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General Sub je cts S ec tio nACADEMIC :JEFARr1ffiN'r'l'H:; il'lFilNl' RY SCHOOLFort Benning, Georgia

ADVANCED il'lFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE1948 - 1949

'l'HE OPERAl'IONS OF TRE 1s t BAl'l'AL10N 310th INFANTRY(78th INFANTRY DIVISION) INl'HE CROSS ING OF 'mELUDENDORFF BRIDGE Al' RE1UlGEN. G E m , ~ N Y ANDl'R3 ExPANSIONOF l ~ BRIDGEHEAD, 7 - 17 March 1945(R1UNELAND CAMPArGN)

(Personal Experience of a Plat oon Sergeant)

Type of operat ion deser ibed:I N F ~ H R Y BA:rl'ALION "EMPLOYED IN I'RE EXPLOIl'ArIONAND EXPANSION OF A BRIDGEHEAD

1s t Lieutenant E d ~ i n ~ Freakley. Infant ryADVANCED INFAN'l'RY OFFICERS CIASS NO 2


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. . . .ndex .. . . . . .Bibl10graphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12'fhe Bat ta l ion SHuat ion 1m; roduo t ion

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fhe Bat!; al10n Plan fo r the Cross in g of theBridge . . . . . ... 11'fhe Gro ssing of the 1udendorf f Bridge 13'fhe Expansion of the Bridgehead . 15Analys is and Crit ioism 1essons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 31Map A - Firs t Army - - Roer - RhineMap B - lhe BridgeheadMap C - fhe Bridgehead

8 - 10 March 194511 - 17 Maroh 1945

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A-1 First U. S. Army Report of Operations(23 February- 8 May 1945)(rrS Library)A-2 Ristory of he ?8th Infantry DiVOision1942 through 1945(personal Possession of Author)A-31'he Remagen Bridgehead ? - 1 ? Maroh 1945Researoh and Eva1uation Div1sion, The Armored Sohoo1(l'IS Library)A-4 Crusade in EuropeBy Dwight D. Eisenhower(Personal Possess ion of Author)A-5 Hist ory of he 31th Infantry Regiment(Personal Possession of Author)

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I'HE OPERArIONS OF TRE 1st BKrrALION, 3l0th INFAlHRY(78th I N F ~ ~ R Y DIVISION) INrHE CROSSING OFrHELUDENDORFF BRIDGE A:r F-E:ifAGEN, GE R'J!ANY AND TRE EXPA:NSIONOE THE BRIDGEHEAD, ? - 17 March 1945

(RHINELANIi CAMPAIGN)(Personal Expe rience of a Platoon Se'rgeant)

INrRODucrION

lh i s monograph is the st ory of the operat ions of the1st Batt alion, 3l0th Infant ry , 78th U. S. Infant ry Division,in the crossing and expansion of the Remagen bridgehead atRemagen, Germany, 7 - 17 March 1945.

In bat t le , the seizing, seeuring and exploit ing of keyte r ra in fea;ures is of paramount importance. In World War 11the surprise capture of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen,Germany, coupled with the tac t ica l ly sound decisions madewithout delay, re la t ive to s ecur ing the bridge and enlargingthe bridgehead, is an excellent example of a rapid exploita-t.ion of a fortune of war.

'ro clearly pre sent a graphic\lio rd pi cture and t o properlyfocus the reader 's at tent ion on th i s operation, a brief summing up of prior actions leading to the seizure of the Luden-do r f f Bridge i s neeessary.

By the middle of January 1945, the back of the Germancounter-offensive,l 'Ihich had been launched in December 1944 inthe Ardennes, had be en broken. The Russians, employing fourarmies, \liere engaged in a huge enveloping movement designedto converge en Germany from the north and south. Allied

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t roops, hold ing defensive posit ions along the lIIestern frontlIIere nOlll preparing to resume the offensive. (1) On lO February 1 ~ 4 5 the U. S. Firs t Army closed to the Roer River,defending that r iver 1ine and simu1taneous1y making p1ansfo r a 1arge scale r i ver cross ing and an at ack in t o heheart of Germany in the near future. Firs t Army lIIas nOlllpoised and ready to 8111ing into action, and that action \'lasto be the las t offensive of the U. S. Firs t Army in Europe.(See Map A) (2)

Dep10yed in he area of Schmidt, Germany, and along theRoer River inhis sector , lJias the U. S. 78th Division, aunit of I I I Corps, Firs t Arroy. Although th is division lIIascomparat ively new \ ;0 combat, i t had recent1y and successful ly completed a 1arge scale operation - - that of capturingthe long and hot1y contested Roer River tOllln of Schmidt andthe mighty SlIIammenauel dam onhat r iver . (See Map A) (3)

'These \'lO vi ta l and cr i t ica l features had been 'IIrestedfrom the enemy against fanat ic opposition and had cost thedivision many oasua1ties in men as \'Ie11 as equipment. Thisact ion, executed in bad lIIeather and over extremely ruggedte r ra in , coupled lIIith a determined enemy, had thoroughlycombat-indoctrinated the men of the "Lighning" Division. (4)

NOlll at th is time on 10 February, the division lIIas employed in defending the hard 1II0n ground, so reoent1y taken,orienting rep1acements arr iving daily , e ffec tin g re-supp1yof dep1eted equipment and genera1ly preparing to continue theat taok. (5)

(1) (2) A-l, p. 1 j (3) A-2, p. 121; (4) (5) Personal Kno1ll1edge - 4 -


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23 February found Ghe U. S. First Army launching a majoroffensive across the Roer River for Ghe purpose of advancingt o the Erft River lIIhile i t protected the flank of he U. S.Ninth Army \'lhich was to drive to Ghe lIIest bank of the Rhine.(See Map A) (6)

Opposing the U. S. Firs t Army on the east side of theRoer River was an estimated 13 German divisions, supportedby armor in considerable quant i t ies , as lIIell as assault gunsand ar t l1lery. 'rhe log is t ica l si tuat ion of the German troopsopposing the American Firs t Army at th is time was extremelycri t . ical . I'ransport '/las at abare minimum, in some instanoes,non-existent. Fuel and ammunition stockpiles had dlllindledto the point Vihere ar t i l lery bat ter ies had been l imited to10 rounds of ammunition per day and very l i t t le fuel wasavailable - o operate the feVl mllitary vehicles st ill oapableof rendering service.

