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8/8/2019 French Army Working

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THE SEEDS OF DISASTERRobert A. Doughty

The framework of French doctrine, organization, equipment, and training came from an

emphasis on the destructiveness of firepower, the strength of the defense, the ascendancyof the methodical battle and the unifying power of the commander. The French firmlybelieved that the new weapons and greater firepower made the battlefield much morelethal than in the past. The great destructive power of the new weapons strengthened thedefense, and relatively less man could establish a virtually impenetrable barrier of fire.An attacker could overwhelm a defender only by the closely coordinated employment ofmassed men and materiel.

The doctrine which emerged from this perception of great lethality stressed what theFrench called the bataille conduite, or the methodical battle. By this term they meant arigidly controlled operation in which all units and weapons were carefully marshaled and

then employed in combat. The French favored a step-by-step battle, with units obedientlymoving between phase lines and adhering to strictly scheduled timetables. Such methods,they believed were essential for the coherent employment of the enormous amounts ofmen and materiel demanded by modern combat. A hastily prepared, impulsive fight wasdoomed to failure. The focus of decision-making was best kept at higher commandlevels, because centralized control was necessary to coordinate the actions of numeroussubordinate units.

The French preferred rigid centralization and strict obedience. Their doctrine stressed thenecessity of avoiding an encounter battle in which moving armies unexpectedly collidedand had to fight in an impromptu or spontaneous fashion. They thus opted for a time-

consuming, intricate process that prized preparation rather than improvisation. As aconsequence of this approach, French doctrine envisaged first the weakening of anattacker by a defenders fire, and then his destruction by a massive but tightly controlledbattering ram attack.

METHODICAL BATTLE: This step-by-step process relied upon the tightly controlledmovement of men and materiel, usually between phase lines and according to a rigidtimetable. It permitted the production of the maximum amount of firepower from everyarm, and ensured that higher-level commanders could completely control or direct thebattle. It accorded very little freedom or flexibility to lower-level commanders.

Doctrine placed great stress upon the defense. It stated that the defense served torepulse enemy attacks, while the offense routed him from his positions and destroyedhis forces.

ANTITANK DEFENSE: The antitank gun, rather than the tank, accorded more withFrances approach to national defense, since it was less expensive, was primarily adefensive weapon, and could easily be handled by the citizen-soldiers. By 1940, theFrench possessed an excellent series of antitank weapons. Their 25mm cannon was


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effective up to 800 meters against heavily armored vehicles (40mm of armor), and up to1,500 m against lightly armored vehicles. The 1938 infantry regulations specified that the25mm cannon, however, was not to be fired at targets beyond a thousand meters becauseof difficulties with target acquisition. By 39-40, the old 75mm cannon was graduallybeing replaced by the new 47mm cannon, which was undoubtedly the best anti tank

cannon employed in the battle of France.

The limitation of military service to only one year necessitated considerablesimplification. One area that was simplified was the number of possible infantryformations for the squad, platoon, and company was reduced and less flexibility in theirapplication was expected. Greater emphasis was placed on fire rather than manuever.Regulations explained the importance of placing a sufficient number of projectiles onspecially selected enemy positions instead of trying to move around them by subtlemaneuvers. The platoon was the small4est unit that was capable of performing anelementary manuever It was easier to train the short-term recruit in the firing of theirweapons than it was to train them to manuever.

Rather than seeing a need for tank units, the French foresaw a need for much greatermotorization of the infantry and artillery units that would be moved forward. Theyconsequently led the worlds military in motorizing their forces.

The cavalry could accomplish an economy-of-force mission and guard the infantry-heavyforces as they occupied their positions.

From their analysis of WWI, the French concluded that increases in firepower had greatlyaltered conduct on the battlefield.

Separate and powerful attacks along converging lines. The enemy could not reinforce onearea without weakening another, and thereby could not prevent the attacker from pressingforward. While attacking across abroad front might appear to be a linear attack, it actuallyconsisted of concentrating powerful means along several areas in a defenders line andthen attacking This type of operation ensured that the attacker was always stronger thanthe defender, and that the defender could not mass sufficient forces to halt the attack. Thesingle axis attack sought dept. It could be used in the opening of a campaign before astrongly organized defensive front had been established or in striking at the boundarybetween different armies or the e armies of different nations.

The attack was divided into three separate operational phases: the preparation, the attack,and the exploitation. Within the planning for the divisions and corps in the battle, severalbounds and phases had been foreseen for the operation. These controlled the forwardmovement of the divisions and prevented accidental bombardment of french units byfriendly artillery.

Even though they preferred a restrained attack, they believed a limited attack could serveuseful functions. Such attacks could improve an unfavorable situation, could gainobjectives the enemy could not recapture except buy a concerted and costly effort, or


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could destroy enemy forces without using the enormous means normally required for amore extensive attack.

The French military placed the greatest emphasis on the requirement for firepower. Thereliance on firepower supported the need for the methodical battle, fought offensively or

defensively. The vast curtains of fire could only be coordinated and delivered throughtightly centralized, successive actions in which the artillery played a large role. Theattack is the fire that advances, the defense is the fire that halts the enemy. Firepermitted the maneuver or movement of infantry which remained the queen of battle.Whether from tanks, aviation, artillery, gas, or the infantry, supporting fires assisted theinfantry with the principal mission of combat> thus the machines of war appeared asthe auxiliaries of the infantryman.

The concept of centralization of artillery assets corresponded with the concept ofmaneuvering masses of fire. Such control was necessary for maneuver, since it enabledthe commander to concentrate his fires on the decisive point in the battle. The decisive

point, however, was one defined by larger unit commanders, and maneuver was viewedin terms of the movement of larger units, rather than smaller ones. While the need fordecentralization during the advance was recognized, the military leaders preferred to havea major portion of the artillery for the use of the larger unit commanders. A centralreserve of artillery provided the higher commander the means to exercise a majorinfluence over the battlefield, and it was a readily available reserve that could be r rapidlyshifted to another area. The requirement for such a reserve meant that a major portion ofthe artillery was long-range, heavy artillery under the control of corps and higherheadquarters. But the use of artillery in this manner favored a more stable battlefield,rather than a highly mobile one, and it viewed mobility predominately from its strategicrather than its tactical aspects.

Centralization affected not only the overall allocation and control of artillery, but also theability of tactical units to receive immediate and responsive artillery fire. This effect canbe seen in the relationship among the units being supported, the forward observers, andthe commander of the artillery unit. Forward observers did not have to accompany theunits being supported. They remained to the rear, observing from a vantage point, so thatthey could identify centers of enemy resistance. As soon as an observer collectedinformation about a potential target to his front, he passed the information to the artillerybattalion, where the commander decided if rounds would be fired. If the commanderdecided not to fire, or if he believed more artillery support was needed, he passed theinformation to his higher headquarters, where that artillery commander decided if his unitwould engage the target. Apparently the unit being supported had little influence over theartillery fires it received. Such methods placed the greatest emphasis on massed firesfavoring larger units rather than smaller ones.

Even requests for direct support fires were not passed directly from the unit needingsupport to the artillery units. Requests were passed from a battalion to the commander ofa regiment and if the request affected only his units, he passed it to the artillerysupporting his regiment. If it affected the maneuver of units in another regiment, he


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passed the request to division HQ, which could place all the artillery fire from thedivision on a target if it desired. once again, massed fires on targets identified byhigher-level commanders. In 1936, the manual concentrated on improving the rate of fireby using preplanned firing points.

Tanks are only supplementary means of action placed temporarily at the disposition ofthe infantry. They considerably reinforce the action of the infantry, but they do notreplace them. The action of the tanks can substitute for the direct support and closeprotection demanded heretofore of the artillery. Armored units tend to move too quickly,thereby losing part of their offensive capability and becoming vulnerable tocounterattacks. The solution of the problem of tanks moving forward too quickly lay insuccessive objectives. If these objectives were placed about fifteen hundred meters apart,the infantry and artillery could provide protective fires and the tanks movement could beclosely controlled.

CHARS DE MANOEUVRE ENSEMBLE: The tanks for mass maneuver were not

constituted into units larger than a battalion. Apparently, a variable number of tankbattalions would be grouped into larger units according to the needs of a specific mission.They would normally be deployed ahead of the infantry and their accompanying tanks inorder to destroy the stronger defenses of the enemy. After they overran the enemyposition, the following infantry and their tanks would then move forward to destroy theenemy resistance completely. They could also be committed against an enemy flank in anoblique fashion, or they could thrust more deeply into the enemys rear.

The chars de manoeuvre ensemble, therefore, were little more than a leading wave oftanks that prepared the way for the infantry, which was the decisive arm, or that enabledan infantry unit to move.

