from conceptual development to science education: a psychological point of view

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From conceptual development toscience education: a psychologicalpoint of viewStella Vosniadou a & Christos Ioannides aa Department of Philosophy and History of Science,National and Capodistrian University of Athens, GreecePublished online: 09 Jul 2006.

To cite this article: Stella Vosniadou & Christos Ioannides (1998): From conceptualdevelopment to science education: a psychological point of view, International Journal ofScience Education, 20:10, 1213-1230

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INT. J. sci. EDUC., 1998, VOL. 20, NO. 10, 1213-1230

From conceptual development to science education:a psychological point of view

Stella Vosniadou and Christos Ioannides, Department of Philosophy andHistory of Science, National and Capodistrian University of Athens, Greece

A theoretical framework based on cognitive/developmental research is described. It is argued thatscience learning is a gradual process during which initial conceptual structures based on children'sinterpretations of everyday experience are continuously enriched and restructured. Conceptual changealso involves increased metaconceptual awareness, cognitive flexibility, and theoretical coherence. Someof the implications of this research for the development of science curricula and for instruction arediscussed. It is also argued that while cognitive/developmental research can provide us with importantinformation about the process of learning science, it does not provide much information about theexternal, environmental variables that can facilitate cognitive performance and conceptual change.What is needed in the future is the development of a theory of learning that bridges science educationand cognitive/developmental research. Such a theory should specify the mechanisms that can take anindividual from one level of cognitive performance to the next and relate them to situational and culturalfactors.

Introduction

During the last twenty or so years science educators and cognitive/developmentalpsychologists have been working in parallel trying to understand how initial con-cepts about the physical world develop and how they change as students areexposed to the teaching of science.

A significant milestone for the science education research has been the work ofscientists such as Novak (1977a), Driver and Easley (1978), and Viennot (1979),who were among the first to pay attention to the fact that students bring to thescience learning task alternative frameworks or misconceptions that are robust anddifficult to extinguish through teaching. Influenced by Piaget's constructivist epis-temology, these researchers nevertheless realized the need to pay more attention to'the actual content of the pupil's ideas and less on the supposed underlying logicalstructures' (Driver and Easley 1978: 76), and 'to shift from a stage dependent viewof cognitive development to a view that cognitive development is dependent on theframework of specific concepts and integrations between these concepts acquiredduring the active life span of the individual' (Novak 1977b: 473).

In their search for a theoretical framework to conceptualize the learning ofscience some science educators turned to the philosophy and history of science as amajor source of hypotheses concerning how concepts change (see Posner et al.1982). They drew an analogy between Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accom-modation and the concepts of 'normal science' and 'scientific revolution' offeredby philosophers' of science such as Kuhn (1970) to explain theory change in the

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1214 S. VOSNIADOU AND C. IOANNIDES

history of science. They derived from this analogy an instructional theory topromote 'accommodation' in students' learning of science. According to thePosner et al. (1982) theoretical framework, there are four fundamental conditionsthat need to be fulfilled before conceptual change can happen: (1) there must bedissatisfaction with existing conceptions, (2) a new conception must be intelligible,(3) a new conception must appear initially plausible, and (4) a new conceptionshould suggest the possibility of a fruitful research program.

This theoretical framework became the leading paradigm that guided researchand instructional practices in the science education profession for many years, butalso became subject to a number of criticisms that current research in scienceeducation is attempting to answer. Some of these questions are: How coherentand resistant to instruction are students' initial conceptions about the physicalworld? Is cognitive conflict a good strategy to produce conceptual change?Should science education aim towards producing 'conceptual change' or towardsfostering 'multiple representations'?

We will argue that in order to answer these questions we need further researchon the development of knowledge about the physical world and about the learningof science. It is only on the basis of such research that we can make sound decisionsabout the design of science curricula as well as about instructional methods andstrategies. Cognitive/developmental research can provide rich descriptions of theknowledge states of students at different ages and phases in the acquisition ofexpertise that can form the basis for a systematic theory of instruction. In thepages that follow some of the changes in conceptual development that happenduring the learning of science derived from research in our lab will be describedand their implications for instruction will be discussed. The paper will concludewith some thoughts about how psychological and science education approaches canbe best synthesized in order to better guide the future development of a theory oflearning science that can provide the necessary framework for instruction.

