus 27D-29C37 C 8, 39 E 1-7,(I') 48E-52D 48E-52D (the Receptacle)

(Epist. VII) 342 E -343 C

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cording to our policy (2) above.) I roughly adopt the chronologicalorder of the dialogues assumed by Ross, since for my present purposeI have no serious objection to it.33Although I do not claim that my list is complete, I believe that it isnear enough to completeness to furnish a true indication of Plato'susage. What emerge clearly from examination of it are as follows:(A) In the early dialogues before the Symposium (and the Phaedo)the relation between the 'X' of the Socratic 'What is X?' questionand its instances is expressed almost exclusively by the group-(I)idioms.34It is noteworthy indeed that, while using ve'xev and itscongeners (group-(II)) elsewhere in neutral contexts, Plato in thisperiod never uses them of the said relation where the 'What is X?'question is definitely raised by Socrates.35This may well be a signifi-cant feature of this period which marks off the early stage of thePlatonic theory from the later one in the middle dialogues.(B) It is markedly from the Symposium (and the Phaedo) onwardand, moreover, strictly simultaneouswith the definite appearance ofthe 'paradeigma' languages of group-(III), that tre'yXeLvand itscongeners (the group-(lI) idioms) come to be used to describe theForm/particular relation.Commenting on the use of ~LtueTE. at Phaedo 100 C-101 C, R.Hackforth writes:3688 The rough division (not necessarily the same as the customary one) of thedialogues into the earlier, middle and later ones is marked by dotted lines.Parenthesized passages indicate that they are dubious cases in my judgement,and bold figures denote a main or important entry.34 The use of 'paradeigma' in Euthyphro 6 E is not, I think, a case of the genuineparadeigmatism we find in later dialogues. Cf. Allen (2), pp. 154-155: "It is onething to say that a Form may be used as a standard, and another to say that itmay be so used because it is an exemplar of which its instances are deficientexamples". Also Ross (2), p. 230. - Gorg. 503 E-504 D and Cratyl. 389 A-Bare listed with parentheses as occurrences of the term of group-(III) becauseof their notion of the craftsman looking up to his model; but the word itselffor paradeigmatism (Wap&8ELy,UX, ?1x)v, 6LotaX etc.) does not occur in thesepassages.36 Ross (p. 229) and Des Places (with a reservation; Platon, Oeuvres CompletesXIV, Lexique, s.v.) cite Gorgias 467 E 7 as an instance of tLe-rieLvmeaning'participation in a Form'. But this it is not, any more than (e.g.) Protagoras322 D 5 (ot8o5qxcxt8'txs ,eTXev, spoken by Protagoras) is. See Dodds' note(p. 237) ad loc. and Hackforth (p. 143, n. 1, quoted just below).Il loc. cit.

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Such expressions as [LenEXetvroi xocXo5 elong to ordinary language, andper se imply nothing technical or metaphysical: see, for example, Gorgias467 E -na 8A p.re ciyaotc i.Lrextxxxx &pxcOLge )Iyst4, a &ivto'e pLiv 0rxettTrO5&yaOC0, VEO-Te i xMxou,VEOTE '? OU'U'TipOU XT>.

This is of course true, as we have already said in stating our policy,not only of the =iv'kyetv-idiomsut also of all the other idioms we areinvestigating. But I think it is still worth while to emphasisethe factthat, once Plato begins in the middle dialoguesto focus his attentionon the ontological status of Forms or once he begins to raise questionsnot about what any given Form is, but about what it means to be aForm,37he begins to use the ,uereXsLv-termsn place of the previousterminology of group-(I) to express the Form/particular relation;he seems to have consciously decided to adopt a new terminology.And one of the basic reasons at least for this replacement of the oldterminology is, no doubt, that he now rejects any term which impliesthe presence of the unique Form itself in its particulars,38 s we sawthe group-(I) terms do. In this sense, Plato's new [i.=ewcv-terminologyadopted to be used in such metaphysical contexts may well be called'technicalor metaphysical'.In one passage in the Phaedo, to be sure, Socrates expresses hisindifference to terminology by saying :39What makes a thing beautiful is nothing other than the presence (7napouatc)or tommunion (xoLvwvEx)of that beautiful itself -if indeed these are theright terms to express how it comes to be there: for I won't go so far as todogmatize about that (ou y&p ouro drt attaxup'oJaL).

