foreshore terminal g.m. pettai road, harbour …€¦ · petroleum industry plays a crucial role in...

1

ERDMP document for Foreshore Terminal Chennai, Tamilnadu

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED

FORESHORE TERMINAL G.M. PETTAI ROAD,

HARBOUR PREMISES, GATE NO. 2

ROYAPURAM, CHENNAI- 600 013 TAMILNADU

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

AND

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (ERDMP)

MAY - 2014

Environmental Technical Services Pvt. Ltd.

C-14-D, Gangotri Enclave, Alaknanda,

New Delhi – 110019

Telefax (011) 40670335 Mobile: 0-9810830190 E-mail –[email protected]

2


The ERDMP Contents (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 5)

CHAPTER No. TOPIC PAGE No CHAPTER A Foreword 6

Acknowledgment 7

Executive Summary (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 4) 8-10

Definitions (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 2) 11-13

List of Abbreviations 14-15 Industrial Description 16-18 Facilities 19-21

CHAPTER -1 Classification of Emergencies (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6)

22-25

Implementation schedule (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 7) 26 CHAPTER –2 Consequences of defaults or non-compliance (ERDMP

regulation 2010-clause 8) 27-28

CHAPTER –3 Statutory requirements (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 9) 29-30 CHAPTER –4 Pre-emergency Planning (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 10) 31

Hazard Identification 32 Wind speed & Direction, Meteorology 35

Hazop Study 37-58 Risk contour, Risk analysis & Risk assessment 62-70 Causes of Disaster & Consequences 71 GAP analysis and mitigation measures

72-81

CHAPTER –5 Emergency Mitigation Measures (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 11)

82

Basic requirements of ERDMP 83

Resource Mobilization 84-85 Incident Preventing Measures & Procedures 86 Safety MIS 87-91

CHAPTER–6 Emergency Preparedness Measures (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 12)

92

Emergency Drills & Mock Exercises 94-95

Mutual Aid 96-105 Mutual Aid Training 106

CHAPTER -7 Response Procedure & Measures (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause13)

107

Zoning & Maps 108

Man Power Data 111-114

Disaster Scenarios and its management plan 114-124

CHAPTER -8 Emergency Organization and Responsibilities (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 14)

126

Organogram Chart 127

Roles & Responsibilities 132-142

Siren Codes 142 CHAPTER –9 Infrastructure (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 15) 143

Emergency Control Center (ECC) 144

http://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-1.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-1.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-2.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-3.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%204.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%205.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%206.docxhttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%207.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%208.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%209.doc

3


Assembly Points 146

Evacuation and sheltering 147 CHAPTER –10 Declaration of On-site & Off-site Emergencies (ERDMP

regulation 2010-clause 16) 148-150

CHAPTER –11 Resource for Controlling Emergency (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 17)

151

Fire & Gas Detection System 152 Fire Protection System 152

Rescue Facilities & PPEs

153

Fire Fighting Systems 154

CHAPTER –12 Demographic Information (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 18) 155

Neighbouring Population 156

CHAPTER –13 Medical Facilities (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 19) 158

CHAPTER –14 Evacuation (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 20) 161

Evacuation & Rehabilitation 163

Previous Drill Report 164

CHAPTER –15 Information to Public (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 21) 165-166

CHAPTER –16 Roles & Responsibilities of External Agency (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 22)

167-170

CHAPTER –17 Reporting of the Incident (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 23) 171-174

CHAPTER –18 Action after reporting of Incident (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 24)

175-176

CHAPTER –19 Termination of Emergency (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 25) 177-178

CHAPTER –20 Emergency Recovery Procedures (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 26)

179-183

CHAPTER –21 ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 27)

184-186

CHAPTER –22 ERDMP for tank trucks carrying petroleum products (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 28)

187-192

Truck dispersal plan 193

CHAPTER –23 Integration of the ERDMP with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 29)

194-196

CHAPTER –24 Security threat plan (ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 30) 197

Preventive Measures 198

Bomb Threat Assessment Committee & Responsibilities 202

Search Team 204

Evacuation of Area 206

Evaluation of the Bomb Threat 206

Procedure after Identification of Suspected Object 207

All clear/completion certificate 208

Procedure for Dealing with a Bomb 210

CHAPTER-25 Annexures 211

Annexure – 01: Material Safety Data Sheet 212-216

Annexure – 02: Information Sheet for Medical Management 217

Annexure – 03: Industrial First-aid 218-221

Annexure – 04: General Guidelines for Neighbouring People 222

Annexure – 05: Role of SDRF & NDRF 223

Annexure – 06: Contact Nos. of NDRF and NIDM 226

http://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%2010.dochttp://galaxy/S%26EP/ERDMP%202012/Chapter%20-%2011.doc

4


Annexure – 07: List of Important Telephone Numbers 232

Layout, P & I Drawings 233

5


Chapter - A

6


FOREWORD

This refers to Communication No. M (I)/DMP/1/2008 dated 28th July 2010, from Secretary, PNGRB, addressed to CMD / CEO of the downstream organizations (including GAIL) regarding implementation of Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP).

“The Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan is prepared as per the guidelines from PNGRB (Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board), New Delhi and as per Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Regulations, 2010 notified vide Gazette of India notification No. G.S.R. 39(E) dated 18th January 2010.

Same has been designed with following objectives:

a. to prevent casualties both at on-site and off-site and reduce damage to public, property and environment;

b. to develop high order state of preparedness for prompt and orderly response of any emergency;

c. to provide incident management organogram with clear cut roles & responsibilities & action plans for various emergencies;

d. To ensure orderly and timely decision making and response processes; etc.

The ultimate goal is the effective containment of the situation by proper mitigating action at the place of occurrence, cautioning people in adjoining affected localities, prompt rescue and medical aid to affected persons and communication to civil authorities for rushing in help from outside.

Schedule of Implementation for ERDMP is stated along with present status.

As per PNGRB guidelines, ERDMP is applicable to petroleum marketing locations. Accordingly a ERDMP for Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, Foreshore Terminal is prepared in conformity with regulations.

These may be altered, if felt necessary, during the actual emergency based on unforeseen circumstances prevailing at that time. All concerned are hereby requested to carefully study and thoroughly familiarize themselves with it, in order to ensure its effectiveness at the time of emergency.

Place : FORESHORE

Date : 20.5.2014 N. Girish

CHIEF. TERMINAL MANAGER,

7


ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To, Chief Manager (Operations) M/s. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED Marketing Division, Southern Region 139, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Nungambakkam High Road Chennai 600 034 I Dear Sir,

Please refer the work order No. TNSO/OPS/ERDMP/PT-04/2013-14, Dated

02.04.2014, “Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan” (ERDMP), for

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, Foreshore Terminal, Chennai. The Report has been

prepared by our well qualified experts in the area and confirming to guidelines of

Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board , G.S.R. 39 (E)-codes of practices for

Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) regulations, 2010.