Cognitive/developmental research and the problem ofconceptual change

In recent years research in the area of cognitive development has attempted to findways to reconcile Piagetian constructivism with experimental findings that show,on the one hand, that young children are much more cognitively capable thanPiaget had originally thought, and, on the other, that initial conceptual structuresundergo radical changes with development. An important influence in this direc-tion has been Carey's (1985) suggestion that cognitive development could bethought as involving domain-specific restructuring. Until then, developmental psy-chologists influenced by Piaget's stage theory conceptualized cognitive develop-ment in terms of global restructurings — that is, changes in the logical structure ofthought brought about by the child's active, constructive interaction with thephysical world. Such changes are supposed to constrain children's ability to reasonand acquire knowledge in all domains.

Carey argued for a type of developmental change which was domain-specifictheory change. According to this view children begin with a few theory-like con-ceptual structures (e.g. a naive psychology and a naive physics) that, throughrestructuring, give rise to new theories (e.g. biology, economics, a theory ofmechanics, of heat, etc.). This type of domain-specific restructuring is conceptua-

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CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 1215

lized as a product of the child's increased knowledge of a domain (brought aboutby the child's experience and/or by instruction), rather than as the result of thechild's logical capabilities per se (without, however, necessarily precluding suchdevelopment).

The emphasis on domain specificity is consistent with recent accounts of thehuman mind as a modular system rather than as a general information processor. Itmakes sense to assume that during the thousands of years of human evolution thissystem has developed specialized cognitive mechanisms to deal with differentkinds of information (see Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994). Domain-specificity isalso consistent with the results of research investigating the expert/novice shiftshowing that experts in physics, medicine, or chess differ from novices mainly inthe content and organization of information in the knowledge base rather than onthe use of more powerful general processing strategies (Chi et al. 1981, Larkin1983). Finally, such results agree with science educators' observations that thelearning of science is dependent on the framework of specific concepts and inte-grations between these concepts acquired during the active life span of the indi-vidual (Novak 1977b).2

Developmental research on conceptual change has taken at least two differentdirections. Some developmental psychologists have focused on investigations ofthe conceptual knowledge of infants and very young children trying to determinehow it is organized and whether it can be said that it has the status of a 'theory'.Other researchers have tried to understand how conceptual structures change inthe process of development and with the acquisition of expertise. The focus of thepresent paper will be on this last line of cognitive/developmental research. Some ofthe results of the research that takes place in our lab in this area will be described inthe next section.

The development of science concepts

Concepts and conceptual structures

In recent years there has been an interesting reversal of the view that people startthe knowledge acquisition process by forming atomistic concepts which then getconnected on the basis of similarity to create more complex conceptual structures.A number of researchers have made persuasive arguments in support of the posi-tion that concepts are embedded in larger theoretical structures from the start (e.g.Carey 1983, Murphy and Medin 1985, Vosniadou and Ortony 1989).

One of the reasons for this reversal has to do with the realization that thenotion of similarity is insufficient to explain how atomistic concepts are groupedtogether to form categories (Rips 1989, Medin and Ortony 1989).3 The view thatconcepts are embedded in theories is also supported by the results of recentresearch with infants which has suggested that the human mind is more specifiedinnately than originally believed to deal with the complexity of environmentalstimulation at birth (Keil 1990, Gelman 1991). This research has succeeded indescribing some of the basic principles that seem to guide the process of acquiringknowledge about the physical world. For example, Spelke (1991) has describedfive constraints about the behaviour of physical objects which infants appear toappreciate from early on, such as continuity, solidity, no action at a distance,gravity and inertia.4

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I Framework theory |

Presuppositions

\Ontological

-There are physical objects. Thereare animate and inanimatephysical objects-Physical objects have properties.Force is a property of inanimate oranimate objects, etc.

Epistemological

-The movement of inanimateobjects is a phenomenon thatneeds explanation-Explanations should be causal,etc.

Specific theory

Observations or other information in the culturalcontext (related to force)

Some objects canpush/pull otherobjects and can causethem to change

Some objects resist thepush/pull of otherobjects, some do not

Some physical objects haveweight/mass/force*

Mental model

Force is a property of physical objects that are heavyand/or big

* We assume lack of differentiation of concepts such as mass, weight and force

Figure 1. Hypothesized conceptual structure underlying the internalforce mental model.

In previous work, we have argued that such constraints or entrenched pre-suppositions are organised in a framework theory5 of naive physics which is notavailable to conscious awareness and hypothesis testing (Vosniadou 1994). Thisframework theory constrains the process of acquiring knowledge about the physi-cal world in ways analogous to those research programs and paradigms have beenthought to constrain the development of scientific theories (Lakatos 1970, Kuhn1977). In addition to the framework theory of physics we assume that children alsoconstruct specific theories used to explain a limited range of phenomena (such as forexample, explanations of the day/night cycle, explanations of the movement ofinanimae objects, and the like). Specific theories consist of beliefs that give riseto mental representations, or mental models, under the constraints of the presup-positions of the framework theory.6 These theoretical terms are further definedbelow. An example is shown in figure 1 that presents the hypothesized conceptualstructure underlying one of young children's initial mental models of force.

