FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING AND THE US USE OF FORCE: DIENBIEN PHU, 1954 AND GRENADA, 1983

Karl R. DeRouen Jr.Dept. of Political Science

Texas A&M UniversityCollege Station, TX 77843-4348

Bitnet KRD0131@LEWIE.TAMU.EDU

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, May,1993, Kingston, Jamaica.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to develop a revised theory of the use of force, and to apply this revised theory totwo separate US foreign policy crises. This revised theory provides an alternative to the ensconced realist model whichholds that domestic politics stop at the water's edge, and that decision makers are fully rational actors.

A common practice in recent studies on the use of force is to claim to address presidential decision making,however this claim is largely unjustified (e.g., Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger 1992; Meernik 1992). With such a lack offocus on actual decision making theory, we have yet to arrive at a fully specified alternative to the rational actor modelespoused in realist explanations of the use of force. In other words we have yet to tap motivations and processes.

While James and Oneal (1991) and Oneal and Lian (1992a, 1992b) went a long way in improving the innovativework of Ostrom and Job (1986), the cybernetic model still only superficially captures the actual motivations andperceptions surrounding decision making. The case studies here are designed to highlight the relevance of domesticpolitics to uses of force. While I agree with Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) that domestic politicsplay a role, I believe that these scholars have understated that role, and failed to offer substantive theory. Their findingssuggest that domestic factors need only have ancillary relevance, while the noncompensatory model developed here holdsthat domestic politics are a sine qua non (see Mintz and Geva 1992). Below I summarize decision making theories fromtheir origin in microeconomics, to the noncompensatory theory of the use of force. It makes sense that if we are going tocriticize realism by attacking its reliance on the rational actor model, we should trace the decision making literature fromits origins in classic rationality, to the cognitive revolution fueled by the likes of Simon, Snyder, and Steinbruner. I alsoprovide two case studies in which the noncompensatory model is shown to have obtained.

AN OVERVIEW OF DECISION MAKING THEORIES

Early work in decision making was in economics and public administration where actors were presupposed to bein possession of rationality, knowledge of all possible alternatives and their outcomes, and a hierarchically rankedoutcome preference scheme (Robinson and Snyder 1965, 437-438). These cardinal assumptions were first called intoquestion by Herbert Simon (1958, 1959, 1961, 1985) and a group centered around Richard Snyder (Snyder 1958; Snyderand Robinson 1961; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Snyder and Paige 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965). Latercriticisms and alternatives to rationality have primarily been provided by Axelrod (1976), Braybrooke and Lindblom(1963), Halperin (1974), Jervis (1976), and Steinbruner (1974).

The two broad categories of decision making are the compensatory/linear and the noncompensatory. The formeris additive and a low score on one dimension can be compensated for by a high score on another dimension, while thelatter is non-additive and depends upon decision heuristics to deal with the cybernetic nature of the process. A heuristicis simply a 'cognitive shortcut' used by individuals to simplify choices when, as is usually the case, information islimited (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 19). The noncompensatory model(s) is an example of a heuristic.Compensatory processes are generally marked by interdimensional searches using a constant amount of information peralternative (Billings and Marcus 1983, 333). The additive difference model is an exception (see Mintz 1993). Thecompensatory model is alternative-based as all dimensions of an alternative are considered before moving on to anotheralternative (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 536). It will be instructive at this point to look more closely at thespecification of the main decision making models as they may be applied to the use of force.

Compensatory models. There are presently two main approaches applied to assess decisions to use force from acompensatory perspective: the expected utility and cybernetic approaches. The former relies upon classical rationality todeduce formal mathematic equations and is holistic in that it considers all alternatives, while the latter exploits boundedrationality and satisficing and is nonholistic in that alternatives are sequentially eliminated. When there is more than oneindependent variable, this model specification allows for compensation between dimensions. Since the variables areadded, a low score on one variable will not necessarily preclude the use of force. This is consonant with the rationalactor paradigm in which decison makers make detailed assessments of costs and benefits. Subsequently, decision makers

in the rational actor paradigm are fully prepared to think in terms of trade-offs by comparing costs and benefits (Kinderand Weiss 1977, 708; Lebow 1981, 101). Below I briefly trace the linkages of expected utility theory to the classicrationality, and the cybernetic approach to bounded rationality.

There is an abundance of foreign policy decision making research done from the classical rational perspective.Allison (1971), Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990, 1992), Frankel (1963), Niou andOrdeshook (1986, 1987), Powell (1987) and Putnam (1988), to name but a few, proceed from the rationality assumption.The realist approach clings to the tenets of rationality including states as unitary actors with a set of well-identifiedinterests, cost-benefit calculation for each alternative, interest maximization, and transitivity of interests (Levy 1989b,224-225; see also Singer and Hudson 1992). Realism also considers factors such as the balance of power, defensespending and other strategic considerations at the expense of domestic and political factors. Subsequently, analysts areonly afforded insight into the necessary conditions for the use of force (Mintz 1993).

Steiner (1983, 376) summarized the classic rational actor model of decision making:

"Decision-makers consruct an explicit causal model of the policy-making environment,using logical analysis and empirical inquiry. They are open to refining the modelas additional information becomes available. When preparing to make a decision, theyidentify the consequences that the courses of action they are contemplating willproduce on the basis of the understanding of the environment their causal modelprovides. They then assess the outcomes...carefully measuring and comparingthe costs and benefits attached to the alternative policies. Bythis approach they identify and select optimal courses of ac tion... ."

Another way of looking at the rational decision maker is as a utility maximizer. The viewpoint is initialized atthe assumption that "there is a single homogeneous good, utility, that is present in all actually desired ends, and that anincreased amount of any end brings with it an increased amount of utility, at a steadily diminishing rate" (Snyder andDiesing 1977, 340). The utility assumptions ultimately distill down to the assumptions of the marginal comparabiltiy ofgoods, infinite calculating ability, and omniscience (Snyder and Diesing 1987, 341). Thus the rational decision-makerchooses from among a well-defined and mutually exclusive set of alternatives, the alternative that maximizes utility bycomparing alternatives with (presumed) enough expertise to be sure the correct alternative was chosen.

For Allison (1971, 30), rationality is "...the consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints."Allison's rational or classical model entails some rather strict assumptions. For instance, the nation as actor has one setof goals, one set of options, and one estimate of the consequences of each alternative. The payoffs or consequences ofeach alternative are ranked a priori in terms of the decision maker's values and objectives. The decision maker choosesan alternative "whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives" (1971, 33). In other words, theactor will seek to maximize the value of his or her selection based on the a priori preference ordering. If the costsattached to a certain alternative increase either as a result of a decrease in the perceived value of the alternative or adecrease in the perceived probability of attaining the outcome, then the chances of selecting that alternative is reduced.The opposite also holds true (1971, 34). Allison's rational actor paradigm, by stating a few simple assumptions, purportsto explain a wide variety of actions (1971, 30-31).

The expected utility approach of Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Bueno de Mesquite and Lalman (1990, 1992)uses axiomatically-derived formal equations to characterize the decision to go to war. Expected utility is grounded inseveral assumptions such as unitary rational actor, preference ordering, and utility maximization. The expected utilityapproach is an alternative-based decision process because each of the dimensions of every alternative must be comparedso that trade-offs between alternatives can be performed. The approach concentrates on foreign policy choices resultingfrom rational calculations of national leaders (Bueno de Mesquite n.d., 6-7). The authors provided a much more sophisti-cated formal conception of the additive compensatory model of decisions to use force. The international interactionsgame that the authors axiomatically derive is used to assess the costs/benefit determinations decision makers are said topractice. The leader in the game is cognizant of domestic political considerations, but such factors can be overshadowedby favorable accountings on say, the strategic or military dimension. There are several strict assumptions embedded

within the international interactions game (see Bueno de Mesquita n.d., 15-16). For example, it is assumed that allnations prefer to resolve differences through negotiation rather than war. However, the recent Saddam Hussein'sunwillingness to negotiate with the US in 1991 clearly contradicts this assumption. The game also purports to assignvalues to costs depending on the location of the conflict, whether or not the state is the initiator or the target, anddepending on the domestic costs, which are said to be always greater than zero. It is this final assumption that I findtroublesome as there appear to have been many cases in which uses of force have led to domestic political windfall. Thisgets at the heart of the present study. I argue that the president, savvy politician, will not attempt uses of force short ofwar when such costs would be detrimental to political status.