Please find enclosed Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Foreshore Terminal, Chennai,

ERDMP report prepared and approved by us. We sincerely thanks Indian Oil

Corporation Limited for giving us the opportunity to prepared the report, Petroleum

Products Pipeline system network as per PNGRB TNS (Technical standards and

specifications including safety standards for Petroleum Products Pipelines)

Regulations, 2010.

Thanking You and assuring our best attention always.

With Regards

Place : New Delhi Dr. J.P. Shrivastava

Dated : 20-05-2014 Managing Director

8


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Petroleum Industry plays a crucial role in meeting the daily needs of the common man, but also contributes significantly towards Industrial and Economic Growth of the Nation. Environmental Risk is inherent in design and operation of a System. Any major failure in the system or Disaster could lead to loss of human life and/or property and damage to the Environment. OBJECTIVE Keeping the development in view, an attempt has been made in this Emergency Response Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Manual as per Emergency Response Disaster management Plan (ERDMP) Regulation - 2010 as per PNGRB (Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board), to explore and select factors that could provide the means to FST Chennai for enhancing the mitigation practices in various emergencies scenarios in various sects of pipeline & terminal activities. The main objective of the study are as follows :

Identification of hazard prone area and estimation of damage distance for the

Maximum credible accident scenarios visualize for storage.

Computation of frequency of occurrence of hazards and evaluation of risk.

Based on the studies, suggest risk mitigation measures.

AN APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT

PHASE –I : HAZARD IDENTIFICATION - Study of engineering details - Detail study of plot plan/layout - Collection/generation of data on physical properties of fuels - Hazard identification PHASE -II : DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Suggest preventive and corrective measures based on phase - I.

SCOPE The scope covers – (i) the identification of emergencies;

(ii) the mitigation measures that attempt to reduce and eliminate the risk or disaster;

(iii) the preparedness that to develop plans for actions when disaster or emergencies occur;

(iv) the responses that mobilize the necessary emergency services including responders like fire service, police service, medical service including ambulance, government as well as non-governmental agencies;

(v) the post disaster recovery with aim to restore the affected area to its original conditions;

9


INTENT ERDMP is made concise and informative so that members of the emergency control organization should be able to quickly refer to the action plan to determine important functions to be carried out; (a) to manage an emergency and not to use ERDMP just as reference material for training and shall be made applicable -

(i) to prevent casualties - both on-site and off-site;

(ii) to reduce damage to property, machinery, public and environment;

(iii) to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an emergency and to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate with the risk;

(iv) to provide an incident management organogram with clear missions and lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified command);

(v) to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process (notification, standard operating procedures);

(vi) to maintain good public relations; In the ERDMP prepared, followings are readily available for reference concerning handling of disaster or emergency scenarios - Material Safety Datasheets of hazardous chemicals used in Foreshore Terminal - Flora and fauna Plantation details carried out by Foreshore Terminal in the surrounding for the preservation of natural resources and environment. - Demographic details Location of Foreshore Terminal, population data in close vicinity of the installation & within the 5 Km range, meteorological conditions like temperature, pressure, relative humidity, wind speed & direction are available. - Hazard identification & risk assessments Identification of various risk scenarios with consequences (with contours), threats of terrorism like bomb threat and handling procedure of such emergencies. The mitigation measures for the identified hazard and risk scenarios like resource mobilization (e.g. manpower available, fire fighting appliances, resources for communication, transport, emergency drugs available etc.).

10


- Preventive and risk mitigation measures. Safety management system for preventive measures including SHE Policy, various committees, safety audits, work permit system & work procedures. In-built facilities like interlocks, availability of gas detectors. Fire protection systems comprising of fire water storage, pumps, fire water network with hydrant system details, foam system, cooling system, protection of storage tanks, including control and administration building. - Emergency preparedness measures Mock drills of various scenarios, schedules of testing of detectors and automatic actuated fire fighting systems, testing of various communication modes, training details etc. - Response procedure Response procedure available for various types of risk scenarios like HC leaks, catastrophic failure, oil spills, fire and explosion, flood, large oil spill, earthquake and flood scenario etc. Emergency Control Centre (ECC) & assembly points, Terminal process layouts, fire water network and individual process flow diagrams (PFDs) are available. - Emergency Organization To follow the response procedure for effective mitigation of disasters well defined Emergency Organogram with roles and responsibilities is available. - Infrastructure for emergency response Details of amenities in Emergency Control Centre and assembly points. - Resources for Control of emergency Details of mobile and static fire fighting appliances, fire extinguishers, first aid facility, PPEs available, communication facilities like fire siren, phones, walkie talkies, PA systems etc. Contact details of external agencies for fire fighting, police administration, civil administration, medical hospitals and doctors etc. - Evacuation procedures Evacuation procedures for inside and outside the installation, instruction for general public, transport facility for evacuation etc. are available. - Procedure for recovery Procedure for salvage of product, record of affected manpower, information to outside bodies, investigation, damage assessment etc. Are given in detail.

11


DEFINITIONS (Under Regulation 2 of ERDMP regulation 2010) (1) Definitions as per ERDMP regulation 3- 2010-clause, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) “Act” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006;

(b) ‘‘Board” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act;

(c) “boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE)” means the violent rupture of a pressure vessel containing saturated liquid or vapour at a temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point and the resulting flash evaporation of a large fraction of the superheated liquid which produces a large vapour cloud which burns in the form of a large rising fireball due to ignition;

(d) “chief incident controller” means the person who assumes absolute control of the unit and determines action necessary to control the emergency;

(e) “codes of practice” means the codes of practice for emergency response and disaster management plan notified by the Board;

(f) “disaster” means an occurrence of such magnitude as to create a situation in which the normal patterns of life within an industrial complex are suddenly disrupted and in certain cases affecting the neighborhood seriously with the result that the people are plunged into helplessness and suffering and may need food, shelter, clothing, medical attention protection and other life sustaining requirements;

(g) “disaster management plan“ means a well-coordinated, comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property, environment and provide speedy and effective recovery by making the most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster and is known as On-site Emergency & Off-site Emergency Management Plan. (h) “emergency” means a situation or scenario which has the potential to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and may require the help of outside resources;

(i) “emergency response vehicle (ERV)” means a vehicle for handling emergencies having necessary equipment meant for rescue and relief operations and ERV can be put to use within installation, outside of installation including road incident;

(j) “hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment, or some combination thereof;

(k) “incident” means an unplanned or unintended or intended event having potential to cause damage to life, property and environment;

12


(l) “incident record register” means a register containing complete information pertaining to all incidents covering near miss, and all other incidents leading to Level-I, Level-II and Level-III emergencies;

(m) “installation” means facilities, namely, gaseous product pipeline, liquid Product pipeline, hydrocarbons processing installation, oil and natural gas terminals and commercial storage and transportation, hydrocarbons gas bottling Installations including CNG, city gas distribution facilities and retail outlets;

(n) “leak” means release or discharge of a dangerous chemicals or substances or material into the environment;

(o) “Level-I emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (a); (Refer Chapter – 1)

