franklin d. roosevelt and a naval quarantine of japan

Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of JapanAuthor(s): John McVickar Haight, Jr.Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 203-226Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638297 .Accessed: 28/01/2011 02:03

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Franklin D. Roosevelt and a

Naval Quarantine of Japan

JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

The author is professor of history in Lehigh University.

S OME THIRTY-FOUR YEARS AGO, on October 5, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed at Chicago that "peace loving" nations of the world quarantine "aggressors." During a press conference the next day, newsmen attempted to determine what he meant, but, aside from his remark, "It might be a stronger neutrality," they earned no additional insight.1 As the president provided little further public indication of his personal thoughts and plans for American foreign policy in that fall of 1937, most historians have agreed that Roosevelt, without a specific plan for action, quickly dropped his vague quarantine proposal when faced by a storm of isolationist protest.2

Actually, President Roosevelt not only had a specific plan in mind, but he pursued it further during the winter of 1937-1938. As Sumner Welles disclosed in 1950, the president had developed in the summer of 1937 a plan for a long-range naval blockade of Japan.3 New evidence reveals that shortly after Japanese planes sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River on December 12, the president proposed this "naval quarantine" to Britain and that he also sent to London a highly placed

The preparation of this article has been furthered by the generosity of the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society and Lehigh University's Institute of Research.

1 Press Conferences ofFranklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 (Hyde Park, 1956), microfilm, vol. 10, Roll 5, no. 400.

2 For the view that Roosevelt did not seek to implement a vigorous policy in the fall of 1937, see Francis L. Loewenheim, "An Illusion that Shaped History: New Light on the History and Historiography of American Peace Efforts before Munich," Some Pathways in Twentieth-Century History: Essays in Honor ofReginaldCharles McGrane, ed. D. R. Beaver (Detroit, 1969), 177-220; William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Quarantine' Address, 1937,' AnAmerican Primer, ed. Daniel J. Boorstin (Chicago, 1966), 846-856, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), 226-230; Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 385-386, 486-518; and Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from China: British Policy in the Far East, 1937-1941 (Seattle, 1967), 29-55, 161-167.

3 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped the World (New York, 1950), 71-75.

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naval officer, Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, for discussions with the

Admiralty about joint action. It is now clear that Roosevelt did not back down following his quarantine speech; rather, he sought to restrain not

only Japan, but also Germany and Italy from destroying the peace of the world.

According to Sumner Welles, it was in mid-July 1937, shortly after the Japanese launched their undeclared war against China, that Roosevelt began to explore the possibility of a long-range naval blockade

ofJapan. Welles, who was then Under Secretary of State, recalled that

[Roosevelt] was talking with the Navy about drawing an actual line in the Pacific to be maintained by the United States, if the British would agree to cooperate, beyond which Japan would be told she would not be permitted to trade or to expand in the event she persisted in the policy of military conquest of China.

The president believed that "Japan's economy depended largely upon the American and British markets. If these were denied to her, Japan could not hope for long to continue her onward march." To Welles's

question about the danger of such a blockade resulting in war, Roosevelt

replied that

he did not think so. Japan was already so heavily committed to China that her economy was stretched to the breaking point. If her trade were cut off she would bog down long before she could get access to the oil and other raw materials in Southeast Asia that she would need [so] . . . she would not dare risk war at this juncture.4

Then the Under Secretary asked "what assurance he had[,] in view of our past experience, that the British Government would be willing to

go along with so radical a policy." The president replied that he had reason to hope that Neville Chamberlain's new cabinet, which had come into office in the past May, "would not only have more 'guts' than its predecessor, but that it might be able to see [that] the survival of the British Commonwealth [was] at stake." Welles noted that "the President used the word 'quarantine' in connection with that line," and he also remarked that the chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D.

Leahy, favored it. Though Admiral Leahy's diary contains no specific reference to a quarantine of Japan, it leaves no doubts that this officer

supported an Anglo-American naval demonstration in the Far East.5

4 Ibid. 5 Diary of William D. Leahy, Aug. 24, 28, 29, 30, and Sept. 1, 1937, Manuscript Division,

Library of Congress.

A Naval Quarantine of Japan

By late September, Roosevelt had decided to postpone a blockade of

Japan until he had convinced Americans of the necessity for collective action against aggressor nations.6 As a step in this direction he prepared a major address on foreign policy. On October 5 in Chicago he declared in his "Quarantine Speech," "There is a solidarity and inter-dependence about the world . . . which makes it impossible for any nation com-

pletely to isolate itself." He warned of the spreading of an "epidemic of lawlessness" and called for "peace-loving" nations to "make a con- certed effort to uphold the laws and principles on which alone peace can rest assured." Likening such action to a quarantine imposed by a community to prevent the spread of a disease, he concluded that "war is a contagion" and called for "positive endeavors to preserve the peace."7

The president's quarantine proposals drew favorable headlines across the country,8 but raised immediate questions as to his exact meaning. The press on the following day failed to smoke out the president who believed public opinion was not ready for the "naval quarantine" of Japan which he had explored during the past summer. When Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, queried whether the president fully understood the implications of a quarantine, he learned to his dis- satisfaction that Roosevelt was not yet willing to amplify his plans.9

Though President Roosevelt spoke softly after his quarantine speech, he privately welcomed two additional opportunities to educate the public. One was Sumner Welles's plan for an international conference and the other a meeting scheduled for Brussels in early November of the Nine Power Treaty powers, who, in 1922, had established the basis for Far Eastern peace which Japan now challenged.

By late October Welles's conference plan ran into opposition from Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who argued that in the current international situation such a project was "illogical and impossible." The president agreed to shelve it, but he kept the plan at hand for a more propitious occasion.10 In the meantime, the Nine Power conference,

6 Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes (3 vols., New York, 1954), II, 211-213. 7 For text of the quarantine speech, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941

(2 vols., Washington, 1943), I, 379-383 (hereafter cited as F.R. Japan). 8 Travis B. Jacobs, "Roosevelt's 'Quarantine Speech,"' The Historian, XXIV (1962),

483-502. 9 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 (4 vols., Washington, 1954), III, 600-602 (here-

after cited as F.R., 1937). See also Clifford, Retreatfrom China, 34-35. 10 Sumner Welles, Timefor Decision (New York, 1944), 13-24, 65-69. For Hull's opposition,

see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York, 1948), I, 546-549. For the development of this conference project, see Loewenheim, "An Illusion that Shaped History," 177-186.

