from confrontation to collaboration - world...

John GarrisonThe World Bank1818 H Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20433 USATelephone: 202-477-1234Facsimile: 202-477-6391

Telex: MCI 64145 WORLDBANKMCI 248423 WORLDBANK

Internet: www.worldbank.orgE-mail: [email protected]

NGO and Civil Society UnitSocial Development Department

Facsimile: (202) 522-1669E-mail: [email protected]

Internet: www.worldbank.org/ngos

From Confrontation to Collaboration

Garrison The World Bank

From Confrontationto Collaboration

Civil Society -- Government -- World Bank Relations in Brazil

From Confrontation to CollaborationCivil Society–Government–World BankRelations in Brazil

The World BankWashington, D.C.

John Garrison

Copyright © 2000The International Bank for Reconstructionand Development/THE WORLD BANK1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

All rights reservedManufactured in the United States of America

First printing June 2000

A free publication.

This document was prepared by the NGO and Civil Society Unit of the World Bank’s Social Development Department. It isnot a formal publication of the World Bank. It is being published informally and circulated to encourage discussion andcomment within the development community.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not beattributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of ExecutiveDirectors or the countries they represent.

Copies of this paper are available from:

NGO and Civil Society UnitSocial Development DepartmentThe World Bank1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433 USA

Fax: (202) 522-1669E-mail: [email protected]: www.worldbank.org/ngos

Cover designed by Melody Warford, Stone Soup, Inc.Photo credits: top photo, staff of CNPT/IBAMA; middle photo, Melody Warford, Stone Soup, Inc.; bottom photo,Curt Carnemark.

The text and cover are printed on recycled paper.

Foreword vPreface viAcknowledgments viiAcronyms and Abbreviations viiiExecutive Summary xiii

1. Background on the Civil Society Sector 1Overview 1Community Organizations 3Social Movements 5Charitable Organizations 6Church 6Professional Associations 7Foundations 8

2. Nongovernmental Organizations 10Origins 10General Characteristics 13Staffs and Budgets 16Networking Efforts 18Taking Up the Civic Banner 21Challenges of Consolidation 23

3. Relations among Civil Society, Government, and the World Bank 25Civil Society View of the Bank 25Mutual Misperceptions 27Bank–Civil Society Commonalities 28Bank Stakeholder Participation Policies 30Forging A Tripartite Dialogue 34Growing Relations and Operational Collaboration 37CSO Funding 42Disadvantages and Advantages of Tripartite Collaboration 46

4. Conclusion 51

iii

Contents

Notes 52

Attachments 58A. References 58B. Comments by Civil Society Organizations’ Representatives about the World Bank 61C. Civil Society–World Bank Consultation Meetings 64D. World Bank Materials on Participation and Social Analysis 66E. List of Brazilian Civil Society Organization Directories and Studies 67

World Bank Addresses in Brasília 68

Boxes1. The Legal Status of the “Nonprofit Sector” 42. Rural Landless Movement 53. Corporate Philanthropy 84. Rede Brasil Monitors Bank Portfolio 215. Anti-Poverty Campaign 226. Planafloro: From Impasse to Collaboration 307. World Bank Participation Policies and Initiatives 318. Wolfensohn Meets with Brazilian CSOs 379. Pursuing Sustainability in the Amazon 4010. Northeast Rural Poverty Alleviation Program Incorporates Participation 4111. Conselho da Comunidade Solidária 42

Tables1. Legal Founding Dates of 143 NGOs 112. Principal Activities of NGOs 143. Government Funding of NGOs 184. Bank Mechanisms Geared to Funding CSOs 445. Government Small-Grant Funds Geared to Funding CSOs 45

Figures1. Principal Beneficiary Populations of NGOs 132. NGO Budgets, 1990 and 1993 16

iv From Confrontation to Collaboration: Civil Society–Government–World Bank Relations in Brazil

v

This report vividly portrays what the World Bank hasknown for some years, that Brazil has a vibrant andincreasingly influential civil society sector. A civil soci-ety that is multifaceted, resourceful, and largely suc-cessful in promoting organizing and small-scaledevelopment efforts at the grassroots level. Althoughnongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are most oftencited by Bank documents dealing with civil society, thestudy appropriately describes how other, larger sectorssuch as community-based organizations (CBOs), socialmovements, and professional associations play a keyrole in the so-called Third Sector in Brazil. Further, thestudy describes the emerging social agenda of the pri-vate sector, particularly corporate foundations, and itsgrowing partnership with government through the inno-vative projects being implemented by the Conselho daComunidade Solidária.

The paper also documents well the advances thathave been achieved in government–civil society–WorldBank relations over the past several years. Many of theseadvances are ground-breaking and demonstrate that

all sides, especially the government and the civil soci-ety, which are the two principal interlocutors, are learn-ing to collaborate well and constructively. Perhaps mostsurprising are the high levels of funding within WorldBank cofinanced projects that are channeled to thecivil society sector through government-managed small-projects funds in such areas as the environment, health,and rural poverty. The study cites a variety of sources,and growing evidence from several proven Brazilianpartnership experiences, that stakeholder participa-tion policies and approaches can improve the perfor-mance of development projects as well as increasetheir social impact. Finally, the report reminds us thatdespite the important advances in terms of tripartiterelations, there is still a good deal of common groundthat needs to be cultivated so all sides—government,civil society, and the World Bank—can join forces moreeffectively to promote the social development of Brazil.

Gobind NankaniBrazil Country Director

Foreword

vi

This study on the civil society sector in Brazil and theevolving relations among government, civil society, andthe World Bank was based on a variety of sources includ-ing bibliographical searchers, project desk reviews andsite visits, focus group meetings, and individual inter-views. The research began in mid-1996 with the host-ing of Bank–Civil society consultation meetings heldthroughout Brazil, and was concluded in 1999 after par-ticipation in several annual meetings of leading civilsociety organization (CSO) networks. It involved con-tact with dozens of Bank staff and government offi-cials, and hundreds of CSO representatives throughoutBrazil.

The report is primarily geared to World Bank staffand particularly to task managers, but audiences with-

in civil society and government may find it useful. Itspurpose is fivefold:

• Provide a brief overview of the civil society sectorin Brazil with emphasis on NGOs.

• Describe the view CSOs have of the Bank.• Analyze the advances made in relations among the

civil society, government, and the Bank.• Demonstrate the advantages of promoting closer col-

laboration among the three sectors.• Describe some of the necessary steps to further

improve these relations.

Preface

vii

John Garrison, Social Development and Civil SocietySpecialist at the Brasília Country Management Unit,wrote this study. He relied on the support of countlesspersons who offered their assistance through the pro-vision of information, criticism, and suggestions.Reflecting the heterogeneous nature of the study, a widearray of persons representing the three major sectorscontributed important insights or reviewed the variousdrafts. These include:

Civil Society: Leilah Landim, Aurélio Vianna, ZanderNavarro, Anna Cynthia de Oliveira, Nancy Alexander,Michael Bailey, Rebecca Abers, and Linda Rabben

Government: Alexandrina Sobreira, Augusto de Franco,Gustavo Rodrigues, Roberto Carreiro, Carmen Puig,Luiz Carlos Abreu Mendes, Murilo Lobo, and GuilhermeCosta Delgado

World Bank: Gobind Nankani, Antônio RochaMagalhães, Caroline Moser, John Clark, John Redwood,

Acknowledgments

Chris Parel, Daniel Gross, Warren Van Wicklin,Katherine Bain, Claudia Fumo, Angela Furtado,Christopher Diewald, Anthony Anderson, Neila Soares,Luiz Carlos Ros, Jairo Arboleda, and Mario Marroquin.

Special acknowledgment also goes to Neuza Queirozand Julia Conter, who helped with assembling someof the data and preparing the final version. This studywas made possible by the support and funding of theBrazilian Country Management Unit. Finally, a wordof thanks goes to the staff of the Bank’s SocialDevelopment Department in Washington, especiallyWilliam Reuben, Coordinator of the NGO and CivilSociety Unit, and Bonnie Bradford, who oversaw thepublishing of this report. While most grateful for thevaluable contributions made by the many colleaguesabove, the author is ultimately responsible for theanalysis, conclusions, and eventual lapses that mayhave occurred.

viii

AACC Associação de Apoio às Comunidades do Campo do Rio Grande do NorteABI Associação Brasileira dos JornalistasABIA Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDSABIFARMA Associação Brasileira da Indústria FarmacêuticaABONG Associação Brasileira de ONGs ABRINQ Associação Brasileira dos Fabricantes de BrinquedosAIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency SyndromeALOP Associação Latinoamericana de Organizações de PromoçãoAMCHAM American Chambers of Commerce

ANPOCS Associção Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-Graduação em Ciencias Socias ANSUR Associação Nacional de Reforma UrbanaAPAES Associação de Pais e Amigos dos ExcepcionaisBNB Banco do NordesteBNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e SocialCAPOIB Conselho de Articulação dos Povos e Organizações Indígenas do BrasilCAS Country assistance strategyCBOs Community-based organizationsCCONG Confederación Colombiana de ONGsCEF Caixa Econômica FederalCE0 chief executive officerCETS Centro de Estudos do Terceiro SetorCGAP Consultative Group to Assist the PoorestCIMI Conselho Indigenista MissionárioCJC Centro Josué de CastroCLF Centro Luis FreireCLT Consolidação das Leis TrabalhistasCMP Central dos Movimentos PopularesCMU Country management unitCNAS Conselho Nacional de Assistência SocialCNBB Conselho Nacional dos Bispos do BrasilCNPQ Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnologiclCNS Conselho Nacional de SeringueirosCNSS Conselho Nacional de Servico SocialCOFECON Conselho Federal de EconomiaCOIAB Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Região Amazônica BrasileiraCONAMA Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CONANDA Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança e do AdolescenteCONCRAB Confederação das Cooperativas de Assentados do BrasilCONIC Conselho Nacional de Igrejas CristãsCONSEA Conselho de Segurança AlimentarCONTAG Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na AgriculturaCOOTRARON Cooperativa de Trabalho Multíplo de RondôniaCPDC Caribbean Poverty and Development and CenterCPT Comissão Pastoral da TerraCSO Civil society organizationCUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores EDI Economic Development Institute

(World Bank)DESCO Centro de Estudios y Promoción del DesarrolloDGF Development Grant FacilityETAPAS Equipe Técnica de Assessoria, Pesquisa e Ação SocialFACS Fundación Augusto César SandinoFAP Fundo de Apoio a ParceriasFASE Federação de Orgãos de Assistência Social e EducacionalFENABRAVE Fedração Nacional de Distribuição de Veiculos AutomotoresFETARN Federação dos Trabahadores Rurais do Rio Grande do NorteFGV Fundação Getúlio VargasFICONG Programa de Fortalecimento Institucional y Capacitación de Organizaciones

no Gubernamentais FLONAS Floresta NacionalFNU Federação Nacional dos UrbanitariosFOE Friends of the EarthFORECOM Fórum Empresa-ComunidadeFÓRUM BRASILEIRO Fórum Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente

e o DesenvolvimentoFÓRUM CAMPO Fórum Nacional pela Reforma Agrária e pela Justiça no CampoFÓRUM DCA Fórum Nacional Permanente de Entidades Não-Governamentais de Defesa dos

Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente FORMAD Fórum Mato-grossense de Meio Ambiente e DesenvolvimentoFOS Federação de Obras SociaisFUNBIO Fundo Brasileiro para a BiodiversidadeGEF Global Environment FacilityGESC Gestão para Organizações da Sociedade CivilGIFE Grupo de Instituições, Fundações e EmpresasGSO Grassroots Support OrganizationsGTA Grupo de Trabalho AmazônicoIAF Inter-American FoundationIBAM Instituto Brasileiro de Administração MunicipalIBASE Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e EconômicasIBOPE Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e EstatísticaICNL International Center for Non-Profit LawIDAC Instituto de Ação CulturalIDB Inter-American Development Bank

Acronyms and Abbreviations ix

IDF Institutional Development FundIEA Instituto de Estudos AmazônicosIECLB Igreja Evangélica de Confissão Luterana do BrasilIEE Instituto de Estudos EspeciaisIFC International Finance CorporationIMAZON Instituto de Homem e Meio Ambiente da AmazôniaIMF International Monetary FundINCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma AgráriaINESC Instituto de Estudos Sócio-EconômicosIPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica AplicadaISA Instituto Sócio-AmbientalISER Instituto de Estudos da ReligiãoISPN Instituto Sociedade População e NaturezaLBV Legião da Boa VontadeLOAS Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social

MAB Movimento dos Atingidos pelas BarragensMNDH Movimento Nacional de Direitos HumanosMNMMR Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de RuaMNU Movimento Negro UnificadoMST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem TerraNGO Nongovernmental organizationNGOWG NGO Working Group on the World BankNOVIB Netherlands Organization for International Development Co-operationNRPD Northeast Rural Development ProgramRPAP Northeast Rural Poverty Alleviation ProgramOAB Ordem dos Advogados do BrasilOECD-DAC Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development

Assistance CommitteeOED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank)OXFAM Oxfam Great BritainPACS Políticas Alternativas para o Cone SulPAD Project Analysis DocumentPADIC Programa de Apoio à Iniciativas ComunitáriasPAIC Programa de Iniciativas ComunitáriasPDA Projeto Demonstrativo do Programa PilotoPIC Public Information CenterPID Project Information Documents PLANAFLORO Plano Agropecuário e Florestal de RondôniaPMACI Programa de Meio Ambiente e das Comunidades IndigenasPNMA/PED Programa Nacional de Meio Ambiente/Projetos de Execução DescentralizadaPOLIS Instituto de Estudos, Formação e Assessoria em Políticas SociaisPREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (World Bank)PROCERA Programa de Crédito Especial para a Reforma AgráriaPRODEAGRO Projeto de Desenvolvimento Agroambiental de Mato GrossoPROSANEAR Programa de Abastecimento de Água e Esgotamento Sanitário para as

Populações de Baixa Renda em Áreas Urbanas

x From Confrontation to Collaboration: Civil Society–Government–World Bank Relations in Brazil

PT Partido dos TrabalhadoresPTA Programa de Tecnologia AlternativaPUC-SP Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São PauloREDE BRASIL Rede Brasil sobre Instituições Financeiras MultilateraisRESEX Extractive Reserve SubprogramRITS Rede de Informação do Terceiro SetorRNP+ Rede Nacional de Pessoas Vivendo com HIV/AIDSSAPRI Structural Adjustment Participatory Review InitiativeSAR Serviço de Assistência RuralSBPC Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da CiênciaSEAIN Secretaria de Relações Internacionais - Ministério do PlanejamentoSEPURB Secretaria de Políticas UrbanasSGP Small Grants ProgramSMU Sector management unitUNCED United Nations Conference on the Environment and DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIPOP Instituto Universidade PopularUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSP Universidade de São PauloWDR World Development Report (World Bank)WWF World Wildlife Fund

Acronyms and Abbreviations xi

Our experience in Brazil demonstrates that beyond the prob-lems of the free market and the limits of government action,civil society has been responsible for important transfor-mations, not only in how politics is exercised, but in theforging of an international policy agenda.

Hebert “Betinho” de SouzaSpeech given at the United Nations

(New York, August 1994)

The term civil society has emerged in Latin America inthe last two decades. Its meaning varies greatly depend-ing on who is utilizing it: a government official, aWorld Bank task manager, or an NGO technician. InBrazil, the term civil society has a political connotationand refers to the vast nongovernmental sector composedof community organizations, social movements, NGOs,charitable organizations, professional associations,churches, and corporate foundations. The emergenceof strong national social movements is a recent phe-nomenon in Brazil closely tied to the redemocratizationof the country, best exemplified by the visible and activistMovimento Nacional de Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra(MST). Another emerging sector within civil society isthe corporate foundations, which recently establishedits first national association, the Grupo de Institutos,Fundações, e Empresas (GIFE). As with the undefinedsector it represents, there are no firm estimates on howmany CSOs exist in Brazil.

The various laws and government agencies that over-see the sector were established over 50 years ago andare clearly not adequate for the evolving and dynamicnature of the civil society sector. The definition in theCódigo Civil Brasileiro is overly generic, and jurisdic-tion for registering and monitoring nonprofit organi-

zations falls between two ministries, justice and socialsecurity. On the other hand, a new law drafted by a jointgovernment–civil society working group and recentlypromulgated by the Brazilian Congress should providea more enabling legal environment for the sector. Thereis growing research by leading social scientists thatdemonstrates the economic strength, political lever-age, and social value of civil society as an essential ele-ment in a country’s development.

NGOs are one of the most visible sectors withincivil society. They have certainly been its most impor-tant interlocutors for the World Bank in recent decades.Although there are no exact figures, recent studieshave placed the number of NGOs in Brazil at over 5,000.Brazil has witnessed an impressive growth of NGOs inthe past 20 years, as the great majority were estab-lished with the onset of the political opening in 1979.Reflecting the strong regional concentration of the coun-try, 53 percent of all NGOs are located in the southeastregion of the country. NGOs have their origin in threeinstitutions—church, academia, and political parties—and most were created by strong, single-minded lead-ers. Over the past decade, NGOs have undergoneprofound changes in their conceptual paradigms andorganizational structures, becoming more self-affirm-ing, specialized, and results-oriented. NGOs work inmany different areas (there are 27 terms used to describethe types of services provided), but the most commonterm utilized to describe their work is assessoria. Reflectingthe major demographic shift in Brazil over the past threedecades—rural-to-urban migration—the principal ben-eficiary population selected by NGOs is the urban poor.

The great majority of Brazilian NGOs were estab-lished with donations by nongovernmental interna-tional donor agencies and, as a result, most are still

xiii

Executive Summary

heavily dependent on foreign funding. The adoptionof the Real Plan in 1995 and the decrease in foreignassistance contributions, especially from Europe, hit theNGOs hard, many reporting a 30 percent budgetaryreduction over the ensuing years. As a matter of fact,many NGOs are threatened with severe cutbacks, ifnot closure, at the same time that new sources of gov-ernment, multilateral, and private sector funds arebecoming available to them.

One of the principal characteristics of NGOs is theirability to network around common issues. Many largecities and states in Brazil have established NGO coali-tions, and there are a number of well-known nationalNGO networks, such as the National Association ofNGOs (ABONG). Brazilian NGOs have also expandedtheir networking efforts overseas, having actively par-ticipated in the many United Nations summits. A sem-inal event in this regard was the 1992 United NationsConference on the Environment and Development(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, during which BrazilianNGOs hosted the Global Summit, a nongovernmentalconference that attracted over 25,000 participants. NGOshave also established a network to monitor the invest-ments of the multilateral institutions in Brazil, namelythe World Bank and the Inter-American DevelopmentBank (IDB). The Rede Brasil has 51 institutional mem-bers and has closely monitored a dozen Bank projectsin Brazil, including Itaparica, Planafloro, Prosanear,Northeast Education, and Prodeagro.

More recently, Brazilian NGOs have begun to beinvolved in civic campaigns at the national level. NGOsplayed an important organizational role in the successfulcampaign to impeach President Collor on corruptioncharges in 1992. This impetus led NGOs to organize anational anti-poverty campaign in 1993 that mobi-lized an estimated 2.8 million volunteers to form localcivic committees throughout Brazil. It is estimated that16 million destitute persons received food, clothing,health care, and jobs.

In order to ascertain the view CSOs have of the WorldBank, a series of consultation meetings were held in1996 in Brasília and six state capitals in all five geo-graphic regions of the country. Over 85 representativesof social movements, NGOs, and donor agencies thatwork in a variety of fields ranging from education and

environment to indigenous issues participated in thefocus group–style meetings. Among the many and var-ied opinions expressed about the Bank, several drewbroad agreement:

• The overall image of the Bank is negative and gen-erally associated with large infrastructure projectsthat do not seem to benefit local populations andoften have unforeseen social and environmentalimpacts.

• The Bank is perceived as being slow and overlybureaucratic.

• The Bank is generally seen as inaccessible and outof touch with grassroots reality.

• The Bank has more recently adopted positive envi-ronmental protection and social development policies.

On the other hand, most representatives of CSOspresent at these meetings admitted that they have lim-ited overall knowledge of the Bank and that much oftheir perception is based on press coverage of specificBank-financed projects. Most stated that these meetingsconstituted their first contact with the World Bank andwelcomed the opportunity to learn more and enterinto a dialogue with the Bank.

These consultation meetings also highlighted the factthat CSOs and the Bank often have exaggerated mis-perceptions of each other, which are not generally basedon firsthand knowledge. Recent experience in severalBank-financed projects has demonstrated that whensubstantive dialogue takes place among CSOs, thegovernment, and the Bank, many long-standing con-ceptual disagreements give way to consensus aroundspecific issues. The lesson seems to be that CSO, gov-ernment, and Bank staff have a better chance of con-structive engagement when focused on a specific programor project than when they remain deadlocked on larg-er policy questions.

It is becoming clear that CSOs and the Bank have alot more in common than generally thought. They arenot only both global actors that practice the same devel-opment trade and largely target the same beneficiarylower-income population, but are both being pressuredto demonstrate more results and effectiveness in theirwork. A convergence is actually under way, in which

xiv From Confrontation to Collaboration: Civil Society–Government–World Bank Relations in Brazil

the Bank is reaching down to the grassroots sectorthrough its stakeholder participation policies and itssmall-grants funds, and CSOs are striving to reach themacro level by scaling-up of services and increasedcollaboration with governments.

These commonalities are becoming clearer as CSOs,governments, and the Bank are developing formal mech-anisms for dialogue and operational collaboration. TheBank and CSOs are intensifying the number of consul-tation meetings that began at the global level, but whichare now being decentralized to the hemispheric andnational levels. As a result of the 1988 Constitution,federal, state, and municipal governments in Brazil haveestablished joint government–civil society policy coun-cils in major areas such as health, children’s rights, andrural development. There are even increasing numbersof CSO technicians being elected to office or workingwith government agencies at the highest levels. The areathat has perhaps witnessed the most significant advancein intersectoral collaboration is in funding. It is esti-mated that over a six-year period (1997–2002) the Bankwill channel approximately $806 million through gov-ernment-operated small-grants funds to CSOs, espe-cially community organizations.1 There are otherexamples of successful CSO-government partnershipsat the national and subnational levels. One of the mostapparent is the Conselho da Comunidade Solidária,which is sponsoring six innovative pilot programs inthe areas of education, volunteerism, and strengthen-ing of the civil society sector.

On the other hand, analysts at both ends of thepolitical spectrum feel that this growing collaborationhas gone too far or generated unresolved problems.Those on the government side, for instance, questionthe participation of CSOs (with full voting rights) inthe numerous government-citizen policy councils, sincethey were never elected for this role. Others within thecivil society sector are hesitant about greater collabo-ration with government, lest this lead CSOs to be co-opted, lose their watchdog function, or even replace theresponsibilities of the state as enshrined in the BrazilianConstitution. The Bank, however, is sometimes (par-

ticularly in projects that generate conflict) placed in aposition of having to intermediate between the gov-ernment and civil society, but this is neither an appro-priate nor a desired role. Not only is the Bank unsuitedfor this role, but its mandate should, at most, be to serveas a catalyst for improved relations.

Still others in both sectors are pleased with the grow-ing intersectoral relations, since they feel that CSOs willnot replace the state in the provision of social services,but rather have strong complementary functions thatstrengthen the role of the state. They point to the factthat while the Bank has expertise on content, or “hard-ware,” elements of development and a longitudinal view,CSOs have experience with process, or “software,” aspectsand a more localized knowledge. The government rep-resents the weight and resources of the official sector,and CSOs bring social legitimacy and grassroots par-ticipation. Recent studies on this growing collaborationhave demonstrated that there are certain thematic areas,such as environmental protection, AIDS prevention, andrural poverty alleviation, that seem more predisposedto intersectoral collaboration and can maximize theirbenefits.

In conclusion, despite the problems and questionsthat characterize the growing phenomenon of Govern-ment–Civil Society–Bank collaboration, recent experi-ence clearly demonstrates that it can be a win-winproposition to all three sectors, and can enhance theeconomic and social impact of development projects.The Bank should take several steps in order to furtherthe recent growing number of instances of collabora-tion in Brazil. These measures include:

• Adopting a more proactive information dissemina-tion strategy, including the more regular translationof Bank documents into Portuguese.

• Consolidating and expanding mechanisms for dia-logue and consultation, including undertaking jointGovernment–Civil Society–Bank training workshops.

• Incorporating proven social analysis and stakeholderparticipation methodologies into more Bank-financedloans in the Brazil portfolio.

Executive Summary xv

Overview

Much like the vast and undefined sector it refers to, theterm civil society has many meanings, depending onwhom one is talking with: a government official, anNGO technician, or Bank staff. Its definition also variesaccording to country context and hemisphere. ClassicEuropean political thinkers first coined the term, but itis in Latin America that the terminology took on amore political connotation and became more widelyused in the past several decades. In Brazil, the termcivil society gained ascendancy during the latter yearsof the military regime in the 1980s, and at that timewas used to refer to groups that opposed the regime.Other terms frequently used to refer to this sector aresociedade civil organizada, 2 movimento popular, NGO sec-tor, nonprofit sector,3 informal sector, and more recentlythe Third Sector.4 As a matter of fact, one researcherassembled a list of 47 different terms to denote the ThirdSector (Adil 1996). In addition to the more specificacronym NGO, the term civil society organizations (CSOs),which encompasses all the subsectors, will be usedthroughout the paper to refer to all the different sortsof organizations described above.

Leading researchers worldwide are beginning to takea closer look at the characteristics and impact of thecivil society sector. Well-known economist AlbertHirschman coined the term social energy to describethe grassroots resourcefulness being generated by theproliferating movement of CSOs he studied in LatinAmerica during the 1980s.5 More recently, Robert Putmanhelped to popularize the expression “social capital” ashe analyzed the importance of civic traditions in theconsolidation of democracy in Italy and the United States(Putman 1993). Even Francis Fukuyama, well knownfor having espoused the “end of history” as a result ofthe demise of socialism, defends the key role played bycivil society, or the third sector, in the overall well-being

of developed societies. He goes further by stating thatthe art of association is not only important politically,but key to the very health of the economy as docu-mented in case studies of six industrial countries. Inhis book Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation ofProsperity, he writes that “the vitality of liberal politicaland economic institutions depends on a healthy anddynamic civil society”(Fukuyama 1995).6

What these authors and others seem to be pointingto is an exponential growth of citizens’ movementsthat utilize civic action to seek greater democracy, gov-ernment transparency, and social equity. As a recentreport by Civicus, a global citizens’ coalition, stated,“The breath-taking peaceful revolutions in EasternEurope, the democratic transitions in so many coun-tries of the South, and the dramatic changes in SouthAfrica all bear witness to the strength of civic action.”As the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report(WDR), on the role of the state, argued:

In most societies, democratic or not, citizens seekrepresentation of their interests beyond the bal-lot: as taxpayers, as users of public services, andincreasingly as clients or members of NGOs andvoluntary associations. Against a backdrop ofcompeting social demands, rising expectations,and variable government performance, theseexpressions of voice and participation are onthe rise (World Bank 1997a, p. 113).

There is now a study under way to better understandand measure the size, nature, and economic weight ofthe nonprofit sector in more than two dozen countries.The 27-country study titled “The Comparative NonprofitSector Project” is being undertaken by Lester Salamonof Johns Hopkins University. The first phase of the studyexamined the role of the Third Sector in six leadingindustrial countries, including the United States, and

1

1. Background on the Civil Society Sector

2 From Confrontation to Collaboration: Civil Society–Government–World Bank Relations in Brazil

now the second phase is researching the impact of thissector in developing countries, including half a dozenin Latin America. Partial findings of the study havedemonstrated, for instance, that the Third Sector in 22of the countries studied created 19 million paid jobs,which represents 30 percent of all public-sector postsand 5 percent of all jobs. Further, the volunteer laborleveraged by nonprofit organizations in these coun-tries represents 28 percent of their combined popula-tions. Financially, the sector generated over $1.1 trillionannually, making it the equivalent of the eighth largesteconomy in the world. (Salamon and Anheier 1998)As the authors state, “The non-profit sector continuesto be the lost continent of the social sector in our mod-ern society, invisible to the majority of political leaders,businessmen, for the media, and even to many peoplewithin the sector itself” (Gazeta Mercantil 1998, p. 4).

In Brazil, the study is being coordinated by LeilahLandim of the Instituto de Estudos da Religião (ISER),who has been a leading researcher of the Brazilian NGOand nonprofit sectors. Her preliminary findings are thatthe Third Sector in Brazil has grown by 44 percent infive years, employing 1.1 million persons in 1995, upfrom 775,500 in 1991. This is nearly double the num-ber of federal employees (600,000).7 While historical-ly the areas of greater concentration have been educationand health, which employed 38 percent and 20 per-cent of all Third Sector personnel in 1991, the mostrecent growth has occurred in the areas of social ser-vice, rights advocacy, culture, and leisure. As Landimwrote, “Politically, socially, and economically, the Braziliannonprofit sector is fragmented and heterogeneous. Itsnumerous organizations are extremely varied and dif-fer significantly from each other in terms of the rolesthey play in Brazilian society.”8

NGO leader and anthropologist Rubem CesarFernandes has been one of the first to examine the roleand impact of the sector in Brazil and other LatinAmerican countries. In his book Private but Public: TheThird Sector in Latin America (1994), Fernandes providesone of the first roadmaps to the vast and heteroge-neous civil society sector in Latin America. He not onlyexamines the better-known sectors such as trade unionsand NGOs, but describes the vast submerged sectorwithin civil society. This sector, referred to as “belowthe water line,” is composed of thousands of informaland nonlegalized groups that have largely served as the

social “safety net” for the region’s destitute majority, whichthe government has historically been unable to providefor.

The Brazilian government has also begun to take noteof the potential of the civil society sector for promot-ing social development. President Fernando HenriqueCardoso has himself set the tone for this new govern-ment posture of recognizing the need for governmentto work closer with the civil society sector in order totackle Brazil’s pervasive social problems. A documentprepared by the presidency-sponsored Conselho daComunidade Solidária stated that:

The strengthening of the Third Sector, in whichare included the nonprofit and public-orientedcivil society organizations, constitutes today anational strategic-policy in light of their capacityto generate projects, assume responsibilities, under-take initiatives, and mobilize resources necessaryfor the development of the country. 9

Multilateral organizations have also begun to payattention to the civil society sector. The IDB adapted theterm civil society in the mid-1990s and established aCivil Society Unit at its headquarters in Washington.This unit funded a series of conferences and countryconsultations in Latin America to better understand andsupport greater civil society–government interaction.10

The World Bank has also begun to focus increasinglyon the civil society sector, although it generally utilizesthe term NGO to broadly refer to it. There is increasingBank literature on the subject. The most complete Bankpublication printed to date on how to work with NGOsstated that “the building of social capital and the emer-gence of a strong civil society are essential ingredientsin achieving long-term, sustainable development atthe national level” (World Bank 1995, p. 64).

The 1996 Human Development Report, producedby UNDP and the Brazilian government’s applied eco-nomic research institute, IPEA, came up with the fol-lowing broad definition for CSOs (UNDP and IPEA 1996).They have the following six characteristics in common:

• They are structured entities.• They function outside the formal government sphere.• They do not generate or distribute profit.• They are self-governing.

Background on the Civil Society Sector 3

• They involve individuals in significant volunteeractivity.

• They produce goods or services for the collective good.

As further indication of how important the sector isbeing perceived to be, the UNDP and IDB offices inArgentina are undertaking a research project to deter-mine the size and depth of the civil society in that coun-try by region. For this project, they have developed asurvey instrument called the Civil Society DevelopmentIndex (CSDI), which is intended to be used in thesame way as the UNDP’s Human Development Index,to determine the vitality of the civil society sector inany given country or region. The CSDI contains threetypes of classification (structure, process, and results)and 11 institutional/programmatic indicators.11

Brazil is known to have a vast and multifaceted civilsociety sector, one of if not the most active and visiblein Latin America. On the other hand, reflecting the dif-ficulties in defining the sector worldwide, the size andcharacteristics of the civil society sector in Brazil arelargely unknown. The only more reliable indicatorsavailable, which allow one to attempt to determine thesize of the sector, are maintained by the government’sincome tax agency, the Secretaria da Receita Federal.Until a few years ago, the Receita Federal had 219,559nonprofit entities registered. Approximately 50,000 ofthese were “beneficent, religious, and assistencial asso-ciations”; 44,000 were sports clubs; 30,000 were reli-gious bodies; and 8,000 were trade unions (box 1).These figures are, at best, an approximation, and thenumbers are most likely considerably larger.