(p) “Level-II emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6

(b); (Refer Chapter – 1)

(q) “Level-III emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (c); (Refer Chapter – 1)

(r) “Mutual aid association” means an industrial mutual aid association in which participating industries as a community shall assist each other in case of emergency. Mutual aid associations supplement a site’s emergency control plan. Services of member industries shall be requested only when the emergency threatens to exceed the capability of otherwise available resources;

(s) "occupier” of an installation means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the installation;

(t) “Off-site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects of emergency extends beyond the premises or the emergency created due to an incident, catastrophic incidents, natural calamities, etc. It no longer remains the concern of the installation management alone but also becomes a concern for the general public living outside and to deal with such eventualities shall be the responsibilities of district administration;

(u) “Off-site emergency plan” means a response plan to control and mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents in above ground installation (AGI) or underground installations (UGI) or road transportation. This plan shall be prepared by the district administration based on the data provided by the installation(s), to make the most effective use of combined resources, i.e. internal as well as external to minimize loss of life, property, environment and to restore facilities at the earliest;

(v) “On site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects are confined to the Installation premise’s involving only the people working inside the plants and to deal with such eventualities is the responsibility of the occupier and is mandatory. It may also require help of outside resources;

13


(w) “on site emergency plan” means a response plan to contain and minimize the effects due to emergencies within the installations which have a potential to cause damage to people and facilities within the installation premises; It is also known as Emergency Response & Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP).

(x) “risk” means the chance of a specific undesired event occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances and it may be either a frequency or a probability of a specific undesired event taking place;

(y) “risk analysis” means the identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and, usually, the estimation of the extent, magnitude, and likelihood of any harmful effects;

(z) “risk assessment” means the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused by them, together with the value judgments made concerning the significance of the results;

(aa) “Risk management” means the programme that embraces all administrative and operational programmes that are designed to reduce the risk of emergencies involving acutely hazardous materials. Such programmes include, but are not limited to, ensuring the design safety of new and existing equipment, standard operating procedures, preventive maintenance, operator training, incident investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, emergency planning, and internal and external procedures to ensure that these programmes are being executed as planned; (ab) “site incident controller” means the person who goes to the scene of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the emergency at the site of the incident; (ac) ‘spill” means an unintended release or discharge of hydrocarbon or any other dangerous liquid into the environment; (ad) “transport emergency (TREM) card” means a card containing details about the nature of hazards, 12 protective devices, telephone numbers and actions related to spillage, fire, first aid and other details of national and international (UN) numbers or signage which is common in India and abroad; (ae) “unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE)” means the formation of vapour cloud due to release of significant quantity of liquefied hydrocarbons into the atmosphere and its explosion due to ignition which may cause high over pressure and low pressure that cause very heavy damage. (2) Words and expressions used and not defined in these ERDMP regulation 2010-clauses, but defined in the Act or rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clauses made there under, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in this Act or in the rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clause , as the case may be.

14


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ERDMP- Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan IOCL- Indian Oil Corporation Limited SV- Sectionalizing valve station RT- Receiving Terminal ALARP - As Low As Reasonably practicable PCV- Pressure Control Valve SDV- Shut down Valve SSV- Slam Shutdown Valve PNGRB - Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineering API - American Petroleum Institute ASTM - American Society for Testing and Material DHO - District Health Officer ECO - Emergency Coordination Officer ERT - Emergency Response Team ESD - Emergency Shut down FCO - Fire Control Officer HSE - Health, Safety and Environment MSDS - Material Safety Data Sheet OISD - Oil Industry Safety Directorate MSIHC - Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

PLL - Potential Loss of Life SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

15


UVCE - Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

HR - Human Resources

NDMA - National Disaster Management Authority

NEC - National Executive Committee

DM - Disaster Management

NCC - National Cadet Corps

NCDM - National Committee on Disaster Management

NDMRCs - National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centres

NDRF - National Disaster Response Force

NSS - National Service Scheme

NGOs - Non-Governmental Organisations

SDMA - State Disaster Management Authority

SEC - State Executive Committee

DDMA - District Disaster Management Authority

16


A.1 INDUSTRIAL DESCRIPTION Introduction: The FST of IOCL is situated in the Northern most part of Chennai Port Trust Premise. The main approach to the Terminal is through Gate No. -2 of CPT at the Royapuram end. The Terminal is close to the Bharathi docks sectors and jetties. BDI, BDII and III are situated close to Terminal. BDI and BD III jetties handle Oil Cargo exclusively. BDII is basically meant for Ore Jetty and Berthing of Chemical Tanker is also possible. Terminal A and B of this unit is separated by CPT road which run from Gate No. 2 to Bharathi Bocks sector. Terminal A is located on a plot of 32227 Sq.m are (7.96 Acres) and is surrounded by CPT road in the North, Port Trust Rly. Siding in the South, Coal Yard in the east and G.M. Pettai road in the West. Terminal B is occupying an area of 20300 Sq.m (5.02 Acres) and is surrounded by FCI good own in the North, CPT road in the south, G.M. Pettai road in the west and reclaimed vacant land in the east. Tankage Details

Tank No. Product Gross capacity (KL) Releasable capacity (KL)

1 BSIIIHSD 14600 12412

2 FO 180 CST 7700 5649

3 LSHF HSD 8500 6348

4 BS III HSD 14600 12134

5 BSIVHSD 14600 12241

6 FO 380 CST 11500 9163

7 FO 380 CST 11500 9442

8 LDO 4416 4053

9 FO 180 CST 2810 2598

10 LSHFHSD 1096 1024

17


5 Km Radius from the Centre of

Foreshore Terminal

18



Foreshore Terminal


Foreshore Terminal

19


PPE’s and FIRST AID Facilities

Fore Shore Terminal – Chennai

Sl.No.

Description Available at

1 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SCABA

At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

2. Water Gel Blanket At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

3. Fire Proximity Suit At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

4. Safety Helmets At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

5. Resuscitators At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

6. Rubber Hand Gloves At Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor.

7. Stretcher with Blanket One at Terminal A,Near Staircase of Main Office Ground floor. And one at Terminal-B Administrative Building