The expected utility of the above equation is then compared to that of the other options of capitulation,negotiation and acquiescence. The model is additive and compensatory as the equation is halved and one half cancompensate for the other. Also, within each half of the equation high political costs can be compensated for by highutility from gaining demands.

Thus the Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman formulation differs from those who argue that US leaders are some-times willing to use force in order to boost public opinion or divert attention from domestic troubles by insisting thatuses of force are always considered foreign policy failures by domestic constituencies. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman(1992, 46, fn. 4) contradict the core "rally 'round the flag" tenet that uses of force must be decisive and quick if theyare to elicit diversion and/or a rally effect by assuming that domestic costs are actually greater for stronger nations.Their point is that stronger countries are seen as "bullies" when attacking weaker countries, and therefore there is agreater burden on the former to find peaceful resolutions.

The usefulness of expected utility theory is evident when the elegant mathematics of the theory capture decisionsto use force. Expected utility generates results that can be interpreted in terms of standard conflict parameters. Forexample, expected utility theory can be used to gain substantive insight into the role alliances play within both balance ofpower, and power transition theories. That is, the expected utility captures these two theories by explaining what a thirdparty will do when confronted by an ongoing conflict (see Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman1986).

Another treatment of the compensatory decision process was provided by Ostrom and Job (1986) and James andOneal (1991). These versions differ from the expected utility approach in that satisficing behavior is subsumed within acybernetic framework consisting of three specific dimensions. The literature from which the cybernetic model is drawn isparticularly rich and is considered below in some detail.

As mentioned, the classic model of rational decision making was first challenged by Herbert Simon (1958,1959, 1961, 1978, 1985). Rational maximization of interests is acceptable in "slow-moving situations where the actor hasa single, operational goal," but in more complex situations rational explanations are inadequate (Simon 1959, 279).Simon formulated a model in which the decision maker did not necessarily exhibit optimizing, but rather, satisficingbehavior. That is, since information costs are high, decision makers evaluate the possible alternatives and accept the firstone that meets a certain minimum requirement. Simon's satisficing, or bounded-rationality model is derived frompsychology where drives continue until satisfied and biology where humans are limited in their capacity to compare andcalculate (Simon 1959, 262-3; Steiner 1983, 376). Classical economic theory does not allow for such satiation - ratherfirms must maximize, or risk losing out to those that do (Simon 1959, 263). Satisficing models are richer thanmaximizing models because they capture equilibrium, as well as how that equilibrium was reached (Simon 1959, 263).

In contradistinction to the objective rationality of economics, the bounded rationality models can best be termedprocedural in nature (Simon 1985, 294). This is because these models capture both the limitations of the actor in termsof cognitive abilities, and external constraints. To determine the procedurally rational alternative the actor's goals, theinformation, and conceptualization the actor has of the situation must all be known. The nature of the external environ-ment need not be known. Cognitive psychology best exemplifies the research done from within the bounded rationalityparadigm.

Simon's bounded rationality model has given rise to several theories of decision making. Notable among these

scholars are first the Snyder group (Snyder 1958; Snyder and Robinson 1961; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Snyderand Paige 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965), and later Axelrod (1976), Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), Steinbruner(1974) and Jervis (1976).

The Snyder group extended foreign policy decision making beyond the narrow confines of rationality and lookedat it as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The group posited an array of categories each consisting of variousdimensions. They arrived at three major factors that explain decision outcomes: 1) the occasion for the decision; 2) theindividual decision-maker; and 3) the organizational environment (Snyder and Robinson 1961; Robinson and Snyder1965, 439-456). These three components are the essential theme of the group's socio-psychological research agenda.

The occasion for decision concept is also broken down along three dimensions (Robinson and Snyder 1965,440-443). First, whether or not the situation can be anticipated or not is relevant to the resources used, reaction timeand, ultimately, the outcome. The individual characteristics of the decision-maker, i.e. the psychological component ofthe model, are also important determinants of the outcome. In particular, they identify personality characteristics, socialbackground and experiences, and personal values to be the ingredients that feed into psychological influences on decisionmaking Finally, the organizational context is deemed important because it provides the social system in which decisionsare made. Some of the relevant factors organizational environments provide are objectives, authority and control,motivation, communication, divisions of labor, internal specialization, and routinization (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962,88-89).

The Snyder three-pronged approach is an improvement over models which only consider organizational,intellectual, or functional variables (e.g., Simon 1962). The group's work does not assume rationality on the groundsthat most models perceive of rationality as it pertains to the individual decision-maker, and not the organization.Therefore rationality must be "discovered rather than presumed* because it is uncertain how the concept will fit into asocio-psychological approach. The socio-psychological approach then seeks answers to questions such as:

*what rules for rational behavior are prescribed by the organization?are these rules attached to roles, or do they result from socializationof the individual policy-maker? are the rules different for different deci-sional units within the total structure? and how are the rules andtheir applied consequences affected by organizational processes of reachingdecisions?* (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 8)

As we will see below, each of the questions identified by the group is relevant to a full understanding of foreign policydecision making. In particular, the psychological and bureaucratic aspects of foreign policy decision making identified bythe group have been fertile grounds for research.

Alexander George (1980) attached import to the images and beliefs of the policy makers. George is a proponentof multiple advocacy models of decision-making and a broader information processing paradigm. The multiple advocacymodel, like the bureaucratic model, posits a loose decision structure with the executive moderating a diversity of views.The central element of the model is that the president, wanting to ensure that no decisions are reached before a policyleaves a department through a purely internal bargaining process, uses a "mixed system" approach in which he advocatescompetition between agencies (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472-473). The president then chooses from amongseveral policy options which have been openly debated by various agencies. If the president does not approach policy inthis way, he risks missing out on certain policy options that have been discounted internally before they can reach thetop decision level.

The multiple advocacy model of the executive best obtains when three conditions are met: 1) intellectual(information, competence, technical support) and bureaucratic (bargaining skills, status, power) resources are evenlydistributed; 2) the president actively monitors the multiple advocacy process; and 3) there is adequate time for debateand bargaining (George 1980, 194).

Information processing is derived from the cognitive psychology literature (see also Snyder and Diesing 1977,ch. 4). Simply put, recent scholarly efforts in cognitive theory imply that man is a problem solver and an information

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processor - not simply a "passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli" (George 1980, 56). Like Simon(1958, 1961, 1985), George plays off of cognitive psychology to relax the standard narrow assumptions of thedecision-maker as a rational utility maximizer. There are several central principles from cognitive psychology that aredirectly applicable to information processing (George 1980, 56-57). One is the fundamental role played by beliefs andimages. Individuals develop beliefs and use them to organize and simplify environmental stimuli. Also, the beliefs arerelatively stable over time, and as a result, new information is adjusted so as to be more compatible with beliefs andimages. This does not mean that "discrepant" information will not be realized for its utility content.

The cybernetic decision making model of Steinbruner (1974) offers a cognitive substitute to the rational oranalytic model (Steiner 1983, 373). Steinbruner noted that the analytic paradigm is a powerful one, but it has limitations.Some actions cannot be easily accounted for with rational explanations. For example, the Japanese attack on PearlHarbor and the Egyptian advances on Israel in 1967 seem to defy rationality (Steinbruner 1974, 47). The cyberneticparadigm is designed to address these seemingly complex and counterintuitive decision processes.

This is the logic employed by Ostrom and Job (1986) in their cybernetic model. The decision maker simplifiesthe process by organizing the information along three dimensions and sequentially eliminating alternatives. Thecybernetic decision maker filters out extraneous information, and only focuses upon a narrow range of incominginformation. With only a few options available, the cybernetic approach takes on the appearance of a programmedresponse.

The Ostrom and Job model assumes that the decision maker creates a composite index with the three dimensionswhich greatly simplifies the decision environment. The model is compensatory because trade-offs occur and the threedimensions are combined additively. This is an alternative-based compensatory model as the alternative which scoreshighest across the composite index is the one with the greatest probability of being chosen.