This statement has usually been taken in its prima facie meaningand often cited as evidence for Plato's own attitude toward terminol-ogy.40 But I think the treatment of it requiresextreme circumspec-tion. For we in fact see that Plato himself does 8LaXuyptLrct: in spite37 See Allen (2), p. 158.38 Cf. Section I (p. 32) supra; Comford (1), p. 78. The 'participation' idiomsmust, therefore, be said to be meant to express 'transcendence' of Forms ratherthan, as generally assumed, their 'immanence' in relation to particulars - ifsuch a viewpoint of classification is to be taken at all.a9 Phaedo 100 D 4-8, translated by Hackforth (p. 134).40 Campbell, pp. 309; Archer-Hind (1), ad loc.; Burnet, ad loc. (p. 111); Hack-forth, p. 143; Cherniss (1), p. 166, n. 95; Crombie, pp. 251-2 with n. 1 (he citesthis sentence to support his view that "although these metaphors (similarity,participation, presence and agency) have in a sense different meanings, the useof one rather than another does not indicate a difference of doctrine; it mayindicate a mere desire of variety": italics mine); Skemp, p. 208, n. 2, etc.44



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of, and with the sole exception of, these words of Socrates, the termsused throughout this passage of the Phaedo to describe the Form/particular relation are all [LeU'rXzLvnd its variants.41 On the otherhand, when a little later the immanent character (e.g. 'the greatnessin us') is clearly distinguished from the Form ('the Greatnessitself'),the terms used for the relation between it and the thing that possessesit are this time exclusively those of group-(I) (gxew and rv?va) 42Thus the text shows a perfect consistency in usage of idioms. Thiswould not have been so, however, if Plato himself were really in-different to his terminology. As to the exceptional words of Socratesjust quoted, therefore,we must at least warn ourselves against takingthem as expressions of Plato's own attitude; indeed we may feelreasonably sure that Plato intentionally made his Socrates utter thesewords without committing himself to them; for as Cornfordrightlyremarks 43

If (as I suppose) Plato was aware that his own doctrine of separatelyexisting forms had never been maintained by Socrates, we might expectsome embarrassment just here, where he has to speak, through Socrates'mouth, of the relation between Form and thing.The fact that the appearance of the 'participation' terminology todescribe the unique relation of particulars to Forms is simultaneouswith the definite appearanceof the 'paradeigma' dioms is noteworthy,and, at least as far as Plato's middle dialoguesare concerned, confirmsthe thesis that

'the occurrence of idioms of participation ... is never in itself evidencethat the ideas were not at the same time held to be paradigms; far from4' Phd. 100 C 5, 101 C 3, 4, 5, 102 B 2. - I agree with Vlastos ((3), p. 143,n. 33) that "the formula, 'x is F because it participates in V', may be abbreviatedto 'x is F because of OV,but only after the context has made it clear this is acontraction of the complete formula: thus 'all beautiful things are beautifulin virtue of Beauty' in 100 D 7-8 is used only after participating in Beauty(not Beauty as such) had been said to be the aitia in 100 B 4-6 and again in100 D 4-6".42 Phd. 102 B 5, C 2, 4, 7, 103 B 6, 8. - This use of idioms of group-(I) isdifferent from that in earlier dialogues, in so far as the distinction is now express-ly marked between the immanent character (of which alone these idioms arenow used) and the Form - the two ontologically distinct items into whichthe undifferentiated 'X' of the Socratic 'What is X?' question (of which theidioms had been used) has developed. In my list, therefore, this use is markedby (I') to be distinguished from the earlier one."Cornford (1), p. 78.

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being felt as incompatible, the two kinds of idiom could even be usedtogether to describe the single conception, as in fact they not infrequentlyare'.44

(C)The 'paradigma' diomsof group-(III), however,gather strengthfromthe passageabout the Divided Line and the Cave (in the Repfublic)onward, whei e the notion of the relation between the real or originalthing and its image or shadow is the very basis that the whole de-scription is dependent upon.From the same periodonward,on the other hand, the 'participation'idioms of group-(II) disappear as metaphysical terms - exceptwhere they are subjected to critical discussions in the 'first part' ofthe Parmenides.And it is noteworthy that, when in that dialogue(128 E-129 D) the theory of Forms was put forwardby the youthfulSocrates, it was put forward solely in terms of the 'participation'idiomsto state the Form/particularrelation,and it is this conceptionof'participation' that became the target of the subsequent criticism.Even the 'resemblance'was described there not as an alternative to'participation',but as one way in which 'participation'may be inter-preted. And after this criticismin the Parmenideswe never find in thelater dialogues the 'participation'idioms used of the Form/particularrelation; instead we find them being used in the Sophistes(251-259) tostate the relationof Forms to one another,which, I insist, is a differentmatter from their relation to particulars, not the same thing as E.Zelleronce tried to contend.45Now, some similar theses, that idioms of 'paradeigmatism'super-seded those of 'participation'in Plato's later dialogues,have hithertobeen maintained,in one form or another, by scholarssuch as H. Jack-son, R. D. Archer-Hindand W. D. Ross, and were rejected by critics4" Chemiss (3), pp. 363-4. Cf. esp. such passages as Republic 476 C-D."5 Zeler (p. 378) argued (against H. Jackson, see below) that the things saidthere of the relation of Forms to one another (the r/ID relation) must also beapplied to that of particular to Form (the x/O relation) because, as the FormMan is called a Living Thing in virtue of its participating in the Form of Life,so a particular man too is called a living thing for the same reason. He allegedthis to be evidence to show that the ,LvrkXELv s being used in the Sophistes ofthe x/@ relation as well. This would not be tenable, however, since the relationof a particular man to a Form is not simply that of x to O. The FD/O elation isof an entirely different nature from the x/O relation, and the LvryXLVusedto state the former also belongs to an entirely new usage, for which see J. L.Ackrill, "Plato and Copula: 'Sophist' 251-259" in Studies in Plato's Metaphysicsed. R. E. Allen, pp. 207-218.46



