From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship:How and Why the Armenian PoliticalParties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics inthe Post-Taif Period (1989–Present)

OHANNES GEUKJIAN

This study examines and analyzes the policy of the Armenian political parties inLebanese politics after the 1989 Taif agreement that was drafted in Saudi Arabia andsupported by Syria and the United States. The accord ended the Lebanese civil war,advocating state-building, stability and peaceful relations among the 18 Lebanesereligious communities. This research also provides an in-depth assessment of how andwhy the Armenian parties abandoned their traditional policy of positive neutralitythat was adopted during the 1975–89 civil war and took sides with different politicalmovements and coalitions in order to achieve their political goals. In the post-Taifperiod the Dashnak, Hunchag and Ramgavar parties failed to reach a compromiseagreement over the political representation of the Armenian community in theLebanese parliament as well as cabinet appointments mainly because the Hunchag andRamgavar parties were eager to benefit from the political change that the Taif usheredin with separate representation. Indeed, the Hunchags and Ramgavars rejected theformer Dashnak monopoly to control Armenian deputies, ostensibly to maintain anArmenian bloc inside parliament that could defend Armenian communal concerns.From a Dashnak perspective, the Armenian bloc demonstrated political strength andability to bargain with the various Lebanese groups during election campaigns as wellas exerting significant influence on any government.

To better understand all of these complexities, parliamentary elections from 1992until 2005 are examined in light of the policies of the Armenian parties, beforeassessing the epochal political developments in 2005. Within this context, it isimportant to stress the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in light of the SecurityCouncil Resolution 1559 and its implications particularly over the Armeniancommunity, the division of the majority of the Lebanese people between the March 8and March 14 Forces and the impact of both camps on the policies of the Armenianparties. No less important were the positions Armenian parties held with respect tothe Turkish peacekeeping troops deployed to southern Lebanon as part of theUnited Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as a result of Security CouncilResolution 1701 to monitor the ceasefire after the July–August 2006 war betweenHizbullah and Israel. Another key issue that highlighted the weakness and inability

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 45, No. 5, 739–767, September 2009

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/09/050739-29 ª 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00263200903135554

to control the Armenian electorate was the 2007 Metn by-election when a splitoccurred within Dashnak ranks. A group of discontented Dashnaks, supported andfinanced by Rafic Hariri’s Future Movement, separated from the party andchallenged the Dashnak stance by supporting the candidacy of former PresidentAmin Gemayel. The splinter group established an organization called FreeLebanese–Armenian Movement (FLAM), a development that was arguably crucialnot only in Armenian circles but also in Lebanese internal politics because a newArmenian player, in addition to the three traditional parties, with considerablepolitical significance was ready to negotiate over Armenian concerns.

Also addressed are the various roles played by Armenian parties, particularly theDashnak party, in the May 2008 Doha agreement that ended the political standoffbetween the ruling majority comprised of the March 14 Forces and the anti-government opposition led by Hizbullah and the Amal Movement. This contributionconcludes with several observations, including a complete reassessment of time-tested positions that protected and promoted Armenian rights and privileges inLebanon. It speculates that the policy of positive neutrality that was adopted in thecivil war period may well be an alternative to current penchants that subjected andcontinue to compel Armenians to intense Lebanese internal rivalries. This researchgathers its data from newspapers and periodicals published in Lebanon during theperiod under review, as well as personal observations and open-ended interviewsconducted with prominent Armenian figures and politicians in Lebanon.

The foundation of Lebanon’s Armenian community grew as a result of two migrationwaves. The first wave occurred at the end of the First WorldWar, when approximately40,000 Armenians settled in Beirut and the northern region of Mount Lebanon. Themajority were fromCilicia, a medieval Armenian province in Anatolia. The refugees ofthis wave settled mainly in Beirut’s Medawar and Quarantina areas but many wereeventually assimilated into the native Christian population. The second wave reachedLebanon between 1937 and 1939, when approximately 15,000 Armenians arrived afterthe FrenchMandatory government ceded the Alexandretta Sanjak to Turkey. Some ofthese Armenians settled in Syria and others in the Bekaa valley, particularly in the cityof Anjar, as well as Tyre in southern Lebanon.1 In addition to these two migratorywaves, nearly 5,000 Armenians reached Lebanon from Palestine in the aftermath ofthe 1948 Arab–Israeli war.2

The French Mandatory government in Lebanon and Syria was responsible for theArmenian settlements. Towards that end, land was allocated for building refugeecamps in both countries. In addition to French assistance, a number of orphanageswere established by the American Near East Relief organizations to shelter thehomeless Armenians. Most of these orphanages were later transformed intoeducational and/or vocational training institutions, like the Bird’s Nest in Jbail(Byblos) which had been run by the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia. According tothe stipulation of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Mandatory government grantedLebanese citizenship to the Armenians on 31 August 1924.3 Immediately thereafter,the French and their allies ‘reinforced and expanded the political spaces reserved forthe Armenians in the new confessional system being established in Lebanon’4 apolicy that was criticized by Lebanese Muslims because the Armenians contributed

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to the sustenance of a Christian predominance in Lebanese society. Indeed, LebaneseChristians, particularly Maronites, supported and defended the Armenian presencein Lebanon because they considered the latter ‘a significant factor for thepreservation of their dominant political power in the country’.5 As time went by,the initial hostile attitude of the Muslims and the prejudices of the native populationlessened as the Armenians effectively participated in the post-First World Warreconstruction process and pursued a policy of least interference in Lebanese internalconfessional politics. In fact, they openly adopted pro-government policies andsupported the President. Given the complex nature of Lebanese society it would beunwise to side with one community against the others. However, after theindependence of Lebanon in 1943 and particularly in the 1958 Lebanese civil war,the Dashnaks sided ‘with the pro-Lebanese nationalist political forces in the country’including the Phalange party and the pro-western President Camille Chamoun whilethe Hunchak ‘actively supported Kamal Jumblatt and the anti-government politicalgroupings’. As for the Ramkavar party, it was cautious in its political choices anddid not openly support any political group although it took an anti-governmentstance.6 Consequently, by supporting rival blocs, the Armenians in 1958 committedintra-communal violence and gained no political benefits. The Armenians were noteven represented in the cabinet.

In religion, the majority of Armenians belonged to the Armenian Apostolic(Orthodox) community under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia. Therest were distributed between the Catholic and Evangelical faiths. According to theconfessional structure of Lebanese society, the Armenian Orthodox and Catholicchurches were recognized as separate communities whereas the ArmenianEvangelicals as part of the Lebanese Protestant/Evangelical community.

In the first half of the 1900s, the Armenians organized themselves and establishedtheir political institutions in Lebanon, including the Armenian RevolutionaryFederation, ARF, or simply the Dashnak (1904), socialist in doctrine but whichremained more of a nationalist party throughout its history; the Social DemocraticHunchakian party, or simply the Hunchak (1912), which considered itself Marxistbut with a nationalist element; and the Democratic Liberal Ramgavar party (1921),that advocated the application of democratic principles in Armenian public life. Allthree gradually emerged with sophisticated cadres and leaders. Within this context,no independent Armenian groups emerged to challenge the leadership and play anactive role in the community. As for Armenian communists, they did not establish aparty but contributed, in 1925, to the establishment of the communist party ofLebanon.7 The three Armenian parties aimed to preserve Armenian national identityby maintaining Armenian culture and heritage ensuring that the Armeniansremained loyal and dutiful citizens in Lebanon as well as the Armenian diaspora.The three parties were committed to the Armenian cause that is the liberation of allArmenian territories occupied by Turkey during the First World War and theirannexation to Soviet Armenia, that became independent with the demise of theSoviet Union in 1991. Evidently, all three parties believed that the Armenian causecould evaporate if diaspora communities became assimilated with the localpopulations in their respective host countries. Within this context, the nature ofthe Lebanese socio-political system that was based on a strictly communal structurecontributed greatly to the preservation of Armenian national identity and offered

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 741

socio-economic, cultural and political advantages to the Armenian community.Indeed, in addition to the political parties, the Armenians established their schools,churches and sport clubs to sustain their Armenianness and national identity.Furthermore, the Lebanese political system that was based on confessional powersharing fully recognized the rights of the various communities in Lebanon. Theprovisions of the Lebanese constitution indeed guaranteed broad freedoms toorganize educational institutions, clubs and social activities. The Armeniancommunity, like other communities, were granted legitimate access to politicalinstitutions, and played critical roles in domestic affairs. Hence, the Armenianparties served as the major structures and channels for political participation whilenurturing socio-economic ventures.

Participation in the political sphere started in 1929 when Abdallah Ishaq, anArmenian Catholic, became the first elected member of parliament. This was theresult of ‘Maronite-Armenian collaboration that granted the seat reserved for therepresentative of minorities’ to Ishaq.8 In the 1934 parliamentary elections, when aseat was allocated to the Armenian Apostolic community, the French-backed and apro-Ramgavar candidate, Vahram Leilekian, was elected.9 In the 1943 parliamen-tary elections one Dashnak and one Ramgavar candidate were elected. During thisperiod the Dashnaks and the Hunchaks formed a united front and supportednationalist leaders Abdallah Yafi and Saeb Salam, in spite of French attempts to winArmenian votes for their proteges, Sami Al-Solh.10 It is out of the scope of this studyto present a detailed analysis of the role of the Armenians in the consecutiveLebanese elections. Given their valuable roles the Armenian quota was adjusted in1972, when the Apostolic community was granted the right to elect fourrepresentatives, while the Armenian Catholics were assigned a single seat.Remarkably, all the parliamentary seats reserved for the Armenian communitywere won by candidates supported by the Dashnak party between 1953 and 1972.The party had been eager to form an Armenian bloc inside parliament to betterarticulate Armenian interests. We can consider the Armenian bloc an institutionalgroup to express the interest of the community and to have direct access topolicymakers. A fragmented representation inside parliament would not serveeffectively Armenian communal interests. It was also crucial to note the Armenianelectoral power in Lebanon. The Armenian political parties compared to otherLebanese parties were very efficient in political mobilization of their electorate. Oncetheir support had been won by other parties they reliably delivered the Armenianvotes to the polling stations. In the post-Taif period, as will be discussed below, theArmenian parties sustained their efficiency by mobilizing and organizing theirelectorate but failed to maintain an effective and united parliamentary bloc.

Still, the Armenians’ determination for the preservation of the Lebaneseconsociational democracy, that manifested itself in power-sharing arrangements indifferent state institutions, was best illustrated with a sustained participation invarious governments. From 1969 until the beginning of the second civil war in 1975,the Armenians maintained a regular presence in successive cabinets. The mosteloquent and notable among the Armenian ministers was Khatchig Babikian whofor the first time represented the Armenians in the cabinet in 1961. Babikian, a highlyrespected lawyer, believed that ‘working for general social improvements’ inLebanon best served the interests of the Armenians and that ‘the Armenian

742 O. Geukjian

community could be badly hurt by prolonged civil disorders’.11 Babikian’sstatements highlighted that Armenians were eager to support consensus andreconciliation. Most Armenians believed that their contributions enhanced thecountry’s socio-economic development and kept peace among all groups.