Because of the continued confusion in the legislationgoverning the nonprofit sector and the lack of any effec-tive provisions for tax-exempt charitable contributions,several initiatives are under way to unify legislationand establish a more enabling legal environment for thecivil society sector. The principal research and advoca-cy effort has been carried out by the Conselho daComunidade Solidária (funded by the IDB) in collab-oration with the association of corporate foundations(GIFE) and the national network of NGOs (ABONG).After a year of intense planning meetings and numer-ous drafts, the conselho, through the president’s office,introduced a bill that features two important mea-sures: (1) a new organizational classification system thatrecognizes the NGOs for the first time as organizaçõesda sociedade civil de interesse público (OSCIP), or civil soci-

ety organizations of public interest, and introduces safeguards against fraudulent nonprofit entities, and (2) establishes the convênio de parceria, or “cooperativeagreement” modality, which allows for more stream-lined and effective government–civil society contrac-tual partnerships. This new “civil society” law (Lei9790/99) was passed by the Brazilian Congress in March1999, and a regulatory decree was signed by the Presidenta few months later. It should also be noted that sever-al laws enacted last year by the government had alreadybrought some measure of flexibility to the govern-ment-CSO relationship. The new law (Lei 9608/98),enacted in February 1998, encouraged greater volun-teer work in CSOs by more clearly regulating the rightsand responsibilities of volunteers. A law (Lei 9637/98)adopted in May 1998 established the concept of orga-nizações sociais (OS), or social organizations with pub-lic functions, which allows the government to privatizesome of its agencies as well as permitting CSOs to receivepublic funds more easily (Mendes 1998).

For the purposes of this paper, the term civil societyis used as a broadly defined sociological term to definethe nongovernmental and nonprofit sectors in Brazil,which are composed of a myriad of groups. The majorsubsectors of the civil society in Brazil include com-munity groups, social movements, professional associ-ations, church institutions, charitable organizations,corporate foundations, and NGOs. Each of these sec-tors has its own origin, institutional characteristics, pro-grammatic objectives, and societal role. It should benoted that these categories are largely descriptive andnot mutually exclusive, as many of the organizationsbelong to more than one category. A brief descriptionof each of these sectors is provided below with greaterattention given to the NGO sector, since this is the groupthat has been the most visible and active interlocutorof the World Bank in Brazil.

Community Organizations

Community organizations are the principal buildingblocks of Brazil’s civil society. They are often referred toin Bank literature as community-based organizations(CBOs). Although the estimate is in the tens or evenhundreds of thousands, there are no reliable numberson how many community organizations exist in Brazil.


During the 1970 and 1980s there was a proliferationof community groups as the poor and politically dis-enfranchised populations throughout Brazil formedinformal organizations to pressure for rights, demandsocial services, carry out self-help community improve-ment, or undertake income generation activities. TheCatholic Church played a key role in this process sincemany of these grassroots organizations sprang fromthe estimated 80,000 Comunidades Eclesiais de Base, orChristian base communities, the church established dur-ing these earlier decades. Community groups represent-ed a variety of constituencies and undertook many differentactivities. They included women’s sewing groups, ruralproducers’ associations, adult literacy groups, urban con-sumer cooperatives, cultural preservation societies, neigh-borhood associations, and preventive health collectives.

Community organizations are by definition local,their spatial locus being the community. They are mem-bership organizations with representative and clearly

defined constituencies such as neighborhood residents,agricultural producers, indigenous people, women,youth, and so forth. They also have decisionmakingstructures that are generally participatory in nature, withtheir leadership being elected by the membership base.Community organizations are generally single-issueorganizations with narrowly defined institutional objec-tives geared to addressing such problems as lack of landownership, water, housing, and transportation.Community organizations are normally legalized,although the process of registration is somewhat cum-bersome and onerous.13 Since they often have fragileorganizational structures, unstable sources of funding,and low levels of institutional consolidation, the activelife span of community organizations generally lastsonly a few years. These groups may also cease to existwhen the initiatives they undertake (building a school,training health promoters, obtaining land title, and soon) are partially or fully implemented.

The legislation that regulates the civil society sector is notclear and is considered by most legal scholars to be inad-equate, thus further contributing to the ambiguous andlargely submerged nature of the “nonprofit sector” in Brazil.The sector is defined and regulated by several different gov-ernment agencies that in turn apply inconsistent defini-tions and criteria, often leading to confusion and redundancy.The best-known legal definition of the nonprofit sector canbe found in the Código Civil Brasileiro, or Brazilian CivilCode, enacted in 1916, which has been extensively amend-ed over the years. Article 16 of the code defines nonprof-it organizations, as “sociedades civis sem fim lucrativo.”

Another attempt at regulating the nonprofit sector wascarried out by the Conselho Nacional de Serviço Social(CNSS), established in 1943, which carried out the func-tion of setting up a national registry of nonprofit organi-zations. A third agency involved in regulating the nonprofitsector is the Ministry of Justice. It grants a certificate of“utilidade pública,” or public utility, which in conjunctionwith the CNSS registration provides several financial andtax benefits. Because obtaining the CNSS and Ministry ofJustice certificates was traditionally quite cumbersome andoften politically influenced, only a few of the larger, moreestablished NGOs were ever registered there.12 On the otherhand, the law had long been undermined by the fact thatmany large, for-profit entities such as insurance companiesand universities had also obtained these certificates.

In 1993, after several scandals involving politicianschanneling funds through bogus charitable organizations,including high government officials in the Collor admin-istration, the CNSS was abolished. A new law, Lei Orgânicade Assistência Social (LOAS), was approved: it establishedthe National Social Service Council (CNAS), to be locat-ed in the Ministry of Social Security and Assistance (MPAS).This new law and council were approved after ample debateinvolving government, church, business, legal, and civilsociety representatives. Today the council has 18 members,9 of these being from key civil society sectors such as trade unions (CUT), church (CNBB), and NGOs (ABONG,INESC, and MNMMR). One of the first steps undertakenby the council was to have all organizations apply for newregistrations under new, more stringent criteria. As of 1998, approximately 4,700 organizations are registered atthe CNAS and, of these, 4,125 have the Certificado deEntidades de Fins Filantrópicos. This certificate entitles the organizations to receive grants from government agen-cies and apply for duty-free importation of equipment.Further, if the organization also has the public utility sta-tus granted by the Ministry of Justice, then the CNAS reg-istry allows such additional benefits as receivingtax-deductible donations, receiving contributions fromCongressional charitable funds and federal lotteries, andbeing eligible to apply for employer payroll social securi-ty exemption.

Box 1. The Legal Status of the “Nonprofit Sector”


Social Movements

Social movements are a more recent and growing phe-nomenon in Brazil. They are generally defined by theirconstituency (landless rural workers, factory workers,rubber tappers, street children, Afro-Brazilians) or the-matic priority (human rights, urban reform, educa-tion, health) as their raison d’être. Their organizationalstrength vary somewhat from the more consolidatedlabor unions to the newer, less consolidated landlessrural movements and street children movement. Amongthe best-known movements are the Central Única dos

Trabalhadores (CUT), Movimento Nacional dosTrabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) (box 2),Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura(CONTAG), Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros (CNS),Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua(MNMMR), Movimento dos Atingidos pelas Barragens(MAB), Conselho de Articulação dos Povos e OrganizaçõesIndígenas (CAPOIB), Central dos Movimentos Populares(CMP), Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU), and theMovimento de Mulheres Trabalhadores Rurais.14

Many of these social movements began as commu-nity organizations that slowly grew into regional and

The most active and visible social movement in Brazil todayis the Movimento Nacional de Trabalhadores Rurais SemTerra (MST), or the Rural Landless Movement. Spearheadingweekly occupations of large tracts of unproductive landthroughout Brazil, the MST has captured the attention ofthe national press and the government, and has achievedgenerally favorable support from public opinion. In a fewinstances MST occupations—such as in Corumbiara(Rondônia) and Eldorado do Carajás (Pará)—have result-ed in violent confrontations, with the death of dozens ofworkers. This notoriety has also been obtained by public-awareness campaigns such as a national march in 1997 andby being featured on a recent prime time novela “Rei doGado.” Although the MST had its origins in the CatholicChurch, spawned largely by the Land Pastoral Commission(CPT), it is today an independent political organizationwith a well-known militant posture. The movement claimedin 1998 to have a membership of over 140,000 familieslocated in 1,564 assentamentos, or resettlement communi-ties, throughout Brazil, although the government conteststhese numbers. The movement also is said to maintain over240 temporary camps, generally by the roadsides of thecountry’s highways, which contain an additional 45,000families awaiting land. In order to guarantee that they remainon the land once it has been secured physically and whilethey await legal titling, the MST has promoted collectiveplanting of crops and has spawned the creation of producercooperatives. The Confederação das Cooperativas deAssentados do Brasil (CONCRAB) congregates over 70 pro-duction and marketing cooperatives with a membershipof over 8,000 members. Many of these have been quite suc-cessful in boosting agricultural production and establish-ing profitable rural enterprises.

In addition to their agricultural production efforts, theMST has also been successful in the area of basic educa-

tion, spawning the creation of a network of schools andvocational training centers. There are approximately 35,000children in 17 states studying in 620 resettlement schools,which are generally built and staffed with local governmentfunds. The Ministry of Education provided approximate-ly R$600,000 to the MST in 1997 to cover the cost of 400adult literacy teachers and classroom materials. The pressreported that the movement was able to raise $20 millionin 1996, $4 million of which came from the governmentthrough the PROCERA Program, and $660,000 fromEuropean church agencies and the European Union (Folhade São Paulo, 1997a, p.1/5 ).

The Cardoso administration has responded to the MST’smobilization by creating a new ministry called the Ministériode Desenvolvimento Agrário. The ministry has attemptedto speed up the government’s agrarian reform program byresettling over 287,000 families since 1995, although theMST claims this figure is somewhat lower. A recent surveyof 10,000 resettled families carried out by the Ministry ofAgrarian Policies in partnership with 37 universities hashelped to disprove the widely held view that most reset-tled landless workers do not successfully make the transi-tion to productive farmers. The survey demonstrated thatof the 250,000 families resettled nationally, 94.2 percentcontinue to live on their property, 70 percent had previ-ous farming experience, and their average family month-ly income is $330, placing them well above the rural povertyline.15 The World Bank has also demonstrated its sensi-tivity to the issue by approving a $90 million loan for amarket-based agrarian reform pilot project.16 The MST hasjoined ranks with other rural development groups orga-nized in the Fórum pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça no Campoto oppose the World Bank–financed pilot program and sub-mitted two requests for investigation to the Inspection Panelin 1998 and 1999.

Box 2. Rural Landless Movement


national movements. They are, by nature, organizationswith a membership base that is often well organized andcan be strongly militant. Their membership varies con-siderably from several hundred to several million mem-bers. As with community groups, their leadership isgenerally elected, and is often quite strong and charis-matic. The organizational structures vary according tothe movement’s size and budget. While the unions (whichreceive government-mandated worker contributions)maintain large national organizational structures, thenewer social movements (which rely largely on inter-national donor agencies) maintain much smaller insti-tutional apparatus. The thematic focus of socialmovements is generally twofold: public policy advoca-cy geared to defending the interests of their constituencyor forwarding a thematic agenda; or providing servicesto their membership such as training programs, healthplans, legal aid, and retirement benefits.

Charitable Organizations

Charitable organizations are Brazil’s oldest civil societyorganizations, and some were brought over from Portugalby Jesuits and other religious orders in the 16th cen-tury. Since then the Santa Casas de Misericórdia andother religious charities have proliferated throughoutthe country. Charitable organizations are distinguishedfrom community groups and NGOs because of theirparticular institutional goals of providing “front-line”social services to lower-income and destitute popula-tions. Like NGOs, charitable organizations generally arenot membership organizations, although they often havevolunteer governing councils. These organizations belongto the centuries-old tradition of “mutual-help” practicedamong the poor, which involves thousands of informaland nonlegalized groups established to provide essen-tial health, cultural, and charitable services, as describedin the book by Rubem César Fernandes (Fernandes1994). Once again, there are no exact figures as to thenumbers of charitable organizations operating in Brazil,but the best estimate (as listed by the Receita Federal)places their total number at approximately 50,000.

While churches operate the great majority of chari-table organizations, many others are administered byneighborhood associations, companies, and even indi-viduals. These organizations vary as much in institu-

tional characteristics and nature as the needs they ful-fill. They can include orphanages, daycare centers, sportsclubs, retirement homes, soup kitchens, cultural cen-ters, health clinics, youth vocational training centers,and schools for the mentally handicapped. Among thebest known are the Catholic Church’s thousands of socialservice centers;17 APAES, which are parent-operatedschools for the mentally handicapped, and Brazil’s largestcharitable organization Legião da Boa Vontade (LBV),which operates hundreds of schools, daycare centers,and health clinics throughout the country.18 While theexistence of these institutions disproves, in part, thewidely held belief that generosity is nonexistent with-in Brazilian society, Brazil does lag behind other coun-tries in terms of charitable giving. According to figuresreleased by income tax authorities, the average Braziliandonates some $21 a year (compared with an estimated$450 in the Unites States), which tends to be consid-erably less than in other countries. On the other hand,individual donations, which tend to sustain local char-ities, account for 96 percent of all charitable giving inBrazil, thus demonstrating the significance of individ-ual giving (Gazeta Mercantil 1998, p. 3). There is verylittle regulatory control of these centers, though, andexploitative for-profit or “front” organizations, popu-larly referred to as pilantrópicas,19 at times compete withthe more legitimate centers.

Church

The church is included here because of the strong socialrole it plays in Brazilian civil society. The largest play-er, by virtue of its majority following, is the CatholicChurch. Although the Catholic Church has historical-ly been a powerful actor in Brazilian society, it has increas-ingly played a visible social role in recent decades sincethe Vatican II Council.20 The Catholic Church’s pres-ence is spearheaded by the powerful, 270-memberNational Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), whichis an ever-present actor in Brazil’s public policy arenadefending positions ranging from constitutional issuesand indigenous policy to educational reform. In addi-tion to the Bishop’s Council, the Catholic Church main-tains dozens of human rights organizations (Justiceand Peace Commissions and Human Rights Centers)and over a dozen national pastorais, or social action


secretariats, which are generally thematically or con-stituency focused. The better known of these are the:Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI), establishedin 1972 and geared to indigenous affairs (13 regionaloffices); the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT), found-ed in 1975 and focused on agrarian policy and ruralviolence (21 regional offices); and the Pastoral da Criança,initiated in 1983, which provides health prevention andeducational programs geared to children and women.21

These secretariats generally maintain local diocesanbranches throughout Brazil and also have considerablenational weight in the national public policy debate.

The Protestant churches have historically maintaineda lower presence and profile in Brazil’s civil society,reflecting their smaller membership base and more recentorigins in Brazil.22 The latest figures place Brazil’sProtestants at 16 million, or 10 percent of the country’spopulation. Although much smaller in overall numbers,the Protestant church has experienced a phenomenalgrowth rate of nearly 50 percent since 1980. While themore traditional and smaller denominations (such asBaptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, andAdventists) have generally been involved in establish-ing schools and hospitals, the Pentecostal churches (suchas the Assembly of God and Jehovah’s Witnesses) havebeen more geared to proselytizing and increasing theirmembership. As a result, the Pentecostal churches (whichtend to direct their appeal to lower-income classes) haveexperienced the most pronounced growth in the lastdecades, especially such spin-off denominations as theIgreja Universal do Reino de Deus.23 Another fairlyrecent and significant phenomenon among Brazil’schurches has been the growth of ecumenical relations.This is best exemplified by the creation of the ConselhoNacional de Igrejas Cristãs (CONIC), which is com-posed of several mainline Protestant denominations(Methodists, Episcopalians, and Lutherans) and theCatholic Church. Reflecting the civic activism of itsmember churches, CONIC speaks out often on nation-al issues such as poverty, agrarian reform, foreign debt,and corruption.

A third strong religious presence in Brazilian civilsociety has been the Espiritista, or Spiritist, congrega-tions, divided largely among the Kardecistas, or follow-ers of European thinker Allan Kardec, and theAfrican-originated groups known as Candomblé andMacumba. Recent studies place the number of Kardecista

Spiritists at about 4 million followers nationwide, andan even greater number attending Afro-Brazilian ter-reiros, or worship centers (Landim 1998). Since chari-ty is a key tenant of Spiritist creed, these congregationshave been leaders in establishing thousands of daycarecenters, health posts, vocational training courses, andfood banks throughout Brazil.24 The Spiritists played akey role in the anti-poverty campaign that NGOs spear-headed in 1993 by operating hundreds of food kitchensnationwide (box 5).

Professional Associations

Brazil has a long tradition of well-organized and activistprofessional associations. The principal associations rep-resent lawyers, journalists, businessmen, economists,and scientists. Among the best-known associations arethe Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB), AssociaçãoBrasileira dos Jornalistas (ABI), Conselho Federal deEconomia (COFECON), Sociedade Brasileira para oProgresso da Ciência (SBPC), and the Associção Nacionalde Pesquisa e Pós-Graduação em Ciencias Socias(ANPOCS). While most of the organizations and busi-nesses represented by these associations are more appro-priately identified with the profit-making second sector,the associations themselves and many of their memberentities have played a visible role in civil society.

In addition to lobbying for the specific interests oftheir membership, these associations generally partic-ipate in larger public policy matters. The lawyers’ andjournalists’ associations, in particular, have been keymembers of watershed civil society movements thatbegan with the political amnesty movement of the late1970s. More recently, the OAB, ABI, and others wereleaders in the national civic movement to impeachPresident Collor on corruption charges. As was true inthis case, these professional associations often workedclosely with NGOs and labor unions in bringing theirsocietal influence to bear on particular national issues,such as the recent national campaign against the pri-vatization of the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce.

Mention must also be made of the media, some-times called the fourth estate because of its increasingpower in modern society. Brazil is no exception, hav-ing a proficient and influential written and spoken press.Brazil not only has dailies such as the Folha de São Paulo,


Jornal do Brasil, and Gazeta Mercantil, whose quality ofreporting and critique rival leading newspapers in Europeor the United States, but a vast publishing conglomerate(Editora Abril), and a globally competitive television net-work (Rede Globo). While part of the media has at timesbeen seen as too aligned with government interests overthe past decades, other sectors have played a key watch-dog role in investigating instances of government cor-ruption and denouncing human rights abuses. The mediahas also been instrumental in documenting and provid-ing visibility to the emerging civil society sector in Brazil.

Foundations

Foundations in Brazil are, juridically, the most formaland structured organizations within the civil society sec-tor. They must have formal, independent, volunteerboards and they are subject to yearly audits carried outby the Ministério Público or public auditing agencies.The best-known foundations in Brazil are either paras-tatal cultural foundations such as the Fundação RoquetePinto and Fundação Padre Anchieta or research insti-

tutions. Among the best known of the latter are theFundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo),Fundação Joaquim Nabuco (Recife), Fundação JoãoPinheiro (Belo Horizonte), Fundação Carlos Chagas (SãoPaulo), and Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Rio de Janeiro).

On the other hand, unlike the United States andEurope, Brazil does not have a strong sector of social-ly oriented grant-making foundations. Although fami-ly and educational/hospital “operating” foundationshave existed since the turn of the century, only recent-ly have private or corporate “grant-making” foundationsbeen established (box 3).

There have been several more recent developmentsin the area of social philanthropy that promise to sig-nificantly consolidate this emerging sector. First was thelaunching of the balanço social, or social balance sheet,campaign, which was launched by the Gazeta Mercantilnewspaper and IBASE in June 1997. Companies areencouraged to publish a report on their social contri-butions and philanthropic activities alongside their annu-al financial balance sheets.

The second development was the establishment ofan association of corporate foundations. After several

Brazil’s more recent experience with corporate philanthropyoriginates as a result of two initiatives. First, the AmericanChambers of Commerce (AMCHAM), based in São Paulo,began encouraging corporate social responsibility by estab-lishing an award called Prêmio Eco for innovative andsuccessful company-funded cultural and social projects.Over 800 companies have submitted projects to AMCHAMsince the award was established in 1982. These rangefrom sponsorship of cultural and charitable events to devel-opment grants in the areas of education, health, and envi-ronment. The combined value of the over 1,000 privatesector social projects submitted to AMCHAM in the last 17years has been estimated at nearly $1 billion, clearly demon-strating the strategic importance of this sector (Landim 1998).

The second initiative was the Fórum Empresa-Comunidade (FORECOM), which was patterned on theBritish Prince of Wales’ Business Leaders Forum and itsconcept of “audit of good practices.” The forum was estab-lished during a 1991 visit by Prince Charles, who metwith the CEOs of leading multilateral and national corpo-rations on the royal yacht Britannia while it was anchoredon the Amazon River. Although FORECOM has not evolvedinstitutionally as expected, it has nonetheless helped to fos-

ter the concept of “corporate citizenship” in leading board-rooms.

A study commissioned by the Inter-American Foundationin 1993 on the emerging corporate philanthropy sectorprovides some interesting data. A survey of 58 leadingnational and international foundations and companiesdemonstrated that the great majority are located in theSoutheast (77 percent), and most of these in São Paulo(56 percent). In terms of organizational modus operandi,50 percent reported being grant-making institutions, 15.5percent operate their own programs (schools, hospitals,and so forth), and 35.5 percent carry out both functions.Donations are provided to a wide array of areas, with thethree leading being education (36 percent), health (26 per-cent), and culture (14 percent). One of the key findings ofthe study was that although these 58 foundations fund arelatively large amount per year (approximately $100 mil-lion), they do not have explicit grant-making strategies andpractices, but disburse funds largely for charitable or marketing reasons. Only 33 percent reported havingpreestablished grant-making criteria, and only 50 percentcarried out financial audits or programmatic supervision(Lund 1993).

Box 3. Corporate Philanthropy


years of meeting informally, a group of corporate andprivate foundations, encouraged by AMCHAM andthe Kellogg Foundation, created the Grupo de Institutos,Fundações, e Empresas (GIFE). GIFE was establishedin 1995 in São Paulo and is patterned somewhat onthe U.S.-based Council on Foundations. GIFE has amembership of approximately 40 national and inter-national foundations, and has as its main goal to fosterthe growth and consolidation of the foundation sectorin Brazil.25 Over the past several years, GIFE has pro-moted national and international seminars, sponsoredtraining workshops for its members, and participatedin the national public debate on third sector issues. Asmentioned previously, GIFE collaborated with theConselho da Comunidade Solidária to draft the newnonprofit sector legislation in order to provide the sec-tor with a clearer institutional profile and encouragephilanthropic giving.

The third phenomenon in the field of social devel-opment has been the emergence of individual philan-thropy, spearheaded by generous donations fromrenowned musicians and athletes. Such well-knownstars as Xuxa, Romário, Netinho, and Ronaldinho aredonating millions of dollars to charitable organizations.Some are even establishing their own foundations, such

as the sister of late Formula 1 race car driver AyrtonSenna. As a matter of fact, recent studies show that moreand more individual Brazilians, an estimated 15 mil-lion, made charitable contributions in 1998. An addi-tional 21 million donated materials and 12 millionvolunteered their services. This growing individual giv-ing combined with expanding corporate philanthropyreportedly generates some $12 bullion dollars a year,directly benefiting some 9 million persons. This growthin philanthropy is apparently a consequence of a newapproach that stresses “civic responsibility” over the tra-ditional church- influenced charitable motivation. AsLeilah Landim stated: “Brazilians always donated, butwere motivated by charity. Now they are inspired by cit-izenship” (Veja 1999, p.154–61).

The fourth initiative in the area of corporate socialresponsibility has been the establishment of the InstitutoEthos, which is an association of some 250 small andmedium-size companies. Ethos’ principal goal is to pro-mote corporate social responsibility by encouragingcompanies to donate funds and volunteer expertise tocommunity groups, adopt business practices that areenvironmentally friendly, counter corruption and childlabor practices, and disseminate “best practice” exam-ples of corporate action.

10

2. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

Nongovernmental organizations are some of the small-est yet among the most visible of the institutional sec-tors within civil society. They have been called a “newsociological reality in Latin America” (Fernandes 1985)and “microorganisms of the democratic process” (Souza1992). The abbreviation NGO first appeared withinUnited Nations circles to refer to policy advocacy orga-nizations that were nongovernmental.26 Although thebureaucratic term stuck and is widely used today through-out the world, it does not accurately portray the natureof the diverse work carried out by these groups. TheWorld Bank uses the term NGO quite broadly, general-ly referring to intermediary organizations as well as socialmovements and community-based organizations. TheBank’s Operation Directive 14.70 defines NGOs as“groups or institutions that are entirely independent ofgovernment and characterized primarily by humanitar-ian or cooperative, rather than commercial, objectives.

The term NGOs in the Brazilian context refers to inter-mediate, nonmembership organizations whose activi-ties range from service provision to public policy advocacy.They have also been referred to as “grassroots supportorganizations,” or GSOs.27 Until now, NGOs were legal-ly considered sociedades civis sem fins lucrativos, whichare recognized in Article 16.I of the Brazilian Civil Code.28

With the passage of the new civil society law in 1999,NGOs can now opt to be legally classified as organiza-ções da sociedade civil de interesse público (OSCIPs), whichmore clearly distinguishes them from other nonprofitentities. The term NGO, until recently, was not wellknown by the Brazilian society at large. Only in 1992,with the visible role played by NGOs in the UnitedNations Conference on the Environment andDevelopment (UNCED), did the major press and pol-icymakers begin to take note of their significant role andgrowing size.29 Today the term is frequently used in the

print and televised media, usually in a favorable light,although there are recurrent episodes of negative pressstories involving alleged NGO impropriety. A furtherindication of growing NGO visibility is the increasingnumber of academic dissertations and books that arenow being written on the NGO sector. Whether oneadmires or dislikes NGOs, and both perspectives arequite present in the public policy arena, one cannotdeny their significant role in recent Brazilian history.

Origins

The Brazilian NGO community is the product of anunprecedented level of organizational ferment at thegrassroots level, which began during the early 1960sbut which was partly interrupted by the military coupof 1964. Tens of thousands of base Christian commu-nities, small producers’ associations, rural cooperatives,and neighborhood associations sprang up throughoutthe country. Most NGOs were created to respond todemands for community organizing, specialized train-ing, technical assistance, and policy analysis emanat-ing from the base. Others were born out of desire toaddress broad issues in society such as growing pover-ty, flawed government development policies, and polit-ical democratization. With the advent of there-democratization process in the late 1970s, NGOswere able to develop openly once more, this time find-ing fertile soil on which to proliferate. NGOs were notonly important players in the groundswell of civil soci-ety forces pressing for political amnesty and opening,but benefited decisively from this process. By the early1980s, NGOs could freely organize and undertake ahost of grassroots promotional initiatives. By the mid-1980’s they were entering the realm of public policy,

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 11

attempting to influence policies in such diverse areasas foreign debt, agrarian reform, and human rights. Asin other countries throughout Latin America, NGOs inBrazil were both a catalyst and the clearest evidence ofa budding civil society.

Studies have shown that NGOs were generally estab-lished by single-minded leaders who previously hadbeen community leaders seeking institutional refugewithin the church during a period of widespread repres-sion, intellectuals who grew tired of the bureaucraticconstraints typical of university structures, and politi-cal party members who had outgrown ideological ortho-doxies and sectarian postures. Many of these personsreturned from exile as the political amnesty movementgathered momentum in the late 1970s. What all of thesesocial entrepreneurs had in common was a desire to cre-ate a new, autonomous institutional space that wouldallow them to provide services directly at the grass-roots level while introducing an element of profession-alism and programmatic content to their promotionalendeavors.

Although there is growing anecdotal literature on NGOsin Brazil, there are little comprehensive information ontheir numbers and activities. The first two, more com-prehensive studies were carried out by ISER in 1988and 1991. The first study (ISER 1988) identified theexistence of 1,041 NGOs, located in 24 states and 231cities throughout Brazil. More recent estimates onBrazilian NGOs place the number at 4,000 or 5,000(Landim 1998). Two other surveys, albeit sector-spe-cific, provide further details about the NGO sector’s size.The first survey was carried out by the Ministry of Healthin 1995 and analyzed 141 NGOs that deal with AIDSthroughout the country and received funding from theministry. The other survey was published in 1996 bythe World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and documented theexistence of 725 environmental NGOs. The most recentsurvey was carried out by ABONG in 1998 and focusedon its 211 “developmental” member NGOs.

Counting the number of NGOs is also an uncertainscience throughout Latin America, since there is notmuch uniformity in the definitional criteria utilized.One study, based on the analysis of 32 NGO directo-ries, placed the number of NGOs in Latin America at4,327.30. The difficulty with counting NGOs is also pre-sent at the global level, where the estimates vary wide-

ly. One leading study placed the number of NGOs inthe developing world at 35,000 (Fisher 1993). Anotherstudy, carried out by UNDP, has placed the number ofNGOs that work in developing countries at 50,000.NGOs also play a key role worldwide in terms of chan-neling development dollars. It is estimated that over15 percent of all international development funds arechanneled through donor agency NGOs in industrialcountries. The UNDP study identified 2,500 “Northern”agencies, which fund $5.5 billion in private donationsand $2.2 billion in government funds annually, to theexisting 50,000 “Southern” NGOs.

One of the most striking features of the NGO sectoris its meteoric rise. A study carried out by ABONG in1996 showed that nearly 60 percent of the 143 lead-ing NGOs nationwide were established since 1985 and15.4 percent since 1990 (table 1). Only 21 percent ofthe NGOs are more than 20 years old. The WWF sur-vey found that only 39.2 percent of the environmentalNGOs were more than 10 years old and that the greatmajority were established at the time of the Earth Summit(UNCED).

Reflecting Brazil’s patterns of regional concentration,the greatest number of NGOs documented in the 1988study (ISER 1988) tend to be located in the southernhalf of the country. The Southeast alone accounts for53 percent of all NGOs in Brazil, while the second largestconcentration is in the Northeast, with 27 percent.Moreover, those organizations with a more nationalfocus and greater reach tend to be located in the Southeast,as is the case with applied social research and indige-nous rights organizations. The WWF study demon-strated that this skewed regional concentration is alsopartly prevalent in the environmental area where sig-nificant Amazon support work is undertaken by NGOslocated in other regions. This is the case, for instance,of such organizations as WWF, FOE, and ISA, whose

Table 1. Legal Founding Dates of 143 NGOs

Dates NGOs (Percent)

1961–69 4.91970–79 16.81980–84 18.91985–89 44.11990–94 15.4Total 100

Source: ABONG 1996.


offices are located in the more developed half of thecountry. While NGOs have strong regional character-istics, it is interesting to note that a large proportionreport having a country-wide intervention strategy, whichnot only reflects NGOs’ ambitious public policy agendas,but also the centralized nature of Brazil’s political sys-tem. A survey of leading NGOs found that a surprising46.2 percent maintain national agendas, while 50 per-cent reported a statewide scope (ABONG 1998c).

Although NGOs have had a relatively short history,their evolution has been marked by several distinctstages. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, mostNGO leaders and activists did not believe in the legit-imate role or permanence of their own sector. Sincemost NGOs were born semi-clandestinely in a time ofovert political repression during the height of the mil-itary regime, they did not see themselves as an inde-pendent “nongovernmental” sector that was permanent,but simply a temporary stage in an inexorable transi-tion to a socialist-model government in which therewould no longer be a need for an independent watch-dog sector. Beginning in the mid-1980s, leading NGOsbegan to realize that they represented their own socialsector with its own positions and interests, rather thansimply being the “voz dos quem não têm voz,” or spokesper-sons of the disfranchised poor. A clear indication ofthis newfound sense of identity was the creation in 1991of the Associação Brasileira de ONGs (ABONG), Brazil’sfirst association of developmental NGOs. This stage wasalso characterized by major NGO organizational restruc-turing, generally leading to the introduction of strate-gic planning and evaluation mechanisms, and moreclearly defined and prioritized work programs. Ratherthan being a balcão de serviços, or simply responding todemand for services, NGOs began to hone technicalexpertise, better identify their beneficiary population,and leave the community-organizing activities to thelocal community-based organizations themselves oremerging social movements such as the rural landlessmovement (MST).