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such as E. Zeller,P. Shorey, H. Raederand H. Cherniss.4 From whathas so far been said in (A) and (B) above, however, I hope the im-portant differencesbetween my own position and that of Jacksonandothers may be readily apparent: they all assumed uncritically, Ibelieve, that the 'participation'idioms were meant to express 'imma-nence' of Forms in relation to particulars and the 'paradeigma'idioms their 'transcendence'.According to their theses Plato's devel-opment of his theory was a very simple and straightforwardmovementaway from immanence to transcendence, that is away from the'participation' idioms towards those of 'paradeigma'.47I wouldmaintain this least of all. I regard the 'participation' idioms as meantto express the transcendenceof Forms rather than their immanence,although I am not so much interestedin whethersomeidiomsbelong toimmanence'-or 'transcendence'-language,as I am in the real implica-tions of their syntax. In any case, I submit that the 'participation'idioms, as such, had not occurredin the early stage of Plato's theoryof Forms before the Symposium,but appearedto describe the uniqueForm/particular relation from that dialogue onward, simultaneouslywith the 'paradeigma' dioms (which,in particular, Jackson erroneous-ly held not to have occurredin the 'older' theory of Forms stated insuch dialogues as the Phaedo and Republic). In this I believe myview is fundamentallydifferent from theirs. Related to this, moreover,the kind of idiom that I hold to have disappearedin this connectionfrom the later dialogues is that of 'participation' (group-(II)) alone;I do not say that the idioms of group-(I), which Jackson, Archer-Hind, and Ross coupled together with the 'participation' idioms ofgroup- (I) under the concept of 'immanence',also disappeared.With these provisoes, then, I hold that it is an undeniable fact,that in Plato's later dialogues we cannot find any instance of (.LiXEtVand its congeners used of the Form/particular relation,4aas we could46 See Jackson (esp.) X. p. 284, XI. pp. 292 f., pp. 296 ff., XIII. pp. 3, 267;Archer-Hind (2) (esp. see p. 182 ad Tim. 52 A); Ross (2), p. 230; and on theother hand, Zeller, pp. 369-397; Shorey (1), pp. 274-309, (2), pp. 45-78, esp.p. 66, (3), pp. 37-38; Raeder, p. 85 with n. 4; Cherniss (3), pp. 362-364.47 As to Jackson's thesis (almost entirely accepted by Archer-Hind), it is alsorelated to his rather peculiar distinction between et&qwhich are xaW' aus andwhich are not xcct' X9&, and to his untenable view that Plato in his later periodbelieved only in Forms of natural things as xaW'wi'ur W-n. But these pointsare irrelevant here.48 Ross ((2), p. 229) cites Sophistes 228 C 1 as the only instance of ?tenkxeLvused of the Form/particular relation in the later dialogues. I cannot see how

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not find any in the early dialogues before the Symposium either.Now this disappearance of the 'participation' idioms of group-(II)and, along with it, the preponderanceof the 'paradeigma'idioms ofgroup-(III) in later dialogues would not have so much significanceif they occurred without definite philosophical thought to supportthem. But I think there seems to be adequate reason to supposethat these phenomena have occurred as a necessary consequence ofPlato's development of his philosophical thought, as we saw it hadbeen with the appearance n the middle dialogueof the 'participation'idioms in place of the previous group-(I) terms. I do not at any ratebelieve that this fact, which my list shows, can rightly be explainedaway as simply a matter of the exigencies of Greek style to suit thehe could have thought the passage is such a relevant instance. - Both Zeller(p. 379) and Shorey ((2), p. 66) were mistaken in taking Plato's phrase atTimaeus 51 B 1 px?rccaXa3vov 8 ... 'oi5 voqrTo5 to be strong evidence of the useof 'participation in the Fornz' in the later dialogues. (Proclus made this mis-interpretation of the phrase, cf. In Parm. col. 876.34-35; and so may Aristotlehave done, cf. pp. 55-56 in/ra and Cherniss (1), p. 118.)49 Thus I cannot regard it as an established fact, that "Plato at all times usedboth idioms (0i&E,t and [[L.at;) as they suited the particular context" (Cher-niss (3), p. 362 n. with his italics; so Zeller, p. 376; Shorey (3), p. 37).Zeller (pp. 382-3) contends that, because Aristotle as a rule describes theForm/particular relation as being ,t0t,t and does not speak of xpA8CLtyILexcept in one passage (Metaph. 991 a 21 = 1079 b 25), this must have beenthe case with Plato's terminology at the time when Aristotle was attendingPlato's lectures. Although for the moment I am restricting myself to the evi-dence of the Platonic dialogues and not dealing with the Aristotelian evidence,still I could argue to the contrary on the strength of such facts as that most ofthe extant fragments of Peri Ideon (except fr. 5, Ross) speak of the PlatonicForm predominantly as 7rap&k8eLyp?; that Alexander (In Metaph. 83.21-22)remarks that it is XapMXjpsLGXo ... rtCv t8eiv [wLaBro that they are 7aoxp-Myfa-x; that Xenocrates (fr. 30, Heinze = Proclus, In Parm. col. 888.17-19and 36-37, Cousin) defined Form as C&CEO7op 8ELy,LMczLx'; that Theophrastus(Metaph. 5 a 25-28, Ross and Fobes) mentions IJt,liuaL4as the important notionin the metaphysics of Platonists.I do hold, however, that Aristotle's Corpus, along with the formulation ofthe theory of Forms in the 'first part' of the Parmenides, was chiefly responsiblefor the general impression made upon (and reinforced by) the commentatorsin all ages after him, that ,uvrkxeLvnd its cognates were the regular terms usedby Plato at all times to state the Form/particular relation, whereas in factPlato himself, at any rate in his dialogues, used them so only in the middledialogues. It is noteworthy in this connection that Aristotle in his Physicsapplied the concept of ,uk&E,Leven to the Xc?pccn the Timaeus (see the lastpoint (8) discussed infra in section IV fin.).48