With the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in April 1975, the political leadershipof the three Armenian parties adopted a policy of positive neutrality. Senior decisionmakers wished to steer clear of partisanship with any of the warring Lebanese partiesas well as avoid potential intra-Armenian communal violence. The three partiesmanaged to cooperate and take a united stance because they were not too far onpolicy issues. Parliamentarians Babikian and Melkon Eblighatian took on the taskof explaining the motive behind this policy to various leaders of the Lebanesecommunities so as to avoid potential conflict with any of them.12 Bothparliamentarians carried on their task on behalf of the Armenian bloc thatrepresented all the segments of the Armenian community. Apparently, Armeniancommunists were not party to the policy, although Baruyr Aghbashian, the formereditor of the Ramgavar newspaper, Zartonk, claimed ‘Armenian communistssupported the policy of positive neutrality and they were worried about the safety ofthe Armenian communities in the diaspora.’ However, ‘their name was notmentioned in the Armenian official press and media as a participant in makingthis policy’.13

The adoption of positive neutrality did not mean that the Armenians did not havea position or a political opinion concerning all Lebanese communal issues. As far asthey were concerned, the community was part and parcel of the Lebaneseconfessional political structure and they considered it unwise to remain aloof fromkey decisions concerning the socio-economic, cultural and political rights of allgroups. Yet to remain neutral and not participate in the war was a definite stance.14

Politically, the Armenian leadership strongly supported Lebanon’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity and Babikian argued that it was unacceptable to remain aloofand watch the country’s destruction.15 Armenian parliamentarians met with variousparties to mediate a ceasefire, and pleaded for reason, cautioning that the war wouldcause immense damage. They sought unity to resolve disputes through peacefulmeans and clarified that contested national issues, like the constitution, the structureof government, the institutions, and the political system could be negotiatedpeacefully so as to reach consensus among all Lebanese.16 Moreover, Armenianpoliticians condemned violence, stressed that national solidarity should be developedamong all Lebanese and appealed to warring parties to adopt reconciliation.17

Though proponents of positive neutrality, Armenian deputies, particularlyBabikian, played significant roles in the negotiations of the Tripartite Committeethat was created by the League of Arab States (LAS) at its 23 May 1989 CasablancaSummit. Babikian was a prominent associate of the six member committee createdby Patriarch Sfeir of the Maronite church in Lebanon, later identified as the BekerkiCommittee,18 to negotiate with the Tripartite Committee to stop the war. ThisCommittee that included King Fahed Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, King HasanII of Morocco, and president Al-Shadhili Bin Jdid of Algeria aimed to reach aceasefire by 29 August 1989, to be followed by a meeting of the Lebanese deputiessomewhere outside Lebanon.19 In September 1989, after a ceasefire was reachedbetween the warring parties 63 out of 99 members of the 1972 parliament gathered in

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 743

the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia. Three Armenian deputies, namely Babikian,Eblighatian (Armenian Apostolic) and Antranik Manougian (Armenian Evangeli-cal) attended. The Armenian delegation was jointly supported by the Armenianpolitical parties. Souren Khanamirian and Ara Yerevanian, the other two Armenianparliamentarians, could not be there for personal reasons. The deliberations in theTaif meeting aimed to reform the political system, to abolish political confession-alism on a phased basis as well as to establish a new representation system thatwould grant numeric parity for both Christians and Muslims. Importantly, it wascritical to note that a small group of 16 deputies, including Babikian, out of the 63attending deputies shaped deliberations to avoid gridlock.20 In October 1989, anagreement was reached as a first step to reconstruct post-war Lebanon. TheArmenian deputies signed the agreement, contributed to its ratification andsupported it politically. In part, some of the success attributed to Armeniancontributions, were the result of the tested policy of positive neutrality.

The Taif agreement not only re-established the consociational power-sharingpolitical system but also institutionalized and solidified sectarian and confessionalaffiliations. A confessional balance between the Christians and Muslims wasestablished in parliament with a revamped executive authority vested in the cabinetat the expense of the Maronite President of the Republic. The Ta’if did not alterthe confessional affiliations of the Prime Minister (Sunni) and the Speaker of theChamber (Shiia). Likewise within the readjusted confessional balance, theArmenians did not lose any privileges. Hagop Pakradounian, the ArmenianDashnak MP elected in 2005 from the Metn constituency, argued that Taifrecognized the Armenian community as ‘one of the seven main communities of thecountry rather than the seventh one’.21 In the pre-Taif period, the Armeniansparticipated in Lebanese politics but were not recognized by the system as a maincommunity equal to the six predominant ones (Maronites, Sunnis, Shiias, Druzes,Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics). Hence, Pakradounian stressed that in thepost-Taif period after being recognized as a predominant community, the Armeniansmust further defend all their communal rights with no concessions.22 The Taifagreement also regulated the confessional composition of the Cabinet anddistributed ministerial seats equally among Christians and Muslims. Within thiscontext, Armenians were assigned one ministerial post in any Cabinet formed by atleast 14 members, and at least two portfolios in Cabinets comprised of 28 membersor more.23 With respect to parliamentary seats, electoral law No. 154, supported bySyria after its 1976 deployment as part of the Arab Deterrent Forces to stop the civilwar, granted a further advantage to the Armenians. Signed by President EliasHraoui, the law awarded Armenians a sixth seat (five Apostolic and one Catholic),while Armenian Evangelicals – heretofore considered part of the Protestant/Evangelical community – could also contest the Protestant seat in Beirut.24 In otherwords, in the post-Taif period it was possible for Armenians to win a total of sevenseats, which was unprecedented. These political arrangements apparently enhancedArmenian representations through various state structures as the parties enhancedtheir contribution to domestic politics. Nevertheless, the three Armenian partiesthought about choices and continued to nominate candidates along partisan lines,which caused inevitable problems. What happened in the 1992 elections was a perfectillustration of intra-communal tensions and divisions.

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Indeed, on 14 August 1992, a joint Dashnak–Hunchag communique announcedthat the two parties ‘agreed to submit joint candidates for MP seats in both Beirutand Metn constituencies’. As a result, and in addition to Babikian, Khanamirian,Hagop Tchukhadarian and Dr. Nourijean Demirjian, Dr. Yeghia Djerejian(Hunchag) was elected MP in Beirut and Shahe Barsoumian (Dashnak) securedthe Metn seat.25 The Ramgavar party boycotted the 1992 elections and was criticalof the Dashnak–Hunchag joint list and their alliance with PM Rashid Solh, inBeirut, because it refused to take sides with the Lebanese groups. The position of theRamgavars stemmed from their conviction that ‘the Lebanese crisis was not over yet’and that ‘the Armenian united position’ from 1975 until 1991 (the policy of positiveneutrality) ‘should be maintained’ to preserve the community.26 According toKarnig Megerditchian, a member of the Dashnak party’s Central Committee (CC),the Dashnak supported and imposed Djerejian because ‘we wanted to form anArmenian bloc inside parliament to better protect Armenian communal rights andconcerns’.27 However, the Ramgavars argued that there was no Armenian bloc but‘a Dashnak bloc’ that subordinated the Armenian Evangelical candidate, Dr.Demirjian, who agreed to comply with ‘Dashnak directives’. From a Ramgavarperspective, Armenian candidates to the 1992 elections were not real representativesof the community.28 The Ramgavar stance could be refuted because traditionally theDashnak had nominated only one party member and the remaining non-Dashnakcandidates were chosen from the various Armenian groups in order to form arepresentative Armenian bloc in parliament. In October 1992, after the newparliament was sworn in, Rafiq Hariri, the well known Sunni philanthropist, formeda new cabinet comprised of 30 ministers in which he included two Armenians,Barsoumian (Dashnak) and Hagop Demirdjian (Armenian General BenevolentUnion, AGBU, member and a well-known friend of Hariri). Remarkably, while theDashnaks fostered an Armenian bloc, they were unable to control the pro-HaririDemirdjian who did not attend bloc meetings and preferred to follow Hariri’sdirectives. Moreover, Hariri also coordinated with the Syrian authorities as heformed a government. It was the beginning of a new style adopted by Hariri, whoapparently sought to weaken the Armenian bloc and impose his government’spolitical agenda on everyone. Hariri appeased Armenian independency tendencies tocreate a new base of support within the community.

In the bureaucracy, according to the Taif agreement and the prepared list by PMHariri, in 1993, the so-called 218 ‘first category’ appointive positions in stateinstitutions were to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Armenianswere to be allocated between 9.4 and 10.9 per cent of these valuable appointments,on the basis of the number of the Armenian MPs out of the 13 per cent quotaattributed to minorities.29 Apparently, the 9.4 per cent figure was adopted by thegovernment, which resulted in four civil servants, and another four positions in theequivalent public institutions. With respect to the diplomatic corps, the Armenianshare produced three ambassadors, for a grand total of 11 ‘first category’ appointivepublic posts.30 Notwithstanding these theoretical assessments, recent statisticsrevealed that only five ‘first category’ civil servant positions were allocated toArmenians: one of the four Vice Presidents of the Central Bank (Dr. HaroutSamuelian, neutral but supported by the Dashnak), the head of the GeneralInspectorate (Jean Belian, Dashnak, currently vacant however), the Director

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 745

General of the Central Statistical Office (Maral Gidanian, Dashnak), the DirectorGeneral of the Ministry of Environment (Berj Hajetian, neutral), Lebanon’sAmbassador to Kazakhestan (Vazken Kavlakian, Dashnak). Clearly the Dashnakparty played a pivotal role in the negotiations with successive governments to securethese appointments, and demonstrated strength and greater influence whencompared to the Hunchags and Ramgavars. Nevertheless, Armenian representationswere not fully granted due to internal power struggles between Christians andMuslims over control of key positions in state institutions.

At the second category and lower level posts, it seems that the Armenians wereworse off, barely allocated a handful of civil servant posts. This was either due toindifference or, more likely, specific choices, concerned all Armenians. In general, thelatter favoured self-employment and private sector careers rather than governmentservice, which drew a mild rebuke from President Elias Hraoui on 28 November1993. Indeed, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Homenetmen(Armenian General Athletic Union) sport club, affiliated with the Dashnak party,Hraoui, who was invited to deliver the keynote address, stressed the constructive roleof the Armenians in Lebanon. Yet, he also declared: ‘state institutions, including thearmy, police and internal security forces are open for you to apply and join’.31 Hereiterated that there was no state policy to marginalize the Armenians anddiscriminate against them, and that the state was ready to further embrace thecommunity because its members demonstrated loyalty to the unity and integrity ofLebanon.32

These laudatory declarations notwithstanding, post-Taif governments margin-alized the Armenian community for a variety of reasons. The first reason was thatthe Armenian parties lacked unified strategies and were unable to influence the majordecision makers in Lebanon such as the Prime Minister and Speaker of the House aswell as the Syrian authorities.