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scheduled to open on November 3 in Brussels, offered another opportunity not only to educate the American public but also to persuade powers with Pacific interests to act collectively if Japan refused a mediated peace. Roosevelt instructed the American delegate, Norman Davis, to make the most of both opportunities.11 The president also discussed with Davis his plans for a naval quarantine ofJapan.12

Two pieces of evidence reflect the president's continuing concern for the Far East during November. The memorandum written by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden after his first talk on November 2 with Norman Davis at Brussels stated:

Mr. Davis made it plain that the President is deeply concerned at [the] world outlook and sincerely anxious to cooperate in an attempt to stop the rot.... Mr. Davis also intimated that the President was deeply perturbed at the prospects in the Far East. He thought that Great Britain might be com- pelled to withdraw from her position there and that as a consequence the United States might someday have to deal, maybe alone, with a greatly strengthened Japanese power across the Pacific Ocean. It was this formidable prospect that was making the President wish, if he could, to do something to check the tendency now.13

Roosevelt's continued interest also appeared in a report written by the French charge d'affaires in Washington, Jules Henry, after a conversation with the president on November 6. As France had no ambassador to the United States at this time, Henry had gone to the White House on routine business, and during the conversation the president spoke of France's halting, at Japanese demand, the shipment of arms through Indo-China to Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist forces. Roose- velt labeled the French "scared rabbits" for retreating in Asia. He went on to explain his reasons for using such a term:

Doesn't one clearly see in France that a Japanese attack upon Hong Kong or Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies means an attack upon the Philippines?

11 In my earlier article, "Roosevelt and the Aftermath of His Quarantine Speech," Review of Politics, XXIV (1962), 233-239, I underscored the president's personal interest in a positive foreign policy until the events of the Brussels conference brought a halt. Subsequent research in France, England, and the U.S. uncovered the new evidence presented herewith.

12 A letter dated November 24, 1937, from Ambassador William C. Bullitt in Paris to President Roosevelt, one of the Bullitt letters opened by the Roosevelt Library in the winter of 1970, contains the first evidence I have found that the president had spoken of his naval quarantine to Davis before sending him off to Paris. Bullitt wrote: "Norman [Davis] has assured me that just as soon as the Japanese refuse to join the conference at Brussels you would launch a project for the effective quarantining ofJapan by use of our fleet in the Far East, and even more violent measures" (Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary File, France, William C. Bullitt, 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.).

13 Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Vol. I, Facing the Dictators (Boston, 1962), 609-610.


If this should happen, our common interests would be endangered and we would have to protect them.

From his remarks to Henry, it seemed that the president believed such overt Japanese aggression against the territories of any one Western

power would lead all to mutual defensive action and, as a result, Japan would never dare risk retaliation. Though Henry warned Paris that "the majority of the country do not share his views on this policy," the

charge did note that Roosevelt "seems to be determined to build up, as far as possible, a policy of international cooperation and to keep the

public alerted."14 The president's anxiety over the Far Eastern situation, reflected in

these two memoranda, was deepened by the announcement on November 6 that Italy had finally joined Germany and Japan in their Anti-Comintern Pact. Fearing the worst, Roosevelt believed that these three powers had also signed a secret military and naval agreement making a two-ocean war a serious threat for the first time. Recognizing the increased danger for the United States and its one-ocean navy, the

president ordered the Navy's War Plans Division to consider the problem. By mid-November the division called for a large ship-building program and staff conversations with the British Admiralty about cooperation in the Pacific.15

The Navy's proposal for talks with London came just when Norman Davis in Brussels urged collective action against Japan. However, Roosevelt, believing the isolationists still had strong influence on American public opinion, permitted Secretary Hull to veto Davis's call for action as well as the Navy's proposal for staff talks in London.16 Apparently for the same reason, Roosevelt also allowed the State Department to reject the suggestion of Britain's Foreign Secretary on November 27 for "an overwhelming display of naval force with the Royal Navy providing eight to nine battleships."17

14 Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 7, 1937, in "Roosevelt's Kriegswille gegen Japan, Enthullungen Aus den Akten des Quai d'Orsay," Berliner Monatshefte, Feb. 1945, pp. 56-58. For the background to the Roosevelt-Henry conversation, see my "France and the Aftermath of Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," World Politics, XIV (1962), 299-300.

15 Samuel E. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1948), 49; Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange, Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, XI (1959), 245-250; Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-45," Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. D, Ch. IV, pp. 48-50 (Naval History Division, Department of the Navy); and Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations (Washington, 1950), 92-93.

16 For an analysis of the negative impact upon the British of the U.S. backdown at Brussels, see Clifford, Retreatfrom China, 42-44.

17 Memo by Welles of conversation with British Ambassador (Sir Ronald Lindsay), Nov. 27, 1937, F.R., 1937, III, 724-726. See also Eden, Facing the Dictators, 613-617. For others in the

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By late November 1937 Roosevelt apparently felt that his Quarantine Speech had not sufficiently alerted American opinion. The president, however, refused to surrender to the isolationists. As Jules Henry had predicted, "A severe crisis, no doubt, will clarify how far Mr. Roosevelt will go."18

On December 12 such a crisis arose. Japanese planes sank the U.S.S. Panay.19 Significantly, on the same day, the Japanese ran up their score on the Yangtze River by also sinking three American tankers and shelling a British gunboat, H.M.S. Ladybird, plus several British merchant vessels. The prophecy of Norman Davis in late November now seemed perilously close to the truth: "the powers must either fight to maintain the position they have in China or prepare to give up their position there."20 The State Department, to avoid deepening the crisis, urged caution until it received full details of the sinking. In the meantime, the president agreed to act independently of Britain and to cable directly to Japan's Emperor demanding apology and full compensation.21

In contrast to State Department hesitancy, the chief of Naval Opera- tions responded angrily. While some ranking admirals feared any rash move,22 Leahy, impatient for action, wrote in his diary on December 13, "It is in my opinion time now to get the fleet ready for sea, to make an agreement with the British Navy for joint action and to inform the Japanese that we expect to protect our nationals." On the next day Leahy went to the White House and proposed "sending ships of the Fleet to Navy Yards without delay to obtain fuel, clean bottoms, and take on sea stores preparatory to a cruise at sea." However, as the admiral noted, "the President is not ready to take action at the present time." On December 16 the admiral also ran into opposition when he

State Department besides Welles who were skeptical about British intentions, see The Moffat Papers, Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943, ed. Nancy H. Hooker (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 153, 154-155, 162, 182.

18 Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 18, 1937, Berliner-Monatshefte, Feb. 1945, pp. 58-60.