Framework theories consist of ontological and epistemological presuppositions.Ontological presuppositions are presuppositions about the kinds of entities weassume to exist and the way they are categorised. For example, we assume thatin our ontologies we have entities such as physical objects, and that physicalobjects are categorized into animate and inanimate. We furthermore assume thatphysical objects have properties and that force is conceptualized as a property ofphysical objects. Epistemological presuppositions are presuppositions that have to dowith the nature of our knowledge. In this category we can include presuppositions

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that have to do with the nature of explanation or with the nature of learning.Presuppositions about the self as a learner can also be included here.

Specific theories consist of a set of interrelated propositions or beliefs thatdescribe the properties and behavior of physical objects. Beliefs are generatedthrough observation and/or through information presented by the culture underthe constraints of the framework theory.7 For example, information such as 'Someobjects resist the push/pull of other objects and some do not' (see figure 1) usuallycomes in the form of observations. Other information (such as, for example, theinformation that the earth is round), may come in the form of verbal statements ina cultural context. One can describe the beliefs which constitute a specific theory assecond-order constraints which emerge out of the structure of the acquired knowl-edge itself, as this structure comes to impose its own unique influence on theknowledge acquisition process. As can be seen in figure 1, the assumed beliefthat 'Force is a property of objects that feel heavy' is a construction by the subjectbased on observations or other information in the cultural context under the con-straints of his/her ontological and epistemological presuppositions.

Framework and specific theories provide the basis for generating situationspecific representations of mental models, during problem solving situations. Theconstruct or the mental model has been used by different researchers in differentways (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983, Gentner and Stevens 1983). It is used here to referto a special kind of mental representation, an analog representation which indi-viduals generate during cognitive functioning, and that has the special character-istic that it preserves the structure of the thing it is supposed to represent. Mentalmodels are assumed to be dynamic and generative representations that can bemanipulated mentally to provide causal explanations of physical phenomena andto make predictions about the state of affairs in the physical world. As mentionedearlier, we assume that most mental models are created on the spot to deal with thedemands of specific problem-solving situations. Nevertheless, it is possible thatsome mental models or parts of them which have proven to be useful in the past,are stored as separate structures and retrieved from long term memory whenneeded. Even when constructed on the spot, mental models are assumed to containmore permanent features, because they are constrained by underlying frameworkand specific theories.

A great deal of the our work has been devoted to an understanding of the kindsof mental representations or mental models of the physical world that childrenconstruct and of how they change with development and with the learning ofscience.

Initial mental models. Initial mental models are the first representations of thephysical world that children construct, before they are exposed to the teaching ofscience. One of the most important findings of cognitive/developmental research isthat children do not come to the science learning task as a tabula rasa but they haveacquired rich knowledge about the physical world based on their everyday experi-ences. In our theoretical framework this knowledge is described in terms of frame-work and specific theories, as well as in terms of mental models. We havedeveloped a methodology for understanding the mental models that children con-struct at the time of testing and on the basis of them we make hypotheses about theassumed underlying conceptual structures. This research has shown that there is arelatively small number of mental model types out of which specific, context sensi-tive, situational mental models are constructed (tokens). For example, our studies

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of children's mental models of the earth, sun, moon, day/night cycle, etc. haveshown that young children usually think of the earth as a very big, extended, flatphysical object, supported by ground underneath and covered by the sky above.Solar objects are thought to be located above the top of this flat earth and to moveup and down or hide behind hills and clouds during the day/night cycle(Vosniadou and Brewer 1992, 1994).

Other studies investigating the development of the concept of 'force' haverevealed the co-existence of multiple mental models that seem to be organisedseparately in the knowledge base (Ioannides and Vosniadou 1993, Vosniadouet al. in press). More specifically, we have identified two types of mental modelsof force that appear to be common in young children. One is the model of internalforce according to which force is a property of physical objects that are relativelybig and/or heavy , such as the one described in figure 1. The other is the pushjpullmental model of force, according to which force is conceptualised to be a propertyof physical objects that can transfer to other objects through direct contact. Thismodel seems to be used most often to describe a situation where an animate agentis pushing or pulling an inanimate object. These two representations of force aredescribed diagrammatically in figure 2.

When multiple representations of the same concept co-exist in the knowledgebase, contextual/situational variables become particularly important in influencingthe likelihood that one representation will be used as opposed to another. Forexample, in studies conducted in our lab we have found that the likelihood ofthinking of force in terms of weight and/or size is much smaller in the presenceof a human being pushing or pulling an inanimate object, or even in situationswhere a human being is present in the absence of push or pull (Vosniadou et al. inpress).