8. First Aid Box Available at Security cabin of Terminal- A

9 Safety Harness Available at Security cabin of Terminal- A

10 Ear Muff Available at Security cabin of Terminal- A

11 Goggles Available at Security cabin of Terminal- B

20


FORESHORE TERMINAL

Sl. No

Item Available at

Location

1 10 Kg DCP FE 52

2 25 Kg DCP FE 14

3 75 Kg DCP FE 2

4 2.0 Kg CO2 FE 15

5 4.5 Kg CO2 FE 12

6 6.5 Kg CO2 FE 0

7 500/750 GPM water cum Foam Monitor

2

8 Foam Compound Trolley 200/210 Litres

6

9 Fire Hoses 58

10 Jet Nozzles with branch pipes

26

11 Fog Nozzles 6

12 Universal Nozzle 6

13 Foam Branch Pipe 6

14 Water Curtain Nozzle 4

15 Sand Scoopes 4

16 Safety Helmets 100

17 Stretcher 3

18 First Aid Box with anti snake venom

2

19 Rubber Hand Gloves 4

20 Explosive Meters 1

21 Fire Proximity Suits 1

22 Resuscitators 2

23 Electrical Siren (3 KM Range)

2

24 Hand Operated siren 7

21


25 Water jel Blankets 1

26 Red/green Flags 2

27 SCABA with spare cylinder

2

28 PA System 1

29 Hose Box 22

30 First Aid Fire Fighting Trolley

1

31 CO2 Cartidges for 10 Kg DCP

53


2


30

34 DCP bags for 10 Kg Fes 265kg



37 500/750 GPM water cum Foam Monitor

2

38 Water Monitor 17

39 Double headed hydrant points

17

40 AFFF 12.3

41 ATC Foam nil

42 MEFG 4

22


Chapter - 1

Classification of Emergencies

(Under Regulation 6 & 7 of ERDMP Regulation 2010)

23


Classification of Emergencies This ERDMP has been developed to deal with emergency incidents which occur totally within the jurisdiction of the pipeline stations and terminals and which do not endanger the outside community. Emergency incidents will be classified by the level of response that will be required. The actual classification will be made by the Officer-In- Charge or his nominee as information first becomes available on an incident. The level of response may change as more information becomes available or conditions change. Where information is lacking the worst case scenario will dictate the level of response. The probable emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements, which are given as under— (a) Level 1 : This is an emergency or an incident which (i.) can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within the site, location or installation by the available resources (ii.) has no impact outside the site, location or installation iii. is unlikely to be danger to life, the environment or to company assets or reputation (b) Level 2 : This is an emergency or an incident which (i.) cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site, location or installation by available resource and additional support is required (ii.) is having, or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved (iii.)is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or reputation. (c) Level 3 : This is an emergency or an incident which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation, Although the level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in, it should be responsibility of the unit to manage the emergency. Note: Level-I and Level-II shall normally be grouped as onsite emergency and Level-III as off-site emergency. (i) Level 1: Minor Fire/ Minor Leak/ Injuries requiring medical attention which can be tackled with the available resources within the terminal/stations causing no effect to surrounding public. Such emergency is classified as Level – 1 emergency. On-site ERDMP Plan shall be put in action in case of Level – 1 emergency The possible emergencies which can come under Level-1 Emergencies are

inor leakage from the flanges

24


These emergencies can be effectively and safely managed and contained within the site locations or installation by the available resources in the stations/terminal or either with the help of consumer resources. It has no impact on outside the site, location or installation. (ii) Level 2: This is an emergency or an incident which. (i) Cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the location or installation by available resource and additional support is alerted or required. (ii) is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved. (iii) is likely to be danger to life. The environment or to industrial assets or reputation. The possible emergencies which can come under Level-2 Emergencies are

pilferage. Failures caused by external mechanical interference,

Hazards On-Site ERDMP Plan shall be put in action in case of Level – 2 Emergency (iii) Level 3:- This is an emergency or an incident with off-site impact which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation, and management and control is done by district administration, Although the Level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in. it should be responsibility of the unit to manage the emergency. Other incidents, which can also result in a Level-III Emergencies, are: (i) Agitation / forced entry by external group of people. (ii) Natural Perils- Earthquake (iii) Sabotage, Bomb explosion / Threat Note: Level-I has been considered for fire drill followed with onsite emergency However Level-II shall normally be considered as onsite emergency and Level-III as off-site emergency. Similarly in case of any emergency in ROW will be considered as offsite emergency and Level-III Important Note:- The earlier emergency classification at stations as per OISD-117 has been renamed as per PNGRB Regulation- 2010 as follows.

OISD-117 classification ERDMP Regulation-2010 classification

Small Fire Level-1 Emergency

Major Fire Level-2 Emergency

Disaster Level-3 Emergency

25


Implementation Schedule (ERDMP regulation 2010- clause 7) This Code of Practices shall be implemented for the areas covered under Regulation 3.0 as per the implementation period mentioned in Schedule-I. Note:- A copy of ERDMP, duly approved by the Board of Directors of the organisations before submission to the PNGRB. * Long Delivery Items should be tied up with mutual aid organizations, in case of any delay,

The following scenarios likely to occur at Foreshore Terminal.

Table - 1

Sl no FAILURE CASE : LIKELY CONSEQUENCES

Level

Foreshore

1. Pipeline/ rupture-Pool Fire (Small Leak)

Level 1

2. Pipeline/ rupture – Flash Fire/ VCE(Large Leak)

Level 2

3. Storage Tank leakage/ rupture – Pool Fire (Small Leak)

Level 1

4. Storage Tank leakage/ rupture – Flash Fire/ VCE(Large Leak)

Level 3

5. Failure of HOV/MOV of storage tanks- Flash Fire/ VCE(Large Leak)

Level 3

6. Booster Pump suction/discharge leakage/ rupture – Flash Fire/ VCE(Large Leak)

Level 2

7. Main Line Pump discharge/suction leakage/ rupture– Pool Fire (Small Leak)

Level 1

8. Main Line Pump discharge/suction leakage/ rupture– Flash Fire/ VCE(Large Leak)

Level 2

9. OWS chamber leakage/ rupture- Flash Fire(Large Leak)

Level 1

10. Overheating/electrical spark/arc in control/administration/MCC room-Fire

Level 2

11. Pipeline to Foreshore rupture/failure- Flash Fire/ VCE/ Pollution (Large Leak)

Level 3

12. Integrity failure of structures/tanks due to flood/storm/earthquake/third party activity- Flash Fire/ VCE (Large Leak)

Level 3

13. Accumulation of grass/other combustible material-Fire

Level 1

14. Washout of cross country pipeline- Flash Fire/ VCE/ Pollution (Large Leak)

Level 3

26


SCHEDULE – I (for implementation of regulation 7)

Schedule of Implementation of Code of Practice for ERDMP

S. No. Activity Implementation Time (from the notification date of Codes of Practices for ERDMP)

Status

1. On-site Emergency Plan 3 months Updated Up to 30st June 2014

2. Off-site Emergency Plan(submission of information to District Authority)

3 months Updated Up to 30st June 2014

3, Resources in position 6 months * Complied

4. Accredited Third Party Certification of ERDMP

1 year Mock drill conducted. Certification by June 2014.

5. Testing and Mock Drills (On-site)

3 months 19.04.2014

6. Testing and Mock Drills (Off-site)

** 12 months June 2014

27


Chapter – 2

Consequences of defaults or non-compliance

(Under Regulation 8 of ERDMP regulation 2010)

28


Applicability:

These regulations shall apply to commercial petroleum storage facilities, gas storage facilities and terminals including LNG terminals;

Consequences of Default or Non-Compliance

(1) There shall be a system for ensuring compliance to the provision of these regulations through developing well defined Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan and conduction of mock drill and safety audits during the construction, commissioning and operation phase, as well as on an on-going basis. There shall also be a system of do‘s and don‘ts regarding safety, mock drills or real emergencies for the visitors before entering an establishment. This should be supported by written instruction sheet for the visitor and ensured that visitor is accompanied by plant representative on forward visit and return gate.