Cybernetic decision making centers around the minimization of uncertainty throughinformation feedback loops (Steinbruner 1974, 51). The rational framework largely ignores uncertainty as it assumes that

'the range of possible outcomes is known, and thereby eliminates thepossibility that an outcome might occur which was not even visualizedin advance. It assumes that [the] rules [of the game] are specified and stable.For complex problems neither of these assumptions can be held."(Steinbruner 1974, 18)

Steinbruner (1974, 18) labels the attempts at forcing a structure on complex situations structural uncertainty. Thecybernetic approach is needed because decision makers lack the fundamental cognitive skills needed to carry out the

. - rational schema during the structural uncertainty-laden policy problems of our time (Steiner 1983, 423). The cyberneticparadigm precludes the need to calculate optimal procedures and alternatives based on preferred outcomes by eliminatingalternatives and ignoring the environment and the issue of variety (Steinbruner 1974, 56-57).

Cybernetics dovetails with the satisficing principle of Simon when complex decisions are considered (Steinbru-ner 1974, 62-74). Simon (1957) suggested that decisions be conceptualized as a sequential process in which a range ofpossible outcomes, each with a separate value, are examined until an acceptable alternative is found. This differs fromthe rational paradigm which posits that the process is simply a !natter of choosing from among the various utilityfunctions, the one with the greatest amount, while allowing for trade-offs. Alternatives are less distinct in the rationalmodel.

Summarizing, the compensatory models, as exemplified by the cybernetic and expected utility approaches, sharethe central feature that low scores on one dimension cannot be compensated for by high scores on others. For example,the potentially high political costs of a use of force can be compensated for by the perceived military/national securitybenefits. These models are alternative-based as they entail evaluating each dimension of an alternative before going to thenext alternative, and a constant amount of time spent on each alternative (Billings and Marcus 1983). Compensatorymodels are concerned with finding maximizing alternatives (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen, forthcoming).

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Noncompensatory models. Dawes (1964, 108) identified the key distinction between the linear compensatory andnonlinear noncompensatory models of decision making. The former, he asserted, is based on a pre-weighting of decisiondimensions. Decisions are rigidly based upon the decision maker's needs, and not scores along various dimensions. Forexample, a football player's ability to kick may not be as important in the decision to select him as the extent to whichthe team needs or does not need a kicker is. The latter, however, is more sophisticated as it takes into considerationscores along various dimensions. For example, the decision on whether or not to select a certain kicker will be basedupon how good he is and whether kicking is his best talent, whether he can throw or not, etc. In other words, thenoncompensatory model is dimension-based in that a differing amount of time and effort is spent in evaluatingalternatives based on an interactive use of dimensions. The noncompensatory model is heuristic because it uses cognitiveshortcuts in the form of decision rules to simplify the evaluation of dimensions using nonconstant information and time.The process is simplified by sequentially eliminating alternatives which do not meet a certain threshold using one or afew criteria, as opposed to the compensatory processes which entail the comparison of all alternatives across dimensions(Mintz 1993). I argue here that this criteria is domestic politics. It is at this juncture that the noncompensatory model hasrelevance for the revised diversionary theory, for the president is unlikely to select any alternative in which the politicaldimension is not satisfied for fear of political repercussions. Whereas compensatory models find maximizing alternatives,noncompensatory models find acceptable alternatives, and are satisficing in that it is possible that not all dimensions willbe considered before an acceptable solution is found (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen, forthcoming). This is consistent withthe discussion in chapter three that public opinion constrains the foreign policy choices of leaders.

There are two main noncompensatory procedures used when decisions are made based on multidimensionalcriteria: the conjunctive and the disjunctive. In the former, evaluations are made based on the existence of more than onedimensional threshold that must be satisfied; in the latter evaluations depend on the existence of one dimension which isof paramount importance (Dawes 1964; Geva and Mintz 1992).

The conjunctive procedure, by definition, implies noncompensatory logic in which values must be above acertain level on each dimension. Take for example the human body. Having an excellent heart, liver and lungs cannotcompensate for the fact that the body's sole remaining kidney is dysfunctional (Dawes 1964, 105). In other words, aperson could have poor organs, but as long as they performed a certain minimum level the person would remain alive;or simpler yet, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. In terms of a multidimensional theory of the use of force,this would entail that force score above the threshold on the political, domestic and international dimensions.

Since, the disjunctive procedure evaluates based on the most important dimension, it too is by definitionnoncompensatory. Dawes (1964, 105) gave the example of the football player who is selected based on his exceptionalability in one aspect of the game, be it passing, kicking, running, or blocking. A disjunctive procedure is followed if ateam which needs a quarterback, eschews an average one who can kick quite well, in favor of an excellent passer. Thedisjunctive and conjunctive rules can be thought of as satisficing as iterations are repeated.

Noncompensatory selection procedures usually imply an intradimensional component which is attribute-, ratherthan alternative-based (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 536). It has been suggested that noncompensatory, ratherthan compensatory linear models, are used in more complicated decision environments because they are cognitivelyeasier (Brannick and Brannick 1989; Einhom 1970, 1971; Johnson and Meyer 1984; Payne 1976). The definitive featureof the noncompensatory models is their multiplicative nature which effectively rules out compensation between variables(Brannick and Brannick 1989). A related aspect of the noncompensatory model is that it entails an interactive use of cuesor dimensions. Since there is no compensation between dimensions, the search pattern spends differing amounts of timeand uses nonconstant amounts of information across alternatives (Billings and Marcus 1983, 333). This cognitive"shortcut" classifies the noncompensatory approaches as heuristc devices.

Since the noncompensatory models employ some form of elimination of dimensions, they can also be classifiedas satisficing and not optimizing as in the case of expected utility models (Johnson and Meyer 1984, 531). Noncompen-satory models are concerned with finding "acceptable," rather than maximizing alternatives (Johnson and Meyer 1984,531). They are also satisficing because it is possible that not all dimensions will be considered before a decision is madebased on partial information. The idea behind the noncompensatory models then is to quickly eliminate alternatives tosimplify the information search and evaluation phases of the decision process (Payne 1976, 384; Payne, Bettman, andJohnson 1988, 534). Avella (1991, 233) has applied this logic to the criteria for the use of force:

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"The premise in using a chronological decision format is that the decision-maker proceeds stepwise through the tests, requiring a positive...responseat each level [or dimension] before proceeding to the next. ...If answers to theinitial tests are negative, activity relative to a military option would not takeplace. ...Such an approach places significant importance on objectivedecisionmaking early on in a crisis.*

The key noncompensatory decision models are the CON, DIS, EBA, and LEX. The CON model employs theassignment of thresholds to each of the important dimensions. Alternatives are then rejected if they do not meet any ofthe thresholds.

Recall that in the CON procedure each dimension must meet a certain threshold and therefore the least relevantdimension is the key to the evaluation. According to Einhom (1971, 3), this specification approaches the multiple cutoffprocess of the CON by maximizing the dependent variable whenever there 'are equal amounts for the [independent] vari-ables.' The logged dependent variable is what makes this equation multiplicative (Brannick and Brannick 1989, 101).This specification captures the essence of the CON procedure in that a low dimension value in an otherwise highly ratedgroup will devalue an alternative more than will a high value among a group of generally low values have an improvingeffect (Brannick and Brannick 1989, 119-120).

The most relevant dimension is the key to the disjunctive decision procedure. This model is designed so that analternative will achieve high utility if it has an extremely high score on a single dimension (Einhorn 1971, 3). Thisapproximation thus captures the essence of the DIS model which holds that the alternative with the highest score on themost relevant dimension will be selected (Dawes 1964).

The EBA is a sequential elimination decision heuristic. In this procedure, each attribute or dimension is given adifferent weight reflective of its importance. The dimensions are selected for their use in comparing alternatives with aprobability proportional to their weight. Alternatives which do not score above a certain threshold on a key dimensionare then sequentially discarded. Then a second dimension is chosen and the process is repeated. EBA is inherentlysimilar to the other noncompensatory models, but it differs mainly as a result of its probabilistic nature - i.e. the order inwhich elimination proceeds may vary from case to case as weights change (Tversky 1972a, 285; 1972b, 349-350).

The LEX decision rule simply involves the selection of the alternative which provides the greatest utility onwhat has been deemed the most important dimension. There has been no attempt to formalize this model.

