frank knorek wilkes university thesis

Theory vs. Practice 1

Introduction

A downtown plays a crucial role in defining a community’s tax base, commerce, and

overall quality of life. A city’s downtown health is also one of the criteria against which

municipal leadership is judged. Downtowns across America, as well as in Luzerne County, have

largely been overlooked as areas to live, work, and play, with people instead choosing suburbs,

industrial parks, and malls. In many ways a community’s downtown is synonymous with its

sense of place and identity. In addition, a downtown has a certain innate charm that can never be

replicated in a suburb.

In the last decade, some of the cities located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, have

undergone a tremendous revitalization. Each municipality presents its own unique set of

strengths and weaknesses. I examine the processes and programs of downtown revitalization in

order to understand why some downtown revitalization efforts succeeded while others fail.

A comprehensive study of the downtown revitalization efforts in the four cities located in

Luzerne County has never been undertaken. This study is a panoramic analysis of downtown

revitalization efforts by the administrations in the cities of Hazleton, Pittston, Nanticoke, and

Wilkes-Barre from 1990 to 2005. A healthy downtown is the result of cooperation and a widely

shared vision among downtown stakeholders that results in a clearly articulated revitalization

strategy.

I begin with a brief history of American urban planning, which traces the evolution of the

city, some of its problems, and the role of planning in remedying those problems. The three eras

discussed, pre-industrial, post-war, and modern, reflect the challenges faced in solving urban

problems, and how the responsibility for urban problems and remedies shifted from federal to


state and local governments. The contemporary practice of urban planning is a comprehensive

process, not an endpoint, although it was not always the case.

History of Urban Planning

The study of urban planning has its antecedents in Europe during the transformation from

an agrarian to industrial society. This transformation spawned the reemergence of the market

city, where for the first time the merchant, not the noble or the land owner, became the social

leader. This period also saw the rise of the public square, something that had not been present

since the time of the Greek Polis. The result was the materialization of the market driven local

economy, and the link between commerce and governance.

The Pre-industrial Era

Immigration in the last 200 years is largely responsible for shaping the urban landscape in

America, relegating the new American city to “nothing more than a laboratory for studying the

natural experiment of social change” (Fagin 1967, 51). Up until the 1890s, no other nation had

ever seen a diverse influx of immigration on such a large scale. It is also theorized that mass

immigration is the precursor of today’s social inequity. It must be noted that during America’s

industrial revolution, no prior research was done on urban planning. The only studies that

resembled strategic planning were fragmented investigations, which were nothing more than

recorded local histories.

Prior to WWII, urban development in America was highly unorganized and sporadic, with

development only being undertaken in major metropolitan areas like Boston, New York,

Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago. Urban planning was unpopular in America during the 1920s

due to the “highly oppressive acts taken in the name of planning in totalitarian Russia” (Fagin

1967, 546). City plans were relegated to nothing more than public works plans during the Great


Depression. Additionally, “few, if any, means existed to carry out these narrow objectives”

(Fagin 1967, 546).

The post-war Era

With WWII over, Americans slowly returned to normalcy, and an era of prosperity began

in the 1950s. It is theorized that it was this second wave of domestic immigration that triggered

the move to the suburbs in order to escape the rigors of poverty and the constraint of living in the

urban environment, thus “supplementing the philosophies of individualism and private property”

(Fowler 1992, 116). Cities during this era did not exercise planned growth, rather they were

responding to growth out of necessity. Shortly after WWII, the constraints and paranoia of

negative public sentiment toward urban planning had largely eroded. Leadership capacities were

now being developed to carry out the new task of implementing the two “nationwide programs

of an interstate highway system and federal urban renewal projects” (Fagin, 1967 327). Up until

the 1960s, “no authentic philosophy statement on urban planning existed; instead, the philosophy

was largely based on the thoughts of planners and their plans” (Fagin 1967, 309).

The Modern Era

By the 1970s, leadership and the capacity to plan were now in place. However, it is

during this period that the federal government finally pulls the plug on the few remaining urban

planning initiatives which it controlled. Over the last forty years, the federal government

increasingly distanced itself from participating in urban renewal projects with:

President Nixon withdrawing funding for housing, urban renewal,and local planning programs; President Carter blocked newurban initiatives legislation; and President Reagan cutting the Federal Innovation Program and Federal Stimulus PlanningProgram that dated back to the New Deal (Peterson 2003, 327).


Over the last thirty years, discontent emerged among citizens and civic groups with the

ultimate failure of Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act. Criticism came when this federally

subsidized program could not achieve its goal of slum clearance and urban redevelopment.

Housing would seem to be the focus of the act, however, “the wording permitted the use of

subsidies for projects that destroyed residential areas and replaced them with commercial

development—nothing in Title I mandates the construction of low or moderate-income housing”

(Teaford 2000, 444). From this point on, federal urban renewal programs were decidedly “too

costly and destructive to personal liberty” (Teaford 2000, 454). Also during this time, planning

once again came under fire from citizen advocacy groups due to the increasing use of eminent

domain to displace citizens from their homes in the name of progress that might benefit the entire

community. Activists “sought to replace the top-down tradition of planning with a new bottom-

up approach, in which residents would play a major role” (Teaford 2000, 456).

One of the most important developments to take place during this era was the federal

government granting responsibility for urban development programs to state and local

governments. Federal Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) allowed state and local

governments more flexibility in the use of federal money for locally-identified projects. Many

practitioners criticize that federal block grants are too categorical, and that they do not address

the problems in which they intend to solve (Teaford 2000, 461). During the last twenty years,

federal funding for these grants has been cut dramatically. In the last three decades, the federal

government has granted nearly full jurisdiction to “states and localities, which caused them to

rely on their own ingenuity and resources to finance revitalization programs and their

implementation” (Teaford 2000, 460). Early on in this full transition of power, many state and


local governments were not equipped with policies and programs for this task. It has only been

in the last twenty years that most localities have embraced these responsibilities.

I will now shift my focus from the history of American urban planning to the literature

review. The literature review chronicles works that seek to explain how downtown revitalization

strategies have evolved.

Literature Review

In order to understand what policies, procedures, and characteristics comprise a

successful downtown revitalization strategy, I drew a link between the situations presented in the

evolution of urban planning to recent research on downtown revitalization. For the most part,

national research appearing in books and scholarly articles on downtown revitalization have only

focused on major U.S. cities, not the more abundant smaller municipalities with populations of

less than 250,000. The focus of this study is the administrations of four Pennsylvania third-class

cities. However, there is limited literature on small-city leadership and downtown revitalization

strategies. Some may ask why research on larger cities is not applicable to small municipalities.

A major reason is that the physical size of small cities is inadequate to meet the market

requirements of development projects found in larger cities. Simply put, “larger downtowns

have the assets of larger workforces, greater market areas, and more complementary attractions”

(Robertson 2002, 54).

Much of the research on municipal leadership and public-private partnerships (Robertson,

2002; and The Academy of Political Science, 1986) suggests that healthy downtowns are

reflective of strong sustainable partnerships between the public and private sectors, and are

devoid of conflict. A downtown stakeholder is anyone who has a vested interest in improving

the downtown’s health. Downtown stakeholders consist of city and county government,


downtown development authorities and corporations, the chamber of commerce, downtown

merchants, private investors and developers, and residents. Working partnerships provide the

essential foundation to “create more stakeholders by mobilizing both human and financial

resources, broaden the support base, and aid in promoting efficiency among the different

organizations by preventing duplicate efforts” (Robertson 2002, 54). In addition, these

relationships allow downtown stakeholders to actively engage in shared projects and programs

designed to marshal maximum resources by sharing risks for the benefit of the community,

thereby confirming Alex de Tocqueville’s observation that “extra-governmental associations are

America’s legacy to democracy.”

Nevertheless, conflict between the mayor, city council, and other downtown stakeholders

exists; in order to understand why, the qualities of mayoral leadership must be examined.

Research on mayoral conflict (Wheeland , 2002; and Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005) argues that

political institutions, at all levels, define the agenda within which politics takes place. The

institutional framework of local government places various influences on the mayoral executive

and their relationship with council and other stakeholders. Two models to evaluate mayoral

leadership and conflict include the executive mayor and facilitative mayor paradigms. Wheeland

(2002) argues that facilitative and executive mayors increase a mayor’s chances of being

successful if they (1) act in ways that are compatible to the formal institutional features defining

their roles; (2) build a consensus for a particular course of action; and (3) are supported by other

formal institutional features and benefits. Therefore, mayors in weak-facilitative mayor/council

systems have limited control and influence in setting agendas or advocating policy. When a

facilitative mayor begins to govern as a strong-executive mayor, city council members and other

downtown stakeholders may perceive conflict. On the other hand, if a strong-executive mayor,


who does not act in a facilitative manor (i.e., is unwilling to cooperate, communicate, and

coordinate with downtown stakeholders) on revitalization initiatives, council members and

downtown stakeholders could perceive conflict. In both models, if the mayor acts out of the

institutional boundaries, conflict could be perceived that endangers the revitalization process.