Here '/las a si- uat ion decidedly in\;he favor of the American forces. However, -his advantage was offset , -o a certa in degree, by the '/Ieather, which '/las in favor of no one.Weather conditions Viere ac\;ually Viorse -han a- any oeher timeduringGhe 1IIar in -he European I 'heater. I t had nOlll beoomesuffioiently lIIarm to cause the snow and ice to melt rapidly.I 'his, coupled with heavy rains and the massed movement ofmen and vehicles, including armor, had rendered the roadsin the southern sector of\;he U. S. Firs t Army impassable.'rhis same condition existed for che enemy, too and was afactor to be considered. ('7)

'I'his '/las ;he situation as the U. S. Firs t Army lashed(6) A- 4 , p. 3 ; ('7 ) A.-l, p 6 .

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out on th i s offensive ~ h i c h V i a ~ t o carry i t to the banks ofthe Rhine. In most sectors along the army f ron t , the advance\'las so rapid "Gha i t soon developed into a race . Front l inesin some instances, Viere rear areas a few hours la tero ~ h enemy \'las ree l ing and on h is heels from "Ghe impac"G of thesudden, apparently unforeseen blo\'l "Ghat the Firs t Army Viasdel iver ing and i t \'las imperat ive tha t he be kept off balanceand given no quart er une i1 Che Fhine had be en reached. (SeeMap A) (8)

On ? March 1945, a"task foroe of the 9th Armored Division \'las given "Ghe mission ofse iz ing he small Rhine R1vertO\'ln of Remagen. I t Vias not real ized tha t an important bridge\'Iould be seized at t h i s time tha t \'Iould a l t e r the oourse ofthe \'lar in Europe and short en i t considerably. This poss i -

, b i l i ty had not been overlooked, h01iever. or unforesee)l. On6 March 1945, the 111 Corps Commander. Major General Mil l i -ken, had remarked tO Major General Leonard, Commanding Genera l of the 9th Armored Division. "'You see that black l ineon the map? I f you can seize tha t , your name \ 'Iill go dOVinin his"Gory', or Viords lOO that ef fec t . " ' rhis referred to theLudendorff Railroad bridge at Remagen. (See Map A) (9)

'.chis task force converged on Remagen. and there , spanning the Rhine and apparently in tae t , l Ias the br idge . Afortune of \'lar - - ,and 1l0W utmostspeed '/las neeessary toseize and secure the bridge and protect 1 t against completedes t rue t ion. Without delay a detachment of th is task forcewas sent fOr\'lard and against l igh t resis tance and a stunned(8) Personal KnO\'l'ledge; (9) A-3, p. l.

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and dazed enemy, .he bridge was secured and a defense establ ished. Engineers I'lere brought forward to check the bridge.horoughly for demolitions. Enough explosives were foundin .he under portion to have insured i t s destruc. ion i f detonated and these Viere speedily disposed of. rhe bridge i t -se l f Vias vir tual ly undamaged. One small charge had beendet onat ed but fai led Go do any mat er ia l damage. Becauseof the nature of the consl;ruct ion of th is rai l road bridge.i t Vias necessary to ut i l ize planking to provide a means fo rt rack and wheeled vehicles t o cross. (See Map A) (10)

As indicated by the types and the manner in which thecharges had been affixed to the bridge, .he Germana had takengreat precautions to insure the deatruction of i t at , the mostfavorab le opportun ity. Their e labo ra te plans had backfired,apparently because they delayed the destruction long enought o provide a means of escape for .he Germans who Viere s t i l lstreaming over .he bridge at the time of Hs capture. 'rheadvance of .he Americans had been so swift that the Germandefenders of the bridge had no inkling of the close proximityof American t roops to Remagen. 'ilhen i t became evideut thatthe Americans had arr ived, spearheaded by the 9th Armored Division, confusion reigned i u che ranks of l;he Germans andthey were unable to bloVi the i r bridges behiud them. (11)

rhis extraordinary piece of good luck was relayed atouce to General Omar Bradley, Twelfth Army Group Commander,Viho Vias asked to render a decision as to the number of troopato be committed acroas .he bridge. After conferriug ViithGeneral Eisenhower, i t was decided to put five divis ious(10) A-5, p. 2; (11) A-5, p. l .

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across as soon as possible anO. anything else chat was neeo.edto secure the bridgeheao.. (12)

'lEE BAI'.c ALION SIl'UA'rION

The 310th Infantry Regiment of .he ?8th Infantry D1-vis ion had been atCached to .he 9th Armored Division at thet i ~ e the Firs t Army had launched i . s offensive from the banksof che Roer River aod had renained w1th that division in thelig,hcning-like plunge across .he Cologne plain. 'l'he regiment, however, was spl i t anO. wio.ely separated, each bat tal -ion forming a part of a combat command in conjunction withelements of the 9th Armoreo. Division. On? N"L9.rch, the 2danO. 3d Batt alions of the 310th Infantry Regiment were on theAhr River, in the vicinity of BaO. Neuenahr, preparing todrive south on the west bank of the Rhine to meet the ThirdArmy as soon as the l s . Battal ion linked-up on the l e f t .ROViever, the 1st Battal ion was never to arrive at that point,and the proposed drive to the south to meet the 'rhird ArmyVias never to material ize. A bridge had been captured overhe Rhine River anO. he 1s t Batta1ion, 310th Regiment, Viasschedu1ed co cross and attack the east bank. (See Map A)(13)

'.che troops of the 1st Batta1ion were \o.ely separatedon ? !larch, each company having been formed a s a t a sk forceanO. operating :i.ndependently. HO'o'iever, upon rece ip tof theorder to assemb1e his ba.tal ion, .he bat-ca1ion cOlllIDander soonhad his companies in the vi l lage of Berkum preparing fo r a(12) A-4, p. 380; (13) A-5, p. 88.

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motor march to Remagen, sOrne two hours a ~ a y . At th i s t ime,the men of th e b atta lio n ~ e r e unaware tha t they would soonbe f ight ing on the east bank of the Rhine and Viere in te res tedin just two things: food and resto In the rapid advancefrom Ghe Roer R ~ v e r here had been l i t t l e time fo r e i ther .Food had been in the forro of "Kit ra t ions and 131eep had be-come a thing of the pasto Upon a r r iva l in Berkum, however,a hot meal Vias had and th is helped to boleter morale beforethe men moved out . (See lfLap A) (14)

0230 found the bat ta l ion detrucking in the outl;lkirts~ of Remagen, to learn tha a feVi hours hence they Viould be /croesing the Pbine, through th e co urte sy of the German Army.