Another interesting aspect of NGO evolution is thatthey were born and thrived under adverse societalconditions. While many were established during theproscribed political climate of the military regime, mostproliferated during the 1980s, commonly known as the

hemisphere’s “lost decade,” as Latin America underwenta decade of economic stagnation and worsening socialconditions. NGOs grew both in terms of numbers aswell as in institutional growth (as evidenced by the abovetable) during this period of societal crisis. Some ana-lysts feel that NGOs mushroomed precisely because ofthe political void left by governments limited by bud-get cuts and crises of governance. It was further curi-ous that while most economic indicators experienceda downturn during the 1980s, NGO budgets (almostexclusively maintained by foreign dollar donations) ben-efited by the devalued local currency.

Many NGOs have also undergone profound changesin terms of their conceptual paradigms since the fall ofthe Berlin Wall nearly 10 years ago. Long-standingconceptual notions such as state-centered developmentmodels and dependency-theory critique of capitalismhave given way to more pluralistic and results-orient-ed positions. As Brazil’s best known NGO leader, Herbert“Betinho” de Souza wrote in 1995 referring to NGOs:“Old ideological barriers reminiscent of the Cold Warneed to be replaced by a more pragmatic search for effec-tive solutions to pressing human problems” (Souza,1995, pp.49–50). Another important conceptual changeis that NGO leaders realize that their sector has a legit-imate independent role to play in Brazilian society, muchlike the nongovernmental sector in the industrial coun-tries. While during most of the Cold War Brazilian NGOseither contested or ignored the democratic tradition ofthe Western democracies, there is a growing apprecia-tion among many NGOs for the rich legacy of civilsociety in these countries, and particularly of the “asso-ciational democracy” of the United States as memorablydescribed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the mid-19th cen-tury.31 Further, not only do a growing number of BrazilianNGO leaders recognize the permanent role played byNGOs in developed countries, they maintain increas-ingly closer ties with these organizations, often pattern-ing their own institutional consolidation and fund-raisingstrategies on approaches developed in Europe and theUnited States.32 While NGOs seem to have discardedold orthodoxies and are testing new approaches, manyconsider that their original core objectives have beenmaintained. A recent independent study on the impactof NGO efforts commissioned by ABONG stated:


The change of role, leaving the more politicalwork of the ‘70s to the provision of specializedservices in the ‘90s, did not represent, on theother hand, a distancing of the NGOs from theirprevious popular mobilization activities. Whatseems radically new is the content of the socialservices provided by the NGOs now structuredwithin an institutional space capable of influ-encing the formulation and implementation ofpublic policies. 33

General Characteristics

What has made NGOs effective promotional actors inBrazil is their unique ability to straddle both the microand macro dimensions—providing services to basegroups while also focusing on national policy issues.They possess the wherewithal to address structural issueswithout losing sight of grassroots reality and concerns.Furthermore, they generally combine grassroots knowl-edge and presence with technical expertise in order todesign and implement development programs that areoften participatory, innovative, and low-cost. Today,NGOs provide services in many areas, including non-formal education, community-based health, legal assis-tance, environmental protection, community organizing,agricultural production, video production and dissem-ination, public policy formulation, urban microenter-prise assistance, and AIDS education.

Another important aspect of the NGO sector is itssingular diversity as exemplified by the 1996 ABONGsurvey (ABONG 1996). The study identified no fewerthan 70 terms utilized for the various beneficiary pop-ulations NGOs assist. These included associations (neigh-borhood, producers), children, trade unions, religiousorganizations, populations at risk (street children, pros-titutes, AIDS carriers), and ethnic populations (Afro-Brazilians, women, indigenous). Figure 1 contains theeight principal beneficiary population groups mentionedin order of size. The list demonstrates that, reflectingBrazil’s current population distribution, the majority ofNGOs direct their efforts at urban populations (52.4percent and 46.9 percent respectively), while approx-imately one quarter (22 percent and 21 percent) workwith rural groups. It is also interesting to note the high

number of second-tier NGOs that primarily provide ser-vices to other NGOs (25.8 percent). Two findings thatseem to reflect a growing trend are the NGOs that workwith children and adolescents (63.7 percent) and women(41.9 percent). The more recent ABONG survey report-ed a further rise of groups working with women orwomen’s issues to 54.8 percent (ABONG 1998b).

NGOs are also generally classified by the types ofactivities they carry out, such as community organiz-ing, research and dissemination, social service provi-sion, technical assistance and training, and public policyadvocacy. Reflecting their diversity in this area as well,a total of 27 different activities was listed in the 1996ABONG study (Landim and others). Table 2 lists theseven principal core activities reported. The most fre-quent activity cited, by far, was assesssoria, a catchallterm comprising a mixture of technical assistance/capac-ity building/training that has been used widely by NGOs

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Children andadolescents

Urbanmovements

Urbangroups

Women

Other NGOs

Generalpublic

Rural tradeunions

Ruralproducers

Percent

Note: Multiple answers were accepted.Universe: 124 NGOs.Source: ABONG 1996.

Figure 1. Principal Beneficiary Populations of NGOs


to define the singular brand of specialized assistancethey provide. It is interesting to note that two otheractivities that scored relatively high and reflect a grow-ing trend are civic education, or educação para cidada-nia, and research. As a matter of fact, a growing numberof NGOs are specializing in applied research, the qual-ity and social relevance of which is often equal to thatcarried out by leading universities.

Examples of successful efforts in each of the activi-ty areas indicated above are numerous, including thefollowing:

Technical assistance (assessoria). The Rede PTA(Programa de Tecnologia Alternativa) is a network of23 regional NGOs that provide a wide range of ser-vices to small-scale producers in the areas of agricul-tural experimentation, production, and marketing.Stretching from Maranhão to Rio Grande do Sul, thenetwork carries out joint seed experimentation pro-grams, sponsors national training workshops, and pub-lishes technical manuals on agro-ecology.

Popular education. The Federação de Orgãos deAssistência Social e Educacional (FASE), through itssix state offices nationwide, has helped establish andcontinues to provide nonformal educational and orga-nizational assistance to hundreds of community orga-nizations such as slum dwellers’ associations, ruralcooperatives, and women’s organizations.

Citizenship education. The Geledes Instituto da MulherNegra is a organization established by Afro-Brazilianwomen in São Paulo that carries out applied research,

juridical assistance, and public education in the areasof race discrimination and women’s rights. In additionto producing educational materials for low-income pop-ulations, Geledes has also undertaken well-publicizedcampaigns to counter racial stereotyping on nationaltelevision programming.

Research and policy analysis. The Instituto SócioAmbiental (ISA) carries out extensive research on indige-nous peoples, having produced the most comprehen-sive anthropological almanac and satellite image mapsavailable in Brazil. ISA provides ongoing juridical andpolicy analysis assistance to dozens of indigenous asso-ciations on issues related to land demarcation, devel-opment projects, and indigenous laws.

Information dissemination. The Instituto de Estudos,Formação e Assessoria em Políticas Sociais (POLIS) ofSão Paulo carries out applied research and populationsurveys in the areas of urban land titling, public trans-portation, sanitation, city management, and best prac-tices. Results of this research are disseminated to hundredsof neighborhood associations, labor unions, and munic-ipal governments throughout Brazil.

Advocacy campaigns. The Instituto de Estudos Sócio-Econômicos (INESC) closely monitors the legislativeagenda in the national Congress and disseminates itsfindings regularly to a network of hundreds of CSOsthroughout the country on such topics as agrarianpolicies, human rights, and the environment. INESCalso provides input to congressmen on CSO policy posi-tions and organizes grassroots campaigns to encouragepassage of laws that favor the civil society sector.

Training. Saúde e Alegria regularly promotes trainingseminars geared to hundreds of community leaders ofAmazonian riverine communities in such areas as healthprevention, agroforestry, and environmental education.Its innovative methodology includes locally producedradio/video programs and an interactive circus.

NGOs also have distinct and numerous agendas.These agendas not only vary in terms of thematic areas(such as education, agriculture, gender, environment,and human rights), but also in terms of strategic objec-

Table 2. Principal Activities of NGOs

Activities NGOs (Percent)

Technical assistance (assessoria) 41.4Popular education 14.7Citizenship education 14.1Research and policy analysis 7.4Information dissemination 4.9Advocacy campaigns 4.2Training 3.3Other 10.0Total 100

Universe: 121 NGOs.Source: ABONG 1996.


tives, methodologies, and levels. While most NGOs havelocalized and single-focus agendas (for example, to assistpoor communities in a single region, influence munic-ipal government water distribution policy, or producetraining materials on sustainable agriculture), manyNGOs have several competing agendas on different lev-els. Not long ago it was common for national-level NGOsto have a half-dozen thematic agendas implemented atthe local, national, and even international levels, asexemplified by the Instituto Brasileiro de Econômicosde Análises e Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE).34 Butmore recent pressures for specialization have led theseorganizations to focus on two or three thematic areas.The diversity and complexity of these agendas some-times lead to conflicts among NGOs. For instance, NGOswith agrarian reform agendas have sometimes clashedwith NGOs having environmental protection agendas:the resettlement needs of landless workers in the Amazonand conservation generate competing pressures. In theindigenous area, it is common for church-related andacademic-geared NGOs to diverge over such issues asthe appropriate approach to indigenous acculturationand land demarcation policies.

It is also common for NGOs at various levels to havedifferent strategic agendas. A case in point was the Bank-funded Planafloro loan, which spawned a local-nation-al-international alliance of NGOs to request an InspectionPanel investigation of the problem-plagued project inthe Amazonian State of Rondônia. While it was clearthat the Washington-based NGOs were largely inter-ested in the initiative as a another test case to help definethe role of the panel worldwide, local NGOs were pri-marily interested in improving project performance onthe ground. Although this specific NGO coalition wasdeemed as being successful in generating pressure onthe Bank and the state government, the strain of hav-ing to coordinate differing agendas clearly appeared attimes. This was the case, for instance, when the projectwas restructured in 1996 and the local NGOs decidedto focus their negotiating leverage on the creation of a$22 million small-grants fund. Several of the interna-tional NGOs involved later felt that the local NGOs set-tled for less than they should have, leaving many of theproject’s original environmental problems unresolved.35

NGOs not only clash among themselves over differ-ent agendas, but it is also not uncommon for NGOs to

have conflicts with social movements and communitygroups. While NGOs were initially born out of grass-roots social movements and generally maintain strongties to community groups and national social move-ments, at times NGOs and groups and movements dodiverge over public policy, funding, and other issues.In the AIDS area for instance, AIDS NGOs have attimes clashed with the Rede Nacional de Pessoas Vivendocom HIV/AIDS (RNP+), a growing social movementconsisting of persons living with HIV/AIDS, over thestrategic priorities of the AIDS movement. This mis-understanding seems fueled in part by a competitionfor funds, since the NGOs tend to be better staffed andfunded than their RNP+ counterparts. The social move-ments do seem to have reason to complain in this respect,though a recent survey carried out by four Dutch donor agencies in Brazil demonstrates that 80 to 90 per-cent of their funds is allocated to NGOs, while only 10to 20 percent is earmarked for social movements(ABONG 1998a).

In other areas, conflict between NGOs and their socialmovement allies are generally over the naturally evolv-ing issues of autonomy and leadership. As social move-ments grow in strength and sophistication, they beginto feel that the capacity-building support and policyguidance provided by NGOs, so key in the first phaseof organizational structuring, is no longer needed. Thishas been the case, for instance, in several social move-ments of the povos da floresta, or traditional forest pop-ulations, such as the rubber tappers and indigenouspeoples. While NGOs were key to the establishment andgrowth of the Conselho Nacional de Seringueiros (CNS)in the mid-1980s, by the time the movement came ofage through the leadership and martyrdom of its leader,Chico Mendes, many leaders within the CNS balked atwhat they considered NGO opportunism and tutelage.Similar clashes have occurred between the newly cre-ated networks of indigenous associations, such as CAPOIBand COIAB, and traditional indigenous support NGOsover issues of representation and leadership.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out thatNGOs and social movements also seem to have a knackfor putting aside differences and coalescing into unit-ed networking fronts when necessary, as will be dis-cussed below. These issues of NGO–social movementinstitutional conflicts are also being effectively addressed


by the creation of joint public policy networks andforums. This is the case for instance, of the BrazilianNGO and Social Movement Fórum on the Environmentand Development (Fórum Brasileiro), which advertis-es in its name that the network is composed of bothNGOs and social movements. A second example is theFórum pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça Campo, whichcomprises the landless movement (MST) and small farm-ers’ national labor federation (CONTAG), as well as lead-ing NGOs such as IBASE and INESC.

Staffs and Budgets

The 1991 ISER study revealed an increasing sophisti-cation of NGOs in carrying out their own developmentagenda as reflected in their staffing (ISER 1991). Whilemost had begun largely as “one-man bands,” the studyfound that the leading 125 NGOs employed 2,660staff persons, or an average of 21 staff persons. This issimilar to the Ministry of Health survey that found thatthe average AIDS NGO has a staff of 20, although 35percent of the organizations have fewer than 10 per-sons. The 1991 ISER study showed that NGOs are ledby a well-educated group of professionals, with 87percent having college degrees and 39 percent gradu-ate degrees, percentages many times higher than thenational average.

In terms of budgets, the 1991 ISER and 1996 ABONGstudies (figure 2) showed that the great majority, or 88percent of NGOs, have annual operating budgets ofunder $500,000, and only approximately 7 percent havebudgets over $1 million. It is interesting to note that inthe three years which separated these two surveys, thetwo ends of the pyramid (those budgets of less than$30,000 and those of more than $1 million) decreased,thus making NGO budgets more uniform in size. Amore recent ABONG survey evidences that the largerbudgets (over $1 million) have climbed slightly to 7percent in 1998 from 6.3 percent in 1994, demonstratingthat a few, more established and “new generation” NGOs have actually been able to grow during this period of overall downturn in NGO budgets (ABONG 1998a).

In terms of total numbers, the study found that thecombined budget of these leading NGOs was $28 mil-

lion (102 NGOs) in 1990, and $31 million (121 NGOs)in 1994.

The 1991 ISER and 1996 ABONG studies found thatNGOs are largely dependent on foreign funding, manyreporting that over 90 percent of their budgets origi-nate from overseas. The principal sources of this inter-national funding are religious agencies, privatefoundations, and a few government entities, with themajority being Protestant and Catholic church agencies.A study commissioned by four Dutch donor agencies(Bilance, ICCO, Novib, and Solidaridad) found that 37donor agencies channeled $71.7 million into BrazilianNGOs in 1994 (Netherlands 1997). The largest flow ofdevelopment dollars came from Germany (40 per-cent), followed by the Netherlands (28 percent), theUnited States (13 percent), Great Britain (8 percent),Switzerland (5 percent), Canada (0.9 percent), and Italy(0.8 percent). It should be noted as well that the rela-tionship between NGOs and their donor agencies hasnot simply revolved around financial transfer of resources.There has traditionally been an “ethos of solidarity” inthe agency-NGO relationship, characterized by a notionof North-South partnership. Partnership activities car-ried out have included: regular consultation meetings;technical assistance exchange on such issues as fund-raising and project evaluation; and joint devel-opment education and public policy advocacy cam-paigns in Europe.36

05

10152025

3035404550

less 30 30–100 100–500 500–1000 over 1000

(US$1,000)

19901993

Percent

Figure 2. NGO Budgets, 1990 and 1993

Note: Universe = 102 and 121 NGOs.Source: ISER 1991 and ABONG 1996.


There is growing evidence that the long-standingdependence of NGOs on their traditional internation-al donor partners has reached its limit and can no longersustain the growth of the NGO sector. While NGOsexperienced substantial increases in their operating bud-gets and staffs in the 1980s, in recent years they havesuffered serious budgetary shortfalls leading to pro-gram and staff reduction for many, and even closurefor a few. Well-known NGOs such as IBASE, ISER, CLF,and FASE have all had to adopt drastic cost-cuttingmeasures over the last several years, ranging fromclosing programs and reducing employees, to closingdown offices.

Retraction in NGO budgets has occurred for sever-al reasons. First, nonofficial donor agencies are experi-encing a historic shift in their budgets and changingfunding priorities for a variety of reasons. These includea paradigm shift away from “political solidarity” toprogrammatic result-based giving; shrinking budgetsbecause of growing economic hardships at home; gen-eralized “donor fatigue”; and official foreign assistancemoneys being diverted to new areas such as EasternEurope and Africa. As a matter of fact, many of the tra-ditional donor agencies are undergoing institutionalreengineering processes involving shifts in fundingpriorities (both programmatic and geographic) and sig-nificant changes in organizational structures, which isnot too different from the changes being felt by theBrazilian CSOs. This is the case, for instance, of threedonor agencies that have historically funded CSOs inBrazil: Oxfam/UK, ICCO, and the IAF.

Second, NGO budgets (which were largely dollar-based) were adversely affected by the adoption (in July1994) of the Plano Real, which abolished the currencygap. ABONG reported that its members experiencedan average 30 percent reduction in their budgets in thefour years following the enactment of the of the PlanoReal. Paradoxically, NGOs budgets rebounded some-what with the major devaluation of the Real that occurredin early 1999 in the wake of the global financial crisisstretching from Bangkok to Brasília.

Third, the NGOs themselves have reached a level ofgrowth and absorptive capacity that can no longer besustained by this traditional and limited level of sup-port. Without new, less traditional, and larger sourcesof funding, NGOs cannot break out of the micro-level

threshold and be able to have regional and even nation-al impact. It has become clear to many NGO leadersthat they need to branch out and develop new inter-national and (especially) local sources of funding inthe private sector, government, and multilateral orga-nizations, as well as test other revenue-generatingapproaches such as dues-paying membership bases andselling of services.

Unlike their developmental counterparts, the WWFstudy found that the environmental NGOs largely sub-sist on local funding. While a surprising 52.8 percentof their combined estimated annual budget of $84 mil-lion comes from their membership37 and 28 percent israised from selling services or products, only 15.7 per-cent is received from international donations. Morerecently, an increasing number of developmental NGOshave reported being able to offset their dependence oninternational donor agencies by accessing funds fromthe government and corporate sectors, as well as sell-ing services and publications. Some NGOs, such asIBASE, have literally inverted their dependence on for-eign sources from 70 percent to 30 percent over the pastfive years. A few, such as the rural development NGOAACC in Rio Grande do Norte, have been able to reducetheir foreign dependency considerably by leveragingfunds from government agencies and other localsources.38 Another cogent example is the RondôniaNGO Forum, which went from complete dependencyon foreign funds to establishing a consultants’ cooper-ative that allows individual members to be contractedby government agencies while avoiding cumbersomecontractual provisions.39

The latest survey carried out by ABONG in 1998indeed demonstrates a historic shift in NGO fundingpatterns, with a greater proportion of funding comingfrom government and private sector sources. As table3 shows, almost half (47.2 percent) of the 184 NGOssurveyed reported receiving government funds. Of these,10.6 percent raised over 50 percent of their budgetsfrom government funds, with a surprising nearly 5percent reporting 90 percent of income from this source.Within the government sphere, the federal sector pro-vided the greatest proportion of funds (30.4 percent),followed by state governments (19.5 percent). Thesurvey also demonstrated that 22.2 percent receivedfunds from private companies and foundations, and

45.5 percent reported raising some funds through thesales of products or services (ABONG 1998).

As will be discussed later, the growth of governmentfinancing of NGOs is a significant and important newphenomenon. While NGOs have historically avoidedreceiving government funds, there seems to be a grow-ing acceptance of this modality.40 A recent study byDutch agencies published by ABONG reveals that:

Many partners have begun to collaborate withthe state, many times for financial reasons. Evenwork carried out through contracts can producesynergies in the achieving of common objectives,altering the collaboration between the public andprivate sectors, or leading the government to improveits implementation (ABONG 1998a, p. vi).

NGOs have also attracted the attention of Braziliangovernment and multilateral development agencies. TheWorld Bank and the IDB have come to realize that NGOsmay be important institutional actors to ensure effec-tive and sustainable development at the local level. AWorld Bank guide to working with NGOs stated that:

By offering a perspective which is unique fromthat of government or the private sector, NGOscan help to provide a more complete and bal-anced picture. NGOs have been particularly effec-tive in drawing attention to environmentalconcerns and in bringing to the forefront the per-spective of those whose political voice is weak-est (World Bank 1995, p. 22).

In the case of the World Bank, although it has nomechanisms to fund NGOs directly, there are a grow-

ing number of “small grant funds” in Bank-fundedprojects (AIDS/STD, Pilot Program to Conserve theBrazilian Rain Forest, PNMA/PED, Planafloro, Prodeagro)that finance thousands of NGOs throughout Brazil (table5). The IDB, on the other hand, has even more experi-ence funding NGOs directly. The Small Projects Fund,managed out of its Brasília office, has channeled near-ly $10 million to 19 urban NGOs since 1978 in suchareas as education, microcredit, and health. The fundhas a limit of $500,000 per project. For each NGOproject funded, the IDB also funds a parallel technicalassistance cooperation grant to ensure that needed tech-nical assistance is provided in such areas as programimplementation and financial management. Althoughtechnically a loan, the low interest rate of 1 percentand the 25-year repayment period practically transformthis financing into a grant. On the other hand, sincethe IDB applies many of the same administrative guide-lines to these small loans as it does to the larger ones,the approval process has often been quite cumbersomeand lengthy.

In short, it is indeed ironic that at a time when offi-cial development agencies such as the World Bank arebeginning to understand the value of NGOs as key devel-opment actors and are exploring the possibility of sup-porting them more directly, many NGOs are threatenedwith deep reductions or closure because of the cutbackof traditional development aid. While there are fund-ing opportunities for NGOs emerging within new sec-tors such as the government, private sector, andmultilateral banks, there is a serious issue of timingthat could undermine a possible successful transitionprocess from traditional to new sources of funding forNGOs.

Networking Efforts

The growth and consolidation of NGOs have also ledto a desire to seek greater interinstitutional collabora-tion and integration. The underlying reasons for thisseem to revolve around the need to define a commonidentity, learn from similar experiences, and speakwith a stronger and more unified voice within the pub-lic policy arena. The first networking initiatives appearedat the local and regional levels—especially in theNortheast and Southeast regions of the country—as


Table 3. Government Funding of NGOs

Percent of Budget Percent of NGOs*

0–10 14.610–30 16.030–50 5.950–90 5.990–100 4.9No government funds 50.0Did not report 2.7Total 100

Source: ABONG 1998c.Universe: 184 NGOs.

NGOs began to sponsor meetings to discuss program-matic and technical aspects of their work. With time,as NGOs began to notice their expanding presencethroughout the country and take stock of their grow-ing impact, they felt the need to seek greater interac-tion at a national level.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Brazil experienced animpressive surge in NGO networking efforts. The firsttruly national meeting of NGOs occurred in 1985 andbrought together some 20 to 30 leading organizationsto share experiences and explore possible common pub-lic policy strategies. Since then, numerous national meet-ings have been held to discuss such issues as agrarianreform, the environment, and the changing interna-tional donor landscape. Today many of the larger cities(Recife, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre)and states (Rondônia, Mato Grosso, Rio Grande doNorte, and Santa Catarina) have permanent networksof NGOs known as ”Forums de ONGs,” which meeton a regular basis. Perhaps the most dynamic of theselocal NGO forums has been in Recife, where approxi-mately 20 NGOs have met regularly and carried sever-al successful policy advocacy and service provisionactivities over the past 10 years.41 There are also per-manent national NGO coalitions around thematic areassuch as the Amazon, rural development, education,AIDS, and human rights. These include:

• Fórum Nacional Permanente de Entidades Não-Governamentais de Defesa dos Direitos da Criançae do Adolescente (Fórum DCA), established in 1988,which congregates 67 children’s service and humanrights organizations

• Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos (MNDH),which congregates some 250 human rights centersthroughout Brazil

• Forum Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociaispara o Meio Ambiente e o Desenvolvimento, withsome 130 environmental organizations nationwide

• Rede Brasil sobre Instituições Financeiras Multilaterais(Rede Brasil), which monitors multilateral devel-opment bank activities in Brazil

• Rede Nacional de AIDS ONGs, with over 200 organizations

• Fórum Nacional pela Reforma Agrária e Justiça noCampo, which also congregates the major rural socialmovements and organizations such as MST, CON-

TAG, and CPT• Fórum Nacional de Entidades Civis de Defesa do

Consumidor, composed of some 20 NGOs andhousewives’ associations geared to consumer rightsadvocacy.

The most significant national coalescing effort to dateis the founding of the National Association of BrazilianNGOs (ABONG). The convening assembly was held inAugust 1991 in Rio de Janeiro and brought together135 leading NGOs from throughout Brazil represent-ing a diverse array of organizations. The overarchingpurpose of the association as spelled out in the con-vening document was to ”express the common identi-ty of NGOs committed to the democratization of Braziliansociety and who have a tradition of providing supportand services to grassroots movements.” The principaloperational objectives of the association were definedas threefold: (1) to promote greater discussion andnetworking among NGOs around common develop-ment themes and strategies; (2) represent and defend theinterest of NGOs before Brazilian society and the gov-ernment; and (3) promote greater international coop-eration. Today ABONG has a membership of 211organizations throughout Brazil and maintains eightregional forums.

There are three interesting phenomena associatedwith the networking characteristics of Brazilian NGOs.First, despite the continental size of the country, NGOshave found it relatively easy to establish national net-works. While regional differences sometimes lead todiffering agendas and conflicts in some networks,Brazilian networks, for the most part, have been amongthe most active and consolidated in Latin America.Second, NGO networks tend to be quite interconnect-ed and flexible. It is common for there to be greatintermingling among various networks and a certainlevel of informality among the various coalitions. Forinstance, while many NGOs within Rede Brasil are mem-bers of ABONG, the association itself is a member ofRede. At other times, organizations that are not formallymembers of a particular network will nonetheless signpublic policy petitions for constituents of that net-work. Third, NGO coalition building tends to be quitefluid and closely tied to the ebb and flow of the politi-cal scenario. Large coalitions will form over particularissues such as burnings in the rain forest, a visible case


of human rights violation, or even the representationin a U.N. conference, only to be disbanded shortly after.On the other hand, NGOs tend to show an uncannyability to put aside differences when there is a need tolaunch public policy campaigns in the face of per-ceived common “enemies” such as the government orthe World Bank. This was the case, for instance, inRondônia with the variety of organizations (indige-nous associations, rubber tapper cooperatives, envi-ronmental NGOs, women’s groups) that compose theNGO Forum. While these groups commonly clashedover specific programmatic issues, they invariably unit-ed when larger policy issues were at stake. This wasdemonstrated during the conflict-ridden PlanafloroInspection Panel process, when the NGOs always seemedto muster a united front, often to the chagrin of stategovernment officials who hoped to sow division with-in their ranks.

Brazilian NGOs have also made impressive networkingheadway on the international level. Information shar-ing, staff exchanges, and meetings addressing com-mon topics such as poverty alleviation, human rights,and the environment have been occurring on a regularbasis since the late 1980s. From the onset, the level ofinteraction has been more intense with NGOs in Europeand the United States, but contact has also been grow-ing with groups in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Amilestone in their international outreach efforts occurredduring the United Nations Conference on theEnvironment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.Brazilian NGOs hosted the Global Forum, an NGO net-working summit held simultaneously with the officialU.N. conference. The 14-day forum brought togethersome 25,000 NGO representatives—including envi-ronmentalists, religious leaders, appropriate-technolo-gy entrepreneurs, grassroots community leaders, andscientists—from 167 countries. There were over 500workshops, seminars, press conferences, and exhibi-tions held among the green and white tents on FlamengoBeach. Brazilian NGOs played a key role in planningthe event, managing the $12 million budget, and lead-ing thematic discussions that produced 39 alternativeNGO ”treaties.” Overall, UNCED provided BrazilianNGOs with an opportunity to receive public visibilitywithin Brazil and demonstrate that the NGO sectorhad come of age.

Since then, Brazilian NGOs have increased their pres-ence in a variety of international networks that work insuch areas as AIDS, women’s rights, and sustainableagriculture. As such, leading Brazilian NGOs have attend-ed the most recent thematic United Nations conferences:Vienna (1993, human rights); Cairo (1994, populationissues); Copenhagen (1995, social development); Beijing(1995, women’s issues); and Istanbul (1996, urban devel-opment). One interesting consequence of this height-ened level of globalization is that a growing number ofNGO technicians have begun to have the same oppor-tunity to travel worldwide as their government and Bankcounterparts, leading to a more sophisticated transna-tional perspective. While government officials and thepress often question these international linkages, someeven stating that the NGOs are hostages to the agendasof their international donor agencies, these linkagesseem to be driven more by pragmatic considerations.As exemplified by the Planafloro case (box 6), NGOsrealize that they could often have more leverage overthe state and even federal governments if they soughtsupport for their critique of the Bank-financed projectin Washington and Europe. As a recent book on inter-national networks states: “Transnational value-basedadvocacy networks are particularly useful where onestate is relatively immune to direct local pressure andlinked activists elsewhere have better access to theirown governments or to international organizations.Linking local activists with media and activists abroadcan then create a characteristic ”boomerang’ effect, whichcurves around local state indifference and repressionto put foreign pressure on local policy elites” (Keckand Sikkink 1998, p. 200).

Reflecting this newfound global perspective, BrazilianNGOs are beginning to demonstrate an interest in thepresence and impact of multilateral development insti-tutions as witnessed by the establishment of Rede Brasil(box 4). In short, we are witnessing a unprecedentedphenomenon—the globalização, or the “international-ization,” of civil society—where the borders betweenglobal and local are increasingly becoming more virtu-al than real. On the other hand, while these transna-tional coalitions represent the emerging of what somehave called a sociedade civil planetária, or “global civilsociety,” their growth is not certain. Often these coali-tions seem fragile and based on single-issue campaigns


or one-time events. A recent book edited by civil soci-ety expert Jonathan Fox on the topic did not find evi-dence that Northern-Southern advocacy coalitions arenecessarily in the process of greater consolidation. Itstates that “many of the relationships are limited to frag-ile fax-and-cyberspace skeletons, and the strong onesare often based more on key cross-cultural individualsthan on dense institutional bonds” (Fox 1998, p. 30).

Taking Up the Civic Banner

One of the most apparent results of greater networkingamong Brazilian NGOs has been their impressive newpresence in the public policy arena. This expandedrole reflects the activist nature of their own institution-al persona. The 1991 ISER survey of NGO leaders states:

NGOs are small, but they propose to act on wideobjectives. No fewer than half of our sample define

their role as “contributing towards an alterna-tive development project,” while 36 percent seetheir role as “the elaboration of alternative pub-lic policies.” They are small, private organiza-tions, but they behave as if they were big andpublic (ISER 1991, p. 21).

NGOs promote public policy activism at the grass-roots level by teaching the basic tenets of citizenshipand encouraging the poor to exercise their rights as fullcitizens. Furthermore, their institutional autonomy—especially in relation to the government—and for-ward-leaning social agendas have made them effectivemonitors of government action and advocates of pub-lic sector accountability. Political scientist and currentMinister of Culture Francisco Weffort recognized thedemocratizing nature of NGOs by stating in the nation-al weekly Veja that NGOs “are a genuine product ofdemocracy and reflect a maturation of Brazilian soci-ety” (Veja 1994). As was demonstrated earlier, NGOs


One of the most recent NGO networking efforts has coa-lesced around the perceived need to better understandand monitor the work of international financial institutionsin Brazil. The Rede Brasil sobre Instituições FinanceirasMultilaterais (Rede Brasil) is a network of NGOs and socialmovements established with the explicit purpose of mon-itoring and influencing the macro policies and fundingstrategies of the multilateral development agencies in Brazil,namely the World Bank and the IDB.

More recently, Rede has shifted its advocacy strategy tofocusing its attention more directly on the Brazilian gov-ernment, namely pressuring to increase the oversight roleof the legislative branch over multilateral loans. In theprocess, Rede has also attempted to develop cordial infor-mation exchange relations with SEAIN and other execu-tive branch government agencies.