The speed of the attack was conditioned by the ability of the artillery to provide support.Large armored formations could move no faster than their artillery, which would remainunder centralized control at as high a level as possible.

The French placed great importance on the various arms cooperation together. Theythought an infantry attack could be decisive only if carried out with tank support and ifsupported by artillery. In the name of combined arms, they preferred to subordinate eacharm to the others, and rejected the possibility of the tank acting relatively independently.The French wanted the tank to be bound tightly to the infantry and to be restrained by thetether of artillery support. Their emphasis on combined arms on the battlefield overruledany possibility of the tank performing a function other than supporting the infantry. Asthe tank was made more vulnerable by slower speed, French tanks were more heavilyarmored than were the Germans.

Gamelin described the best use of armored divisions was in an action on the decisivepoint of the battle. They were obliged to advance in successive jumps according to theclassic process of slow attacks based on the movement of infantry and artillery. Armoreddivisions were to operate in the same manner as other tanks in a mass manuever. . in a


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step-by-step, carefully controlled fashion within the methodical battle. Gamelin failed torecognize the ability of the armored division to restore mobility to the battlefield, but hedid recognize tank units to be most valuable for their ability to add considerablefirepower to an attacking force and for their potential for crushing any opponent in theirpath, and believed a tank division provided more firepower and mass than any other

organization.

The 1939 manual concentrated on the employment of the armored division to assist themaneuver of a larger unit, which was obviously an infantry unit. It also discussed theactual employment of the division as if it were simply a much larger grouping of mass-manuever tanks. The French still intended to employ the large tank units to increase theoffensive power and assist the maneuver of the infantry, which remained the decisivearm.

The manual also included a concept for successive objectives, but the bounds wereincreased to three or four kilometers because of the great size of the division. The tanks

would be habitually organized into two echelons with tow or three battalions in the firstechelon and one or two battalions in the second echelon. While the first echelon foughtits way to the next objective, the second echelon protected its flanks or reduced centers ofenemy resistance bypassed by the first echelon.

The DLM was designed to fulfill the traditional roles of cavalry units on the battlefieldand also to be able to accomplish, with appropriate reinforcement, missions usuallyassigned to infantry or armored divisions. Ironically, the wartime doctrine for theemployment of the DLMs, except for the emphasis on cavalry-type missions, closelyresembled the eventual doctrine of most Western powers for the employment ofmechanized units during the battles of WWII.

The cavalry was viewed as being particularly suited for rapid engagement on extendedfronts for abrupt and violent action by fire, and for the conduct of the exploitation. Thecavalry division could be employed on security or reconnaissance missions and as ahighly mobile reserve of fire. While the division could be employed in the offensive, itwas best suited of r employment in weakly defended intervals on exposed flanks, oragainst unprepared defenders. The regulation emphasized that an attack by a cavalrydivision was different from that by an infantry division, for a cavalry division attack wasbased on the exploitation of the effect of surprise, while an infantry attack was based ona succession of efforts. Defensive combat, however, was like that of the infantrydivision; it was based on the establishment of barrages of continuous fire. As for theeffect of firepower, the regulation strongly emphasized that fire and movement wereintimately bound together. There was on inordinate emphasis placed on firepower,since the cavalry had depended on mobility is one if its distinct characteristics forcenturies.

The DLM was given the mission of security and reconnaissance operations, theexploitation of a breach of enemy lines, and the sealing of a breach in friendly lines byoccupying a defensive position or by counterattacking. Although capable of the


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offensive, the division was thought most suited for movements to contact, operations onan enemys flank, and for exploitation after a front had been ruptured by other units. Themanual emphasized that such an attack should be closely supported by the artillery andinfantry and should not be conducted against an enemy in a strongly held position.

The DLM could accomplish the same sort of mission for a large motorized unit that anon-mechanized cavalry unit could accomplish for a normal large unit.

The defense was described as a necessary form of operation, so long as it contributes atthe least cost to the success of the offense. Defense could therefore contribute, but onlythe offense could gain final success. The recognition of the importance of the offense didnot mean that the French always preferred to attack rather than to defend. The perceptionof an immense amount of fire available on the battlefield contributed to the armys beliefthat the defense was stronger than the offense. The employment of automatic weaponsand artillery permitted the establishment of a curtain of fire that would extract a terribletoll from any attacker. For an attack to succeed, a larger number of troops and materiel

were required than for the defense. A hasty attack against a well-prepared defender wouldprobably lead to failure, since the defender had the advantage and could inflict heavycasualties on an attacker. The only way for an attacker could penetrate a deadly curtain offire would be to create a much greater concentration of fire with three times the infantry,six times the artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition. The complexity of such an neffort limited the possibility of maneuver dramatically.

The manual: The offensive battle thus assumes the form of successive actions of force, preceded by indispensable delays for their preparation, and followed by periods ofmovement more or less long.

The French perceived maneuver predominantly in the sense of moving units in order tohave them deliver fire or of moving fire without moving units. They rarely emphasizedthe advantages of moving units to gain something other than an advantage in firepowerover an enemy. The physical destruction of the enemy was stressed to destroy his will tofight, not the movement of a unit so it could have a decided advantage over the enemy.Manuever therefore, did not necessarily mean movement.

The key to the methodical battle and its frequent pauses was the role to b e played by theartillery, since the successive actions were necessary to permit the forwarddisplacement of the artillery during an attack.

France had 5,412 75mm guns left over from the Great War. It therefore remained themajor artillery piece of the division.

Description of typical battle When the attack began, the infantry advanced on or twokm before halting in order to readjust the artillery fire. The attack again commenced and,after advancing one or two km, another readjustment was necessary. In order to control


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the advance of the infantry and to ensure artillery support, a number of intermediateobjectives were established which corresponded to theses advances of one to two km.After a total advance of the infantry of about four or five km, a displacement of theartillery and a halting of the infantry advance was required. This displacement ensuredthat the infantry remained under the cover of the artillery and did not go beyond its

maximum range. For control purposes, the maximum advance was sometimes limited tothree or four km before the artillery began its displacement by increments. One rule ofthumb stated that the distance of the advance ought to be half the maximum range of theartillery supporting the attack.

Yet another aspect of the methodical battle affected by the artillery was consideration ofthe proper frontage of units in the attack. The width of the attack depended upon theamount of available artillery. A rule of thumb was that the depth of the attack wouldequal about one half of its width. If the front of the attacking troops begins to shrinkappreciably, the range of artillery permits the enemy to execute concentrations of fireunder the pressure of which the attack is weakened and finally is stopped. The greater

the initial frontage upon which an attack is made, the more desirable the results obtainedfrom it.

Standard densities were also used for specific types of fires. A rolling barrage, forexample, that was two hundred m wide required one battalion of artillery, consisting ofthree batteries. Consequently, a division supported by its own artillery and that of anotherdivision, could attack on a front of about two thousand m. A density, even against anunfortified front, of at least four battalions per km was essential. With its organic fivebattalions of artillery, a divisions maximum front would still be from twelve to fifteenhundred m. anything beyond this forced the commander to break down his operation intodifferent phases.

Obtaining the proper density of artillery was the prime factor in determining whether toemploy phasing. The artillery could be massed for the support of one attack; after thatphase ended, it could be massed in support of another attack and the completion ofanother phase.

Another result of the emphasis on the artillery and the methodical battle was that infantryunits became burdened by the requirement to move heavy equipment. Infantry unitstherefore became less, rather than more mobile. In 1914 a division of four regimentswould be thirteen km long when conducting a road march. A 30s division of only threeregiments would be thirty-four km long because of the additional number of trucks andhorses. The newer division was much more complex and heavy and consequently lesssupple and less tactically and strategically mobile. Mobility was sacrificed for greaterfirepower; the onerous burden of displacing massive amounts of artillery seriouslylimited the possibility of any wide-ranging or sweeping operations.

The motorized divisions were different from normal infantry in their strategic mobility,not in how they fought once they disembarked from their trucks. They required protection


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while they displaced and had to disembark in a protected area. Essentially this was thesame concept of motorization that was practiced in the Great War.

It is by lateral fire that the infantry makes the enemy feel his advance, it taking him fromthe flank, the diagonal, the rear. It is by this fire that he will aid the progression of

neighboring units that have been held up.

The smallest infantry unit capable of maneuver was the rifle platoon and that themaneuvers should always be simple. A squad would never try to maneuver by using afew of its men to provide a base of fire while the remainder moved forward. If a platoonencountered fire from an enemy position, it should try to outflank this resistance, ratherthan; make a direct assault. While one squad placed fire on this point, the rest of theplatoon would use favorable paths of approach toward it, move to its flanks, and thenplace oblique fire upon it. Companies used their platoons in the same manner. Theplatoons might move by bounds, but they moved slowly and eliminated enemy resistanceas soon as they encountered it.