' rhat b it of information lI'I2.S enwgh t e keep even an exhaustedinfantryman all'lake. (15)

An unusual s i tua t ion, ' unusual even fo r cembat, con-frented the off icers and men of the 1st Bat ta l ion as they contemplated the crossing o f t h e bridge and the at tack to f o l l o ~ .No t ime lI'Ias avai lable for such things as reconnaissance, for-mulation of a detai led plan of at tack or gathering intormat ion of the enemy. (16) I t Vias l a t e r learned, however, tha tGerman forces opposing the 1st Battal ion consisted of Hit le rJugend, plus Volkstrum uni t s . Elements o f t h e 9th and 11thPanzer Divisions Viere Being rushed to the bridgehead area \ toreinforce he inadequate forces already there . 'rhese fac tslI'Iere unknoVin before the crossing as lI'Iell as many other essen t ia l elements of information. (17)

As fo r he t e r ra in on the east bank of the Rhine, i trr.ay v;ell be said ,ha t H lI'Ias madeGo order fo r the enemy.(14) (15) (16) Personal Kno-wledge; (17) A-3, p. 42.

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St eep, 'Ilooded ol i f f s rose almost dire ot ly from the Viat e r ' sedge, overleoking t he east ern approaoh to the bridge , oreat ing an effeot ive soreen fo r the enemy a r t i l l e ry lIIhioh wasem?laeed behind it. Enemy observat ion on the bridge was exoel len t and would remain so un t i l tha t h i l l mass had beenseeured. A good road ne t , cOIrimencing a t the bridge, providedexoel lent avenues of approaoh to the numerous tOVIllS andvi l lages within the bridgehead area . Seven miles to the eastl a y a four- lane superhighway whioh, when oaptured, would denythe enemy a road on whioh Go move h is t roops rap id ly in th eba t t l e fo r 1;he bridgehead a t a t ime when he Vias hard pressedfo r manpower and tiI:'.e. (18)

rhe VieaCher was wet and oold whi le the r r ~ l t i n g snow andioe had been transformed in to seas of mudo Vehioles were re -s t r io ted to the r o ad s , t hu s adding 1;0 the oonges;ion and oonfusion oaused by t r a f f io jams in Remagen. Roads. s t ree t s anda l leys leading in to the t01l ' l l Viere ohoked Vi1th men, vehiolesand equipment prepar ing to oross the br idge . A well-t imedGerman a r t i l l e ry barrage at t h i s t ime would have ser ious lydelayed or even denied a orossing te the Amerioans.

'rhe 1st Bat ta l ion, although depleted in s tre ng th , su f-fer ing from l oss of sleep and the lo ss of many of it s keypersonnel, was in good sp i r i t s and ready to f igh t . How wellthey fought was to be demonstrated during the next 1;en dayswhich oulminated in the winning of a uni t oi t a t ion by the 1stI la t ta l ion . (19)

(18) (19) Personal Knowledge.

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rEE BAl'l'ALION PLAN FOR mE CROSSrnG OF .cHE RHlNE

Because of the s'l'iift events leading up to the 1st 13atta lio n a rriv al in Remagen, the plan for the erossing ",assimple. A brief , concise attack order 'l'ias issued. "Crossthe bridge, turn right and at tack." (20) 'l'he crossing "'asto be made in a column of companies as follo"'8: Company 13,Company C and Company A. Upon reaching&he fa r bank, the 2dPlatoon of Company 13 ",ould attack and secure the high groundoverlooking the bridge, Companies C and A ",ould drive tothe s outh and captu r e t he vil1age of Ockenfe1s and Kasbach.Company 13 ",ould then follo"" 1eaving behind a platoon totemporari1y protect the eastern approach to the bridge. (SeeMap 13)

A platoon of tanks, attached to the battal ion, wou1d bedistr ibuted t hroughout "he column un t i l the fa r bank wasreached. They would "hen, ini t ia11y, cover the roads andprotect the battal ion against enemy armor. Machine guns ofCompany D were to be att&ched t o t he 1eading companies, 13akerand Charlie, while "he 81IDID mortars ",ould follo", Company Aacross the span.

The 13attalion Command Group ",as to follow direct ly behind Company A, at a diatance of 200 yarda, preceding themortars of Company D. The 13attalion rear command post wouldremain in Remagen, ini"ia1ly. (21)

Arti11ery in the forro of one 4.5-inch gun batta1ion,one 155mm gun batta1ion and one 8-inch HOVl"zer battal ion,were in posi t ion and prepared to de1iver heavy in terdict ion(20) A-5, p. 89; (21) Personal Know1edge.

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t i r e s around the bridgehead. (22) H o ~ e v e r , there ~ a noa r t i 11ery in d i reo t suppor t of ;he 1st Batta1ion and i t ~ a l lhoped t ha t pos i t ions would be readi ly av ailab le fo r the Blmmmortars so they Vlould be able to supportGhe at taok, i f neoessary.

'llhe l ine ot departure Vlas designaGed as the Viestern approaoh to the bridge; H-Rour, 0430, 8 Maroh 1 ~ 4 5 . (23)

The men VIere briefed as to the k n o ~ n oonditions exis t -ing on the bridge and also on those ClonditionsGhat mightpossib1y exis t - - before the orossing Vlas oompleted. I t~ a expeoted tha t gaps might be present in the f looring otthe bridge, guard r a i l s broken or missing, debris and ~ r e o k age on the span, that ~ o u l d impede progress, and the poss i b i l i ty existed t ha t the bridge might be des tr oyed befor e thebat ta1ion reaohed Ghe eas"t bank. l'he neoess i ty for speedin moving aoross Vias s t ressed, l e s t "he bat ta l ion plus vehiClles beoome so jammed on;he bridge that enemy ar t i l l e ryf i re Vlould destroy the ent i re oolumn. I t ~ o u l d be impossibleto move noise1ess1y beoause o f t h e armor tha t ~ o u l d be movingvlithGhe bat ta1ion. '.che nen best move Vias "(;0 oross Viitha l l possib1e haste .

Wire was t o be la id from the bat ta1ion rear commandpost in Remagen to the fa r side of the b r i dg e . r h e ~ i r e1aying party ~ a to aCClompany th e b atta 1io n oommand group.Radio and messenger Viou1d be the on1y other types of communioat ion used.

LOClation for th e b atta 1io n ammunition supply point was(22) A-5, p. 8; (23) Personal KnoVl1edge.

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to be in Remagen, ~ h i c h was the only reasonable place for i t .I t might prove a problem l a t e r to get vehicles back acrossthe Ludendorff bridge for re-supply, 01' the bridge might evenbe deEtroyed leaving the bat tal ion with no means of re-supply, but th is 'IIas a necessary r isk to take. l'he battal ionaid sta"tion Viould i nHia l ly be si tuated in Reroagen, but Vloulddisplace across the bridge as soon as the assau1t companieshad cleared th e far side.