Rede Brasil was established in 1995 and today has 51institutional members, ranging from single NGOs (FASE, IBASE) and NGO networks (ABONG, GTA), tonational trade union confederations (CONTAG, CNB). The major activities undertaken by Rede Brasil to dateinclude a study of six World Bank and IDB projects to deter-mine the levels of stakeholder participation;42 the publi-cation of a guide on the World Bank;43 dozens of regional training and planning workshops; and schedul-

ing visits by project stakeholders to the Bank’s offices inBrasília. Rede Brasil has closely tracked the following WorldBank projects: Planafloro, Prodeagro, Northeast EducationII, AIDS/STD, Itaparica Resettlement, and PROSANEAR(Belém). Rede has also carried out a public campaign, involving the Brazilian Congress, to obtain access andpromote a participatory CAS process in Brazil.44 Rede isconsidered one of the most representative Bank-monitoring networks in Latin America because of the broad-based thematic and geographic coverage of its memberorganizations.

Rede Brasil has strong linkages with North Americanand Latin American NGOs and important official repre-sentation at several key Bank-NGO liaison committees. Itis a member of the NGO Working Group on the WorldBank (NGOWG), Structural Adjustment ParticipatoryReview Initiative (SAPRI) coordination committee, and of the Latin America regional steering committee.Although Rede has a small staff (one executive director andan administrative assistant) housed in the Brasília officesof INESC, much of the research, networking, and advoca-cy work is carried out by the member institutions such asFASE, IBASE, Ação Educativa, and CONTAG. Rede Brasilis funded by OXFAM/UK, the Ford Foundation, ChristianAid, and the MacArthur Foundation.

Box 4. Rede Brasil Monitors Bank Portfolio

have of late begun to exercise this public watchdogrole at the national level. The principal public policyareas most intensely and successfully addressed by theNGOs have been children’s rights, indigenous issues,women’s issues, and AIDS.

In the children’s area, for instance, a national net-work of children’s service and human rights organiza-tions coalesced in the Fórum DCA successfully lobbiedthe Brazilian Congress to pass the first comprehensivelaw on children and adolescent rights and establish hun-dreds of citizen-government policy councils through-out the country.45 NGOs also played a key role duringthe country’s Constituent Assembly of 1996–1998 byencouraging an unprecedented level of grassroots par-ticipation in the law-making process. NGOs were instru-mental in promoting local constituent seminars,organizing citizens’ petitions, bringing community lead-ers to testify before Congress, drafting legislation, andlobbying for the passage of laws.

This new important civic role played by NGOs wasno more apparent than with the significant behind-the-scenes support it contributed to the impeachmentof President Fernando Collor in 1992 and the subse-quent Anti-Poverty Campaign (box 5). The impeach-

ment movement began in June 1992 as political lead-ers and a host of civil society representatives held avigil at the Congress to demand a full accounting of cor-ruption charges against President Collor. What grewout of this initial effort was the Movimento pela Éticana Política, composed of 850 professional associations,unions, NGOs, student and teacher organizations, churchagencies, and community groups organized in hundredsof local impeachment committees. Alongside other larg-er national organizations, such as OAB, CUT, CNBB,and ABI, which organized the colorful and large streetdemonstrations, NGOs convened the planning meet-ings, organized letter-writing campaigns, and in gen-eral assisted with the organizational wherewithal for themovement’s success in Brasília and cities throughoutBrazil. The impact of this movement, coupled withstrong public opinion sentiment, led to Collor’s impeach-ment by the Brazilian Congress in December 1992.The organizational role played by such NGOs as IBASEand INESC in the impeachment process represented theemergence of a new concept in Brazilian politics, thatof an independent, nonpartisan citizens’ movement thatdemands greater ethical standards and political account-ability from those in public office.


Buoyed by their success in the impeachment of Collor, lead-ing NGOs associated with other national organizationsspearheaded an unprecedented anti-poverty campaigncalled Ação pela Cidadania Contra a Miséria e Pela Vida,better known as the Anti-Poverty Campaign. Launched in March of 1993 with the support of President ItamarFranco, who established a national food policy council(Conselho de Segurança Alimentar/CONSEA), the Anti-PovertyCampaign grew to unprecedented proportions. It is esti-mated that over 3,300 local Anti-Poverty Committees wereestablished in all 27 states of Brazil congregating such diver-sified volunteers as employees of the Bank of Brazil, NGOsstaffers, housewives, charitable groups, labor unions, andthe military.

The campaign was able to distribute millions of cestasbásicas, or basic foodstuffs; carry out hunger surveys with-in low-income neighborhoods; support gardening and waterprojects; and prod local and state governments to improvesocial services to the poor. The campaign generated animpressive level of public interest and media attention asevidenced by a nationwide survey carried out by IBOPE,which reported that 68 percent of Brazilians had heard

about the campaign and that 93 percent said they felt theinitiative was worthwhile. Further, the survey found thata surprising 32 percent, or 25.6 million persons, had con-tributed money or supplies and that 2.8 million personshad volunteered in local Anti-Poverty Committees.

As with the impeachment of Collor, NGOs played animportant role in the Anti-Poverty Campaign, organizinglocal committees, serving on the CONSEA, and publiciz-ing the campaign. Although the Anti-Poverty Campaignwas largely decentralized in its structure, key institution-al leadership was provided by IBASE in Rio de Janeiro andINESC in Brasília. The head of IBASE, Herbert de Souza(Betinho), even became the leading figure of the campaign.A charismatic and transcendent figure because of his per-sonal bout with the HIV virus and eloquent advocacy forthe country’s disenfranchised majority, Betinho not onlybecame a national civic leader, but came to symbolize thevery ethical nature of the citizen’s movement. Althoughthere are no definitive figures on the number of peoplereached through the campaign, it is estimated that 16 mil-lion destitute persons received food, clothing, health care,and jobs.

Box 5. Anti-Poverty Campaign

The NGOs’ recent experience with national civic cam-paigns has been important, for it has allowed them toincorporate the issue of citizenship into their work. Thisis a broadly defined agenda that includes democracy,social equity, ethnic and gender diversity, and politicalplurality. The citizenship banner has also allowed NGOsto get away from partisan alliances and sectarian strate-gies, thus validating them as autonomous public actorswho operate independent of the state and politicalparties. Although NGOs are sometimes perceived bygovernments as being partisan, most often associatedwith center-left parties such as the Workers Party (PT),when one examines their track-record more closely, it become evident that NGOs are generally above thepartisan political fray and can thus defend larger socialconcerns. This is evidenced by the recent administra-tions of the Workers Party in such cities as Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, and Brasília. In these instances,while some NGO technicians joined the incoming administrations, the majority remained in their insti-tutions and did not feel constrained to criticize specific government policies and programs when deemed necessary.

Challenges of Consolidation

As Lester Salamon pointed out in a speech deliveredduring a hemispheric conference on the Third Sector,“The Three Faces of the Third Sector” (Salamon 1996),civil society organizations, and specifically NGOs, cur-rently face three challenges in order to be able to becomemore institutionalized, larger, and sustainable. Althoughhe was speaking about NGOs worldwide, the lessonsapply well to Brazilian NGOs. Now that NGOs haveachieved greater public visibility and scrutiny, the firstchallenge they need to meet is to demonstrate moreinstitutional accountability and transparency in theirprogrammatic and financial management. As a leadingcivil society researcher, Fúlvia Rosemberg, states: “It isessential that society have adequate information aboutthese civil society organizations, such as their budgetsor financial reports, where they spend their money,where their funding comes from … so the recipients ofthe services being provided are protected” (Goncalves1996, p.120).

This could be done through the development of acode of ethics and through the publishing of annualfinancial reports. At present few NGOs disseminate theirannual financial and programmatic reports or main-tain professional and independent boards of directorsthat can help ensure greater stewardship of their funds.At most, NGOs report to their donor agencies, but theseare generally in Europe and can thus only carry out lim-ited monitoring. This trend is changing, though, as moreNGOs are beginning to adopt autonomous boards ofdirectors and are inviting representatives of their ben-eficiary groups to participate in strategic planningexercises. Their uncertain legal status also needs to beclarified and regularized through improved and strength-ened legislation that regulates the sector and encour-ages philanthropic giving.

The second challenge is for NGOs to demonstratemore competency in their work and more effectivenessin their results. There is no question that NGOs havebeen effective community and institutional organizers,as witnessed by their meteoric rise over the past twodecades. The challenge now is to improve their orga-nizational management and technical skills in order toexpand the reach and impact of their efforts. The tra-ditional informal and antibusiness approach needs togive way to more professional management approach-es and specialized technical knowledge. As a leadingNGO leader from Recife stated, “The most importantrole of NGOs in the past was to denounce ‘wrongs.’The next phase was to develop proposals for theConstitution—but some NGOs became lost at this stagebecause they were generalists. NGOs can’t afford to begeneralists anymore.”46

This will require more investment in personnel train-ing and capacity-building initiatives. Reflecting thistrend, several international donor agencies and Brazilianuniversities have established capacity-building trainingcourses for NGOs and charitable organizations.47 Therealso needs to be greater concern and capacity to assessand disseminate results and impact. Research is alreadyunder way by NGO networks such as ABONG and theirtraditional donor agencies to develop practical resultsindicators and benchmarks. ABONG published in 1998a book assessing the social impact of 12 NGO case-studyexperiences written by independent university profes-sors.48 While the results are inconclusive in some of


the case studies because of the lack of baseline evalua-tion data, in others it is clear that NGOs have had a sig-nificant impact in a thematic area or region. Donoragencies have also launched their own results assess-ment programs, pressured by their governments andsocieties to demonstrate the effectiveness of their for-eign assistance investments. The Inter-AmericanFoundation, for instance, developed its own concep-tual model, the “Grassroots Development Framework,”with 22 tangible and intangible results indicators.49

Seven of the leading protestant agencies (German, Dutch,British, Swiss, and Danish) established the Processo deArticulação e Diálogo process, which involved a seriesof evaluation meetings with its 200 counterpart granteesin Brazil.

The Bank and other official donor agencies are alsoincreasingly interested in assessing the impact of NGOwork. A 1997 overview of NGO performance carriedout by the OECD/DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluationfound that:

NGO impact is hard to assess because most assess-ments, lacking adequate baseline data and mon-itoring, rely on qualitative data and judgement,have been undertaken rapidly, and have focusedon project outputs. It recommends that donorsand NGOs … together … examine this issue insome depth, not only in order to unravel com-peting claims and assertions, but in order to help

expand the common ground between donors andNGOs and to reduce potential conflict.50

The third challenge for NGOs is to ensure greaterinstitutional and financial sustainability. The lack oflong-term survival strategies is most apparent in bud-getary terms, since most NGOs in Brazil continue to begreatly dependent on foreign donor agencies. But thisis true of human resources as well, as many NGOs arepoorly staffed beyond their founding leaders. Whilemany NGOs attract bright young technicians, they oftendo not stay for long because of low salaries and insta-bility brought on by cyclical budgetary shortfalls. Thecivil society sector needs to be seen as a career oppor-tunity rather than a professional way station to gov-ernment or academia. In the budgetary area, NGOs needto branch out and develop new international and (espe-cially) local sources of funding in the private sector, gov-ernment, and multilateral organizations, as well asattempt other revenue-generating approaches such asdeveloping a dues-paying membership base and rais-ing funds through selling of services. Several NGOs anddonor agencies are also beginning to consider estab-lishing endowments and permanent local funds to financeNGOs. ABONG, for instance, has received funding fromseveral donors, including the IDB, to explore the pos-sibility of establishing an NGO-geared community foun-dation in Brazil.


25

3. Relations among Civil Society,Government, and the World Bank

Civil Society View of the Bank

Meeting Methodology

At the suggestion of the Bank’s Resident Representativein Brasília and in order to ascertain the views of civilsociety organizations about the Bank and the impact ofits presence in Brazil, a series of consultation meetingswith representatives of civil society organizations washeld throughout the country during the months ofMay through October 1996. Meetings were held inBrasília and six state capitals in all five geographic regionsof the country: Cuiabá (Center-West); Rio de Janeiro,São Paulo (Southeast), Porto Alegre (South), Recife(Northeast), and Belém (North). The meetings had threeunderlying objectives:

• Inform civil society organizations about the Bankand its operations in Brazil.

• Hear the perceptions and opinions of the civil soci-ety organizations about the Bank.

• Consult them on how to improve dialogue as a wayof promoting more collaborative Government–CivilSociety–Bank relations.

The meetings were divided into two parts: a pre-sentation on the Bank and a discussion by meetingparticipants on their view of the Bank (guided by a set of questions distributed before hand). The presen-tation on the Bank was given via 50 transparencies anddivided into three parts: (1) origins and characteristicsof the Bank; (2) Bank policies on poverty alleviation,CSO interaction, stakeholder participation, and infor-mation disclosure; and (3) the Bank’s country strategyand portfolio.

These were focus group–style meetings, thus theywere small and informal, and followed a participatoryapproach. Each meeting lasted approximately four hoursand had a facilitator chosen from local civil society orga-nizations. An average of 12 persons participated permeeting, totaling over 85 participants. As a demon-stration of the interest elicited by these meetings, 90percent of those invited participated or sent a repre-sentative. A wide spectrum of organizations, representinga variety of thematic areas, was invited in order to pro-mote as ample a discussion as possible. The areas includ-ed agriculture, education, the environment, women’srights, health, human rights, microcredit, Afro-Brazilianissues, development policies, street children, indige-nous issues, and urban development. In order to guar-antee wide institutional representation, a complementaryset of actors were invited: NGOs, social movements,nongovernmental donor agencies that have funded Bank-civil society dialogue (OXFAM/UK, Ford and the Inter-American Foundations), and social scientists who haveexpertise in this area.

Below is a summary of the many comments madeby the meeting participants. For a complete record ofparticipants’ comments, see Attachment B and for a listof participants see Attachment C. As stated before, theterm civil society organizations (CSOs) will be usedthroughout the remainder of the paper as a broaderdescriptor to refer to community groups, NGOs, socialmovements, and so forth.

Participants’ Comments

The comments made by the meeting participants aregrouped in four major topics: policy issues, operational

matters, institutional relations, and specific project performance.

Policy Issues • The Bank has an image in Brazil much more asso-

ciated with the policies of structural adjustment ofthe IMF than with a development agency that fundspoverty alleviation and other social initiatives. Inthis light, the Bank seems to have an economic andtechnocratic approach to development, often ignor-ing the social development or organizational aspectsof development.

• Several commented that the Bank’s approach is toocompartmentalized in different sectors and that amore integrated and holistic approach to humandevelopment is needed.

• It is also necessary for the Bank to address the caus-es of poverty and not only its consequences.

Institutional Relations • The relationship between the Bank and the Brazilian

government is not clear, and each side seems to blamethe other when projects experience problems.

• At times the Bank has a positive role in encourag-ing governments to maintain a more open and col-laborative posture with civil society.

• The World Bank should coordinate its efforts bet-ter with the IDB and other official donor agenciesin order to avoid overlapping and contradictorystrategies and impacts.

• The Bank is not as accessible to civil society as itsinformation disclosure and stakeholder participa-tion policies would lead one to believe. Not onlyare most Bank documents still hard to obtain, butwhen released they are invariably in English. It isalso difficult to meet with Bank task managers dur-ing their quick passages through Brazil.

• The little dialogue that has occurred between theBank and CSOs has generally been too formal andconfrontational. It is necessary to tear down the wallof misperception, with each side accepting the legit-imacy and role of the other.

• The government is the missing link in these meet-ings, and should always be present.

• CSOs are generally not invited to participate dur-ing the design and planing stages of project prepa-

ration, but generally only once Bank-financed pro-jects are undergoing problems and stakeholder par-ticipation is sought. CSOs, especially communityorganizations and social movements, and not justNGOs, should be invited to participate at the initialstages.

• On the other hand, CSOs are not always technical-ly prepared for these meetings but should be will-ing to participate and risk exposure.

Operational Matters • It is not surprising that the Bank faces disburse-

ment and operational problems in its projects, espe-cially in more complex social projects, since its overallapproach is more geared to funding technical “pro-jects” rather than social “programs.” This approachmay have been appropriate when the Bank primar-ily funded infrastructure projects, but this opera-tional methodology is inadequate for funding socialprograms that are much more complex, process-ori-ented, and unpredictable.

• The quality of project supervision by Bank staff variesgreatly among projects, for it depends on several fac-tors, which range from the capacity and opennessof the task managers and their continuity to a will-ingness to critique government implementation whenneeded.

• The Bank has overly bureaucratic administrative pro-cedures in such areas as bidding and procurementthat hinder project performance. There is no ques-tion that the Bank is adopting policies that favorgreater stakeholder participation; the question iswhether these policies will be mainstreamed in theoperational areas of the Bank. This will be the lit-mus test to ascertain if the Bank reforms are indeedgoing to improve the institution’s performance.

• The Bank should consider funding initiatives direct-ly at the municipal level; such initiatives have beencharacterized by innovation, effectiveness, and stake-holder participation, since they are in keeping withthe decentralization trends now sweeping Brazil andthe rest of Latin America.

Specific Project Performance • Participants highlighted several Bank-financed pro-

jects for their effective performance, important social


impact, and innovative supervision approach. The twoprojects mentioned in this regard were the AIDS/DSTand Pilot Program to Conserve the Rain Forest.

• A number of participants criticized the NortheastRural Poverty Alleviation Program (RPAP) and theNortheast Education Project for being too traditionaland top-down in their approach. Several personsstated that the results of these multistate projectsvary from state to state—the performance is betterin some states—and that their results depend onsuch factors as the willingness of local governmentto pursue a participatory approach and the presenceof a strong civil society at the local level.

Conclusions

These consultation meetings demonstrated clearly thatmost CSO representatives have only limited knowledgeof the Bank. The participants had, at most, sketchy infor-mation about a particular Bank project in Brazil, butalmost no understanding about the World Bank inWashington and how it operates. This was not sur-prising, since most stated that this was the first formalcontact they were having with the Bank. When CSOshad information on specific projects being financed bythe Bank, this information tended to be cursory andnegative, often obtained from the press. There were afew participants who demonstrated more firsthandknowledge about the Bank, but this apparently wasbecause they served on Bank-NGO committees or hadresearched Bank activities in Brazil.

The general perception of the participants about theBank tended to be negative, with some persons mani-festing fairly strong criticisms. While not discountingthe validity of many of the criticisms, much of the neg-ative tone seemed to be sparked by the fact that thiswas the first time that the World Bank had sought outthese organizations for dialogue. Thus there seemed tobe a good deal of pent-up reproach to be released. Itwas interesting to note that many of the comments var-ied by region. The participants from Rio de Janeiro andSão Paulo tended to express broader and more con-ceptually based criticisms about the Bank’s macroeco-nomic policies. CSOs in the Southern (Porto Alegre)and Northern (Belém) regions, on the other hand,expressed positive comments related to specific Bank

projects. In the South, the Bank’s open disclosure pol-icy during negotiations with the anti-dam movement(MAB) was cited. In the North, several complimentarycomments were made about the Bank’s stakeholder par-ticipation approach in the Pilot Program project. In theNortheast (Recife) meeting, most of the negative com-ments were geared to two large Bank-financed pro-jects, NRPD and Northeast Education I and II, althoughthere was recognition of the participatory nature of theBank-funded Recife urbanization project implementedin the 1980s.

There was almost total consensus about the validityof consultation meetings such as these. Many partici-pants expressed satisfaction with having been invitedand hoped that this would lead to more frequent andsystematic dialogue. Further, many participants madespecific suggestions on how the Bank could promotemore effective dialogue, enhance its relationship withcivil society organizations, and improve the effective-ness of its lending and supervision work in Brazil. Manyalso mentioned that the dialogue and possible collab-oration needs to be tripartite in order to include gov-ernment participation. On the other hand, some personscontinued to express suspicion regarding the Bank’sunderlying motives for these meetings, since, in theiropinion, the Bank does not have a tradition of dialogueand transparency. For these participants, greater accessto information seems to be the sine qua non conditionto allow for better relations.

Mutual Misperceptions

As the consultation meetings findings demonstrate,much of the exaggerated criticism that is lobbed backand forth among the government, civil society organi-zations (especially NGOs), and the Bank is generallybased on little actual information and fact. In reality, theGovernment, CSOs, and the Bank generally know solittle about each other and have had such limited directinteraction that basic misconceptions and stereotypestend to be the rule. Below is a description of the mostcommonly held views:

• Bank staff and government technicians often viewCSOs, at best, as well-intentioned do-gooders who

Relations among Civil Society, Government, and the World Bank 27

are often ill prepared and have a simplistic analysisof complex Bank-financed government projects, and,at worst, opportunists who make a career of Govern-ment-Bank bashing and are not truly interested inpromoting development, but rather promote them-selves at the expense of the Government-Bank.

• Many CSOs on the other hand, view the Bank, atbest, as a large bureaucracy that has the wrong pri-orities and methodologies (top down and short-sighted), and keeps the wrong company (out-of-touchgovernment officials); and, at worst, a Machiavellianagent of first world powers (namely Washington)to undermine developing countries, impoverishingpeople and harming the environment in the process.The CSOs’ view of government is not much betterthan their view of the Bank.

Curiously, both Government and Bank staff, and NGOtechnicians, have similar misperceptions about eachother. First, each side projects an unrealistic degree ofpower onto the other interlocutor. While NGOs feelthat the Bank has the power to dictate Brazil’s devel-opment strategy and micromanage project implemen-tation, Bank staff often think that the NGOs are betternetworked and more powerful than they are in reality.Second, both sides view the other as arrogant. WhileGovernment and Bank staff are viewed as distant andtechnocratic, NGO activists are seen as smug pretendersof the moral high ground. Third, both sides view theother as incompetent: the government and Bank becauseits projects are perceived to have countless implemen-tation problems and unintended social and environ-mental consequences; and NGOs because they areseen as offering simplistic criticisms and unsuitablemicro-level alternatives to complex macro projects. Last,both sides tend to undermine the other’s legitimacy asinterlocutors by questioning each other’s motives andbehavior. Bank staff often views NGO activists asunscrupulous for their pamphleteering-style tactics, andmany NGOs feel that the government and Bank behaveunethically by hiding project information to cover upmistakes or avoid being criticized for unpopular policies.

One is left with the impression that the govern-ment, CSOs, and the Bank have, until recently, largelybeen fighting each other’s shadows, each side basing itsanalysis on inaccurate preconceptions and not taking

time to engage in real dialogue in order to better under-stand each other’s positions. As World Bank PresidentJames Wolfensohn stated at the opening of the AnnualMeetings in Hong Kong in September 1997:

Name calling between civil society and multi-lateral development institutions must stop. Weshould encourage criticism. But we should alsorecognize that we share a common goal and thatwe need each other (Wolfensohn 1997, p. 9).

Bank–Civil Society Commonalities

Once each institutional actor gets past the seeminglyirreconcilable differences in policies and operationalstyle, the Bank and CSOs actually have a good deal incommon. First, they are both modernizing agents with-in a dramatically changing world context. Both repre-sent the growth and importance of transnational linkages.The Bank is itself multilateral and embodies global con-nectivity. The CSOs, and particularly NGOs, are alsoglobal actors because they not only espouse universalprinciples such as democracy, social equity, and envi-ronmental conservation, but because the bulk of theirfunding comes from international donors and they areincreasingly closely networked with international CSOs.Further, much like the Bank, CSOs represent a mod-ernizing influence in Brazilian society. While Brazil hashad a hierarchical society in which the state has his-torically controlled most facets of public life, the appear-ance of the NGO sector has represented a break in thistradition, as there is now a sector that considers itselfautonomous, exerts a monitoring role relative to thestate, and even carries out the needed intermediationbetween the population and the government. It is there-fore curious that while CSOs often speak out on the illeffects of globalization, they are themselves a result ofglobalization and embody a modern construct of soci-ety. Paradoxically, NGOs are often more in tune withBank policy in such areas as gender, environment, andstakeholder participation, than with governments at thenational and subnational levels.

Second, although it may seem contradictory, bothCSOs and the World Bank support the restructuring ofthe state and strengthening of the role of civil society,


albeit for different reasons. The Bank because, as arguedin the 1997 WDR on the role of the state, there is grow-ing evidence that an active civil society is not only a pre-requisite for democracy, but good for development aswell (WDR 1997a). Many civil society organizations,on the other hand, support the restructuring of the statein order to make government more effective and account-able, reduce corruption, and introduce policies moregeared to the needs of the poor. Further, many in civilsociety see a growing role for the nongovernmental pub-lic arena, or what some have begun to refer to as the“setor público não estatal.” Advocates as diverse as theFirst Lady, Ruth Cardoso, and late NGO leader Herbert“Betinho” de Souza have been increasingly speaking andwriting about the notion of a nonstate public sector,where the government and civil society sectors jointogether to promote policies and undertake programsgeared to the interests of the entire society. Underlyingnotions of this concept are accountability, transparen-cy, and participatory decisionmaking approaches. A doc-ument undersigned by the First Lady stated that:

In Brazil, as everywhere, a Third Sector—non-Governmental and non-profit—coexists todaywith the State (First Sector) and with the Market(Second Sector), mobilizing a growing volumeof resources and energies for social development.This multiplication of private initiatives for a pub-lic purpose is a new, massive, and global phe-nomenon. The protagonism of citizens and theirorganizations overcomes the dichotomy betweenprivate and public, in which the public was syn-onymous with state and private with business.The expansion of the Third Sector gives originto the public, nonstate sphere (Conselho daComunidade Solidária 1997, p. 3).

In short, although the focus and degree of govern-ment reform agendas may vary somewhat, in the endboth the Bank and CSOs espouse a larger common agen-da to reform government by making it more account-able, more streamlined, and more effective in the deliveryof services.

Third, CSOs, and more recently the Bank, largelyshare the same goals of human development and envi-ronmental sustainability. This is true at least at the con-

ceptual and rhetorical levels, since these goals are oftennot fully achieved by either side in practice. AlthoughCSOs and the Bank are clearly still far apart on the spe-cific strategies and programmatic priorities, the fact thatboth sides share the same larger developmental objec-tives provides the needed foundation on which tobuild more collaborative efforts.

Fourth, both are practitioners of the same trade, pro-moting development through similar operational func-tions: funding (in the case of CSO donor agencies),executing, monitoring, and evaluating projects. In thisrespect, despite the differences brought on by the vary-ing economies of scale, they share many of the samemethodological dilemmas, planning problems, andresult-assessing challenges.

Fifth, although they interact with different inter-locutors, the Bank works with governments and CSOsdirectly with the beneficiary population, they both sharethe same target population: the disenfranchised poor.Even the difference in institutional partners is begin-ning to change. The Bank, on the one hand, is increas-ing its direct interaction with beneficiary populationsbecause of a growing emphasis on stakeholder partic-ipation mechanisms, and CSOs, on the other, are begin-ning to work more directly with governments.

A final commonality is the fact that both the Bankand CSOs are being pressured to demonstrate more tan-gible and sustainable results of their work, especiallyin the area of social development. While the Bank isbeing prodded by its shareholder governments andCSOs to show results, the CSOs are being pressured bytheir traditional donor agencies and society at large (asexpressed by the press).

A convergence is actually under way in which theBank is reaching down to the micro sectors through itsstakeholder participation policy, and the CSOs are reach-ing up to the macro level through its efforts to scale upservices and methodologies. There is a real potential forsynergy to occur between these two developmentalactors. Recent experience with Bank-funded projects inBrazil has demonstrated that when productive dialoguetakes place, all three sides tend to find that there is alot more common ground and interest than was origi-nally imagined. This was clearly the case in the Planafloroexperience, where long-standing disagreement amongCSOs, the state government, and the Bank on larger


conceptual issues gave way to collaboration and spe-cific agreements once discussions were centered on howto reformulate the project itself (box 6). This was alsotrue with the AIDS project, in which traditional animositybetween AIDS/NGOs and the Ministry of Health hasbeen greatly overcome through the adoption, by the for-mer, of a more effective stakeholder participatory strat-egy in project implementation.

Bank Stakeholder Participation Policies

During the past two decades—and especially in thelast five years—the Bank has begun to take specific stepsto improve relations with the civil society sector world-wide by adopting more participatory policies and pro-grams. These steps have included sponsoring Bank–civil

society consultation meetings, carrying out studies, andadopting operational directives to encourage greaterinvolvement with CSOs at the project level. Many ofthese activities were carried out or coordinated by anNGO Unit established in 1986. Today there are opera-tional directives, plans of action, and other policiesthat encourage Bank staff to pursue more collaborativeworking relations with the civil society sector (box 7).Stakeholder participation is a concept that indeed isbeing emphasized within the Bank as James Wolfensohnstated in his address before the 1998 joint BankGroup–IMF Annual Meeting:

Participation matters—not only as a means ofimproving development effectiveness as weknow from our recent studies, but as the keyto long-term sustainability and to leverage. We


Planafloro is an emblematic example of an overly complexand troubled project that was completely restructuredand decentralized in a participatory fashion. Planafloro isa Bank-funded natural resource management project in theWestern Amazonian state of Rondônia. Planafloro (Loan #344-BR) was signed in 1992 at a total cost of $229 million($167 million was the Bank’s share), and became effectivein 1993. In hindsight, it became apparent that the projectdesign contained several flaws: too many subcomponents(rain forest conservation, social development, road con-struction, indigenous health, and agroforestry activities);a complex structure (involvement of 10 state and federalgovernment agencies); overambitious and poorly definedsustainable development goals; and limited local owner-ship by either the state government or the society at large.

At the end of the fourth year of the project, few of theproject goals had been met, stakeholder participation mech-anisms were not working, and only 50 percent of thefunds had been spent. The local NGO and Social MovementForum, with approximately 35 organizational members(agricultural workers’ federations, indigenous and rubbertapper associations, environmental NGOs, and urbaneducational groups), which had been established with thesupport of international NGOs (World Wildlife Fund/Swedenand OXFAM/UK) to monitor Planafloro, mounted an inter-national campaign to suspend disbursement of projectfunds, and sent a request for inspection to the Bank’sInspection Panel.

The Bank took several steps to address the issue. First,it decentralized project supervision responsibility to thefield office. Second, it decided to carry out a comprehen-

sive and independent midterm review. Third, realizing thatthe project lacked local ownership and support, it insist-ed that the principal stakeholders take full responsibilityfor its restructuring. A midterm evaluation was carriedout by a multidisciplinary team of Brazilian consultants,and a stakeholder consultation workshop was held in PortoVelho to discuss the possible reformulation of the project.The major stakeholders present included the state andfederal governments, the NGO Forum, international NGOs,UNDP, and the World Bank.

A formal agreement was reached between the stategovernment and the CSOs that led to the complete restruc-turing of Planafloro. Project components were reduced, thenumber of government executing agencies was cut back,and bureaucratic procedures were streamlined. A $22million demand-driven community projects fund (PAIC)was created and is today being comanaged with CSOs.51

Equally important, long-standing mutual animosity andtension gave way to effective engagement. Once a policyof more open and frank dialogue began to be pursued,noticeably improved relations among CSOs, the state gov-ernment and the Bank were established. As Oxfam/UK’sPatricia Feeney stated: “NGOs now have a stronger formalrole inside the project: helping to develop and administersmall-scale community projects. Funds have also been allo-cated to enable the NGO Forum to monitor implementa-tion of the overall project” (Feeney 1998, p. 6). Based onthis positive momentum, a comprehensive strategic plan-ning exercise called Umidas, geared to defining a sustain-able development plan for the state until 2020, was carriedout in 1998 involving the major societal actors of Rondônia.

Box 6. Planafloro: From Impasse to Collaboration

must never stop reminding ourselves that it isup to government and its people to decide whattheir priorities are should be. We must neverstop reminding ourselves that we cannot and should not impose development by fiat from above or from abroad (Wolfensohn 1998, p. 10).