19 See Manny T. Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude to War (Lafayette, Indiana, 1967) for the most judicious account. For greater detail, see Hamilton D. Perry, The Panay Incident, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1969). For a firsthandJapanese report, see Masatake Okumiya, assisted by Roger Pineau, "How the Panay was Sunk," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXIX, (June 1953), 587-596. See also Alvin D. Coox, "Year of the Tiger," Orient-West, 1964, pp. 83-88.

20 Memorandum by the Delegation of the United States to the Brussels Conference, Nov. 29, 1937, File Box 4, Conversations-Brussels Conference folder, Norman Davis Papers, Manu- script Division, Library of Congress.

21 For the text of the president's message to the Emperor, see F.R., Japan, I, 522-523. 22 See Welles, Seven Decisions, 72, and Donald F. Drummond, Passing of American Neutrality

(Ann Arbor, 1955), 66.


conferred with the State Department. There the majority, though recognizing that "nothing useful can be accomplished by conversations with the Japanese," also felt strongly that "America is not yet ready to apply pressure." However, another person at this conference, Norman Davis, supported "a demonstration in force." He had just returned from Brussels where, as Leahy noted, he "has been informed by British Cabinet officers that the British are prepared tojoin in such a demonstration with a naval force of as much as six battleships and the usual accom-

panying smaller vessels." Though some other State Department members feared lest the United States "become a junior partner to Great Britain in policing the world," Davis favored cooperation with the British.23

Despite Roosevelt's apparent hesitancy on December 14 to ready the Navy, he was already developing two other steps to bring direct pressure upon Japan. On that same day, he approved the suggestion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., that he explore plans to freeze Japanese financial assets in the United States.24 On December 14 the president also determined, with the approval of Secretary of State Hull, to talk secretly with British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay and propose joint naval action.25

Publication of Anthony Eden's first volume of memoirs in 1962 provided the first evidence that on December 16 President Roosevelt did meet secretly with Ambassador Lindsay and Secretary Hull.26 However, Eden's memoirs do not report the entire conversation between the president and the British ambassador. Lindsay's full report has now been released by the British Foreign Office, and it deserves detailed consideration.27

After a diplomatic reception at the White House on December 16, Roosevelt returned to the privacy of his study with Ambassador Lindsay

23 Leahy Diary, Dec. 13, 14, and 16, 1937. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, who in the fall of 1937 was chief of the State Department's European section, reported in his journal for December 14 and 15, 1937, Davis's actions and thoughts during his first visit to Washington after the Brussels conference. The quotation about being a "junior partner" is Moffat's own reaction to Davis's proposal to work with Britain. See "DiplomaticJournals ofJay Pierrepont Moffat," Houghton Library, Harvard University.

24John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, Vol. I, Years of Crisis, 1928-1933 (Boston, 1959), 486.

25 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 617. On December 13, as soon as he learned of the attack on the Ladybird and the sinking of the Panay, Eden told Washington that "action should be taken jointly." See ibid., 614-616, and F.R., 1937, III, 798.

26 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 618. Both Clifford, in Retreatfrom China (p. 49), and Loewenheim, in "An Illusion that Shaped History" (p. 200), cite Eden's report on Lindsay's talk with Roose- velt, but ignore the president's blockade proposal.

27 Sir Ronald Lindsay to Foreign Office, Dec. 17, 1937, Public Record Office, Reference Number FO 371-Volume 20961-1937.

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and the Secretary of State. The president opened by calling for restora- tion of the secret informal Anglo-American naval staff talks of 1915-1917. Lindsay admitted he had never heard of those talks and Roosevelt pointed out that neither the Foreign Office nor the State Department had been aware of such liaison between the two navies.

Lindsay prefaced Roosevelt's "first object of Staff conversations" with his own observation: "We then had a spell of the President in his worst 'inspirational' mood and I admit that I can give no account of what he said which is both consistent and sensible." What so upset the ambassador was the president's proposal to arrange a blockade of

Japan for which "he used the word 'quarantine[,]' an echo of his Chicago speech." Lindsay recalled that the President then said:

The line should run from Aleutia Island, through Hawaii, mid-way between the islands to the north of the Philippines to Hong Kong. Japanese mandated islands would not count and could be starved by military measures. Americans should look after everything up to the Philippines and Great Britain the western section. Battleships should not intervene and should be kept in the rear and it should be a cruiser blockade .... The purpose of the blockade should be to cut Japan off from raw materials, and it might take eighteen months to produce results. It would be necessary to bring in at least French and Dutch ... [and] there would have to be prohibition of buying from and of selling to Japan and he admitted that this would necessitate legislation by many states.... The occasion of the blockade would have to be the next grave outrage by [the] Japanese.

Though the ambassador might have felt upset, his account nevertheless spelt out the very "naval quarantine" that Roosevelt had initially developed with Sumner Welles during the previous summer.

The ambassador noted that, in an effort to divert the president from his blockade, "I said that the best way to prevent war without firing a shot would be for the United States Government to make a demonstration showing clearly that they would not be indifferent to further dis- regard of normal morality in international affairs." "To stop the rot and give pause to Japanese aggression," Lindsay pushed the naval demonstration in the Pacific which Eden had recently proposed. Roosevelt rejected this as inadvisable, since "it was more important that His Majesty's government should keep their battleships to look after the situation in

Europe." As far as his naval quarantine was concerned, he noted that "a reenforcement of cruisers, destroyers and long range submarines in the Far East would be sufficient, though he also mentioned in passing one or two battleships."


When Lindsay expressed his belief that American opinion would not approve of a blockade, the president answered that he thought public opinion was moving favorably since the Panay incident. He claimed that 80 percent of the more than 100 letters he had received that day supported "vigorous action," but he admitted that reports "were still rather preliminary." Only then did Secretary of State Hull enter the conversation. He admitted his own concern for adverse public opinion and advised London against any public talk about "joint action" with the United States. The president readily agreed.

Ambassador Lindsay's account offers incontestable evidence that by December 16 President Roosevelt, with the full knowledge of Cordell Hull, had revived his July plan for a long-range "naval quarantine" of

Japan, and had proposed that the British join this blockade if Japan perpetrated another outrage. On the following day Lindsay talked with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles about his conversation with the president and reported that "it coincided well with his

[Welles's] understanding of what had passed."28 Indeed, Roosevelt was so excited about his plan for a quarantine that

on the following day, December 17, he outlined it to his cabinet. Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson initiated the conversation by speaking in favor of war, and, as Secretary Ickes noted in his diary, "At the very least he wants to send our Navy from the Atlantic to Hawaiian waters." The president replied that "he wanted the same result that Swanson did, but didn't want to go to war to get it." Roosevelt then spelled out the blockade plan he had proposed during the previous evening. Ickes's recollection of it bears repetition:

The American navy could blockJapan from the Aleutian Islands to Hawaii, to Wake, to Guam. Great Britain would take over from our line to Singapore. This would be a comparatively simple task which the Navy could take care of without having to send a great fleet. Blocked thus, the President thinks that Japan could be brought to her knees within a year.