I t Vlas fe l t that[;he supply problem would be cri t ica1for ~ h f i r s t 24 hours a f te r the erossing, at l eas t , and themen were eautioned to expend the i r ammunition wise1y andwell. and to oonserve as mueh of i t as possible. (24)

Weapons were ehecked. ammunition issued, extra "Kit ra-t io ns d is tr ibu te d and l as t minute instructions given. '1'he1st Batta1ion, 310th Infantry. was now ready to begin thehazardous crossing.

m E CROSSJNG OF 1':1:8 LUDENDCRFF BRIDGE

1'he route ~ h ba;talion fol10wed, in the direetion ofthe bridge, seemed to cr iss-cross through the town of Remagen but in rea1ity, i t proved to be a direot route [ ;0 thebridge. The cobblestone st reets , besides crea"ing muohnoise as "he roen moved over ;hem, caused many a soldier tostumble as he made his way. A b o u ~ a 20-minute hike ensuedbetween che bat tal ion assembly area and the 1ine of departure , but "; o the b a ~ t a l i o n it seemed mueh longer. Itwas stop and sta1't, walk a few feet and hal t . Thie wae

(24) Personal Knowledge.- 13 -


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aaused by the tremendous numbers of men, armor and t ruaks,a l l being rushed to Remagen at the same t ime.

In a aolumn of aompanies, one aolumn on ei ther side ofthe road, the batta.lion marahed through the dark, aongestedtown, pausing now and then temporarily beaause of t ra f f iajams at various co rners and crossings. 'fhe tenseness of themen aou ld almost be fe l t and seemed tO grow as hey approaahedthe bridge. The march disaipl ine was exaellen and i t tookvery l i t t l e effort on the part of the off icers and non-commissioned off icers o keepGhe men quiet and moving in ther ight direat ion.

Company B moved aaross he l ine of departure at 0430 andstarGed moving up to the span and began.o a ro ss ..i ?he tankshad arrived at che l ine of departure by a different routeand VIere guided in to .he column at various in tervals .Tl ' le lvehundred feet of st eel now s t ood bet'lleen the 1st Battalionand the east bank of the Fbine. The aolumns moved aautiouslyone to the l e f t flank and one to the r ight flank of thebridge. (25)

In i t i a l progress Vlas good but slowed down by poor vis i -bi l i ty , aaused by the 10'11 hanging, early morning fog. Also,numerous pi t fa l l s existed, in the nature of holes in thebridge f loor and broken guard ra i l s . Several men had the misfortune to stumble ino these holes in the darkness and inth i s mannerGhe ba ta lion sus ta ined i t s f i r s t aasuaHies inchis operat ion.

Soon, however, enemy ar t i l l e ry f i re besan to fa l l , and'IIhile no casual t ies ",ere sustained by the bat tal ion, aonsid-(25) Personal Kno'llledge.

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erable fear and confu sion we re creat ed among he meno CoupledViithhe d eb ris an d he tanks moving in and out through thecolumns, the bata l ion was soon brouo:ht to an unscheduledha l t . In consequence 01' the fast ac"tion, in1t ia t ive and exce lent learership exerted by the off icers and non-commissionedoff icers , cont ro l was rapidly re-es tabl ished and the columnsmoved again. 1'he t anks 'llere noVl ins t ruc ted te keep t he i r aesigned posi t ione in he center 01' che span while che footco lunms were le d as fa r t eChe l e f t and t o the r ight as poss iblein order t o maintain freedcm 01' movement. Close observat icnwas now exercised by the men in ' llatching 1'01' holes in thebr idge . l ll iny ' llere found and usual ly by-passed but in sorne cases1t was necessary to bridge these gaps wiGh planking. (26)

fhe roen were no'll beccming fat igued. Machine guns, heavyand l ight 60mm moxtars and ammunition 'llere being hand-oar-r ied . Suddenly a "s i len t cheer" was ra ised, 1Iieapons beoamel ight as fea thers - - wo rd lIms pass ed eo the real ' chat Com-pany B had reached the east bank 01' the Rhine 1

f?:? ;':xPANSION 0F 'RE BEIDGDFEAD

Upon reaching ;he east bank, t h e2d I 'latoon 01' CompanyB, 'llhieh had spearheaded the eross ing, deployed and began;heir at taek up the steep sides o f t h e h i l l mass overlook-ing ene bridge. As soon as they began tO elimb, they wereh it by small arms and automatie 1Iieapons f i re from dug-in pos i t io ns o nth e tep vf the hi l lo .che 2d Platoon eontinued i t sadvanee, h01liever, while che 1st Platoon which had now eleared(26) Personal Knowledge.

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the bridge, attaekedt;he enemy posit ion from the le f t flank.Soon 13.11 resistance had eeased and th i s c r i t i ca l terrain fea-ture was no longer a threat to the seeuri ty of the bridge. (27)

rhe 3d Platoon of Company B had also crossed the bridgeby th is time and was dispersed along the road some 200 to300 yards to the north when i t was alerted by the sound oftroops approaching from the north. Feeling sure that thesetroops Vie,re enemy, the men of the 3d Plat oon immed ia t ely surrounded th is group and found that they had to the i r creditan enemy demo1it ions SQuad with enough explosiv e t o suceessful ly destroy the bridge. ' rhis incident oeeurred before thelas t elements. of the 1st Battalion had eleared the bridge. (28)

Company C eleared the span, turned r ight and proceep.edtOl"lard Oekenfels Viithout ineident at .h i s time, elearingKasbaeh I"Ihich \'las undefended. (See Map B)

Company A eompleted "he croEsing, turned south and hadproceeded about 200 yards dOl"ln .he road I"Ihen the entire eom-pany \'las pinned down by enemy smal1 arms f i re , grenades andp a n z e r f a ~ s t f i re , "he equivalent of our rocket 1aunchers.This elose range f i re Vlas eoming from the l e f t flank froma distanee of 75-100 yards. A rai lroad embankment on thel e f t and at a higher e1evation than the road, along whichVIere six or seven boxears, seemed to be the source of .hef i r e . Company e had passed t;hi s " ,aya short t i l ' .e before buthad apparently by-passed Chis group of enemy int ;he darkness. NOVl, with the eoming of d ay ligh t, th e enemy was re-s is t ing. (29)

'rhe eompany eommander, ea1lingt;he l"Ieapons platoon(27) Personal Know1edge; (28) A-2, p. 162;(29) personalKnol"lledge.