An integral aspect of LAC’s Participation Action Planwas the hiring of social analysis and NGO specialistsfor the resident missions. Ten consultants, also knownas NGO liaison officers, were hired by March 1996,one for each of the 10 countries where the Bank hadlocal offices in the region.53 In global terms, as of mid-1999, 71 resident missions had staff that work with

NGO/civil society issues. The NGO specialists hired inLAC were all experienced social scientists or develop-ment practitioners. While all had previous experienceworking with CSOs, several had established their ownCSOs, and two had previous experience working withthe Bank. After two years, five of these specialists hadleft the Bank for a variety of reasons, and their replace-ments were hired in 1999. While many specialists ini-tially carried out primarily liaison-related functions (forexample, disseminating information, organizing con-sultation meetings; channeling CSO project-related com-plaints to task managers), over time their work evolvedto providing operational support to task managers insuch areas as social analysis, beneficiary assessment,and stakeholder participation strategies. In June 1998,


The Bank’s stakeholder participation policies and initia-tives are grounded in a series of operational directives (ODs)drafted over the years.52 The first operational policy onNGOs was adopted in 1981. Today, there are several dozenODs geared to environmental, resettlement, and povertyalleviation projects that contain general guidance or spe-cific directions on how Bank staff should promote greaterstakeholder participation by involving NGOs. The mostcomprehensive of these is OD 14.70, which was adoptedin August 1989 and is entirely geared to the Bank’s rela-tionship with civil society. It contains an analysis of theNGO sector, provides guidelines on how to involve NGOs,and assigns responsibility to different offices within theBank to carry out NGO liaison. It states that “staff are encour-aged whenever appropriate to involve NGOs, particularlylocal NGOs, in Bank-supported activities.” OD 14.70 hasnow been replaced by GP (Good Practices) 14.70.

A number of important Bank studies have also been pro-duced in recent years on the topic of stakeholder partici-pation and particularly on NGO participation in Bankprojects (attachment F). Each of these studies has servedto further define the Bank’s definition and understandingof stakeholder participation, as well as document the growing web of relations between the Bank and NGOs.One of the best-known studies, “The World Bank andParticipation,” was published in 1994 and was the resultof the Bank-wide Learning Group on Participation, launchedin 1990. This study provided the most definitive Bank inter-pretation of what constitutes participation: “a processthrough which stakeholders influence and share controlover development initiatives, decisions and resources whicheffect them.” The most complete and recent Bank publica-

tion on stakeholder participation is the Participation Sourcebook (World Bank 1996), which includes successfulexamples of participation strategies utilized in 17 Bank-financed projects worldwide and offers summaries of thebest-known participatory research, meeting facilitation, and consensus-building methodologies. The sourcebookstates that:

Many cultural, economic, and political barriers effec-tively prevent the poor from having any real stakein development activities. Without special efforts bythe designers and sponsors of projects and withoutappropriate policies to address and overcome theseobstacles, the voices of the poor will not be heardand their participation will at best be token (p. 6).

In order to further mainstream the Bank’s participationpolicies, a series of “Participation Action Plans” were draft-ed and enacted Bank-wide and regionally. The Latin Americanand Caribbean (LAC) region adopted its Participation ActionPlan in 1995. The plan included the following activities:

• Hiring of social analysis and NGO specialists in theLAC resident missions (see below).

• Hosting a series of subregional tripartite (government–civilsociety–Bank) thematic seminars. Seminars were carriedout in Ecuador (Andean Region), El Salvador (CentralAmerica), and Brazil (Southern Cone and Brazil).

• Tracking of 12 flagship projects designed through par-ticipatory mechanisms.

• Undertaking NGO country surveys in each of the threeregional departments (Argentina, Ecuador, and Mexico).

Box 7. World Bank Participation Policies and Initiatives

new, more detailed terms of reference incorporating thisshift in role was drawn up, and their title was changedto Social Development and Civil Society specialist.

Several Bank studies on participation have demon-strated that there is growing empirical evidence thateffective participation strategies do improve the successrate of development projects and programs. They doso by encouraging:

• Greater social relevance of the initiatives undertaken• Increased ownership by all stakeholders, but espe-

cially by local beneficiaries, who are generally ulti-mately responsible for carrying out and maintainingthe project activities

• Improved project implementation (including dis-bursement schedules and programmatic results)

• Greater social control and enhanced monitoringcapability

• Institutional collaboration that allows for comple-mentary skills mixes to be leveraged

• Greater sustainability in the long-term.

Another important aspect that experience in sever-al Bank-financed projects in Brazil has demonstrated isthat participation can benefit the stakeholders involvedin different ways. First, local beneficiary populationshave more say in how development projects are car-ried out and thus can better optimize the benefits. Second,NGOs, researchers, and other supporting actors benefit by being constructively engaged and having theirexpertise better utilized. Third, if well informed, CSOscan monitor the implementation of projects and helpgovernment authorities and Bank staff avoid unneces-sary delays and guard against corruption. Finally, gov-ernments and the financing agencies havebetter-performing projects, and society at large (whichultimately pays the bill) gets more “bang for its buck”in terms of successfully implemented development pro-grams. The Bank’s 1997 WDR states that:

Evidence is mounting that government programswork better when they seek the participation ofpotential users, and when they tap the commu-nity’s reservoir of social capital rather than workagainst it. The benefits show up in smootherimplementation, greater sustainability, and bet-ter feedback to government agencies (p. 10).

In short, participation can be a win-win propositionfor all parties concerned.

On the other hand, these studies have also demon-strated that there are various constraints and unknownaspects related to participation. Not only is there stillmuch to learn about the nature, benefits, and costs ofparticipation, but different actors such as CSOs andmultilateral banks have different definitions and expec-tations about what is substantive participation, since itcan range from simple consultation to full operationalpartnership. Participation also involves a series of method-ologies and techniques that are still little understoodby most Bank staff and are only now being written upand decodified by the experts:

Experience indicates that strong NGO/CBOinvolvement significantly contributes to projectsuccess, especially providing benefits and oppor-tunities for participation by the poor and mar-ginalized. However, the record is mixed:NGO/CBO involvement varies greatly in depthand quality, and the Bank and borrowers give toolittle attention to factors critical to success, suchas the environment for NGOs/CBOs, NGO capac-ity, and the use of appropriate business practices(World Bank 1998d, p. 37).

Further, the financial and time costs of participationhave not been adequately quantified. Effective stake-holder participation can imply such costs as transla-tion and distribution of Bank/government documents;organizing community consultation meetings; carry-ing out of needs assessment research; arranging for CSOrepresentatives to accompany appraisal missions; andfunding CSO monitoring of Bank-funded projects. Thesecosts are generally not foreseen by task managers andthus are not factored into preparation and supervisionbudgets.

As the Bank has experienced firsthand in such pro-jects as Planafloro, promoting participation in com-plex and conflict-ridden social settings can also bedifficult and time consuming. While experience hasdemonstrated that incorporating stakeholder partici-pation mechanisms into projects of this nature is essen-tial to their sustainability, this process can representunexpected delays in operational timetables. There are


also situations where the parties are seemingly so farapart and the interests so diametrically opposed thatpromoting collaboration seems impossible, at least atthat juncture. This is the case, for instance, in the Amazonregion, where the interests of rubber tappers and cat-tle ranchers have frequently led to violence. The best-known case, of course, was that of rubber tapper leaderChico Mendes, who was killed by cattle ranchers in1988. In short, there is still a good deal to learn andskills to acquire on participation before it can be effec-tively mainstreamed throughout the Bank.

Recognizing that information is the cornerstone toany successful participation strategy, the Bank has alsobegun to take specific steps to bridge the informationgap. In January 1994 it adopted a new policy on pub-lic disclosure of information that detailed which docu-ments were placed in the public domain, proceduresfor obtaining them, and established public informationcenters in Washington, Paris, and Tokyo. The brochureWorld Bank Policy on Information Disclosure stated:

The Bank recognizes and endorses the funda-mental importance of accountability and trans-parency in the development process. Accordingly,it is the Bank’s policy to be open about its activ-ities and to welcome and seek out opportunitiesto explain its work to the widest possible audi-ence (World Bank 1994a, p. 2).

As a result of this policy, many of the most relevantBank documents can be found in the Bank’s home page,http://www.worldbank.org/, or at one of the many pub-lic information centers (PICs) that are being establishedthroughout the world.

The Brazil country management unit (CMU) hasundertaken two important initiatives to improve its pub-lic information disclosure and dissemination policies.First, the Bank opened a Public Information Center(PIC) in partnership with UNICEF and the FundaçãoGetúlio Vargas (FGV). The PIC was inaugurated in August1997 and is now located at the Bank Office in Brasilia(see address at the back). The PIC has reference mate-rials, a small stock of free Bank publications such asreports and studies, and several computer terminalsavailable to users wishing to access the Bank’s homepage on the Internet. Since information exchange is a

two-way street, the Bank has also taken steps to betterinform Bank staff on the positions and perspectives ofBrazilian CSOs. Thus the second information-relatedinitiative undertaken was the establishment within theBank’s Brasília office, of a Civil Society Reference Center.There are brochures and literature of dozens of BrazilianCSOs, as well as directories and studies on the civil soci-ety sector.

In addition to providing CSOs with general Bankmaterials and basic project-specific documents such asthe project information document (PID) and projectanalysis document (PAD), the Brazil office has been ableto enhance its information disclosure policies even fur-ther in some cases. In projects such as Planafloro,AIDS/DST, and the Pilot Program, “aide memoirs” andofficial Bank-government correspondence are being pro-vided to CSOs on a regular basis as an explicit and suc-cessful strategy to promote more transparency andimprove relations. Experience has demonstrated thatthere is generally little to be lost technically (quality ofprogram implementation) and much to gain institu-tionally (promoting ownership and improved relations)in such an approach. This is especially true of socialprojects, where there is almost no, if any, informationof a sensitive nature that cannot be divulged.

The Bank has also taken steps to revise its policiesregarding the country assistance strategy (CAS), whichis not generally in the public domain and has been atthe center of the information disclosure discussions withCSOs worldwide and in Brazil. A recent report on theBank’s CAS policy and experience found that 22 of the47 CASs undertaken during fiscal year 1997 and thefirst half of fiscal year 1998 had elements of participa-tion. Of these 22 cases, 10 were undertaken with exten-sive consultation with a broad array of civil societystakeholders that included follow-up consultation mech-anisms. Further, 13 CAS (59 percent of the 22 cases)managers reported that civil society participation had“directly identifiable impacts” on the CAS. The studyfound that participatory CASs “helped to focus gov-ernment development agenda, or to build consensusaround government strategy” (World Bank 1998c, p.7). As a result of these findings, the Bank’s ExecutiveDirectors adopted a new CAS policy in September 1998that encourages greater disclosure of the CAS by theintroduction of the CAS public information notice (a


two-page summary of the major elements of the strat-egy document) and procedures for public disclosure ofthe CAS if the local government requests such action.In light of this evolving CAS policy worldwide, the BrazilCountry Management Unit decided to undertake a broadconsultation process in preparation for the 2000-20001country strategy. A wide array of CSOs including NGOs,social movements, trade unions, universities, churchgroups, and donor agencies were invited to several meet-ings held in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo during October-November, 1999. The participants were provided with a summary draft of the strategyand a list of all active loans and published Bank studies. Bank staff also consulted, for the first time, a variety of federal ministries, state governors and congressmen.

Mention should also be made of the Bank’s InspectionPanel, which many CSOs consider to be one of the Bank’smost significant instruments, to date, to ensure account-ability, transparency, and participation. Since the panelwas established in 1994, Brazilian CSOs have submit-ted requests for investigations of three Bank-financedprojects in Brazil in which they claimed that the “rightsand interests” of local people has been adversely affect-ed. These were the Planafloro (1996), Itaparica (1997),and Pilot Agrarian Reform (1998 and 1999) projects.While none of the three were approved for full inves-tigations by the Executive Directors of the Bank, thepanel nonetheless undertook several fact-finding mis-sions to the project sites and produced reports on eachproject. Although there is considerable disagreement asto the applicability and veracity of the Brazilian CSOclaims, as well as to the results of these investigations,there seems to be, nonetheless, agreement that the panelmechanism represents a significant new element inGovernment–Bank–CSO relations. As Bank PresidentWolfensohn wrote in a report on the first four years ofthe panel, “When the Board … created the InspectionPanel five years ago, it created an unprecedented meansfor increasing the transparency and accountability ofthe Bank’s operations” (World Bank 1998a, p. vii). Inthe case of Planafloro, it is widely accepted that the Panelprocess played a key role in the impetus to restructureand improve project performance. Well-known ruraldevelopment expert Zander Navarro has written that“Planafloro most likely represents the most significantand broad transfer of decision-making authority that a

World Bank-funded project has experienced in Brazil,markedly increasing the participation of Rondônian civilsociety groups in project implementation and manage-ment” (Zander, 1996, p.41).

Forging a Tripartite Dialogue

While Bank-CSO formal contact and dialogue are onlybeginning in Brazil, relations have been evolving forsome time on the global level. These contacts began in1981 with the establishment of the internationalNGO–World Bank Committee (NGOWG). This was acommittee consisting of Bank staff and 26 NGO repre-sentatives from throughout the world that has met ona yearly basis to exchange information and promote pol-icy dialogue. In 1995 the NGO–World Bank commit-tee was decentralized by the establishment of regionalsubcommittees in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (LAC).The first LAC Bank–NGO meeting was held in Paipa,Colombia, in June 1995 with over 80 participants fromthe Bank, NGOs, and governments from the region.Leading Washington-based and Latin American NGOsattended. During this meeting, the Bank vice presidentfor Latin America committed his staff to implementinga series of interchange activities in order to enhance dia-logue and improve relations between the Bank andNGOs. This became known as the LAC ParticipationAction Plan (box 7).

The second LAC Bank-NGO meeting was held inMontelimar, Nicaragua, in June 1996 with largely thesame representation of Bank staff and NGOs. The agen-da of this second meeting consisted of several presen-tations and panel discussions by Bank staff and NGOrepresentatives regarding flagship and social investmentfunds projects in several countries (Argentina, El Salvador,Nicaragua, Peru) and gender. Commitments made bythe Bank in the Montelimar meeting included pilotingparticipatory CAS processes in several countries, andholding a series of subregional thematic workshops inthe region during 1997. These seminars were carriedout in Ecuador (Andean Region), El Salvador (CentralAmerica), and Brazil (Southern Cone and Brazil).

The third regional meeting was held in Lima, Peru,in October 1997. The meeting was organized around aseries of joint panel discussions (Government–CSOs–Bank) on such key issues as macroeconomic policies,


state reform, participatory CASs, urban poverty, andgender. The Bank’s delegation, which was once againheaded by the LAC vice president, also included thechief economist as well as other regional managers.The Brazilian CSO presence consisted of representativesfrom Rede Brasil and CEPEPO (Belém). The Lima meet-ing was more informal and relaxed than the two previ-ous annual gatherings, leading to substantive andfree-flowing discussions on the topics. The most impor-tant commitment made was a proposal to institution-alize the intersectoral dialogue process by establishinga permanent Bank-CSO committee in Latin America.

Another commitment made in the Nicaragua meet-ing and seconded at the Lima meeting was to carry outa joint Bank-CSO study on urban poverty. This studywas initiated by a workshop held in Rio de Janeiro inMay 1998 that brought together leading Bank staff, CSOpractitioners, and academics in the area of urban pover-ty. The Bank’s Poverty Reduction and EconomicManagement (PREM) network and FASE jointly orga-nized the workshop. Papers were produced and dis-cussed on the following topics: context of urban poverty;role of the informal sector; provision of basic services;gender issues; social capital and networks; correlationbetween violence and poverty; environmental degra-dation; and governance issues. The level of discussionat this workshop was both thorough and intense, allow-ing all sides to get past preconceived notions and open-ly express their views.

The fourth LAC Bank-CSO meeting was held inMontego Bay, Jamaica, in June, 1998, and was pro-grammed more as a technical workshop than the pre-vious three. There were panel discussions on urbanpoverty, privatization, gender, debt management, edu-cation, and the CAS. The discussion revolved aroundmacroeconomic and key social issues as the Bank broughtseveral of its leading regional economists to debate withCSO economists and leaders such issues as the impactof privatization on unemployment, the role of the infor-mal sector in addressing urban poverty, and differingpriorities in educational reform. While the discussionwas often intense, characterized by clearly divergent views,it proved to be quite helpful in clarifying positions andidentifying common ground on several key issues suchas poverty alleviation, gender, and education reform.

Acting on the decision made the previous year inLima, both the Bank and the CSOs consolidated their

regional Bank-CSO operational structure. In order tobetter coordinate its civil society strategy in the region,the Bank established the LAC Civil Society SteeringCommittee, chaired by the Vice President and com-posed of representatives of all seven country (CMU) andfour sector (SMU) management units in the region.The CSOs for their part elected a new steering com-mittee for the NGOWG and agreed on an annual bud-get to finance ongoing dialogue and partnershipinitiatives.54 In terms of new and ongoing collabora-tive commitments, the Bank and the CSOs agreed onthe following initiatives: (1) the Bank would initiate aregional consultation process on the WDR 2000, whichwould focus on poverty, inequality, and vulnerability;(2) the Bank would carry out participatory CASs intwo or three countries;55 and (3) the Bank would fillthe five vacant slots for the social development and civilsociety specialists in the Bank’s country offices.

The fifth regional meeting was held in Santiago, Chile,in October 1999 and was preceded, for the first time,by country-level preparatory meetings in Colombia,Argentina, and Nicaragua. Reflecting the evolving natureof Bank-civil society relations in the region, this meet-ing proved to have the most fluid and effective meetingdynamics. There were panel and small group discus-sions on the social impact of structural adjustment loans(fiscal policy, social security, and social project compo-nents) and the future role of these bilateral regional meet-ings. Several important agreements were reached gearedto revitalizing the strategic role of these regional meet-ings: (1) encourage the decentralization of the regionalforum to the country level by establishing local gov-ernment-CSO-Bank mechanisms for dialogue and col-laboration; (2) broaden the participation of CSOS inthe NGOWG by inviting trade unions, indigenous, afro-latino, and other social actors to participate in the forum;and (3) develop a single, broad agenda for the next region-al meeting to be jointly researched and presented.

The Latin American CSO representation in thesefive regional meetings was coordinated by the AssociaciónLatinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción(ALOP). ALOP is a leading regional network of 43 devel-opmental NGOs located in nearly every country of thehemisphere.56 Local ALOP affiliates in each of the coun-tries organized and hosted the meetings. In Colombia,the Confederación Colombiana de ONGs (CCONG),or the association of Colombian NGOs, hosted the


meeting. The Fundación Augusto César Sandino (FACS)organized the second meeting, in Nicaragua. The Perumeeting was hosted by one of LAC’s best-known NGOs,Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO).The meeting in Jamaica was convened by the CaribbeanPoverty and Development and Center (CPDC). Finally,the meeting in Chile was organized by the regional CSOworking group with assistance from the Santiago-basedNGO, SUR.

While in the beginning of this process, nearly all ofthe CSO participants were NGOs that belonged to ALOP,by the Jamaica meeting a concerted effort had been madeto broaden the representation to include other NGOnetworks and representatives from trade unions, pro-fessional associations, and academia. On this issue ofcivil society interlocutors in Latin America, it is inter-esting to note that the World Bank and the IDB havehad different liaison strategies and contacts in the region.While the World Bank has tended to concentrate itsefforts on leading NGO networks such as ALOP andFICONG, the IDB has sought out a different public,namely corporate foundations, charitable organizations,as well as some individual NGOs.

Unprecedented Bank–Civil Society dialogue andexchange has also occurred in Brazil throughout thisperiod, in part instigated by the liaison impetus at theregional level. Several groundbreaking meetings andworkshops were held over the past three years. The firstwas a tripartite seminar called “Novas Parcerias emPolíticas de Combate à Pobreza,” which took place inBelo Horizonte in March 1997. The seminar was con-vened as part of the LAC Participation Action Plan thatcalled for regional seminars throughout Latin America.The seminar was sponsored by the World Bank, andsupported financially by the Banco Nacional deDesenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) and theMinas Gerais state government. The principal objec-tives of the seminar were twofold: share informationabout Government–Civil Society–Bank collaboration inpoverty alleviation activities, and promote tripartite dia-logue geared to building future partnerships.Approximately 60 participants from Brazil, Argentina,Paraguay, and Chile attended the seminar, including topfederal and state government officials, representativesof leading CSO networks, and Bank staff fromWashington. The seminar addressed broader issues suchas government–civil society relations, new civil society

actors addressing poverty alleviation, as well as casestudy presentation of specific government and civil soci-ety poverty alleviation programs. Overall, the meetingwas deemed successful in terms of the quality of thethematic presentations and discussions, diversity of par-ticipants (sectorally and regionally), and because it afford-ed a singular opportunity for institutional exchangeamong Government officials, CSO technicians, and Bankstaff. At the end of the meeting, the Bank’s Brazil coun-try director announced several future Bank initiativesgeared to improving government-CSO-Bank relationsin Brazil. These included (1) carrying out a review ofthe Brazil portfolio to determine the existence of par-ticipatory mechanisms; (2) hosting a follow-up tripar-tite seminar on the advantages and constraints ofparticipation; and (3) establishing a public informa-tion center in Brasília.

A second important instance of Bank–CSO dialoguewas a meeting Bank President James Wolfensohn held with leading NGOs representatives in March 1997(box 8).

A third and more recent and strategic initiative gearedat promoting tripartite dialogue was a meeting convenedto discuss sector-specific issues. The Ministry of Planning’sinternational relations office (SEAIN), at the sugges-tion of the Bank’s Country Director, decided to holdtripartite discussion meetings on the different sectorsthat are of interest to CSOs and that are also coveredby the Bank’s country strategy. The first such meetingwas held in April 1998 and was geared to the sanita-tion sector. The watershed meeting brought togetherrepresentatives of three government agencies (Secretariade Políticas Urbanas/SEPURB, Caixa EconômicaFederal/CEF, and Banco Nacional de DesenvolvimentoEconômico e Social/BNDES), the World Bank, the IDB,and the civil society (Rede Brasil, FASE, AssociaçãoNacional de Reforma Urbana (ANSUR), FederaçãoNacional dos Urbanitarios (FNU), and the FrenteNacional de Saneamento Ambiental no Brasil.

The meeting consisted of presentations by the gov-ernment, multilateral bank, and CSO representatives,and a general discussion on the major challenges fac-ing the sanitation sector in Brazil. Although the con-tent of the discussion was somewhat general and therewas disagreement over several basic issues, the overalltone was constructive and conducive to improved col-laboration. Consensus was reached on a few issues: the


serious deficit the country faces in the area of sanita-tion; the need to ensure active local government par-ticipation in federally funded sanitation projects; andadvantages of promoting effective stakeholder partici-pation strategies. New meetings geared to discussingother sectors such as education and environment arecontemplated for 2000.

A fourth instance of increased dialogue has occurredin the area of education, where there has historicallybeen little contact between the government/Bank andCSOs related to Bank-financed loans, despite being anarea of the great priority and interest to all three sides.In order to attempt to bridge this perception gap andhelp the Bank design its long-term education strategyin Brazil, the Bank in 1997 established a multidiscipli-nary and representative consultative group on educa-tion. The Bank invited education specialists as well asrepresentatives of leading Brazilian CSOs to join thegroup, including one (Ação Educativa) that had beenamong the most vocal critics of the Bank’s policies. In1998, the Bank followed a similar participatory method-ology when it undertook studies on gender and on earlychildhood education. In the first case, the Bank hiredindependent researchers who interviewed key govern-ment, academic, and civil society gender specialists andpractitioners. In the case of early childhood education,

the Bank convened a two-day workshop and invitedan intersectoral group of experts from the government,private sector, and civil society sectors to discuss themajor issues and experiences of early childhood edu-cation and the appropriateness of the Bank’s study design.

The final example of consultative processes has beeninvolved the revision of several Bank operational direc-tives. The ODs in several key areas such as indigenousaffairs, involuntary resettlement, and forest manage-ment are being converted to operational policies (OPs),bank procedures (BPs), and good practices (GPs). Bankstaff began the consultation process in each case by cir-culating the relevant documents widely through theInternet and hiring independent experts to research thepolicy changes and/or facilitate the consultation meet-ings. After this initial process, consultation meetingswere held with a representative group of NGOs, socialmovements, and government officials in Brasilia dur-ing the October 1998 to November 1999 period.

Growing Relations and OperationalCollaboration

Although it may seem improbable when consideringthe traditional antagonistic relationship between CSOs


A significant Bank-CSO liaison event was a meeting heldbetween the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn,and representatives of Brazil’s leading CSOs. The meetingoccurred during the International Rio+5 EnvironmentalConference, held in March 1997 in Rio de Janeiro.Wolfensohn requested the meeting in order to become better acquainted with the views of Brazilian CSOs regarding the World Bank presence in Brazil, and as a follow-up to a meeting he had with CSO leaders in theAmazon in 1995.

Wolfensohn met with 15 representatives of the follow-ing leading CSO groups in Brazil: five major networks(ABONG, Fórum de Brasileiro de ONGs, Rede Brasil, GTA,and ALOP), and CSOs that are involved in Bank projects(Planafloro, Itaparica Resettlement, AIDS/STD, and PilotProgram to Conserve the Amazon).

The meeting began with general comments byWolfensohn on his past contact with CSOs in 50 countries,the importance the Bank places on maintaining dialogue

with CSOs, acknowledgment of past criticism of Bank work,and the Bank’s internal reform agenda. In response to ques-tions from the CSO representatives, Wolfensohn said heagreed that there needs to be greater balance between eco-nomic and social goals within the Bank’s work; was seek-ing discretionary funds to be able to fund CSO institutionbuilding; was in favor of participatory CAS processes butreiterated that governments need to be in agreement; andwould personally look into a pending Inspection Panelissue (Itaparica dam resettlement project) to ensure thatthe Brazilian government carried through with its reset-tlement commitments.

The meeting was characterized by an overall climate offriendly and frank exchange of views. After the meeting,several participants expressed their satisfaction with thecandor and thoughtfulness of Wolfensohn’s comments.Most CSO representatives considered the exchange animportant step in the increasing dialogue and contactbetween Brazilian civil society and the World Bank.

Box 8. Wolfensohn Meets with Brazilian CSOs

and the Government/Bank, often characterized by mis-understandings and recriminations, in reality there is agreat deal of contact and relations between the twosides. A recent worldwide study carried out by the Bank’sOperational Evaluation Department (OED) demonstratesthat CSO–Government/Bank collaboration has increasednearly tenfold in the last decade. The 1998 study focusedon the role of NGOs and CBOs in 37 projects being imple-mented in five countries—Brazil, Bolivia, India, Kenya,and Mali. The study found that over the last 5 years, (fis-cal years 1993–97), involvement with NGOs/CBOs wassought in 954 Bank-supported projects, which repre-sent 17 percent of the 5,666 projects approved. On theother hand, the number of projects with provision forcivil society participation has increased significantly inrecent years, from 20 percent in 1989 to 46 percent in1997. Overall 38 percent is projects of the Bank’s activeportfolio make some provision for CSO involvement.

The report noted with interest that “provision forNGO/CBO involvement was highest in projects target-ed at improving gender equality (80 percent), improv-ing the environment (54 percent), and reducing poverty(48 percent), that is, NGOs/CBOs are involved in Bank-supported projects in accordance with the priorities ofOD 14.70.” The study also found that CSO involvementis greatest in regions where poverty is highest, such asAfrica and Asia. In terms of the type of CSOs involvedin Bank-supported projects since 1973, the most com-mon were NGOs (64 percent), followed by CBOs (49percent), and international NGOs (28 percent). Themost common reason cited by Bank staff for involvingCSOs was to “enhance beneficiary participation” and“capture expertise.” Oddly, three institutional qualitiescommonly cited as CSO comparative advantages—cost-effectiveness, innovation, and flexibility—were not high-ly listed (World Bank 1998d).

It should be mentioned, however, that the report alsopointed to a certain overprojection in the involvementof CSOs in Government/Bank–financed projects world-wide, at least in terms of what the data would seem toindicate in the Bank’s own databases. It stated that:

Nevertheless, substantive involvement ofNGOs/CBOs is less frequent in these two coun-tries (Brazil and India) than the Bank’s databaseindicates. A small number of projects are high-

ly successful, demonstrating good practices thatare likely to be applicable elsewhere. It is alsoevident that the design and implementation ofprojects that involve NGOs and CBOs is improv-ing: newer projects are doing more to involveNGOs and CBOs than older ones. Overall, how-ever, a gap remains between good intentionsand achievements (World Bank 1998d, p. 14).

In Brazil, the growing level of CSO–government inter-action and collaboration has taken various forms andincludes citizen-government policy councils, partici-patory budgetary processes, and project advisory bod-ies. First, CSOs participate in national citizen-government policy councils in such areas as children’srights (Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança e doAdolescente/CONANDA), health (Conselho Nacionalda Saúde), the environment (Conselho Nacional doMeio Ambiente/CONAMA), and women’s rights(Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher/CNDM).These councils are generally composed of both gov-ernment and civil society representatives, sometimesevenly distributed, and in some cases with a majorityof civil society representatives.57

These councils were created after the promulgationof the 1988 Federal Constitution which introduced var-ious mechanisms for citizen participation in policy-mak-ing within a larger and comprehensive politicaldecentralization framework which transferred powerand resources to the local level. The great majority ofBrazil’s 5,508 municipalities have bipartite councilswhere government and civil society organizations haveequal representation. The different types of local coun-cils include health, children’s rights, social service, schoollunch, education, rural development, women, urbandevelopment, environment, culture, sports, trans-portation, employment, and budget. Many larger citiesand capitals, such as Recife, have over 10 active citi-zens’ councils, although their activism and effectivenessvary considerably.

A recent study on this phenomenon carried out joint-ly by IBAM (a research NGO) and IPEA (governmenteconomic research agency) defends the notion that,despite some phase-in problems, these councils can beconsidered a transition to “deliberative democracy,” andthat they can effectively promote greater government


accountability, transparency, and partnership with civilsociety. The Bank in its 1997 WDR, on the role of thestate, also clearly recognized the value of these partic-ipatory policy councils:

But periodic voting does not always mean thestate is more responsive. Other mechanisms areneeded to ensure that the concerns of minori-ties and the poor are reflected in public policies.Getting genuine intermediary organizations rep-resented on policymaking councils is an impor-tant first step in articulating citizen interests inpublic policymaking (p. 10).

The Bank has followed through on this view by includ-ing the establishment of local rural development coun-cils as a funding precondition in several of its ruralpoverty and land management projects.58

The other citizen participation mechanism mentionedis the participatory budgeting experiences being imple-mented at the municipal level throughout Brazil. Theexperience began in the early 1990s in the city of PortoAlegre, and because of its effective results in terms ofpromoting greater citizen involvement, curbing cor-ruption, and improving cost-benefit ratios, it has beenreplicated in dozens of cities. The Bank analyzed thePorto Alegre experience and estimated that 14,000 per-sons were involved directly in the budgeting processthrough assemblies and meetings, and another 100,000were linked indirectly through neighborhood associa-tions (WDR 1997, p. 122).

The second form of CSO-government collaborationhas occurred as CSOs have begun to provide technicalassistance to local and state officials through consul-tant contracts in such areas as the environment, health,education, and urban transportation. One example ofthis is the technical assistance and lobbying exercisedby the Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos (IEA) in favorof improving the livelihood of rubber tappers while pre-serving the Amazonian rain forest. As a result of theirefforts, President Jose Sarney established the firstExtractive Reserves in 1990. In an additional instanceof collaboration, the researchers associated with lead-ing CSOs are increasingly being contracted by theBrazilian government and the Bank to carry out pro-ject analysis and evaluation. There are several recent

technical assistance experiences that stand out becauseof their unprecedented and strategic nature:

• The Ministry of the Environment hired CSOresearchers to evaluate two of its subprograms(Demonstration Projects and Extractive Reserves)within the Pilot Program to Conserve the RainForest.59

• The Ministry of Health hired a number of CSOconsultants to analyze project proposals and pro-vide technical assistance within its AIDS/STD pro-gram. As a matter of fact, the social analysis of therecently approved AIDS/STD II loan was carriedout by a well-known NGO activist and researcherwho had been among the most critical of the earli-er AIDS/STD project.

• A senior economist at the Brasília office contractedin 1998 leading urban development NGOs (FASEand POLIS) to carry out household and communi-ty surveys to determine the characteristics and impactof urban poverty. These data will be fed into a Brazilurban poverty study and the 2000-2001 WDR whichis geared to poverty.