A concept related to the noncompensatory model is prospect theory which also refutes expected utility theory(see Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1992). Prospect theory affords an explanation for differentiating between thevarious noncompensatory models, and as such offers much salience decision to use force. Simply put, prospect theoryholds that people are risk-averse with respect to gains, and risk-acceptant with respect to losses (Kahneman and Tversky1979). Furthermore, individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of a reference point, and they weight losses more hevilythan gains (Levy 1992, 171). Put in the context of the use of force, the EBA strategy would exemplify risk-avoidance asfar as the desire to avoid political fallout from an ill-advised use of force, whereas the LEX model would emphasize arisk-acceptancy and the desire for political reward in terms of the rally effect after force is used (Mintz and Geva 1992,6). The EBA strategy would be considered a reactive process, while the LEX would represent a proactive process. Thefactor which differentiates between the two processes is the domain of the decision maker. In a domain of gain, e.g.high public approval, the president would be more risk-averse, and therefore less likely to use force (Mintz and Geva1992, 9). The reverse would hold true when the president's approval rating is down. This partially accounts for why theapproval and success coefficients are negative in the use of force equations. The decision to use force, and the level offorce used both increase when approval decreases because the president enters the domain of loss. Similarly, in theirexperimental design, Mintz and Geva (1992) found that presidents were more likely to use force when they wereexperiencing negative domestic conditions. The case studies below further illustrate these points.

CASE STUDIES

The main merit of the case study is that it allows the researcher a more detailed look at cognitive processes andbackground factors. With the heightened interest in political psychology and foreign policy decision making, therelevance of detailed case studies cannot be overstated, particularly since they can be used as foundations for formalmodels (Singer and Hudson 1992, 256). The case study pays greater attention to detail and complexity than either thestatistical or experimental approaches (Tetlock 1989, 358). While a case study cannot address necessary or sufficientconditions (Most and Starr 1989, 13), when used in conjunction with quantitative approaches from which generalizationscan be made and knowledge accumulated, the case study provides a more complete picture. Of particular utility is thetheory-driven comparative case study approach (see George 1979), an example of which follows. Such an approachcompares case studies which share common features, thus increasing generalizability.

According to Tetlock (1989), the case study method is quite valuable to the study of the initiation of conflict.Tetlock (1989, 358) noted that case studies, for example those of Jervis (1976), and Lebow (1981), have providedpathbreaking insights into foreign policy decision making. Of particular relevance to this study is the claim by Tetlock(1989, 358-359) that:

"[c]ase studies complement quantitative, variable-centered research by providingqualitatively rich and contextually detailed descriptions of the lives and eventsthat we seek to understand. The explanatory goal is no longer the creation ofstatistical models that account for as much of the variance across cases aspossible; the goal is the creation of conceptual models that organize the dis-parate themes...that run through the particular historical events.'

A final asset of the case study is that it lends itself to the construction of testable hypotheses, particularly when severalcase studies can be combined (Robinson 1962). These hypotheses can then be tested against a greater number of cases.

The cases presented below share that each involves a foreign policy crisis in the first term of a two-termpresidency. The cases vary in that they are at opposite ends of the study period placing one pre-Vietnam and one post-Vietnam. This should provide a further rigorous test of the whether domestic politics matter since, as mentioned above,informal consensus has it that domestic politics have only mattered to foreign policy makers since the Vietnamexperience and the breakdown of bipartisanism. Another compelling factor regarding case selection is that the choice of a"non-event" will provide valuable information for, as Holsti (1992, 453) asserts, "[s]olid evidence about contemporarynon-events is, to understate the case, rather hard to come by. Case studies appear to be the only way to address suchquestions... ." For instance, what would the Reagan adminstration's course of action have been in Central America hadnot public opinion been strongly against a use of force (Holsti 1992, 453)? Thus case selection has been based upontheoretical consideration and not simply novelty or drama (see Robinson 1962, 24). Subsequently Holsti (1992, 459)calls for a greater emphasis on the case study approach with archival documents stressing the need to extricate therelevance of public opinion to decision makers.

The purpose of the following two case studies is twofold. First, to document evidence that domestic politicswere a primary concern in the making of foreign policy well before the Tet Offensive of 1965, and to uncover thecybernetic/noncompensatory decision processes.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

Background. President Eisenhower was confronted by a serious foreign policy crisis in 1954 as he had to makea decision on whether or not to use force against the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu. The French had gotten bogged down intheir former colony in Southeast Asia and were repeatedly requesting large-scale air support from the Americans. TheFrench had chosen Dien Bien Phu as the site to make their last stand, and subsequently Dien Bien Phu had taken on adisproportionate political and psychological value in light of the upcoming Geneva peace talks (Gravel 1971, 97). Thesituation appeared to have all the markings of a cut-and-dry, low-cost military venture. Admiral Radford remarked inJanuary, 1954 that a single mission composed of one squadron of US planes over Dien Bien Phu might settle the matterin one afternoon (Glennon 1982, 953).

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The primary decision makers. The President, Vice President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State John F. Dulles,and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the key decision makers in this foreign policycrisis. The following interpretation of events is consistent with recent "revisionist" characterizations of the Eisenhowerpresidency. Whereas in the past he had been regarded as aloof and passive, for instance during the McCarthy hearings,he was actually quite complex, had excellent behind-the-scenes political savvy, and exercised considerable control overSecretary of State Dulles (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 11; Greenstein 1982).

The alternatives. Eisenhower's choices can be distilled down to: 1) unilateral air-strike; 2) military action aspart of a "united front"; 3) status quo, i.e. covert / psychological operations, and continued supplying of the French withsupplies (see Glennon 1982; Gravel 1971). 1 It was alternative three which was agreed upon by the President at a NSCmeeting on April 29 despite the protests of both Radford and Nixon (Herring and Immerman 1984, 361; Hoxie 1977,343). Below I will derive this choice based on a noncompensatory decision strategy in which the political, as well as themilitary dimension was of great import.

The noncompensatory nature of the political dimension. The three essential dimensions - international ormilitary, domestic and political - were directly relevant to the decision process. Militarily, Eisenhower always placedregional crises within the context of the East-West strategic balance (Saunders 1985, 100). The President was extremelyleery of starting WW III. Domestically, he regarded the use of ground troops overseas as an extremely expensiveventure, and therefore such a decision could not be taken lightly (Saunders 1985, 100). Politically, the President waswell aware of the opposition he would face from the American public and Congress over the decision to use force inSoutheast Asia (Glennon 1982; Kamow 1983; Saunders 1985). Eisenhower was well aware that key Southern Democrats- Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, and Senator Richard Russell of Georgia - were opposed to the use of force(Draper 1974, 154-155; Eisenhower 1963, 343-344). Eisenhower regarded the use of force in Indo-China as politicallyrisky, i.e. a military victory might exact too high a political toll (Brands 1987, 622, fn. 25).

Interestingly, at the peak of the so-called "era of consensus" in which bipartisanship in foreign policy matterswas said to be almost institutionalized, Eisenhower was closely tracking public opinion which showed that over 68% ofthe population were opposed to US involvement in Indo-China (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 112-113; Herring andImmerman 1984, 351; Orbovich and Molnar 1992, 209; see also Joes 1992, 114-117). Politically, the administration wasin a very precarious position. Nixon and Dulles were leery, and with good reason, that the Democrats would use the lossof Indochina to their advantage (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 113-114). The reason the President consulted Congress atall is probably due to the strong public opposition to the use of force, and in fact the widely cited restraint the Presidentshowed is probably exaggerated as Herring and Immerman (1984, 363) concluded from recently declassified documents:

"The political situation left him little choice but to consult, and in any event hisintent was to manipulate Congress into giving him a broad grant of authority notunlike that which President Johnson secured in 1964. Implicating Congress in theDienbienphu decisions protected the administration's domestic flank..."

Actually, several Members interviewed at the time said they would have allowed the use of force had the Presidentforcefully and clearly presented his case (C. Roberts 1954, 35). This lends credence to the argument that the administrat-ion's real obstacle to the use of force was popular opinion and that Congress was to be used as a way of swingingopinion. After all, "Congressional reaction," was usually taken to mean a concern for more far-reaching politicalconcerns (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 33).