After reaching the company objective, the company was supposed to halt so thecommander could issue a verbal order to his platoon leaders describing how the nextobjective would be attacked. The company would utilize a succession of efforts and asuccession of attack until it reached the battalions objective.

French doctrine assumed that once a defenders front was broken, he could reestablish positions to the rear which could be taken only after the employment of large andpowerful forces. The defender would be able to establish subsequent defensive positionsrabidly and solder together the broken pieces of the front. This was not simply aprocess of reinforcement but one of sedimentation in which the defenders augmentedthe depth of a position of resistance and reestablished the continuity and depth of thefront. Only after the successive enemy positions had been penetrated would theexploitation or pursuit begin.

The French doctrine suggested a completely different tempo and approach. Thepreference for short-range attacks with numerous phases and bounds, the lengthy timerequired to displace artillery, and the use of standard densities to compute the amount ofwork demanded by such an operation.

German: On the field of battle, the individual soldier fought bravely and well in thiswar, but the fundamental training of the French army was faulty. It was not trained andeducated in the war of movement.


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On attack-The "Deliberate Advance"

Their experiences in 1914-1918 had convinced the French High Command thatmobile warfare was unlikely. Instead, they based their idea of an offensive on aplan called the "Deliberate Advance". This was designed to give a slow but

extremely safe method of attacking, designed to maximize enemy casualties andminimize friendly casualties. Of course it also minimized the chance of rapidlywinning the war. There was a common saying in vogue at the time that "TheArtillery conquers, the Infantry occupies", and the Deliberate Advance certainlymirrored this theory. The basic idea of the DA was for friendly artillery topulverize enemy front line positions and neutralize the enemy artillery, afterwhich friendly troops would occupy their trenches. If this seems similar to whathappened in World War I, it is not coincidental!

The deliberate advance was to be done in distinct stages:

1. ReconnaissanceUsing infantry patrols, air reconnaissance, and sound-ranging equipment,the French would determine the German (the French had a pretty goodidea of who they were going to be fighting: front line and artillerypositions.2. PreparationDivisional and corps artillery assets would be brought forward andcarefully sighted. A comprehensive fire plan would be developeddesigned to attain artillery supremacy. Prewar planning specified theextensive use of chemical weapons, and it is one of the few small merciesof WWII that they were not employed.

3. Bombardment and AttackThe plan would be put into effect. After the artillery plan had smashed theenemy artillery and forward positions, the infantry, accompanied bytanks, would occupy the enemy positions. Tanks were never seen as abreakthrough weapon, but were designed to act as mobile artilleryplatforms to overcome local strongpoints that survived the initial artilleryconcentrations.4. ConsolidationAfter advancing 6-10km (the limit of the artillery support), the friendlyforces would stop (ignoring that annoying Charles De Gaulle screamingfor them to continue on to Berlin), dig in and establish new trench linesand artillery positions. A new fire plan would be developed for the nextstage of the advance.

The deliberate advance cycle could be repeated about once every 7-10 days.Although an adequate fire plan to defend the positions could be developed withina day, the reconnaissance necessary to for the next deliberate attack would takelonger. This would give an average advance of 1km/day which was quiterespectable by WWI standards. The key to the Deliberate Advance was the word


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Deliberate.

During the "phony war", the French used this a couple of times but then stopped(Poland had disappeared and there was no hurry). The basic defensive mindset ofthe French in 1939-40 meant that the Deliberate Advance was never really put to

the test. However, it relied on its power upon a certain amount of cooperationfrom its opponent. If the enemy front-line trenches were heavily occupied andbatteries fired from fixed positions, the DA could cause severe casualties.However, the build-up needed for a DA would be fairly easy to detect, and bydeception operations the Germans could ensure that the massive blow would fallmainly on empty ground. They could then counterattack when the Frenchattempted to consolidate.

On Defense-Forts and Concrete

The French could see World War II coming, but spent much of their defense

budget on concrete instead of tanks and mobile forces. In hindsight, the Maginotline was a waste of money, especially as it was not extended along the entireNorthern frontier (for both political and budgetary reasons). The Germans simplywent around the end of the fortification line. However, at the time, the idea of animpregnable shield on the border supported by mobile forces to the rear seemedto be sound doctrine. By the standards of 1939, the Maginot line WASformidable, and the Germans did not really attempt a break-through. One of thefeatures of the Maginot line was that almost every inch of ground around it wasplotted for artillery support. It would have been very difficult to take by directassault. When defending static positions, the fire plan should be comprehensiveand well developed.

On Defense- Mobile situations

The key to defending in mobile situations is whether the French have been allowed timeenough to register their artillery. As stated earlier, it took the French about 24 hours toestablish a basic fire plan.

A PERSPECTIVE ON INFANTRYJohn A. English

FRANCE

The French army tended to think in terms of artillery dominating the battlefield.Described by some as a clumsy army, still beladen with much equipment from 1918.Tactically the French remained convinced that the artillery-infantry array was all butinvincible. The defensive orientation of the French army naturally placed great stressupon the dominance and development of firepower. Weight of metal was consideredparamount for both attack and defense. A standard division comprised three or fourinfantry regiments, each of three battalions, supported by two regiments of organicartillery. An infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a close support


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company, which included a section of antitank guns and close support mortars. Within arifle company there were four sections (Platoons) each of three groups. The tacticaldistribution of the division was effected in three echelons; the battle echelon, entrusted tothe divisional infantry commander; the artillery; main body, under the divisional artillerycommander; and the divisional reserve. It was more a rigid fighting machine, with

artillery openly regarded as the decisive arm, than a flexible instrument.

The combat and fire unit of the French infantry was its Great War innovation, the groupede combat, 12 strong. Its members were virtually tied to the light machine gun accordingto whether their individual role was to move it, service it, feed it, or protect it. Notsurprisingly, the tactical training of automatic-rifle and machinegun teams wasmaintained at a reasonable standard, the technique of creating a tidal wave of small-armsfire ahead of advancing infantry being developed to a particularly high pitch. The rifle, onthe other hand, was regarded as very much a subsidiary weapon and the standard ofshooting was universally low. The further subdivision of the groupe into an automaticrifle squad and a rifle team partially reflected their priority since the latter, commanded

by a corporal, was not strictly a rifle team but rather a specialized bombing cell ofgrenade thrower, grenade firer, and three riflemen-cum-grenadiers. Ideally suited forclearing the firebays and traverses of a trench system, the French groupe remainedessentially indivisible and untrained to manuever within itself.

French defensive thinking, based on the preeminence of firepower, remained essentiallylinear in conception. Superiority of fire was thought of as superiority along the wholefront, not in a localized sense. Defensive tactics thus stressed stringent centralized controland the protection of flanks. Antitank weapons, of which a division in 1940 had 52 onpaper, but in reality only 12, were to be placed well forward. Reinforcement of forwardpositions by reserves was considered normal practice, though little reliance was placed onthe counterattack. Practically no emphasis was given to preparation of strong points indepth.

In offensive operations the French that the offensive power of the unit was to bemaintained by the gradual fusion of the reserve into the echelon of fire. The doctrine ofdirect reinforcement rather than outflanking manuever indicated a distinct Frenchpreference for deliberate methods of attack. French military opinion advocated attackingwith preponderant fire on a narrow frontage of from 300 to 800 meters, the principlebeing that such concentration would ensure a dense volume of fire. The initiative of smallunits was restricted to a minimum.

The role of tanks was thought to begin at the moment the infantry were held up orreached assault distance. Although normally controlled at a high level (corps) tanks weretreated essentially as a subdivision of infantry. Because of the perceived antitank threat,the 1937 manual stated that tanks should never move out of the range of artillery support.It was common practice, therefore, to attach a tank company to an infantry regiment forextra firepower. The task assigned tanks would usually be to reduce centers of resistanceencountered by foot soldiers. In the assault, they would advance immediately in front ofthe infantry, which on point of honor were never to let a tank fall into enemy hands.


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The French tanks were thus employed, in fact, as but armored pillboxes on tracks, andso endowed with the power of movement at a foot soldiers pace.

STRANGE DEFEATMarc Bloch

More than once during the First War it was brought home how inefficient the Highcommand could be when calculating accurately the length of time needed for an order,once issued from HQ to pass through its various recipients until finally it reached theformations who would have to act upon it. No amount of instructions will ever succeedin convincing the unimaginative that a runners pace is slow, and that he will often gowrong when roads and tracks have been turned into sea of mud.