Secondly, a change in the community’s demographic situation caused by massiveemigration to America, Europe and elsewhere, meant that the vote was no longerweighty. In fact, the sheer number of voters, which secured Armenian key privileges,fell in the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 elections when there was extremely low turnout.In 2000, for example, the Metn constituency indicated 19,666 Armenian Apostoliceligible electors while only 5,412 actually cast ballots. Likewise, out of 5,603Armenian Catholic eligible voters, only 1,147 voted. These dramatic drops – 27.5and 20.5 per cent respectively – represented a dilemma for the single most importantparliamentary seat, in the Metn, which encompassed the Bourj-Hamoud bastion.The situation was no better elsewhere, including the third Beirut constituency wheretwo Armenian Apostolic and one Armenian Catholic seats faced similar results. Outof 29,777 Armenian Apostolic eligible voters, a mere 6,841 voted (23.0 per cent), andout of 1,996 Armenian Catholic eligible voters, only 519 (18.2 per cent) cast ballots.33

Inevitably, a negative image emerged, supported by such low participation levels.Indeed, while these figures demonstrated a lack of interest by the Armenian public inpolitical participation, it was more reasonable to conclude that a significantpercentage of the Armenian electorate was no longer living in the country.

The third reason for the community’s marginalization was the crisis between partyleaders and younger Armenians. Apparently, while all three parties were able tosubstantially count on the loyalty of Armenian families in parliamentary elections,

746 O. Geukjian

doubts surfaced as to their intrinsic capabilities to deliver similar numbers in thefuture. In this regard, the 7 July 2009 parliamentary elections would be a testingground for the ability of the Armenian parties to mobilize and win Armenian votes.

If the 1992 parliamentary elections were characterized, in the Armenian politicalcamp, by a continuous Dashnak hegemony, the 1996, 2000 and 2005 elections wereprofoundly influenced by the Hariri factor, along with the political intervention ofSyria in Lebanese politics under the pretext of protecting the new power-sharingarrangements ushered in by the Taif. The 1992 Dashnak–Hunchag cooperation frozein 1995 after the latter, like the Ramgavars, perceived a rare window of opportunityto voice independent concerns. Up to that point Hunchags and Ramgavars wereunable to challenge the Dashnak party, even if an entirely new factor prompted themto seek change. Indeed, the nascent Republic of Armenia, which earned itsindependence in 1991, played a growing role in Lebanon through its ambassador,Yervant Melkonian. To weaken the Dashnak party, which was not on particularlygood terms with Armenia’s President Levon Ter-Petrossian, Melkonian courtedHunchags and Ramgavars.34 In the words of Dr. Djerejian:

Armenian political leaders should be broadminded and should try to form acoalition list, where all political currents, groupings and worthy non-partisanpersonalities should be included to represent the Armenian community at itsbest in the parliament for the benefit of Lebanon and the Armenian community.Otherwise, the confrontation would spread on many fronts and would createnew dissent.35

This was telling but not entirely surprising, and like most Lebanese groups,Armenian representatives trekked to Damascus to meet with Syrian Vice President,Abdul Halim Khaddam, as well as General Ghazi Kanaan, head of the Syrianintelligence network in Lebanon, to explain their political positions and seek Syriansupport to realize communal and personal interests.36 In the words of the Director ofthe Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Paul Salem, ‘everyone used and was usedby the Syrians’.37 According to Megerditcian, ‘the Syrians imposed both on Haririand the Dashnak to accept a coalition list in which the three Armenian parties wouldbe fairly represented’.38 Consequently, an Armenian coalition list emerged for the1996 elections, masterfully orchestrated by Hariri. It comprised Babikian, H.Demirjian, Tchoukhadarian and Dr. Djerejian. The Dashnak candidate, Dr. SebouhHovnanian was elected in the Metn constituency and the pro-Dashnak GeorgeKassardji was elected in the Zahle district of the Bekaa. Importantly, the Dashnakparty maintained its traditional leadership role and led the winning coalition list(Dashnak, Hunchag, Ramgavae/AGBU) in Beirut, while it sided with the Syriansupported lists of the government.

From a Dashnak perspective, an Armenian bloc survived but without HagopDemirjian and Dr. Djerejian. Both were elected with Dashnak support but remainedloyal to Hariri and did not participate in the bloc’s meetings. According toMegerditchian, cooperation and alliance between the Dashnak and Hariri to run theelections with a joint list stemmed from a general consensus to stand with thegovernment and support his policies related to Beirut but concerning Armeniancommunal concerns, ‘Armenian MPs would enjoy political independence to make

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 747

their own decisions irrespective of Hariri’s political agenda’.39 As a matter of fact,Megerditchian reiterated, when Hraoui, in accordance with the constitution,engaged parliamentarians to settle on a Prime Minister, ‘the Armenian bloc madeits own choice’ independently of Hariri.40 From the aforementioned, it seemed thatthe Syrians and Hariri wanted to weaken the influence of the Dashnak in Lebanesepolitics in general and the Armenian community in particular, presumably tointerfere in communal affairs and impose their political views. Hariri’s toleration ofthe Armenian bloc apparently hinged on Syrian policies, as well as growing intra-Armenian divisions, all to better contain alienated Armenians.

This situation grew in complexity in the aftermath of the 1998 presidentialelections that saw Emile Lahoud fill this weak but critical post. Displeased with theimposed candidate, Hariri refused to form a government, and after the compulsoryconsultations Lahoud turned to Dr. Salim Hoss to assume the premiership. ArthurNazarian was appointed Minister of Environment in the Hoss government thencomprised of 18 Ministers.41 For the next two years, Hariri and Lahoud delineatedtheir respective positions, forcing everyone, including the Armenian parties, to eitherside with the government or with Hariri. The latter prepared for the 2000 elections ashe plotted an anticipated comeback. In the pre-election period, the Armenian partieswere divided over policy alternatives and were unable to resist Hariri’s determinationto create a base of support within the community. In 1999 and 2000, as part of anelection campaign to boost his image among the Armenians, Hariri inauguratedhumanitarian offices in the Armenian neighbourhoods and dispensed aid to needyfamilies. These offices maintained ties with aid recipients and sought their votes inthe upcoming elections. To reach more Armenian voters, Hariri also introduced a15-minute news service in Armenian on his own Al-Mustaqbal (Future) televisionnetwork, which left its mark.42 Apparently, Hariri’s powerful campaign aimed toprevent the formation of the Armenian bloc to disperse the political power of thecommunity. The Dashnak party, stemmed from its traditional leadership role inthe community, and with significant new attempts to address unity, proposed to theHunchag and Ramgavar parties to create an Armenian United Front to safeguardcommunal interests. From a Dashnak perspective, the Armenian United Frontaimed to form an Armenian bloc, nominate an Armenian candidate for theProtestant seat in Beirut and choose Armenian candidates to stand for election.43

For reasons that are still not entirely clear, Hariri not only disregarded thetraditional Dashnak role in the community but also proceeded to unilaterally choosethe Armenian candidates. He believed that ‘non-Dashnak political groups should alsobe independently represented in parliament eager to serve in a Hariri government’.44

Hariri was the first Sunni PM who intervened in Armenian intra-communal affairs topropagate his policy. According to recent statistics the Dashnak party represented 85per cent of the Armenians whereas both the Hunchags and Ramgavars represented 15per cent.45 Hariri’s stance motivated Hunchag and Ramgavar potential candidates tocontest Dashnak power. Internal Hunchag and Ramgavar splits further servedHariri’s objectives, as the premier consolidated his power base. It was around this timethat the Hunchag Central Council dissolved its Lebanese Administrative Body headedby Sebouh Kalpakian who insisted on unconditional cooperation with Hariri andproposed Dr. Djerejian’s candidacy. Both Kalpakian and Djerejian were detachedfrom the party, while the Central Council appointed a new Administrative Body to

748 O. Geukjian

protect Armenian communal interests. Similarly, Ramgavar party’s Regional Councilof Lebanon disagreed with its own Central Council’s decision to nominate HagopKasarjian, and resigned in Toto. The party’s Central Council then appointed a newRegional Council that supported Kasarjian’s nomination.46 Hence, the Ramgavarsalong with a faction of the Hunchags joined Hariri without even negotiating theirpolitical agenda with him. They accepted that Dr. Djerejian and Kasarjian would beincluded on Hariri’s list, which consolidated candidates that were as far as possiblefromDashnak obligations to unite in a bloc. As far as the Dashnaks were concerned, itbecame evident that the party could only join on Hariri’s conditions, namely,renouncing the candidacy of an Armenian for the Protestant seat and abandoning thevery idea of an Armenian parliamentary bloc. According to Avedis Dakessian, theleader of the Ramgavar party, ‘had the Dashnaks abandoned their demand for theProtestant seat, Hariri would have included them in his list’.47 However, GaroHovanessian, a Dashnak CC member in 2000 and a prominent intellectual, arguedthat the main disagreement with Hariri was over maintaining the Armenian bloc, andthat ‘the issue of the Protestant seat was only a negotiating chip on the table to reach acompromise with Hariri’. Hovanessian further clarified: ‘the party was ready toabandon the Protestant seat in return for securing the Armenian bloc in parliament’.48

This may well have been the case, but ‘Hariri was unable to submit to Dashnakdemands because he was pressured by the Syrians not to do so’.49

Notwithstanding these complexities, Hariri was able to play the aspiringArmenian parties against each other because he preferred not to work with strongallies. His provocative policies evoked disappointment, and stimulated a strongreaction from the Dashnaks who categorically rejected his conditions, preferring toadopt go-it-alone policies that insisted Armenians chose their own representatives.They argued that Armenian MPs should not be subordinate to non-Armenianpoliticians because they would lose their Armenianness and whatever power theyhave to influence state policies. Negotiations to close these gaps between theDashnak and Hariri failed, but in order to prevent further divisions in the Armeniancommunity Catholicos Aram I of Cilicia urged Armenian candidates ‘to pursue theinterests of the Armenian community and Lebanon and keep away from pursuingpersonal and partisan interests’. He also expressed concern about the ‘unity of theArmenian community’ and cautioned that ‘the community should be kept tight andprotected from all those who had been trying to divide and weaken it’, with anindirect reference to Hariri.50

Both Dashnak and Hunchag parties mobilized the Armenian community toobtain the majority of the Armenian votes, but the Hoss government list in whichtheir candidates ran lost the 2000 elections. For the first time in decades the Dashnakcommunal hegemony was defeated as Hariri imposed his will on a large segment ofLebanese political circles. In addition to Kasarjian and Dr. Djerejian, SerjToursarkisian and Jean Oghasabian were elected as Armenian MPs in Beirut,which literally meant that their political allegiance was to Hariri rather than theparties to which they belonged.51 The Dashnaks who allied with the Phalange partyand Michel Murr, a strong Dashnak ally since the 1960s, won in Zahle and Metnconstituencies where Kassardji and Dr. Hovnanian secured seats.52 Although theDashnaks lost in Beirut, it would be wrong to conclude that the party’s dominantrole ceased within the Armenian community. Indeed, the disappointed electorate

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stood with its leadership because the party competed with Hariri for the sake ofArmenian communal interests. It must also be noted that Armenian parliamentar-ians who won in Beirut received rather limited votes, perhaps gathering a handful ofArmenian ballots, but were elected by non-Armenian votes, mainly Kurd andMuslim Sunni. Hence, one can argue that the Beirut Armenian MPs did notrepresent Armenian political opinion nor were they the real representatives of thecommunity. Indeed, Kasarjian, being elected by Lebanese-Kurdish votes, ignoredArmenian critics who accused him of selling himself to Hariri.