(2) There shall be a system for ensuring compliance to the provision of these regulations through developing a well-defined Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan and conduction of mock drill and safety audits during the construction, commissioning and operation phase, as well as on an on-going basis. There shall also be a system of do’s and don’ts regarding safety, mock drills or real emergencies for the visitors before entering an establishment. This should be supported by written instruction sheet for the visitor and ensured that visitor is accompanied by plant representative on forward visit and return gate. - Complied

Following emergency drills being conducted at Foreshore Terminal.: i. Off-site disaster drill – Yearly.

ii. On site disaster drill – Half Yearly.

iii. Fire drill / emergency handling drill – Monthly.

iv. Safety Briefing is compulsory for contract personnel at Foreshore once every fortnight. For visitors, Safety Information sheet is given while issuing gate pass.

(3) In case of any deviation or shortfall, in achieving the recommended standards the entities are liable to penal provisions under the provisions of the technical standards, specifications including safety standards. Complied

(4) Mutual Aid Association not responding as per Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or written agreement on request of assistance shall attract penalty under these regulations as under:-

a. for default in response, the defaulting entity with the application and its management shall have to submit written explanation to affected mutual aid members.- Complied

b. for the second and successive failure, the defaulting entity shall have to pay the double of the billed amount of expenses incurred by affected mutual aid members in case of any eventuality occurs in the premises of affected mutual aid members.

29


Chapter - 3

Requirements Under Other Statutes


30


Schedule – II

(Refer regulation 9(1))

S. No.

Activity Compliance Status YES/ NO

Remark

1.

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended 1991) and following rules there under: The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 (amended 2004).

Yes Air/water consent available Applied for renewal.

2.

The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 (amended, 1994 and 2004).

Yes

3.

The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling ) Rules, 1989 (amended 2000 and 2003).

Yes Valid up to 08.01.2020

4.

The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987) State Factory Rules.

Yes 31.12.2014, Applied for renewal

5.

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001) The Central Motor Vehicles rules, 1989 (amended 2005)

No Not Applicable

6. The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1993)

Yes Valid up to 31.03.2015

7. The Petroleum Act, 1934 The Petroleum Rules, 2002

Yes

8.

The Insecticide Rules, 1968 (amended 2000) The Insecticide Rules, 1971 (amended 1999)

No Not Applicable

9. The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995

Yes complied

10.

The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended till 1983) The Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004.

Yes Valid Explosive licence up to 31.12.2015

11. The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired) Rules, 2004.

No Not Applicable

12. The Explosives Rules, 1983 (amended 2002)

Yes Valid Explosive licence up to 31.12.2015

13. Fire Licence No Not Applicable

31


Chapter - 4

Pre-emergency Planning


4.a PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING

32


Hazard identification Information on toxicological, physical & chemical properties of the substances being handled in the format of Material Safety Data Sheet is attached as Annexure-02

Table –2

Sl. No

Scenario Level

1.

FIRE IN THE TANK FARM AREA (MAJOR FIRE)

Level 2

2.

FIRE AND EXPLOSION IN THE STATION PIPELINE AREA

Level 3

3.

FIRE IN GRASS/BUILDING IN STATION AREA

Level 2

4.

FLOOD/EARTHQUAKE/THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY IN THE STATION

Level 3

5.

LARGE OIL SPILLAGE IN STATION/ROW/WATER BODIES

Level 3

6.

FIRE/EXPLOSION/POLLUTION IN ROW AREA

Level 3

7.

LEAKAGE, POLLUTION AND FIRE IN TERMINAL AND PUNPING STATION

Level 3

The identification of potential impact on downwind air quality or downstream water quality from an incidental release and possible danger to human, flora and fauna and animal health.

Hazards to the Installation as Natural Calamities like

Flood

Earthquake Tsunami cyclones Check points for hazard identification are given as per the checklist in below.

CHECK LIST-1 (Refer Regulation 10.1(d))

33


Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Hazard Identification

Sl.No CHECKPOINT YES NO REMARKS

Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment

1 Whether any of the following procedures or techniques for hazard identification has been used in the terminal/ installation :

HAZOP _/

Accident Consequences & Analysis _/

Event Tree Analysis. _/

Fault Tree Analysis _/

Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis. _/

Risk Assessment _/

What If, analysis. _/

Other accredited practice _/

Hazard Identification :

2 Is the terminal / installation covered under the definition of “Major Accident Hazard Installation” as per the Manufacture Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989?

_/

3 If yes, whether major accident hazards identified and steps taken for their prevention

_/

4 Whether design deficiencies, failures or errors which can contribute to hazards and cause abnormalities leading to an accident are identified.

_/

5 What are the measures undertaken to counter above deficiencies or, errors

_/

6 Consequences of a major accident on the workers, people in the neighbourhood and the environment are considered

_/

7 Steps envisaged for mitigation of the consequences of such accident

_/

8 Does the installation produces / handle / use / import / store any hazardous chemicals as defined under MSIHC Rules 1989?

_/

9 If yes, whether a list of these chemicals, preferably in alphabetical order with their maximum licensed storage quantities is displayed

_/

10 Are material safety data sheets (MSDS) of these chemicals are prepared / obtained in the prescribed format as per MSIHC Rules and State Factory Rules?

_/

11 Whether a system for disseminating information about these MSDS to concerned workers are existing

_/

12 Are there a system of labelling of containers / storage tanks for the chemicals / hazardous substances

_/

13 Whether estimation of maximum possible quantity of each hazardous substance are considered including any vehicle (TT/TW) on site or within 500 mtrs of the site.

_/

14 Whether location, configuration and condition _/

34


Sl.No CHECKPOINT YES NO REMARKS

under which the hazardous substances are stored & handled are clearly declared

Vulnerability Analysis :

15 Whether zones of influence or vulnerable zones are estimated by considering the maximum single storage of hazardous substance & maximum loss scenario

_/

16 Whether effects of influence on the vulnerable zones are made after considering the population, facilities & environment encompassed inside that zone

_/

Risk Analysis :

17 Whether a relative measure of the probability & consequences of various possible hazardous events are taken into account.

_/

18 Whether risks are calculated by multiplying the probability of occurrence of each event by the consequences of that event and then summing up the results

_/

19 Whether all types of events possible in petroleum installations are considered including i) storage tanks on fire, ii) pool fire [burning pool of liquid fuel], iii) Flange joint leakage in pipelines, iv) Fire in TT or TW gantry, and v) rupture of hoses.

_/

Risk Reduction Measures :

20 Whether measures for reduction of identified high risks are included by reducing the consequences thru’ hazard Mitigation measures.