One simple and obvious remedy for this state of affairs would have been to establish asystem which would have made it possible for small groups of officers to serve, turn andturn about, in the front line and at HQ. But senior generals dislike having the personnel oftheir staffs changed too often.

What drove our armies to disaster was the cumulative effect of a great number ofdifferent mistakes. One glaring characteristic is, however, common to all of them. Ourleaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war.Faced with the undisputed evidence of Germanys new tactics, we ignored, or whollyfailed to understand the quickened rhythm of the times. The relative value of distanceshad changed. For example, a unit pulled back to reform and reorganize, would not bepulled back far enough and would be over run sometimes even before all its sub-units hadarrived. Supply depots were so close to the front that they were commonly over run.

But it would not be fair to confine these criticisms to the High Command. Generallyspeaking, the combatant troops were no more successful than the staff in adjusting theirmovements or their tactical appreciations to the speed at which the Germans moved.From the beginning to the end of the campaign, the Germans showed the sameembarrassing skill in appearing where they ought not to have appeared.

The Germans took no account of roads. They were everywhere. They felt their wayforward, stopping whenever they ran up against serious resistance. Where, however, theresistance was not serious and they could find a soft spot, they drove ahead, exploitingtheir gains and using them as a basis from which to develop the appropriate tacticalmovement of, rather, as it seemed, to take their choice of a number of alternativepossibilities already envisaged in accordance with that methodical opportunism. They

relied on action and on improvisation.

Many of our military pundits were profoundly suspicious of armored units, judging themtoo heavy to be moved easily (and their rate of progress as shown in official statisticswas, it is true, very slow, but only because it was assumed that they mustmove by nightfor security reasons---whereas, as things turned out, the war of speed was conductedalmost uniformly by day); because those attending the Cavalry courses at the Staff


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College had had it drilled into them that, though tanks might be tolerably useful indefense, their value for attack was nil.

Rear area support troops were not armed or trained for their own defense.

Army promotions---with very few exceptions---was, generally speaking, slow, and theold men at the top, even when they did show willingness to help their juniors up theladder, were inclined to pick their men from among those who had shown themselves tobe model pupilsalmost excessively model.

They were defending a country, which they did not seriously think could offer anygenuine resistance. The soldiers under their command were the sons of that Peoplewhich they were only too glad to regard as degenerate.

WHY FRANCE FELLGuy Chapman

In April 1917 a law was passed requiring that divisional generals should be retired at age62 and brigadier generals at age 58. This was rescinded in 1919 and the collection ofoverage generals began.

Each division had an infantry commander and an artillery commander. The CG had to gothrough both and coordinate both.

A British officer who attended a course for divisional and regimental commanders shortlybefore the war reported that seventy-five percent of the time was devoted to defense. Themain theme was artillery. There was no tank officer among the instructors. There was no

sense of the time element in war, which was presented as a series of mathematicalproblems, rules for frontages, numbers, and weight of fire. The defense was ingrainedand initiative deprecated.

If the active regiments were reasonably equipped, the newly formed A divisions werewithout many necessities. Most of the requisitioned elements were defective. The armyhad only 30,000 trucks and the balance was made up by civilian vehicles. Onereconnaissance squadron, for example, had cars and motorcycles of twenty-fourmanufacturers and forty-two types. Weapon availability was equally deficient. Few of thenewer weapons allotted to reserve formations actually existed.

The failure to rear-echelon elements to defend themselves may, to a large degree, beexplained by the fact that there were not enough weapons to arm the entire army andmany of these units were disarmed so their weapons could be given to units more nearlyexpected to see combat.

There were 23 active infantry divisions. Then came 16 A divisions made up ofreservists aged between 24 and 32 years. These units normally had 19-20 regularofficers, 76 NCOs, and 50 or so enlisted specialists. The B divisions (numbered from


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51 through 71, were made up of men over 32 years old. These divisions were supposed tohave 3 regular officers. normally the CG and the infantry and artillery commanders.

The 47mm antitank gun was likely the best piece fielded by any army in 1940, but washorse drawn.

Corps artillery included two groups of 105mm guns of two batteries each, and two of155mm. Corps troops also included a commo group, a regiment of pioneers, and wassupposed to have an observation group of eight planes.

THE IDES OF MAYJohn Williams

The completion of Frances fortification system had been geared to the year 1935, thefirst of the annees creuses when, owing to the low wartime birth rate, the annual intakeof army recruits would begin to fall sharply from an average 24,000 to 170,000.

In response to the mood of a war-weary nation, military service had been reduced toeighteen months in 1923 and to one year in 1928.

With the war won, and Alsace-Lorraine recovered, the much-depleted professional cadresof the French Army suddenly found themselves deprived of the sense of purpose that hadinspired them in pre-war years. Not only were there no more worlds to conquer, but in thehorror of the trenches, war had lost its last vestiges of glory and glamour.

Deprived of its old respect, without an inspiring goal, and subject to damaging cuts andeconomics, the army was falling into a vague malaise militare. The postwar inflation

and high cost of living put officers and NCOs at a disadvantage financially. This,together with poor promotion prospects, was causing promising officers to leave the armyfor more attractive civilian employment and discouraging potential entrants fromtraditional military families.

The older generals were staying on, perpetuating the blockage at the top that was sodiscouraging to ambitious colonels and majors. Their retirement age, which during thewar had been fixed at sixty, rose in the twenties to sixty-two, sixty-five, and finallyseventy. The general staff and Ecole were unduly influenced by the rigid militarythinking of elderly wartime commanders whose minds were unreceptive to new ideas.Petains dicta, pronounced in his PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMBATOF LARGE UNITS (1921) that a continuous front cannot be broken by the attacker,and tanks can only be simple auxiliaries for the infantry, still held sway. AmongFrances senior generals the trench-bound Western Front had created its dangerouslypersistent myth of stasis, impregnability, and defensive supremacy. It was a myth thatenshrined not the final success of 1918when defense lines had cracked andconcentrations of tanks, used independently, had contributed to the breakthroughbutthe long exhausting years of attrition that had gone before. Now, behind the passiveconcept of the Maginot line, strategy was being neglected; warfare was being reduced to


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meticulously worked-out but unimaginative tactics that continued to give the infantrypride of place and subordinate movement to firepowerproducing an army that CaptainLiddell Hart described in 1927 as a slow-moving steam-roller of fire. The postwarFrench army seemed to miss the old moral force. The loss of 80,000 of its officers, deador disabled in the war, was beginning to make itself felt.

A series of cuts in budget, personnel and officer strength prompted Weygand to say uponretirement in 1935, My feeling of impotence at getting the government to see themilitary situation in its reality made my last years of active service particularly painful.

A hard and bitter winter of 1939 slowed down what training there was and in manyplaces stopped work on the defenses. Training was one of the major difficulties of theHigh Command during these months. Four-fifths of the French Army was composed ofreservists; likewise 100,000 of its 128,000 officers were from the reserve. In a number ofinferior reservists or series B divisions, the mens average age was as high as thirty-five. These troops were in poor physical shape and in need of toughing-up, let alone

training. Moreover, the officers and NCOs in charge of them had only short peacetimecourses and were inexperienced in up-to-date arms and equipment, as well as lacking intraining expertise.

Gamelin May 18 1940: The French soldier, the citizen of yesterday, did not believe in thewar. His interest did not extend beyond the group in his factory, office, or field. Prone toconstant criticism of anyone wielding authority, encouragedto enjoy an easy day-to-day life, in the inter-war years todays call-up man did not receive the moral and patrioticeducation that would have prepared him for the drama in which the fate of the countrywas to be enacted. Gamelin seemed to forget that the High Command had had eightmonths in which to reindoctrinate these defaulting troops.

Apart from the disappearance of most able-bodied males, civilian France retained analmost peacetime atmosphere in these waiting months. Troops returning home on leavesaw nothing to inspire them with the zeal that was wanting in the Zone of the Armies.Many Frenchmen felt that since Germany had achieved her aims in the East, there wassmall point in continuing to oppose her. But if the war had to go on they had little doubtabout the result. The press, fed with official propaganda, optimistically assumed victoryas a forgone conclusion. Germany, it was implied would eventually be beaten by theAllied blockade; and in any case, there was the impregnable Maginot Line. After fourmonths of eventless war, Paris, and with it France, seemed lulled into a comfortableoblivion of danger.

The French tanks were ill fitted for modern mobile warfare. They were slow, heavy andunwieldy. The largest, of 35 tons, had armor up to 70 mm thick and mounted two guns, a47mm, and a 75mm. These could withstand all German tank and antitank fire and pierceall German armor. Firepower and strength were the chief assets of all French tanks, butfor these they sacrificed precious mobility and cruising range and speed.