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sergeant forward, direeted him co plaee 60mm mortar f i re inand around these boxears, se t t ing up the mor"CarS in Che bestposi t iona ava lable . rhe eompany, in the meam ime, was d i-reet ing small arma f i re along th i s embankment, with l i t t l ee1'1'e et rhe be st posit ions avaHable 1'or "che mortars provedto be just of1'Ghe road and they were soon se t up and f i r ingin bat tery . AfGera barrage of some 15 mortar rounds hadbeen placed in and around Ghe open doors of the boxears,German sold iers l i t e ra l ly streamed out and in a maCter 01'a 1'ew minutes, Company A had well over a hundred prisoners .(30)

lc was now about 0630, 8 March 1945, and day1ight. AlighG ra in was fa l l ing and the men of che bactal ion wereeold, wet, t i r ed and hungry. In spHe of (;hese eondi t ions ,l;he men wel'e exuberanl; and in h1gh ap i r i t s . Morale "'lashigh as they eont emplat ed the event s of the past t ViO hours .'L'hey were on the eaSC bank of che Rhine, had made a sa1'ee ro ss ing , s us ta in ing very feVl easual t ies in the proeess andwere now pushing toward Ockenfels where a short res t mightbe possible . L1 t t l e d id they knowGhat th i s was just thebeginning and tha t on1ythe sur1'ace of th i s bridgehead op-era t ion had been scratehed.

Company e at th i s t ime was nearing oekenfels , when t heeolumn was suddenly halced by a s ignal from the lead platoon.'rhe vwrd was passed t o t he rear chat a vehicle was movingnorth out of Oekenfels in the diree t ion of the Company Ccolumn. 'rhe men were moved of1' t he road and st ood by whilethe lead p la toon eap tu red an Ameriean jeep and four German(30) Personal Knowledge.

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off icers . ~ h e y ~ e r e soon en t he i r ~ a to the prisener efwar cage.

~ h company now entered Ockenfe1s against very 1ight,scate ered re sistance. Company A, meanwhile, moved int o ~ h undetended town of Kasbach, and prepared to defend i t . Com-pany B, in conjunction with Company C, was deployed in andaround Ockenfels.

Now, some time ear l ie r , a 12-man patro l from Company A,plus two canks, had moved out from the bridge ahead of A Com-pany, wHh;he mis sion of determining the enemy strengthand for t i f icat ions on the road and in the vil lage of Ockenfe ls . I t is not known whether they by-passedche COVIll inthe darkness or fai led to recognize i t from the direct ionsgiven; but at any ra te , the patrol did not go to Ockenfelsbut proceeded to Linz, a considerably larger town and abouta mUeco che south of Ockenfels. (See Map B) I t appearedat f i r s t thaC the town had capitulated, judging from the bedsheets , white f lags, and handkerchiefs flut tering from thew i n d o ~ s of che houses. 'fhrough the int errogat ion et civ i l -ians , hOlllever, i t wa1l det ermined t hat SS and Panzer unit swere in the area. fhe patrol , upon reporting th is informat ion co battal ion headquarters, was told to hold where theywere and a detachment of Company C men was dispatched coLinz at once to re inforce the 12 men from Company A. No organized resistance ~ a encountered in Linz, but in spHe otthe Vlhite flags t lying, considerable sniping by German soldiers was in progress. (31)(31) A-2, p. 165.

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The batta1ion commander now hastened to revise his p1ansin view o ~ h unexpected and unoreseen capture ot Linz.Company A was ordered to proceed to Linz at once where i t sp1atoons were wide1y deployed in order to detend the wholeo the town. 'l'he men oceupied positions in the southernportion ot the town, detending to the south and to the east .

Company C remained in the village ot Ockene ls , preparedt o detend i t against counj;er-attack. Company B was moved inand around Kasbaeh and dug in tor the n1ght. l'hus, at day'send, 8 Mareh 1945, the 1st Battal10n was wide1y' scatteredand uncoordinated. (See Map B) (32) An uneasy night lIasspent by the men ot the 1st B a ~ t a l i o n . Reports trom captured enemy sold1ers stated that the enemy was concentrat1ngintantry and armor south and east o Linz with lIhich to annihi1ate ~ h sma1l br1dgehead torce. (33)

In spit e ot t he taet ~ h a t the men ot t he 1 st Battalionhad had less than 14 hours sleep in eight days and nights,i was necessary tor the entire batta1ion to remain on thealer t a l l through the n1ght of 8 March due to the 1mm1nent~ h r e a t of a large sca1e counter-attack trom the enemy.

During the n1ght. however, 1t ..as poss1ble to send theeompany vehieles back to Remagen or a re-supp1y o ammun1-t10n as well as a hot meal, which were bad1y needed.

The night passed and the expeet ed c o u n t e r - a t ~ a c k failel.to materia11ze. 9 Mardh was spent in the improv1ng ot posit10ns, cleaning ot weapons and equ1pment. and the men wereable to spend a l i t t l e t1me in resting.

Th1s brief holiday ended la t e in the aft ernoon ot 9 March(32) Personal Knowledgej (33) A-5, p. 95.

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when t;he ba1talion was orderedt;o prepare to at taek "Ghe townof Dattenberg, about one and one-half miles 10 the south ofLinz. (See Map B ) r h i s att;aek was to jump off about dayl igh t , 10 Mareh 1945, wHh "he missi on of elearing "Ghe t oV/nof SS and Panzer units Ghought too be in that area as well asto furCher enlargeche bridgehead. (34)

The plan was th is : Company A and Company B (Company Aon 1he r ight) would launeh a eoordinated attaek from thesou"Ghern edge of Linz, while Company C 'l'iould eonverge on chetown from "Ghe eas t . Tanks would support Company C. Line ofdeparture for Companies A and B was the south edge of Linz,Company C from posi"Gions east and south of Linz. H-Hour was0600. (35)

rhe bat tal ion erossed the l ine of departure, as seheduled. In Companies A and B zone, "Ghe advanee 'l'ias good, in i1 ia l ly . In Company C zone, however, i t was a differents t ory. rhe east ern approache c' 1o che, t own were well defendedand a1 Che onset che lead tank struck an an"Gi-tank mine, disabling i t and preventing the resto of Ghe tanks to follow.Company C eont; inuedG he at t ack, however, but 1Jias sufferingheavily from Panzerfaust. maehine gun and r i f le f i re from thehigh ground to Che l e f t of Che road as they moved.

Company B. af t e r advaneingt;o the northeast of the town'/las effect i vely pinned down under inC ense f i re from 20mm guns.mortar and arGil lery.

Company A cont;inued co advanee in Che face 01' very l ightand s ca tt er ed res is tanee and af"Ger a delay of some li"Gtlet; ime, on Che out skirt. s of t own. while art i l lery f i re was c a l l e ~(34) (35) Personal KnoV/ledge.