Conceptual change

Developmental, cross-sectional, research has shown that young children's initialrepresentations of the physical world undergo important changes with develop-ment and learning. Some of these changes cannot be directly related to the teach-ing of science whereas others can. We will call the first 'spontaneous' and thesecond 'instructionally based'.

Spontaneous changes. Initial conceptual structures can change as a result ofchildren's enriched observations in the cultural context, or because of otherkinds of cultural learning (such as language learning), rather than as a result ofspecific science instruction. One example of such a conceptual change is the changefrom a mental model of force as an internal property of big/heavy inanimateobjects (internal force model) to that of an acquired property of inanimate objectsonly (acquired force model).

Studies by Ioannides and Vosniadou (submitted) have shown that the pre-ferred mental model of force in kindergarten children is that force is an internalproperty of physical objects that are big and heavy, regardless of whether theymove or not (see model 1, figure 3). It appears that as they develop, children startto differentiate between animate objects (that move by themselves) from inanimateobjects (whose movement is a phenomenon that needs explanation) with respect toforce. At this point they form a mental model of force according to which inani-mate objects that move have 'more force' than objects that do not move (model 2,

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Force is a property of physical objectsthat transfers to other objects by directcontact (e.g. push/pull).

Force is a property of inphysical objectsthat are big and/or heavy

• This model offeree is used most often todescribe a situation where an animate agentpushes or pulls an inanimate object

Figure 2. Initial representations of force.

figure 3). This model seems to combine the internal force model with aspects of thepush/pull model. That is, the additional force (which we call acquired) is the trans-ferable property of a (usually) animate agent that caused the inanimate object tomove. This acquired force eventually dissipates, causing the object to stop moving.

At a later age children seem to give up the internal force model in the case ofinanimate objects altogether. We hypothesize that this is the result of their differ-entiating force from weight and/or mass. The new model of force contains thenotion of an acquired force only (model 3, figure 3). The children who form thismodel always relate force in inanimate objects to the presence of movement. Theexplanatory model that relates motion to force is well known, and has beenobserved in many studies (McCloskey 1983, Clement 1983) as well as in thehistory of science (Nersessian and Resnick 1989). As shown in figure 3, there isa clear developmental progression from mental model 1 to mental model 2, tomental model 3.

Instructionally-based changes. Other kinds of conceptual change are products ofscience instruction. An example of this kind of change is the synthetic mentalmodels of the earth or of the day/night cycle, obtained in Vosniadou and Brewer(1992, 1994). We have explained synthetic models as representing attempts on the

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Mental ModelsKind/gartenn=15

4th grade

n=30

6th grade

n=30

1. Internal Force: There is an internal force within stationaryand moving heavy objects

53.3% 13.4% 0%

2. Internal Force and Acquired Force: There is an internalforce within stationary heavy objects - There is an internal andan acquired force within heavy objects that are moving

20% 26.4% 20%

3. Acquired Force: There is an acquired force within movingobjects only

6.7% 26.9% 56.7%

4. Mixed* 20% 33.3% 23.3%

* The category mixed is used when children seem to use more than one of the above mentionedmental models of force in non-internally consistent ways

Figure 3. Selected mental models of force: Developmental trends.

part of children to synthesize the currently accepted scientific explanation (e.g. thespherical shape of the earth) with aspects of their initial concept (e.g. of a flatearth). Some children interpret the scientific information to mean that the earthis a sphere but that people live on flat ground deep inside it (hollow sphere model,figure 4). Some other children create a representation according to which the earthis spherical all over but kind of flat at the top where the people live (flattenedsphere model, figure 4). Others think that there are two earths: a flat one on whichpeople live and a spherical another one which is a planet up in the sky (dual earthmodel, figure 4).

Children construct such synthetic models in order to reconcile the informationthey receive from the culture that the earth is a sphere with certain importantpresuppositions and beliefs supported by their everyday experience. Some ofthese presuppositions are that the ground is flat, that space is organized in termsof the directions of up and down and that unsupported physical objects fall in adownward direction (see Vosniadou and Brewer 1992).

Synthetic mental models have not been obtained only in the case of theearth concept. They are common in mechanics (Ioannides and Vosniadou 1993),in geology (Ioannidou and Vosniadou 1997) and in biology (Kyrkos andVosniadou 1997, Archodidou and Jacobson 1997). They can also be found inmany of the misconceptions noted in science education research (e.g. Novak,1977c).