_/

21 Whether steps have been consider to reduce risks to the exposed population by increasing safe distances by acquiring property around the facility, if possible HAZOP Study

_/ HAZOP study

done and report available with

location

22 Whether the above method is applied if the location handles more than specified storage and / or critical operations

_/

23 Whether the study systematically identifies all possible deviations from normal operations

_/

24 Whether risk levels are established for each deviation after considering the probability & consequences of each such events

_/

25 Whether potential means for detection of such events & preventive measures are recommended by the study

_/

Meteorology

35


Climate of Chennai:

The geographical setting of any station determines its weather and climate. Chennai is located at Latitude 130 04' N and Longitude 800 15' E. The close proximity to the sea and the thermal equator makes the climate and weather in Chennai relatively consistent with less variation in the seasonal temperature (Ref.Table1). The weather in Chennai is mostly hot and humid for most of the year. The hottest part of the year is late May to early June, with maximum temperatures around 35-40°C. The coolest part of the year is January, with minimum temperatures around 15-22°C. The lowest temperature recorded is 13.8°C and the highest recorded temperature is 45°C. The average annual rainfall is about 140 cm. The city gets most of its seasonal rainfall from the north–east monsoon winds, from mid–October to mid–December. Thus, the arrival of the Northeast Monsoon Winds marks the advent of the Monsoon in Chennai. Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal sometimes hit the city. The highest annual rainfall recorded is 257 cm in 2005. Prevailing winds in Chennai are usually southwesterly between April and October and northeasterly during the rest of the year. Historically, Chennai has relied on annual monsoon rains to replenish water reservoirs, as no major rivers flow through the area. The northeast monsoon winds blow over the bay of Bengal; pick up moisture and when they intercept the eastern Ghats, cause heavy rainfall on the coromandel coast.

The information of the climatological parameters of Temperature, rainfall and wind for the Chennai station are obtained from the climatologial Tables, published by the India Meteorological Department (IMD) with averages computed from 1951-1980 data; which is presented in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3

Mean monthly Temperature, Rainfall and wind speed at Chennai

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Mean Morning Temperature 0C

24.0 24.9 27.1 29.6 31.2 30.4 28.7 28.1 28.3 27.4 26.0 24.6

Mean Evening Temperature 0C

25.9 27.4 29.0 30.5 32.0 31.9 31.2 30.6 30.1 28.5 26.8 25.8

Mean Monthly Rainfall (mm)

16.2 3.7 3.0 13.6 48.9 53.7 97.8 149 109 282 350 138

Mean Wind Speed

Km/hr

5.6 5.4 6.6 8.2 10.1 10.3 8.7 8.0 7.2 4.9 6.3 7.0

Table 4

36


Mean ANNUAL Wind direction (Wind From) at Chennai

N NE E SE S SW W NW CALM

Morning 9 7 3 3 7 23 25 9 14

Evening 5 16 17 27 13 6 6 1 9

Mean ANNUAL Wind direction (Wind From) at Chennai

N NE E SE S SW W NW CALM

Morning 9 7 3 3 7 23 25 9 14

Evening 5 16 17 27 13 6 6 1 9

HAZOP STUDY

37


INTRODUCTION :- With progressive advances in technology, the continuing trend towards large and more highly integrated production units and the ever-increasing demand by governmental and public bodies for improved safety and environmental standards, hitherto conventional methods of design based on established principles and codes of practice are no longer adequate in themselves for ensuring acceptable standards of safety and reliability in the process industries. This has necessitated the development and use of more searching and systematic methods for risk control to supplement the existing design procedures. TECHNIQUES FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT :- To evaluate process risks two popular methods/techniques developed about three decades ago and now being used increasingly throughout the chemical, petrochemical, oil gas and allied Industries are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS) for hazard identification and Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) for quantitative risk evaluation. These techniques, which are applicable to both new projects and existing installations, and to both batch wise and continuously operated systems are concerned with' purely operational risks as well as hazards and therefore lead to not only to safer plants but also to an improvement in reliability. In hazard evaluation, the first task is usually to identify the hazards that are inherent feature of the process and / or plant and then focus the evaluation on events, which could be associated with the hazards. Once the hazard has been identified, the Hazard can then be evaluated in terms of risk it presents to the employees, the neighboring public, property, environment and the Company. One cannot complete an assessment of the potential failures and their effects until every attempt has been made to identify the hazards of a system. The methods for identifying hazards are qualitative and may be obvious in many cases, or may have to be identified through systematic techniques or those which promote some form of lateral or creative thinking.

OBJECTIVES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION :-

38


The objective of hazard identification is to identify and evaluated the hazard and the unintended events, which could cause an accident. The first task usually is to identify the hazards that are inherent to the process and/or plant and then focus on the evaluation of the events, which could be associated with hazards. In Hazard identification and quantification of probability of occurrence, it is assumed that the plant will perform as designed in the absence, of unintended events (component and material failures, human errors, external event, process unknown), which may affect the plant/process behavior. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION: Formal hazard identification studies generate a list of failure cases. The list can usually be derived reliably by considering: a) form in which chemical sate stored or processed, b) nature of hazard it poses and c) quantity of the material contained. METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION A. Traditional Methods

1. Obvious reasons 2. Previous occurrence experience 3. Checklist

B. Current /Creative Methods

1. Hazard and Operability study 2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 3. HAZID Study

Whilst shown above as being separable for some techniques, the methods of identification are combined inherently with those of assessment. The methods of hazard identification and assessment can be divided into four main categories, with some of the main techniques listed as under; EXPERIENCE

Code of practice

Checklists

"What if” CREATIVE

Brain storming

HAZOPS ANALYTICAL (Quantitative)

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

39


Logic Trees - Fault Tree - Event Tree - Causes / Consequence diagram

Human Reliability Analysis HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID) Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) is a systematic method for identification of potential hazards in each and every area of activity in a process operation. It is a search for potential hazards in the system parameters from normal design intent. It is performed by an experience inter-disciplinary team representing design, operations and also includes representative’s knowledgeable in inspection, maintenance, safety, equipment and other disciplines as appropriate. The multi disciplinary team brainstorms the plant design, following structure provided by guide words and team leader's experience. The primary advantage of brainstorming is that it stimulates creativity and generates ideas this creativity results from interactions of team and their diverse backgrounds. METHODOLLGY OF HAZID STUDY The technique of HAZID study is systematically applied to assess the safety and operability of the plant. It is made through a structured set of questions using "guidewords" which focus on the process or operating deviations outside the established parameters. The guide words arc used to ensure that the questions which are posed to test the integrity of each part of the design will explore all conceivable ways in which they could deviate from the design intentions. Each deviation is then considered to decide how it could be caused and what would be consequences. The team looks for causes of each deviation and if there is a consequence of concern, they evaluate the safeguards in place to determine if they are sufficient given the risk posed. If the team feels additional safeguards may be warranted they make recommendations. The technique is then repeated until every Processing section and piece of equipment of concern has been reviewed.

The important terms used in HAZID study are: Intention : The intention defines how the part is 'expected to operate.