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fo r and rece i ved, Company A aSlSault ed the 1; O1Nn in coordin. .at ion with Company C and by 1600 hours Datenberg \Vas secured.(See Kap E) (36)

I t 1Nas n01N necessary GO send one r i f l e platoon and thel ight machine gun sect ion froro Coropany A plus a platoon oftanks to re l ieve Coropany B 1Nhich 1Nas s t i l l undergoing t e r -r i f i c punishment on Ghe north e rn edge of t O1Nn. Aft er a hotf i re f ight in 1Nhich eight enemy 20rom guns 1Nere knocked out,Che Germans ' /lithdrew. The score: 12 enemy dead, 14 cap-tured . Company B, h01Never, also had sustained heavy cas-ua l t i e s . (37)

At 1900 hours, the 27th Armored Infantry Bat ta l ion rel ieved the 1st 3atca l ion, 310th Infant ry , and set up defens-ive posi t ions , south and east of Datt enberg, while the 1stBat ta l ion dug in and prepared co defend co the north and

rhe night of 10 l!Larch 1Nas a wakeful one forChe 1st Bat-t a l ion . A constant a le r t '/las maintained, fo r enemy mortarand ar t i l l e ry f i re which rained on the posi t ions most ofthe nighc as wel1 as enemy armor could be heard to .h e southand '11 es t of Datt enberg.

11 Larch davmed ' ,lichout event. A counter-a t tack hadagain ' fa i led O mater ia l ize . The bat ta l icn spent che day inimproving posi t ions and caking advantage cf what l i t t l e timewas avai lable to s leep. A11 too soon the bat ta l ion wouldagain be on he move.

Gn Che morning of 12 l1arch,Ghe bat ta1ion was orderedto move, arrd by 1200 hours 1Nas moving on foot tO'llard Linz.(36) A-5, p. 95; (37) Personal Znowledge.

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Upon arr iv al . in Ghe tOVln, Ghe baGtalion learned tha" i" hadbeen l 'el ieved and V'las co remain in l inz fo r an undeterminedperiodo It V'las unbelieveable tha" a f te r 15 hard days andnights in Vlh icheher-e had been l i t t l e res t and very l i t lefood,ehaG "he l1:t Bat ta l ion had been pulled out of "he l ineo'he men Viere ass ignedco b i l l e t s and Viere prepared 1;0 relaxVihenl;he bloV/ f e l l . l'he order arr ived a ler t ing Ghe ba t t a l -ionGo be ready to move at a momentts not ice . (38)

In the northern sec tor of the bridgehead, in the v i-cin i ty of Ronnef , che 311th Infant ry Regiment of the 78thDivision Vlas f ight ing against rapidly s t i f fen ing res is tanceand che 1s t Ba"ta l ion Vias to be at tached to tha t regimentto re inforce i t in the ba t t l e fo r Ronnef. (See I:p e) (39)

Beginning a t 1600, 12 March , I ;he bat t al ion moved out ofLinz on foot in a cold dr izz ly ra in and by 1900 hours hadreached i t s assigned area near Ronnef, and the men dug in andprepared to defend the area alongl ;he r iv e r in the zone oft he 311th Infant ry .

'rhe morning of 13 March, the 311th Infantry launched ana t tackGoGhe nor th , designed GO c lea r and se cure the highground norl;heast of Ronnef and to capture the t011ln of Rhohdorf . In i t i a l ly , che 1st Batcal ion, 310th Infantry , \l'jas inreserve, bul ; th i s pleasant s tua t ion V'las nol;l;o l a s t long.By mid-afternoon, che ba t t a l ion had been committed with themission of se cu rin g th e l e f t f lank of "he 311th Infant ryRegiment. l'he t erra in over Vlhi ch the ba t t a l i on V'las t o a t t ack,while beau t i fu l "o behold, VlLS an infantryman's nightmare.

(38) A-2, p. 187; (39) Personal Knowledge.

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High wocded hi l l s , barefaced knolls , d e e ~ draws and ravineslaced ~ i t h intermit tent streams, const i tuted the zone al lot tedto the 1st Batta l ion.

l'he attack jumped off , wHh the three companies againin l ine , ana found i t extremely dif f icu l t tO keep contact ,due o the nature of che t errain. I t 1I'Ias a struggle fo r manyof the roen to keep up as the cre1l'l-served weapons and ammunit ion 111 ere be ing hand-carried. ieapons carr iers ' 1 ~ e r e unableto foll01l'l due to Ghe nature of the t e r ra in and lack of roadsin chis sect oro

In A Company zone of advance , (he a1;tack 1I'Ias sl01l'led almostto a s tands t i l l as che enemy suddenly brought murderous smallarms f i re to bear on them. In a sparsely 1I'Iooded area and ona gently r is ing slope, the Germans had prepared cleverly concealed posi t ions and 1I'Iere using them to gOOd advantage.

A Company C o r r ~ a n d e r , at once placed the four r i f le platoons on l ine , plus the c ~ c h i n e gun section, and ut i l iz ingmarching f i re soon cleared out the pockets of resistance int his area.

Company A 1I'Ias actually a reinforced r i f le company, having rec eived on 12 March a "Sunday Punch" in the form of afourth r i f le platoon. fhis platoon 1I'Ias composed of a l l volunteer Negro soldiers whO, a fe1l'l 1I'Ieeks previously, had takena condensed form of infantry training in France and 1I'Iere sentat once to the 1st Battal ion, 3l0th I n f a n t r y . r h i s platoonsoon proved to be an excellent f ighting force and a 1I'Ielcomeaddition to a sorely depleted r i f l e company. (40)(40) Personal Kn01l'l1edge.

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At nigh t fa l l of 13 March, harassed by Nebelwerfer's andmaking EloVi progress in the Vioods, the bat;"alion was orderedto dig in fo r the night . A busy night was spent in f ight ingoff German tanks whieh were not , however, at taeking "he 1stBat ta l ion posi t ions but were t ry ing to fight the1r Vlay backto the German 11nes, having been eut off dur1ng t;he advaneesmade tha t day by the 311th Infantry and the lEt BaGtal1on,

A platoon of tanks waEt;o re1nforcet ;he 1st Batta l ionthe night of the 13th, and an off ieer from Company A was tobe post ed on a road adjaeent t o the pos it i ons seleot ed fo rthe tanks to oeeupy. Hear1ng a tank approaoh1ng, th is of f i -oer ran out into the road to direet 1t into the pre-arrangedposi t ions , but i t was soon apparent tha t the tank lIIas enemy,

judg1ng from "he amount of ammunition "hat was expeded in aneffor t to l iqu1date the off loer , who w a no longer there .'llhis tank was speedily eaptured and the crew taken prisoner .No oasual t ies Viere sustained by the 1st Bat ta l ion ._ ~ Mov1ng out early On the morn1ng of 14 Maroh, the bat ta l ion was ordered to conc1nue i t s drive northward along ther iver . Slo1N and pa1nful ga1ns were made aga1nst a stronglyres is t ing enemy using tanks, mach1ne guns and mortars. Them1ssion was enlarged to include "he capture of Neider-Dollen-dorf in conjunction with elements of che 311th Infantry Reg1ment. 'fhe ma1n efforc was nade by che 31l th Infantry and the1st Battal10n helped t;o mop up the cown and c lea r the housesof snipers and enemy sold1ers who were ready to surrender .(See Map Cl

