free-riding and intergroup moblitily jun kobayashi (chicago) hideki fujiyama (dokkyo) yuhsuke koyama...
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FREE-RIDING and
INTERGROUP MOBLITILY
Jun Kobayashi (Chicago)Hideki Fujiyama (Dokkyo)Yuhsuke Koyama (Tokyo Tech)Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo)
August 16, 2004ASA, San Francisco
OVERVIEW
Free-riding and Mobility?
Experiment w/ Exit Option
Macro Dynamics and Micro Behavior
3
Modern Societies... MOBILITY Turnover, Divorce, Moving, Immigration
Globalization, Internet
QUESTION
Effects of MOBILITY on FREE-RIDING???
4
RATIONAL to FREE-RIDEbut EFFICIENT to COOPERATE
(Externality)
Promise, DonationTeamwork, Social Movement
FREE-RIDER PROBLEM
ON the RUN (Erhart-Keser) Experiment, 9 in initial 3 groups Cooperators “ESCAPE”
(Group) CirculationCooperation↑ -> Size↑ -> C↓-> S↓
(Individual) Avoid Free-ridersCooperator↑ -> Leave S↑, Enter S↓
Various Conditions???
Introduction
Data
Result
7
2003/4, 4 universities in Japan 14 Sessions, 234 students 1289.0 yens ($11), 90 minutes Computer-based, Group data
NO Mobility LOW/ HIGH/ COMPLETE Mobility
16-7 in 4 Groups, Anonymous 50 Rounds， 9 Pauses/Exit chances
EXPERIMENT
8
9
GAMEA B C D
Pause/Exit
Free-rider Problem
10
Resource 20 yensPROVIDE or NOT
Pooled Resources...DOUBLED...3/more-player groupsx 1.5... 2-player GroupsSAME... 1-player Groups
EQUALLY Distributed in Group
1. FREE-RIDER PROBLEM
11
Provide = 40m / 4 (Providers) Not = 40(m-1) / 4 + 20
NotProvide
NotNot
x 2 =
EXAMPLE (4 PLAYERS)
12
NO Mobility... PAUSE
LOW Mobility... 50 yens to Exit
HIGH Mobility... 20 yens
Complete Mobility... 0 yen
2. PAUSE or EXIT
A 33.3
3
B 25.0
0
C 27.5
0
D 25.0
0
A 33.3
3
B 25.0
0
C 27.5
0
D 25.0
0
A
3
B 4
C 8
D
2
Groups’ Average PayoffsLast Round
Groups’ Average Payoffsin This Block
Groups’ Size
Group C Block 2 Round 2Your Decisions and Payoffs in This Block
Round Your Decision Your Payoff
1 NOT 35.00
2 PROVIDE 5.00
Your Total: 125 yens(20 yens subtracted for Moving)
Group C's Members: You (ID 6) and Other 7
What do you do this round?
PROVIDE 20 yens
NOT
Provided 20 yens: 3 persons
Not: 4 persons
Your Decision: Provide
Your Payoff: 17.14 yens
Groups’ Average PayoffsLast Block, Size
BLOCK END
Groups’ Average Payoffs
Group Round 1 2 3 4 5
A 33.33 20.0
0 15.5
5 24.7
635.00
B 25.00 35.0
0 19.1
0 35.0
035.00
C 27.50 27.5
0 22.0
0 27.5
020.00
D 25.00 35.0
0 25.0
0 25.0
018.88Your payoff Last Block: 112 yens in Group C
Click to Next
A 30.0
03
B 33.3
34
C 25.0
08
D 27.5
02
A 30.0
03
B 33.3
34
C 25.0
08
D 27.5
02
Groups’ Average PayoffsLast Block, Size
BLOCK END
Groups’ Average Payoffs
Group Round 1 2 3 4 5
A 33.33 20.0
0 15.5
5 24.7
635.00
B 25.00 35.0
0 19.1
0 35.0
035.00
C 27.50 27.5
0 22.0
0 27.5
020.00
D 25.00 35.0
0 25.0
0 25.0
018.88Your payoff Last Block: 112 yens in Group C
Which Group in Next Block? Move with 50 yens
Group A
B
C
D
Introduction
Data
Result
18
Cooperation DECREASES
RoundsCoo
pera
tion
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Mobility
y = GROUP SIZE
N=360 (Groups in Blocks)
Group Cooperation↑ -> Size↑
Model 1 2BLOCK (1-10) .001 .002PREVIOUS SIZE -.602***PREVIOUS C .163** .356***Adjusted R2 .021 .347
y = GROUP COOPERATION
Group Size↑ -> Cooperation↓
Model 1 2BLOCK -.059 -.061PREVIOUS C .232***PREVIOUS SIZE -.143*CURRENT SIZE -.377*** -.269***Adjusted R2 .164 .127
LEAVE and ENTERCorrelations with COOPERATION
N=505 (Individual Mobility)
Cooperators Leave LARGE Groups Enter SMALL Groups
(to Avoid Free-riders)
Group Size rPREVIOUS Size, Left .041PREVIOUS Size, Entered -.141**
22
Mobility DECREASES Cooperation
Cooperative Groups EXPAND, then DECREASE Cooperation Cooperators Enter SMALL Groups
Differences b/w CONDITIONS? Role of SANCTION?
SUMMARY