Further, the 2000 elections demonstrated the collective political weakness of theArmenian community, contrary to the 1970s when Armenian leaders displayedstronger unified political stances and reached useful compromises. With ineffectiverepresentatives, the Armenians also lost considerable political influence as thecommunity’s traditional leaders were in abeyance. In addition to the marginalizationof the community in parliament, Armenian political rights were also violated in theexecutive branch. For example, in October 2000 there was only one ArmenianMinister, Hovnanian, in the 30-member cabinet formed by Hariri. While that was aprofound violation of the Taif agreement that granted two ministerial posts to theArmenians in any cabinet comprised of 28 or more ministers to keep the ethnicbalance in the government, pro-Hariri MPs were impotent to secure the legal secondministerial portfolio. More generally, the 2000 elections demonstrated the weaknessof the political system in general and the limitations of the post-Taif power-sharingarrangements, to produce a fair representation.

Pro-Hariri Armenian MPs, who enjoyed a poor support base, did not protestagainst this violation and did not voice any doubts. Apparently, their positionstemmed from personal interests and loyalty to Hariri as they preferred to be alienatedfrom the Armenian community rather than antagonize the powerful premier. Strongpolitical protest came from the Dashnak CC that ordered Minister Hovnanian toboycott cabinet meetings until Armenian rights were restored. Likewise, religiousauthorities along with non-Armenian deputies also supported the Dashnak party’sposition, as many advocated fair representation of the community in the cabinet.53

Against growing pressure and to appease dissent, President Lahoud and PM Haririconceded on 29 November 2000 the constitutional right of the Armenian communityto secure a second Minister. Hence, Minister Hovnanian returned to his cabinet postwhile Armenians waited for a second appointment. It never came, and observersopined that Lahoud and Hariri were not in a hurry, perhaps to prevent pro-SyrianAlawis from making a similar demand for a portfolio. Though no linkages existedconstitutionally between the two positions, the Syrian military presence in Lebanoncarried a great deal of weight, and Armenians were once again victimized. Lahoud andHariri understood that satisfying Alawi demands would also mean satisfying Syria butthat was at a time when Hariri was still struggling with a conceptual framework thatdefined his ties with Damascus. Yet, as Syria gradually sought to undermine Hariri’spolitical standing and bolster Lahoud instead, the Armenian parties were once againconfronted with fresh political choices.

Hariri’s victory in the 2000 elections, and his reappointment as PM, meant that theSyrian leadership in Damascus was defied by a much stronger political actor not

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entirely under its control. Bashar al-Asad assumed the Syrian presidency on 10 June2000 a few days after his father’s death. Bashar adopted ‘the foreign policy script forLebanon to manage the Syrian occupation following the Israeli unilateralwithdrawal’ from southern Lebanon in 2000. He also ‘ensured that his country’sdominant role in Lebanese politics’ continued.54 After the 2000 Israeli withdrawal,anti-Syrian sentiment increased significantly, particularly among the Christians, asleading Maronite politicians wished to enhance Lebanese sovereignty and remainindependent from all foreign influences. Hariri, who apparently had become wearyof Syrian intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, sought new policies with the helpof the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as the United States and France, with whichcountries he had established good relations without Syria’s consent. Before long, hissearch for independence meant that he would antagonize Syria, which cherished itspresence in Lebanon.

Relations between Hariri and Bashar further deteriorated in the autumn of 2004when the Syrian leadership supported the extension of Lahoud’s term as President ofthe Republic in defiance of Lebanese constitutional provisions. Needless to say,opposition to this constitutional manoeuvre rallied anti-Syrian politicians, asinternational criticism of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon increased. However, atSyria’s urging, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution in September 2004and extended Lahoud’s term in office for three years. Syria’s stance prompted theUN Security Council to adopt resolution 1559 (2 September 2004), calling upon ‘allremaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon’, ‘disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias’ and support ‘the extension of the control of the government ofLebanon over all Lebanese territory’.55

Carsten Wieland, the author of Syria at Bay, argued that resolution 1559 was theresult of a divergence of American and French interests in Lebanon. France wasinterested in ‘Lebanese sovereignty and democratization’, which would also restoreits historical role in the country, whereas the United States ‘aimed at weakeningSyria and had no further stakes’ there.56 Irrespective of American and Frenchinterests, resolution 1559 triggered a dramatic sequence of events and divided theLebanese people between supporters of resolution 1559 and those who opposed it,on the basis that it facilitated western intervention in internal Lebanese affairs.Hariri, who was frustrated over Lahoud’s extension, submitted his resignation. Hewas replaced by Omar Karami, who formed a 19-member cabinet in which AlainTabourian (pro-Dashnak) became Minister of State.

After his resignation, Hariri planned to join the anti-Syrian opposition bloc inparliament. On 14 February 2005, as he was apparently to side with the opposition,Hariri was assassinated in the heart of Beirut.57 The anti-Syrian oppositionconsidered the Syrian regime and its Lebanese acolytes responsible for the murderand declared the independence intifada (uprising) or the Cedar revolution. A series ofspontaneous anti-Syrian demonstrations in the streets of Beirut forced Karami toresign on 28 February, while a carefully organized counterdemonstration was calledfor by Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, and pro-government forceschampioned Damascus. The 8 March gathering was allegedly attended by anestimated half a million people, whose leaders rejected resolution 1559, asdemonstrators vented their anger against the United States and France. They alsodemanded a transparent investigation to reveal and punish Hariri’s assassins while

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participants expressed gratitude to Syria for its long-standing political support andhelp in stabilizing Lebanon after 1976 along with its support of the resistance leadingup to 2000.58 These sentiments notwithstanding, the Syrian army had already startedits gradual withdrawal from Lebanon on 7 March, ostensibly to fulfil itsinternational obligations as enunciated in the Security Council’s resolution. Asanti-Syrian sentiments grew in Beirut an estimated 1 million Lebanese gathered inthe heart of the city on 14 March 2005, where politicians demanded the complete andfinal withdrawal of the Syrian army and the dismantlement of the latter’s intelligencenetwork in Lebanon. The participants in this rally also demanded internationalinvestigation of Hariri’s assassination and the unity of all Lebanese.59 The March 8and 14 Forces, as they came to be known, illustrated the sharp polarization of theLebanese over common domestic and foreign policy goals. Although the conflictbetween the two rival camps was at first political and not sectarian in nature, furtherdissent and hatred took precedence between the Muslim Shiia and Sunnicommunities. While the initial impact of these political developments on theArmenian parties was marginal, as they did not take a clear position towards theMarch 8 and 14 Forces, many Armenians participated in both rallies. True to theirestablished legacies, the Armenian parties vowed that internal disputes betweenLebanese parties could only be solved by dialogue and reconciliation.

To break the political impasses, the moderate Sunni politician from Tripoli, NajibMikati, formed a 14-member cabinet on 15 April, in which Tabourian was assignedthe telecommunications, youth and sport ministry. In fact, this new interimgovernment’s main task was to organize democratic and transparent elections, andend political turmoil. On 7 May, following Syria’s complete withdrawal on 25 Apriland on the verge of the parliamentary elections, General Michel Aoun, a formercommander of the army who would eventually become the leader of the FreePatriotic Movement (FPM), returned to Lebanon from his forced exile in France.Aoun had escaped in 1990, when Syria attacked and occupied the presidential palacein Baabda, and ousted their opponent.60 Aoun, who promised institutional reformsin the Lebanese system, declared that he returned ‘after the country had becomesovereign and independent’ and that ‘the victory achieved by the 14 March uprisingbelongs to the Lebanese people’.61 Aoun, who undoubtedly contributed to theindependence intifada and was known as a determined politician, would eventuallydisagree with the leadership of the March 14 Forces but, at the time, banked on thepublic’s anti-Syrian positions. Aoun’s disagreement apparently stemmed frompolitical issues related to leadership and representation in the Christian community.Like other parties, the Dashnak CC leaders welcomed Aoun and sought hiscooperation, ostensibly to enhance the Christian representation throughout theinstitutions of the state because the 2000 election law marginalized the Christiansand violated their political rights. In hindsight, leading religious figures MaronitePatriarch Sfeir, Catholicos Aram I and a large number of Christian politicians allcriticized the 2000 election law.

As parliamentary elections approached in 2005, a Dashnak delegation met SaadHariri, Rafiq Hariri’s son and the leader of the Future Movement, who would lead acoalition in the three constituencies of Beirut. Discussions with Saad Hariri focusedon a fair and genuine representation of the Armenian community based ondemocratic principles. However, he disregarded calls ‘for a more solidly supported

752 O. Geukjian

Armenian representation’, as the Dashnak party was left out of his coalition on theground that it did not participate in the ‘anti-Syrian and anti-Lahoud’ 14 Marchrally.62 Further, like his father, Saad Hariri too ‘did not favour the idea of aDashnak headed Armenian bloc in parliament’.63 On the other hand, the initialcooperation between the Dshnak party and General Aoun’s FPM quicklytransformed into political alliance. On 29 May both boycotted the elections in theBeirut constituencies to protest against alleged Christian marginalization. OnlyAoun, as Christian leader, strongly condemned the government’s unfair policy thatviolated Armenian political rights. Not surprisingly, the four incumbent pro-HaririMPs mentioned above won uncontested seats reserved to the Armenian community,which meant that both Hunchag and Ramgavar parties were now part of the 14March Forces and accepted their political agenda. Once again, this divisiontranslated into an isolation of the Dashnaks, even if the latter enjoyed greaterpopularity and influence among Armenians. Still, from an ideological perspective, itwas difficult to comprehend how the Hunchag Marxist-oriented party could joinpro-western and rightist groups, like the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces, of theMarch 14 coalition. From a Hunchag perspective,

Their participation in the Beirut elections contributed to the newly being builtstructure of Lebanon. They did not intend to support one Lebanese groupagainst the other. Their participation stemmed from their belief in a free,sovereign, democratic and united Lebanon.64

If the results were poor in Beirut, in the Metn elections on 12 June the Dashnakcandidate, Pakradounian, won due to the successful political alliance with Aoun andtraditional ally Murr. Similarly, in the Zahleh district, in Bekaa, the incumbent MPKassardji was re-elected with Dashnak support, but unlike Pakradounian, whobecame a member of Aoun’s Reform and Change parliamentary bloc, stayedneutral.