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'Ehe 1st Bat ta l ion s i tua t ion a t th i s t ime Vlas o rH ica l .Depleted in manpoVler, 10111 in sp i r i t s , physical1y exhaustedand Vlith mora1e at a 10111 ebb, the men were in dire need ofre1ief i f they ~ e r e Co remain an effeot ive f ight ing foroe .Rif le oompanies ave raged about 50 men and off ioers Vlith heexoeption of Company A, which was supplemented by the oneplatoon of Negro soldiers . (41)

Instead of oontinuing che attack from Neider-Do11endorf , the 1 st B atta lio n \'las given the miss ionof defendingi t throughout the remainder of 14 March and throughout the15th .

Ehis Vias no res t oamp, h01llever. Ehese Viere the frontl i nes and whi1e Chere was no immediate threa t of a counterat taok, i t was fa r froID being an imposs ibi l i ty . : rhroughout15 Maroh, the bat ta l ion consolidated 1GS posi t ions and there!!as an opportunity fo r the men to s leep. shave and eat foodonoe more.

Throughout t h i s period, posi t ions of t roops and weaponsViere improved. In some oases, second s tory windows of houseson the outski r ts of tOVln VIere u t i l i z eda s machine ,sun posit i ons , boCh heavy and 1igh t . I 'here VIere unlimited f ie lds off i re covering broad expanses of o:pen ground leading up Co thetO'I'Vn. MOrtar observation posts fo r both the 60s and 81swere also 100ated. most1y in upper s to r ies of houses - - themortars being dug in ViHhin the l imi ts of Che t o ~ n . Communioat ions beoame quHe elaborate , extensive use being made bycompanies of Che numerous sound-pOViered phones avai lable .Command posta Viere taking on an a i r of grandeur ana i t ap-(41) Personal Ilowledge.

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peared thao ohe 1st Bat ta l ion ~ a ae t t l ing d o ~ n fo r a longatay. ITowever, th i s was not to be fo r less ohan 36 hoursa f t e r Neider-Dollendorf had been taken , the 1st Bat ta l ionlIias again on the move. In oonjunct ion with Company G of~ h 3l0th Infantry and the 31lth Infantry Eegiment, ohe 1stBat ta l ion lIias to drive 00 the much coveted Autobahn, a German superhighlliay, and one of the key obj ect ives of thebridgehead ope ra t i on . r he capture of the superhighwaywould expand the bridgehead to a depoh of about seven miles.rh is would ternlinaoe the expansion phase of the operationand gi v e ~ h e American for'ces a ooe-hold from VYhich t o launcha breakout from the bridgehead. (See IfLap e) (42)

So on 16 l ~ r c h , at daylight , the bat ta l ion set out fromNeider-Dollendorf and again crossed what seemed to be anunending suooession of l ines of depar ture . With three oompanies abreast , "the bat ta l ion moved int o te r ra in s imi la r totha t operated over fo r the many p rev iou s day s. In i t i a l1y ,resistance was 11gbt and the bat i tal ion proceeded without in -cident un t i l it arr1ved in an area jus t north of the oO'l'mof I t tenbach. ITere i t was hit hard by a wel1 dug-in enemy,reinforced by tanks. Small a r n ~ , automatic weapons, mortal'and 88mm gun f i r e from the German tanks d ea lt d ev as ta tin gblows t o al1 companies of tihe batoal ion. :h ile not pinnec:1down, the bat ta l ion was held" up and t he bat ta l ion commanderr eque sted t ank support. (43)

Tanks were received and the at tack continued. Heavyoasualt ies were sustained by the bat ta l ion and in Company Aseotor b i t t e r hand-to-hand f igjning wHh tihe enemy follolled.(42) Personal KnoViledge; (43) A-3, p . 19.

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fhe bat ta l ion was f ighting SS ~ r o o p s deployed in th is areawho were figh"ing desperately and fanat ical ly , but f ight ingfu t i l e ly , to keep the 1 st B atta lio n from gaining "he Autobahn.

By la te afternoon the 1st Bat ta l ion had seized theAutobahn in t h e i r s ec t o r and were f ight ing against deter mined res is tance too hold the ground (;ained. (See M ~ C)Enemy tank f ire was received along the ba"ta l ion front asthe men attempted to dig in . 'l.'he ta nks atta ched to the1s t Batta1ion Viere brought up and using di rec t f i re againstthe enemy armor, s oon drove the m off . Art i l l e ry f i re no"began to reg is te r onGhe neVily acquired posHions and "hecompantes, besides consol idat ing and preparing defensiveposi t ions , Viere engaged in re -dis t r ibut10n of ammun1tion.which lIIas at a 10\'1 ebb. 'he expected enemy counter-a t taokwas received ju st a f t e r dark, hi t t ing Conlpany A l e f t f1ank.fh is was successfully repulsed. however. by the fourth r i f l eplatoon, \'Ihich was in support . Else1llhere along the bat-ta l ion f ront there was no ac t iv i ty other than the t e r r i f1car t i l l e ry barrages which continued to regis te r on the batta110n posi t ions throughout the n1ght. (44)

rhe Autobahn in "h is sector was l i t e r a l l y covered withdisabled and burned enemy vehicles from enemy supply columns.This was an excel lent example of the effec ts of our a i r force1n dim1nishing the enemy abi l i ty to re-supply h is t roops andin rendering the highway impassable fo r "he rap1d movementof reserves .(44) Personal Knowledge.

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Very ear1y on the morning of 17 March i t ~ a w i ~ h awonderfu1 feel ing of r e l i e t tha t the men of the 1st Batt a l ion stood up in t he i r toxho1es and cheered as elementsof the 9th Infantry Division attacked through the 1ine heldby the 1 st B atta lio n, and north acro ss the Autobahn. (45)

Short ly t h e r e a t t e r , ~ h e 1 st B atta lio n 11Ias detached fromthe 3l l th and "came home", s o o speak, when i t revert ed . ocont rol ot the 310th Infantry Regiment a f te r a period ot17 days of operating as a s epar at e bat ta110n . It is in te r esting to note , tha t on th i s same day, at 1500 hours, theLudendorff Bridge, a f t e r standing up to the pounding i t hadreoeived to r so long, f ina l ly "gave up the ghost" and 1ikethe "11I0nderful one hoss shay" , oo11apsed and s1id into theRhine, carrying . th 1t a number of engineers 11Iho 11Iere re pair ing Ghe bridge at that t ime. (46)

ANALYSIS k ~ CRITIGISMIn making an analysis of th i s operat ion, 1 is import

a n t ~ o remember tha t as fa r as the 1st Bat ta l icn , 310th Infant ry , is oonoerned, i t was an unexpec ted move and vir tua l lyno pr ior plan nin g o r reoonnaissance 11Ias possible . Further ,th i s 11Ias the a.ction of a separate bat ta l ion , i n i t i a l ly , re infcroed by a pla t oon of Ca.nks.