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particularcontext: it might be the case that Plato had come to thinkthat, though the 'participation' idioms could be used to describe therelation of Forms to one another, they were, in contrast with 'para-deigma' idioms, no longer suitable to describe the relation of partic-ulars to Forms. In the next section I shall try to present my reasonsfor this supposition.

IV. Someaspectsof thePlatonic 'paradeigmatism'nd theconceptionof xcopi in Timaeus 48 E-52 DWe have already seen that TMA (Parm. 132 A 1-B 2) is invalid forPlato's theory of Forms in the sense that it turns on assumptionswhichviolate what Plato had actually laid down in the Phaedo and else-where; and I hold that Plato was well aware of this. It might be said,however, that given the two propositions: (e.g.)

(i) The Form of Beauty (ai&Y 6 xa)6v) is beautiful.(ii) This particular thing is beautiful.the theory of Forms with its 'participation'terminology does leave apossibility, at least to those who do not see the force of such passagesas Phaedo 100 C and Republic 597 C, to take the function of '...is beautiful' of (i) in the same way as that of the proposition (ii) inwhich the criterion of the meaning of '... is beautiful' is erroneouslyfixed.I am confident that what youthful Socrates suggested a little laterat Parmenides 132 C 12-D 4, i.e. that the Forms are the originalsor paradigmsof which the many particularsare likenesses or images,is, if rightly interpreted, a hypothesis such that it excludes from thefirst the very possibility mentioned above, the possibility, that is,to think the criterion of the meaning of '... is beautiful' exemplifiedin (ii) and to interpret the proposition (i) accordingto that meaning.For to say that the Forms are the originals of which particulars arelikenesses is to declare, in the clearest possible way, that the criterionof the meanilng of '... is beautiful' should now certainly be fixed in(i) and it is applied to 'this particular thing' in (ii) only throughdenrvativedesignation in much the way that a likeness of Socratesmay be called '(... is) Socrates'; this declaration makes as explicitas possible the point that the Form of Beauty is beautiful in virtueof nothing other than itself and thus, while (ii) is equivalent to'... has the character of beauty (in virtue of being a likeness of the

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Form of Beauty)', the proposition (i) must not, and cannot, be para-phrased in any such way, since the Form of Beauty is the very par-adigm or standard of 'being beautiful'. We must note that, in spite ofwhat Plato actually said in the Phaedo and elsewhere, all these thingsthat are brought out by the terminology of paradeigmatism couldnot be expressed so explicitly by that of 'participation'.The objection put forward by Parmenides (132 D 5-133 A 6) tothis new hypothesis is not valid, since it turns upon his substituting(at 132 D 9-E 1) the old Pse'rXsLw-termor the new elxocra4b&vmt-termand his ignoring, thus, the new point of this new hypothesis, accordingto which, if there are images that are similar to one another by re-semblance to a single original, this original and any one of the imagesare similar to each other not by the participation of both in one andthe same thing, but just by the latter's imitating the former.50 I can-not quite understand why so many writers on this problem5l took thestatement - that any two things which are similar to each other mustparticipate in one and the same thing52 - to be an assumption seriouslyassumed by Plato himself and to be true even of the relation betweenthe original and its likeness - if, indeed, this is not because theAristotelian framework of thought had had a strong influence uponthem concerning how to interpret the above-mentioned two typesof proposition.53The 'paradeigma' idioms of group-(III), then, make explicit the50See Cherniss (3), pp. 365-369. Cf. also Bluck, p. 124.51 Ross (2), p. 89; Owen (1), pp. 318-9; Vlastos (1), p. 244; Runciman, pp.158-9; Wedberg, p. 38, etc.52 Parm. 132 D 9: so 8i 'pLoLovT(C 'Votc ... ey&x-n Mv&yzxnv6 TOI3oc,rOTX5Lv.53 A. E. Taylor, (esp. pp. 253-255) provides, I think, another typical case.In defending Plato's theory he correctly distinguished the 'is' of identity fromthe 'is' of predication. Since, however, he took the Platonic Forms basicallyto be 'concepts', 'properties', 'universals', etc. (his examples: 'the colourgreen' opp. 'a green leaf', 'whiteness' opp. 'snow', which would correspond to Fopp. Fx, rather than to d opp. F), his meaning of the 'is of identity' has becomevery empty (conceptual identity, not substantial identity, so to speak). And,although he pointed out with Proclus that the original/copy relation is not merelikeness but likeness plus derivation (an asymmetrical relation), he failed in theend, owing to his basic notion of Forms as concepts etc., to make sufficientsense of the Platonic statement that the Form is the paradigm of which theparticulars are copies. For this last point Owen's criticism ((1), p. 319, n. 3)is valid. Possibly the 'is of identity' in Plato's theory of Forms might betterbe called 'is of identification', the function of which is positively to identifya Form as the unique, intelligible (voTq6v) paradigm of particular F.50