Although conflict is possible when people come together to make decisions, conflict can

be beneficial to group productivity as it prevents groupthink, and allows an open line of

communication on decision-making and policy outcomes. The factors most often cited that lead

to group conflict were gender, education, leadership credibility, and age. It was found that

“older mayors and council members perceived less conflict than younger mayors; female mayors

and council members perceived more conflict than males; tenure and higher education decreased

the perceived level of conflict; and the more credible or authentic the mayor is the less conflict

council perceived” (Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005, 455).

Studies of urban planning (see for example Fagin, 1967; Francaviglia, 1996; Ford, 2002;

and Peterson, 2003) indicate that a lack of planning, in the form of a comprehensive plan,

significantly influences the resulting business climate and overall downtown health. Frederic

Law Olmstead was the first to propose the administrative planning agency. In 1909 no such

office existed, and he theorized that the only time planning would work was when city planning

was conceived as a continuous, non-static, process. Olmstead thought that a comprehensive plan

was not a single report, and that it was never finished. The concept of planning, as portrayed in

history, has changed over time. This study examines planning techniques utilized during the last

fifteen years, using the variables of community surveys, market studies, property inventories, and

comprehensive plans. Olmstead also argued that unplanned, quick-fix approaches and large-

scale catalytic development projects would fail in the long-term if a needs assessment was not


first completed. This is because in many cases communities become enamored with the concept

of large-scale projects before it is determined that there is a real need for the project. Olmstead’s

needs assessment was the forerunner of what we know today as a market analysis. Local leaders

need to market and promote their downtowns’ assets in order to attract visitors and private

investors. Without a market analysis and comprehensive plan, local leaders and citizens may

support a project, but if the market does not support demand for a project, it should not be built

because it will ultimately fail. A market study also assesses a community’s current assets, can

provide information on how to enhance its marketability, and illustrates what type of

complementary attractions should be developed. Many times, a proposed downtown convention

center or movie theater is construed as a panacea that will spark additional investment. Without

the proper planning, the probability of a project failing may result in an overall lack of

coordination and direction for future development.

Due to tight municipal budgets, private investment is crucial in providing additional

funding for downtown development. If conflict erupts, it may cause private developers and

investors to abandon a project, which would serve as a warning to other investors to avoid

business in the community.

Various studies (Robertson, 1999; and Fowler, 1992) have sought to analyze downtown

problems, and then prescribe revitalization strategies. Revitalization strategies can be placed into

two categories: functional and physical.

Functional revitalization strategies are closely associated with providing a means to foster

cooperation and mobilize resources. Examples of functional strategies include the formation of a

non-profit downtown development organization, forging public-private partnerships, and

facilitating university-community partnerships.


Physical strategies address design, architecture, and aesthetics to create a sense of place.

Physical strategies include streetscape and façade improvement programs, open space, arts and

cultural exhibits, waterfront development, zoning ordinances, and design guidelines. It was

found that for a downtown to attract people over time, it needs to be pedestrian friendly and have

a sense of place. A sense of place is difficult to describe since it is largely subjective, but a

definitive sense of place is when a location feels like home and is a place most people want to

frequent and experience. Additionally, a sense of place includes an inviting ambiance that is

created from the elements of architecture, façade and signage, street layout, open space, and the

urban forest that come together to create this perception as a venue for community gatherings.

Many practitioners state that a downtown is best experienced on foot. However, closing the

downtown to traffic was found to be detrimental. Pedestrian traffic serves as a visual stimulus to

those in their automobiles by creating curiosity. Traffic flow into the downtown is important in

making the downtown a destination, rather than having cars simply pass through it. By fostering

activity at the street level, this causes an individual to “want to shop that trendy boutique, eat at

the crowded restaurant, or stop and browse the venders at a festival” (Fowler 1992, 88).

The most successful downtown revitalization strategy frequently cited in the literature is

the Main Street Program. The Main Street program is a four-point approach (design, promotion,

economic restructuring, and organizational development) that requires the hiring of a full-time

downtown manager that oversees revitalization efforts, fosters public-private leadership

capacities, and cultivates resources in order to forge sustainable downtown development. It has

been estimated that 1,200 communities across America have participated in the Main Street

Program. The Main Street Program should not be viewed as a panacea either. In most cases the

program is only instituted after prior conflict has subsided, or in municipalities that exhibit


minute levels of conflict. This is crucial if the downtown manager is to receive full support in

harnessing all available cooperation among stakeholders. All involved must be on the same

page.

Methodology

The small number of analytical research studies that focused on small city downtowns

motivated me to initiate this research to understand why some revitalization efforts are

successful while others fail. A comprehensive study of the downtown revitalization efforts by

the administrations of the four third-class cities in Luzerne County has never been undertaken.

In order to draw a direct connection between the works presented in the literature review

to my four test cities, I specifically crafted two hypotheses. When all stakeholders in a

municipality cooperate on downtown development, then the stakeholders will be more likely to

create and adopt a strategic downtown revitalization plan; and if a municipality creates a

strategic plan for its downtown, then the municipality’s downtown is more likely to experience

sustained economic growth.

In hypothesis one, cooperation among downtown stakeholders is the independent

variable, and strategic planning is the dependent variable. In hypothesis two, strategic planning

becomes the independent variable, and economic growth is the dependent variable. Both

hypotheses are causal and are in a positive direction.

In hypothesis one, the conceptual definition of my independent variable, cooperation, is

downtown stakeholders working together toward a common goal. A stakeholder, as opposed to

its use in a business context, is anyone who has a vested interest in the health of their downtown.

Downtown stakeholders include municipal and county government leaders, downtown

development authorities and organizations, the chamber of commerce, downtown merchants,


private investors and developers, and residents. I operationally define cooperation as

measurements of local newspaper stories for reported evidence of communication between

stakeholders in the form of meetings, conferences, and community survey results.

The conceptual definition of my dependent variable, strategic planning, is a supported

approach that addresses all aspects of development with clearly identifiable and measurable

goals, and contains programs and processes for implementation. There are two variations of the

definition of strategic planning referred to throughout this study, the “supported” and

“unsupported” comprehensive plan. A supported plan is a comprehensive plan that is universally

recognized by all stakeholders as the strategy that identifies downtowns’ strengths and

weaknesses, and as the strategy that will be followed in implementing revitalization initiatives.

An unsupported plan is a strategic plan that is not universally recognized by all stakeholders. An

example of an unsupported strategy is when a downtown development organization or chamber

of commerce prepares its own downtown revitalization plan without the authorization or

recognition of city government or other stakeholders. Unsupported plans may be applicable and

contain a solid strategy, but “unless city government authorizes and initiates the drafting of a

strategic plan, the unsupported plan is artificial in its purpose” (Robertson 2002, 55). Also, no

matter how much planning is independently undertaken by one stakeholder, “if city government

does not recognize these actions, those actions do not become universally accepted and in most

cases a great plan can go unused” (Robertson 2002, 57). As this example illustrates, when city

government builds a consensus among stakeholders and initiates the planning process the

likelihood of a supported plan resulting increases. For the context of this study, strategic

planning is assumed to mean a supported plan. The operational definition of strategic planning

was measured by the presence or absence of a comprehensive plan.


In hypothesis two, strategic planning becomes the independent variable. I kept the same

conceptual and operational definitions for strategic planning that were used in hypothesis one.

The conceptual definition of my dependent variable, economic growth, is a downtown that

demonstrates evidence of new retail businesses and professional offices being built or relocating.

I operationally defined economic growth by measuring primary and secondary economic

indicators in each city. Primary indicators include the estimated number of downtown workers,

total square feet of downtown office space, the percentage of vacant downtown office space, and

the number of retail businesses in operation. Secondary economic indicators include total

population percent change and aggregate revenue in the four municipalities tested. These

indicators will illustrate how downtown health influences a community’s tax base.

Of the four cities studied, Wilkes-Barre was the only municipality to have the primary

downtown economic indicator data recorded. This data came from the 1992 Greater Wilkes-

Barre Partnership Major Office Space Survey and the 2003 Diamond City Partnership

Downtown Wilkes-Barre Strategic Market Development Plan. In the remaining three cities, the

secondary economic indicators and newspaper reports of economic growth were substituted as

the measure for my dependent variable.

The three municipalities that did not record the primary economic indicator data raise a

serious question. If this data is not being recorded, then what criteria do city officials use to

make informed decisions in measuring revitalization goals and in prescribing strategies to

improve the economic health of their downtown? I freely admit that the secondary economic

indicators and population data is not a representative measure of downtown economic health.

However, these aggregate indicators serve as surrogate data in assessing the overall economic

health of a municipality. It is often stated by economic development and urban planning


professionals (Robertson, 1999; and Fowler, 1992) that the downtown contributes a considerable

amount to a community’s tax base. By focusing on total revenue, a measure of economic health

can be inferred. In my analysis of newspaper reports, I supplemented the secondary economic

indicator data with descriptive evidence from business leaders and residents that illustrates an

improvement in downtown economic health. This evidence includes an increase in downtown

activity and entertainment, new businesses opening, number of jobs created from development

projects, as well as a comparative assessment of the downtown to prior years.