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Sphere Scientific Model

Flattened Sphere

Hollow Sphere

Dual Earth

1 I 1

Synthetic Models

Disc Earth

Rectangular Earth z \Initial Models

Figure 4. Mental models of the earth.

Explanation of conceptual change

In order to explain the spontaneous or instruction-based kinds of conceptualchanges described above, we need to assume that knowledge acquisition is a gra-dual process during which existing knowledge structures are continuouslyenriched and/or restructured. We have assumed conceptual structures to form acomplex network of interrelated observations, beliefs, and presuppositions thatcomprise a relatively coherent explanatory framework. Despite their assumedinterrelatedness, the various beliefs and presuppositions have differential weightsand some are more difficult to change than others. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992,1994) distinguish between beliefs that can be based on everyday observations andwhich are relatively easy to change (such as, the belief that the sun and/or themoon are shaped like a disc rather than as a sphere) as compared to presupposi-tions that are closer to innately based constraints or principles, and which are moredifficult to change (such as, the presupposition that space is organised in terms ofthe directions of up and down and that unsupported objects fall downwards). Asmentioned earlier, this distinction is crucial in order to explain the empirical

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1 222 S. VOSNIADOU AND C. IOANNIDES

findings that show that there is a sequence in the acquisition of knowledge aboutthe physical world (e.g. that having some understanding of gravity with respect tothe earth is essential for understanding the spherical shape of the earth) and thatsome aspects of children's knowledge about the physical world are more difficult tochange than others (e.g. the presupposition that force is a property of physicalobjects stands in the way of a Newtonian understanding of force as interaction).

Another two assumptions needed to explain the obtained empirical evidenceare the following. One is that students (both children and adults) are not aware ofthe hypothetical nature of the presuppositions and beliefs that constrain theirlearning. They take them to be facts about the way the physical world operatesrather than propositions in a hypothetical explanatory framework subject to ver-ification. The other relates to diSessa's (1993) argument that the explanatoryframeworks children (or novices) use lack the systematicity and coherence of thetheory of physics used by experts. Conceptual change involves not only change inspecific beliefs and presuppositions but also requires the development of metacon-ceptual awareness and the construction of theoretical frameworks with greatersystematicity, coherence, and explanatory power.

Developmental research has produced certain important findings about thenature and process of conceptual change. One is the finding that by the timethey enter elementary school children have already constructed initial conceptualstructures about the physical world which are very different from the scientificconcepts to which they will be exposed through instruction. These initial concep-tual structures form the basis upon which further information is incorporated. Theprocess of conceptual change appears to be a gradual and complex affair duringwhich information that comes in through observation and/or instruction is used toenrich, replace or restructure existing beliefs and presuppositions.

The characterization of the process of conceptual change that emerges fromthese studies is different from the Posner et al. (1982) view of science learning insome important ways. The Posner et al. (1982) theory focuses on the incompat-ibility between two distinct and equally well organized explanatory systems, one ofwhich will need to be abandoned in favour of the other. The results of the above-mentioned cognitive/developmental studies, however, suggest that conceptualchange is a slow revision of an initial conceptual system through the gradualincorporation of elements of the currently accepted scientific explanations.During this process students also need to be helped to a) to become aware oftheir existing beliefs and presuppositions, and b) to create larger theoretical con-structions that have greater explanatory adequacy.

Such cognitive/developmental research findings have implications for scienceinstruction which are different from those of the Posner et al. (1982) theoreticalframework.9 Some of these implications will be described below.

Designing curricula and instruction to facilitate the learningof science: implications of cognitive/developmental research

The domain-specific restructuring interpretation of the process of learning sciencewhich was outlined above has specific recommendations to make for scienceinstruction both at the level of curricula and at the level of instructional methodsand interventions.

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Science curricula

The finding that the understanding of science concepts and explanations is adifficult and time consuming affair, likely to give rise to synthetic models or mis-conceptions, calls for a reconsideration of current decisions regarding the breadthof coverage of the curriculum in science education. It may be more profitable todesign curricula that focus on the deep exploration and understanding of a few, keyconcepts in one subject-matter area rather than curricula that cover a great deal ofmaterial in a superficial way. For example, the science curriculum for the 5th gradein Greece includes short units on mechanics, thermodynamics, energy, particulatenature of matter, the processes of life, etc. This approach does not give studentsenough time to achieve a qualitative understanding of the concepts being taught.On the contrary, it encourages the casual memorization of facts, and is very likelyto lead to logical incoherence and misconceptions. It also makes teachers veryanxious about covering the all material with the result that not enough attentionis paid to what students actually understand.