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important points which were not so explicit in the 'participation'idioms of group- (II). But there is further a no less important differencebetween these two kinds of idioms, which I think is very essentialfor the grasping of Plato's thought.To describe phenomena in the language of 'participation' (,uxteeZv)and 'possession' (sXLv in the sense of (I')), as Plato did in his middledialogues, is to analyse them in terms of three items we have seenabove: (1) the Form ((D), (2) the character (F), and (3) the concretething (x); and, though Plato does not expressly say so, there can belittle doubt from the instances of its use in the dialogues that the[Le,eCsLv-terminology s properly used of the relation of x to (D, notF to (D. Thus this way of describing phenomena requires 'x' ('thissome-thing') as the subject of descriptive propositions: x is F= xhas F because x participates in (D. Presumably it is this indispensa-bility or even apparent priority of 'x' ('this some-thing') as the subjectin the pLZT'sYEv-terminologyhat leads some commentators to say:(e.g.)

there is nothing in it (viz. in the theory of Forms) to question the realexistence of thephysical things which Socrates in the Phaedo (96-9) confesseshe found so difficult to understand ...But neither there nor in the Parmenides is there any suggestion that thereality of particulars (i.e. of physical things) depends on their participation incharacteristic forms w,lhich hey suggest to us or 'remind' us of.5'

This feature of the terminology may be called a root of the possibilityof the above-mentioned type of misunderstanding that involves thetheory of Forms in the problem of TMA: for, in this very indispens-ability of 'this some-thing' as the subject, this way of description isliable enough to be assimilated to that way of looking at things whichinterprets the two types of proposition, (i) and (ii) above, alike interms of 'subject'-'predicate' 'substance'-'attribute' = 'this some-thing'-'such and such quality', and in which x and F are the twoultimate factors and hence the locution "x participates in (D" isregarded as being almost the same as, or merely synonymous with,"x has F" (as we saw in section II).Now it is true that, in the Parmenides, the locution 'resemblanceto the Form' is introduced simply as a way in which 'participationin the Form' may be interpreted55 and thus it looks as though the54 Murphy, p. 141 (italics mine).5$ Parm. 132 D 3-4.

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two kinds of idiomare also exactly the samein theirsyntax regardingx,F and (D.But I believe that other textual evidences plus the innerlogic itself of the idioms would show clearly enough that the 'para-deigma' idioms of group-(III) are properly used of the relation be-tween F and F, and not, like the 'participation' dioms, of the relationbetween x and D.'56On the other hand, the philosophy of Plato (pace the statementjust quoted about the reality of the physical things) had from thefirst had in its core the motive of calling into question the ultimatestatus of 'x' ('this some-thing'); for Plato regardedsensible phenomenaas the world of continuous flux, and this is a view according to whichit is impossiblein the final analysis to have such 'x' remaining withinthis phenomenalworlditself as a substantial entity of ultimate status.True, we saw the distinction is clearly marked in the Phaedo betweenthing (x) and character (F), and it may seem to be the case that:

the particulars of which they (the Forms) are causes are qualities of con-crete things, not concrete hings themselves.Beauty itself is not the cause of abeautiful thing, but of a thing's being beautiful. Plato makes this quiteclear, but it is important to emphasise it ... because, when Socrates spokeof the need to examine the whole question of the cause of coming-to-be andperishing (95 E), it was natural to expect an account of the ykveat; andy4opi of animate and inanimate substances rather than of the origin andloss of their attributes.57