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With antiaircraft artillery: compared with the German total of 9,300, the French were toturn out less than 3,000. French antitank gun production, 8000 at the highest estimate,was to be well below the armys needs only in field artillery was France to exceedGermany. In this arm for which she was always famous she would, by May, possess over11,000 guns of all calibers from 75mm to 280mm, as against Germanys 7,700 odd. But

even here France was at a disadvantage, for her artillery was mainly horse-drawn andtherefore unsuited to mobile operations.

The 55th division, one that was to have a key role, was a Series B reservist division. Theaverage age of all the men in this division was over thirty. Most were married and hadchildren. Many had forgotten much of the soldering that they had learned during theirone-year active duty. Many were overweight and in poor physical condition. Whateverenthusiasm they had brought with them when called up had been eroded when they foundthat not even uniforms awaited them and they had to drill in their civilian clothes forweeks.

The 55

th

and similar formations suffered a lack of regular officers. Out of a total strengthof 450 officers, only 20 were active. These 20 were at the end of their careers and hadbeen given an easy last tour of duty.

In late May, Weygand introduced a new defense. No longer was there to be a thindefensive line which, if broken, would be re-formed further back. Now the line wasdesigned as a band of strong points, extending in depth as well as length, a qudrillage, orcheckerboard, of fortified positions such as villages of small woods, chosen mainly withthe aim of denying the roads to German tanks. From these mutually supporting points,counterattacks were to be made; and from them there would be no withdrawal. Thissystem depended on armored forces to destroy whatever Germans that had bypassedthese strongpoints and thus restore the front.

Divided and Conquered

By: Jeffery A. Gunsburg

This is the first book Ive read about the fall of France in 1940 thatdoesnt repeat a bunch of sets of conventional wisdom about thecampaign. It uses a variety of new sources to understand what the Frenchgenerals were thinking, and why they thought it. After reading thisbook, I still think that the French made some fundamental mistakes inthe war, but those mistakes were an entirely different set than the onesthe conventional wisdom about the campaign put forward.

The conventional wisdom about the fall of France in 1940 says thatFrance prepared to fight World War I again, spreading their tanks out inpenny packets to support the infantry. Most importantly, theconventional wisdom says that the French tried to re-fight World War I


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by building the Maginot line, and then cowering behind it until theGermans swept around behind it through Belgium and Holland and swept theFrench army away.

There are some elements of truth to some of that conventional wisdom.

The French probably did spend too much money on the Maginot line. Theydid spread a lot of their tanks out in infantry support roles. Thatsnot the full story though. The French high command understood theadvantages of concentrating their armor, and they did have three lightarmored divisions (DLMs) and three heavy armored divisions (DCRs).

Those divisions were not hasty reactions to German successes in Poland.As early as 1930, the French planned to motorize five infantrydivisions, turn one cavalry division into a light armored division andmotorize one brigade each of the other five cavalry divisions. Thoseplans were delayed by the Great Depression, but by 1936 the French had a

functioning light armored division. In the early 1930s, "Students ofthe Army Staff College learned that strategic maneuver by motorized andmechanized forces, particularly on the flanks, would dominate at leastthe early stages of the next war." In the fall of 1936, the Frenchgovernment approved a program that would equip 3 light and 2 heavyarmored divisions, along with 7 motorized divisions. The program wouldalso produce equipment for 3 more motorized divisions. That plan calledfor production of 3200 tanks, 5000 armored utility vehicles, over 650025mm and 47mm anti-tank guns, and mechanized artillery for the armoreddivisions.

The French were quite aware that the Germans could and probably wouldavoid the Maginot line by attacking through Belgium. Channeling theGermans in that direction was the main point of the Maginot line.

The French had a plan to counter that attack, and attempted to implementit in May 1940. That plan resulted in the defeat of France, but notbecause France cowered behind the Maginot line (they didnt), and notbecause the French high command attempted to re-fight World War I. TheFrench lost primarily because they tried to implement a daring, highlymobile strategy in May 1940 with an army that simply wasnt as good ator as well equipped for that type of war as their German opponents.

The French had three fundamental problems as they developed their forcesand strategies for World War II. First, the defense of the vitalnorthern industrial areas of France was dependent on Belgium. Meetingthe Germans on the France/Belgium border was a prescription for thedevastation of Northern France. Unfortunately, even after the experienceof World War I, Belgium refused to cooperate with France on defenseissues in the late 1930s. Instead Belgium enforced a very strict


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interpretation of neutrality, refusing to even covertly talk to theFrench about coordinating defenses. That made things very difficult forthe French. If the French took the offensive on the French/Germanborder, they risked the Germans going through Belgium and cutting offany forces used in that offensive. As long as they respected Belgiums

neutrality, the French handed Hitler the initiative. He could chose thetime and place that any war got serious.

Second, France simply didnt have enough high-quality manpower to matchthe Germans. They didnt have the population base Germany did, and as aresult they had to use people who would not have been in the Germanarmy, at least not at this stage of the war. They had a number ofSeries B divisions composed mainly of flabby shopkeepers in their late30s, who had last trained ten or fifteen years ago. These men wereofficered by a minuscule cadre of active duty officers, supplemented byreserve officers who had often also been out of the army for years. The

French had enough sense to put that kind of division on sections of thefront that they thought would be quiet. Unfortunately, that meant that acouple of Series B divisions ended up taking the initial assault fromelite German units like Gross Deutschland, followed by most of the Germanpanzer divisions.

Third, Frances main ally, Great Britain, simply was not prepared for awar on the continent. With a population comparable to Frances, and allof the resources of the Commonwealth countries to draw on, they stillhad an army on the continent about half the size of Belgiums, and aneven smaller fraction of Frances. By May 1940, England had less than adozen divisions capable of actually fighting on the continent. Giventheir population, they should have had four or five times that number ofdivisions, and they approached that later in the war. England did have avery good air force, but it wasnt designed to help defend France.Englands fighter aircraft were tied to an elaborate system of airdefenses that later proved its worth in the Battle of Britain, while itsbombers were designed for a strategic bombing role. Together, Englandand France had enough aircraft to give the Germans very strongcompetition. Unfortunately, the majority of Englands aircraft, thoughnot all of them, sat on runways waiting for German attacks on Englandthrough much of the battle of France.

Given those constraints, French strategy called for bold action as soonas the Germans attacked Belgium. The best, most mobile French army unitswould dash forward into Belgium, occupying positions along somethingcalled the Dyle line. If Germany attacked the Netherlands too, thenFrench forces would make an even longer dash through Belgium to link upwith the Dutch army. In theory, that would keep the Netherlands andBelgium in the fight, and make the British more apt to fight seriously


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because of the threat that German occupation of the Low Countries posedto England.

The Netherlands part of that strategy--called the Breda variant--wasvery controversial among the French high command. The French commander,

Gamelin, rammed it through in spite of almost unanimous opposition fromthe other French commanders. It may have been part of the reason thatFrench Prime Minister Reynaud tried to fire himironically on the daybefore the German offensive started. The problem was that the Bredavariant cut French reserves for the central front in half, taking sevenof the most mobile French divisions, including one of the three lightarmored divisions and putting them in the worst possible position tocounter any German breakthrough. The Breda variant also diverted scarceanti-aircraft guns from more important fronts, as the French set up ananti-aircraft screen to protect those divisions as they dashed acrossBelgium.

France had made enormous strides in rearmament from September 1939 toMay 1940. Gamelin apparently looked at the large French mobile forcesand felt that France had built up to the point where it could match theGermans at mobile warfare, at least under certain circumstances. Francehad implemented most of the 1936 plans. It had 3 light and 3 heavyarmored divisions, (versus 10 panzer divisions) 7 motorized infantrydivisions, (versus the same number of German motorized divisions) and 5partially mechanized cavalry divisions. The Germans would have to gofight their way through Dutch and Belgian defenses, while the Frenchwould be arriving at the battle site relatively unscathed. Doing theDyle plan with the Breda variant was a gamble, but Gamelin though it wasworth it. If it succeeded, it would keep Belgium and the Netherlands inthe war, and make an allied offensive in 1941, after England built up areal army, a realistic possibility.