The data for this study were collected in the fall 2005 and spring 2006 semesters by

examining local newspaper archives for articles on the topics of downtown revitalization and

downtown development from 1990 to 2005. I then contacted each municipality, chamber of

commerce, and downtown development organization in order to conduct interviews with city

officials on the status of their revitalization initiatives and to gather information on

comprehensive plans, downtown reports, and maps.

Each administration was tested separately for two reasons. First, each administration is

similar in its structure and encountered a declining downtown. Second, from the literature

review, I learned that strategic planning, precipitated by cooperation, is considered the

preeminent strategy for communities to remedy the problems facing their downtown. Data on

the structural features of Pennsylvania local governments came from the Pennsylvania Local

Government Manual. From this publication I determined all four municipalities governing

structures employed a mayor/council type arrangement. One difference encountered in

determining the governing structure, is that the cities of Hazleton and Wilkes-Barre are strong-

mayor/council systems, while Pittston and Nanticoke are weak-mayor/council systems.


By testing each administration separately, this method presents the history and individual

attitudes toward planning. Also, if each administration is not evaluated separately, it does not

allow for a comprehensive assessment of revitalization activities. All administrations took a

different approach to revitalizing their downtown. It is not reasonable to contribute the activities

of one administration for the conditions that are present because of actions taken by prior

administrations. The time period used for my observation allowed me to apply my hypotheses to

multiple administrations that were in office during the same election cycle.

Population data for the years 1990, 2000, and 2004 came from the United States Census

Bureau. Aggregate municipal tax data was retrieved from the Governor’s Center for Local

Government Services database. At the time of retrieval 2004 and 2005 data were not available.

All amounts were then adjusted for inflation by using the United States Federal Reserve inflation

index.

My purpose for testing the two hypotheses was to determine if the key factors leading to

successful downtown revitalization were present, and whether they influenced the downtown’s

economic health.

Results

Applying my hypotheses to the four test cities yielded the following results:

Hypothesis One

When all stakeholders in a municipality cooperate on downtown development, then the

stakeholders will be more likely to create and adopt a strategic downtown revitalization plan.


Hazleton

The Quigley Administration (1988-1995)

John Quigley was first elected as mayor of the city of Hazleton in 1987, and was

reelected in 1991. There were reports that demonstrated evidence of cooperation among

stakeholders, when the city was awarded a $978,000 low interest loan that aided in the

revitalization of downtown Hazleton. It was cited by Mayor Quigley that “cooperation among

all who had a vested interest in revitalizing this great city were the reason the grants were

awarded.”1 Hazleton was also presented with a two million dollar state grant for downtown

development. The money was used for downtown development, and to update the city’s

comprehensive plan. Downtown revitalization was one of the top priorities reported in the

Mayor’s 1993 State of the City Address.2

There was additional evidence of cooperation reported when the mayor and city council

approved a study for a downtown parking garage. Mayor Quigley said “building a parking

garage is a key project to revitalizing the city by dealing with the problem of a lack of parking in

the downtown district, council and I am actively listening to merchants concerns.”3 The mayor

and city council agreed to apply for a $750,000 state grant that was used for blight removal, as

well as a $150,000 loan for historic preservation.

There were also reports of conflict between Mayor Quigley and one city council member

over a downtown business center project. Mayor-elect and current city councilman, Mike

Marsicano, felt Mayor Quigley was financially benefiting from the development projects taking

place in the city.”4 There were reports of merchants and residents who felt Mayor Quigley’s

actions to revitalize the downtown were working.5 From the reports gathered, it is apparent

throughout the Quigley administration that downtown revitalization and historic preservation


were among his top priorities. However, criticism and conflict seemed to result from a single

councilman, Mike Marsicano. At times, Marsicano’s comments seemed to tarnish the mayor’s

revitalization initiatives. In 1994, city council voted to update the city’s comprehensive plan for

the downtown, and administer a community survey to residents and downtown merchants for

input on the plan. The decision to update to the city’s largely outdated 1980 comprehensive

plan, was found to be reflective of the cooperation among the mayor, city council, residents, and

downtown merchants.6 Based on this evidence, it appears that cooperation and strategic planning

were present. Thus, my hypothesis was confirmed.

The Marsicano Administration (1996-2000)

Mike Marsicano, a former councilman, was elected mayor in 1995. There were reports

that illustrated downtown merchants objected to the new mayor’s comments on the future of

downtown revitalization. It was reported that the mayor wanted to concentrate on developing the

Hazleton Municipal Airport, instead of the downtown.7 There was also evidence that downtown

merchants felt the new mayor was not following the strategies outlined in the updated

comprehensive plan. Instead, the mayor wanted to purchase all blighted buildings and tear them

down. Merchants argued that the mayor’s haphazard plan to tear down buildings was not

discussed with them.8 There was also evidence that the conflict between Mayor Marsicano and

city council over the plan to raze vacant main street buildings, moved U.S. Representative Paul

Kanjorski, to urge the mayor and council “to come together to make something work that is

important to the city’s future.”9

It would appear from reports that the mayor was not cooperating with city council or

downtown merchants on the initiatives established in the comprehensive plan. However, ground

was broken for the downtown parking garage project. My hypothesis was not confirmed.


Conflict was present, but downtown development and historic preservation projects outlined in

the comprehensive plan were conducted.

The Barletta Administration (2000 - present)

Louis Barletta, a former councilman, was elected mayor in 1999, and was reelected in

2003. Newspaper reports revealed examples of cooperation when the newly elected mayor

administered a survey to the chamber of commerce and downtown merchants that sought their

input on future downtown development.10 The results of the survey revealed the need to fix

traffic signals, recruit new businesses, and to construct additional parking spaces. A story on

Mayor Barletta’s first 100 days in office reported that merchants felt the mayor and his

administration were listening to their requests by cooperating with them, as well as the municipal

authority and city council in building a consensus by focusing on revitalizing the downtown with

an update to the 1995 comprehensive plan.11 Merchants felt confident in the job the new mayor

had done so far, and sensed they were close to a downtown renaissance.12

Another example of cooperation among the mayor and downtown merchants occurred

when mayor Barletta visited downtown merchants to check on the progress of the façade

improvement program, and to gather input on future downtown development projects.13 Based

on the evidence I observed, cooperation and strategic planning were present during the Barletta

administration. My hypothesis was confirmed.

Pittston

The Walsh Administration (1981-1997).

Thomas Walsh was the city of Pittston’s four term mayor. During his last two terms,

(1991-1997) newspaper reports about downtown development were sporadic. I relied on

interviews with city officials to understand the political and business climate in the downtown.


From personal interviews, I learned that city leaders recognized the need to plan for the

future in the mid 1980s. With the assistance of generous federal funding, the city drafted a

comprehensive plan in 1987 that not only focused on the downtown, but also addressed a variety

of residential needs including parking, paving, and recreational activities. When asked to

describe the relationship among stakeholders, interviewee said, the “Walsh administration and

the update to the comprehensive plan was the byproduct of cooperation among the mayor,

chamber of commerce, city council, and various city departments.”14

Based on the information uncovered during the interview with a city official, I observed

evidence of cooperation that lead to drafting a comprehensive plan. Thus, my hypothesis was

confirmed.

The Lombardo Administration (1998-2005)

Michael Lombardo was elected in mayor in 1997, and was reelected in 2002.

Newspaper reports revealed the condition of downtown Pittston, which told of blighted buildings

and vacant storefronts.15 During the election campaign, mayoral and city council candidates

presented a twelve-point plan to revitalize the city.16 The plan consisted of an update to the 1987

comprehensive plan and zoning ordinances, the implementation of façade and streetscape

improvement programs, an update to the property inventory database software, and a survey of

residents and downtown business owners. A survey of residents and merchants during Mayor

Lombardo’s first six months in office revealed evidence of cooperation, with those who lived

and worked in Pittston demonstrating a high approval rating for the strategies the mayor and

council had implemented to revitalize the city.17 Furthermore, I observed evidence of

cooperation when the mayor and city council agreed to apply for the Pennsylvania Main Street

Program.18 From news stories and interviews with city officials, I discovered the Lombardo


Administration exhibited multiple instances of cooperation and an updated comprehensive plan.19

My hypothesis was confirmed.

Nanticoke

Th e Sokolowski Administration (1987-1993)

Walter Sokolowski was elected mayor in 1987. I found evidence of cooperation during

the Sokolowski Administration when the mayor and city council authorized the Nanticoke

General Municipal Authority to apply for a grant for downtown development.20 Nanticoke

received federal and state grants to build the Kanjorski Center, a 40,000 ft2 multi-tenant office

building in the downtown.21

During the period of the Sokolowski Administration, I observed no evidence of strategic

planning. However, the mayor, council, and municipal authority did exhibit cooperation in

securing funding for the Kanjorski Center. Based on this evidence, my hypothesis was not

confirmed, because we have evidence of cooperation, but an absence of a strategic plan.