Yet we must firmly bear in mind that this distinction, namely thedistinction between 'thing' and 'quality', 'substance' and 'attribute',x (or Fx) and F, cannot, even in the Phaedo,have ultimate and funda-56 Cf. esp. Phaedo 74 D-75 B where what 'resemble' or 'strive for' aort6 'r6taov are being spoken of as (e.g.) c'r &vXrol6 t6Xol (sc. ta) (not X'&am t?Ax),'c &x r&vmEaHc&cv tam, etc. In general, it is true, Plato speaks of the phenom-enal particular sometimes as F (e.g. Symp. 210 A-C: t6 i7r =TCaLVTLOtqa6[LOCaLVx6Moq etc.), sometimes as Fx (e.g. Symp. 211 C: 7rkv'rx ' xacX& w'ra etc.);and there is always the same ambiguity in the meaning of such phrases as sanox),& xaXo (Rp. 479 Af.) (cf. Crombie, pp. 70, 264). But, as Crombie (p.275) remarks, "we cannot compare in point of P-hood the class of P thingswith P-hood itself", whereas it may be possible to "compare the P-hood ofP things with 'true P-hood' and to say that the former falls short of the lat-ter." - Timaeus 48 E - 52 B (to which we shall refer) leaves no doubt thatthe 'paradeigma' idioms are properly used to describe the F/O relation.b7 Hackforth, p. 144 (italics mine). But, on the other hand, he (p. 154) con-ceives of x as being 'no more than a container of forns, a container which al-ways remains what it is, but in which various forms, amongst which are twoopposites, reside'.52



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mental significance for Plato's theory, just because 'x' is somethingto be dissolved in the final analysis. The distinction which is and willremain ultimate and fundamental in Plato's theory is, of course,the distinction between F and (D. And if so, the way of descriptionwhich is and will remain fundamental in Plato's theory must be theone which, without mentioning 'x' as the subject-thing-substance,just describes the F-D relation, namely the 'paradeigma' idioms,not those of 'participation' which require 'x' as the indispensablesubject of description.There are indications in his later dialogues that Plato was pursuingthese lines of thought: i.e. to question the ultimate status of 'x'and to elaborate the logic of paradeigmatism58 and all these pointto the final answerin the Timaeus.The relevant points are as follows:(1) The fundamental distinction between the Form ('that which isalways real and has no becoming' etc.) and the sensible ('that whichis always becoming and is never real' etc.), together with the notionof the former being the paradigm of which the latter is likeness orimage, is placed in the forefront of the discourse as the very basisfor the whole description of the physical world.59(2) The dissolution of 'this some-thing' (x, which had been figuringas the subject of the 'participation' terminology) is fully achievedin the passage dealing with 'the Receptacle of all becoming' (finallycalled 'Space', 0xP).60 There Plato begins by emphasizing the factthat it is desperately difficult to say which elements genuinely deserveto be called (e.g.) water any more than fire, and urges us to viewthe physical world,not as a realm of subsisting things,but as a movingpattern of recurringcharacteristics.(3) In particular, the semantic injunction there given concerningthe use of 'o53'o or -6ae is important.61We are urged not to say'thisthing is water' or 'this thing is fire' etc., because it is impossible, by

58 For instance: Plato's analysis of our sense-perception in Theaetetus 156 A-157 C, in which the physical objects that yield our sensation and perceptionare described as actually being 'slow changes' (cf. further the notion of &&potalmat 157 B 8- C 1); the discussion of real being in Sophistes 246 A ff.; the inquiryinto the problem of eidolon constantly taken up in the Sophistes (240 A-C et al.).59 Tim. 27 D-29 C.60 Tim. 48 E-52 D.61 Tim. 49 C-52 D. With Solmsen (p. 41, n. 83; p. 43, n. 91), Lee, and Mills(but his notion of 'rbT'OLOTOV, T6 &&'nmvrv6g rOLOYTOVetc. as referring to Forms,not to images of Forms, is unacceptable), I accept the main line of Cherniss'interpretation (2) of this passage except in some details.

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saying 'this thing (ToDto s. -o'6) is ...', to distinguish any phase of thephenomenal flux from any other; we are told that the distinctivenames instead properly denominate in each case 'such and such charac-teristic, that is always identical throughout all of its occurrences'(T0 rOL0TOVyXa,To0t, T0 8aL Cv'or ToLoi3-ov,t6oPoLov OV s 7repLepOp6-tizvov O4OLOV,etc.).(4) This final rejection both of the view of the physical world as arealm of subsisting thingsand of the locution using 'this thing' (to6to,'6e) as its subject must, I believe, surely also entail a formal rejectionof the t zy.v-terminology of group - (II) to state the Form/particularrelation - the terminology to which 'this thing' (toiD-o, r6ae) is indis-

pensable as its subject, 'x', though of course Plato allows and continuesto use such a locution for other uses in neutral contexts.(5) The determinate, self-identical characteristics just mentioned(T06 aL&nc,.-; - OLOiTooOV tc.), to which distinctive names must refer,are manifested by coming into Space from which again they disappear;they are called likenesses or images of the eternal entities (i.e. Forms).62No doubt, as Proclus thought,63 they correspond to that immanentcharacter (F) which, as we have seen, was mentioned in the Phaedoand there said never to change its own nature.