The Breda variant probably made the German task much easier than itwould have otherwise been, but the fundamental problem was that theFrench command was trying to implement a mobile strategy with an armythat really wasnt as well trained or equipped for that type of warfareas the French high command apparently thought. The French trainingphilosophy was one of "Methodical Battle". The French were not taught togo off on impetuous, risky tangents. They were trained to hold a line,bring up massive firepower, then go over to the offensive. Thatphilosophy might have been fatal against the Germans even given morerational deployment of French resources. The point is that an armytrained that way was flung into a wild adventure that had to result inan encounter battle between them and the Germansexactly the type ofbattle they had been trained to avoid. In adopting that strategy,Gamelin also managed to commit every one of his seven motorized infantry


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and three light mechanized divisions before he knew where the mainGerman thrust was coming. That proved fatal when the Germans brokethrough south of the mobile French forces, cutting them off in Belgium.

The French did make some major mistakes in weapons design and

organization. For example, their heavy armored divisions (DCRs) werebuilt around the B1 series of tanks. The B1 was heavily armored and hada lot of firepower, but it was also very expensive, complex, hard toproduce, and not very reliable (The reliability was apparently madeworse by some very sophisticated sabotage efforts on the part of FrenchCommunists). The B1 tanks had a very short range without refueling, andtrack life was short. The French intended to get the tanks to the frontby railcar, while moving the rest of their armored divisions by road. Inthe confusion of the German breakthrough, the two components of thearmored divisions tended to never link up, and tanks did tend to be usedin small packets, but that was not the French intention.

Some individual French commanders apparently didnt get the concept ofarmored divisions, and one vital heavy armored division was squanderedwhen a corps commander scattered it along the flank of the Germanbreakthrough as mobile pillboxes. Again, this was not French doctrine.It was a matter of an individual being stupid. Every peacetime army getsa few people like that in key positions, and spends the first months ofactive combat getting rid of them. The French didnt get time to get ridof them.

Another major French problem was their shortage of radios. They reliedon telephone systems to make up for that shortage, which turned out tobe a major mistake. Their phone network got cut to pieces by acombination of bombing, military movement, and actions of refugees. Theradios they had were not very reliable, and they were overly cautiousabout using them, at least partly because the French had no equivalentof the German Enigma coding machines, and they suspected that theGermans would be able to monitor radio traffic. As the phone system fellapart, the French command lost contact with their armies to a greaterand greater extent.

Another problem: all French tanks, including the otherwise very goodSomua S35, had one-man turrets. The one man in that turret had so manyroles that it was virtually impossible for him to do them all well. TheGermans captured quite a few S35s and apparently initially thought theywould be valuable additions to their armored force, but ended uprealizing that there really wasnt much they could do with them, beyondsecurity work.

Yet another problem: as mentioned earlier, the French had five partly


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mechanized cavalry divisions. Those divisions each still had a majorcomponent of horsed cavalry, along with armored cars and light tanks.These divisions proved to have very little fighting ability. Theycouldnt move any faster than the horsed component, while at the sametime they didnt have the cross-country mobility that a purely cavalry

force would have had. The Germans really hammered a couple of thesedivisions early on, and routed them. That may have played a role indestroying the morale of some of the French "B" divisions who saw theremnants pass through their positions shortly before the main Germanassault.

Bottom line: *Divided and Conquered *claims that the French worked hardand reasonably rationally to prepare for a German attack. The fact thatthey were defeated so quickly was due in part to mistakes on their part.They had some serious flaws in their weapons and organization. Gamelinsstrategy made those flaws worse by putting French troops into a

situation that they werent trained or equipped for. On the other hand,England and Belgium share a major part of the blame too. French "B"divisions wouldnt have had to be on the front line if England had builta serious land army. The French dash into Belgium wouldnt have been sodangerous if the Belgian government had allowed some covert coordinationbetween the forces. The Germans would not have had as easy a time asthey did in the air if the English had been willing to commit thefighter squadrons they had sitting on the runways of England early inthe German offensive. The French are still bitter about the fact thathundreds of British fighters were sitting idle while French troops weregetting picked apart from the air, and French pilots were flying theirinadequate planes against the full weight of the Luftwaffe.

The defeat of 1940 was an allied defeat, not just a French one. Englandand Belgium contributed to it in very major ways. This book paints apicture of a French command that made mistakes, many of them in effortsto make up for the deficiencies of their allies, but which generallyacted in a reasonably rational way to prepare for the assault that theyknew was coming.

French Army of 1940

This was a conscript force with a considerable proportion of regularsoldiers particularly in its Colonial units. It depended upon the recallof reservists to bring its divisions up to war strength. Conscript servicewas for two years followed by part-time reserve service and continuingreserve obligation to the age of 42. Divisions were on severalestablishments: Active, consisting of regulars, conscripts and the firstthree-year groups of reservists; 'A' reserve divisions, consisting of the


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next year-groups of reservists up to the age of 32; 'B' reservedivisions, of the older reservists, with an average age of 36; Colonialdivisions of white regulars, with some black or Arab regiments; and NorthAfrican divisions, with some white conscripts, and a majority of Arabregulars. The cavalry, mechanized, armored, fortress and alpine divisions

were a mixture of regular, active, A and B classes. These establishmentsprovided seven active motorized divisions, ten Active infantry, 17 'A'infantry, 19 'B' infantry (of which three were alpine), ten North African,seven Colonial, five fortress, five cavalry, three mechanized and fourarmored divisions; two other alpine divisions were a mixture of Activeand A reservist classes. There were a number of combat units not formedinto divisions, including the Foreign Legion, and Polish and Czechvolunteer legions.

The infantry divisions were organized into three infantry regiments ofthree battalions each, with two artillery regiments, given 36 field and 24

medium guns, and a reconnaissance squadron, two engineer companies andservices; it had 52 light (25mm) anti-tank guns. Alpine divisions weresimilar; fortress divisions had infantry only.

The cavalry divisions consisted of two horsed and one mechanized regimentsand a reconnaissance group ,and its artillery of 12 field and 12 mediumartillery pieces and eight 47mm anti-tank guns; it had 20 light tanks and15 armored cars. The mechanized divisions (division legere mecanisee) hadtwo tank regiments, each of 87 medium or light tanks, a reconnaissanceregiment with 40 armored cars, and three motorized infantry battalions;its artillery was 24 field and 12 medium guns and nine 47mm anti-tankguns. The armored divisions (division cuirassee) of which the first threewere formed between January and March 1940 and the fourthduring the Battle of France itself, contained two light and two mediumtank regiments, one infantry battalion in armored carriers and anartillery regiment of 24 105mm guns. Tank strength was 62 medium and 84light tanks; anti-tank guns numbered 167. There were also about 50independent tank battalions attached to armies.

Equipment was of mixed quality: the 75mm field and 105mm medium guns wereimproved World War I models; the anti-tank guns varied in caliber from theplentiful but obsolete 25mm to the excellent but scarce 47mm. Tanks wereof eight types from the completely obsolete Renault F tanks of 1918 to theexcellent modern Somua and B.I. models, both mounting the high velocity47mm gun, the latter also a 75mm low-velocity gun. Total strength was

2235.The command system was over-complicated and slow moving. At the head stoodthe Supreme Commander Land Forces (Gamelin), with headquarters located atthe Fort de Vincennes, near Paris; subordinate to him were the frontcommands, the most important of which was the Commander North East Front


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(Georges) at La Ferte. Georges commanded three Army Groups, 1st(Billotte), 2nd (Pretelat, with 35 divisions) and 3rd (Besson, with 14divisions). Besson's and Pretelat's Groups garrisoned the Maginot Line,with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Armies. Billotte commanded the field armyconsisting of 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th Armies and the British Expeditionary

Force (which, however, took its orders direct from Gamelin). The FrenchAir Force had a separate command system and its headquarters were notco-located with the Army's.

Fall of France 1940 :Strategic and Tactical Blunder

By Khan.

Introduction

After the dramatic fall of France in June 1940, many Frenchmen asked themselveswhether they had been betrayed. If military ineptitude can be called betrayal, then it isfair to say that France's army betrayed her. At the forefront of this betrayal were the menwho led it. Analyzing at all levels; serious command and control differences were the keyto the undoing of French defenses. Nobody noticed these differences until after the warwas over. The First World War was fought in the grip of rigid doctrine. Since such

doctrine hates imagination, all that the both sides could do was throw men at one another.Of course the result was that Germany lost, having fewer men to lose. When WWI wasover, the Allies convinced themselves they had won and that the Central Powers had lost.In Germany this broke the power of old theories for some time; whereas in France, itstrengthened them. Eventually this formed the basis for leaders like Hitler to come topower and for generals such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein to rise within theranks.