The Kobela Administration (1994-1997)

Wasil Kobela, a former Nanticoke police chief, was elected mayor in 1993. I observed

evidence of discontent among those who lived and worked in Nanticoke. Six Months after the

Kanjorski center was completed, it was reported many residents and merchants had a pessimistic

view of the downtown and the new Kanjorski Center because it had not spurred additional

downtown development that was promised by city officials.22 Another story reported that

downtown merchants felt they would not see a downtown renaissance due to a lack of parking,

and that their requests had not been taken into consideration by the new mayor.23 Merchants

cited a 1980 ornamental brick paving project that reduced the number of available off-street


parking spaces by half on Main Street.24 In response, the city created a temporary parking lot

when they razed the vacant State Theater.25

During the Kobela administration, I found no evidence of strategic planning. Conversely,

the mayor, council, and municipal authority did exhibit cooperation by creating a short-term

solution for the downtown parking situation. There was further evidence of downtown

development after the construction of the Kanjorski Center, when the Nanticoke Municipal

Authority purchased six properties for its revitalization project.26 No reference was made to a

downtown plan. I learned during a recent interview with city officials that the city of Nanticoke

never had a downtown revitalization plan.27 During the Kobela administration, there were few

reports of conflict between city council, the mayor, and municipal authority. I observed conflict

among the city officials and downtown merchants over the need for additional parking. In

response, the city created a commission to study the feasibility of a downtown parking garage

and created a temporary parking lot. Based on this evidence, I observed cooperation in short-

term problem solving, but a lack of strategic planning. My hypothesis was not confirmed.

The Toole Administration (1997-2005)

John Toole was elected mayor in 1997 and was reelected in 2001. During the Toole

administration, cooperation was observed among the mayor, city council, and the Nanticoke

Municipal Authority over the need for a comprehensive plan, but a plan never resulted.28 There

was also conflict present among the mayor, city council, and the municipal authority over a plan

to recruit businesses to the downtown.29 Further evidence of conflict emerged when two

members of the Nanticoke Municipal Authority resigned because of a lack of communication

between the mayor and authority. They also claimed that the reason the downtown was in poor

health was due to a lack of planning downtown development projects.30


Evidence of a lack of cooperation between the city and the Kanjorski Center’s tenant,

Health Now, was observed during the later portion of the Toole administration when the

Medicare claims processing company wanted to expand operations.31 A spokesperson for Health

Now cited that both the city and the municipal authority had not replied to its requests for more

parking. The company said it would leave if its requests were not taken seriously.32

Multiple examples of conflict and a lack of communication among the mayor, city

council, municipal authority, a State Representative, and a U.S. Congressman were observed in

the later years of Mayor Toole’s term.33 It was reported that State Representative John Yudichak

and U.S. Representative Paul Kanjorski, both from Nanticoke, were at odds concerning

downtown development due to a past feud.34 Evidence of a lack of communication and

cooperation was observed when city officials accused the municipal authority of holding

repeated closed-door meetings..35 City officials said “they do not know what downtown

development programs the city has access to, the financial status of grants, or the status of any of

its projects.”36

I did not observe evidence of strategic planning, but an attempt was made by

representatives of the South Valley Partnership to join with the Nanticoke Municipal Authority

to hire an urban planner and draft a regional comprehensive plan, but the municipal authority

dismissed the idea.37 During the Toole administration, I observed multiple instances of conflict

among the mayor, city council, the South Valley Partnership, state and federal representatives,

and municipal authority. Based on evidence of conflict found during the Toole administration,

and the absence of a strategic plan, my hypothesis was confirmed: conflict resulted in a lack of

strategic planning.


Wilkes-Barre

The Namey Administration (1987-1995)

Lee Namey, a high school art teacher, was elected to two terms as mayor of the city of

Wilkes-Barre. I found evidence of conflict during the Namey administration with reports of

internal conflict among city council and the city administrator over a proposed plan to renovate

the downtown.38 Further evidence of conflict was observed during when the mayor wanted to

bring a museum to the downtown, but the proposal did not receive support from city council to

pursue funding for a feasibility study.39 I also observed evidence of internal conflict between the

mayor and city council in a report that summed up the mayor’s two terms, and how conflict with

city council hindered the attraction of businesses to the downtown.40

I did not observe evidence of strategic planning during the Namey administration, but

there was evidence of planning undertaken by the Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Commerce with

their Downtown Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment Plan in 1992. However, the plan was not adopted

by the city. Based on evidence collected during the Namey administration, I found multiple

examples of conflict, and an absence of strategic planning. My hypothesis was confirmed

because conflict between the mayor and council inhibited strategic planning.

The McGroarty Administration (1996-2003)

Thomas McGroarty was elected to two terms as mayor of the city of Wilkes-Barre.

There was evidence of cooperation among city officials and the chamber of commerce reported

when Mayor McGroarty and Steve Barrouk traveled to Burlington, Vermont to study a model for

the revitalization of downtown Wilkes-Barre.41 Later in his term, there was evidence of conflict

reported among city officials and downtown business owners. Merchants felt the McGroarty

administration was not responsive to their needs for a better downtown, which included better


lighting, more parking, and more frequent police patrols.42 Additional evidence of conflict was

reported among the mayor, city council, and the chamber of commerce when the mayor was

criticized for his confrontational, go-it-alone approach by merchants and residents.43

Little evidence of cooperation during the McGroarty administration was discovered.44

I read numerous articles that illustrated an increased awareness for the need to revitalize the

downtown.45 However, these reports were accompanied by an increase in conflict between the

mayor and the chamber of commerce; these included the mayor not answering chamber or city

council’s questions about proposed downtown development projects, and the status of the stalled

downtown movie theater project.46 Lack of communication between the mayor and the chamber

was apparent when the chamber of commerce took out a full-page advertisement in a local

newspaper explaining its position on downtown revitalization initiatives to the mayor.47

Strategic planning during the McGroarty administration appears to have been absent.48

However, 2001 saw the formation of the Diamond City Partnership, a non-profit downtown

revitalization organization.49 Soon after its formation, the Diamond City Partnership held a

series of four visioning sessions that were designed to bring residents, merchants, city officials,

the chamber of commerce, and downtown development professionals together to formulate a

revitalization strategy.50 It appeared the participation of Mayor McGroarty was uncertain.51

Evidence of conflict was apparent at the conclusion of the last session when four groups emerged

with differing strategies to revitalize the downtown.52 In 2003, the Downtown Wilkes-Barre

Strategic Market Development Study was released, which was a comprehensive analysis of the

downtown market and its governance.53 Evidence of a comprehensive plan was not present.

Based on evidence collected during the McGroarty administration, I found multiple

examples of conflict among the mayor, city council, downtown merchants, residents, and the


chamber of commerce. Strategic planning was also absent.54 My hypothesis was confirmed,

because conflict produced no plans.

The Leighton Administration (2004 - Present)

Thomas Leighton, the owner of a real estate and insurance company, was elected mayor

in 2003. There were reports that indicated evidence of cooperation among the newly elected

mayor and city council. City officials agreed that the 1974 comprehensive plan and other

planning documents were outdated. In response, city officials voted to update the

comprehensive plan, amend zoning regulations, and authorized the Diamond City Partnership to

draft a downtown revitalization plan. Evidence of cooperation appeared in a report that

illustrated residents, the chamber, and downtown merchants supported Mayor Leighton’s vision

for the future of the city.55 In the summer of 2005, Mayor Leighton delivered his “I Believe”

speech to stakeholders. There appeared to be conflicting evidence as to whether the citizens

supported the mayor’s revitalization visions.56

I found evidence of support for strategic planning, when city officials voted to update the

1974 comprehensive plan and draft a downtown revitalization plan. It should be noted that the

city never had a downtown revitalization plan. In addition, during the initial years of the

Leighton administration, I found multiple instances of cooperation among the mayor, city

council, and chamber of commerce on downtown development issues and solutions. My

hypothesis was confirmed.

Hypothesis Two

If a municipality engages in strategic planning, then the municipality’s downtown is more

likely to experience economic growth. The primary indicators of downtown economic growth

were not recorded by the chamber of commerce or the governments of Hazleton, Pittston, and


Nanticoke. Therefore, I collected newspaper reports, aggregate revenue data, and population

data to use as surrogate indicators of economic activity. Kent Robertson (1999, 2002) has stated

in numerous articles that the downtown contributes a considerable amount to a community’s tax

base. The links among these indicators present an overall view of the economic exchanges and

health of each municipality.

Population statistics are also an important economic indicator. If a significant population

loss occurs, it may be credited to the death of the elderly population or a loss of young educated

workers. Population losses due to a lack of employment opportunities serve as an indicator of

economic health. The Brookings Institution’s 2004 study, A Competitive Agenda for Renewing

Northeastern Pennsylvania cited Northeastern Pennsylvania as having the largest population loss

of those 18 to 34 years of age during the last decade. I supplemented the population and

aggregate revenue data with information of economic conditions and job creation reported in

local newspapers.