• The Bank’s social development sector leader for LatinAmerica hired in 1998 two leading CSO/universityresearchers to carry out a study on urban violence.

• The Bank’s environmental sector leader for Brazilhired in 1998 two leading CSO researchers from theAmazon to assist with the development of the Bank’sforest resource management strategy paper for Brazil.

Third, CSOs are increasingly becoming grant recip-ients of government “small-grant funds” such as thePilot Program’s PDA and the Ministry of Health’sAIDS/STD (table 4).

Fourth, key CSO leaders have been elected to pub-lic office as mayors, city council members, and evencongressmen, or have been hired or appointed to gov-ernment posts. Several known cases include the Secretaryof Justice of Pernambuco State, the Secretary of theEnvironment of Sao Paulo state, the recent head of Brazil’senvironmental protection agency (IBAMA), the may-ors of several towns, and several members of the Conselhoda Comunidade Solidária. All are well-known CSOactivists and leaders in their respective fields of endeav-or. President Cardoso himself and his wife were found-


ing members of one of Brazil’s best-known social scienceresearch NGOs, CEBRAP. In short, the distance betweenthe CSO and government sectors, which was quite greatonly a few years ago, is quickly and quietly being bridged.As a recent Bank OED report found: “Constructive rela-tionships often depend on creative individuals with pre-vious links to the NGO community who carefully nurturenew relationships with NGOs/CBOs as has occurred inBrazil in AIDS/STD control and the Northeast RuralPoverty Alleviation Program in the State of Rio Grandedo Norte” (World Bank 1998d, p. 16).

A clear example of this growing government–civilsociety–Bank collaboration is the Pilot Program toConserve the Brazilian Rain Forest, which has been a watershed experience from a variety of perspectives(box 9).

Unprecedented CSO–government–Bank relationshave also evolved around the AIDS/STD project, whereNGOs now largely maintain collaborative relation-ships with the three levels of government. An illustra-tive example of improved government-CSO relations

in the AIDS field occurred in Curitiba. There, a rela-tionship that had only a few years before been charac-terized by conflict and tension gave way in 1996 to aproductive partnership between the municipal and statelevel AIDS programs and a dozen CSOs. This wasachieved after CSOs were brought into the processthrough an invitation to serve on the Paraná State AIDSCommission. With adequate information and frank dia-logue, CSOs not only learned more about the com-plexities of governing with its daily tradeoffs andbureaucratic impediments, but were made to feel co-responsible for AIDS policy in the state.

The level of improved collaboration in the AIDSarea was further exemplified by a consultation seminarheld to discuss the $300 million AIDS/STD II project.The seminar, “AIDS II: Novas Parcerias no Combate aEpidemia,” was held in Brasília in April 1998. The eventwas tripartite in nature and involved over 60 govern-ment officials (from all three levels), donor agency rep-resentatives (official and nonofficial), and civil societyrepresentatives (NGOs, trade unions, social movements).


The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forestwas initially proposed by the G-7 industrial countries inthe wake of growing concern for the fate of the BrazilianAmazon in the early 1990s. The program consists of twelvesubprograms executed by the Ministry of the Environmentand several other government agencies to address suchissues as indigenous land demarcation; rain forest conser-vation; sustainable community development; scientificresearch and experimentation; state environmental poli-cy; consolidation of extractive reserves; and watershed man-agement. Different from most Bank loans in Brazil, the pilot program is funded by a $250 million grant providedby the European Commission and half a dozen industri-alized countries, namely Germany, and is managed by theWorld Bank.

This program has been quite innovative from a varietyof standpoints that include its sustainable developmentphilosophy, collaborative design and supervision approach,and stakeholder participation mechanisms. First, the pro-gram is based on the notion that development approach-es in such fragile ecosystems as the rain forest must berooted in environmental and biodiversity conservation.More important, it is actively supporting environmentallyfriendly community development initiatives at the local

level carried out by traditional forest peoples and small-scale agricultural producers. Second, the project design ismultilateral in nature, operationally linking over 15 inter-national donor and government agencies. The Bank’s ownsupervision approach, carried out by a multidisciplinaryteam of staff residing in Brasília, is more collaborative andinteractive than the norm.

Last and perhaps most innovative is the pilot program’seffective stakeholder participation approach. Of the nineactive subprograms, six have unprecedented participato-ry mechanisms which include CSO consultation meetings;hiring CSO researchers to carry out project feasibility andmonitoring studies; CSO representation on project selec-tion committees; and funding of CSOs. By 1999, over 110CSOs from throughout the Amazon and Atlantic rain for-est regions have received grant funds totaling $19 million,and leading environmental NGOs such as Imazon, ISA, andISPN have been heavily involved in the design and evalu-ation of several of the subprograms. Further, the two prin-cipal CSO network counterparts to the pilot program, the430-strong Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico (GTA) and the110-member Rede Mata Atlântica, have received institu-tional support funds of over $700,000 to participate andmonitor the program.

Box 9. Pursuing Sustainability in the Amazon

The meeting had two underlying objectives: (1) dis-cuss the results and impact of the AIDS I project; and(2) analyze and comment on the AIDS II proposal.This was the first national seminar of the Bank-fundedAIDS project that involved all major stakeholders, andit not only produced timely programmatic recommen-dations (several of which are being incorporated intothe AIDS II execution), but was surprisingly construc-tive in tone. As a result of this positive momentum, anational seminar on the institutional and financial sus-tainability of AIDS organizations was held in October1999 involving 80 representatives from these samesectors as well as from private sector companies. Another

interesting and singular experience of greater govern-ment–civil society–Bank operational relations was theRPAP in Rio Grande do Norte (box 10).

The federal government’s principal advocate for theneed to better explore the potential for government-civil society partnership has been the Conselho daComunidade Solidária, which is headed by First Ladyand anthropologist Ruth Cardoso. Reflecting this new-found recognition of the civil society sector, the coun-cil has launched a program geared to promoting amore enabling legal environment and more visibility forthe civil society sector, as well as more government-civilsociety collaboration (box 11).


The Northeast Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (RPAP)is a large Bank-funded rural development program initiat-ed in 1985 and implemented in all 10 Northeastern states.An estimated 14,000 community groups (producers asso-ciations, cooperatives, and women’s groups) have receivedgrants to carry out over 30,000 small-scale infrastructureand productive projects. In one state, Rio Grande do Norte,the RPAP has stood out for the singular quality and inten-sity of government–civil society relations.

The principal catalyst of this collaboration has been theFórum do Campo, a network of 15 CSOs composed oftrade unions (FETARN), social movements (MST), NGOs(ACC, SEAPAC), and church organizations (SAR, MEB),which was established in 1993 as a result of a campaignto combat the endemic drought of the region. Over time,utilizing a combined strategy of policy advocacy and ser-vice provision, the Fórum was able to influence and gainunprecedented access to the RPAP. Initially, the Fórumearned a seat on the state’s RPAP governing council. Later,Fórum members were selected to provide technical assis-tance to RPAP-funded associations.60 In 1995, Fórum mem-bers were invited to carry out the monitoring of the RPAPprogram, carrying out field visits of over 350 small-scaleprojects in the state. This monitoring process involvedassessing the physical project results, functioning of munic-ipal RPAP councils, and quality of technical assistanceprovided.

The impact of the active Fórum participation in RPAPin Rio Grande do Norte state has been noticeable in sev-eral respects:

• A total of 136 municipal RPAP councils were established,

many with the active participation of the Forum. Further,Rio Grande do Norte is the only Northeastern state tohave an active state-level RPAP policy council.

• The state seems to have a greater percentage of moreconsolidated and sustainable community associationswhich carry out a series of integrated development activ-ities, and not just the single activity funded by theRPAP.

• An unprecedented level of political dialogue and col-laboration has developed between the state government,rural trade unions, NGOs, and even the landless ruralmovement.

As the Bank’s Implementation Completion Report stat-ed, “performance improved markedly and the NGO part-nership with the [technical unit] and the communities isa distinguishing feature of the State’s project experience”(World Bank 1998d, p. 19). There are many contextual fac-tors that explain the advances made in Rio Grande do Norte,but four stand out. First, the state has an unusually cohe-sive and strong civil society sector that has a proven trackrecord of successful development initiatives and more prag-matic, results-oriented approach to policy advocacy. Second,the state has a government characterized by openness tocivil society and a willingness to test new ideas. Third, thereare institutional “bridge-builders” who served a key rolein forging partnerships. This was the case, for instance, ofseveral leaders of the trade union federation who were hiredto work within the RPAP executing agency. Last, the par-ties set up experimental mechanisms for collaboration,which were quickly “field tested” and later expanded oncethey proved successful.

Box 10. Northeast Rural Poverty Alleviation Program Incorporates Participation

Another recent trend in intersectoral partnership isoccurring between civil society organizations and theprivate sector. There are several examples of private sec-tor–civil society collaboration which demonstrate thepotential benefits that such collaboration can bring interms of mobilizing resources, policy innovations, andprogrammatic results. Below are three of the most salientexamples:

FUNDAÇÃO ABRINQ is a foundation established in1990 by the Association of Toy Manufacturing Companies(ABRINQ), which has been able to generate a varietyof highly successful public education, corporate respon-

sibility, and fundraising activities geared to children’sservices and rights. The foundation received its firstfundraising grant of $160,000 in 1994 and by 1996 hadleveraged this seed money into a $1.4 program budget.ABRINQ’s current annual budget is $8 million, whichbenefits over 250,000 children through a number ofprograms ranging from child sponsorship and class-room improvements to an award program for compa-nies that refrain from using child labor. ABRINQ carriesout these activities with a staff of some 40 persons,through partnership with CSOs and government agen-cies, and with funding from a solid donor base con-sisting of wealthy individuals and over 2,000 companies,


The Conselho da Comunidade Solidária is a joint govern-ment-civil society body established by the Cardoso admin-istration in 1995. Its purpose is to advise the governmenton social development policies, as well as serve as a forumfor intersectoral dialogue and program experimentation.It currently is composed of 32 members: 4 ministers; 27representatives of civil society (NGOs, private sector, acad-emia, church, culture); and presided over by the First Lady.

To date the conselho has launched six major programs,three of which have been operating for four years:

Alfabetização Solidária, a youth literacy program, 24,000community teachers have taught over 475,000 youth in589 municipalities with the highest rates of illiteracy. It isfunded, in part, by 59 companies which have donated$32 million.

Capacitação de Jovens, an urban youth vocational train-ing program which has enlisted over 1,000 NGOS to train35,000 youth from throughout Brazil. The program hasleveraged over $30 million from private companies.

Universidade Solidária, a university student summer vol-unteer program, has sent some 5,300 students from 152universities to over 343 of the poorest municipalities ofthe Northeast and Northern regions of the country tocarry out community development initiatives. Over $3.5million leveraged from the armed forces, universities, andcompanies.

Three projects were initiated in 1997 with funds fromthe Inter-American Development Bank (IDB):

Revisão do Marco Legal was instrumental in the approvalof several new laws geared to promoting an enabling legal

environment for the nonprofit sector in Brazil: law regu-lating and encouraging volunteer work and the civil soci-ety organization law.

Promoção do Trabalho Voluntário promotes voluntarismthrough the establishment of a national network of vol-unteer service centers (17 established to date) throughoutBrazil.

Rede de Informação do Terceiro Setor (RITS ) increas-es the visibility of the Third Sector through a nationalelectronic information network.

All of these programs have three features in common:they (1) seek an end to traditional clientelistic depen-dence on government programs by promoting sustainable,self-help initiatives; (2) encourage programmatic innova-tion, replication, and scaling up; and (3) promote govern-ment–civil society–private sector partnerships. Importantcollaboration has been forged so far with major compa-nies (ABIFARMA, Votorantim, General Motors, FENABRAVE,DM9), government ministries/agencies (Aeronáutica,Petrobras, Telebrás, CNPQ), and leading NGOs (ISER,Centro Luis Freire, Géledes).

The conselho has also played an important role in pro-moting intersectoral dialogue and consensus building aroundseveral key and politically sensitive issues. These includeagrarian reform, job creation, children’s rights, food secu-rity, basic education, and nonprofit law reform. In each ofthese themes, leading national opinion makers (govern-ment officials, trade unionists, businessmen, CSO leaders,academics, and church officials) were brought together inlively workshops that resulted in a series of “common agen-da” recommendations and, in some cases, specific researchand policy initiatives.

Box 11. Conselho da Comunidade Solidária

including major corporations such as Adidas, Citibank,and Sadia.

PORTOSOL is a foundation established in Porto Alegrein 1996 to carry out a microcredit program geared tolow-income producers and vendors. It is one of the mostpromising programs in Brazil, having an active clien-tele of over 1,300 small-scale entrepreneurs. It has lentout over $5 million for its revolving capital fund fromprivate banks, government, and international donoragencies. What makes this experience unique is that itrepresents an effective collaboration by three distinctactors: private sector (Federation of Industries and asso-ciation of businessmen), government (municipal andstate governments of different political parties), and civilsociety (community leaders and university professors).

MOVIMENTO VIVA RIO was established in 1993 asa broad-based civic campaign to address growing urbanviolence in Rio de Janeiro. It promoted street marches,anti-violence public education campaigns, and com-munity policing programs. Over the past three years ithas also developed an urban development programsponsoring a variety of cutting-edge initiatives. Theseinclude a volunteer placement phone bank, adult lit-eracy educational programs, and a micro-financing pro-gram in Rio de Janeiro’s largest favela (Rocinha). VivaRio was established by a diverse set of organizations includ-ing NGOs, municipal government, leading newspaperand television companies, businesses, and churches.

CSO Funding

Relations between CSOs and the Government/Bank haveevolved to the point that thousands of CSOs today receivefunding from the latter. Although most of this fundinghas been provided indirectly, the Bank does maintainseveral mechanisms for funding CSOs directly. Bothmodalities will be described below.

In terms of direct funding, there are several CSOfunding mechanisms based in Washington. Theseinclude:

• Small Grants Program (SGP)• Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)

• Global Environment Facility (GEF)• Special Grants Program.

In August 1997, as part of the Bank’s internal reforms,several of these grant funds were incorporated into theDevelopment Grant Facility (DGF) in order to consol-idate their management under a single umbrella mech-anism. The funds that have been utilized to fund CSOsin Brazil are presented in more detail below (table 4).The Institutional Development Fund (IDF) is anotherfunding mechanism which, while largely geared to gov-ernments, has been used in some countries (such asArgentina and Bolivia) to fund CSOs directly. In the caseof Brazil, utilizing IDF funds to fund CSOs has beendiscouraged, since the funding request must undergothe standard government approval channels of all Bankloans, even becoming a line item in the national bud-get. Thus the cost-benefit ratio for such small grants isdeemed unfavorable.

In terms of indirect funding through government,the World Bank currently funds thousands of CSOsthroughout Brazil via small-grants funds in various exist-ing government loans. As a matter of fact, approximately$806 million has been channeled to CSOs during thesix-year period of 1997 through 2002 (table 5). Thisamounts to approximately $134 million per year, andthis figure is expected to grow as new loans come on linein the next few years. Although these funds vary consid-erably in terms of thematic areas, they share many of thesame developmental goals and programmatic functions:

• Encourage demand-driven initiatives• Decentralize decisionmaking to the local level• Transfer benefits directly to impoverished commu-

nities.

It should be noted that the Government and the Bankare learning from operating and supervising these funds,since neither one has much experience in retailing mon-eys through small grants. While the funds representvaluable mechanisms by which to begin integratingthe macro and micro development sectors, they alsogenerate problems related to contrasting institutionalcultures. Clashes over such issues as differing pro-grammatic expectations, administrative procedures, andaccountability standards are not uncommon since CSOs



Table 4. Bank Mechanisms Geared to Funding CSOs

Name Total funds Program characteristics

This program was established in 1983 and has funded hundreds of CSOs world-wide. The program is geared to promoting Bank-CSO interaction through suchactivities as networking meetings and publications. The limit per project has been$15,000. In fiscal year 1997 a total of 60 grants were awarded globally. The mostrecent Brazilian CSO recipient of the SGP was the Fórum Brasileiro de ONGs eMovimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento, which received$15,000 in 1997 to host a national meeting of CSOs to prepare for the Rio+5International Environmental Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in March 1997.

In 1998, for the first time, a portion of the SGP funds were decentralized tothe country level. A total of 20 countries worldwide were awarded funds of $25,000each to disburse until June 1998, including the Brazil CMU. In Brazil, the Bankestablished the Fundo de Apoio a Parcerias (FAP), which was designed to fundactivities specifically geared to tripartite interaction. A tripartite selection com-mittee chooses six CSO proposals for funding.61 In 1999 the funds allotted to theFAP were increased to $60,000 and 17 grants were awarded to a variety of NGOs,community groups, and social movements from throughout Brazil. 62

CGAP was established in 1995 as a follow-up to an international conference onmicrocredit. It is geared to funding successful CSOs that provide microcredit andtraining to small-scale entrepreneurs. By 1998 it had channeled over $16 millionto several dozen CSOs worldwide.

In Brazil, the CGAP provided the Banco do Nordeste (BNB) with $50,000 in1997 to assist it in designing its rural credit program. One limitation CGAP hasfor Brazilian CSOs is the fact that it requires proponents to maintain a relativelyhigh client level, a minimum of 4,000 active borrowers. Few if any of Brazil’snascent microenterprise service organizations can yet meet this threshold.

GEF has three modalities which fund CSOs in Brazil. They are the Fundo Brasileiropara a Biodiversidade (FUNBIO), which is discussed below; Programa de PequenosProjetos (PPP); and the Mid-Sized Projects Fund.

The PPP receives funds from GEF through UNDP and is geared to fundingsmall (limit of $30,000) environmental projects in the Cerrado biome in Brazil.The fund is operated by Instituto Sociedade, População, e Natureza (ISPN), awell-known NGO in Brasília. By 1998 the fund had channeled over $524,000 to24 CSOs.

The Mid-Sized Projects Fund was established in 1996 and is geared to fund-ing CSOs that require up to $1million to scale up successful environmental pro-grams. CSOs must send their applications directly to Washington.

Small Grants Program(SGP)

Consultative Group toAssist the Poorest(CGAP)

Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF)

$750,000 (annually)

$32 million

generally have less formal accountability standards thangovernment agencies.

The differences in project implementation and report-ing generally begin with the relations between donorand grantee. While CSOs have traditionally maintaineda relationship with donors based on trust and politicalsolidarity that led to less detailed project design andinformal reporting requirements, the governmental sec-tor has been characterized by greater formality causedby the need to guarantee public accountability and strin-gent financial accounting regulations. For this reason,

CSOs sometimes balk at having to follow the moredetailed and often overly bureaucratic administrativeprocedures mandated by Brazilian administrative law. One of the most common complaints heard byCSOs involved in these funds is that the procure-ment procedures require grantees to obtain three written bids before they can make purchases above acertain amount.65 Another common complaint heardis that these funds cannot be used to pay labor benefits (social security, retirement, and so forth) orother taxes. The OED report on NGO participation in


Rural Poverty Alleviation Project(RPAP)

Pilot Land Reform a

Mato Grosso Natural ResourcesManagement Project (Prodeagro)

Rondônia Natural ResourcesManagement Program (Planafloro)

Pilot Program to Conserve the RainForest b

AIDS/STD

Rio Grande do Sul NaturalResources Management and RuralPoverty Alleviation Project

Fundo Brasileiro para aBiodiversidade (FUNBIO)



Note: This is not an exhaustive list of all funds of this nature in the Bank’s Brazil portfolio, only the best-known cases. A portfolio review that will map all such funds in thecountry portfolio is now under way. These amounts include Brazilian government (federal and state) counterpart funds as well. Although the limits and average size of the CSOgrants vary depending on the fund, an overall estimate of the approved projects ranges from $50,000 to $80,000 annually.

a These funds are all provided as grants with the exception of part of the funds within the Pilot Land Reform, which are provided as loans to purchase land.

b It should be noted that the three Rainforest Pilot Program funds are not World Bank funds, but rather originate from the G-7 industrial countries, namely Germany and themembers of the European Union, and are managed by the Bank.

These are funds earmarked for CSOs in eight Northeastern states to carry out infra-structure, production, education, and health community-based projects. The greatmajority of the organizations funded are community associations, although some NGOsbenefit by being hired by recipient organizations to provide technical assistance andtraining.63 The projects are increasingly selected by municipal development councilsthat must have at least an 80 percent civil society composition.

Part of these funds ($40 million from the Brazilian government) is provided in theform of loans to groups of landless rural workers to purchase land, and the remainderis distributed as grants to cover community-based infrastructure, agricultural pro-duction, and technical assistance activities. The project is being implemented in fiveNortheastern states (Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco).

The Programa de Apoio a Iniciativas Comunitárias (PADIC) was established as a demand-driven instrument to improve project performance during the restructuring of Prodeagroin 1997. Leading CSOs in the state not only sat on the selection committee but werealso grant recipients. By 1998, 191 local projects had been funded.

As with its sister agency in Mato Grosso, the Programa de Iniciativas Comunitárias(PAIC) was established as a result of the complete restructuring of Planafloro. Not onlydid representatives of a broad spectrum of CSO (small-scale rural producers, rubbertappers, indigenous, and environmental NGOs) and private sector organizations siton the selection committee, they also participated in the identification and analysis ofprojects. By 1998, 146 local projects had been funded, for an average amount of $65,000,over 110 to carry out environmental protection, agricultural production, and socialinfrastructure projects.

The Demonstration Projects subprogram (PDA) had provided by 1999 $19 millionto NGOs, social movements, and community groups of the Amazon and Atlantic rainforest. These carried out environmental protection, social development, agriculturalproduction, and extractive marketing activities.

The program had successfully funded, by 1997, 427 projects implemented by 175CSOs and worth $18.1 million, which ranged from leading policy advocacy and pub-lic education organizations to small community groups that provide care and coun-seling. The Bank renewed this loan in 1999, and its NGO funding component is expectedto disburse $20 million over the next four years.

This rural poverty alleviation project, which incorporates the major lessons the Bankhas learned with the implementation of rural social funds worldwide, will fund pro-jects selected by municipal development councils and submitted by informal groupsof low-income farmers.

FUNBIO is operated with GEF moneys to fund NGOs, community groups, govern-ment agencies, and research centers that carry out environmental and biodiversityprojects. The fund approved in 1998 the first tranche of 10 projects valued at $2.4million. The selection committee is composed of leading business leaders, researchers,government officials, and NGO technicians.

The Forest Resource Management Subprogram (Promanejo) came on line in 1999and is geared to funding local “promising initiatives” in the areas of forest manage-ment, agro-forestry systems, and sustainable logging.

The Extractive Reserve Subprogram (RESEX) is funding agroforestry and productiveactivities of six associations of rubber tappers located in four extractive reserves in theAmazon.

Eight Northeastern stategovernments (Bahia,Ceará, Sergipe, Rio Grandedo Norte, Piaui,Pernambuco, Paraíba, andMaranhão)

Ministério Extraordináriode Política Fundiária

State of Mato Grosso

State of Rondônia

Ministry of theEnvironment and WaterResources

Ministry of Health

State government of RioGrande do Sul

Fundação Getúlio Vargas



Table 5. Government Small-Grants Funds Geared to Funding CSOs

Total funds

Project ($ millions) Executing agency Program characteristics

$548.8

$118.9

$40.0

$22.0

$21.0

$20.0

$12.9

$10.0

$7.9

$4.5

TOTAL $806

Bank-funded projects worldwide recognized these problems:

Contracts are often tightly drawn, providing lim-ited allowance for overheads and little room forflexible implementation. NGOs accept these con-tracts because they are often dependent on pro-jects for operating funds, but many do soreluctantly. The problem lies mainly in the com-plexity of government payment procedures andthe limited administrative capacities of NGOsand CBOs. A few projects make significant effortsto overcome these problems. Good examplesinclude the Demonstration Projects in the PilotProgram to Conserve Brazil’s Rain Forest wheregovernment works through a commercial bankto disburse funds at the community level (WorldBank 1998d, p. 360).

While the executing government agencies often under-stand the criticism, they must explain to the CSOs thatthese are procedures governed by specific Brazilian lawsand World Bank regulations that are geared to ensur-ing the proper use of public funds. Paradoxically, althoughCSOs have for years conceptually defended the needto ensure accountability of public funds, they are hav-ing a difficult time, in practice, abiding by the additionaladministrative procedures these laws entail.

On the other hand, the Bank has begun to realizethat it may also have to adjust to working with CSOs.With this in mind, it has carried out many studies world-wide that analyze the problems with small funds admin-istration and has attempted to adopt more flexibleprocurement, disbursement, and reporting requirementswhen possible. The OED report specifically made sev-eral recommendations in this regard:

To ensure flexible project implementation, helpborrowers and train Bank staff to employ fullythe flexibility that exists in Bank procedures (suchas for consultancy and procurement) with respectto working with NGOs/CBOs, further simplifybusiness procedures without loss of transparen-cy or accountability, and provide guidelines forreasonable overheads for contracts with NGOs(World Bank 1998d, p. xviii).

Another Bank study referred to the singular finan-cial nature of CSOs and the need for governments andthe Bank to be sensitive to their budgetary needs: “NGOsoperate on a very thin financial base and need to be fullycompensated for the services they are expected to pro-vide. They should receive overhead and advances sim-ilar to those customary for commercial contractors”(Carroll, Schmidt, and Bebbington 1996, p. 39). In thecase of Brazil, more streamlined procedures have beenestablished for the PDA, PAIC, PADIC, and FUNBIO,although some CSOs continue to complain about rigid-ity in some of their oversight requirements.

Although it is too early to assess the results and impactsof these funds, since the majority of them have onlyrecently been established, the preliminary analysis hasbeen largely positive. An independent evaluation ofthe PDA, carried out in 1999 by researchers associatedwith several leading NGOs, demonstrated that the 97projects funded to date were quite socially relevantand technologically innovative, and were being carriedout by highly representative grassroots organizations.While the economic sustainability of the productiveprojects (which account for over 40 percent of all fund-ed projects) was not yet assured because of several struc-tural problems with marketing and enterprise management,it was clear that the projects were helping to promoteneeded community organizing and institution capacity-building in the Amazon region (Santilli 1997).

Disadvantages and Advantages ofTripartite Collaboration

Disadvantages

While acknowledging that important strides have beenmade in government–civil society–Bank collaboration,some analysts and practitioners in all three sectors feelthat the growing phenomenon of tripartite relations mayeither have gone too far or have generated several unre-solved problems. This is the case, for instance, withthose that feel that the proliferation of government–cit-izen policy councils is exaggerated and question therepresentativity of the CSOs and other civil societyparticipants. Some officials in the Cardoso administra-tion share this view and question the legitimacy of the


conselhismo phenomenon, where self-appointed CSOrepresentatives have as much voting power as electedofficials. They feel that CSOs need to have a presencein such councils but they should be consultative innature in order to not dilute the legitimate power ofelected officials. It is for this reason, they point out,that bipartite councils set up by the Cardoso adminis-tration have tended to be consultative in nature ratherthan deliberative.65 At the other end of the politicalspectrum, analysts point to the dangers of participaçãoconstrangida, in which project-induced councils are seenas a straitjacket or “token” bodies rather than beingspontaneous and effective participatory mechanisms.66

In these situations, the councils simply serve to legit-imize interests of government officials or rubber-stampgovernment-induced decisions.

Critics also often point out that CSOs have neverbeen elected and thus do not have legally granted rep-resentation or formally speak for anyone. This is obvi-ously true, but what this view ignores is that CSOsgain their political legitimacy, in part, not from a rep-resentational or electoral rationale, but rather fromdefending larger, universal principles. These princi-ples include human rights, gender equity, and envi-ronmental protection. While these do not have naturalconstituencies, they must nonetheless be advocated inmodern society. Further, as established political partiesface a disenchanted electorate and a crisis of governancein Brazil and worldwide, it is increasingly the organizedcivil society sector, often led by the CSOs, which helpto fill the political void. Most analysts agree that elect-ed representatives in Brazil and throughout the worlddo not have the capability to represent the interests ofall the myriad constituencies within society.

This is especially true of marginalized sectors suchas landless rural workers, indigenous populations, andthe urban poor, who often do not have the political baseto elect their own representatives. In these situations,CSOs often play a crucial role as the voice of the voice-less. This is the case of the Rede Brasil, which, althoughled by traditional NGOs, represents large constituen-cies such as small-scale rural producers and urban slumdwellers when discussing broad policy questions or spe-cific projects with the World Bank and the IDB. Theseinformal citizens’ movements should thus be seen as acomplementary power that adds strength and depth to

the democratic system, rather than a movement thatchallenges the power of elected representatives. As theBank’s 1997 WDR recognized:

The growth of these intermediary organizationsreflects the larger movement toward democracyin many regions and, in some countries, the needto bridge the ”missing middle” between citizensand the state (p. 114).

CSOs also derive legitimacy from—and are increas-ingly recognized as important development actorsbecause of—their largely successful efforts at the grass-roots level. As reflected by the title of the Veja coverstory on civil society some years ago O Brasil que dáCerto” or “The Brazil That Works,” CSOs are increas-ingly valued for their effective organizing, resource mobi-lization, and technical skills. Further CSOs, andparticularly NGOs, often have the technical capabilityand financial resources to participate at national andinternational public policy forums that the smaller,less sophisticated groups cannot attend. In this way,NGOs can and generally do defend the broader inter-ests of other civil society sectors.

Interestingly enough, greater CSO influence and rela-tions with government are also questioned by many inthe CSO community. Not only do many CSOs contin-ue to harbor long-standing suspicion of their govern-ment interlocutors, expecting them to attempt to controlor co-opt them, countless others maintain conceptualrestrictions to working closely with government or evenscaling up their operations. Many CSO leaders andacademics feel that CSOs should not attempt to replacethe role of the state in providing social services, sincethese are governmental responsibilities enshrined in theBrazilian Constitution. Further, they feel that an expand-ed CSO role in society is part of the so-called neoliber-al strategy to reduce the size and influence of the state.This view, as expressed by a well-known academic, gen-erally sees CSOs as contributing: “to the privatizing ofpublic policy, and to leading these policies to a market-based solution, just as prescribed by conservative alter-natives to the welfare state model” (Gonçalves 1996, p.56). For this reason, many CSOs are hesitant to receivegovernment funds or to accept the invitation by gov-ernments to expand their often-localized education and



health services. Even the Bank recognizes the dilemmaexperienced by CSOs as stated in the OED report onCSO-Bank relations:

Many NGOs have reservations about acceptingcontracts from governments. Reservations maybe ideological or practical. Accepting funds formgovernments may reduce NGOs’ credibility withtheir clients and their supporters and have a chill-ing effect on their ability to have a critical rela-tionship with government (World Bank 1998d,p. 36).

Some CSOs also feel that they will stray away fromtheir traditional government watchdog role and losetheir hard-earned autonomy if they collaborate too close-ly with government.

Still others, take a middle position in this debate onevolving government-civil society relations. They arguethat by adopting a more visible and proactive stance,CSOs don’t risk substituting government, but ratherserve to complement government action. As LeilahLandim states, “This is the worst idea one can have ofthis sector. A civil society sector presupposes a strongand active state, transparent, with clear rules, and CSOswhich are autonomous, vibrant, and proactive” (GazetaMercantil 1998, p. 4). Further, this view contends thatCSOs bring singular skills and experiences that com-plement government expertise and capabilities. Ratherthan be seen as an impediment, CSOs can play a role,as they do in the United States and Western Europe, ofmonitoring government action and establishing part-nerships with government to provide services to soci-ety at large, and in the long-run contribute to theimproved effectiveness of government projects. Whilemany within the civil society sector feel that the Bankis intent on having CSOs substitute the work and eventhe role of the state, the Bank’s OED report is clear onthis: “NGOs and CBOs are valued partners most oftenwhen they complement government rather than sub-stitute for it” (World Bank 1998d, p. 16).