The German Invasion of May 1940 followed a series of spectacular German victories inCzechoslovakia, Poland and Norway. Contrary to many beliefs, the campaign in Polandwas not a rapidly mobilized armored assault like that in France. It was fought more

conventionally with foot soldiers led by concentrated tanks in a WWI fashion. Yet thiswas a campaign that the French should have taken serious note of. Their failure toimprove the Army and Air Force command system would have disastrous consequencesin the fast paced campaign that was to follow. A rigid adherence to principles of the FirstWorld War was also to prove disastrous. Exploiting these lapses on the part of the Frencharmy, the Germans were able to penetrate at Sedan and encircle the best armies the Alliescould field at the time.


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France and her Allies

The France of 1939 was very different from the France of 1914. After the Great War, awave of pacifism had overtaken the country. While anti-war literature in Germany hadbeen hastily put aside and hidden by Hitler, the citizens of France accepted it

wholeheartedly. "Never again!" was the cry in the hearts of the people. From the time ofArmistice to the time WWII broke out, 19 governments had been elected and then ousted.Otherwise, the existence of a socialist government by the name of the 'Popular Front' haddone much to damage national unity amongst Frenchmen. France in 1939 was a dividedcountry whose people had no idea why they had been suddenly thrown back into a stateof serious conflict. As the Army failed and disaster befell them, the general populationresorted to accusations of betrayal and the presence of a "Fifth Column" of spies andtraitors. This was a way to avoid blaming themselves and their leadership for failurewhen the critical time was upon them and national unity was required the most.

The French Army: Ripe for DefeatGenerals and DoctrineWhile the German army modernized with radical new ideas, the French army wascommanded and dominated by a cadre of Generals that had fought the First World War.The great catastrophe that was about to overtake France would require quick anddynamic thinking from its leaders. The French system of command at this time was rigidand inflexible, a relic from the previous war. Bypassing orders and making quick tacticaldecisions was almost shunned. At the pinnacle of this huge Army was General MauriceGamelin. He evolved and issued all orders to the entire army. Gamelin's headquarterslacked radio. His method of issuing orders was through dispatch riders and the often-

unreliable telephone network. Thus it usually took 48 hours for his orders to get throughto his men. One is shocked upon discovering this; in the fast paced and dramaticcampaign that would follow, every minute was precious. Gamelin also had no GeneralStaff to make the passage of commands easy. The 'operational' head of the Army wasGeneral A. L. Georges. There was no boundary to demarcate where his powers startedand Gamelin's ended. To make matters worse, there was an animosity between the twomen.

The tactics and doctrine of the French army were as antiquated as its generals. Duringand after the war, many French officers and leaders alike claimed that they had gone towar in 1939 with a 1918 army. Indeed the concepts of warfare the French generals clung

to during the May campaign can be called antique. More than once French senior officersfailed to show required aggressiveness in defense against the German armies. Insteadthey contented themselves (in WWI terminology) to 'sealing off' and 'containing' theenemy where counter attacking would have had devastating effects upon the Germancolumns. It is apparent from the command decisions these men took that they were stillcaught up in the defensive siege mentality of the previous war. Otherwise, thecumbersome system of command would always mean that orders would be received late


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and would not be able to keep up with the rapidly changing face of the battlefield.Matters were made even worse by the use of the unreliable telephone network.

Tanks were simply viewed as a support weapon for the infantry. New theories and tacticspresented by officers such as Colonel Charles de Gaulle were completely ignored. The

theory that tanks should be used as the cavalry of an infantry attack prevailed. Thisliterally meant that these valuable weapons would be dispersed ahead of the infantry andthe deadly effect of concentrated armour would be lost. Their duties would be limited toinfantry support and reconnaissance, rather than actual breakthrough. Inevitably, aGerman force applying exactly the opposite tactics defeated the French army.

Men and MaterialContrary to what many have said after the war, the French army and her Allies werehardly outnumbered by the Germans. The total number of French divisions fielded was94. These were of mixed capability. Alongside these were 10 British, 10 Dutch (thesewere eliminated early in the war) and 22 Belgian divisions. Bringing the total to 136.

Against them, the Germans could count upon 136 of the Heer's 157 divisions. Of these,only about a third were first rate offensive material. As to the number of tanks possessedby both sides, the Germans appear to have possessed between 2,400 to 3,000 tanks. Atleast half of these were Mark Is and IIs, which could hardly be considered tanks, takinginto account their light primary weapon and Armour. The Allies on the other hand fieldedaround 3,100 to 3,400 vehicles of which at least 2,285 could be considered modern andformidable. Thus, there were three French armored divisions and three light mechanizeddivisions. It is clear that the Allies possessed enough vehicles to match that of theGermans in quality and quantity. (1)The only serious lacking we see in Allied armor isthat of radio. This would to lead to much confusion and lack of coordination in theensuing battles.

The only lack of weapons in the French Army was that of anti-aircraft (AA) guns, anti-tank (AT) guns and anti-tank mines. There was a grave shortage of AT guns, yet in theperiod up till May 1940, the French were still exporting such guns. 830 AT guns, 500Artillery pieces were actually exported on the eve of the German attack . Of the last 500Renault R35 tanks, nearly half were exported. Even till the end of the campaign, suppliesof AT guns were far from sufficient. To top these shortcomings, there was a stunninglack of AA weapons. France had only 5 AA regiments, whereas the Germans possessedabout 72. Later on this was to prove to be another of many fatal flaws as French troopswould not be able to defend themselves against air attack.

France had many reasons to doubt the quality of her army in 1939. Much of this was dueto the destabilization of French society. There was a huge gap between the workers,communists and the bourgeois. The lack of national unity was bound to affect the men atthe front as well. Although there were some excellent professional 'A' class divisions, thebulk of the Army was formed by reservists and conscripts. The discipline amongst theseunits is hardly worth calling adequate. The reason most historians give for this isboredom. The 'Phoney War' after Poland had left many servicemen with nothing to do.Drunkenness and disorder was common. There was hardly any attachment between the


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officers and the men. Both the latter and former were seemingly more concerned withpay and holidays. The question of "Why are we here?" was asked more than oft amongstsoldiers. German propaganda also took its toll; with right wing and communistnewspapers it managed to instill a strong feeling of Anglophobia amongst the men andofficers. This situation contrasts heavily with that of the well trained and well disciplined

Wehrmacht.

The French Air Force at the time had 3,289 modern aircraft operational. Of these 2,122were fighters. Although French aircrew were very well trained and morale was high, theyhad no idea of modern tactics. They knew nothing of extensive ground support andtactics of concentrating air power to maximize sortie success. To make matters worse,there was no coordinated system of command for the Air Force. No specific body was incharge of issuing orders, and the chain of command overlapped in many places;maximizing confusion. These factors were to prove to be the undoing of the French airfleets.

The Maginot LineDue to the wholesale slaughter of Frenchmen in the fields of World War I, there wereapproximately 300,000 fewer men to defend France in 1934 than were in 1914. Thus theFrench built an elaborate system of forts and defenses along the Franco-German border.This was called the Maginot Line. It was a great feat of engineering and a formidabledefense against any attacker. The only problem was that the Line could not be extendedalong the Belgian order and up to the sea due to the dense presence of the French industryin the region. It was along this route that the invaders of May 1940 would come. Thus allthe Line accomplished was to lull the French public and leadership alike into a fatal falsesense of security.

RearmamentIt has been said by some that the Maginot Line prevented the French army fromrearming. This statement seems quite hollow when looking at the amount of credits givento the military to modernize. The Maginot Line was completed in 1934 at a cost of 30million. During 1933-5 an average of 47% of military credits went unspent. In 1936, theWar Minister asked for a 4-year rearmament plan in light of the rise of Nazism inGermany. General Gamelin asked for 9 billion Francs. The minister raised it to 14 billion.In 1938, there was another 12 billion increase, and in 1939 a further 11 billion was added.Thus it cannot be denied that France's generals were given enough resources to expandcountry's military capability.

The BEF

To aid France, the British Government sent a force of 10 divisions called the BritishExpeditionary Force. This force was tiny in comparison to the great French and Germanarmies massed at the borders. The size of this force was to cause much bitterness inFrenchmen when viewing the British contribution. The armored elements present couldhardly be called an armored division. Due to the tiny size of this force, it was placed


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Also, as the French High Command had ruled out the possibility of any enemy movementthrough the Ardennes forest in Belgium, the weakest units were placed ahead of this vitalsector. Gamelin having visited the region many times, declared it impossible for tanks toscale the narrow winding forest roads of the region. Ironically this would be the focus ofthe German thrusts. Which would then slice through a 40-mile stretch of the Meuse, held

by the poorly equipped 9th Army under General Corap. France would be caughtcompletely off guard.