Hazleton

The Quigley Administration (1988-1995)

The Quigley administration exhibited evidence of strategic planning when an update was

made to the comprehensive plan in 1995. I observed evidence of economic development in the

downtown district when a total of four million dollars in grants from the state and county were

awarded for downtown revitalization projects. Newspapers reported that theses initiatives were

the first downtown development in Hazleton in 30 years.57 This news story also illustrated a plan

to construct a seven story office and retail building, as well as an intermodal transportation

center, plus historic preservation of the Markle Building, which is the tallest building in

Hazleton.58 It was estimated that the projects would create 500 additional jobs in the


downtown.59 Strategic planning and funding for of economic development projects was present.

Therefore, my hypothesis was confirmed.

The Marsicano Administration (1996-2000)

A comprehensive plan was in place during the Marsicano administration. When Mayor

Marsicano took office many revitalization projects started by mayor Quigley were in the process

of construction. There were reports of the mayor focusing on developing the Hazleton

Municipal Airport and development of the Humboldt Industrial Park, instead of following the

plan meant for the downtown.60 Based on this evidence, strategic planning and the construction

of development projects were present, my hypothesis was confirmed.

The Barletta Administration (2000- present)

During the Barletta administration, an update to the 1995 comprehensive plan was made

in 2000. Evidence of economic development was observed in reports that compared the

declining downtown of the early 1990s to the renaissance that took place during Mayor

Barletta’s first term.61 A news story told of an increase in the downtown business occupancy

rate from 60% in 1998 to 90% in 2004.62

Over the past two decades, Hazleton’s population of Hispanic-Americans has increased

dramatically. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic-Americans composed five percent

of Hazleton’s total population in 2000. Hazleton’s Hispanic-American population has played a

key role in revitalizing the downtown. It was reported in 2004 that there were 250 Hispanic-

owned businesses in the downtown.63 Based on this evidence, strategic planning and the

description of a revitalized downtown confirmed my hypothesis.

From 1990 to 2004 Hazleton’s population decreased by ten percent. (see Table 1) In

addition, Hazleton’s revenue increased three percent from 1990 to 2000, and 71% from 2000 to


2004. (see Table 2) This data would appear to confirm the reports of economic growth from

1990 to 2005.

Pittston

The Walsh Administration (1981-1997)

As mentioned earlier, reports during the Walsh administration were sporadic. Based on

information gathered from an interview with a city official, Pittston drafted a comprehensive

plan in 1987 with the full cooperation of stakeholders.64 I learned the city had completed most of

the city-wide initiatives outlined in the plan by the mid 1990s. I then asked city officials to

describe some examples of economic growth that took place during the Walsh administration.

Examples included a dress factory converted into a professional center on main street, an Insalco

Supermarket that was converted into office and retail space, and construction of a downtown

building that housed a Dollar General and a gym. Evidence of businesses that relocated to

downtown Pittston included a dance studio, and the headquarters of Landmark Bank and Joyce

Insurance. It was estimated by one city official that the development activities during the Walsh

administration created 160 jobs in the downtown.65

Based on my interview with a city official, the Walsh Administration adopted a strategic

plan that led to development projects and an increase of economic growth in the downtown.

This evidence confirmed my hypothesis.

The Lombardo Administration (1998-2005)

During the Lombardo administration, the city of Pittston updated its comprehensive plan

in 1998. Primary economic indicator data was not available. Evidence of economic

development was observed in reports that illustrated a stagnant downtown business district lined

with vacant buildings.66 There were reports that illustrated how the revitalization programs


outlined in the 1998 comprehensive plan have attracted new businesses to the downtown.67 I

found that strategic planning was present, which resulted in businesses relocating to the

downtown. My hypothesis was confirmed.

From 1990 to 2004 Pittston’s population declined 18%. (see Table 1) From 1990 to

2000, Pittston’s total revenue increased 117%, but decreased to 14% from 2000 to 2003. (see

Table 3) This data would appear to confirm the reports of economic growth during the period

from 1990 to 2005.

Nanticoke

The Sokolowski Administration (1987-1993)

Strategic planning was not observed during the Sokolowski administration. Primary

economic indicator data for the city of Nanticoke was not available. There were reports of

economic development during this period with the construction of Kanjorski Center.68 The

project created 300 jobs in the downtown.69 Based on this evidence, strategic planning was not

present, while economic development was present. My hypothesis was not confirmed.

The Kobela Administration (1994-1996)

Strategic planning was not observed during the Kobela administration. There were

reports of economic development activity that resulted in an increase of eight Pennsylvania

Department of Labor jobs in the Kanjorski Center.70 There were also reports of the city

purchasing downtown properties due to a natural gas explosion that severely damaged four

buildings during the summer of 1993. It was reported the damaged downtown properties were to

be developed into retail space, “yet no plan for the properties had been solidified as of yet”, said

Municipal Authority, Chair Charles Margelewicz.71


Based on this evidence, strategic planning was not present, but there was evidence of

eight jobs created in the downtown. My hypothesis was confirmed, because there was no

strategic planning and a lack of job creation after the construction of the Kanjorski Center.

The Toole Administration (1997-2005)

Strategic planning was not observed during the Toole administration, as the city has

never had a market study conducted or a comprehensive plan drafted. However, there was an

attempt made by members of the South Valley Partnership to join the Nanticoke Municipal

Authority to draft a regional economic development and comprehensive plan, but the proposal

was rejected. There were reports that the city was advised by the state to hire a downtown

planner. In addition, Nanticoke Councilwoman, Yvonne Bozinski said, “that the seemingly

haphazard selection of developers and development sites in the economically flagging downtown

without a general overall plan is cause for concern.”73 Furthermore, Governor Ed Rendell said

“that the state will not invest anymore money in Nanticoke until it gets its financials in order and

a comprehensive plan in place.”74 It was reported that the city needed to have a comprehensive

plan in place by May 2005, or it would lose a $1.5 million dollar federal grant.”75

There was evidence of economic growth with the construction of two new pharmacies

and a new grocery store in the downtown. I estimate that an additional 150 jobs were created.

Conversely, it was reported that additional attempts were made for economic development with

the proposed construction of a multi-story parking garage and retail space that could have created

an additional 120 jobs to the downtown.76 Reports illustrated the city lost an estimated 300 jobs,

when the Kanjorski Center’s main tenant, Health Now, terminated its lease. Representatives

from Health Now claimed the city was unresponsive to its needs. The building is currently 89%

vacant, and is costing the Nanticoke Municipal Authority $33,000 a month to operate.


Based on the evidence observed, strategic planning was not present. Nanticoke also

encountered a net loss of 150 jobs during the Toole administration. My hypothesis was

confirmed, because the absence of strategic planning caused economic decline and job loss.

From 1990 to 2004 the population of Nanticoke decreased by 15%. (see Table 1)

Nanticoke’s total revenue increased 40% from 1990 to 2003. (see Table 4 ) Data for the year

2000 was not available. Due to a projected three million dollar deficit, city officials were

reviewing a decision to declare Nanticoke a financially distressed city under Act 47. Tax rates in

the city were raised to their highest amounts. Although this data would appear to confirm the

reports of economic growth during the period of 1990 to 2005, the true economic impact of the

vacant Kanjorski Center will not be known until the end of the 2006 fiscal year.

Wilkes-Barre

The Namey Administration (1987-1995)

Strategic planning was not observed during the Namey administration. There was little

reported evidence of economic development in the downtown. One report told of PNC Bank

relocating to Scranton. Downtown merchants commented that residents have little reason to go

downtown, and criticized the mayor for worrying about downtown aesthetics rather than

attracting businesses.77 Council president Thomas Leighton said, “the downtown is a

deteriorating relic of the past, something needs to be done to save it before it is too late.”78 Lack

of a strategic planning and reports of a downtown littered with vacant storefronts, confirmed my

hypothesis.


The McGroarty Administration (1996-2003)

Strategic planning was not observed during the McGroarty administration. Yet, there

was a visioning session held in 2001, and a downtown market study completed in 2003.

Economic growth was evident in the relocation of Alltel and Commonwealth Telephone to the

downtown. The relocation brought 350 jobs to the downtown.79

In testing my first hypothesis, the McGroarty Administration exhibited multiple instances

of conflict among the mayor, chamber of commerce, residents, downtown merchants, and city

council. However, economic development projects and jobs were created in the downtown. By

looking at the downtown economic health indicator data from 1992 to 2003, I found an increase

of 20% in the estimated number of downtown workers, a 97% increase in total office space, but a

three percent decrease in the number of downtown retail businesses. From 1992 to 2003 vacant

office space increased 18%. (see Table 5) From 1990 to 2004, the population of Wilkes-Barre

declined by 13%. From 1990 to 2000, Wilkes-Barre’s total revenue increased 48%. From 2000

to 2003 total revenue decreased 19%. (see Table 6) It appears that the downtown is

experiencing economic and workforce growth, while the overall population of the city is

declining. Based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence, my hypothesis was not

confirmed, because there was an absence of planning, but economic growth occurred.