The role of the Bank is also questioned at times, espe-cially when it finds itself unwittingly cast as middlemanbetween the government and civil society. What oftenhappens in problematic projects is that the Bank is placedin an intermediation role between feuding government

and civil society organizations. This was clearly the casein the Planafloro, Prodeagro, and Itaparica projects,where the local CSOs attempted to influence govern-ment policy by putting pressure on he Bank. This isnot an appropriate role for several reasons. First, becausethe Bank is, after all, an outside funder, while govern-ment and civil society are the principal protagonists ofnational development processes. Government and civilsociety should thus always take center stage in the devel-opment process. Second, the Bank is poorly equippedfor such an intermediate role because of its own dis-tant and tentative relations with civil society. Clearly,the best-case scenario for any development project isfor the government to constructively engage civil society in its implementation. The ideal position for the World Bank, on the other hand, is to simplyplay a catalytic role in this process by encouraging thegovernment, when needed, to be more open and responsive to CSO overtures for information and participation. The OED study found that the Bank hascomparative advantages in fulfilling a catalyst role and has made some headway in this regard. The reportstates that:

The Bank is in a unique position to facilitategovernment-civil society dialogue and interac-tion because of its direct relationship with gov-ernment, in particular the economic/financialsectors. In several instances (e.g. in the formu-lation of the Pilot Program or in the preparationof the AIDS/STDs Control project), the Bankhas played a positive role in this. (Fumo, 1998,p.36)

In this light, the Bank is accumulating valuable insightabout stakeholder participation experiences worldwidethat it can bring to bear on the Brazilian portfolio.

Advantages

Despite the contradictions and problems that charac-terize Government–CSO–Bank collaboration, mount-ing evidence suggests that the advantages of this growinginstitutional synergy are many and mutually benefi-cial. The Bank’s WDR 1997 report on the role of thestate was clear on this point:


The benefits of greater consultation and part-nership with civil society show up in improve-ments in the process of public policymaking, inthe quality of service delivery, and, in someinstances, in improved rate of return (World Bank1997a, p.120).

This growing recognition of the successful track recordand unique expertise of NGOs is especially importantduring this period of generalized political decentral-ization and redefinition of the role of the state in Braziland throughout Latin America. As the state reduces itssize and some of its attributions in the social areas, part-nerships with CSOs are increasingly seen as a more effec-tive, flexible, and low-cost alternative to traditionalunilateral government programs.

There are several studies under way geared to betterunderstanding and encouraging Government–CSO–Bankcollaboration. First, the Bank sponsored worldwideresearch on the legal status of CSOs that has resultedin the first draft of the Handbook on Good Practices forLaws Relating to Nongovernmental Organizations.67 TheBank also sponsored an electronic symposium inNovember 1997 with the participation of leading NGOleaders and jurists from Latin America to discuss thefindings of the handbook. Second, the already men-tioned OED study on the participation of NGOs in Bank-financed projects worldwide attempted to determinethe costs and benefits of this collaboration. Brazil wasone of the five countries selected, and participation bycommunity associations, social movements, and NGOswas analyzed in the following three projects: AIDS/DST,PDA, and RPAP.

Third, the World Bank Institute or WBI has under-taken a Partnership in Poverty Alleviation Program,which is geared to identifying, analyzing, and reward-ing successful poverty alleviation programs carried outthrough intersectoral (Government–CSO–private sec-tor) partnerships. WBI’s program was launched in 1996 in partnership with UNDP and the Inter-American Foundation in six countries: Argentina, Bolivia,Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Venezuela. A prin-cipal feature of the program was the establishment ofnational tripartite (government, civil society, private sec-tor) advisory committees to oversee the program andselect the case studies. In Brazil, this program was intro-

duced in 1998 and carried out in partnership with theFundação Getúlio Vargas (São Paulo branch). FGV con-vened an intersectoral group of development expertsand practitioners that selected and researched 10 suc-cessful subnational partnership initiatives locatedthroughout Brazil. These initiatives are geared to suchareas as health care, sanitation, microcredit, education,and enterprise development, and were all carried outthrough local intersectoral partnerships. The findingsand “lessons learned” of these experiences were dis-seminated through a video, national seminar, and publications.

The civil society consultation process carried out bythe IDB in three Latin American countries, includingBrazil, also recognized the value of a tripartite approachto development. The process revealed that:

There is an increasing maturation of the worldat large, with bilateral donors, the World Bankand UN, Governments, academics, and Northernfoundations all recognizing the trisector approachas important to addressing development problems.These diverse actors are beginning to tease out astrategic framework for this approach whichincludes: a legal and fiscal enabling structure; capac-ity building for the civil society sector; resourcesfor the sustainability of the sector; partnershipmechanisms and operations; and mapping andincreased visibility of the civil society sector.68

These various studies have produced several lessonsthat clearly point to the advantages of intersectoral col-laboration. First, the benefits are mutual, since each sec-tor (Government–Civil Society–Bank) has differing, yetcomplementary, experience and know-how. In termsof technical expertise, the government and Bank haverecognized competency in the content, or “hardware,”aspects of development such as conceptualizing macropolicies, baseline research, economic modeling, and sec-tor work. CSOs, on the other hand, have proven expe-rience in the process and organizational, or “software,”aspects of development such as participatory approach-es, community organizing, and stakeholder ownershipstrategies. Because of their self-help nature and smallersize, CSOs also tend to have an ability to innovate andadapt, as well as be more cost-effective than government


agencies. Further, civil society entities have an inti-mate knowledge of local reality and conditions andcan provide an in-depth, sector-specific perspective,while the Bank brings a broader, longitudinal, perspectivethat is both cross-sectoral and international. A Bankstudy on stakeholder participation stated: “Many inter-mediary NGOs have experience in participatory pro-ject design and skills in participatory research, communitymobilization, facilitation techniques, and group dynam-ics” (World Bank 1996, p. 156).

Second, in terms of institutional roles, while civilsociety entities bring grassroots representation and legit-imacy to the bargaining table, the government and theBank bring the weight and resources of the official sec-tor. Experience has demonstrated that both aspects,social legitimacy and institutional support, are neces-sary ingredients to allow for successful developmentinitiatives. Third, if CSOs are brought into the processin a constructive fashion, they can prove to be effectivepartners in terms of project monitoring, technical assis-tance, and project implementation. The Bank primerWorking with NGOs states that:

The most successful examples of Bank-NGO col-laboration are those in which NGO involve-ment comes early on in the project cycle andNGOs are treated as partners in the developmentprocess, not simply as hired contractors or ser-vice delivery agencies. Partnership implies: con-sultation concerning development objectives andgoals, mutual transparency and shared deci-sion-making (World Bank 1995, p. 45).

Even if CSOs are not involved directly in project mat-ters, they are key opinion makers in society and canhelp mobilize community interest around the projectand disseminate useful information about the projectsto the beneficiary population. With the adoption of anew worldwide anti-corruption policy in 1998, the Bankis also beginning to recognize and value the importantrole CSOs can play in helping to curb corruption at theproject level.

Recent experience demonstrates that certain thematicareas seem to be more inclined to encourage closer rela-

tions and more operational collaboration among thethree sectors. These include the environment, health,education, and rural poverty issues. There are certain-ly a variety of reasons that account for this trend, butthree key factors, which seem to encourage greaterparticipation, are:

• Issues that have a more universal and less politi-cal/ideological appeal, such as AIDS and the envi-ronment

• Social programs that are more complex to imple-ment and thus require greater stakeholder discus-sion and ownership to ensure successful projectoutcomes and long term sustainability, such as ruralpoverty and education

• Regions such as the Amazon, which, because of theirimmensity and problems, have limited governmentpresence.

Another lesson on partnerships seems to be that theBank and CSO personnel have a better chance of moresubstantive and constructive engagement when focusedon a specific program or project, rather than on largerpolicy questions. The Mato Grosso Natural ResourcesManagement Project (Prodeagro) exemplifies this pointwell. While there is still considerable disagreementbetween the state government and CSOs over more con-tentious issues such as indigenous land demarcation,agrarian regularization, and environmental protectionpolicies, both parties opted to negotiate the establish-ment of a small-grants fund (PADIC) and concentrateon its joint implementation. The hope is that many ofthe small-scale initiatives financed by the fund wouldnot only serve to address the larger, thornier issues,but its joint administration would allow both sides toforge a more constructive working relationship. Thisexpectation seems to have at least partly been borne outas expressed by Mato Grosso’s opposition partyCongressman Gilney Viana in a 1998 report aboutCSO participation in Prodeagro. He stated that this expe-rience had been: “a concrete and successful example ofparticipation, intervention, and change in public poli-cy, with significant reflexes for other sectors in society”(ABONG 1998b, p. 95).

51

4. Conclusion

The civil society sector in Brazil is not yet clearly definedor visible, yet its significance and weight are steadilybecoming more apparent. Not only has the number ofCSOs mushroomed over the past decade, but their rolein national and local development processes is beingincreasingly recognized. This is especially true of NGOs,which have gone from near-clandestine status a decadeago to being valued and visible development actorstoday. After having demonstrated their effectiveness inpromoting grassroots organizing and social services,NGOs are now participating in policy discussions at themacro level.

While barriers based largely on past animosity stillexist between CSOs, government, and the World Bank,relations are improving rapidly. There are a growingnumber of innovative mechanisms for tripartite infor-mation sharing, dialogue, consultation, operational col-laboration, and funding. Recent experience withBank-financed projects in Brazil demonstrates thatincreasing Government–Civil Society–Bank collabora-tion can improve the effectiveness of development pro-jects. Collaboration not only promotes greater localownership and beneficiary involvement, but can resultin improved operational results and social impact. Whilethe World Bank recognizes its catalytic role in promot-ing stakeholder participation, it is the Brazilian gov-

ernment, at various levels, that is taking the lead inpromoting government–civil society collaboration.

There are several steps that can be taken to furtherencourage government–civil society–Bank collabora-tion within the World Bank’s Brazil portfolio. First, gov-ernments at various levels and the Bank need to furtherpromote public disclosure of project documents in orderto enlist informed stakeholder participation. The Bank,in particular, needs to more systematically translatekey documents into Portuguese. Second, dialogue andconsultation mechanisms, which are beginning to effec-tively improve the relations between the govern-ment/Bank and national CSO networks, should beconsolidated. A more participatory approach needs tobe undertaken at the country strategy level (CAS), aswell at the level of each Bank-financed loan.

An approach that is being used successfully at head-quarters and in the LAC region and could be appliedin Brazil is the sponsoring of joint (CSO–Government–Bank) research and training activities. Third, task man-agers should increasingly adopt social analysis and stake-holder participation methodologies that are beingeffectively implemented in several projects (in the areasof the environment, AIDS, and rural development) toincrease government–civil society ownership and improveproject implementation performance.

52

Notes

Notes

1. All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless other-wise noted.

2. Sociedade civil organizada is a political term thatemerged during the 1980s to refer to sectors that active-ly opposed the military regime, such as labor unions,NGOs, social movements, church and communitygroups, and activist professional associations. Thisdefinition is not as inclusive as others, since it general-ly does not include the private sector.

3. This is the term most widely used in the UnitedStates. In Great Britain the word most widely used todesignate this sector is charities.

4. The term third sector originated in the United Statesand was popularized by such social scientists as AlanWolfe and Lester Salamon to describe the third leg of asocietal tripod that consists of the government (first sec-tor), the economy or markets (second sector), and thesocial sector (third sector). This is generally consid-ered a less political and more inclusive term, since itincludes charitable organizations, cultural associations,and corporate foundations.

5. In his book Getting Ahead Collectively: GrassrootsExperiences in Latin America, Albert Hirschman wroteabout the innovative, low-cost, and successful devel-opment approaches adopted by 45 cooperatives, NGOs,and neighborhood associations he visited in six LatinAmerican countries (the Dominican Republic, Colombia,Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) in 1983 underthe sponsorship of the Inter-American Foundation.

6. Fukuyama studied the three countries with a “highdose of trust” (Germany, Japan, and the United States),and three countries with “low dose of trust” (France,Italy, and China) in order to demonstrate how the lev-

els of trust and social capital affect the political andeconomic life of these countries.

7. These figures are based on comparing data fromtwo sources: the Demographic Census of 1991 and theNational Household Survey (PNDA) of 1995 (GazetaMercantil, 1998, Dôssie, p. 1).

8. Defining the Nonprofit Sector, The Johns HopkinsComparative Nonprofit Sector Project, July 1993.

9. In Conselho da Comunidade Solidária 1998b.10. The initiative began with a conference hosted by

IDB’s president, Enrique Iglesias, in October 1994 inWashington and included formal consultations, meet-ings, and studies in several Latin American countries.These activities were held in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombiaand were carried out by the Synergos Institute andCivicus. In Brazil, this consultation was coordinatedby two NGOs; IDAC and ISER. The initiative also result-ed in the forming of the network Latin American SocialLeaders Working Group on Civil Society, which bringstogether leaders and specialists from NGOs and donoragencies from throughout the hemisphere. The mostrecent event of the IDB Civil Society Initiative was alarge regional conference held in Colombia in May 1998,which brought together some 800 persons includingthe president and vice presidents of the IDB, govern-ment officials, civil society leaders, private sector exec-utives, and social science researchers. The three-dayconference analyzed the lessons learned from 32 “bestpractice” case studies of Government–CivilSociety–Private Sector partnerships throughout LatinAmerica, and discussed the IDB’s strategy to promotethe consolidation of civil society in the region.

11. These include founding date, staff size, financialresources, institutional vitality, thematic diversity, mem-bership base, beneficiaries reached, and visibility in

the press (Inter-American Development Bank, UnitedNations Development Programme El Capital Social).

12. A 1998 survey of 184 ABONG members foundthat only 36 organizations, or 195 percent, had thefederal “utilidade pública” certificate. A larger number,however, 38.5 percent of the surveyed NGOs, were reg-istered in the CNAS, which represents a marked increasein relation to the 19.3 percent reported in 1994. Yetonly 16.3 percent of those registered with the CNAShave been able to obtain exception from paying employ-ee social security taxes (ABONG, 1998c).

13. In order for a community organization to becomelegalized, it has to register as a “nonprofit civil associ-ation” by filing the “articles of incorporation” at a localCartório de Registro de Pessoas Jurídicas, or organizationallegal notary office. These articles include bylaws, a listof elected officers (generally four), headquarters address,and minutes of the founding assembly (with a quorumof members signing). Until recently the organizationhad to pay for these documents to be published in thelocal Diário Oficial, or government registry newspaper.Since the organizational proponents often had little for-mal education and the nascent organizations had nofunds, they either opted not to become legalized orhad to rely on donations from local politicians, whichoften served to compromise the independence of theorganization from its founding. Many “legal assistance”NGOs were established precisely to assist base groupswith this legalization process.

14. Although the women’s rural movement is one ofthe least visible and researched, there is evidence thatit is a dynamic and growing social phenomenon. Themovement in Rio Grande does Sul, which is closelytied to the MST, has a reported membership of 20,000women. The quebradeiras de côco movement in Maranhão,which was organized to obtain the right of access tothe babaçu nut tree in squatter areas, has promotedseveral multiple-state conferences and has even sentrepresentatives to several global United Nations con-ferences.

15. Folha de São Paulo 1997b, pp. 1–11.16. The Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation Pilot

Project (Loan# 6475) is being enacted in five Northeasternstates (Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, andPernambuco) for a total value of $150 million. As thePAD states: “Land conflicts have built up pressure on

the government to decisively address the problems relat-ed to skewed land distribution . . . [and thus it] is eagerto experiment with alternative approaches to landreform.” The project will provide associations of land-less workers with loans to purchase land, and grantfunds to implant infrastructure improvement and con-tract technical assistance geared to promoting sustain-able land management and agricultural production.

17. Brazil has nearly 7,500 Catholic parishes, andmost of these maintain a variety of charitable or socialaction centers. The Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro, forinstance, has helped establish and maintain 113 schools,51 health centers, 41 daycare centers, 22 food and clothesdistribution centers, 9 orphanages, 6 community cen-ters, 5 vocational training centers, 2 legal aid organiza-tions, and 17 centers for young women, elderly,handicapped, street children, and marginalized popu-lations (Landim1993a).

18. LBV was established in 1950 by São Paulo radiopersonality Alziro Zarur. Today LBV is an ecumenicalcharity that reaches over 3 million low-income per-sons through its 440 social service centers located inall 27 states and several neighboring countries in theSouthern Cone. LBV is one of the few Brazilian chari-ties to effectively tap into the reservoir of individualcharitable giving, with a current membership of over 5million contributors.

19. This term is a clever play on the term pilantra,which signifies “swindler,” with filantropia, or “philan-thropy.”

20. The Second Vatican Council (1962–65), con-vened by Pope John XXIII, became the symbol of thechurch’s new openness to the modern world. Termingthe church the “people of God,” the council encyclicalsdeclared that the church shared the “joy and hope, thegrief and anguish of contemporary humanity, particu-larly of the poor and afflicted.” In Latin America, thefollow-up conferences of Medellín and Puebla (1968and 1973) gave this progressive message a clear socialexpression by highlighting the concern of the churchfor social justice issues such as poverty, land concen-tration, and urban violence. Thus was spawned LiberationTheology with its “preferential option for the poor”and emphasis on the growing leadership role of lay lead-ers through the “base Christian communities” that pro-liferated in urban slums and rural communities throughout

Notes 53

Latin America, and especially Brazil. By the 1990’s, therewere an estimated 70,000 base Christian communitieslocated in 94 percent of Brazil’s 255 dioceses.

21. The Pastoral da Criança began in a small Paranátown and by 1998 provided services to over 17,000communities throughout Brazil through a network of56,000 volunteers. Because of the Pastoral’s low-costand innovative nutrition and oral rehydration programs,infant mortality fell nearly by half in just five years(1989–93)—from 53 to 27 per thousand births—in thecommunities it assists.

22. Many of the Protestant denominations in Brazilare still considered “missionary churches” having beenfirst implanted in Brazil in the latter half of the 19thcentury. The first group of Protestants to arrive wereseveral dozen Methodist families, which came to Brazil fleeing from post–Civil War United States in the1870s. They settled in a rural area in the interior of the state of São Paulo that later became the town of Americana.

23. The Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus was estab-lished in 1978. Geared mainly to the urban poor andpreaching a mixture of financial rewards and medicalcures for the faithful, the church has mushroomedover the past years to include a reported 2,500 church-es in 50 countries. The temples are often located in con-verted old movie houses or large storefronts in thedowntown areas of Brazil’s cities, large and small. Asalient characteristic of the church has been its aggres-sive proselytizing, noisy church services, and astutemoneymaking approach. The press reports that thechurch today raises over R$1.5 billion annually fromtithing members and a vast array of business holdingsthat includes Brazil’s third largest national television net-work (TV Record) and a commercial Bank (Banco deCrédito Metropolitano) (Veja 1997, pp. 76–81).

24. It is estimated that the in the municipality of Riode Janeiro alone, there are 288 Spiritist obras sociais,orsocial service centers. A study that researched a subsetof 62 of these centers documented that over 13,000low-income and indigent persons in Rio de Janeiro werereached daily through some 190 different charitable ser-vices being offered (Landim 1998, pp.130–148).

25. The principal members of GIFE include the fol-lowing Brazilian and North American foundations andcompanies: Instituto C and A, Bradesco, Vitae, Sirotsky

Sobrinho, Oderbrecht, Roberto Marinho, Alcoa, ABRINQ,Oderbrecht, IBM, Xerox, Kellogg, Ford, and MacArthur.

26. It was reportedly first used in a 1950 report ofthe Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Gonçalves1996).

27. In his book Intermediary NGOs: The SupportingLink in Grassroots Development (1992), Thomas Carrolldefines a GSO as a “civic developmental entity that pro-vides services … to local groups of disadvantaged ruralor urban households and individuals.” Unlike the MSOs(membership support organizations such as local coop-eratives or trade unions), GSOs do not have a member-ship base, but tend to be more formal and professional.

28. The term nongovernmental organization does notappear anywhere in the legislation, and thus NGOs arenot juridically distinguished from any other nonprofitorganizations. As the ranks of NGOs have grown expo-nentially over the past decades, the continued juridicallimbo and lack of tax incentives have increasingly becomean operational impediment, sometimes forcing NGOsto ignore tax and labor laws, or even avoiding becom-ing legalized. A survey of environmental NGOs carriedout by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) found that 15percent of the 725 groups studied were not legally registered.

29. The first time the term NGO was reportedlyused in the national written press was in a 1988 Jornaldo Brasil article titled: “Nongovernmental OrganizationsTake Over the Country” (Landim 1998, p.53).

30. The study was based on a “directory of directo-ries” published by the Inter-American Foundation in1990. The countries with the largest number of NGOswere Brazil (1,010), Colombia (594), Bolivia (365),Chile (345), Honduras (250), and Mexico (212)(Fernandes 1994).

31. Alexis de Tocqueville, French political writer andstatesman, described the virtues of nascent Americandemocracy in his 1835–40 book Democracy in America.Tocqueville argued in his book that the flowering ofdemocracy occurred in the United States, best exem-plified by the existence of thousands of voluntary asso-ciations, because conditions there best permitted thespreading of European social ideas.

32. This is the case, for instance, of NGOs such asISA, which established an active (not just pro forma asis usually the case) board of directors mirrored on the


U.S. non-profit tradition of active boards, and IBASE,which attempted to diversify its fundraising strategybased on European NGO experience (that is, adoptingfor-profit spin-off ventures and selling services).

33. Catia Lubambo and Sueli Guimaraes in “OPrezeis—Uma Estrategia de Ação Coletiva para umaConquista Social” in ABONG, 1998b, p. 146.

34. During the early 1990s IBASE worked on morethan 10 thematic areas ranging from agrarian reformand street children to the foreign debt. Its multifacetedstaff trained local community leaders, participated innational policy advocacy networks, and participatedfrequently in U.N.-sponsored international conferences.

35. See the views expressed by Friends of the Earthand OXFAM in the report titled “Planafloro um AnoDepois” (Friends of the Earth, OXFAM 1997).

36. The European agencies were in the forefront ofthis agency-counterpart partnership approach. The pre-cursor was the Dutch agency NOVIB, which began tohold its plataforma consultative meeting in the mid1980s, in which NOVIB’s funding strategy was fully dis-cussed with its NGO grantees. OXFAM/UK has alsobeen well known for carrying out joint public advoca-cy campaigns in both Brazil and Britain on such topicsas debt relief, land violence, and poverty alleviation.North American Foundations such as Kellogg, Inter-American, and MacArthur also held joint thematic andconsultative seminars with their grantee organizationsaround such topics as capacity building, project eval-uation, and fundraising.

37. This figure is somewhat skewed by two well-known environmental organizations, SOS Mata Atlânticaand Greenpeace, which have unusually large member-ship bases of 10,000 and 3,000 respectively. SOS MataAtlântica, for instance, was the first to adopt its owncredit card, which today generates nearly 70 percent ofits income.

38. AACC reported that 11 percent of its $1.8 mil-lion annual budget came from several Swiss and Germanagencies (church, government, private), and 89 percentwas raised from federal and state government sourcesthrough convênios, or service-provision contracts. These sources include the Ministry of Labor’s FAT fund,INCRA’s Lumiar program, and several state agencies,including the Secretary of Planning, which implementsthe Bank-funded Poverty Alleviation Program (RPAP).

39. Leaders of the Forum de ONGs de Rondôniaestablished the Cooperativa de Trabalho Multíplo deRondônia (COOTRARON) in 1997. By 1998 it was com-posed of 58 persons ranging from technicians to clean-ing persons, who provide services to over nineorganizations in such areas as juridical assistance, forestry,strategic planning, agronomy, and office cleaning. Severalof its members provided services to the Bank-fundednatural resource management project Planafloro andto INCRA’s Lumiar project. The cooperative was able togenerate $22,000 a month in salaries, and its contractscost 15 to 20 percent less than standard, formal con-tracts that utilize the Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas(CLT) law.

40. The Bank recognizes this reluctance.41. For a detailed history and discussion of the impact

of NGOs in Recife, see “NGOs in Recife: From PolicyAdvocate to Policy Maker.” In this article, Kaye Pyle pre-sents an interesting case study of how NGOs encour-aged and assisted the government of Recife in establishingan innovative favela, or “shantytown,” urbanization pro-gram called Prezeis (Pyle 1997, pp. 12–23).

42. Of the six studies undertaken, four were WorldBank–financed: (Planafloro (Rondônia); Prodeagro (MatoGrosso); AIDS/STD (national); and FLONAS/PilotProgram (Pará). Two others were funded by the IDB:Macrodrenagem (Belém/PA) and PMACI (Acre). The finalversion of the study, Bancos Multilaterais e DesenvolvimentoParticipativo no Brasil: dilemas e desafios, was publishedin book form by FASE and IBASE in 1998.

43. The guide Para Compreender e Dialogar comOrganismos Internacionais: Um Guia sobre o Banco Mundialno Brasil e no Mundo was published in September 1995and is geared to CSOs. The guide contains chapters onBank history, operational structure, structural adjust-ment policies, Brazil portfolio, and recent advances inthe relationship with civil society.

44. In keeping with its strategy of working throughCongress, Rede was able to get access to the CAS andthe IDB’s country paper through a congressman whoformally requested both documents from the Ministryof Planning. Both were subsequently published andcommented on in a 1998 book titled A Estratégia dosBancos Multilaterais para o Brasil.

45. The Fórum DCA, established by 67 organizationsin 1988, played a key role in helping to draft and pres-

Notes 55

suring the Brazilian Congress to adopt the Estatuto daCriança e do Adolescente in 1990. Similar legislationwas adopted in 25 state constitutions. The Fórum DCAfurther lobbied to have legislation passed by the Presidentin 1991 to establish the Conselho Nacional dos Direitosda Criança e do Adolescente, which has 15 civil societyrepresentatives and oversees government policies andprograms in this area. Today all 27 states and many largecities also have local children and adolescent rights citi-zen-government councils (ABONG 1998b, pp. 61–75).

46. Statement made by Neide Silva of ETAPAS (Pyle1997).

47. NGO training courses have been launched by thefollowing organizations: United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID); Centro de Estudosdo Terceiro Setor (CETS) of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas(FGV-SP); Instituto de Estudos Especiais (IEE) of thePontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP); Federação de Obras Sociais (FOS); and the Gestãopara Organizações da Sociedade Civil (GESC) of theUniversidade de São Paulo (USP) (Gazeta Mercantil1997a, p. A7; Dôssie 1998, p. 3).

48. ABONG 1998b.49. Zaffaroni 1997.50. Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO

Evaluation Synthesis Study, OECD/DAC Expert Groupon Aid Evaluation, 1997.

51. The coalition of civil society organizations coor-dinated by the NGO Forum (FETAGRO, CUNPIR, OSR)are not only members of the PAIC Deliberative Council,which approves the projects submitted by the com-munities, but sit side by side with government techni-cians to analyze the project proposals. This participationhas enhanced the selection process in two basic ways:the analysis is more complete, as CSO representativeshave more local knowledge, and their presence has helpedthe state government avoid the political pressures asso-ciated with the statewide elections held in 1998.

52. The Bank is currently in the process of convert-ing ODs to a new, more flexible format composed ofthree modalities: operational policies (OPs), bank pro-cedures (BPs), and good practices (GPs).

53. These were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,Costa Rica (Central America); Ecuador, Jamaica(Caribbean); Mexico; Peru; and Venezuela.

54. The eight-member CSO Steering Committee isbeing headed by a representative from the Confederación

Colombiana de ONGs (CCONG) with an alternate coor-dination by the Caribbean Poverty and Developmentand Center (CPDC).

55. Participatory Country Assistance Strategy process-es have subsequently been carried out in Colômbia, ElSalvador, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic withvarying degree of civil society participation.

56. The three ALOP members in Brazil are Federaçãode Orgãos de Assistência Social e Educacional (FASE),Centro Josué de Castro (CJC), and Instituto de Estudos,Formação e Assessoria em Políticas Sociais (POLIS).

57. The committee which selects grants for the PilotProgram’s Demonstrations Projects (PD/A) is composedby an equal number of government officials and CSOrepresentatives. The national and local health coun-cils, for instance, have the following composition: 50percent health consumers, 25 percent government, and25 percent health professionals. The Conselho daComunidade Solidária council which is consultative innature, on the other hand, has an almost 7:1 ratio ofcivil society representatives (28) over that of govern-ment officials (4).

58. These include the reformulated RPAP projects(now called Rural Poverty Alleviation Projects—RPAP),the Paraná Land Management, and Rio Grande do SulRural Poverty Alleviation projects. The RPAP projectalone has encouraged the creation of over 250 munic-ipal councils throughout the Northeast. Further, thestatutes of these RPAP councils stipulate that 80 percentof the seats be occupied by civil society organizations.

59. It is significant to note that one of the researchershired to evaluate the RESEX project has previously beenheavily involved in mounting the Inspection Panelcase against the Bank in the Planafloro project. The factthat this environmental expert and NGO activist couldbe engaged more constructively in a Bank-financed pro-ject is a testament to what dialogue and a more openattitude on all sides can yield.

60. AACC alone was awarded over 50 technical assis-tance contracts by over 40 local producers associationsduring the 1993–96 period. These contracts totaledapproximately $75,000.

61. The FAP selection committee is composed of rep-resentatives of SEAIN, Rede Brasil, and the World Bank.The fund received 48 proposals from 15 states, eventhough the edital, or “call for proposals,” was adver-tised on the Internet for only a two-week period. The


six proposals selected were to cover the costs of tech-nical assistance and training, project evaluation, andnetworking meetings. They were submitted by onenational CSO network, three regional CSO networks,and two local CSOs.

62. The overarching objective of the Brazil SGP Fundis to promote government-civil society-Bank partner-ship through seminars, training, research, and dissem-ination activities. The thematic areas supported by theFAP during the past two years have included humanrights, women’s health, environment, Afro-Brazilian cul-ture, corporate philanthropy, and children’s rights.Perhaps the most notable feature of the Fund is theunusual composition of its selection committee, whichis made up of three institutions which are generally atodds over the Bank track record: the Ministry of Planning,Rede Brasil, and the Bank.

63. This is the case in Rio Grande do Norte, wherethe Fórum Campo has successfully participated in theRPAP process on various levels from providing techni-cal assistance to monitoring projects.

64. The amounts vary among funds—while one fund(PDA) requires three bids for all purchases above $200,the RPAP funds require bids for all purchases.

65. It is interesting to note, for instance, that theConselho da Comunidade Solidária differs in two fun-

damental ways from the citizen-government councilthat preceded it, the Conselho Nacional de SegurancaAlimentar (CONSEA). While the CONSEA, which wasestablished during the Itamar Franco administration,had more of a deliberative function and its membersboth formally represented and were selected by civilsociety organizations, the Comunidade Solidária coun-cil has a clearly consultative status, and its civil societymembers are selected by the government and serve asindividuals “chosen for their community and socialtradition.”

66. Horácio Martins, community participation expert,has written widely about some of the legally mandatedlocal participation councils in the Northeast region ofBrazil, where the civil society participants do not, inreality, have equal representational rights to local polit-ical bosses, and are in this way vulnerable to beingmanipulated (Carvalho 1997).

67. This study was carried out by the InternationalCenter for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) and analyzed suchissues as the legal definition, governance, taxation, andself-regulation of the NGO sector based on experi-ences worldwide.

68. Synergos 1996, pp.12–13.

Notes 57

A. Bibliography

ABONG (Associacao Brasileira de Organizações Não-

Governamentais). 1996. ONGs: Um Perfil - Cadastro das Filiadas

à Associação Brasileira de ONGs (ABONG). Landim, Leilah, and

Lecticia Ligneul Cotrim. ABONG/ISER, São Paulo.

———. 1998a. As ONGs e o Desenvolvimento Institucional.

Cadernos da ABONG N. 24, São Paulo.

———. 1998b. O Impacto Social do Trabalho das ONGs no Brasil

ABONG, São Paulo.

———. 1998c. ONGs: Um Pefil - Cadastro das Associadas à ABONG,

São Paulo.

Adil, Najam. 1996. “Understanding the Third Sector: Revisiting

the Prince, Merchant, and the Citizen” Nonprofit Management

and Leadership. [QUERY: Is this a journal? A book? More

publication info needed.]

Bailey, Michael, and Henrique M. de Barros. 1995. Para

Coomprender e Dialogar com Organismos Internacionais: Um

Guia sobre o Banco Mundial no Brasil e no Mundo. Oxfam, Recife.