There are two main reasons for the lack of popular support, and subsequently administation support, for the useof force at Dien Bien Phu: 1) the American public was leery of another intervention in faraway southeast Asia a la'Korea; and 2) under Roosevelt, Americans had become accustomed to aiding colonies, not metropoles, and Eisenhower,or more importantly the American public, agreed in principle with this philosophy (Draper 1974, 152; Eisenhower1963, 373; Glennon 1982, 1443; Saunders 1985; US News and World Report 1954, 35-38).

The following summary is based largely on the synopsis provided by US News and World Report (1954, 35-38)of the events leading up to the fall of Dien Bien Phu. An interesting side note to this chronology is that was planted by

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the administration in response to a published report that the President had been on the verge of using force (Herring andImmerman 1984, 343-344, fn. 1). The fact that the administration would go to such lengths indicates that it was verymuch concerned with the public's conception of foreign policy. The French were convincd they could not prevent thecommunists from coming to power without substantial US support as General Paul Ely iterated in Washington on March20 during an unofficial request for assistance. Two weeks later on April 5, the French officially requested US airsupport for Dien Bien Phu (Joes 1992, 114). The same day in Washington key Congressional leaders and the adminis-tration decision makers were meeting in the State Department. The Members present emphatically answered in thenegative when Radford and Dulles, who had been lobbying for the use of force all along, asked whether a resolution insupport of force should be introduced. The Members agreed that Congress feared "another Korea". It was at thismeeting that Dulles proposed his united front action plan in which the US, Britain, France and seven other nations wouldjoin forces. Dulles was led to believe that this would be agreeable to Britain after an April, 13 meeting with Churchill inLondon, and the next day in Paris the French approved the plan. However, such plan was not to be as the Britishbalked, opting instead to wait for the outcome of the Geneva Conference. Dulles was said to be furious.

On April 23 the French again requested US assistance making it clear that French General Navarre who was incharge in Indo-China was readying for surrender. However, the next day Dulles rejected the plea based on the need forCongressional approval which, of course, he knew was unattainable, and the need for the US to act as part of a coali-tion. Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7, the remaining French stronghold no larger than a baseball field.

This chain of events reveals that at no time did the US offer to intervene in Indo-China. It does reveal thatinitially the US wanted to use force, but only under politically favorable conditions entailing a united coalition. This wassimilar to the strategy used to justify intervention in Korea to the American public. Such political expedience wouldagain ostensibly quell dissent in Congress. Eisenhower (1963, 340) wrote that he would only consider the use of force ifthree conditions were met: 1) "a legal right under international law;" 2) "a favorable climate of free world opinion;" and3) "favorable action by the Congress." The first conditon was met in the President's opinion as France formallyrequested assistance. The second condition could be met, Eisenhower felt, if the US joined forces with Britain andFrance. Congressional approval was by far the most difficult of the conditions to meet, indeed the apprehension in whichthe President approached Congress regarding Indo-China casts reasonable doubt on the many studies which characterizethis period as an age of consensus. Congress could probably also be mollified with a united action strategy as well as theleader of the minority in the Senate, Lyndon Johnson, indicated in a meeting with Dulles and Radford (Draper 1974,155; Joes 1992, 115-116). Therefore much utility was placed by the administration in a coalition approach as it wouldappease Congress, the public and other nations (see Eisenhower 1963, 332-375).

There can be no doubt that the President was wary of the political consequences of a failed intervention in Indo-China at this time as he wrote, u[a]ir power might be temporarily beneficial..., but I had no intention of using UnitedStates forces in any limited action when the force employed would probably not be decisively effective" (Eisenhower1963, 341; see also Orbovichand Molnar 1992). The President realized a quick low-cost victory was nearly impossibleto achieve, and any American casualties in the event of ground engagements would be heavy (Eisenhower 1963, 373).Dulles agreed that a defeat would be costly as he communicated to the President that "we could not afford thus to engagethe prestige of the United States and suffer a defeat which would have world-wide repercussions" (Eisenhower 1963,345). NSC documents published in The Pentagon Papers (Gravel 1971) reveal that those at the highest decision makinglevel were cognizant of American opposition to the use of force in Indo-China NSC Action No. 1074-a of April 5,1954 entitled "Special Security Precautions" sought to ascertain the environment in which the US could use force andconcluded that:

"... 5. a. ...US commitment of combat forces would involve...highcosts in US manpower and money, and possible adverse domesticpolitical repercusions Moreover, the United States would be undertakinga commitment which it would have to carry through to victory. ...Onthe other hand, under the principles laid down in NSC 5405, it isessential to US security that Indochina should not fall under Communistcontrol. ...b. Of the alternative courses of action..., Course A or B has theseadvantages over C [unilateral force]. Neither Course A or B

depends on the initial use of US ground forces. For this reason alone,they obviously would be much more acceptable to the Americanpublic. ...d. There would be advantages to Course B [waited action force]also in that US opinion would be more favorable if the other freenations and the Asian nations were also taking part and bearing theirfair share of the burden." (Gravel 1971, 462-465).

The decision process. Moving first along the political dimension, the alternative of unilateral bombing waseliminated as Congress and the public, considering the President's rather low approval rating, could not be sold on theidea largely because an alliance structure could not be formed (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 44; Herring and Immerman1984, 361). Relatedly, alternative two was precluded as the British would not commit to such action. It was widelyregarded that British participation in a coalition would suppress much of the political risk and would attract congressionalsupport (Gravel 1971, 56, 94-95). State Department polls showed that the public support for multilateral intervention wasat 69% (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 269). Along this dimension, this only left alternative three. Assuming the interna-tional dimension was the second most important dimension, which is understandable considering Eisenhower's famous"domino theory" of communist aggression, which was born of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, and the McCarthy hearings, theonly choice remaining had to satisfice. Continued covert action as the primary option, similar to the current strategies inEgypt, Guatemala and Iran (see Cook 1981; Immerman 1980-81; Schlesinger 1972), would have very little chance ofsuccess against the well-equipped (courtesy of the Chinese) Vietminh. Such operations stood better chance of successtoppling regimes in which the masses either were not armed, or troops loyal to the government were restrained, e.g.Guatemala, 1954; Chile, 1973; Iran, 1953.

In their excellent summary of the decision not to use force at Dien Bien Phu, Herring and Immerman (1984,349) commented that the President never seriously entertained a one-time covert strike at Dien Bien Phu. Karnow(1983), in his compelling account of the US experience in Vietnam, argued that although the President was not dovishover Vietnam, he would not even consider Admiral Radford's plan to use force without prior political support. Burkeand Greenstein (1989, 273) also stated that the President never even allowed the debate over an air strike to reach thelevel of consideration by the "full advisory machinery." However, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel 1971, 573-583)revealed that the CIA's Saigon Military Mission (SMM) was hard at work with a covert operation in 1954-55. ThePresident's only alternative was to work for a united coalition, to continue to supply the French with materiel (Eisenhow-er 1963, 341) and to continue covert operations. After the Geneva Accords were signed, the hopes of the administrationin averting a total communist takeover now lay with Ngo Dinh Diem who would become the first in a series of USpuppets in Vietnam.

During Dien Bien Phu the President would not even allow Dulles to "explain alternative courses of action"(Saunders 1985, 105; see also Kamow 1983). This is clearly the cybernetic decision process at work and is inherentlydifferent from the linear, compensatory framework. Even though the crisis was rather severe by Brecher, Wilkenfeld,and Moser's (1988) standard (5.70), and would therefore seem to justify a use of force within the realist paradigm (seeOneal and Lian 1992a), no force was forthcoming. Because there could be no united coalition to deflect the politicalfallout, the military option was not considered along all dimensions and had been effectively ruled out by the Presidentfive months prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

The decision process is best described as EBA. Clearly the most important dimension was the political, and anyalternative that did not satisfice along this dimension was summarily discarded. The President opposed military forcebecause allied support, the primary necessary condition which would lessen the political damage, did not materialize(Bundy 1987, 230, n. 6; Saunders 1985, 111). The decision did not appear to be disjunctive, i.e. there were no multiplethresholds among dimensions. As evidence, the President did not appear to link the country's domestic recession to thecrisis, i.e. the fact that the economy was doing poorly and externalization of the problem might divert attention, did notcompensate for the fact that the political score was low. The President was well aware of the sluggish economy and wasnot above trying some degree of macroeconomic manipulation in order to head off further economic woes. He wrote inhis diary at this time:

"David McDonald...brought to me a summary of his views on the current

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economic conditions, together with recommendations for governmentalaction to head off a depression. ...In the meantime, I talked to the secretary of thetreasury in order to develop real pressure on the Federal ReserveBoard for loosening credit still further. ...Secretary Humphrey agreed with meand promised to put the utmost pressure on Chairman Martin...in order to get agreater money supply throughout the country. ...I am convinced that the dangersof doing nothing are far greater than those of doing too much. By which I mean thateverything the government can now do to increase the spending power of the country,both by the individual and the government, will, at least until there is a decided upturn ineconomic activity, be a good thing.' (Ferrell 1981, 277-278)

It is probable that the decision process never made it to the domestic dimension as there was only one alternativeremaining after the political and international dimensions had been explored.