The Leighton Administration (2004-Present)

Strategic planning was observed during the Leighton administration when city council

and the mayor voted to update the comprehensive plan, and commissioned the Diamond City

Partnership to draft a downtown revitalization plan. The city of Wilkes-Barre had not updated its

comprehensive plan since 1974. Strategic planning in 1974 was in response to the devastation

caused by Hurricane Agnes. This thirty-year gap in strategic planning is “believed to be caused


by the political realignment in Wilkes-Barre that took place following the devastating flood

caused by Hurricane Agnes” (Baldino, Hepp & Wolenski, 2004). As stated in hypothesis one,

Wilkes-Barre’s political history was rife with conflict, “being one of the few American cities to

experience the commission, city manager, and strong mayor forms of governance” (Baldino,

Hepp & Wolenski, 2004). During an interview with a city official I posed the question of why

there was an absence of planning. The elected official cited the conflict-oriented past

administrations, and a political culture was resistant to change.80 Furthermore, the chamber of

commerce drafted a downtown revitalization plan in 1992, but prior city administrations never

adopted it. All downtown development prior to the Leighton administration was unplanned.81

There were reports of economic growth when Mayor Leighton outlined the advancements

of downtown businesses with the opening of the chamber-owned Innovation Center in 2004, the

expanding of Guard Insurance Group, and the opening of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor

office.82 Mayor Leighton also stated that “he had solid funding and a committed tenant for the

construction of the downtown movie theater, which also includes housing and retail space.” 83

These activities were expected to result in the creation of 650 jobs in the downtown. I observed

evidence of strategic planning and affirmation of economic growth, which confirmed my

hypothesis.

Discussion of Findings

By clustering the results of my hypotheses, a clear pattern to compare the outcomes

emerges. (see Tables 7 & 8) In hypothesis one, I found that administrations that exhibited

evidence of cooperation, facilitated the updating and adoption of a strategic plan. In hypothesis

two, I found that the same administrations that confirmed hypothesis one, also encountered an

increase in economic growth. As expected, I observed confirmation of both hypotheses in the


Quigley, Barletta, Walsh, Lombardo, and Leighton administrations. Also as anticipated, my

hypotheses were negatively confirmed. I found that if conflict was present and a strategic plan

was not drafted, the downtown experienced economic decline and job loss. This finding was

observed in the Namey and Toole administrations.

Research on public-private partnerships (Robertson, 2002) indicated that healthy

downtowns are the result of sustainable partnerships. By mobilizing both human and financial

capital, the probability of drafting and adopting a comprehensive plan increases. Literature on

urban planning (Fagin, 1967; Francaviglia, 1996; Ford, 2002; and Peterson, 2003) explains that

communities that conduct market studies, inventory land use, seek public input, and update their

comprehensive plans, increase the probability of revitalizing their downtown and generating

sustained economic growth. I found these two theories to validate my observations of the

administrations that confirmed both hypotheses.

My observation of the Marsicano and McGroarty administrations were found to be

anomalies. It appears that the conflict-oriented Marsicano administration inherited the prosperity

produced by the planning activities of the prior administration. In contrast, the McGroarty

administration did exhibit evidence conflict and an absence of strategic planning, but the

downtown still experienced economic growth. From my observations, it appears that city

council and the chamber of commerce facilitated workforce development and recruitment of

businesses, in defiance of Mayor McGroarty’s criticisms. In both the Marsicano and McGroarty

administrations, conflict was present, but economic growth occurred because of prior or external

planning activities.

The findings for the Sokolowski and Kobela administrations were also unique. The

Sokolowski administration demonstrated that cooperation, not strategic planning led to short-


term economic growth occurring in the downtown. Strategic planning, land use inventories,

market analyses, and public input were absent during the Sokolowski and Kobela

administrations. From my observations, it appears the construction of the Kanjorski Center was

anticipated by city officials to generate additional downtown development. Eleven years after its

construction, the Kanjorski Center now sits vacant, and is costing the Nanticoke Municipal

Authority $32,000 per month to operate.

Research on urban planning indicated that unplanned, quick-fix approaches and large-

scale catalytic development projects will ultimately fail if a market analysis and strategic plan are

not first completed. Additional research also indicated that private investment, not public

ownership of development projects, is crucial if projects are to be financially sustainable in the

long-term. My findings support this theory.

Conclusions

To conclude, the contemporary problems facing the downtowns located in Luzerne

County are not insurmountable. In my analysis I sought to answer the question why some

downtown revitalization efforts were more successful than others. From my findings I found

that administrations that exhibited cooperation and embarked on strategic planning activities,

experienced sustained economic growth; administrations that exhibited cooperation in spite of

strategically plan, experienced short-term economic growth; and administrations that

experienced conflict and had strategic planning activities occur externally, saw an increase in

economic growth.

I also learned from earlier research conducted that strategic planning cannot occur in

absence of a written plan. In the literature review, I did not find reference to an unwritten

strategic plan. Municipalities can, however, plan in the short-term. The majority of practitioners


agree that most short-term problems have long-term consequences if not properly planned.84 The

Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (2001) states in its

planning guidelines, that a statement of community development goals and objectives must be

provided in a written document.

My main audience for this study was the Political Science Department at Wilkes-

University. That is not to say that city and county officials, and economic development

practitioners could learn valuable lessons from this study. My research and analysis provided

valuable insight into past and present situations facing the cities of Luzerne County in their quest

to revitalize their downtowns. Therefore, cooperation and strategic planning significantly impact

a community’s downtown economic health. From the theories presented and confirmation of my

findings, it becomes apparent that the adage holds true—there are those who fail to plan and

those who plan to fail.


Tables and Figures

Table 1: Municipal Population Data Percent Change 1990-2004.

City 1990-2000 2000-2004 1990-2004Hazleton -6% -4% -10%

Nanticoke -11% -4% -15%Pittston -14% -4% -18%

W-B -9% -4% -13% Source: Data taken from United States Census Bureau American Fact Finder. Summary File 1. <http://factfinder.census.gov/>.


Table 2: City of Hazleton Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data Total Revenue* Percent Change

2003 $21,186,465 71%2000 $12,382,988 3%1990 $12,075,694

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics. Governors Center for Local Government Services. 2005.<http://cax.agsci.win.psu.edu/CAXDRLOCGov.asp.>. *Amounts adjusted for inflation.


Table 3: City of Pittston Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of DataTOTAL

REVENUE*Percent Change

2003 $6,579,727 -14%2000 $7,679,406 117%1990 $3,549,395

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics. Governors Center for Local GovernmentServices. 2005.<http://cax.agsci.win.psu.edu/CAXDRLOCGov.asp.>. *Amounts adjusted for inflation.


Table 4: City of Nanticoke Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data TOTAL REVENUE* Percent Change

2003 $4,762,329 40%

2000 NA NA

1990 $3,406,984

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics.

Governors Center for Local Government Services. 2005.<http://cax.agsci.win.psu.edu/CAXDRLOCGov.asp.>.

*Amounts adjusted for inflation.


Table 5: City of Wilkes-Barre Downtown Health Indicators 1992-2003.

Indicator 1992 2003%

ChangeEstimated Number of Downtown Workers 10,000 12,000 20%Total Multi-Tenant Office Space sq. ft. 864,855 1.7Million 97%Office Vacancy % 9.00% 27.00% 18%Retail Businesses in Operation 200 195 -3% Source: Data taken from "Major Office Space Survey." 1992. Greater Wilkes-Barre Partnership (February): 1-6; "Strategic Market Development Plan for Downtown Wilkes-Barre." 2003. Diamond City Partnership (May).


Table 6: City of Wilkes-Barre Aggregate Tax Information.

Year Of Data TOTAL REVENUE* Percent Change

2003 $41,961,931 -19%2000 $51,601,019 48%1990 $34,778,412

Source: Data taken from Local Government Financial Statistics.Governors Center for Local Government Services. 2005.<http://cax.agsci.win.psu.edu/CAXDRLOCGov.asp.>. *Amounts adjusted for inflation.


Table 7. Comparative Results for Hypothesis One. IV Yes No

Yes Quigley (H) Marsicano (H) Barletta (H) Walsh (P) DV Lombardo (P) Leighton (W-B) No Sokolowski (N) Namey (W-B) Kobela (N) McGroarty (W-B) Toole (N) H = Hazleton, P = Pittston, N = Nanticoke, W-B = Wilkes-Barre


Table 8. Comparative Results for Hypothesis Two. IV Yes No Yes Quigley (H) Sokolowski (N) Marsicano (H) McGroarty(W-B) Barletta(H) DV Walsh (P) Lombardo (P) Leighton (W-B) No Kobela (N) Toole(N) Namey (W-B) H = Hazleton, P = Pittston, N = Nanticoke, W-B = Wilkes-Barre


Notes

1. The Times Leader. 1993. “Hazleton Restoration.” 19 June. p. 3A. 2. The Times Leader. 1993. “The State of Hazleton.” 24 January. p. 14A.