After the 2005 elections, Fouad Seniora, who vowed to continue the martyredHariri’s political agenda, formed a 24-member cabinet in which the pro-HaririOghasabian was assigned the portfolio of Minister of State for AdministrativeDevelopment. Aoun and the Dashnak party refused to join on the ground thatChristians were marginalized even if other political reasons precluded participation.When asked about the policy of the Dashnak party in the aftermath of the 2005elections, Pakradounian reiterated that ‘from then on we were part of the anti-government opposition’, which was unique in Lebanese-Armenian annals.65 For thefirst time since the late 1940s the Dashnak party adopted an anti-government stanceto express its displeasure, and to defend its interpretations of Armenian communalinterests. From a Dashnak perspective, the policy of the party to join the anti-government opposition stemmed from its conviction to protect the security ofLebanon and the Armenian community. ‘It is unacceptable’, said Pakradounian, ‘totrust other communities to make our political decisions.’ ‘Joining coalitions becameacceptable’, he stressed ‘provided that we do not lose our political freedom.’66 Theparty maintained the Armenian bloc with two deputies, a policy that was consideredcrucial for the protection of Armenian rights in the Lebanese confessional powersharing system. Contrary to their policy of positive neutrality that was adopted in

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 753

1975, the Armenian parties reached significant new levels, as Hunchags andRamgavars sided with the March 14 Forces while Dashnaks inclined towards theanti-government opposition coalition, mainly the March 8 Forces. In either case,preferences required that additional commitments be made as Armenians engagedwith internal Lebanese politics.

At the communal level, the unity of the Armenian parties was also shaken. Indeed,both Hunchags and Ramgavars failed to participate in the Dashnak 16 June 2005protest in the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hamoud, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan, thePrime Minister of Turkey, visited Lebanon.67 The rally was organized becauseTurkey refused to recognize as genocide the massacres committed by Ottomanauthorities against the Armenians during the First World War. Within this context,it is important to stress that the Lebanese parliament recognized the Armeniangenocide in May 2000 and expressed solidarity with the Armenian community.68

By February 2006, Aoun reached a ‘mutual understanding’ with Hizbullah, whichcreated political tensions and divisions within the Christian community. SeveralChristian leaders criticized Aoun as they considered Hizbullah to be a pro-Syrianand pro-Iranian military organization with a regional political agenda.69 Hence,Aoun’s agreement with Hizbullah was unacceptable to the Christians in general,although from a Hizbullah perspective it contributed to unity and mutualunderstandings between the Lebanese to rebuild the broken state.70 Though Syriaand Iran supported resistance movements like Hizbullah and Hamas against Israel,and stood with the Palestinians as long as a just peace was not reached between themand Israel, many felt that the Hizbullah-led Lebanese resistance had a separateobjective and should not be confused with regional ones. Contrary to manyChristian politicians who categorically refused to keep Lebanon a battlegroundbetween Hizbullah and Israel, Aoun, for his part, stressed that a commonunderstanding with Hizbullah over national issues – like the resistance in the southand the presidency – would better protect Christian interests. Equally important washis expectation that such support be reciprocated, to elect him President of theRepublic in September 2007. Where he erred was in underestimating domestictensions between Sunnis and the Shiia that threatened the domestic peace in thecountry. It is important to stress that after the 2005 Hariri assassination the twocommunities became even more estranged, with Sunnis blaming Hizbullah’s pro-Syrian policy as detrimental to Lebanon. The Sunni community arguably held Syriapolitically and morally accountable for Hariri’s assassination because its militaryand intelligence network had been in control of Lebanon for 30 years.

To ease inter-communal tensions and resolve the conflicting issues, on 2 March2006 Nabih Berri, the Speaker of parliament, invited representatives of leadingLebanese communities to engage in a national dialogue. Pakradounian, Dr.Djerejian and Kasarjian represented the Armenian community and joined thedebates that covered a slew of super-sensitive issues: the status of the Palestinianarms outside the refugees camps in Lebanon, the investigation into the 2005 Haririassassination, political reform, the stalemate over presidential elections, relationswith Syria, the return of Lebanese territory in the south still under Israeli occupation(the Shebaa Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills), and Hizbullah’s weapons. Notsurprisingly, these concerns caused further tensions, as national dialogue quicklybecame bogged down.71 Concerning the role of the Armenian parties in resolving

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these conflicting issues, Pakradounian argued that ‘their participation in the nationaldialogue was symbolic’ and that ‘the Armenian parties were unable to take a stancein regard to the conflicting domestic issues because they were politically divided anddid not adopt a common agenda’.72 In the event, dialogue sessions were suddenlyhalted with the 12 July 2006 start of the Hisbullah–Israel war as Lebanon entered aperiod of political uncertainty. The feared polarization between the March 8 and 14Forces solidified as all factions adopted incontrovertible positions.

The Armenian community strongly condemned the Israeli attacks againstLebanon and the Lebanese. The Dashnak CC provided shelter and food forthousands of internally displaced persons who were welcomed into the Armenianneighbourhood of Bourj Hamoud. Further, on 24 July representatives of the threeArmenian parties met and issued the following communique:

The Armenian political parties address the Armenian community of Lebanon torecognize its collective responsibility for protecting and supporting theirbrethren for the sake of rebuilding Lebanon and the common responsibilityand role of the Armenian nation.73

To illustrate pan-Armenian support to Lebanon, the Republic of Armenia sent 7.5tons of humanitarian aid that was delivered via Aleppo airport in Syria. A jointArmenian committee was also established that included all Armenian relieforganizations in Lebanon, to pinpoint the central role and collective responsibilityof the community towards Lebanon.74

On 11 August the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701 thatstopped the war, and called for the deployment of peacekeeping troops to southernLebanon to join the 1978 stationed United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Thelarger force known as UNIFIL II intended to upgrade UNIFIL I and monitor thecessation of hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel. UNIFIL II was also geared up toassist the Lebanese army to deploy in the south from where it was expelled byPalestinian, Syrian, Israeli and Hizbullah forces. Importantly, Resolution 1701provided strong international support to Lebanon’s government, to bolster and spreadits control over the country. In addition to a number ofWestern countries, Turkey alsopledged 681 peacekeeping soldiers to join a new ceiling of a 15,000-strong force.75

Armenians were alarmed by Turkey’s participation in UNIFIL II peacekeepingbecause Ankara denied genocide. To mobilize diplomatic support against thedeployment, a Dashnak delegation visited the Cypriot and French embassies inBeirut to voice their concerns. Documents clarifying military ties between Turkey andIsrael were submitted to both ambassadors to demonstrate that Turkey could not playa neutral peacekeeping role in Lebanon as long as it remained an Israeli ally.76

Further, at the domestic level, Dashnak officials communicated with parliamentarians,and asked the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to ‘reconsider the case’ and take apolitical stance.77 Within this context, Pakradounian reiterated that the Dashnak did‘not understand why the government was keen for the Turks to come’, while the pro-Hariri Kasarjian accepted the facts on the ground and declared: ‘Even though we areArmenian and we have protested, we are Lebanese after all. We did what we have todo but the Lebanese government has taken a decision and so has the internationalcommunity.’78

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 755

Kasarjian’s pragmatic and conciliatory stance was not an obstacle to preventinter-party cooperation. Indeed, on 24 August the three Armenian parties,irrespective of their political disagreements, adopted a unified stance and in acommunique rejected the presence of Turkish peacekeepers in Lebanon.79 To furtherexpress their frustrations and secure the sympathy of the Lebanese government theDashnak mobilized youth groups and organized mass rallies to pressure Beirut.Indeed, in addition to rallies that were held in Bourj Hamoud and in front of theUN’s Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) headquarters, amajor rally was held on 12 October 2006 at Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square, which honourssix Lebanese nationalists hanged by the Ottoman authorities during the First WorldWar. The demonstration attracted the attention of the international as well asTurkish media, perhaps because its location, Martyrs’ Square, conveyed a powerfulpolitical message. It certainly raised dormant concerns, including how Turkscommitted violence against the Lebanese in general, and why they were not qualifiedto join a peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. An overhead placard carried by aparticipant spoke volumes as it read: ‘placing Turkish troops in southern Lebanon isan insult to the collective memory of Lebanon’.80 It was important to stress that the12 October rally was organized after the Lebanese government, in early September,ignored Armenian demands to exclude Turkish peacekeepers.

The anti-Turkish position of the Armenian community stemmed from twoconcerns. Firstly, Armenians sought to attract the attention of the internationalcommunity to their cause – recognition of the genocide – and, secondly, as one of theseven major Lebanese communities, they refused to be marginalized by thegovernment. They peacefully reminded Beirut that, according to power-sharingagreements, major decisions taken by the government should not be against theinterests of the major Lebanese groups.

From a Turkish perspective, Turkey’s parliament approved sending soldiers tomonitor the ceasefire between Hizbullah and Israel in southern Lebanon despitepublic opposition in the streets of Ankara after ‘Erdogan vowed that troops will bewithdrawn if asked to disarm Hizbullah’.81 As NATO’s only Muslim state, Turkeywas careful neither to lose Israel’s friendship, nor antagonize its co-religionists.Ankara valued its close ties with several Arab states, and Israel saw its participationin the peacekeeping force ‘as a chance to raise its international profile as it strived tojoin the European Union and reassert Turkish influence in the region’.82 Towardsthat end, and to demonstrate goodwill in its role as a robust peacekeeper, in June2008 Turkey donated $20 million to the city of Sidon in southern Lebanon for theconstruction of a new hospital and rehabilitation centre specialized in treatingpatients suffering from burns and war injuries. Serdar Kilic, the Turkish ambassadorto Lebanon, described the donation as a ‘gift from the Turkish government whichsought to help the Lebanese people in any way possible’.83

As alluded to above, the 2006 Hizbullah–Israel war interrupted the nationaldialogue, but Speaker Berri rekindled the exercise on 6 November 2006. Once againparticipants resumed their consultations, all to prevent fresh inter-communalviolence. Once again, these meetings failed to establish a national unity governmentto address all the contested issues, and on 11 November the five Shiia Ministersrepresenting both Hizbullah and Berri’s Amal Movement resigned under the pretextthat they were not given enough time to study a draft resolution which proposed to

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establish an international tribunal to investigate and try the Hariri assassination.These resignations did not prevent the government from ratifying the internationaltribunal and sending it to the UN. Hence, the anti-government opposition whichAoun’s FPM and the Dashnak had already joined considered the government’sdecisions illegitimate. It was an epochal declaration as anti-government elements setup a mass rally in Riad el-Solh Square in downtown Beirut that was quicklytransformed into a permanent sit-in complete with fully equipped tents.84

The Dashnak participated in the sit-in and vowed not to leave Riad el-Solh Squareuntil Armenian demands of fair representation were fulfilled. The anti-governmentopposition also vowed not to end the sit-in until the formation of a national unitygovernment that would protect the interests of the Lebanese communities. Sadly, thedaily demonstrations that followed paralyzed the country, eroded whatever economywas left, and plunged Lebanon into an 18-month-long political crisis. Dejected andimmobilized, both sides welcomed a Qatari mediation, which culminated in a freshaccord in Doha on 21 May 2008.

