UNIVERSITY OF KENT

Why Did France Evoke Article 42.7

International Relations

James Peters

1/12/2016

Words: 2,990

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On the night of Friday the thirteenth of November 2015 the French city of Paris was attacked by a group of terrorists. The attack was later attributed to the Islamic State and President Hollande of France declared the attack to be an “act of war.” Surprisingly, France chose to invoke not article 5 of the NATO treaty or Article 222 of the TEU but rather article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, a mutual support clause. While article 5 of the NATO treaty would have considered the Paris attack as “an attack on one is an attack on all” and article 222 of TEU was written as a response to the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004, and was intended to be used in the event of future terror attacks on a Member State of the European Union, the French President 1

invoked a clause that is vaguely worded at best and is fairly open to interpretation as to how the other 27 Member States of the European Union are obliged to come to France’s aid.

The question then becomes why did France invoke article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty instead of Article 5 of NATO (which was invoked for the first time ever by the United States following the 9/11 terror attacks) or the European specific treaty clause intended to enact European collective security and self­defense in response to a terror attack. This paper will look at the theoretical framework of structural realism and constructivism and contrast the two to determine if one or the other can offer a more concise explanation as to why the French president and state responded to the terror attacks in the manner that they did. And by extension, the paper will beg the question of, are international relations theories developed in the 20th century still sufficient to explain international relations in the 21st century?

Structural Realism

Structural Realism is the name given to the International Relations theory developed by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics. Waltz’s theory came as a response to the rise and failings of positivism to provide a sound explanation of International Relations during the Cold War. While his argument follows much of the same logic of classical 2

realism and embodies similar assumptions about human nature, the key difference is found in 3

the ontology of his argument.

For classical realists and structural realists the state is the primary actor in the international system. The two schools make different assumptions about the motives that drive 4

politics between states. And as a result, both schools believe that states exist in a system of international anarchy, but structural realists believe this anarchy results from the structure of the 5

international system. Waltz pays special attention to what he sees as the fallacy of logic to focus 6

1 (Breeden 2015) 2 (Waltz, 1979, p.81) 3 (Mingst, 2008, p. 68) 4 (Resnick, 2011, p. 152) 5 (Waltz, 1979, p. 114) 6 (Waltz, 1979, p. 81)

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on the way that the units interact as being a product of agency. Instead, Waltz suggests that states interact the way that they do with a limited amount of agency as a product of structure. 7

While proto­realism authors like Hobbes and classical Realism authors like Hans 8

Morgenthau tend to focus on a level one analysis (building from the idea that inherently flawed 9

and selfish human nature is embodied by the state and is the driver of politics) for explaining 10

the behavior of political units, Waltz prefers to look at the structure of the system as the independent variable and the resulting actions of states as the dependent variable (level three analysis). This difference in ontology is critical; it indicates that instead of states being motivated to gain as much power as possible as postulated by classical realists, there is a limited power 11

distribution of resources and hard power that is unequally divided between states and thus states will seek a balance of power between themselves to ensure security. This then results in the 12

formation of one out of three possible systems formations: unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. 13

Waltz really delves into the details of various permutations of power division throughout chapter eight of his 1979 piece. The main idea is that a bipolar world (a world dominated by two superpowers) would produce the most stable international system because the distribution of power would never be in question and two superpowers of roughly equal power distributions would have more to lose in a great power war than they could possibly gain. This then leads to 14

predictability between the two sides that cannot exist in a multipolar world dominated by a number of great powers locked into a interdependent and ever­shifting system of alliances, like 15

the world prior to the onset of the first and second world wars. At the time of his writing, the world was dominated by a bipolar system that divided power between the United States and its Western European allies and the Soviet Union with its allies throughout Asia and Eastern Europe. Following the collapse of communism and the USSR, this has left the United States and its Western European allies as the undisputed unipolar alliance in the world.

While a multipolar world is characterized by the ever­present possibility of miscalculation that can rapidly escalate to a great power war and a bipolar world is characterized by rapid responses to proxy conflicts by the two superpowers that tend to lead to protracted proxy wars that last until one power withdrawals its support (Vietnam, Afghanistan and Angola/Mozambique), it would seem that a unipolar world dominated by one cultural and military narrative sees conflict proliferate where its interests intersect with minority cultural

7 (ibid) 8 (Hobbes, 1994, p. 74) 9 (Mingst, 2008, p. 65) 10 (Hobbes, 1994, p. 76-8) 11 (Morgenthau, 2014, p. 58) 12 (Waltz, 1979, p. 116) 13 (Waltz, 1979, p. 164-5) 14 (Waltz, 1979, p. 170) 15 (Waltz, 1979, p. p 171-2)

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opposition. The current unipolar world dominated by Western values and predominantly US military primacy supported by the vestiges of European colonial power has seen the greatest challenges to its dominance come not from rising great powers like China or a resurgent Putin­era Russia, but from persistent armed resistance organizations in the Middle East. The cultural counter­narrative offered by groups like ISIL in the Middle East have thus far been the greatest drain on the unipolar governance of the West. And when the age of mass communication and globalization is added into account, terrorist attacks like the one on New York City in September 2001 or in Paris in November 2015 are prime examples of the security challenges faced by the unipolar order.