Research in the learning of science has also shown that the concepts thatcomprise a subject-matter area have a relational structure that influences theirorder of acquisition. This structure needs to be taken into consideration whendesigning curricula and instruction. For example, in the subject-matter area ofastronomy, students understand the spherical shape of the earth only after theyhave acquired an elementary notion of gravity. Explanations of the day/night cycleon the basis of the earth's axis rotation cannot be understood before students knownot only that the earth is a rotating sphere but also that the moon revolves aroundthe earth. Otherwise they form misconceptions such as the misconception that thesun and the moon are stationary at opposite sides of an up/down rotating earth (seeVosniadou and Brewer 1994). Similarly, a scientific explanation of the seasons onlyoccurs in students who have formed the mental model of a heliocentric solarsystem, know the relative sizes of the earth, the sun, and the moon, and understandthe scientific explanation of the day/night cycle. As Saddler's studies with Harvardundergraduates show, very few college students understand how the seasons hap-pen, despite the fact that this is a piece of science included in the elementary schoolcurriculum in the US.

At present, such findings are not taken into consideration in the design ofscience curricula. A detailed investigation of the astronomy units in four leadingscience series in the US, as well as an examination of the national curricula forteaching astronomy to elementary school children in Greece, shows that manyconcepts are introduced in a sequence that does not provide students with allthe information necessary for understanding them.

Instructional strategies and interventions

The realization that students do not come to school as empty vessels but haverepresentations, beliefs and presuppositions about the way the physical worldoperates that are difficult to change has important implications for the design ofscience instruction. Teachers need to be informed about how students see thephysical world and to learn to take their points of view into consideration whenthey design instruction. Instructional interventions need to be designed to a) makestudents aware of their implicit representations, as well as of the beliefs and pre-

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suppositions that constrain them, and b) provide meaningful experiences to moti-vate students to understand the limitations of their explanations and be motivatedto change them.

Facilitating metaconceptual awareness: Although children are relatively goodinterpreters of their everyday experiences, they do not seem to be aware of theexplanatory frameworks they have constructed. They do not appear to knowthat their explanations of physical phenomena are hypotheses that can be subjectedto experimentation and falsification. Their explanations remain implicit andtacit. Lack of metaconceptual awareness of this sort prevents children fromquestioning their prior knowledge and encourages the assimilation of new infor-mation to existing conceptual structures. This type of assimilatory activity seemsto form the basis for the creation of synthetic models and misconceptions andlies at the root of the surface inconsistency so commonly observed in students'reasoning.

To help students increase their metaconceptual awareness, it is necessary tocreate learning environments that make it possible for students to express theirrepresentations, and beliefs. This can be done in environments that facilitategroup discussion and the verbal expression of ideas. Recently technology-supported learning environments have been constructed that make it easier forstudents to express their internal representations of phenomena and comparethem to those of others. Such activities may be time-consuming, but they areimportant for ensuring that students become aware of what they know and under-stand what they need to learn.

Providing meaningful experiences: Students often do not see the reason tochange their beliefs and presuppositions because they provide good explanationsof their everyday experiences, function adequately in the everyday world, and aretied to years of confirmation. In order to persuade students to invest the sub-stantial effort required to become science literate and to re-examine their initialexplanations of physical phenomena, we need to provide them with additionalmeaningful experiences (in the form of systematic observations or the results ofhands-on experiments), that prove to them that the explanations they haveconstructed are in need of revision. If we want these experiences to be useful inthe process of theory revision we need to carefully select them so that theyare theoretically relevant. What we mean by theoretically relevant is that theyaddress the underlying presuppositions and beliefs that constrain students'representations and influence the way they interpret scientific information. Forexample, an underlying presupposition constraining students' understanding ofthe concept of force (that is not usually addressed in instruction) is the presuppo-sition that force is a property of objects (internal or acquired). In the areaof astronomy a presupposition that stands in the way of understanding thespherical shape of the earth is that space is organised in an up/down directionand that unsupported objects fall down. Unless these presuppositions arebrought out in the open, and discussed, they will continue to influence students'thinking.10

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On the future of conceptual change research: towards asynthesis of science education and developmental approaches

Cognitive/developmental research has provided rich descriptions of the knowledgeof children at different ages that help us make better hypotheses about the knowl-edge acquisition process. However, cognitive developmental psychologists usuallyfocus on descriptions of the cognitive performance of subjects at different ages andat different levels of expertise rather than on the mechanisms that explain howcognitive performance and cognitive change happen. Furthermore, they are pri-marily interested in understanding the cognitive, mental processes that areassumed to go on inside the head during intellectual activity. This research doesnot provide information about the external, environmental variables that can bemanipulated to facilitate cognitive performance and conceptual change. It isknowledge of these variables that is needed to guide instructional research andpractice.