Divisionswithin theChristian community in general and theArmenians in particularprevented consensus in two by-elections to replace assassinated MPsWalid Edo of theFuture Movement and Pierre Gemayel, son of Amin Gemayel. Both MPs belonged tothe March 14 Forces. By-elections were held on 5 August 2007 and in the Metnstronghold MP Michel Murr and the Dashnak party supported the FPM-affiliatedReform and Change parliamentary bloc’s candidate Camille Khoury against AminGemayel, the leader of the Phalange party and a former President of the Republic.Gemayel’s nomination could be traced to the patriarchal nature of leadership inLebanese politics as family-run fiefs pass along public posts among family members.With Murr’s significant support, the FPM candidate secured a substantial number ofroughly 32,000 Armenian voters out of the 162,950 registered voters in the Metnelectorate.85 In his election campaigns and in order to mobilize thousands of ChristiansupportersGemayel built on anti-Syrian feelings and declared that the ‘Metn will neverbe a suburb of Damascus’, warning that ‘a vote’ for Aoun’s candidate, Khoury, ‘was avote for the return of Syrian tutelage’.86 Friction between Gemayel and Aoun, twoMaronite leaders, increased after Aoun rejected a compromise and decided that hisDashnak allies, with Murr’s formidable machine, would jointly contest the Metn seat.A full mobilization ensued. Tension erupted into sporadic clashes in Bourj Hamoudbetween Amin Gemayel supporters and Aoun’s sympathizers, though Dashnaksdenied that ‘clashes of a political nature’ occurred in the Armenian neighbourhood.87

The Dashnak party and MP Murr decided to support Khoury when hope for aconsensus candidate between Maronite politicians was lost. Being on the side of theanti-government opposition the Dashnak had no choice but to support Khourybecause the party’s alliance with Murr and the FPM secured the 2005 victory(limited as it was). Further, the Dashnak considered that ‘Aoun gave the Armenianstheir rights whereas Rafiq Hariri took their rights out of their hands’.88 In hisaddress to a FPM rally on 4 August 2007 Pakradounian justified the preference bystressing that ‘Armenians were here because they were free and faithful and rejectedmarginalization, oppression and injustice’.89 It was apparent from Pakradounian’sstatement that the Dashnak were linking these elections with the results of previouselections, all of which stemmed from the 2000 electoral law that denied the partyspecific manoeuvring capabilities.

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In the Beirut second constituency, March 14 candidate Mohammad al-Amin Itaniwon with 22,988 votes out of 27,100 cast ballots.90 His victory was considered aconfirmation of parliamentary majority leader MP Saad Hariri’s influence in thedistrict rather than an election battle between the government and oppositioncoalition, as in the Metn by-election. Nevertheless, Auon considered CamilleKhoury’s victory with 39,534 votes over Amin Gemayel who got 39,116 votes ‘anational victory’ by the anti-government opposition.91 Gemayel and his supportersblamed the loss on Armenians as the Dashnak immersed itself in an intra-Maronitestruggle. In a moment of utter frustration, Gemayel lost his temper, and accused theDashnak of committing irregularities by rigging votes at the polling stations in BourjHamoud. From Gemayel’s perspective, Khoury won by a margin of 418 Armenianvotes, while receiving about 34 per cent of Maronite votes. Hence, he reasoned,Khoury could not be considered a representative of the Metn Maronites. Evidently,Gemayel gathered 56.3 per cent of the Maronite votes, and gained in most of theMetn, except in the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hamoud. It seemed that about 7,000of 9,000 Armenians there voted for Khoury.92 Although the Dashnak, for the firsttime, mobilized less than 80 per cent of Armenian voters, 27.9 per cent of eligiblevoters went to the polls compared to 26 per cent in 2000. It is also important tounderscore that 7 or 8 per cent of Dashnak supporters and independent Armeniansvoted for Gemayel and did not follow party lines.93 Most of these Dashnaksupporters were mobilized by the FLAM, the separatist organization created in May2007 by former Dashnak party members who had become estranged over politicaldisagreements regarding leadership positions. The FLAM, headed by formerLebanese Army General Nareg Aprahamian, was financed and supported by SaadHariri’s Future Movement. It sided with the March 14 Forces in the 2007 by-elections and while it established headquarters in Bourj Hamoud, its radioprogrammes in Armenian were broadcast from a station in west Beirut. TheDashnak ignored FLAM’s potential political threat, and minimized its importanceas an independent group, concluding that it was unlikely that the modest radiostation would seriously affect the 2009 elections. FLAM recently opened anotheroffice in Anjar, an Armenian village in the Bekaa, to mobilize support for the March14 Forces and ‘articulate Armenian interests that differ from Dashnak policies’.94

FLAM did not enjoy enough support in the Armenian community. Indeed, in agathering organized by the latter, on 1 February 2009, to protest against violencecommitted by Dashnak members against a founding member of the organization,only 50 followers attended.95

The 2007 Metn by-election had a negative impact on the Christians who supportedAmin Gemayel as it unleashed a series of criticisms. Indeed, the Armenian supportfor the FPM prompted opportunistic politician Gabriel Murr (a brother of MichelMurr), to label the Armenians as intruders, not Christians and not Lebanese. Hequestioned their Lebanese identity and urged Armenians to reform the Dashnak and‘change the way it dealt with elections’.96 In the multi-ethnic Lebanese societyGabriel Murr apparently wanted to appeal to communal and ethnic impulses thatwere often an effective way of mobilizing support and winning elections. Thoughsuch statements illustrated anger, they also displayed irrationality, racism andmanifestations of hatred towards the Armenian community. From a Dashnakperspective, Gabriel Murr’s statements ‘threaten[ed] the civil peace and risk[ed]

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instigating sectarian strife’ between Lebanese communities.97 Although bothGemayel and Murr explained that their problem was not with the Armeniancommunity per se, but with the leadership of the Dashnak, their statements angeredand disappointed many Armenians. Gemayel visited the Armenian Catholicos AramI in the latter’s Bikfaya Summer residence, ironically in Gemayel’s ancestral fiefdom,and stressed ‘his firm political, economic, social and cultural bonds with theArmenian community’, concluding that the community was ‘dear to his heart’.98

Still, as Gemayel assured Armenians of their long and shared alliance, he insistedthat future ties with the Dashnak would hinge on more democratic choices.

Some neutral Armenians also criticized the participation of the Dashnak in the2007 by-elections on the side of the anti-government opposition. According tocritics, ‘The shortsighted Dashnak leadership’ could have avoided taking sides withAoun’s FPM and Hizbullah against Gemayel at a very critical moment of Lebanesehistory when a number of significant Christian politicians, like Gemayel’s son, wereassassinated.99 Contrary to the policy of positive neutrality adopted in the 1970s, theunwise strategy of the Dashnak increased feelings of hatred and inspired hostilityagainst the Armenian community. The Armenians could avoid taking sides withLebanese parties by adopting a neutral policy.

Gemayel’s remarks were dwelt on by Speaker Berri and Ghaleb Abou Zeinab,Hizbullah politburo member, as allegedly demonstrating the Phalange party’sinherent racism. Berri stressed that sectarian speech was shameful and represented athreat to Lebanon’s future, confirming at the same time that ‘Armenians in Lebanondid not need to prove their nationalist credentials and their firm roots in thiscountry’.100 Abou Zeinab, for his part, reiterated that ‘no one had the right toquestion the national identity of any Lebanese’, indicating that Armenians belongedin and were loyalty to Lebanon.101 Hizbullah also rejected political racism againstthe Armenians and advocated instead national unity between all Lebanese sects. Inrelation to the adopted policy of the Armenians in the Metn by-election, Hizbullahstressed:

The Armenians deserve the right to make their own political choices becausethey are not an isolated group as some would like to portray them to be. Everypolitical party has the right to choose a political path, this is democracy.102

The strength of the Dashnak coalitions with the FPM and Michel Murr provedwould be tested in upcoming elections. Still, party officials were quick to point outthat the coalition with the FPM was not ‘part of a broader battle against the March14 Forces and was unrelated to the Beirut polls’ as Hovig Mekhitarian, the generalsecretary of the Dashnak, declared.103 Contrary to his anti-Armenian declarations,Gemayel should have recognized that his assassinated son, Pierre, was elected in2005 with Armenian votes. Likewise, the 2007 Metn by-election could also beconsidered a political message to Saad Hariri and the March 14 Forces, ostensibly toupdate unjust rules that froze the Dashnak out of the previous victories. Therefore,while it may be wrong to argue, as many Christian politicians and commentatorshave, that the Dashnaks committed a fatal mistake, Armenians were far morevaluable voters than heretofore assumed. It remained to be determined whethersiding with the Syrian-backed anti-government opposition, led by Hizbullah and the

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 759

Amal Movement in the 2007 by-elections, lost the Armenian neutrality, even if partyofficials were persuaded that the role of the community had improved sharply. Therewas an assumption that Maronites would need Armenian votes at every electionhenceforth and that, consequently, Armenian political parties would demandsupport in exchange for political and socio-economic privileges. Arguably, theopposite was also accurate, especially with dwindling demographics.

As Lebanon emerged from its opposition-induced 2008 crisis, the Armeniancommunity played a constructive role in the Qatari mediation which culminated inthe May 2008 Doha Accord. This agreement ended an 18-month feud that unfoldedinto deadly sectarian fighting on 7 May 2008 when Hizbullah and Amal militiamenopened fire on fellow Lebanese. Although Armenian representatives participated inthe Doha negotiations, the credit for restoring Armenian political rights should beattributed to both the Dashnak MP Pakradounian and Aoun, who negotiatedskilfully with the representatives of the March 14 Forces and allocated five Christianseats in Beirut’s first constituency, where the Armenian vote may be a deciding factorin the 2009 elections.104 According to voter registers there are 15,059 Orthodox and4,837 Catholic Armenian voters in the Beirut first constituency.105 In Doha,Pakradounian, who was chosen as a member of the election law drafting committee,emphasized the importance of the new electoral law that enabled Armenians to befairly represented in parliament. The Dashnak attributed Pakradounian’s success tothe small Armenian bloc to illustrate the effectiveness of having a bloc in parliament.Contrary to the 2005 divisions, Beirut was divided into three new constituencies thatwould enable Christians in general and Armenians in particular to elect their owngenuine representatives.106 In addition, in order to ease the political tension andfierce sectarian rivalries between the Lebanese parties in the second constituency ofBeirut, the participants of the Doha Accord agreed to concede to the FutureMovement one Sunni and one Armenian MP, to Hizbullah one Shiia MP and to theDashnak one Armenian MP.107 Consequently, pro-Hariri Sebouh Kalpakian andpro-Dashnak Arthur Nazarian won the Armenian seats in this constituency prior tothe 2009 June elections. From a Dashnak perspective, the party’s policy tocompromise one of the two Armenian seats in the Beirut second constituencypreserved the ‘unity of Beirut’ and ‘served the national interests of Lebanon’.108 AtDoha, a new electoral law was also adopted, based on the 1960 qada (smaller district)preference for better representation.109 As a corollary to the agreement, Doha alsofacilitated the election of a new president, Michel Suleiman, on 25 May 2008. Thiswas followed by the formation of a 30-member national unity government in whichthe Armenian community was represented by two Ministers, pro-DashnakTabourian and the pro-Hariri Oghassabian.