The process also did not appear to have been LEX. Recall that the LEX model presumes that only onedimension - the most crucial one - is considered. The evidence is preponderant, however, that the internationaldimension was given much thought. Furthermore, Mintz and Geva (1992) note an interesting distinction between theEBA and LEX models that is pertinent in this case. The EBA model is more of a defensive or "reactive" decisionmechanism, while the LEX is offensive or "proactive." The former allows a leader to avert harmful political fallout,while the latter allows a situation to be exploited for political gain.

The satisficing behavior observed during the Dien Bien Phu crisis was a by-product of George's (1972, 771)multiple advocacy model of decision making. Recall that the multiple advocacy model obtains as the executive usesinternal disagreement in his search for alternatives. The executive has the all-important role of custodian overseeing thedebates between competing viewpoints (George 1972, 761). Eisenhower fully expected his advisers to back views evenwhen contrary to his own (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 266). In this manner the President becomes the central decisionmaker and a diversity of views are entertained and "harnessed". The multiple advocacy model is termed a "mixedsystem" as it incorporates centralized management and pluralistic participatory strategies (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff1990, 472). A primary mission of this model is to prevent agencies or subunits from working out compromises amongthemselves before issues are heard at the highest level (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472). Rationality can behamstrung if the multiple advocacy model is overly centralized in the early stages as the range of alternatives is con-strained by cues perceived to be emanating from the executive; i.e. no options regarded as contrary to the President'sagenda will be entertained (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 472; George 1972). This, of course, is anathema to thecentral tenet of rational decision making and was probably a factor in 1954 assuming, for example, the President'sfamous 'row of dominoes" speech exuded cues to his subordinates.

The multiple advocacy process "force[d] decision makers to face up to the sobering question of the costs andrisks of intervention" (George 1972, 771). Eisenhower worked at using the NSC in the manner spelled out by theNational Security Act. To this end he treated it as a corporate body; i.e. with representatives from different agenciespresenting opinions based on experience and expertise rather than based on departmental compromise (Falk 1969, 684).Even though the process was constrained by the obvious inclinations of the President to stem communism at almost anycost, it effectively brought to the surface factors such as public opinion and the possibility of a humiliating defeat inanother ground war in southeast Asia. The multiple advocacy model was played out against a noncompensatory decisionmaking backdrop.

Could the process actually have been a compensatory one? For the decision to have been a compensatory one,all alternatives would have had to be considered. This was not the case. In their comparison of the Vietnam decisions of1954 and 1965, Burke and Greenstein 1989, 60) noted that Eisenhower's decision making group did not consider the airstrike, as the President effectively ruled this out, nor did they consider the option of doing nothing.A second reason theprocess cannot be considered compensatory is that Eisenhower's rather favorable approval rating (64% in May, 1954)could not compensate for the fact that the public was averse to the use of force in Indochina at this time (see Burke andGreenstein 1989, 112-113).

A third piece of evidence is the heavy reliance upon preconditions by the President. A compensatory processwould allow exceptionally high utility scores along a particular dimension to outweigh the weak dimensions. However, itis quite clear that the President was not very willing to consider options which did not subsume his preconditions.

These three factors taken together left the President with only one alternative: to try and build domestic supportfor united action (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 65). Eisenhower was forced to frame his message to Congress in termsof possible future Chinese or other communist intervention in the region (Burke and Greenstein 1989, 69, 74-77, 109).

Conclusion. Foreign policy decision making in the Eisenhower Administration did not follow the rationalprotocol in that it was not exhaustively comparative. On the contrary, the possibility for true comparison was precludedby an overwhelming desire to reach compromise. The NSC structure was slow and plodding and did not generate distinctalternatives, but rather worked to "plaster over" differences as major policy statements became "all things to all men"with opposing sides able to find justification for their agenda in the vague wording (Falk 1969, 686). Rather than followa rational decision strategy in which the NSC entertained viewpoints from outside the agency and compared opposingviewpoints against each other, instead major decisions were made through "horse-trading" and legislative-like behavior(Falk 1969, 686).

That the decision process under Eisenhower was a cybernetic, bounded rational one is evident from itscharacterization as neat, mechanistic and tending towards mass production, while undertaking a heavy workload. DuringEisenhower's first three years the NSC made 829 policy decisions, while in a five year period under Truman there hadbeen only 699 decisions (Falk 1966, 685). The NSC was able to react to crises during Eisenhower's two sicknesses byrelying upon policy guidance that had been stored away (Falk 1969, 685-686). This is precisely the logic that Steinbruner(1974) is alluding to in his theory of cybernetic decision making. The tennis player need not be coached each time hestrokes, for the many minute decisions are stored in the brain and operate almost in an automatic fashion.

The issues that came into play during the Dien Bien Phu crisis reveal that the use of force has been wrapped upin political-economic factors at least since the Eisenhower administration. During his tenure President Eisenhowerregarded domestic political support as a sine qua non of the use of force. Before he would send troops abroad, and evenif he felt he was correct in doing so, certain specific political conditions had to be met as Eisenhower realized suchimportant decisions required broad political support (Saunders 1985, 109-110). As it turned out, Eisenhower's handlingof the crisis garnered high public approval. A poll circulated by the State Department, which had been monitoringopinion, found that 60% of the public approved of the President's handling of the events even though it was widelyunderstood that the communists had increased their holdings in southeast Asia as a result of US nonintervention (Burkeand Greenstein 1989, 114). The President had chosen the politically expedient alternative.

Thus the widely held notion that only realist variables such as the strategic balance held sway in decisons to useforce prior to the "Vietnam syndrome" can be put to rest. Decisions to use force are not made exclusive of domesticpolitical considerations. Also, arguments that cast Eisenhower as a strictly rational decision maker (see e.g., Saunders1985) are called into doubt.

Grenada 1983

Background. On October 25, 1983, the US invaded Grenada. The justification for the invasion was the need torestore order and protect American lives after the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several otherleading members of the New Jewel Movement by radical elements within the party led by Bernard Coard. The NewJewel Movement had taken over the government from a brutal authoritarian regime during a bloodless coup in 1979.Unlike the Dien Bien Phu crisis 30 years prior, in this case the President decided to respond with force.

Although the invasion had been formally requested by the Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, andthe Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), in particular, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, it islikely that the US would have resorted to the use of force regardless. In this case study I will trace the decision makingprocess that led to the use of force on the island. In particular, I argue that, unlike Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, thedomestic environment was not prohibitive. If anything, the domestic dividends would be reaped quickly. It is conceivable

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that the invasion could deflect the fallout from the tragedy that took place in Beirut days earlier when over 200 marineswere killed by a terrorist's bomb (Bostdorff 1991). The Grenada venture, alternately called an invasion and rescuemission by Reagan as political winds dictated, was of dubious legality and had many earmarks of a carefully designedgambit made with public opinion as the paramount variable. The OECS charter clearly states that any action of suchgravity must be approved unanimously. Obviously, Grenada did not vote in favor of its own invasion. Furthermore,Scoon's position as Governor-General afforded no legal authority in dealing with anyone other than the Queen (Dore1984, 185, fn. 65), and it is unclear whether his request even reached the US prior to the invasion. Clearly then, theserequests were little more than window-dressing. Another fact that reinforces the conclusion that the entire crisis wascarefully planned with political sensitivity in mind was that the media was banned during the early phases of the invasion(Kaiser et al. 1983, 83; Kenworthy 1983). One thing the military had learned during Vietnam was that vivid pictures ofbloody American youths had devastating effects on public opinion towards the operation.