40


Guide words : These are simple words which are used to qualify' or

Quantify the intentions in order to guide and stimulate brain storming process and so discover deviations.

Parameter : A aspect of process that describes it physically chemically or in terms of what is happening viz. flow, Pressure, Temperature, Level Composition etc, Deviation : These are departure from the intension, which are, discovered by systematically applying the guide words. Causes : These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Consequences : These are the results of the deviations, would they occur. Safeguards : These are the protection provided in the system. Recommendation : These are hardware and software changes required for

protecting and smooth operating of the system.

Table- 5

List of guide words

41


Guide Words Meanings Comments

None Complete negation of the intention

No part of the intention is achieved e.g. no flow or reverse flow.

More of Quantitative increase

More of any relevant physical properties than there should be e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity) higher temperature, higher pressure higher viscosity, more heat, more reaction etc.

Less of Quantitative decrease

Less of any relevant physical property than there should be, e.g. Lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature, lower pressure, less heat, less reaction etc.

Part of Quantitative decrease

Composition of system different from what it should be e.g. Change in ration of components, component missing etc.

More than Qualitative increase

More components present in the system that there should be e.g. extra phase present (Vapor, solid), impurities (air, water, acids, corrosion products etc.)

Other than Substitution What else can happen apart from normal operation e.g. Start up, shutdown, high/low rate running, alternative operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance, catalyst change etc.

Guidewords are applied to the design intention. The design intention informs us what the equipment is expected to do.

42


HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY WORK – PLT RECEIPTS

Event

Cause/Comments Possible Consequences Prevention/ Protection

1. Mechanical impact on the pipeline causes leak of petroleum products from the pipeline.

3rd party involvement e.g. digging or trenching, or other earth work.

1st party involvement. Non through wall damage, i.e. part wall or delayed failure damage.

Massive release of petroleum products. If ignition, then possibility of flash or jet fire. Physical explosion from the pressure of the pipeline creates projectiles (earth, sand, stones). Injury and property damage.

- Automatic shut down through automatic line break detection and valve closure if large hole in pipe. Manual shut down by Network Controller in Control Centre if pressure drop.

- Terminal storing class B and class C products only, therefore, minimising chances of ignition. Explosion not credible in unconfined situation.

2. Corrosion leads to leak of Petroleum Products from the petroleum products pipeline.

Damage of pipeline coating due to excavation inspection damage leads to corrosion. Construction damage or coating flaw or faulty materials

Release of petroleum products. If ignition, a jet fire is possible. Injury and property damage.

- Cathodic protection for external corrosion. Internal corrosion virtually absent with clean hydrocarbon.

- Coating on external surfaces of pipelines. - Routine inspection of pipeline (including regular

patrol). Visual and sound indications if leak. - Pipeline to be constructed to facilitate internal inspection (minimize dips). - Terminal storing class B and class C products

only, therefore, minimising chances of ignition.

43


Event Cause/Comments Possible Consequences Prevention/ Protection

3. Nearby explosion at neighbouring petroleum products pipeline or tie-offs.

Incident (wear and tear, mechanical impact, lightning strike etc. etc.) at the parallel petroleum products pipeline.

Possible damage to petroleum products pipeline with release of Naphtha, HSD, SKO. If ignition, then possibility of flash or jet fire. Injury and property damage.

- Management procedures / systems by petroleum products pipeline operator.

- Pipeline integrity plan (incl. protection, to monitor integrity of pipeline and coating inspection).

- 24 hour monitoring of petroleum products pipelines. - Terminal storing class B and class C products only,

therefore, minimising chances of ignition. Explosion not credible in unconfined situation.

- Buried pipelines. - Thickness and grade of pipelines. - The pipeline is buried 1.0 meter to 1.25 meter depth.

4. Pressure excursion leads to failure of the pipeline.

Operational error upstream or downstream facility.

Over pressuring the petroleum products . If ignition, then possibility of fire. Injury and property damage.

- Pipelines constructed and hydrotested as per requirements.

- Continuous observation of pressure of pipeline from Control Centre. Lack of control for several hours required before pressure could exceed critical levels.

- High-pressure trip and automatic line-break protection isolating flow of petroleum products.

- Mechanical over pressure protection & controls at compressor stations.

44



5. Spontaneous loss of integrity of pipe

Construction defect or operational error (repeated).

Massive release of petroleum products. If ignition, then possibility of flash or jet fire. Injury and property damage.

- X-raying of welds as required. - Cathodic protection. - Pipeline has integrity management plan. - Pipeline subject to CP monitoring at regular

intervals.

6. Erosion results in damage to piping and equipment.

Flooding Potential for flood waters to wash away soil cover. May cause pipeline to be exposed. Possibility of damage to coating and subsequent corrosion issues. If not corrected may eventually lead to failure of pipeline.

- Control of erosion through regular and periodic patrols and inspections (ground patrols after heavy rain/flooding).

- Repair to soil cover if erosion.

7. Land subsidence results in pipeline damage.

Earthquake creates. Failure of pipeline resulting in potential for rupture or massive leak. Release of petroleum products. If ignition, then possibility of flash or jet fire. Injury and property damage.

. - Pipe is designed as per requirements in terms of

strength of material and design.

45



8. Damage to pipeline through terrorism / vandalism.

Malicious damage. Massive release of petroleum products. If ignition, then possibility of flash or jet fire.

- Buried pipeline. - Any building doors will be fitted with intruder alarms.

9. Neighbouring fire. Bush fire. Possible heat radiation at pipeline. If damage to pipe and equipment then possibility of release of hazardous material and fire risk.

- Control of vegetation in easement. - Buried pipeline is unlikely to be affected by heat radiation. - Above ground valves are fire safe.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY WORK – TANK FARM

Event ID No. Hazardous Event Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures

10.

Major mechanical failure of tanks

Metal fatigue Faulty fabrication Corrosion of tank base / weld Tank explosion due to lightning strike / breach of hazardous area ignition source controls Adjacent tank on fire Blocked vent

Large spillage of combustible materials in bund. Fire if ignited Tank explosions. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Tanks designed to API 650 Regular maintenance and inspection procedures Tank and site fire protection facilities available Explosions only occur when ullage vapour is between LEL and UEL. For combustible liquids, the vapour concentration is expected to be below the LEL.

46


11.

Tank roof failure

Ignition, e.g. by lightning, of atmosphere within the roof space Vents blocked during filling procedure High speed filling

Rim seal fire (floating roof tank) Tank top fire Initial explosion possible leading to a tank top fire Potential for spill into the bund with a fire if ignition occurs Boil over possible if water layer exists Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Internal floating roof with mechanical seal Foam injection system Fire fighting system Regular maintenance and inspection procedures Level alarms, controlled tank filling Explosions prevention .


12.

Pipe failure (i.e. new piping within the terminal)

Corrosion Impact Maintenance work Pressure surge

Spillage of combustible material. Fire if ignited. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Regular maintenance and inspection procedures Emergency isolation valves on the tanks Fire fighting system (including foam)

47


13.