The suooess of the R ~ m a g e n bridgehead operat ion dependedon the rapid movement o f troops into the bridgehead area andthe expansion of i t as expedit iously as poss ib le . As a re su1t , on a. scant 12-hours not ice , the 1st Ba.ttalion was readyto oross the P.hine. At -he time of i t s coromitme'nt the bat-(45) (46) Personal Kno11l1e dge.

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-alion had be'en almost eonscantly on the move fo r a fu l l~ e e k and Ghe men were physieal ly and mentally exhausted.

In the batCalion erossing 01' he bridge,Ghe o1'1'ieersand non-eommissioned off icers displayed exeel lent leader ship in keeping the columnmoving and -he men Quiet in spi te01' the adv8rse condit ions encounGered.

It i s the I"lriter' s opinion tha t a regiment should havebeen given the mission ass igned GO the 1st Batta l ion on theeast bank 1'or the 1 ' o l l o ~ i n g reasons:

l . One bat ta l ion was needed to defend -he area inthe vieini-y 01' the bridge i t s e l f . A la rge seale countera'Gtaek by the enemy could have well des t royedthe bridge andthen systemat ieal ly des troyedche 1st Bat ta l ion .

2. One bat ta l ion was needed to the south, secur-ing the towns eapGured by the 1st Bat ta l ion .

3. One bat ta l ion was needed to be held in mobilereserve so it eould be rapidly moved to meet a threa t fromany dire et ion.\C)(( 11' a regiment had been employed in th is manner, the 1st

~ ~ \ ; t \ Batta l ion, 3l0th In1'antry, would not have been so vulnerable1).,. v!:r-"'" to destruct ion by the enemy as chey \ ~ e r e 1'or the 1' i rs t 24-hours

\,\\t 1'ollowing the crossing.~ \ It i s 1'elt t h a t t h e in i t i a t ive displayed by the ba t t a l -

ion commander in deciding to Quickly move Company A in to Linz,capi ta l iz ing on the mistake 01' the pat ro l in aceidental lystumbling in t o i t , fore s t al led a poss ible large soale count er-atcack by Ghe SS and Panzer uni ts which were deployed to thesouth 01' Linz a- the time i t was entered by our t roops.

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Due to the taet ioal situation ' lI ithinthe bridgehead,i t is d1'fioult to eri t ie ize the oriers relieving the 1stBattalion on 12 Mareh, and then in the spaoe of a fe'll hoursagain eommitting i t . HOllever, the 101lering of mozale 'lIithin the unit 'lIaa a factor to be taken into consideration.

It must be noted that in the majority of the aetioneof the bat.a lio n in the bridgehead, i t 'lIas usually 'lIiththree oompanies abreast or engagecl. Due to the nature ofthe objeetives, as in the in i t i a l phase, or due to thefrontages assigned to the battalion, this 'lIas a must.

The defensive positions maintained by the battalion in Neider-Dollendorf proved to be a God-send to the men in

thei r 1I0rn-out condition. While s t i l l engageQ, i t 'lIaspossible for the men to res t , to re-supply and to olean'lIeapons.

The Negro r i f le platoon, assigned to Company A, oont ribu ted large ly to the sueoesa of the battalion in reaohing the Autobahn and in containing the enemy oounter-attaekwhieh developed in Company A zone and th reatened the battal ion 'lIith a large seale penetration.

In summing up this operation, a period of ten ays, i tmay -.ell be eaiCl that the 1st Battalion, 3l0th Infantry, haiaceomplished 'lIhat seemed to them the imposaible. I t hadsuceeeded in orossing the Ludendorft Bridge, oaptured orassisted in the oapture of tive tOllns, cut the Autobahn andeontributed largely to the seeuring and exploiting of theRemagen briQgehead.

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By General Orders Number 513, Headquarters 78th Infant ry Division, he 1 s t B a t ~ a l i o n , 310th Infantry, 'lias ci tedfo r out s"tanding perfo rroan ce of du..y in ehe Remagen bridgehead and un de r t he provisions of Se ct ion rv, \'lar DepartmentCiroular 333, a'liarded he Distinguished Unit Badge.

In clos ing, 1 t i s in te res t ing to note tha t Caesar madehis f i r s t Rhine cross1ng in 55 B. C. in the vioin i ty of An-dernaoh.f ' l lo thousand years l a t e r , in 1945, the ls Batt a l ion , 310th Infantry, orossing was made 12 miles north otthe Roman bridge s i t e . (47)

LESSONS

l . 'fhe rapid exploi tat ion o t a bridgehead is of para-mount importanoe.

2. Surprise, couped w ith a fast-moving s.. r iking force,is a neoessH y in the expansion of a bridgehead.

7. - 3. Leaders can capi ta l ize on m i s t a ~ e s made by subord-, inates .4. Armor i s 01' prime necessi ty in an exploi ta t ion.5. 60mm mortars oan be used wi"h great advantage against

' - - - - , ~ _ '_ "_'0__ an enemy making s tro ng poin ts out of boxoars.Marching f i r e , used in s l ight ly 'IIooded areas, has--a tremendous demoralizing ef feot agains t a well dug-in enemy.

7 . A fourth r i f le platoon adds to the eftect iveness o t\-., .. - -a r i f l e company and inoreases the morale o f ehe meno

8. Rest fo r t roops i s a neoess i ty , espeoially in sus-

(47) A-3, p . 45.- 31 -


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LESSONS ( Contlnued)

9 . Lead ers must ant lc lpate t h e l o s s o f key p e r s o n n e land p l a n fo r t h e 1 r r e p l a c e m e n t .

1 0 . L eader s must be versa t l le arrd a le r t l n f a s t - m o v l n gan d f a s t - c h a n g l n g s l tua t ions .

1 1 . '!ihen t h e at tack h a s a c h l e v e d s u r p r l s e and g a l n e dt h e i n i t l a t lve , g r e a t r i sks a r e jus t i f ied .

freakleyedwinm. 1lt[1]

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