3. The Times Leader. 1994. “Hazleton Sets Study of Parking.” 26 November. p. 3A.

4. The Times Leader. 1995. “Downtown Nearing Crossroads Out-of-Town Development.”17 September. p. 3A.

5. The Times Leader. 1995. “Witness to Hazleton’s History Recalls Downtown’s heyday.” 19 September. p. 5A.

6. Barletta, Louis. 2006. Personal interview by author. Hazleton City Hall, PA. 31 March.

7. The Times Leader .1996. “Merchants Object to Mayor’s Comments About Downtown.”31 March. p. 3A.

8. The Times Leader. 1997. “Hazleton Mayor’s Demolition Idea Baffles Owners, Officials Say the Plan was Not Discussed with Them.” 5 July. p. 3A.

9. The Times Leader. 1997. “Kanjorski Urges Cooperation for Development.” 13 July. p.1A.

10. TheTimes Leader. 2000. “Merchants' Input Sought on Boosting Downtown Hazleton.” 1 April. p. 2B.

11. The Times Leader. 2000. “Downtown Hazleton’s Rebirth Near.” 30 January. P. 3A.

12. The Times Leader. 2000. “Confidence Still Reigns High on Hazleton Hiring A Downtown Manager to Direct Revitalization.” 23 January. p. 3A.

13. The Times Leader. 2005. “Hazleton Gets Some New Life: Redevelopment Programs Help to Turn the City Around.” 24 April. p. 3A.

14. Mullarkey, Jerry. 2006. Personal interview by author. Pittston City Hall, PA. 20 January.

15. The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate Envisions New Downtown.”30 April. p. 3A.

16. The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate wants to Rid Decay, Deterioration.” 12 October. p.3A.

17. The Times Leader. 1998. “Pittston’s New Mayor Draws Praise.” 12 July. p. 3A.


18. The Times Leader. 2003. “Pittston to Revitalize Downtown.” 18 December. p.12A.

19. Lombardo, Michael. 2006. Personal interview by author. Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Commerce, PA. 31 March.

20. The Times Leader. 1993. “Loan Pushes Nanticoke Plan Forward.” 20 April. p. 3A.

21. The Times Leader. 1993. “Travelers Data Office Could Bring 300 Jobs.” 14 January. p. 3A.

22. The Times Leader. 1994. “Wanted: A Bustling Nanticoke Now.” 4 November. p. 1D.

23. The Times Leader. 1995. “Nanticoke Parking Elicits Complaints.” 1 April 1. p. 3A.

24. The Times Leader. 1994. “A Quiet boom.” 2 January. p. 2F.

25. The Times Leader. 1996. “Nanticoke Officials Plan for More Parking.” 12 April. p. 3A.

26. The Times Leader. 1996. “Authority to Buy Six City-Owned Properties for Revitalzation Plan.” 23 January. p. 3A.

27. Bushko, John. 2006. Personal interview by author. Nanticoke City Hall, PA. 13 February.

28. The Times Leader. 2005. “Councilwoman: Downtown Needs a Plan, Nanticoke: Sporadic Redevelopment Efforts are Cause for Concern, Planner is

Advised.” 3 March. p. 3A.

29. The Times Leader. 1999. “Nanticoke Factions at Odds Over Possible Jobs.” 28 July. p. 3A.

30. The Times Leader. 2001. “Chairman, Member of Nanticoke General Municipal Authority Quit.” 17 July. p. 15A.

31. The Times Leader. 2000. “Decision Could Cost Nanticoke 300 Jobs.” 12 February. p. 1A.

32. The Times Leader. 2004. “Resignations Disable Nanticoke Municipal Authority.” 15 September. p. 1A.

33. Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2006. “Nanticoke Officials Bicker.” The Citizens’ Voice, 5 February.

34. The Times Leader. 2005. “Yudichak Rebukes Kanjorski.” 20 February. p. 1A.


35. Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2005. “Nanticoke Wants Answers from Authority.” The Citizens’ Voice. 24 February.

36. The Times Leader. 2005. “Controversy Pits Toole vs. Authority.” 9 January. p. 3A.



38. The Times Leader. 1993. “Business District Pleads for Repair.” 23 April. p. 3A.

39. The Times Leader. 1995. “Museum Plan No Hit with Council.” 26 April. p. 11A.

40. The Times Leader. 1995. “Publicity Pros Urge Wilkes-Barre to do its Homework A Little Mental Elbow Grease Regenerates Life in A City if the Focus is

Long-term Selling Points -- Not Quick Fixes, Experts Say.” 16 December. p. 1A.

41. The Times Leader. 1996. “Mayor to Tour Growth in Burlington, VT.” 16 April. p. 3A.

42. The Times Leader. 1999. “W-B Chamber Rips McGroarty.” 22 December. p.1A.

43. The Times Leader. 2001. “McGroarty not Delivering, Chamber Complains.” 18 March. p. 3A.

44. The Times Leader. 2002. “No Arguing McGroarty Means Well.” 15 August. p. 3A.

45. The Times Leader. 2000. “Remaking the Downtown McGroarty: Savior or Saboteur? Mayor’s Go-it-Alone Approach Draws Fire as well as Respect.” 23

January. p. 1A.

46. The Times Leader. 2001. “Developer Criticizes McGroarty: Mayor Won’t Give Answers about Theater.” 31 January. p. 1A.

47. The Times Leader. 2001. “Chamber’s Ad Takes Issue with McGroarty.” 17 April. p. 1A.

48. The Times Leader. 2001. “Public Input Sought on Downtown Wilkes-Barre.” 19 January. p. 1B

49. The Times Leader. 2001. “Future of W-B’s Downtown in All Our Hands.” 4 February. p. 3A.


50. The Times Leader. 2001. “Four Meetings That Could Save Wilkes-Barre.” 28 January. p. 3A.

51. The Times Leader. 2001. “Planners Wonder: Is McGroarty In or Out.” 30 January. p. 1A.

52. The Times Leader. 2001. “Adjourning into a Limbo of Indecision.” 29 March. p. 9A.

53. The Times Leader. 2003. “An Attitude Adjustment Can Only Help Downtown.” 29 May. p. 7A.

54. The Times Leader. 2003. “Lame-Duck Mayor Takes His Ball, Goes Home.” 30 December. p. 3A.

55. The Times Leader. 2004. “Revitalization won’t Come Through City Hall Alone, Expert Says, Private and Public Sectors Implored to Strike Balance That will

Redefine what a Downtown is all About.” 2 March. p. 3A.

56. The Times Leader. 2005. “More Than Just Belief: Leighton Criticized for His "I BELIEVE" Campaign, Wilkes-Barre’s Mayor Gets Specific.” 29 June. p.

1A.

57. The Times Leader. 1993. “The State of Hazleton.” 24 January. p. 14A.

58. The Times Leader. 1993. “Hazleton Restoration.” 19 June. p. 3A.

59. The Times Leader. 1995. “Downtown Nearing Crossroads Out-of-Town Development.”17 September. p. 3A.

60. The Times Leader. 1997. “Hazleton Mayor’s Demolition Idea Baffles Owners, Officials Say the Plan was Not Discussed with Them.” 5 July. p. 3A.

61. The Times Leader. 2000. “Downtown Hazleton’s Rebirth Near.” 30 January. p. 3A.

62. The Times Leader. 2005. “Hazleton Gets Some New Life: Redevelopment Programs Help to Turn the City Around.” 24 April. p. 3A.

63. The Times Leader. 2004. “Hispanics Cashing In on Hazleton.” 19 December. p. 2D.



66. The Times Leader. 1997. “Pittston Mayoral Candidate Envisions New Downtown.”


30 April. p. 3A.

67. The Times Leader. 2003. “Pittston on the Rise, Mayor and Businesspeople Attempt to Breathe Life Back Into the City.” 21 December. p. 1D.

68. The Times Leader. 1994. “Wanted: A Bustling Nanticoke Now.” 4 November. p. 1D.

69. The Times Leader. 1994. “A Quiet boom.” 2 January. p. 2F.

70. The Times Leader. 1995. “Job Center Makes Smooth Transaction Into New Building.” 1 February. p. 1A.

71. The Times Leader. 1996. “Authority to Buy Six City-Owned Properties for Revitalzation Plan.” 23 January. p. 3A.

72. Bushko, John. 2006. Personal interview by author. Nanticoke City Hall, PA. 13 February.



74. Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2004. “Nanticoke Ready for Fresh Start.” The Citizens’ Voice, 8 August .

75. Fox, Jon. 2005. “Turf War Dividing Nanticoke.” The Times Leader, 19 March.

76. Skrapits, Elizabeth. 2005. “Nanticoke Authority Outlines Building Project, Legal Action.” The Citizens’ Voice, 15 September.

77. The Times Leader. 1995. “W-B Needs Identity, Observers Say.” 14 December. p. 28A. 78. The Times Leader. 1993. “Core City Renewal Proposed.” 29 November. p. 18A.