(6) The recommended way of speaking, then, describes phenomenajust in terms of F and (D (and Space), without referring to x. Thus"This (x) is beautiful (F)" in everyday language would be in a philos-opher's version equivalent to "In this part of Space the Form ofBeauty (Q) is imaged (F)", or "An image (F) of the Form of Beauty(F) has now come into this part of Space", or, further, "This partof Space has now received an image (F) of the Form of Beauty (D)".And, what appears as fire is in fact the part of Space that has receivedan image of the Form of Fire, what appears as water the part that hasreceived an image of Water, and so on according as the images (tip.-,uovexo)ome into Space.64(7) Enough has already been said to distinguish, I hope, differencesand advantages of this new formulation compared with the 'partici-pation' terminology. (a) Basically, the 'participation' terminology,62 Tim. 50 C 4-5, 51 A 2, 52 A 4-7.63 See Cornford (2), pp. 183-4, with references.64 Cf. Tim. 51 B 4-6, 52 D 5-E 1. It is important to notice, with Cherniss((2), p. 129), that the so-called qualitative or adjectival Forms (such as theBeautiful) and their images are on the same footing as the substantial or sub-stantival ones (such as Fire and its image): cf. 51 A 6.54



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as we have seen, is liable to be taken into that framework of (Aris-totelian type of) concepts which should in turn necessarily involvethe theory of Forms in the problem of TMA; whereas the new for-mulation, conceiving of the Form emphatically as the paradigm of Fand dispensing with the notion of 'this thing' (x) as subject-substrate-substance, is not of such a nature. (b) Specifically, the term 'utvre'?>tv'itself, despite Plato's systematic distinction, has a strong possibilityand an actual tendency of being confused or assimilated with 'Izev',the serious consequences of which we saw above in sections I and II;whereas those who utilize the new formulation, of course, need notbe concerned about this at all. (c) Needless to say, 'this part of Space'which may figure as a grammatical subject in this formulation isfundamentally different in its real significance from 'this thing'(rOiro s. t68?) which is the subject in the old locution - the reductionor dissolution of the latter into Space and property-instances havingbeen the very basis of the new formulation. (d) While using suchexpressions as 'receive' (86Xeaoc) and 'enter or come into' (elatev"L,EyyLyvrathn)which belong to the idioms of group - (I), Plato is emphaticin asserting that the Form and the Space, the two permanent separatekinds of being, cannot be one in the other and therefore what 'comesinto' Space or what Space 'receives' is not 0 itself but F, an imageor likeness of the Form, which, owing to the Space, can 'somehowcling to existence' as ov 7te; and escape being nothing at all (7avMX&)

)/OV) 5(8) Nothing could be more instructive in this connection than toobserve that Aristotle, identifying Platonic xc'p?cwith 'matter', appliedto it again the term 'the participant' (TO ET nX7T6vXO, 'TO ?.E,&xtrX.6V)in relation to the Forms.66 For this would show that Aristotle wasinevitably led, by his basic metaphysics of the individual particular(o6& -n) and the material substrate, to ignore all the above-mentionedpoints of Plato's conception of xc,pa and to reintroduce automaticallyinto that conception the 'x' (= T68o T-, 'okTo) as the subject-sub-strate and, with it, reinstate the discharged Vv.entsw-terminologyin its former office of describing the relation to the Forms.67 Further-6f5 Tim. 52 A 2-3, C 2-D 1.66 Physics 209 b 11-13, 35.17 As for Aristotle's identification of Zc'pmwith , Ross ((I), pp. 565-6) isright in agreeing and quioting A. E. Taylor's comments on Tim. 52 B 4, that"Aristotle is himself so imbued with the view that the permanent implied inchange can only be thought of as 'stuff' or 'substrate' that he was probably

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more, his supposition that, if the participant is place, the Formsthemselvesmust be in place68clearly indicates that Aristotle took thislocution, "Space participates in D",which is itself an unwarranted,non-Platonic locution, to mean "'D s in Space" (which is equivalentto "Spacehas (9XeL) D"), nd that he did not take any account of F,likeness or image of 4D,which Plato says is what in fact enters intothe Space.Thus, Aristotle's interpretation of the y6px discloses his doublemisunderstanding about the fundamental significance of the PlatonicForm-image-Space viewpoint and thereby most conspicuously con-trasts his own with that viewpoint, the latter being such that itenabled Plato to have a way of describing phenomena without x asthe subject, as well as a physical theory without the notion of 'things'as subsisting entities of ultimate status (such as the atoms or anyother material substances). We may conclude our observation bynoting that the point at issue must raise some serious concerns as tothe problemof Value and its relation to Being: for it can surelybe saidthat 'this thing' as subject-substrate, x, is in itself axiologicallyneutraland hence to hold such xs in some form or other to be ultimate factorsin the worldwould seem to exclude values fromthe basic reality in theworld and dissociate Being from Value.Kyoto University