There were also the particularly sticky questions the administration had to answer regarding the War PowersResolution. Recall that the resolution requires the president to notify Congress prior to any use of force. The Presidentconsulted with Senate majority leader Howard Baker and House Speaker Tip O'Neill the night before the invasion, butsolicited no advice or approval - hardly a bona fide interpretation of the War Powers Resolution considering that thepresident had been considering intervention since the murder of Bishop at least four days earlier (Rubner 1985; see alsoUSCCAS 1990). In fact, there is substantial evidence that the invasion had been planned over three weeks earlier asArmy Rangers which were based in Georgia and later took plart in Urgent Fury, practiced maneuvers in Ephrata, Wash-ington at a runway similar to that found in Grenada (Kenworthy 1984, 644). Operation Urgent Fury, as it came to becalled, was formally decided upon on Sunday, October 23 after two NSC meetings in which the decision makers werereassured that expected casualties would be light - another Vietnam lesson taken to heart (DeFrank and Walcott 1983,75).

The primary justification for the invasion was to rescue approximately 1000 US citizens, many of them medicalstudents, and it is probable the administration truly believed the students to be in danger. In retrospect, however, thisargument turned out to be largely inaccurate. The chief administrator of the medical school, Charles Modica, emphasisedthat the invasion was "totally unnecessary" and had in fact been making plans to evacuate about 10% of the students whowanted to go (Kenworthy 1984, 637). The infamous "shoot-to-kill" curfew had also been lifted the day before theinvasion. The most compelling evidence that the invasion should not have been justified as a rescue mission was thatforeigners were free to leave the country at all times, and according to Carter's former NSC adviser on Latin Americanaffairs, the invasion precluded an orderly evacuation of Americans (Kenworthy 1984, 638).

The evidence gathered by Bostdorff (1991), Conell-Smith (1984), Dore (1984), Levitin (1986), and Rubner(1985) leads to a conclusion that the decision to intervene in Grenada was not based solely upon realist factors such asthe Soviet/Cuban threat and the cache of largely outdated weapons stockpiled in Grenada. Levitin, writing in theHarvard International Law Journal, concludes that the intervention cannot be justified using international law. 2 Severalstudies, arguing from a realist perspective, assert that the US intervention was fully justified in light of the US's need tomaintain international economic power and influence (Coll 1987), or simply because the US, since it had "effective anddetermined leadership" deserved to use force as a "valid tenet of international politics (Motley 1983-84).

The key decision makers. The President, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz,national-security adviser Robert McFarlane, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were the central players. Theoverarching atmosphere surrounding the decision making environment was one of consensus - i.e. there was not muchdebate within the inner circle (Hooker 1991; Shapiro et al. 1983, 82). Furthermore, although some have questionedwhether the President was even a part of the decision to invade Grenada, Greenfield (1984, 80) forcefully argued notonly that Reagan was at the center of all important decisions coming out of the White House, but also that his decisionswere based on his firm conservative beliefs and not "seat-of-the-pants" decision making While the President may not beas detached as popularly believed, in foreign policy matters the president operated on a very low level of complexity(Church 1982, 17).

The alternatives. The decision makers had to choose from three alternatives: do nothing; the use of covert /psychological operations a la' Guatemala, 1954, or Chile, 1973; and the use of full-scale force (see Andriole 1985, 80,82; Hybel 1990, 270).

The noncompensatory nature of the political dimension. The President, in true proactive form, was able toorchestrate the entire crisis for the ultimate political benefit of the administration. The administration meticulouslytracked public opinion during the crisis, and as a reward, received a boost in ratings after the President's speech ontelevision (Isaacson 1983, 37). The boost in public opinion numbers translated into Congressional support for thedecision as open criticism of the invasion quickly died down (Isaacson 1983, 39). George Shultz revealed, albeitindirectly, that the Grenada venture was linked to the fallout of both the Beirut tragedy and the Iranian hostage-taking ashe responded to a question of a possible linkage:

"...and the President had to weight this - with the violent and uncertainatmosphere that certainly was present in Grenada, the question is:Should he act to prevent Amerians from being hurt or taken hostage?I think that if he waited and they were taken hostage or many werekilled, then you would be asking that same question: Why didn't youin light of this clear, violent situation, take some action to protectAmerican citizens there? I don't want to get into the position ofsecond-guessing myself, but I'm trying to say one has to weightthese considerations and be willing to take a decsion in the lightof all the circumstances, and that is what the president did."'

The President himself told a group of military personnel a week after the invasion, "we weren't about to wait for theIran crisis to repeat itself, only this time in our own neighborhood - the Caribbean" (Bostdorff 1991, 744).

It becomes apparent that the President's main goal all along was to avert a hostage situation and the subsequentpolitical nosedive. Shultz and McFarlane were the earliest advocates of force as they desperately feared a repeat of theIranian hostage crisis (DeFrank and Walcott 1983, 75; see also Hooker 1991, 65; Hybel 1990, 270; Kegley and Wittkopf1987, 117; Thomdike 1989, 259). Such a possibility was not lost on Republicans in Congress as Representative HenryHyde of Illinois remarked that the Beirut tragedy was a political "time bomb."' The President, according to someMembers of Congress, was cognizant of the fact that the Carter presidency suffered an "instant personal identificationwith crisis events."' Of course, such an identification was made more probable in the wake of the Beirut incident. Thedecision makers recognized Grenada as the type of low risk venture that would rally domestic support (Erisman 1981,18, cited in Thomdike 1989, 256), and to the surprise of no one, Reagan used the invasion as a rallying point days laterat a Reagan - Bush campaign reunion (Bostdorff 1991, 744). According to Bostdorff (1991), the Grenada venture was apromoted crisis which was managed closely by the President. The promotion occurred as the president fostered thenotion that a state of urgency existed in Grenada; management took place as Reagan began to persuade the public toaccept his solution as the most appropriate on (Bostdorff 1991, 737). After the President went on television to discussthe invasion, his critics became silent in the wake of the rally effect (Hinckley 1992).

This handling of the crisis resulted in symbolic political resources being garnered by the President, who wassubsequently able to withstand the resource deficit precipitated by the Marine bombing and the September, 1984 bombingof the US embassy in Beirut. Such resources are particularly valuable in cages such as these when the president has noone from which to exact revenge (Bostdorff 1991, 745). Bostdorff (1991, 739) terms such symbols in which victory pro-gresses into the future and distributes "needed symbolic reassurance" condensation symbols.

The decision process. Many contingencies were not even considered as the planning for the invasion was carriedout, primarily because the decision makers often lacked detailed or verified information (Hooker 1991, 68). This isconsonant with a cybernetic approach in which satisficing is the principle strategy and there is little comparative evalua-tion of different alternatives. As a counterpoint, during the Johnson administration, the President often felt compelled tohear out each of the options from George Ball of the State Department, and to debate each of the conflicting opinions(Shapiro et al. 1983, 82). Johnson did not, however, appear to have ever organized a grand foreign policy strategyduring his tenure preferring instead a "day to day decision making procedure" (Trager and Scully 1981, 186).

The decision to use force appears to fit a noncompensatory decision structure. Recall that noncompensatorystrategies can require the identification of one dimension as paramount. (EBA, LEX), or there can be multiple dimension

thresholds (CON). I have argued above that the political dimension was the most important to the decision makers asevidenced by the way the President managed the issue with the public, the press ban, and the waryness of the decline inapproval that would be precipitated by an American hostage situation. We can then rule out the CON strategy since itdoes not appear that all three dimensions warranted thresholds from the decision makers. The domestic dimension didnot present an acute situation, as the economy was on the road to recovery and unemployment had just dropped substan-tially (Hugick and Gallup 1991, 22). 6 The President only resorted to an international explanation for the use of force,i.e. the threat of the Soviets using the new runway as a refueling depot, or Cuban style exportation of revolution in thesmaller islands of the Caribbean, after the fact. Earlier the president had been careful to label the venture a rescuemission. Interestingly, President Johnson had similarly presented the situation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 inwhich he sent in the Marines as first a rescue mission, and after the fact, a move to thwart "another Cuba" in the region(Kegley and Wittkopf 1987, 118). Perhaps the Soviet/Cuban threats, and indeed the entire international dimension weresubordinate to the political dimension. After all, the US had little international support even from its closest allies(Cohen 1984). 7 In the UN, only Israel, El Salvador and the participating Caribbean states supported the invasion.Consequently, the international dimension largely proved to be a restraint to the use of force as the US was not able towin the diplomatic skirmishes in Europe as Britain did during the Falklands War (Cohen 1984, 163).