As the date of the June 2009 elections approached, the tension between FLAM andthe Dashnak escalated. On 27 January 2009 a founding member of FLAM, HragOkian was shot by a Dashnak gunman, under the pretext of provocative anti-Dashnakstatements, and taken to hospital. FLAM and the Hunchag and Ramhavar partiescondemned the violent act that aimed to ‘suppress freedom of expression and politicalopinion’.110 Although the incident caused fears among many Armenians that intra-communal violence, similar to that of 1958, could be triggered, all the parties practisedself-control and restraint. FLAM also advocated dialogue rather than violencebetween the Armenian parties to address their political differences peacefully.111

760 O. Geukjian

Participation of the anti-government opposition in the newly formed national unitygovernment after the Doha agreement lessened political tensions in the country butdid not end major disagreements over several issues, including Hizbullah’s illegalweapons. In the new cabinet, a cohabitation phenomenon prevailed until the nextparliamentary elections in June 2009, when a new power sharing government maywell be established. Currently, in addition to FLAM, the Hunchag and Ramgavarparties continue their alliances with the Future Movement and March 14 Forceswhereas the Dashnak that joined Aoun’s Reform and Change bloc sides with theopposition. Yet, contrary to its 1992 stance, refusing to support Rashid Solh’sgovernment, the Ramgavar party aligned with the Future Movement after 2000,which effectively meant that the Armenian political parties abandoned their 1975policy of positive neutrality and participated actively in Lebanese politics. Accordingto Karardjian ‘the party owed its access in parliament to R. Hariri’. Kasardjian alsostressed that ‘the Ramgavar party was in permanent political alliance with theFuture Movement and the March 14 Forces’ to prove that ‘Armenian society coulddevelop by following free and liberal principles’.112 A similar stance was alsoillustrated by Oghasabian, who wished the March 14 Forces to win the June electionsand that ‘his nomination to one of the Armenian seats in Beirut would be determinedby S. Hariri’.113 The above statements indicate that the Armenian parties abandonedtheir least-interference policy in Lebanese internal issues, apparently being aware oflooming dangers that would alienate them from certain political groups. On theother hand, after the Taif accord and from 1996, the Armenian bloc became smalleras a representative from each of the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties supported theFuture Movement and won seats in parliament. From their perspective, joiningHariri’s Future Movement did not threaten the Armenian community and was ‘thebest means to rescue Lebanon from its crisis’.114 From a Dashnak perspective,Pakradounian reiterated that during the civil war the Armenian community adopteda policy of positive neutrality, and refused to take sides. In the post-Taif peacefulperiod, however, ‘neutrality had not been a necessity’ because ‘the Dashnak partyhad its viewpoint in relation to Lebanese politics’, he declared. ‘We, i.e. theDashnaks, were committed to our choices and alliances’, he stressed, so thatLebanon and the Armenians would not be threatened.’115 From both perspectives itis reasonable to assume that irrespective of their political choices, the Armenianparties acknowledged that when their policies and alliances would threaten thesecurity of the Armenian community they were ready to abandon their allies. Hence,it seemed that neutrality was a political choice about a collective future, and tomaintain peaceful relations Armenian leaders were vigilant.

A united Armenian position and political agenda was unlikely to emerge from theinter-party meetings initiated by party leaderships as long as they were entrenched innon-Armenian blocs. The Armenian parties, irrespective of their alliances, supportedthe unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, because they feltprotected by the rule of law and the state.

Still, after the Metn by-election and the Doha agreement, and in light of thepositions of some influential figures in the upper echelons of the Phalange party andthe Lebanese Forces, the Armenian parties face a number of important challenges.Firstly, to adopt a united political agenda that would support Christian politicalrights because only in that context would the Armenians be able to prevent

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 761

infringements of their rights and privileges. Provided that Christians within theMarch 14 Forces assure the Armenians that they would respect their freedom,democratic choices, political rights and participation in the decision-making process.In addition, Dashnak leaders insist that other Christian parties should acknowledgeits role within the Armenian community rather than criticizing it and holding itresponsible for political failures and losses in general elections but praising it whenthey achieved victory. Presumably, if Christian parties within the March 14 Forcesgained the trust of the Armenian community; the Armenian political parties couldwell adopt a neutral policy, as they did in 1975. This would allow them to bridgedifferences between the Lebanese groups by dialogue to encourage domestictranquillity.

Secondly, the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties may have to acknowledge that therights of the Armenian community would not be protected and promoted withoutthe creation of a strong Armenian bloc. Although the pro-Hariri Oghasabianacknowledged the importance of an Armenian bloc, he related its creation to ‘clearpolitical principles’ that should be acceptable to the Armenian parties withoutclarifying the nature of those principles.116 Within this context, the Dashnakdeclared that the aim of running the June 2009 elections would be the ‘creation of theArmenian bloc’.117 ‘If we succeed in fulfilling our goal’, Pakradounian declared, ‘wewill call the Armenian bloc the 22 November independence bloc’, attributing itsymbolism from Lebanon’s independence day in November 1943 to illustrateArmenians’ commitment to national unity, peace and security.118 Pakradounian alsostressed that the creation of this bloc did not prevent the Armenian parties frommaintaining their alliances.119 However, only by voting as a bloc can the Armeniaparties maintain control and influence in the policy process, which promotessectarianism and communal rights. From a Dashnak perspective, FLAM, Hunchagand Ramgavar parties that remained subordinated to Saad Hariri’s political agendawould be unable to defend Armenian rights. However, Dashnak subordination toHizbullah and the Aoun-led opposition did not promise that the party would be ableto distance itself from controversial domestic policy not in favour of the Armenians.Hence, the Armenian parties may like to reconsider their political choices andcooperate after the June 2009 general elections to enhance Armenian privileges. Therecent division within the Ramgavar party between Kasarjian’s supporters and anopposition group headed by Nar Khachadourian did not inspire optimism. Contraryto Kasarjian’s faction, Khachadourian supported the creation of an Armenian blocthat would represent all the Armenian parties.120 The recent position of theRamgavar party, declared by Kasarjian in December 2008, ‘to remain committedand loyal to the political agenda of martyr Rafiq Hariri whose support enabled theparty to win a seat in parliament’, did not inspire optimism.121 In addition, theHunchag party’s policy to coordinate with the Future Movement hinderedthe prospects of compromise with the Dashnaks. Within this context, the leader ofthe Hunchag party, Sarkis Chapoutian, who failed to prevent Dr. Djerejian’s factionfrom nominating the pro-Hariri Sebouh Kalpakian to the June elections, resignedfrom his post and Dr. Mardig Jamgotchian was elected leader.122 Similarly, thearmed clash on 27 January 2009 in Bourj Hamoud between some supporters of theDashnak party and FLAM demonstrated intolerance and deep political divisionsbetween the Armenians.123 Contrary to the Dashnaks, the Hunchags and

762 O. Geukjian

Ramgavars seemed weak, internally fragmented and unable to make their owndecisions independently of the March 14 Forces.

On the other hand, being the strongest Armenian party, it was likely that theDashnaks would be called upon to play a pivotal role, as they did in 1975, to addressthe controversies between the Armenian parties by giving the Hunchags andRamgavars a greater say in Armenian communal concerns. In this way the Dashnakin cooperation with the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties may prevent themarginalization of the Armenian community and negotiate Armenian rights withthe various Lebanese parties from a strong position. The 1 December 2008 visit ofrepresentatives of the Dashnak CC to Syria, and their meeting with President Basharal-Asad apparently demonstrates the leading role of the party at the start of the 2009election campaign.124 In addition, the visits of party officials in January 2009 to theUSA and Canada to mobilize the Lebanese Armenian diaspora to visit Lebanon andparticipate in the June 2009 elections demonstrated the ability of the party to wage abroad international campaign that aimed to protect the rights of the Armenians ofLebanon.125 From Pakradounian’s statement, that ‘the Dashnak party would try tocreate a strong Armenian bloc in 2009’,126 one may reasonably assume that the partystarted to mobilize support to its political agenda given the influence of the Syrianson their allies in Lebanon. The results of the upcoming elections may well determinewhether the ability of the Dashnak to form coalition lists in the Beirut constituencies,the Metn and the Bekaa will be successful. Further, the Dashnak party’s Lebanesepolicy was carefully engineered so as not to support the anti-Syrian groups of theMarch 14 Forces in order not to endanger the interests of the Armenians in Syria,which enjoyed the trust and support of the regime. If party candidates succeed asthey did until 1972, the Dashnak would resume its traditional leading role, but if notthe party might lose political capital.

To further strengthen its negotiating position and shape policy, the Dashnak,despite its poor relations with the Phalange party since 2007, met with SamiGemayel, younger son of Amin Gemayel, and discussed the prospects of cooperationin the Metn and Beirut. To create a strong Armenian bloc the Dashnak embarked onan open door and pragmatic policy with some politicians of the March 14 Forces butwithout antagonizing its strategic ally Aoun. The party needed the support of thePhalange in Beirut and probably in the Bekaa to guarantee victory to its candidates.Although there was no progress in the negotiations with the Dashnaks, SamiGemayel tried to mend fences with the party because ‘what united the two parties’,he declared, ‘was big and was related to a history of cooperation, common valuesand respect of pluralism in Lebanon’. Hence Gemayel stressed that ‘a strategicalliance with the Dashnak should be established’, because the Phalange was moreconcerned to improve their relations with the Armenians than any other party inLebanon.127 Concerning the Future Movement, the mediation of Michel Murrmanaged to bring Mekhitarian and Saad Hariri together on 10 March 2009 toaddress the issue of Armenian representation in the Beirut constituencies.128 Bothleaders tried to find common ground between their parties to resume cooperationover policy programmes, as they did from 1992 to 1996. The policy of the Dashnakto establish the Armenian bloc and enhance Armenian political rights required thatthe Dashnak leadership would open communication channels with the FutureMovement regardless of Rafik Hariri’s policy of marginalization of the Armenian

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 763

community. Likewise, Saad Hariri should also recognize that by excluding theDashnaks from his domestic policy and by only supporting the FLAM and theHunchag and Ramgavar parties he could not satisfy Armenian demands and enjoythe full support of the community in the future. In addition to its alliance with theopposition, if the Dashnak party’s pragmatic policy succeeds with the March 14Forces, it could create an Armenian bloc comprised of four or five MPs.

In addition to the two challenges alluded to above, a third challenge thatconfronted the Armenian parties was to play a more active role in Lebanesepolitics by further joining state institutions like the army, the bureaucracy and thepolice to work through those structures to enhance Armenian privileges. Ratherthan ask for more representatives and posts from what they were accorded earlier,the parties may want to exercise political pressure on key decision makers in thegovernment to fill vacant Armenian posts, to improve and protect the community’sidentity and political and socio-economic rights. The legacy of the genocide andthe fear of losing their Armenian identity should not become obstacles to furtherintegration into Lebanese society, especially if Armenian votes add decisive value,particularly within Christian constituencies. Armenians were able to protect theiridentity and culture, established good relations with all the groups anddemonstrated loyalty to the state of Lebanon. Although the Armenian partieswere too far apart on policy issues due to their alliances, nothing would preventthem, in the post-election period, from revising their choices to lessen thepolarization against the community. Presumably, adopting a policy of positiveneutrality could better serve Armenian communal interests and rebuild thedamaged bridges with the various Lebanese groups.