Roosevelt went on to amplify his thoughts about engaging "in hostilities without being at war." He had just uncovered forgotten powers which Congress had granted him in 1933 "to prevent war" and they included such economic sanctions as a blockade ofJapan or a freeze of that nation's financial assets in the United States.29 Secretary of the Treasury Henry

28 Lindsay to Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1937, ibid. 29 Ickes, Diaries, II, 274. In his "Year of the Tiger," pp. 89-90, Alvin Coox cites Ickes's

notes on Roosevelt's comments on a blockade ofJapan during the cabinet meeting of December 17, but he adds no comment of his own.

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Morgenthau recorded that the president also announced during this cabinet meeting that "We want these powers to be used to prevent war." The president then commented, "After all, if Italy and Japan have evolved a technique of fighting without declaring war, why can't we develop a similar one?" When Vice-President John Nance Garner

expressed his opinion that only real force would have an effect on the

Japanese, the president replied that economic pressure could be made effective but, he added, "We don't call them economic sanctions; we call them quarantines. We want to develop a technique which will not lead to war. We want to be as smart as Japan and as Italy. We want to do it in a modern way."30 Significantly, Secretary Ickes added his own conclusions: "the President is working on some plan looking toward cooperation with the other democratic countries, particularly Great Britain and France."31

Though there is no available record of such conversations with France, there is proof that, while Roosevelt talked to the British about joint naval action, he also gave the green light to Secretary Morgenthau to initiate talks with London about freezing Japan's foreign assets. The Secretary's efforts, however, were quickly frustrated by SirJohn Simon, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer.32

In contrast to Simon's negative reply to Morgenthau, the British Foreign Secretary wired Lindsay after the December 16 meeting at the White House that His Majesty's government would welcome an Ameri- can naval officer for staff talks, and hoped that one would be sent with the least possible delay. Eden also stated that rather than delay Far Eastern action until further outrages by theJapanese, as Roosevelt had suggested, both governments should take preparatory measures which might restrain Japan from further bad deeds.33 Indeed, the Foreign Secretary considered staff talks with an American naval officer in London to be of such import that he postponed his own holiday on the French Riviera for a week, until Ingersoll's scheduled arrival on the last day of 1937.

Eden's acceptance of these staff talks apparently followed the line laid down by the British cabinet. A follow-up paper attached to Lindsay's dispatch on his meeting of December 16 with President Roosevelt

30 Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, I, 489. 31 Ickes, Diaries, II, 275-276. 32 Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, I, 489-490. 33 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 619.

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indicated that Chamberlain's cabinet discussed the dispatch and, though not quite sure of Roosevelt's position, it agreed that "this is a useful line to follow." The cabinet at this time also ordered the subcommittee of its Imperial Defense Committee to shift its focus from economic pressure on Germany to economic pressure upon Japan. While some members of the cabinet favored such direct action, Prime Minister Chamberlain was less interested for, as he stated before Parliament on December 21, he was not ready to become the "policeman of the world."34

In contrast to this British activity, Roosevelt's administration did little for the next several days. While Morgenthau suggested in his diary that Roosevelt had "cooled off a bit" after the cabinet meeting of December 17, Leahy explained that the president was merely awaiting full details of the Panay attack from the navy's Court of Inquiry in Shanghai.35

Meanwhile, the navy furthered its plans to send a staff officer to London and mapped out several points of discussion besides a blockade ofJapan. One related to the "Big Navy" program which called for two or three additional battleships large enough to carry sixteen-inch guns with adequate protection and range. Before these could be constructed, the Admiralty must agree to waive the 35,000-ton limit set by the London Naval Treaty of 1936. Another point related to American vessels joining in the British inauguration of Singapore's new defenses.36

On December 22 the Navy's radio carried the court of inquiry's report from Shanghai on the sinking of the Panay. For the first time the wantonness of the Japanese attack and the ruthlessness with which American survivors were hunted became fully evident.37

The president's reaction can be gauged by his meeting early the next afternoon with Secretaries Hull and Morgenthau, Admiral Leahy, and Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, the Navy's chief of War Plans. Roosevelt ordered Ingersoll to proceed as soon as possible to London for secret staff talks. In addition to the problem of capital ships with sixteen-inch guns, the dispatch of ships to Singapore, and general strategic problems,

34 For the activities of the committee on economic pressure on Germany, see V. N. Medli- cott, The Economic Blockade: The History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series (2 vols., London, 1952), I, 14. For Chamberlain's remark, see Survey of International Affairs, 1937, ed. ArnoldJ. Toynbee (London, 1938), 35.

35 Leahy Diary, Dec. 19, 1937. 36 See Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-45," Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. D, Ch.

IV, pp. 48-50; and Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans, 92-93. See also Leahy's Diary, Dec. 14, 17, 19, 22, 1937. None of these sources refers to plans for a naval quarantine ofJapan.

37 The court of inquiry's report is printed in F.R., Japan, I, 532-541. The State Department's copy was not received in Washington untilJanuary 5. However, it is likely that the report was originally sent via navy radio, for Leahy noted its receipt in his diary on December 22.

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the president specifically instructed Ingersoll to discuss a long-range naval blockade ofJapan.38

Roosevelt, together with Hull and Morgenthau, went directly from the White House conference with Leahy and Ingersoll to the regular weekly cabinet meeting. Ickes' diary notes that Roosevelt saw in the Panay incident "an opportunity for the democratic governments to reassert themselves in world affairs.... The President also thinks that[,] if the civil population ofJapan should learn of such a move on the part of America, there might be a revolution in Japan." In concluding this entry in his diary, Ickes noted that Roosevelt and Hull believed that "there is a secret and offensive alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy"; nevertheless, the president estimated that, if the United States should take action against Japan, it was probable that "Italy and Germany would find some way of squirming out of this agreement..... They are not prepared for war." Even so, Germany might take advantage of this situation and grab Austria and Czechoslovakia, but such a move, in the estimation of Roosevelt, would not lead to European war, for "France probably would not go to war to defend Austria and, in spite of her treaty, would not send a soldier across the border to protect Czechoslovakia."39

The afternoon of December 24 brought a new development. Japan's Emperor answered the president's earlier appeal by apologizing for the sinking of the Panay and offering to meet all American demands. On Christmas Day the United States accepted the Japanese note and officially closed the incident.40

Most historians of American foreign policy have also closed their studies of the Panay incident with this note. Roosevelt, however, did not. He determined to prepare for future outrages. According to Ickes, the president noted in the cabinet meeting of December 31 that "we didn't get the satisfactory apology from Japan that we asked for." "It may be," Ickes wrote, "that the President thinks public opinion would not support

38 This meeting of December 23 in the White House has been reconstructed from Admiral Ingersoll's remarks to the author during an interview on March 26, 1962. Leahy's Diary, December 23, records that Ingersoll would discuss only the London Naval Treaty. For these meetings, see also Blum, Morgenthau Diaries, I, 491.