The sequence of events indicates that the first, and likely only, alternative considered was the use of force. Theadministration did not appear to seriously consider the covert alternative, perhaps because of the time constraints and theneed to quickly shift the focus away from Beirut. Furthermore, when officials at the invasion-day briefing were askedwhere CIA chief William Casey was, they responded that they did not know, further leading to the conclusion that a co-vert/psychological operation was not being considered.' It also seems unlikely, although it is difficult to verify, that thedecision makers ever seriously contemplated doing nothing. Reagan ran on a strong platform in 1980 that promised toreturn America to international (military) pre-eminence, and a failure to act so close to home would be interpreted asreneging. The choice of an alternative before considering others is of course consistent with the bounded rationali-ty/satisficing principles. Time constraints and situational pressure apparently forced the decision makers to take"cognitive shortcuts" (see Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Geva and Mintz 1992; Holsti 1990). Larry Speakes, thepresident's spokesman commented that it was "...a very narrow planning operation" which even excluded him.' Thedecision process during the Grenada crisis was the antithesis of multiple advocacy. Defense Secretary Weinberger'spreference for restraint in the use of force was strongly overshadowed by the State Department's advocacy of an all-outuse of force (Hooker 1991, 67). From the outset it appeared that the Grenada venture was a State Department projectand that the input of the various agencies was not equally weighted as in a multiple advocacy setting (Hooker 1991).Bona fide multiple advocacy had very little room to obtain in an atmosphere in which aides told the President only whatthey knew he wanted to hear, and feared giving the President bad news (Church 1982, 15).

There is little evidence that an exhaustive, comparative decision process entailed by the rational strategy evertranspired. Weinberger's disdain for incremental approaches to the use of force is yet another factor which identifies thedecision makers' apparent predisposition towards the use of force, as he argued that such a tact will inevitably lead toinsufficient force being applied.° Incremental approaches to the use of force tend to lead to outcomes in which force isthe last resort as less drastic measures are attempted first (Tarr 1981, 57). This was clearly not the case in Grenada.

Judging from the evidence that covert operations, or the possibility of doing nothing were probably neverconsidered, and that the use of force was proactive in terms of creating a diversion from the tragedy in Beirut, the LEXmodel seems the most applicable in the case of Grenada. Recall that the LEX strategy identifies a most important dimen-sion, and then the alternative with the highest utility along this dimension is selected. A use of force provided the highestscore along the domestic political dimension. Doing nothing did not score well along the political dimension as thePresident ran on a strong defense platform. A covert or psychological campaign also would not satisfy the politicaldimension in the wake of Beirut. Thus we are left with the use of force as the alternative chosen in a LEX process inwhich political lagniappe was both a necessary and sufficient for the use of force (see Mintz and Geva 1992). Bostdorff's(1991) argument dovetails neatly with Mintz and Geva's (1992) conception of the LEX model as proactive - i.e. theexecutive "creates" situations in which the use of force brings political windfall. In this case the windfall circumventedthe unpopular policies in Lebanon, and gave the President a significant boost just months before his campaign forreelection was to begin. This is consistent with a central argument of this entire study that opinion and policy areinterdependent, and therefore the president has considerable control over his political fate.

t7

Could the process actually have been a compensatory one? The weight of the evidence seems to indicate that acompensatory process was not carried out. First of all, the speed in which the decision had to be made makes it morelikely that the decision involved the cognitive shortcuts embedded within the noncompensatory approach (see Payne,Bettman, and Johnson 1988). When time is limited, as it was in this case because of the overlap of events in Beirut andGrenada, it has been shown that a noncompensatory process is more efficient. Second, and as already mentioned, it doesnot appear that all alternatives were compared, or even entertained.

Conclusion. It is interesting to note the distinctions between Reagan's actions in Grenada and Nicaragua in1983. In the former case, the President was willing to go against the wishes of Britain, Grenada's former metropole(Grenada had only been independent for nine years), and four members of the OECS - Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, andTrinidad - the latter two geographically very close to Grenada (Hybel 1990). While in the latter case, where the USwould have had at least the implicit support of Nicaragua's nearest neighbors - El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, andHonduras - Reagan chose not to use force. The differences are very clear. Grenada, with its rather poorly trained forceof about 1,000, was a low-risk venture which could almost be guaranteed to end within a week. The fact that it wouldcoincide with the Beirut tragedy only sweetened the pot. Nicaragua, on the other hand, had a formidable military of over50,000 troops (Hybel 1990, 282) and no such blitzkrieg could be guaranteed. Coupled with this fear of protracted war,was the public aversion to direct intervention in Central America (Bowen 1989; Sobel 1989; Sussman 1988). No matterhow strong Reagan's ideology and rhetoric were, and how much he loathed the idea of a Marxist outpost on CentralAmerican soil, domestic opinion tied his hands. Theories of foreign policy basd purely on realpolitik issues such aspower and strategic interest cannot adequately address such decision processes.

SUMMARY

By focusing on both the use and non-use of force by the US, I have been able to demonstrate the relevance ofdomestic politics to foreign policy decision making. The noncompensatory decision process adds substantially to thediversionary theory of the use of force as it captures how domestic politics enter the decision to use force in terms ofconstraints and incentives. Eisenhower was constrained from using force by domestic politics, while Reagan used forceto divert attention from another issue. The noncompensatory model provides a viable alternative to the standardrealist/rational actor models which tend to explain uses of force purely in terms of international/systemic factors.

This study then stands in stark contrast to the recent findings of Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger (1992) and Onealand Lian (1992a) who posit that the state of the economy, and the political standing of the president do not hold importfor the decision to use force. That presidents have been able to use their role as leader of the most powerful hegemonin the international system to enhance their political status is an important finding. However with the US's share inglobal resources declining, defense cutbacks in the US, and the increasing reliance upon collective security, theopportunities for politically motivated uses of force would appear to be declining. Current trends within the US as far aspublic opposition to higher middle class tax rates, and a renewed focus on the domestic economy, further indicate thatthe US may be willing to relinquish its role as global policeman. The upshot is that *postmodern* presidents mayrecognize the need to participate in international problem solving (Rose 1991), thereby surrendering its self-proclaimedright to impose its will on other nations. Hopefully this will spell an end to strings being attached to US aid, or at thevery least, an end to the threat of US intervention in the Third World.

d

1. These alternatives correspond with the decision to use force viaair strike(s). While the plan to use ground troops was entertainedby presidential advisors, the real decision was whether to save theFrench outpost. The President did not appear to ever seriouslyconsider .sending in ground troops, primarily as a result ofAmerican public opinion (Glennon 1982, 946-1477). This is anotherfactor leading to the conclusion that the decision process wasnoncompensatory.

2. For legal studies that conclude that the invasion was justi-fied see Romig (1985) and Wheeler (1985).

3. George Shultz, "Opening Statement," New York Times, 26 October1983.

4. S. Roberts, "Capitol Hill is Sharply Split Over the Wisdom ofInvading Grenada," New York Times, 26 October 1983.

5. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedyand Secrets," New York Times, 26 October 1983.

6. See also, "A, Rose-Colored Recovery," New York Times, 14 November1983.

7. See also B. Feder, "US Warned by Mrs. Thatcher," New York Times,26 October 1983.

8. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedyand Secrets," New YorkTimes, 26 October 1983.

9. Francis Clines, "Days of Crisis for President: Golf, a Tragedyand Secrets," New YorkTimes, 26 October 1983.

10. R. Halloran, "US Will Not Drift into a Latin War," New YorkTimes, 29 November 1984.

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