As we look at the future of conceptual change research, it thus becomesapparent that what is needed is a bridge between cognitive developmental andscience education research, a bridge that can only be provided by a theory oflearning. A theory of learning that specifies the mechanisms that can take an indi-vidual from one level of cognitive performance to the next, and to show how thesemechanisms are related to external, environmental factors. This is exactly what hasstarted to happen in conceptual change research during the last few years, and it isindeed a exciting change with great promises for educational research.

The results of the instructional experiments and interventions of the last yearshave clearly shown that concepts are embedded in rich situational contexts, in thetools and artefacts of the culture, and in the nature of the symbolic systems usedduring cognitive performance. Conceptual change can, and in fact most often is,initiated, facilitated, and consolidated by social and cultural processes. As concep-tual change research moves ahead towards not only a description of the perform-ance of subjects at different ages and levels of expertise but also of the mechanismsthat can bring about these changes, the role of the situational context and of culturebecome much more important. Future research on how to promote conceptualchange should certainly try to understand and describe these processes in greaterdetail. In doing so it is important to pay attention to certain critical issues that havethe potential to lead future conceptual change research in the wrong directions.The remaining pages of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of these issues.

Radical situativity theory and the abolishment of mentalrepresentations

Moving in the direction of taking into consideration situational and cultural vari-ables does not necessarily mean the abandonment of the level of mental represen-tations and its replacement with discourse analysis as suggested by some radicalsituationists (e.g., Saljo in press). Uneasiness with the construct of mental repre-sentation may have been understood at the days of behaviourism when psycholo-gists lacked appropriate methods for the investigation of internal cognitiveprocesses but it is not justified now. As Gardner (1985) argues, one of the mostsignificant accomplishments of cognitive psychology has been the clear demonstra-tion of the validity of positing a level of mental representation.

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A linguistically and anthropologically based discourse analysis which manypsychologists sympathetic to situativity theory propose, cannot provide a satisfac-tory explanation of the well agreed upon findings of cognitive/developmental andscience education research regarding the science learning process. Linguists andanthropologists themselves have found it necessary to introduce in their theoriesthe notion of cultural models to make sense of their data11. According to Quinn andHolland (1987: 24) 'there is a convergence between anthropologists and linguistson the importance of cultural models and a shift from previous work on semanticanalysis toward greater reliance on cultural models with subsequent testing of theadequacy of these models on different kinds of data and the analysis of naturaldiscourse'.

A theory of conceptual change cannot remain at the level of simple discoursedescription. It needs to provide explanations of behaviour, explanations that relatethe assumed internal representations and processes that go on during cognitiveactivity to the external, situational variables that influence them. Special attentionshould be paid to an understanding of how external symbolic systems, products ofour culture, are internalized and exert their own influence thinking processes. Agreat deal of conceptual change can be attributed to the internalization and use ofcomplex systems of symbolic expressions in different symbolic media (see, forexample, the article by Glaser et al. 1996, as well as Vygotsky, 1978).12

Conceptual change versus conceptual enrichment

The term conceptual change has been proposed to denote that conceptual devel-opment involves not just the enrichment of existing structures but their substantialreorganization or restructuring (see Carey 1985, Vosniadou and Brewer 1987).Some researchers are now challenging the notion of restructuring particularly inview of the fact that conceptual change appears to be a slow and gradual affairrather than a sudden shift of theory.

It is true that the classical conceptual change theoretical approach implied thatconceptual change involves a sudden shift, and it is in the context of this implica-tion that cognitive conflict makes sense as an instructional strategy. This assump-tion has not, however, been supported by the empirical evidence. In trying toexplain the gradual process of conceptual change, it is important to make a dis-tinction between the process of conceptual change and the end result of conceptualchange.

The notion of restructuring is clear when one compares, let us say, the con-ceptual system of a young child to that of an expert scientist in areas such asphysics and biology. Expert physicists, regardless of the influence of contextual,task, or situational variables, are operating on the basis of a different theory ofphysics than that of an elementary school student.13 However, the process therebywhich a novice becomes an expert is not a sudden and radical theory shift but agradual and slow reorganisation of existing knowledge structures. In this paper wehave tried to describe some aspects of this process. Future research needs tofurther address the problem of how small and gradual changes in conceptualorganization can bring about radical restructurings in the long run, as well asthe implications of all these for instruction.