79. The Times Leader. 2000. “Mystery Tenant Revealed Commonwealth Telephone Enterprises will Bring 350 Jobs to a Downtown Wilkes-Barre Building in

a Boost for the City’s Economy.” 17 May. p. 1A.

80. Leighton, Thomas. 2006. Personal Interview by author. Wilkes-Barre City Hall, PA. 12 April.

81. The Times Leader. 1996. “Shelved W-B Plan Revived Key to Wilkes-Barre’s Future Might Have Lain Unused for Years.” 27 March. p.1A.

82. Allabaugh, Denise. 2005. “Leighton: Things Looking Up for Wilkes-Barre.” The Citizens’ Voice, 16 April.


83. The Times Leader. 2004. “Wilkes-Barre Government, Leighton: Give me 10 Years.” 14 November. p. 3A.

84. Land Use Workshop. 2006. Regional Economic Indicators Forum. Pittston, PA. 25 April.


Bibliography

Baldino, Thomas J., Hepp, John, and Wolenski, Robert. 2004. Natural Disaster and Municipal Reform: The Case of Wilkes-Barre in the Aftermath of the 1972 Agnes Flood. Wilkes University: Work in progress.

This paper discuses the evolution of city government in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and the changes that took place in the post-Agnes era. Most relevant is the dialogue about the conflict-oriented political culture in not only Wilkes-Barre, but also in Luzerne County, and the political realignment that took place following the Agnes disaster.

Ford, Larry R. 2003. America’s New Downtowns: Revitalization or Reinvention? Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

This book discusses what factors compose a successful downtown. This book rates America’s major cities based on the authors criteria, and his subjective assessment. Most relevant is the author’s critical description of the downtown as a constantly evolving entity that may have never experienced a golden age. He also posits that a downtown does not have a consensus definition, nor how or if it can ever be revitalized.

Fowler, Edmund P. 1992. Building Cities That Work. Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

This book vehemently discusses the political and cultural philosophy of why the city can never be revitalized. The two main reasons for this are decentralization and deconcentration of society in the urban setting. Two key arguments in this book are most relevant: First, the argument made by architect and urban planner Christopher Alexander, who exclaims that we all have the ability to design spaces that work for us, but we are restricted due to zoning regulations. Second, Charles Darwin states that the better adapted a species is to its environment, the more likely it is to survive.

Francaviglia, Richard V. 1996. Main Street Revisited. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

This book considers the various types of urban architecture and landscape. He posits that a main street must evolve, but at the same time retain its unique character, for it is ultimately the people who contribute to this character. Architecture and landscape dramatically impact citizen’s mobility and pedestrian traffic flow. Most relevant is the five images of the city in discerning the types of downtown architecture and landscape.


Ihrke, Douglas M & Niederjohn, M. Scott. 2002. “Conflict On City Councils In Wisconsin.”Journal of Urban Affairs 27(October): 453-462.

This article focuses on determining what demographic and community characteristics lead to conflict between the mayor and city council. The study takes place in small Wisconsin communities with populations greater than 10,000. Most relevant is the discussion of group dynamics in decision making, and the demographic, social, government, and community characteristics in predicting conflict during the governing process.

Peterson, Jon A. 2003. The Birth of City Planning In the United States 1840-1917. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

This book discusses the American history of urban planning, reform and development. The author chronicles the significant eras of reform and their intended and unintended consequences. Most relevant is Frederic Law Olmstead’s vision of the administrative planning agency. In 1909 no such office existed, and it was his theory he posited, that the only time planning would work, was when city planning is conceived as a continuous, non static, process.

Robertson, Kent A. 1999. “Can Small-City Downtowns Remain Viable?” Journal of the American Planning Association 65 (Summer): 270-283.

This journal article discusses the critical role downtowns play in the health of not only larger cities, but also those that are designated as third-class. A healthy down town is an essential element of the prosperity of most non suburban small cities with a population ranging from 25,000 to 50,000. In this article Robertson conducts a survey and observable case-study of 57 small-cities in North America. Robertson identified several downtown problems that led to decline. He accomplished this by having leaders and citizens complete a survey that assessed the municipalities’ strengths and weaknesses. From the survey findings, Robertson prescribes a multitude of downtown revitalization strategies to counter the decline. Most relevant is the examination and exposure of significant differences between downtown development in small vs. large cities.

Robertson, Kent. 2002. “Main Street Partnering.” Economic Development Journal 1 (Fall): 53-59.

This journal article chronicles the advantages of cooperative relationships among multiple public, private, and civic entities, of which all have the mutual goal of downtown economic development. A wide variety of sustainable partnerships are instrumental in


promoting a viable city. It is important to note the absence of local politics in this article. Most relevant, is what is possible when the CED actors work in concert coordinating their activities.

Schnore, Fagin. 1967. Urban Research and Policy Planning. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 2-547.

This classic book outlines the history and evolution of urban planning in the United States from the industrial revolution up to the mid 1960s. Also discussed is the importance of social augmentation and civic participation in the development process. Most relevant is the discussion of the history of urban planning and policy as a vehicle to explain the modern planning process and the subsequent theories of the era.

The Academy of Political Science. 1986. Public-Private Partnerships: Improving Urban Life. Montpelier: Capital City Press.

This book is a compilation of essays and case-studies that discusses the history and evolution of public-Private sector partnerships. The business sector is just as important as the governing entity when it comes to establishing a successful community. Most relevant is the example of how these partnerships can unanimously define common community goals and values. This source is also valuable in defining and measuring what is a successful chamber of commerce.

Wheeland, Craig M. 2002. “An Institutional Perspective on Mayoral Leadership: Linking

Leadership Style to Formal Structure.” National Civic Review 91 (Spring): 25-39.

This fascinating journal article analyzes the institution of the municipal executive, and the various influences on the two mayoral leadership models-the executive mayor and facilitative mayor. Most relevant is the findings of this article in predicting mayoral behavior and the willingness to cooperate with the other actors in the development process.

Primary Sources

Downtown Wilkes-Barre Retail Study. (1990). Wilkes-Barre, PA: Wilkes-Barre Downtown Committee. Draft.

This study presents the results of research conducted on area residents to gather data on downtown and mall shopping patterns; socio-economic and demographic characteristics. From the data gathered, a downtown improvement and market development plan was then drafted. The data gathered is essential to comparing both short-term and long-term retail trends in Luzerne County.


Governor’s Center for Local Government Services. (2001). The Comprehensive Plan in Pennsylvania. Planning Series #3. Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development.

This publication discusses land use planning procedures, legislation, and resources. Furthermore, it outlines nearly every aspect of the comprehensive plan from drafting to implementing. The conclusion provides information to Pennsylvania municipalities for the many planning resources available from the Commonwealth.

Major Office Space Summary. (1992). Wilkes-Barre, PA: Greater Wilkes-Barre Partnership.

This study presents the findings of research conducted on both downtown and non-downtown office buildings in the City of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. In addition, the study analyzed total ft2; cost per ft2, and vacant ft2. The information distilled in this study aids in understanding current and long-term trends in office space use for the city.

Pennsylvania Department of Municipal Government. The Pennsylvania Local Government Manual. Pennsylvania State and Local Government Overview.Harrisburg: Department of Municipal Government. 6-3 – 6-6.

This Pennsylvania local government document gives an intimate overview of the institution of state, local, and county government. Also discussed, are state and constitutional provisions that govern municipal classifications, legislative jurisdiction, the authority to levy taxes, and the Home Rule Charter. Most relevant to my proposed paper is the discussion of third-class cities mayoral institution and its relationship with city council.

Strategic Market Development Plan for Downtown Wilkes-Barre. (2003). Wilkes-Barre, PA: Diamond City Partnership.

This market study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the functional and physical components of downtown Wilkes-Barre. The data compiled examines both past and future trends of the downtown’s assets. The conclusion of this study provides the foundation for a formal comprehensive downtown revitalization plan by recommending six revitalization strategies.


Teaford, Jon C. 2000. “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath.” The Fannie Mae Foundation (11): 443-465.

This journal article discusses the failure of the Title I Federal Urban Housing Act to revitalize urban neighborhoods from the post WWII era until the mid 1970’s. This was in response to the prewar Progressive and New Deal era. This in-depth analysis explains the evolution of federal urban planning programs all the way up to the federal CDBG cuts of the Reagan Administration. Most relevant is the explanation of how those failures ultimately made federal government intervention in the planning process unwanted by city officials, which created a reciprocal relationship, whereby state and municipal governments were left to fend for themselves.


Acknowledgements

Writing this study was a significant challenge. The author would like to thank the following

people and organizations that helped make this project a reality:

Dr. Thomas Baldino

Dr. Kent Robertson

Mr. John Jablowski

Wilkes University Cooperative Education Office

Greater Wilkes-Barre Area Chamber of Business and Industry

Wilkes-Barre Diamond City Partnership

Joint Urban Studies Center

Osterhout Free Library

Mayor Thomas Leighton

Mayor Louis Barletta

Mayor John Bushko

Mr. Michael Lombardo

Mr. Jerry Mullarkey