To understand the French response to the attack on Paris using a structural realist framework it is important start by looking at France’s regional dynamic. Regionalism in Europe has been made largely possible by major American commitments to Western European security and have thus enabled the region to economically and politically integrate in a way that would have seemed impossible even a century before. This then has largely shielded Europe from 16

security concerns beyond the continent, but did nothing to end economic and political regional rivalries on the continent (primarily those between West Germany, France and the UK). French desire to remain a great power on the European continent and to avoid the emergence of a German regional hegemon has been showcased by major French support in starting the European integration project, by the French push for projects that would give the French greater influence 17

in the areas now encompassed by the European Neighborhood policy, and by France’s 18

continued efforts to project its influence abroad in its former colonies. 19

All of these efforts to raise European French political capital have been reflected in the French attitude towards the European Union as an institution. The desire for France to remain a policy setter and not a yes man was exemplified by French condemnation of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, by France’s rejection of the “constitutional” Treaty of Nice, the largely French push for the intervention in Libya in 2011, and most importantly by France’s recent decision to enact article 42.7 (the mutual support clause) over article 222 TEU (the mutual solidarity clause). Had France opted to invoke article 222 TEU, it is stated in 222 (3) TEU that 20

in the event of an attack on a member state, “the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [will take point on the response].” Thus, France would have turned responsibility for its 21

security over the European community.

16 (Wivel, 2004, p. 11) 17 (Hitchcock 1997) 18 (Murphy and Tooze 1991) 19 (Treacher 2003) 20 (Traynor 2015) 21 Treaty of Lisbon Article 222 Paragraph 3

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Instead, President Hollande invoked article 42.7 which reads, “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.” Because it makes no reference 22

to any of the European institutions, the article gives France the freedom to bilaterally negotiate with the other member states to coordinate a response that fits to French national security interests instead of European CSDP. By choosing to invoke article 42.7 over 222 TEU, France made the conscious choice to act as an independent regional European great partner. It chose to use the established alliance system and regional institution as a means to enhance its own national power and influence instead of allowing the attack on Paris to turn more security sovereignty to Brussels.

This structural realist interpretation is further reinforced when noting that France chose to enact a European support clause over the defense clause offered by article 5 of the NATO treaty. Article 5 reads, “an armed attack against one…shall be considered an attack against them all,” 23

and a legal precedence already exists for invoking this article in the event of a terrorist attack (the US invoked article 5 following the 9/11 attack). However, enacting article 5, like invoking 24

article 222 TEU over 42.7 TEU, would have turned French security over to an international institution. Instead as a regional great power, France has chosen to take autonomous steps to project its power and utilize international institutions to its national advantage without ceding sovereignty. By not turning to a military alliance headed by the world’s unipolar power, France has sought to use international alliances as alliances of convenience to elevate its status as both a regional and world great power instead of asking its allies to come to its rescue.

Constructivism

Constructivism emerged in the 90s as a major school of thought in response to the academic void left by the collapse of Communism and the seeming inability for the two major schools of international relations theory (realism and liberalism) to explain the collapse or the new direction that world politics was beginning to take. While Neorealists focus on material power capabilities and the structure of the international system for their ontological view of the world, constructivists take on a very different set of assumptions. Instead, constructivism subscribes to the power of language and society to assign meaning, power, and identity, and thus constructivists believe that state behaviour is then driven by “elite beliefs, identities, and social norms.” The notion of anarchy then only exists insofar as the members of one state don’t 25

22 Treaty of Lisbon Article 42 Paragraph 7 23 The North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 24 (Collective Defense - Article 5 2015) 25 (Mingst, 2008, p. 72)

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identify with others beyond its borders. Identity then becomes a driving vector of international 26

relations.