39 Ickes, Diaries, II, 276-279. Ambassador Bullitt made a similar estimate of France's reaction to German moves against Austria and Czechoslovakia in a cable to Washington on December 23 (State Department Papers, File 740.00/251, Record Group 19, National Archives). This section of Bullitt's report does not appear among the excerpts reproduced in F.R., 1937, I, 206-207.

40 See, F.R., Japan, I, 549-552.

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him if he should go any further just now, but he proposes to be ready if another incident occurs."41

Indicative of his mood, Roosevelt permitted Ingersoll to sail for Britain on December 26 without any revision of his orders. If necessary the Navy was to explain publicly that the chief of its War Plans Division had gone to London to seek British approval for larger battleships than those permitted under the Naval treaty of 1936. However, Ingersoll informed American embassy officials who met him in Southampton that his prime purpose remained "to obtain information on which to plan and base decisions, if necessary, for future action."42

The president's thinking is also indicated by additional notes Ickes made on the cabinet session of December 31. When Vice-President Garner returned to the Far Eastern situation and again, as he had on December 17, pointedly asked how the president planned to take a stand, Roosevelt replied:

Several little things. Instead of sending two ships to Australia, we shall send four, and these four will then be sent to Singapore. The Singapore destination will not be announced until the ships reach Australia. Meanwhile, the rest of the Navy will go to Hawaii. Also, we are having conversations with Great Britain.43

On the day of this cabinet meeting, Captain Ingersoll arrived at Whitehall where he was received by the Foreign Secretary who had delayed his holiday in order to greet the American emissary. In the presence of the Foreign Office's new Permanent Under Secretary, Alexander Cadogan, and the American charge, Herschel Johnson, Eden assured the American naval officer "that he could count on our full cooperation." Eden then asked whether "his Government considered that some joint action should be taken now, or whether the discussions which were to be held between himself and the Admiralty would be limited to future incidents against which joint action might later be taken."44 The Foreign Secretary also asked for further information about the White House talk on December 16. "I told him," Ingersoll later reported, "that ... the President had directed Admiral Leahy to send me to London to obtain naval information on which to

41 Ickes, Diaries, I, 279. 42 Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, "Notes on Arrival in Britain, Dec. 31, 1937," Records of the

War Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Correspondence Re: British- U.S. Conversations in London, 1938-1939," Classified Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Records of Naval War Plans Division).

43 Ickes, Diaries, I, 279. 44 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 619-620.

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plan and base decisions, if necessary, as to future action." Ingersoll then concluded, "I got the impression that Mr. Eden was more interested right now in immediate gestures to impress the Japanese than he was in long-range future planning."45 According to Eden's memoirs, the captain's impressions were correct. The Foreign Secretary left for the Mediterranean sun, believing no decisions would be required for some ten days while Anglo-American naval discussions were carried on at the Admiralty.

The notes of Captain Ingersoll's conversations with the British Admiralty illustrate the extent of United States Navy thought about concentrating forces in the Pacific for a long-range naval quarantine of Japan. The conversations also reveal that the British Admiralty developed plans to join such a blockade. On Monday, January 3, 1938, Ingersoll together with the American naval attache in London, Captain Russell Willson, met the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernee Chatfield. The admiral stated that he had opposed sending British reinforcements to the Far East in driblets and had refused to dispatch any force "unless it can cope with the Japanese fleet." The Admiralty was preparing such a force which would be ready aboutJanuary 15 "if required and ordered by the Government." Later that afternoon of January 3, Captain Ingersoll learned the details of British naval preparations from Captain T. S. V. Phillips, chief of the Admiralty's War Plans Division: "The British are getting ready to send to the Far East" a force of eight battleships and one battle cruiser. These were to be accompanied by 3 aircraft carriers, 8 eight-inch gun cruisers and 11 six-inch gun cruisers, 54 destroyers, and 25 submarines. Captain Phillips believed that with the French covering the western Mediterranean this formidable force could be taken from the Home and Mediterranean fleets and would be ready to sail on ten to fourteen days' notice. The Admiralty was fully aware that this fleet would have to be reduced considerably if a general European war broke out. Captain Ingersoll then described such pro- jected American actions as "docking and filling up crews of certain units" which would ready the United States fleet "without causing concern." He also pointed out that, "until the fleet was prepared to move on and not return," its first step would be to "take a position of readiness covering our West Coast and the Hawaiian Islands."46

45 Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, "Note on Conversation with Foreign Secretary, Jan. 1, 1938," Records of Naval War Plans Division.

46 "Notes on Conversations with Admiralty, January 3, 1938," ibid. The notes for January 3-14 were apparently written by Captain Russell Willson, naval attache, London embassy.

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The final "Record of Conversations" which Ingersoll signed on January 13 provides additional information about how far the United States Navy was prepared to go in the Pacific. While Ingersoll had warned Foreign Secretary Eden that the American navy believed "no gesture should be made unless the Fleet now in commission is brought up to 100 percent full complement and prepared in all respects of war," the "Record of Conversation" reveals that American submarines and aircraft on the Pacific coast were already up to 100 percent, that the advanced force "is now being completed, as far as practicable, to full complement," and that the capital ships, cruisers, destroyers, and auxili- aries on the Pacific Coast were at 85 percent of strength. In contrast, ships on the Atlantic Coast had only a 50 percent complement. All this meant that "9 or 10 capital ships could be ready to sail 10 to 15 days after the Declaration of National Emergency."47

During their initial talk on January 3 Captains Ingersoll and Phillips discussed Roosevelt's plan for a long-range "naval quarantine" of Japan, and the notes made by the American attache who was with them bear full quotation because they show a revision of the President's original plan:

Discussion was held on the subject of a distant blockade or quarantine. No definite understanding was reached but from the discussion it is believed that the British are prepared to cover the line from Singapore via Southern Philippines at least as far eastward as the New Hebrides and that the United States could cover to the eastward via Fiji, Samoa, Hawaii and the United States. They assumed we would close the Panama Canal and cover the west coast of South America to any Japanese vessels that might slip by the long lines in the eastern Pacific. We will get more definite information on January 5.48

When the chiefs of the two war plans divisions met on January 5 for the second time, they again focused on the quarantine. The new blockade line proposed by Captain Phillips reveals that during the two-day

47 "Record of Conversations," signed by Captain Ingersoll and Phillips, Jan. 13, 1938. This "Record" was initially uncovered for me by Commander P. K. Kemp, Librarian, Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defense, London. Through the assistance of the British Foreign Office Library, a copy of the "Record" was forwarded by diplomatic pouch to Washington and there released to me by the U.S. Naval History Division. That Division subsequently discovered Captain Ingersoll's own copy of the "Record" as well as the "Notes of Conversa- tions in London, Dec. 31, 1937-Jan. 14, 1938" in Records of the War Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Folder "Correspondence Re: British-U.S. Conversations in London, 1938-1939," Classified Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

48 Captain Russell Willson, "Notes on Conversations with Admiralty, Jan. 3, 1938," Records of Naval War Plans Division.

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interval Roosevelt's plan had received serious consideration by the Admiralty:

The British stated that they were prepared to stop allJapanese traffic crossing a line roughly from Singapore through the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Hebrides and around to the east of Australia and New Zealand. This they feel they can do because the greater part of this line is a land barrier with comparatively few narrow passages through it.

The Admiralty suggested another significant change:

the problem would be very much simpler if the President could influence the South American Republics to cooperate in the quarantine by non-intercourse, embargoes, boycotts or similar measures.49

The final and official "Record of Conversations" amplifies this revision further:

The U.S. Navy will be responsible for operations against Japanese trade throughout the West Coast of North and South America, including the Panama Canal and the passage around Cape Horn.

The United States Navy will also assume responsibility for the general Naval defense of the West Coast of Canada.50

By January 5 the major British and American positions had been finalized. The officers had agreed on a system of communications and codes which the fleets could use if called into joint action. They also laid plans for the dispatch of American cruisers for the celebrations opening the new British defenses of Singapore. During the next week the "Record of Conversations" was completed, and after approval by the First Sea Lord the final draft was ready for initialing on January 13 when the Admiralty held a farewell luncheon for Captain Ingersoll.

Conversation at that affair was, as the American naval attache noted, "entirely social and had no bearing on the official purpose of Captain Ingersoll's trip." "However," the attache added, "the fact that the luncheon was given and the makeup of the members of the British party may be an indication of the importance which the British attach to the 'conversations.'"51 The British party was indeed impressive. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, acted as official host and was backed by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Alfred E. M. Chatfield, and the officers directly involved in the conversations. In the absence of Eden,

49 Ibid.,Jan. 5, 1938. 50 Royal Ingersoll and Russell Willson, "Record of Conversations," Jan. 13, 1938, ibid. 51 "Note on Conversations with Admiralty, Jan. 13, 1938."

A Naval Quarantine ofJapan

the Foreign Office was represented by Permanent Under Secretary Alexander Cadogan. The party also included a cabinet officer and close associate of Prime Minister Chamberlain, Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Coordination of Defense.

After lunch Admiral Chatfield drew the American officers aside and asked Captain Ingersoll "to convey to Leahy his appreciation for sending an officer from his office to consider the ways and means of cooperation between the two navies, should it ever become necessary." Only then did the admiral discuss the London Naval Treaty, the public reason for Ingersoll's mission to London. Chatfield readily agreed that tonnage limitations should be abrogated.52

As the Anglo-American naval talks were being completed at the Admiralty, President Roosevelt approved steps preparing the United States Navy for activities in the Pacific. Roosevelt had delayed such approval until January 10 when the House of Representatives finally defeated Louis Ludlow's resolution, which called for a national referen- dum before the United States took any military action except defense.53 With this isolationist threat bypassed, the president immediately ordered three of the steps which he had discussed with Ambassador Lindsay on December 16 and with his cabinet on December 31: dispatch of three cruisers to Singapore, the advance of naval maneuvers by three weeks to the middle of February, and, finally, transfer of the fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The president then informed London of his actions.54

The next day President Roosevelt took another step which he together with Welles, Davis, and Hull had designed to persuade the American public to oppose aggression in the Pacific as well as in Europe. He revived Sumner Welles's conference plan of the past fall to discuss essential principles which should be observed in relations among all nations. This time Secretary Hull agreed, but on condition that approval of Britain's Prime Minister be obtained.55 Despite the failure of the Brussels meeting, this approval seemed likely because the idea of an international conference had been explored often between Washington and London during the past year. Ever since November 1936, when

52 Ibid. 53 The strength of isolationist support for the Ludlow resolution has been regarded almost

unanimously by subsequent authorities as final evidence that Roosevelt faced too powerful an opposition to attempt any interventionist policy. See, e.g. Robert A. Divine The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, 1962), 219-221. See also Hull, Memoirs, I, 563-565.

54 See Leahy Diary, Jan. 10, 1938, and Eden, Facing the Dictators, 620. 55 Welles gives due credit to Davis for winning Hull's support. Seven Decisions, 25.

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Eden first heard of Roosevelt's conference plan, the Foreign Secretary had approved.56

On January 11, 1938, President Roosevelt forwarded to Prime Minister Chamberlain a letter marked "very secret and immediate." It spelled out the three goals of the conference which Welles had originally suggested during the fall: agreement on international law, reduction of armaments, and equal access to raw materials. Recognizing that universal acceptance of these principles might not secure the peace, the president added that some inequities of the postwar settlements might have to be removed, but he went on to remind the British that by tradition the United States would remain free from political involve- ment and thus could play no part in determining political frontiers. In closing, Roosevelt requested a reply by January 17 in order to enable him to announce the conference five days later.57

Ambassador Lindsay, in forwarding the President's request to London, sent two cables emphasizing that a major purpose of the conference was to align American opinion behind Roosevelt's foreign policy:

I have long held that the best chance of averting disaster is to range not only the United States Administration but also United States public opinion behind the objectives of the democratic governments. We definitely have no anxiety as to the Administration and this present scheme must have a pro- found effect on the public also.58

The ambassador had discussed the conference with Welles before trans- mitting the president's letter to the Prime Minister, and his own report followed the Under Secretary's approach, for it labeled the conference "a genuine effort to relax the tensions of the world, to stop the prevalent deterioration and to restore the influence of the democracies." Lindsay warned against "destructive criticism, reservations or attempts to define the issues more clearly," and concluded, "I therefore urge respectfully but very earnestly that His Majesty's Government give their reply to this invaluable initiative with a very quick and cordial acceptance."59

56 Facing the Dictators, 595-596. The conference idea was further pursued by Norman Davis during a visit to Britain in the spring of 1937. Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quarterly, XXII (1957), 409-412. Loewenheim, in his "An Illusion that Shaped History," traces in detail the evolution of this conference idea.