Nevertheless it is important not to overlook the fact that with increases in ageand with expertise we not only have a restructured system, in the sense of devel-

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oping radical different representations of reality that were not available before,but, as the proponents of the multiple representations view would argue, also amore flexible system, a system that makes it easier to take different perspectivesand different points of view. One of the limitations of conceptual change researchis that it has paid little attention to the development of cognitive flexibility andmetaconceptual awareness. There is no doubt that adults and particularly thoseliterate in science have a different conceptual organization of science concepts thanelementary school students, but, they also have a more flexible organization, onethat allows them to take different points of view.

An important determinant of cognitive flexibility is, in my opinion, the devel-opment of metaconceptual awareness. It is difficult to understand other points ofview if you do not even recognize what your own point of view is. As has beenmentioned in earlier work (Vosniadou 1994) one of the limitations of children'sthinking is the lack of metaconceptual awareness. Increased awareness of one'sown beliefs and presuppositions and of the fact that they represent interpretationsof physical reality that are hypothetical and can be subjected to empirical test, is anecessary step in the process of conceptual change.

Concluding remarks

It has been argued that conceptual change research has its roots in the efforts ofscience educators to provide a theoretical framework that can capture the learningof science concepts and can be used to guide instructional interventions.Cognitive/developmental research has also provided rich descriptions of thekinds of conceptual change that happen during the knowledge acquisition processand explanations of the formation of synthetic models or misconceptions. Furtherdevelopments will come by bridging the two types of research. We need to under-stand better the external, environmental variables that are related to internal,conceptual changes, as well as the tools, artefacts, and symbolic languages thathave developed through social and cultural processes. Such understanding willresult in the development of better curricula and instructional interventions andthe design of more successful learning environments.

Notes

1. Domain-specific approaches to the study of conceptual development are not necessarilycontradictory with the proposal that there are 'global' changes in representational andreasoning capacities in the child, such as those described in Piaget's work.

2. Despite their similarity, there are different theoretical approaches to knowledge acqui-sition within the domain-specific camp. Most noticeable is the difference betweeninnatist, modular theories that are based on a 'child like an adult' metaphor and theoriesthat propose that there are significant restructurings that take place in the process ofknowledge acquisition. The latter position is often referred to as the 'theory theory'view (see Wellman and Gelman (in press) for a discussion of these differences).

3. These criticisms are related to the general failure of empiricist accounts of learning (e.g.Chomsky 1980, Quine 1951).

4. See also Karmiloff-Smith (1992) for an interesting proposal that conceptual develop-ment involves a process of gradual modularization,

5. By 'framework theory' we mean a causal explanatory framework for organising physicalphenonmena. We do not claim that this construct has the same status as a scientific

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theory. It is particularly different from a scientific theory in that it is assumed not to beavailable to conscious awareness and hypothesis testing

6. We claim that these theoretical constructs are necessary in order to provide an explana-tion of certain well agreed-upon empirical findings regarding the knowledge acquisitionprocess. This issue will be also addressed at the end of this section. For a more detailedpresentation of the empirical findings and of the explanatory framework see our earlierwork.

7. The main difference between presuppositions and beliefs is that the former are assumedto be less specified innately and thus more easy to change than the latter. This theor-etical distinction serves to explain persistent empirical findings of research on knowl-edge acquisition that show that some kinds of learning are less difficult than others.

8. One can make a type/token distinction with respect to mental models in order to differ-entiate general types of mental models (we have also called them generic) from situation-specific instantiations of them (tokens).

9. Although may not be necessarily inconsistent with that framework.10. This brings us to another point that has to do with cultural support for science learning.

Although scientific explanations are the ones our culture supports, they have not yetfiltered down to everyday culture. Whatever science learning takes place in school, it isnot really supported outside the school, except in cases where children have scientifi-cally literate parents who provide them with books, take them to science parks andmuseums, and talk to them about science. It is important that science becomes morea part of everyday reality than it currently is - through TV programmes, popular books,science museums for children, etc.

11. A cultural model is defined by Roy G. d'Andrade (1994) as 'a cognitive schema that isintersubjectively shared by a social group. Because cultural models are intersubjectivelyshared, interpretations made about the world on the basis of a cultural model areexperienced as obvious facts of the world' (p. 810).

12. This system could be easily expanded to include motivational beliefs, beliefs about theself, goals, and other variables that need to be brought into the picture as we move awayfrom 'cold' cognition.

13. Conceptual change does not necessarily mean that the expert has lost the initial conceptsthat a child is operating with, although is some cases this may indeed be the case. This isan empirical issue that can be answered with further research. Some researchers haveerroneously assumed that conceptual change means that the previous system has beenlost.

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1230 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND SCIENCE EDUCATION

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from conceptual development to science education: a psychological point of view

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