Furthermore, because value to material items is socially given, this then separates constructivism from the same materialistic based power assumptions of a “rationalist” school like neorealism. Therefore, different states are driven to act for different reasons that re­enforce 27

the identity that they have created for themselves, the British appeased the Germans prior to WWII because Britain’s historical and political role in Europe had been as a peace maker and the Americans did not attempt to appease the regime in Vietnam because of their self­perception as a capitalist superpower that was ideologically staged to stop the spread of communism. The 28

notion of ‘power’ then takes on a radically different definition for constructivists. 29

Power exists in discursive terms and is manifested in the notions of language, culture and ideas. And the power of identity creation and what anarchy means to different actors greatly 30

affects the power dynamics of international relations; it even allows for non­state actors to take on identities that would empower them to rival the neo­realist assumption that the state is the final actor with the final say in world politics. This notion can be greatly demonstrated by the 31

weak nationhood in many post­colonial countries where they were given an artificial statehood identity that may not have corresponded to thousands of years of prior tribal or religious identity or by how terrorist organisations like ISIL are empowered when their identity is affirmed and they are treated as an ideological unit by Western governments and media.

Therefore, when examining the French President’s reaction to the Paris attacks, the first thing for a constructivist to do would be to analyse the language used. Hollande said that France was at war with a group of Daesh jihadist terrorists that targeted France because the country was the homeland for human rights. First off, by saying that France is at war, the French president is 32

solidifying the French identity. This connects to the idea that anarchy is a social construct that exists outside of self­identification within and between states. And by claiming that it is not just an attack on France, but on French heritage and the idea of human rights, Hollande is evoking the imagery and notion of France as being a Great Power that has been a beacon for democracy and liberalism ever since the French Revolution. That social imagery and iconography is a powerful point of pride within the fabric of the French nation.

And similar to how the American reaction to Vietnam was one to re­enforce its identity as a great power, France too has taken strides to prove its great power status in its response to the

26 (Mingst, 2008, p. 73) 27 (Mingst, 2008, p. 74) 28 (Hopf, 1998, p. 173) 29 (Mingst, 2008, p. 73) 30 ibid 31 (Hopf, 1998, p. 175) 32 (Breeden 2015)

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Paris attacks. Hollande’s choice to evoke Article 42.7 instead of 222 TEU or article 5 of the NATO treaty was the French president’s way of solidifying a ‘French’ response. It empowers the nationhood of France for it to paint itself as a leader in the now global struggle to eradicate ISIS from Syria. It empowers the notion that France is one of the core members of the EU. And instead of having to ask the Council and Commission to coordinate a response, France is able to evoke both European solidarity and a European identity whilst maintaining a notion of French exceptionalism as a European leader.

This interpretation is also re­enforced by France opting not to ask America for help by evoking article 5 of the NATO treaty, but instead bringing the issue before the UN Security Council where it has an equal say, and an equal vote to the United States in negotiating a coordinated global response to the Paris attacks. Thus, by enacting article 42.7, Hollande has 33

opted for the option that most clearly empowers French nationhood, has done the most to project French power, and has reinforced the idea of France as both a regional great power within Europe (at a time when German regional hegemony appears to be on the rise in the wake of the financial and refugee crises) and a global great power equal to the United States, Russia or China to both the domestic French audience and foreigners around the world.

Conclusion

The first notable take away from the Paris attacks would be the long list of possible reactions that France could have taken. President Hollande had a number of legal and institutional solutions that he could choose from, from acting unilaterally to finding a European solution to reaching out to the wider global community. Furthermore, his ability to do just that would suggest that the ontology for both neorealism and constructivism alone may not offer the entire solution when analysing the Paris attacks using international relations theory.

While neorealism was an excellent theoretical framework to use in the 20th century, one of its key weaknesses today is recognizing the rising role of a whole host of non­state actors in global politics today. Institutions like the EU and the United Nations are increasingly able to offer states a wide range of multilateral solutions to unitary problems whilst non­state organizations like ISIL are increasingly able to coordinate attacks on states and civilian populations despite proportionally huge differences in traditional measures of hard power capabilities. Neorealism is also blinded by the power of language and of the media. Because the media is not a traditional hard power resource, its growing role in the information age has been underestimated by neorealists who maintain that structure and balance of power alone are the strongest indicators for the behaviour of states.

33 (Breeden, 2015)

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Constructivism faces the critic of being too subjective at points to offer objective explanations. While it is slightly better adapted to accommodating the growing plurality of actors in global politics in the 21st century, its notions of power constructed through language, propaganda and culture cannot change the fact that traditional notions of hard power still dictate a lot of state motivations such as Russia’s attempts to modernise its military but is stymied by anaemic economic growth despite Putin’s ‘tough man’ rhetoric. Ultimately, 20th century solutions are still applicable when used in a mixed methods/theories approach but the complicated nuances of the 21st century delineate that International relations is no longer defined by one solid ontology such as the state or national identity upon which all actions of international relations can be construed.

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