Currently, unlike the policy of FLAM, Hunchag and Ramgavar parties whichdeclared their alliances with the March 14 Forces, the Dashnak party was trying toreach pre-election coalitions with Michel Murr, the Phalange and Saad Hariri’sFuture Movement to lessen the polarization against the Armenians. This may nothappen in the foreseeable future. The Dashnak confirmed that it would keep itspolitical alliance with Aoun and also vote for Murr in the Metn provided that hewould refrain from including in his coalition list with the Phalange an Armeniancandidate from the ruling majority.129 In fact, the Dashnaks successfullymanoeuvred and Pakradounian was uncontested in his election to the Metn.

Notes

1. H. Bedoyan, ‘The Policies Pursued by the Armenian Political Leadership in Lebanese Internal Politics

(1943–1970)’, Panorama, 7th year, No.30 (1983), p.32. Also see A. Boudjikanian, ‘Les Armeniens aux

Etats Unis’, Hannon, Vol.XXI (1989–92), pp.51–6.

2. Bedoyan, ‘The Policies Pursued’, p.32.

3. H. Bedoyan, ‘The Social, Political and Religious Structure of the Armenian Community in Lebanon’,

The Armenian Review, Vol.XXXII (June 1979), p.120.

4. N. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria, Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the

State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), p.55.

5. Bedoyan, ‘The Social, Political’, p.120.

6. Bedoyan, ‘The Policies Pursued’, p. 38.

7. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.56.

8. Ibid., p.57.

9. Bedoyan, ‘The Social, Political’, p.127.

764 O. Geukjian

10. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.61.

11. Ibid., p.152.

12. V. Jerejian, Hayoutian Yev Lipanani Hamar [For Armenians and Lebanon] (Beirut: Aztag

publications, 2000), p.28.

13. Personal interview with B. Aghbashian, 7 July 2005.

14. See O. Geukjian, ‘The Policy of Positive Neutrality of the Armenian Political Parties in Lebanon

During the Civil War, 1975–90: A Critical Analysis’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.43, No.1 (Jan.

2007), pp.65–73.

15. Interview with K. Babikian, in S.H. Varjabedian, Hayere Lipanani Metch [Armenians in Lebanon],

Vol.4 (USA: Rosekeer Press, 1983), pp.426–7.

16. Ibid., pp.426–7.

17. Aztag, 23 Oct. 1975, p.1.

18. The Bekerki Committee was comprised of Rene Mouawad, Michel Saseen, Nasri Al-Maalouf,

Boutros Harb, George Saadeh and Khatchig Babikian.

19. R. Avsharian, ‘The Taif Accord and the Armenians of Lebanon’, paper presented at a conference

organized by Haigazian University on ‘The Armenians of Lebanon: Past and Present’, Beirut, 12–15

Sept. 2005.

20. Ibid.

21. Personal interview with MP H. Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008.

22. Quoted in Aztag Newsletter, No.1, Jan. 2009, p.7.

23. Z. Messerlian, ‘Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections during the Presidency

of Elias Hraoui (1989–1998), Part I’, Haigazian Armenological Review, Vol.27 (2007), p.314.

24. Ibid., p.318.

25. Ibid., p.331. In 1992, in addition to Yeghia Djerejian, Khatchig Babikian, Souren Khanamirian,

Hagop Joukhadarian (Arm. Catholic) and Dr. Nourijan Demirdjian (Protestant) were elected in

Beirut.

26. Messerlian, ‘Armenian Participation, Part I’, pp.326–7.

27. Personal interview with K. Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008.

28. Messerlian, ‘Armenian Participation, Part I’, p.327.

29. Taif agreement and documents provided by the Armenian parliamentarians’ office in Bourj Hamoud.

30. Ibid.

31. Aztag, special issue, Jan. 1994, p.92.

32. Ibid.

33. K. Fighali, Alintikhabat Alniabiah Al-Lubnania 2005: Mouashirat Ouanataej [Lebanese Parliamentary

Elections 2005: Implications and Results] (Lebanon: Mukhtarat, 2005), pp.17–21.

34. Z. Messerlian, ‘Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections during the Presidency

of Elias Hraoui (1989–1998), Part II’, Haigazian Armenological Review, Vol.28 (2008), pp.339–47.

35. Ibid., p.345.

36. Ibid., pp.341–47.

37. P. Salem, ‘The Future of Lebanon’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.6 (2006), p.21.

38. Personal interview with Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 1999, pp.42–3.

42. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, pp.42–3.

43. Ibid., p.43.

44. Personal interview with H. Havatian, 9 Sept. 2008.

45. Al-akhbar, 5 March 2009, p.3. From a Hunchag perspective, the Dashnaks may represent 60% of the

Armenians but not 85%.

46. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, p.44.

47. Personal interview with A. Dakessian, 19 Nov. 2008.

48. Personal interview with G. Hovanessian, 10 Jan. 2009.

49. Personal interview with A. Dakessian, 19 Nov. 2008.

50. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, p.44.

51. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, pp.188–9. It is important to note that the Dashnak–Hunchak

list called the ‘Armenian United Front’ that lost the elections was comprised of Apraham Dedeyan

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 765

(Arm. Evang.), Mihran Seferian (Hunchag), Hagop Pakradounian (Dashnak), Arthur Nazarian

(AGBU), and Stephan Abajian (Arm. Catholic).

52. Interview with H. Pakradounian, Monday Morning, 20 Aug. 2007.

53. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, pp.48–9.

54. F. Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005),

p.107.

55. Quoted in ibid., pp.213–14.

56. C. Wieland, Syria at Bay, Secularism, Islamism and Pax Americana (London: Hurst and Company,

2006), p.131.

57. Ibid., p.131.

58. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.231–2.

59. Ararat, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.34–5.

60. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.233–4. In 1990 Aoun had been heading the interim military

government which rejected to recognize the Taif agreement and refused to leave the Baabda palace

where he resided so that the newly elected President, Elias Hraoui, would not take his seat.

61. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, p.235.

62. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.188. Commenting on Armenian representation, on 15 May

2005 the AFP said that the Dashnak party, which enjoys broad Armenian popular support, was left

out of Saad Hariri’s coalition.

63. Personal interview with H. Havatian, 7 Oct. 2008.

64. Ararat, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, p.40.

65. Interview with Hagop Pakradounian, Monday Morning, 20 Aug. 2007.

66. Aztag Newsletter, No.1, Jan 2009, p.7.

67. Personal interview with Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008. Also, see Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006,

p.274.

68. I. Azzi, ‘Armenians Protest Turkish UNIFIL Role’, The Daily Star, 13 Oct. 2006, p.2.

69. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, pp.202–3.

70. An-nahar, 19 Feb. 2009, p.13.

71. Editorial, The Daily Star, 15 Aug. 2006, p.1.

72. Personal interview with Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008.

73. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, pp.217–18.

74. Ibid., p.218.

75. The Daily Star, 10 July 2007, p.4.

76. ‘Turks lean towards sending troops for UNIFIL’, The Daily Star, 29 Aug. 2006, p.5.

77. Azzi, ‘Armenians Protest’, p.2.

78. ‘Turkish peacekeepers arrive for mission in south’, The Daily Star, 21 Oct. 2006, p.2.

79. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, p.260.

80. Azzi, ‘Armenians Protest’, p.2. In this context, a statement that circulated at the protest read: ‘Any

participant force in the UNIFIL should be welcomed by the whole Lebanese Society . . . Turkey

continues to lead a hostile foreign policy in the region, especially with its immediate neighbors and

still occupies northern Cyprus, continues to blockade Armenia, and refuses to recognize and

apologize for the 1915 Armenian genocide it has perpetrated.’ See same source, p.2.

81. The Daily Star, 7 Oct. 2006, p.2.

82. The Daily Star, 6 Oct. 2006, p.2.

83. M. Zaatari, ‘Turkey donates 20$ million for Sidon hospital’, The Daily Star, 27 June 2008, p.3.

84. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, p.198.

85. The Daily Star, 26 July 2007, p.2.

86. The Daily Star, 4 Aug. 2007, p.1.

87. The Daily Star, 3 Aug. 2007, p.1.

88. Quoted in The Daily Star, 7 March 2009, p.2.

89. Ibid.

90. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.1.

91. An-nahar, 7 Aug. 2007, pp.1–2.

92. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.1.

93. The Daily Star, 10 Aug. 2007, p.3.

94. As-safir, 5 March 2009, p.3.

766 O. Geukjian

95. Al-Mustakbal, 2 Feb. 2009, p.8.

96. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.3.

97. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.3. In relation to the statements of G. Murr, an Armenian resident in

Bourj Hamoud said that ‘we feel that the Maronites do not like us, they called us intruders, like we

are not Christians just because we are a different sect. Aoun does not look at people like Sunni,

Shiite, Maronite, he is patriotic.’ Ibid.

98. H.M. Bathish, ‘Gemayel tries to make peace with the Armenians’, The Daily Star, 9 Aug. 2007, p.1.

99. Quoted in the Newsletter published by FLAM, 3 Aug. 2007, p.19.

100. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.1.

101. Bathish, ‘Gemayel Tries’, p.1.

102. Ibid.

103. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.3.

104. An-nahar, 22 May 2008, pp.1 and 12. The first constituency of Beirut includes the areas of Ashrafieh,

Rmeil and Saifeh. The five seats in this constituency are distributed as follows: one Armenian

Orthodox, one Armenian Catholic, one Maronite, one Catholic and one Orthodox.

105. Alakhbar, 5 March 2009, p.3.

106. The first constituency includes: Achrafieh, Rmeil and Saifi. The second constituency includes:

Bashoura, Medawar and Marfaa. The third constituency includes: Mina al-Hosn, Ain al-Mreiseh,

Mazraa, Mosseitbeh, Ras Beirut, Zokaka al-Blat.

107. Aztag, 9 Feb. 2009, pp.1 and 10.

108. Aztag, 6 Feb. 2009, p.2.

109. For details about the new electoral law ratified by the Lebanese parliament on 29 Sept. 2008, see

‘2009 Parliamentary Elections: Law, Constituencies and Electors on Board and Let the Race Begin’,

The Monthly, No.76 (Nov. 2008), pp.4–13. This article has no author.

110. Ararad, 29 Jan. 2009, p.1, and An-nahar, 28 Jan. 2009, p.7.

111. Al-Mustakbal, 2 Feb. 2009, p.8.

112. An-nahar, 16 March 2009, p.5.

113. Interview with J. Oghasabian, in Al Afkar, No.1385 (2009), p.19.

114. As-safir, 3 Nov. 2007, p.5.

115. Ibid.

116. Ararad, 28 Feb. 2009, p.2.

117. Aztag, 6 Feb. 2009, p.2.

118. Aztag, 5 Feb. 2009, p.4.

119. Ibid.

120. Addiyar, 5 March 2009, p.5.

121. An-nahar, 19 Dec. 2008.

122. As-safir, 5 March 2009, p.3.

123. An-nahar, 28 Jan. 2009, p.7.

124. Aztag, 2 Dec. 2008, p.1.

125. Aztag, Monthly Newsletter, No.1, Jan. 2009, pp.10–13.

126. Personal interview with Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008,

127. Addiyar, 7 March 2009, p.7.

128. Addiyar, 11 March 2009, pp.1 and 7.

129. Al-akhbar, 9 March 2009, p.6.

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics 767