Carroll, Thomas. 1992. Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link

in Grassroots Development, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Carroll, Tom, Mary Schmidt, and Tony Bebbington. 1996.

Participation through Intermediary NGOs. Environment

Department Paper No. 031. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,

February.

Carvalho, Horácio Martins de. 1997. “Relações entre Estado e

Sociedade Civil: A Parceria que Queremos em Ações de Combate

a Pobreza.” Paper presented at the Seminário Novas Parcerias

em Política de Combate a Pobreza, Belo Horizonte, March

1997.

Clark, John. 1991. Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary

Organizations. London: Earthscan Publications.

Conselheiros da Comunidade Solidaria. 1996. Contornos de Uma

Estratégia de Desenvolvimento Social para o Brasil. Brasília,

May.

Conselho da Comunidade Solidaria. 1997. “O Governo de o

Terceiro Setor” Documento de Referência Para a XV Reuniao

do Conselho da Comunidade Solidaria Brasilia, June 30.

———. 1998a. Relatorio de Atividades. Brasília, October.

———. 1998b. Cover letter to Projeto de Lei 4690, Brasília, July

24.

Cooperativa de Reforma Agraria do Brasil. 1996. Concrab: Quatro

Anos Organizando a Cooperacao. CONCRAB, Sao Paulo.

de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835–50. Democracy in America. France.

Feeney, Patricia. 1998. Accountable Aid: Local Participation in

Major Projects Oxford, U.K.: Oxfam Publications.

Fernandes, Rubem Cesar. 1985. “Sem fins lucrativos.” In

Comunicacoes do ISER 15, Rio de Janeiro.

———. 1994. Private but Public: The Third Sector in Latin America.

Washington, D.C: Civicus.

Fischer, Julie. 1993. The Road From Rio: Sustainable Development

and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World. Westport,

CT: Praeger.

Folha de Sao Paulo. 1997a. “MST movimentou R$20 milhoes

em 96.” March 9, pp.1–5.

———. 1997b. “Sem-terra sao fieis a terra recebida.” April 12,

pp.1–11.

Fox, Jonathan, and David Brown. 1998. The Struggle for

Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements,

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Friends of the Earth, OXFAM. 1997. “Planaforo um Ano Depois:

Análise Crítica da Implementação do Plano Agropecuário e

Florestal de Rondônica um Ano após o Acordo para sua

Reformulação.” São Paulo, August.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation

of Prosperity. New York: Free Press.

Fumo, Claudia. 1998. “The Contribution of NGOs to World

Bank-Supported Projects in Brazil.” Operations Policy

Department. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. June.

Garrison, John W., II. 1993. ”The Greening of Brazilian NGOs.”

Inter-American Foundation. Grassroots Development Journal

17(1).

58

Attachments

———. 1996. “Brazilian NGOs: from Grassroots to National

Civil Leadership.” Oxfam (UK and Ireland), Development in

Practice 6(6).

Gazeta Mercantil. 1997a. “Cursos treinam dirigentes de ONGs,”

October, 14, 1997, São Paulo.

———. 1997b. “Terceiro setor já é maior que o governo” October,

14, 1997, São Paulo, dôssie p. A-7.

———. 1998. Dôssie Terceiro Setor. November, 27, 1998, São

Paulo.

Gonçalves, Hebe Signori (org). 1996. Organizações Não-gover-

namentais: Solução ou Problema? São Paulo: Editora Estação

Liberdade.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1984. Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots

Experiences in Latin America. New York: Pergamon Press.

Inoue, Cristina Yumie. 1997. “Bases para um novo pacto de coop-

eração.” In Cadernos ABONG, ABONG, n. 17, Julho.

Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations

Development Programme. 1998. El Capital Social. Buenos

Aires: Edilab Editora.

Inter-American Foundation.1990. A Guide To NGO Directories.

Arlington, VA.

ISER (Instituto de Estudos da Religão). 1988. Sem Fins Lucrativo:

As Organizacoes Nao-Governamentais no Brasil. Landim, Leilah

and Rubem Cesar Fernandes, ISER, Rio de Janeiro.

———. 1991 NGOs in The Nineties. Fernandes, Rubem Cesar,

and Leandro Piquet. ISER Rio de Janeiro.

Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1988. Activists Beyond

Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Landim, Leilah. 1993a. “A Invencao das ONGs: do Servico

Invisivel a Profissao Sem Nome.” Tese de Doutorado,

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

———. 1993b. “Defining the Nonprofit Sector.” The Johns

Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Working Paper

Number 9, Baltimore, July.

Landim, Leilah (org). 1998. Ações em Sociedade: Militancia, cari-

dade, assistência, etc. Rio de Janeiro: Nau Editora.

Landim, Leilah and Neide Beres. 1999 Ocupaçoes, Despesas e

Recursos: As Organizações Sem Fins Lucrativos no Brasil. Rio de

Janeiro: Nau Editora.

Leroy, Jean Pierre, and Maria Clara Couto Soares (orgs). 1998.

Bancos Multilaterais e Desenvolvimento Participativo no Brasil:

dilemas e desafios. Rio de Janeiro: FASE/IBASE.

Lund, Kristin. 1993. A Filantropia Empresarial No Brasil. Sao

Paulo: ARCO.

Mendes, Luiz Carlos Abreu. 1998. “Organizações da Sociedade

Civil de Caráter Público e Organizações Sociais: duas versões

pra um mesmo fenômeno?” Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica

Aplicada (IPEA) Unpublished Report, Brasília.

Ministério da Saúde. 1997. Catálogo de Organizações Não-

Governamentais AIDS/DST, Brasília.

Moura, Alexandrina. 1994. “Non-governmental Organizations

in Brazil: From Opposition to Partnership.” Paper presented

at the Latin American Studies Association XVII International

Congress, Atlanta, GA, March 10–12, 1994.

Navarro, Zander. 1996. “Politicas publicas, agricultura familar

e os processos de democratizacao em areas rurais brasileiras.”

Paper presented at the XX Encontro Anual da Associacao

Nacional de Pos-graduacao e Pesquisa em Ciencias Sociais

(ANPOCS), Caxambu.

Netherlands Development Assistance (NEDA). 1997. NGOs

and Institutional Development. The Hague: Development

Cooperation Department, September.

O Globo. 1997. “ONGs nacionais enfrentam falta de recursos.”

February, 16.

OECD/DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation. 1997. Searching

for Impact and Methods: NGO Evaluation Synthesis Study,

Washington, D.C.

Oliveira, Anna Cynthia, ed. 1997. Marco Regulador de las

Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en Sudamerica. Inter-American

Development Bank (IDB), United Nations Development

Program (UNDP).

Oliveira, Miguel Darcy de, and Rajesh Tandon. 1994. “An Emerging

Global Civil Society.” In Citizens Strengthening Global Civil

Society Washington, DC: Civicus World Alliance for Citizen

Participation.

Poelhekke, Fabio. 1996. Brazil: NGO Country Profile 1996-1,

GOM: Dutch Co-Financing Agencies, Oegstgeest, Netherlands.

Putman, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions

in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pyle, Kathryn Smith. 1997. “NGOs in Recife: From Policy Advocate

to Policy Maker.” In Grassroots Development, Inter-American

Foundation, vol. 21/1.

Salamon, Lester. 1996. “The Three Faces of the Third Sector.”

Keynote Address Presented at the Third Ibero-American

Conference on the Third Sector. Johns Hopkins University,

Baltimore.

Salamon, Lester, and Helmut K. Anheier. 1998. The Emerging

Sector Revisited: A Summary. Washington, D.C.: The Johns

Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies.

Santilli, Marcio (org). 1997. “Avalicao Independente do Sub-

Programa Projetos Demonstrativos.” PD/A, World Bank, Brasília,

August.

Attachments 59

Souza, Herbert de. 1992. “As ONGs na decada de 90.” In

Desenvolvimento, Cooperacao Internacional e as ONGs. Rio de

Janeiro: IBASE/PNUD.

———. 1995. “Enlisting the Power of Citizenship to Fight

Poverty.” Inter-American Foundation, Grassroots Development

Journal (19)2.

Synergos Institute. 1996. “How Governments and Multi-later-

al Donors can Form Large-scale Partnerships with Civil Society

Organizations: Reflections form Three Latin American

Countries.” New York: Synergos Institute, July.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements,

Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Instituto

de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA). 1996 Relatorio sobre

o Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil. Brasília, DF.

Veja. 1994. “ONGs: O Povo Desunido Jamais Sera Vencido.” Ano

27, No. 6 (2.9.94).

———. 1997. “O Calvario do Bispo.” Ano 30, No. 1424, January

15, São Paulo.

———. 1999. “Novas Faces do Bem.” Ano 32, No. 43, October

27, São Paulo.

Vianna, Aurélio (org.). 1998. “A Estratégia dos Bancos Multilaterais

para o Brasil.” Brasília: Rede Brasil, March.

Wolfensohn, James D. 1997. “The Challenge of Inclusion.”

Address to the Board of Governors, Hong Kong, China,

September 23.

———. 1998. “The Other Crisis.” Address to the Board of

Governors, Washington, October 6.

World Bank. 1994a. The World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure.

Washington D.C., March.

———. 1994b. The World Bank and Participation. Washington,

D.C.: Operations Policy Department, September.

———. 1995. Working with NGOs. Carmen Malena, NGO Unit

OPRPG, Washington, March.

———. 1996. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook.

Environment Department, Washington, D.C., February.

———. 1997a. World Development Report (WDR) 1997. New

York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1997b. “Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation Pilot

Project.” Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 16342-Br.

Washington, April 3.

———. 1997c. Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to

Nongovernmental Organizations. Washington, D.C.: Environmen-

tally Sustainable Development Vice Presidency, May.

———. 1998a. The World Bank Inspection Panel: The First Four

Years (1994–1998). Washington, D.C.: Inspection Panel.

———. 1998b. Cooperation between the World Bank and NGOs—

Provisional FY 97 Progress Report. Washington, D.C., February.

———. 1998c. “Civil Society Participation in World Bank Country

Assistance Strategies—Lessons from Experience, FY 97–98.”

Washington, D.C.: NGO Unit, April.

———. 1998d. Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported

Projects. Washington, D.C., Operations Evaluation Department

(OED), November.

Zaffaroni, Cecilia. 1997. El Marco de Desarrollo de Base. Montevideo:

IAF and SADES.


B. Comments by Civil Society Organiza-tions’ Representatives about the WorldBank

General Comments

The Bank has an image much more associated with the policies of

structural adjustment of the IMF than of a development agency

that funds poverty alleviation and other social initiatives. The

overall image is more negative than positive, and there are seri-

ous contradictions between these two roles, of bank and develop-

ment agency.

The Bank is not a readily accessible institution: its documents

are hard to obtain, and when they are available, they are only in

English. Its staff (particularly task managers) are hard to contact

either in Washington or during their brief trips to Brazil.

Civil society organizations are generally not invited or allowed

to opine on or participate in Bank projects. In the infrequent cases

when CSOs are invited, it is usually only once the project is in

trouble or at the end, rarely during the design and planning stages.

CSOs also want to be able to discuss macroeconomic policies and

the Bank’s overall strategy for Brazil.

The Bank’s funds are public in origin, thus the Bank should

maintain a posture of accountability before society at large,

which includes CSOs.

It is important to know what will be the role of the Resident

Mission (RM), now that it is being expanded. Will the RM have

any significant decisionmaking role regarding the definition of the

Bank’s strategy in Brazil?

Often the World Bank and the Inter-American Development

Bank (IDB) fund different projects in the same locale that have

overlapping or contradictory strategies and impacts. There should

be more coordination between both institutions. If little is known

about the World Bank, much less is known about the International

Finance Corporation (IFC) and its portfolio and strategy in Brazil.

There is no doubt that the Bank has adopted new policies recent-

ly, such as the information disclosure and participation policies,

which are forward-looking and welcome. This is also true with

regard to the Bank’s new gender policy and its role in the Beijing

Conference. The issue, though, is whether these policies, which

have been largely established in the policy area of the Bank, are

also being fully implemented in the operations side, where they

will ultimately have more impact.

While the Bank’s new information policy is welcomed, there

are still problems in accessing Bank documents. A recent search

of the Bank’s home page on the World Wide Web came up with

only 18 project information documents (PIDs) of the 54 active

grants. The fact that the country assistance strategy (CAS) is still

a prescribed document also represents a serious impediment to

better Bank–civil society dialogue.

The Bank is too compartmentalized in its development approach.

A more holistic and integrated view of development is needed. It

is also necessary for the Bank to address the causes of poverty

and not only its consequences.

Bank-Government Relations

The Bank maintains an ambiguous relationship with the different

levels of government, often bickering with the government and

blaming it for delays in project implementation. The Brazilian

government, on the other hand, often uses the Bank as a scape-

goat when problems arise with projects. Civil society organiza-

tions, for their part, are left watching the sparring without knowing

what are the real issues and problems. As a matter of fact, the

Bank is often blamed for project implementation problems that

are, in reality, caused by the government.

At times, the Bank has played a positive role in encouraging

and even pressuring governments to maintain a more open and

participatory posture with civil society organizations in relation

to Bank projects, such as in the case of Planafloro, where the

Bank encouraged the state government to carry out a participa-

tory and comprehensive midterm review process. It is difficult for

the Bank to have an effective social action strategy if its only

interlocutor is the government, since the government often does

not have an adequate or effective social strategy itself. Government

is often divorced of grassroots reality or at best has only a super-

ficial view of social conditions.

Operational Performance

It is not surprising that so many Bank projects suffer delays in

their disbursement schedules and other problems, since the Bank

still follows a management style more geared to funding “pro-

jects” rather than “programs,” with fixed time frames, overly

bureaucratic funding procedures, and performance indicators that

are largely quantitative. This approach may have been appropri-

ate when the Bank primarily funded infrastructure projects, but this

operational methodology is inadequate for funding social programs,

which are much more complex, process-oriented, and unpredictable.

Attachments 61

The Bank should adopt more flexible and process-oriented poli-

cies in projects geared to social development. These new policies

would include longer time frames, decentralized project moni-

toring, and more flexible procurement policies within small-pro-

jects funds.

The Bank should also adopt project approval and evaluation

criteria that take into account gender, race, and income distribu-

tion variables in order to better guarantee projects benefits among

the poor.

The quality of project supervision by Bank staff varies great-

ly among projects, for it depends on the capacity and openness of

the task managers and directors. Another problem is the high

mobility that exists within Bank ranks. It is not uncommon for

one task manager to negotiate a project, a second to monitor it,

and a third to evaluate it.

Often the Bank overlooks serious implementation problems or

does not enforce the full compliance of conditionalities. This

seems to occur either because of slack supervision habits, a char-

acteristic of an “project approval culture,” or because the Bank

does not want to strain its relations with the government.

Specific Projects

The Pilot Program to Conserve the Rainforest is among the most

advanced projects supervised by the Bank in terms of incorpo-

rating innovations and encouraging participation. One of the

reasons for this different posture may be that the funds are pro-

vided in the form of grants rather than loans. Moreover, the pro-

gram has encouraged greater participation of civil society

organizations in the design of the various subcomponents (Demon-

stration Projects, Extractive Reserves, Forest Resource Management).

The program also has a more intensive and qualitative supervi-

sion approach than the standard World Bank project.

The results and impacts of the Northeast Rural Development

Projects (NRDP) vary greatly from state to state. While in some

states the results are far below expected levels, in others, positive

results have been achieved both in terms of the beneficiary pop-

ulation reached and in the level of stakeholder participation. The

level of civil society participation and benefits in Rio Grande do

Norte, for example, is one of the highest. There seem to be vari-

ous variables that account for these differences in local partici-

pation: more openness by state governments to stakeholder

participation; higher level of civil society organization at the local

level; government-civil society dialogue centered on concrete mech-

anisms of participation; good track record of CSOs as technical

assistance providers; and the role of the Bank in encouraging its

government counterpart to promote greater participation.

The Northeast Education Project does not seem to be as well

executed as it could be and is not reaching the expected results.

An independent evaluation demonstrated that basic educational

indicators such as dropout rates and grade repetition worsened

more in areas targeted by the project than in areas untouched by

the project. There seem to be various reasons for these poor results:

(1) the project seems to have been designed by economists of the

Ministry of Finance rather than educators of the Ministry of

Education; (2) the project utilizes a traditional training method-

ology that experience has demonstrated as being ineffective; (3)

the project doesn’t address the issues of low teacher salaries; and

(4) the project maintains goals that are overly quantitative (num-

ber of students per teacher) without considering other qualitative

indicators. Nonetheless, the results of the project have varied from

state to state, with the performance in Ceará being the highest.

The AIDS/STD project is being well implemented by the Ministry

of Health, with an innovative civil society participation compo-

nent. Although over a hundred NGOs were funded to carry out

public education and prevention work, this large project has brought

several problems: (1) the program was characterized by a good

deal of bureaucracy and delays related to procurement norms, dis-

bursements, and labor laws; (2) the contracting of NGO techni-

cians to assess and evaluate other NGOs led to unnecessary

infighting; (3) the project inflated the funding market, leading to

the creation of “bogus” NGOs and leading other international

donor agencies to reduce their AIDS funding in Brazil; and (4)

the program has led many NGOs to be financially dependent on

the ministry. This last point is especially important in light of the

termination of the AIDS projects slated for 1998. In addition,

many of the NGO participatory mechanisms such as participat-

ing in the National AIDS Council and other thematic bodies,

were not very successful, since the ministry did not always

follow through on discussions and decisions made during council

meetings.

The participation of civil society depends, in part, on its abil-

ity to demand and secure participation. An example of this phe-

nomenon are two similar projects in the area of sanitation. While

in the state of Paraná the CSOs were effectively involved in the

design of the state sanitation project and were even able to obtain

Bank funds to accompany the project, in Bahia the state govern-

ment negotiated the project unilaterally with the Bank in Washington,

thus completely excluding the CSOs from the process


World Bank–Civil Society Relations

These consultation meetings are quite welcome, for they demon-

strate that the discourse and intentions of the Bank are beginning

to change. Now it is important to certify that the Bank’s practice

is also beginning to change through greater transparency and

participation in the design and implementation of projects. The

Bank may only be trying to legitimatize its action through the pres-

ence of CSOs in these consultation meetings without permitting

effective participation.

The dialogue between civil society and the Bank is still too for-

mal and in some cases too antagonistic and ideological. It is nec-

essary to tear down the wall of misperceptions, which is based on

caricatures and oversimplification. Each side needs to accept the

other as legitimate and well intentioned. More transparency on

both sides and more frequent and frank dialogue can go a long

way in resolving differences based on these misperceptions. On

the other hand, this new level of interaction will also bring to light

deeper differences of opinion and conceptual disagreements. For

this reason it is important to have realistic expectations regard-

ing this new interaction so that they are not frustrated and pre-

maturely abandoned.

The government is the missing link in these consultation meet-

ings. It needs to be present in a tripartite dialogue so that effec-

tive changes can occur in institutional relations.

Civil society organizations are generally not well prepared for

this greater dialogue with the Bank. Civil society organizations

need to formulate a more global agenda into order to able to dis-

cuss larger issues such as economic integration, local development,

and participation. CSOs need to prepare themselves better to

participate in technical discussions. CSOs also need to take risks,

exposing themselves to criticism and evaluation, just as they demand

of the Bank.

Civil society forums created to engage in dialogue with the Bank

should strive to include the presence of social movements and com-

munity organizations, and not mostly NGOs.

Various agencies of the federal government are not open to dia-

logue with CSOs; thus the Bank should encourage them to become

open by promoting tripartite information exchange and policy

analysis meetings.

It is important to avoid excessive formalization of this new par-

ticipation policy instituted by the Bank. Universal participation

principles should be adhered to in a flexible fashion rather than

attempting to adopt one-size-fits-all participatory mechanisms

that do not take into account local context and demands. An exam-

ple of this point can be seen in Bank-financed projects that have

bipartite decisionmaking or advisory councils on which CSOs have

a seat. It is more important to guarantee effective CSO partici-

pation than to worry about a particular representation formula,

such as councils with exact voting parity between government

and civil society representatives.

What are going to be the new policies of the Bank toward civil

society? Is the Bank going to relate to them as interlocutors to dis-

cuss policies, as consultants to provide services, or as implemen-

tors of programs? No matter what form this interaction takes, it

is important for these organizations to retain their autonomy rel-

ative to the Bank.

The Bank should consider funding initiatives at the municipal

level, which have been characterized by innovation, effectiveness,

and stakeholder participation. This would be in keeping with the

decentralization trends now sweeping Brazil and the rest of Latin

America. Perhaps the Bank should consider funding consortia of

municipalities in order to avoid economies-of-scale problems.

The Bank should also consider funding new initiatives in the area

of microfinancing and income-generating activities that incorpo-

rate economic development with social equity goals.

Attachments 63

C. Civil Society–World Bank ConsultationMeetings

BRASÍLIA

Date: May 2, 1996 Host Organization: World BankMeeting Facilitator: Aurélio Viana (Rede Brasil)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Augustino Veith (MNDH)2. Don Sawyer (ISPN)3. Dorinha Pereira (Partners of the Americas)4. Fabio Vaz de Lima (GTA)5. Iara Pietricovsky (INESC)6. Iares Ramalho Cortês (CFEMEA)7. Katia Drager Maia (Fórum Brasileiro de ONGs)8. Marcio Santilli (ISA)9. Marisa Ribeiro Dias (MNMMR)10. Miralda Fernandes (MNMMR)11. Paulo Lira (WWF)12. Saulo Ferreira Feitosa (CIMI)13. Steve Schwartzman (ISA) 14. Valdi Araujo (FENAPE)

RIO DE JANEIRO

Date: May 13, 1996 Host Organization: IBASE Meeting Facilitator: Maria Clara Couto Soares (IBASE)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Anthony Anderson (Ford Foundation)2. Aurélio Viana (Rede Brasil)3. Herbert de Souza (IBASE)4. Ivanir dos Santos (CEAP)5. Jacqueline Pitanguy (CEPIA )6. Jane Galvao (ABIA)7. Jorge Eduardo Durao (FASE)8. Marcus Arruda (PACS)9. Ricardo Neves (ITC)10 Silvio Gomes de Almeida (ASPTA)

SAO PAULO

Date: May 15, 1996 Host Organization: ABONG Meeting Facilitator: Eduardo Ehlers (Sal da Terra)

Persons (Organizations) That Participated:1. Carlos Vidoto (CNB-CUT)2. Fabio Ribas (GIFE)3. Hamilton Faria (POLIS)4. Isabel (MST)5. Lídia Luz (Comissão Pro-Indio)6. Lucia Calil (Sal da Terra)7. Maria Madalena Alves (Ação da Cidadania)8. Mario Mantovani (Rede Mata Atlântica)9. Roberto Smeraldi (Amigos da Terra)10. Sergio Haddad (Ação Educativa)11. Sueli Caneiro (Geledes)12. Tonhão (Vitae Civilis)

PORTO ALEGRE

Date: May 17, 1996 Host Organization: CIDADE Meeting Facilitator: Zander Navarro (UFRGS)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Auda Miller (CEAP/RS)2. Conceição Paludo (CAMP)3. Ellemar Wojahn (CAPA)4. Jane Barcellos (ICC/Banco Portosol)5. João Augusto de Oliveira (CEPAGRO)6. Lino de David (CETAP)7. Luís Dalla Costa (CRAB)8. Nilton Bueno Fischer (UFRGS)9. Regina Pozzobon (CIDADE)10. Sérgio Baierle (CIDADE)

RECIFE

Date: June 3, 1996Host Organization: OXFAM/UK Meeting Facilitator: Michael Bailey (OXFAM/UK)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Arthur Powers (Projeto Pommar)2. Eduardo Homem (CLF)3. Eduardo Jordao de Araujo (Espaço Aberto)4. Geraldo Marinho (ARRUAR)5. Henrique Barros (Consultor)5. Jose Arlindo Soares (Centro Josue de Castro)7. José Carlos Zannetti (CESE)8. Mauricio Arrocha (CAATINGA/Forum da Seca)9. Haleem Lone (OXFAM/UK)


10. Silvia Camurça (SOS Corpo)11. Vandervaldo Nogueira (ABONG)12. Vital Filho (AACC)

BELÉM

Date: June 5, 1996Host Organization: IPAM Meeting Facilitator: Jean Hebete (CAT)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Marcelo Freitas (SPDDH)2. Adalberto Verissimo (IMAZON)3. Aldalice Otterloo (UNIPOP)4. Denise Gomes (CPT)5. Lucio Flavio Pinto (Jornal Pessoal)6. Olga Lúcia Mantilla (POEMA)7. Padre Bruno (Movimento Emaus) 8. Paulo Moutinho (IPAM)9. Raimundo Waldomiro (Caritas)10. Ubiratan Moraes Diniz (Fórum de Reforma

Urbana/FASE)11. Vicki Schneiber (POEMA)

CUIABÁ

Date: October 25, 1996 Host Organization: FORMAD Meeting Facilitator: Vivianne Amaral (Bioconexao)Persons (Organizations) That Participated:

1. Ivar Luiz Busatto (OPAN)2. Márcia de Campos (CDHHT)3. Lúcia Misorelli (IPECA)4. Heitor Q. Medeiros (Associação Matogrossense

de Ecologia)5. Adalberto Eberhard (Ecotrópica)6. Vicente José Puhl (UFMT)7. Dorotéa E. Dressler (Grupo de Saúde Popular)8. Inácio José Werner (FORMAD)9. Silbene Santana de Oliveira (CPT/MT)10. Roberto Ricardo Vicentin (FASE/MT)11. João Malthezo (ASOR/STR)12. Teobaldo Witter (IECLB/MT)13. Eliana Martinez (ARCA)14. Fábio Ricardo Reis (ECOPANTANAL)

Attachments 65

D. World Bank Reports on Participationand Social Analysis

Aycrigg, Mary. 1998. Participation and the World Bank: Successes,

Constraints, and Responses. Social Development Paper No. 29.

Washington, D.C.: World Bank, November.

Banarjee, Ajit, Gabriel Campbell, Maria Concepcion Cruz, Shelton

H. Davis, and Augusta Molnar. 1997. Participation in Forest

Management and Conservation. Environment Department Paper

No. 049. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April.

Boyd, Barbara, and John Garrison. 1999. NGO Participation in

HIV/AIDS Control Project in Brazil Achieves Results. Social

Development Notes No. 47. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,

May.

Carroll, Tom, Mary Schmidt, and Tony Bebbington.1996.

Participation through Intermediary NGOs. Environment

Department Paper No. 031. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,

February.

Cernea, Michael M. 1992. The Building Blocks of Participation:

Testing Bottom-up Planning. World Bank Discussion Paper No.

166. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Ernest, Massiah. 1997. Towards STD/AIDS Awareness and Prevention

in Plateau State, Nigeria: Findings from a Participatory Rural

Appraisal. Environment Department Paper No. 050.

Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April.

Gopal, Gita, and Alexandre Marc. 1994. World Bank-Financed

Projects with Community Participation. Procurement and

Disbursement Issues. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 265.

Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Hino, Toshiko. 1996. NGO-World Bank Partnerships: A Tale of

Two Projects. Human Capital Development Working Papers,

June.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1998. Nurturing Civil Society at the World

Bank: An Assessment of Staff Attitudes toward Civil Society, Social

Development Paper. No. 24. Washington, D.C.: World Bank,

September.

Malena, Carmen. 1997. NGO Involvement in World Bank-Financed

Social Funds: Lessons Learned. Social Development Paper, No.

21. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May.

Moser, Caroline, Bernice van Bronkhorst, Annika Tornqvist.

1998. Mainstreaming Gender and Development in the World Bank:

Progress and Recommendations. Social Development Department.

Washington, D.C.: World Bank, December.

Narayan, Deepa. 1995. Designing Community Based Development.

Environment Department Paper No. 007. Washington, D.C.:

World Bank, June.

Salmen, Lawrence F. 1995. Participatory Poverty Assessment.

Environment Department Paper No. 024. Washington, D.C.:

World Bank, August.

Salmen, Lawrence, assisted by Misgana Amelga. 1998.

Implementing Beneficiary Assessments in Education: A Guide for

Practitioners (with examples from Brazil). Social Development

Paper No. 25. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, September.

Schmidt, Mary, and Alexandre Marc. 1995. Participation in Social

Funds. Environment Department Paper No. 004. Washington,

D.C.: World Bank, July.

World Bank. 1990. How the World Bank Works with Nongovernmental

Organizations. Washington, D.C..

———. 1992. Participatory Development and the World Bank.

Potential Directions for Change. World Bank Discussion Paper

No. 183. Edited by Bhuvan Bhatnagar and Aubrey C. Williams.

Washington, D.C..

———. 1995. Working with NGOs, Carmen Malena, NGO Unit

OPRPG, Washington, D.C., March.

———. 1996. The World Bank’s Partnership with Nongovernmental

Organizations. Poverty and Social Policy Department.

Washington, D.C., May.

———. 1996. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook.

Environmental Department Papers. Washington, D.C.

———. 1997. Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to

Nongovernmental Organizations. Prepared for the World Bank

by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. Social

Development Paper No. 26E (English). Washington, D.C.,

World Bank. May.

———. 1998. “The Contribution of NGOs to World Bank-

Supported Projects in Brazil.” Operations Policy Department,

June.

———. 1998. Cooperation between the World Bank and

NGOs–Provisional FY 97 Progress Report Washington, D.C.,

February.

———. 1999. Food for Thought: Proceedings from Brown Bag Lunch

Series. Civil Society Team—Latin America and the Caribbean

Region. Washington, D.C. Fall.

———. 1999. Thinking Out Loud: Innovative Case Studies on

Participatory Instruments. Civil Society Team—Latin America

and the Caribbean Region. Washington, D.C. Fall.


E. List of Brazilian Civil SocietyOrganization Directories and Studies

ABONG Associacao Brasileira de Organizações Não-

Governamentais. 1998. ONGs: Um Perfil do Cadastro das

Associadas à ABONG. São Paulo.

———. 1998. O Impacto Social do Trabalho das ONGs no Brasil.

São Paulo.

Bailey, Michael, and Leilah Landim. 1996. Cadastro: Agências

Internacionais Não Governamentais de Desenvolvimento Atuando

no Brasil. Recife: OXFAM/ISER, Março.

Bailey, and Henrique M. Barros. 1995. “Para Compreender e

Dialogar com Organismos Internacionais: Um guia sobre o

Banco Mundial no Brasil e no mundo.” Recife: OXFAM/INESC,

Setembro.

Brazil, Ministério da Saúde. 1997. Catálogo de Organizações Não-

Governamentais. Brasília.

Fernandes, Rubem Cesar and Leandro Piquet.1993. ONGs anos

90: A Opiniao dos Dirigentes Brasileiros. Rio de Janeiro: ISER.

Inter-American Foundation. 1990. A Guide To NGO Directories.

Arlington.

Landim, Leilah, and Cotrim, Lecticia Ligneul. 1996. ONGs: Um

Perfil—Cadastro das Filiadas à Associação Brasileira de ONGs

(ABONG). São Paulo: ABONG/ISER.

Lund, Kristen. 1993. “A Filantropia Empresarial no Brasil” (2

volumes). São Paulo: ARCO.

WWF, ISER, and Mater Natura. 1996. Cadastro Nacional ECOL-

ISTA de Instituições Ambientalistas. Curitiba.

Attachments 67


World Bank Address in Brasília

Banco MundialSCN Q.2 Bl.A S/304-305Edf. Corporate Financial Center70.712-900 Brasília DFPHONE: (061) 329-1000FAX: (061) 329-1010EMAIL: [email protected]

Public Information Center address:(Address same as above)EMAIL: [email protected]

Other World Bank Offices in Brazil:

RecifeEdifício Sudene, Sala 1S-108Cidade Universitária50670-900 Recife PEPHONE: (81) 453-1644FAX: (81) 453-4624

CuiabáAvenida Isaac Povoas, 1251Edifício Nacional Palacius, Sala 603Centro78.045-640 Cuiabá MTPHONE: (65) 624-6661FAX: (65) 624-3820

World Bank address in Washington:

World Bank1818 H St. N.W.Washington, DC 20433

World Bank Web Page:

http://www.worldbank.org/