BIBLIOGRAPHYAllen, R. E. (1): "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues"in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1956, pp. 43-60.Allen, R. E. (2): Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms, London,1970.unconscious that he was falsifying the theory of the Timaeus by forcing his owntechnical terminology into it." On the other hand, Ross is not correct in sayingthat "It is correct to say that the Timaeus identifies x6poc and r6 [eraT'XLx6v"because "'r6 ra.nr?tLX6v is not a bad paraphrase of such words as u7o8OXqand 7ra,veXkq".In fact 'r6 4era),q7r'rLx6v or tekxnLX6v is the worst paraphrase ofsuch words as U'7ro8oX',n the profound sense that I am advocating. On thisparticular point Archer-Hind (2) is right in commenting that "Aristotle has infact no right to apply to the 6r?o8oXi the terms 1CfSX-rLX6V, Le>c)t7rLX6V".So Skemp, p. 209: "Plato's usage encourages the notion that pAftLq or V?Tdkjltwould be the relation of particular to Form, not of 'recipient' to 'occupant"'.Cf. in general Cherniss (1), Chapter II.Il Physics 209 b 33-35.56



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Apelt, O.: Plato's Dialog Parmenides, Leipzig, 1919.Archer-Hind, R. D. (1): The Phaedo of Plato, London, 1883.Archer-Hind, R. D. (2): The Timaeus of Plato, London, 1888.Bluck, R. S.: "Forms as Standards", Phronesis II (1957), pp. 115-127.Burnet, J.: Plato's Phaedo, Oxford, 1911.Campbell, L.: Jowett and Campbell, The Republic of Plato, vol. II, Oxford, 1894.Cherniss, H. F. (1): Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I, Baltimore,1944.Cherniss, H. F. (2): "A Much Misread Passage of the Timaeus (Timaeus 49 C 7-50 B 5)", A.J.P., LXXV (1954), pp. 113-130.Cherniss, H. F. (3): "The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues"in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 339-378.Cornford, F. M. (1): Plato and Parmenides, London, 1935.Cornford, F. M. (2): Plato's Cosmology, London, 1937.Crombie, I. M.: An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. II, London, 1963.Dodds, E. R.: Plato's Gorgias, Oxford, 1959.Geach, P. T.: "The Third Man Again" in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed.R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 265-278.Hackforth, R.: Plato's Phaedo, Cambridge, 1955.Jackson, H.: "Plato's Later Theory of Ideas", Journal of Philol. X (1882),pp. 253-298, XI (1882), pp. 287-331, XIII (1884), pp. 1-40, pp. 242-272,XIV (1885), pp. 173-230, XV (1886), pp. 280-305.Lee, E. N.: "On Plato's Timaeus 49 D 4 - E 7", A. J. P. LXXXVIII (1967),pp. 1-28.Mills, K. W.: "Some Aspects of Plato's Theory of Forms: Timaeus 49 C ff.",Phronesis XIII (1968), pp. 145-170.Moreau, J.: Platon, OeuvresCompletespar L. Robin, II, 1950.Murphy, N. R.: The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, Oxford, 1951.Owen, G. E. L. (1): "The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues" in Studiesin Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 313-338.Owen, G. E. L. (2): "A Proof in the Peni Ideon" in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics,ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 293-312.Raeder, H.: Plato's Philosophische Entwicklung, Teubner, 1905.Ross, W. D. (1): Aristotle's Physics, Oxford, 1936.Ross, W. D. (2): Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1951.Runciman, W. G.: "Plato's Parmenides" in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics,ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 149-184.Shorey, P. (1): "Recent Platonism in England", A. J. P. IX (1888), pp. 274-309.Shorey, P. (2): "The Timaeus of Plato", A. J. P. X (1889), pp. 45-78.Shorey, P. (3): The Unity of Plato's Thought, Chicago, 1903.Skemp, T. B.: "Hyle and Hypodoke" in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-FourthCentury, ed. I. During and G. E. L. Owen, Goteborg, 1960, pp. 201-212.Solmsen, F.: Aristotle's System of the Physical World, Ithaca, 1960.Taylor, A. E.: "Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates", Proc. Arist. Soc. XVI (1916),pp. 234-289.Taylor, C. C. W.: "Forms as Causes in the Phaedo", Mind LXXVIII (1969),pp. 45-59.Vlastos, G. (1): "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides" in Studies inPlato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, 1965, pp. 231-263.

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Vlastos, G. (2): "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parm. 132 A-B 2): Text andLogic", Philosophical Q. XIX (1969), pp. 289-301.Vlastos, G. (3): "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo", Phil. Rev. LXXVIII(1969) pp. 291-325, reprinted in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos, New York, 1971,pp. 132-166.Vlastos, G. (4): "'Self-Predication' in Plato's Later Period", Phil. Rev. LXXVIII(1969), pp. 74-78, see now also Rev. of Met. XXV (1972), pp. 415-458.Wedberg, A.: "The Theory of Ideas" in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos, New York,1971, pp. 28-52.Zeller, E.: "Ueber die Unterscheidung einer doppelten Gestalt der Ideenlehrein den platonischen Schriften", Kleine Schrilten, I Band, 1910, pp. 369-397.

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fujisawa, norio - Εχειν, Μετέχειν, and idioms of 'paradeigmatism' in plato's theory of...

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