57 For the only published quotations from Roosevelt's letter to Chamberlain of January 11, see Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), 269-271. Sumner Welles gave the first public account of Roosevelt's proposal to Chamberlain in 1944 when he published his Timefor Decision. (See pp. 66-69. See also his Seven Decisions, 25-30.)

58 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 624-625. 59 Ibid.


Roosevelt's letter, which arrived in London on January 12 while the Foreign Secretary was still in southern France, was sent to the Prime Minister at Chequers, his official country estate. In the absence of Eden, Permanent Under Secretary Alexander Cadogan advised that Lindsay's recommendations be followed. However, Chamberlain made up his own mind. On the night of January 13, four days before Roosevelt's deadline, he rejected the American call for an international conference. The Prime Minister requested Roosevelt to "hold his hand for a short while" and lend American support to Britain's current attempt to arrange a modus vivendi with Mussolini by extending dejure recognition to Italy's conquest of Ethiopia.60

The Prime Minister's private negotiations with Mussolini provided him with one reason to ask Roosevelt to "hold his hand." There was also another. This stemmed from Chamberlain's personal view of United States foreign policy: "It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words."61 This view had certainly restrained the Prime Minister from supporting his Foreign Minister's long search for common action with the United States against Japan.62 However, there appears to have been another reason for Chamberlain's rejection of Roosevelt's proposal for an international conference four days before the president's deadline and without consulting Eden. The precipitous- ness of his rejection can best be explained by the Prime Minister's discovery on or about January 13 of how far the British Admiralty and the United States Navy had gone in developing joint plans for President Roosevelt's long-range "naval quarantine" ofJapan.

Considering the importance of the "Record of Conversations" which Captains Ingersoll and Phillips had signed on the 13th, the "Record" most probably was forwarded to higher authorities within the British government. With its special relevance for Britain's foreign policy, the "Record" must have immediately come to the attention of Neville Chamberlain, not only because of his position as Prime Minister, but also because he acted in Eden's absence as Foreign Secretary. The best explanation that can now be given for Chamberlain's sudden rejection of the president's international conference is that he linked it with Roosevelt's "naval quarantine" of Japan. He reacted negatively because he believed any such sanction against Japan, together with

60 For text of Chamberlain's letter to Roosevelt, dated January 14, 1938, see F.R., 1938, I, 118-120.

61 Feiling, Chamberlain, 328. 62 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 632.

8

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"standing up" to the European dictators, would mean war on three fronts before Britain was even ready for war on one front.63 By rejecting Roosevelt's international conference, he effectively sabotaged a Far Eastern blockade and removed a fundamental challenge to his current

personal efforts to appease Mussolini. Sumner Welles likened Chamberlain's reply to a "douche of cold

water,"64 and indeed it was. Secretary of State Hull immediately called in Ambassador Lindsay and condemmed Chamberlain's proposed de

jure recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia because it "would be

capitalized by the desperado nations and heralded as a virtual ratifica- tion of the opposing policy of outright treaty violation, and treaty breaking and seizure of properties by force of arms." The Secretary warned that "the repercussions in the Pacific might be very serious in many ways." Sumner Welles in turn reported to the British Ambassador that the president was distressed because he thought opinion in the United States had been crystalizing favorably in the direction he desired and he was confident de jure recognition would turn it back. The Under Secretary added his personal evaluation, "it would rouse a feeling of disgust; would revive and multiply all fear of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire."65

Despite the initial impact of Chamberlain's cable, Roosevelt continued for some weeks to hope that the British Foreign Secretary would be able to keep Britain from appeasement of Mussolini. The president had probably been encouraged by Eden's telephone call to Ambassador Lindsay on January 15 saying he would do everything possible to persuade the Prime Minister to approve an international conference.66

Evidence that the president misread Chamberlain's rebuff and still expected British naval cooperation is contained in notes recently found in Paris. These were written on January 16, 1938, by French Senator Baron Amaury de La Grange following a private conversation with Roosevelt at the White House.67 The president obviously talked freely with his old friend and weekend guest from France and revealed his personal thoughts and plans.

63 Feiling, Chamberlain, 328. 64 Welles, Time for Decision, 66. 65 For Hull's remarks to Lindsay, seeF.R., 1938, I, 133-134; for Welles's remarks to Lindsay,

see Eden, Facing the Dictators, 632-633. See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Challenge to Isolation (New York, 1952), 26-27.

66 Eden, Facing the Dictators, 627-628. 67 Note on White House stationary by Senator Amaury de La Grange and datedJanuary 16,

1938. The original copy of this note has been presented by the Senator's widow, Baroness de La Grange, to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.


Roosevelt focused upon foreign affairs and in speaking about Japan's invasion of China in July 1937, he noted the European reaction to this undeclared war. As during his November meeting with Jules Henry of the French Embassy, he condemmed France for acting like a "scared rabbit" in October when, upon the threat ofJapanese reprisals, France closed Indo-China to the transit of war materials to China. France had been unwise, he felt, because "Japan has complete liberty to replenish supplies: to deny China the same liberty would be departing from neutrality." The president then explained that France's Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, had made a mistake when he asked "if the United States would guarantee the integrity of Indo-China in case of Japanese attack." This request had gone too far and Roosevelt had been forced to reply that "the United States could not enter into that kind of a commitment."

The president next turned to Britain, which in his estimation possessed the "most important interest in the Far East." It was his opinion that "England will not tolerate being thrown out of China-even politely- without actually declaring war on Japan, she will take energetic measures." The president then told his French visitor of the quarantine which he had ordered Captain Ingersoll to discuss with the Admiralty:

Formerly a blockade was carried out inside the limits of territorial waters. Now it could be established 2,000 miles from the Japanese coast. The English fleet, depending for support upon Hong Kong, Indo-China and the Philip- pines, would prevent any Japanese ship from crossing this line towards the South, while the American fleet would bar the route to the North, from Manila to Alaska.