SichelschnittThe original German plan for the invasion was a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan. It calledfor the passage of German forces through Belgium and into France. However, Generalvon Manstein saw things differently. He was not prepared to let this war stagnate into abloody slugfest like WWI. Contemplating that the Allies would consider the Germans tobe using the 1914 plan, he drafted an ingenious offensive plan. Army Group B (North)under General von Bock was to make a frontal assault into Belgium with its 29 divisions;of these 3 were panzer divisions of which 2 would later be handed over to the southern

sector. While these were almost diversionary, the main thrust would come through ArmyGroup A (South), commanded by General von Rundstedt, whose armored columns wouldbe proceeding through the Ardennes forest. It would strike a passage across the Meuseapproximately 45 miles wide. The key focus would be at Sedan, and as the German hadbroken French codes, they knew that it was the weak link in the French army. The forcewould consist of 43 divisions. Of these, 7 were panzer divisions and would beconcentrated to provide a huge armored cleaver. Once breakthrough was achieved, thecolumns would rush across the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium in a Sichelschnitt(sickle) like maneuver and cut them off.

10th May: Hell Unleashed

Meuse CrossingsOn the 10th of May, Hitler issued the orders for attack. The mobilized German armystarted offensive operations immediately. Within 36 hours Holland's condition hadbecome irreparable, and the columns of Army Group B were heading into Belgium. Inresponse to this, the Allies rushed their best Armies into Belgium as the Dyle-Breda Planrequired. Upon hearing this, Hitler was overjoyed; the trap had been sprung. In themeantime, Army Group South was making its was through the Ardennes forest in a longstretch of traffic jams. Roads were clogged for up to sixty miles in some places.

One wonders whether Gamelin was blind. Indeed, French pilots had been flying over the

area had made reports of huge massing of German armor. Yet these reports were notbelieved, and no action was taken. Had the French Air Force taken a serious air offensiveagainst the long immobilized columns of German vehicles, the results would have beenhorrific. Only by the 11th of May did the German movement start to make sense. Notbecoming uneasy and calculating that the Germans would not be there till the 14th andwould then have to wait for artillery, Gamelin ordered 11 divisions to the sector. Giventhe state of the French logistics, it would mean that the first of these would arrive on the


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14th and the last by the 21st. Unfortunately, Gamelin had miscalculated the time theGerman army would take to reach the Meuse.

By the 13th, the Panzer divisions were present at the Meuse, ready to cross without delay.Facing them was the grossly overstretched 9th French Army under Corap. Seven

divisions were holding 75 miles of front. Sedan was where the 9th met the 2nd Armyunder General Huntziger. The 55th and 71st Infantry divisions held this critical crossingpoint. It is hard to understand the High Command's confidence in these troops when mostof the units were composed of second-rate reservists. It were men like these who had ledto so many stories about the lack of discipline and fighting punch in the French army.Arrayed against them were the finest legions Germany could field.

The first crossings took place in the Dinat sector where the 7th Panzer division crossedunder the energetic General Rommel. In a display of extraordinary leadership abilities,Rommel personally led assaults across the river and defense against French armour onthe other side. These were followed by a breakthrough at Sedan by General Heinz

Guderian's panzerkorps. Both of these crossings were accomplished after fierce fightingand heavy bombardment by the Luftwaffe. By the nightfall on the 13th, Germanbridgeheads had been established. At this point in time the German condition wasextremely fragile, a counter attack by even a small armored force would have routed bothbridgeheads.

The battle at Sedan has been called the battle through which France lost the war. AtSedan, 3 Panzer divisions along with some motorized infantry divisions had to fightthrough an array of French pillboxes and fortifications to secure a toehold of the westernbank. Had the muscle of the Luftwaffe not been behind them, one doubts if the attackwould have succeeded. French infantry was tied down by the aerial bombardment and

attacked by daring assaults of German troops in rubber boats. Considering that they wereup against the best troops the Heer could muster, initially the reservists of the 55thInfantry division did not perform too badly. Yet some artillery commanders in the rearareas panicked thinking that they were being attacked by tanks. This was impossible asGuderian's armor was still sitting on the eastern bank of the river. A general rout of rearechelon infantry and artillerymen followed. Men left everything behind and ran likecowards. And thus, once the artillery stopped firing, the front line troops also routed orsurrendered. While at least the 55th made contact with the enemy and held for a while,the 71st Infantry Division withdrew even before they were attacked. And so, Sedan fellinto German hands. Even so, the first tanks would not cross till the morning of the14th;meaning that any determined attack before that would wipe out the bridgehead.

It is here that we see the French commanders sticking to the old tactics of 'sealing off' theenemy. Counterattacks were planned of course, but the sluggishness and lack of punchshowed by French attacks at various levels is all too evident. Everywhere one seesevidence of planned counterattacks being delayed time after time and then, in some cases,cancelled altogether. The mild uncoordinated attack against Rommel's bridgehead is atestimony to this (it was chased away by German infantry firing flare pistols to confuseFrench tanks). Eventually a strong effort to check the German bridgeheads was never


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made. And by the time the French command was thinking of a serious effort to cut theadvance, German bridgeheads had not only become quite powerful, the panzers were onthe move again by the 14th.

Ineptitude at its Worst

The French armored assault scheduled at 4am during the morning of the 14th wasdelayed and rescheduled to 7am. This delay is characteristic of most Frenchcounterattacks during the campaign. It meant that the Germans were able to transport awhole brigade of tanks across. Thus the French attack ran into stiff resistance and waswiped out. Yet all hope for plugging the gap was not lost yet. One of France's threearmored divisions, the 3rd Armored had been ordered to the areas a few days ago. On the14th it stood just south of the German bridgehead.

The division's orders were to "Counterattack with full force". In the meantime Guderianmade the decision to wheel the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions westwards without waitingfor the 10th Panzer to secure his flank. Only the mauled Gross-Deutschland Infantry

regiment was present for flank protection. The attack was supposed to take place on the14th of May on Panzerkorp Guderian's exposed flank as it started to make its vulnerablewestward movement. For this attack, Huntziger had the entire fresh 3rd Armored division(with its formidable H-39 tanks) and the A class 3rd Motorized Infantry Division. Thereis no doubt that if the armored assault had taken place, it would have shattered the flanksof the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions rushing westwards.

Yet General Flavigny, commander of the 21st Corps of armor, postponed the attack forthe next day only 30 minutes before zero hour, and ordered the division to "Seal off thearea". This meant that the unit would be dispersed and all effect of concentration wouldbe lost. The next day, on the 15th of May, elements of the 10th Panzer had crossed and

were moving in to supplement the Gross-Deutschland infantry regiment. Huntzigerordered a rigorous counterattack. Even at this stage, it would have severely set theGerman plans back. Yet there were delays in putting the units back together and only afew elements participated in the battle for Stonne before the attack was cancelled. In theend Huntziger happily accepted Flavigny's excuses, dismissed the commander of the 3rdArmored division for being incompetent, and gleefully added the divisions to his 2ndArmy static defense line. It was these static defense 'lines' that the French generals ofWWI loved so much. Thus the one of the golden opportunities of changing the course ofthe war was lost.

Race for the Channel

After the breakout of all three Panzerkorps; Reinhardt, Hoth and Guderian, the Germansteel columns raced for the Channel in a mad dash starting from the 14th and 15th ofMay. They moved with such speed that the rest of the two armored divisions Francepossessed (1st and 2nd) were surprised and caught in transit. In ensuing action, they werehacked to shreds and scattered into tiny remnants by the advancing Panzers. The fact isthat French reconnaissance was so poor; Gamelin had no idea where the Germans wereheaded! The list of possibilities included everywhere from Paris, Abbeville to theMaginot Line. Advancing, using the Somme as a natural defense, by the 20th, Guderian


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had secured Abbeville. Thus, effectively cutting of the Allied armies in the north andcreating a 'bulge'.

There had been a number of attacks in order to prevent the Sichelschnitt trap from beingset. Colonel de Gaulle attacked the columns from the south twice near Montcomet with

some armored forces, but was pushed back on both instances. On The 18th of May, theseventy-three year old General Maxime Weygand replaced General Gamelin as the CinCof the French Army. This man was known for his severe distrust for politicians and theBritish. It took him two days to arrive in France, and then he took a further 2-3 days in'judging' the situation. This wasted valuable time during which the counter attack south ofSedan Gamelin had planned was shelved.

After passing his judgments, Weygand issued a nonsensical series of orders that required8 Allied divisions to cut a path through the German encirclement. However this attackwould never be possible as the BEF had lost quite a bit of its muscle in attacking Arras onthe 21st and the trapped French forces had also sustained losses during an attack on the

22nd. The fact that these elements were attacking instead of conserving forces forWeygand's plan shows the complete lack of coordination between Allied HQs. Two moreattacks were to take place from the south later, but both would

french army working

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