Japan could not hold out more than a year and a half. It has petrol and rubber for about that length of time.

Roosevelt had prefaced his remarks on this quarantine by a question: "Since the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese have invented a new method which consists of carrying on military operations without declaring war, why not do likewise ?" Then, after sketching out his long- range naval blockade, the president admitted, "It is possible that Germany and Italy in case of blockade, would go to war, but it would not be us who would declare it." The terms Roosevelt used in his conversation with La Grange reveal an impressive continuity of his thinking since he first discussed a quarantine of Japan with Sumner Welles in July 1937.

Until Eden announced his resignation on February 20, Roosevelt continued to hope that the Foreign Secretary would keep Britain from

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swinging from resistance to appeasement. Eden's message to Lindsay on

January 15 had been encouraging as had Chamberlain's temporizing letter ofJanuary 21. These must have confused the issues as much as did Ambassador Lindsay's report of February 9 on Eden's optimism over

Anglo-American cooperation.68 A letter the president wrote to an

English friend on February 10 indicates that Roosevelt still, at that date, nurtured a hope of British support for resistance to the dictators:

I am getting on better with some of your people-for they are really showing signs of wanting to meet me part of the way-perhaps not fifty percent yet! I, too, am pursued by catchries in this country, and I am in the midst of a long process of education-and the process seems to be working slowly but surely.69

By then Roosevelt had postponed Welles's plan for a world conference. However, he presented his "Big Navy" bill to Congress. Isolationists immediately raised a lusty protest, claiming that the president sought these extra ships only to strengthen American intervention in world affairs. Their cries of alarm crescendoed when, at the time Captain Ingersoll reported personally to Roosevelt on his London conversations, word leaked out that Ingersoll had discussed a naval quarantine of Japan with the British Admiralty.70 Though the Chief of Naval Opera- tions was called in to quiet the storm and divert attention from such a quarantine, Roosevelt could still write to his English friend on February 10 that his long process of public education was "working slowly but surely."71 What is of particular interest is that the Secretary of State seems to have shared his optimism. On February 10 Jay Pierrepont

68 For Chamberlain's letter of January 21 to Roosevelt, see Eden, Facing the Dictators, 641- 642. See also Eden's letter of January 25 to Lindsay in which he wrote: "Personally, I now hope Roosevelt will now go ahead." (Ibid., 643-644.) See also Welles's memoranda of Feb- ruary 2 and 9 on conversations with Lindsay (in F.R., 1938, I, 122, 125) and the report of February 4 by Herschel Johnson, charge in the United Kingdom, of a conversation with Eden and Cadogan. Ibid., I, 135-136.

69 Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, later Lord Elibank, Feb. 10, 1938, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, ed. Elliot Roosevelt (2 vols., New York, 1950), II, 757-758.

70 Two journals in particular, one British and the other American, carried detailed, though not identical, accounts alleging that Ingersoll talked with the Admiralty about a long-range blockade ofJapan pivoting on the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, the Panama Canal, and Singa- pore. They also reported that Navy officials believed such a blockade would be 85 percent effective if Britain contributed six battleships. Both journals doubted whether these plans could be put into effect soon and the London daily reported that "American public opinion would not at present support any such proposal, . . . [but] future developments-another Panay incident for example-might change the situation." See London Daily Telegraph, Jan. 28, 1938, p. 3, and Newsweek, "Periscope" for Jan. 31, 1938, which appeared on the newsstands on or aboutJan. 28.

71 New York Times, Jan. '28, Feb. 4, 5, 9, 1938; Roosevelt to Murray, Feb. 10, 1938, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, II, 757-758.


Moffat, chief of the State Department's European section, confided in his diary that Hull "does not believe that the sentiment of this country is

growing strongly isolationist."72 Roosevelt's expectations of British support for a naval quarantine of

Japan were seriously shaken ten days later in February when Anthony Eden suddenly announced his resignation as Foreign Secretary. This action apparently came as a surprise to the president, as well as to most of the world. Later, in a letter of May 13 to his English friend, Arthur Murray, he remarked, "Isn't it amazing that in February there was no thought of the Eden episode."73 Eden's resignation spelled the end to the president's hope for British cooperation in a Pacific blockade of Japan.

Thirty-four years after Roosevelt's quarantine speech, it can be seen that the president did not withdraw into isolation in late 1937. Moreover, the evidence now at hand indicates that Roosevelt's naval quarantine foundered not only on American isolationism but also on Prime Minister Chamberlain's preference for appeasement. Without Britain's naval assistance, Roosevelt could not hope to "quarantine" Premier Fumimaro Konoye's Japan.74 With Britain out of the picture, Japan, as well as Hitler and Mussolini, would be "perfectly safe in discounting the influence of the United States."75

Though President Roosevelt was forced to put aside his naval quarantine of Japan, he did not retreat before the American isolationists. Rather he seized a new initiative to restrain the bandit nations. This became evident onJanuary 16 when La Grange reported that he sought for France 1,000 planes "now in use in the American Army." Shortly after that afternoon talk in the White House, La Grange wrote to Paris that his mission had so far been "crowned with success":

[Roosevelt] is well informed about what is going on in Germany and he appears to be very concerned about the effort being made by [France] in the field of aviation. ... It is his conviction that more and more Japan will depend on Germany and Italy and that, in order to contain the ambitions of

72 Moffat, "Diplomatic Journals," Feb. 10, 1938. 73 Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, May 13, 1938, Lord Elibank Papers, "Elibank-F.D.R.

Conversations, Oct. 1938." In August 1961 the late Lord Elibank kindly opened these papers in London to me.

74 James B. Crowley, in his Japan's Questfor Autonomy (Princeton, 1966), 358-378, shows that between mid-December and mid-January, just at the time Roosevelt was secretly seeking British cooperation for a naval blockade ofJapan, Premier Konoye and his civilian supporters in the cabinet reached the decision to pursue a "war of annihilation" against Nationalist China.

75 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 31.

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these three powers, England, France and America will be obliged to combine their efforts.

The President is thus completely in favor of all measures that the French Government might believe necessary to reenforce its air formations in time of peace and in time of war.76

The president's positive and direct actions to clear the way for the French purchase of the latest American planes show the validity of La

Grange's forecast. This, however, is the subject of another study.77

76 Amaury de La Grange to Senator Joseph C. Caillux, President of the French Senate, Jan. 21, 1938, La Grange Papers, Paris.

77 See my American Aid to France, 1938-1940 (New York, 1970).

franklin d. roosevelt and a naval quarantine of japan

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