Pipeline failure external to the terminal – note that this is existing piping

Vandalism Damage to products pipeline Regular maintenance and inspection procedures Emergency isolation valves Fire fighting system (including foam) Routine inspections during transfers


14.

Spillage of combustible material to the existing or approved or proposed bunds

Tank overfilled during transfer Tank drain valve left open or tank sampling valve left open, e.g. human error

Spill into bund Bund fire if ignited Possible tank fire and boil over Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Fire fighting as above Emergency shutdown system Operating procedures Sampling and inspection procedures prior to disposing of waste bund water

48


Event ID No.

Hazardous Event Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures

16.

Road tanker drive-away incident (i.e. driver does not disconnect the hose and drives away from the loading bay)

Failure of procedures and hardware interlocks

Leak of petroleum product in loading area Fire if ignited Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion) Ignition source present (road tanker engine), hence fire more likely

Driver training Driver not in cab during filling Road tanker bays to be fitted with automatic foam deluge system

17.

Leak at product pumps

Pump seal, shaft or casing failures

Leak of petroleum product in loading area Fire if ignited Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Double mechanical seal with seal failure trip interlock (if filling flammable product) Condition monitoring and preventative maintenance of pumps Fire fighting as above Pumps in contained area

Event ID No.

Hazardous Event

Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures

18.

Road accident (off-site)

Bad road or traffic conditions

Most likely outcome is no loss of load Leak may occur, leading to fire Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Design of road tankers to survive accident without a loss of containment. Driver training and choice of routes to reduce accident potential

49


19.

Strong winds, earthquakes

Strong winds cause equipment damage etc

Loss of containment leading to a fire if ignited (as above)

The tanks are designed API 650 / AS 1692 / AS 1170 to resist the combined effects on internal pressure due to contents, weight of platforms, ladders, live loads, wind loads, earthquake forces and hydrostatic test loads Operations stopped in adverse weather conditions

20.

Breach of Security / Sabotage

Disgruntled employee or intruder

Possible release of product with consequences

Security measures include fencing, CCTV, security patrols, operator / driver vigilance Pressure tests prior to commissioning transfer

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY WORK – PIPELINES

Event ID No.

Hazardous Event Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures

21.

Loss of containment in the Pipeline Corridor

Pipe failures, e.g. due to corrosion, thermal overpressure or third party activity / malicious act

Most likely outcome is a spill onto the ground. Few sources of ignition exist in the Pipeline Corridor.

Regular maintenance and inspection procedures. Emergency isolation valves. Fire fighting system. Routine inspections during transfers

22.

Insulation fires Loss of containment of products into the piping, tank or vessel insulation

Potential for fires, i.e. from burning of the product and/or flammable vapours, and hence propagation to the adjoining system

Flammable vapours are limited and H2S is readily noticeable at low odour levels of 0.005 pm well before LEL. Combustible product. Fire fighting systems

50


Event ID No. Hazardous Event

Causes Possible Consequences Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures

23.

Hose failure, pipe failure, valve left open

Potential for people to be exposed to corrosive liquids. Potential for environmental impact if the spilt liquids are released via the storm water system

24.

Leak during filling of road tanker

Failure of loading arm. Leak from valves or fittings. Road tanker overfill

Leak of product in loading area. Fire if ignited. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

High level of surveillance and immediate access button to shutdown systems. Drivers are well trained so as to minimise chance of operator error and ensure quick response to leaks. Ignition sources controlled at top of road tanker. Fire fighting systems

25.

Road tanker drive-away incident (i.e. driver does not disconnect the hose and drives away from the loading bay)

Failure of procedures and hardware interlocks

Leak of product in loading area. Fire if ignited. Impact to people (radiant heat and/or exposure to products), property and the environment (products of combustion)

Driver training. Driver not in cab during filling but monitoring at same elevation as loading arm. Automatic loading system instructs driver on actions required. Ignition sources controlled at top of road tanker. Fire fighting systems

Node : Transfer of Petroleum Products by Pipeline from CPCL to Storage Tanks at Terminal

51


Sn. Guideword

Deviation Possible Cause Consequence Action Required

26. No/Less No Flow / Less Flow

No flow of petroleum products in pipeline

Operational delay Ensure supply of petroleum products in pipeline

Petroleum products going back in the pipeline

Operational delay Non returning valve (NRV) is provided to avoid the possibility of back flow in the line

Some valves are erratically closed,

Operational delay Proper maintenance an inspection of valves is required.

27. More More Flow Leakage in the transfer line / pipeline

Oil spillage and it may cause fire & explosion

Proper fire-fighting facilities is provided as per rules and standards. Proper inspection and maintenance of transfer line and pipeline.

Not possible as flow is controlled in pipeline from Tap- off point

None None

28. High High Pressure High pressure in pipeline line Possibility of leakage of petroleum product from flange, fittings and joints in the transfer line.

Thermal relief valve (TRV) followed by non –returning valve is provided to release the pressure in transfer line.

29. Reverse Reverse Flow Not possible due to Non Returning Valve (NRV) has already been provided in the line.

None None

30. As well as Flow of Foreign Materials

Not possible None None

52


Node : Petroleum Products Storage Tanks

Sn. Guideword


31 Low Low Level No level measuring device.

No alarm system on the tanks.

Over flow of petroleum product in dyke area Pool fire in dyke area

Hi level alarm switch is provided on the tank as interlock to avoid over flow from tanks.

Radar Tank Gauge (RTG) system is provided

32. No/Low No/Low Flow No/less flow in transfer/pipeline

Operational delay Radar Tank Gauge (RTG) is provided

33. High High Temperature

High Ambient Temperature More emissions of hydrocarbon vapours

Breathing vent is provided on the tank

53


Node : Transfer of Petroleum Products from Storage Tank to Loading Bays

Sn. Guideword


34. No/Less No/Less Flow No pumping from storage tank to filling gantry.

Operation Delay Pump rectification, use stand by pump,

Stop pumping due to power failure

Operational delay Arrangement of power back-up

One of the valve closed erratically/partially block

Excess pressure in line

There should be excess pressure tripping

35. More More Flow Line failure and leakage in line or pump

Spillage of petroleum products Fire, if, ignition source is available

Ensure mechanical integrity of line. Provision of adequate fire fighting facilities. Inspection and maintenance schedules should be prepared and followed as per operating procedures.

36. High High Pressure More pressure in line due to pumping

Non as thermal relief valve (TRV) provided

None

37. As well as

Other products

Pumping of other petroleum products

None hazardous. Contamination of petroleum products

Density meter is provided

38. Reverse

Reverse Flow Reverse rotation of pump None hazardous

Non returning valve (NRV) is provided to avoid the possibility of back flow in the each line

54


Node : Filling of Petroleum Products in Tank Truck through Loading Bays

Sn. Guideword


39. No/ Less

No flow in loading arm

No pumping from Storage tank

Operational delay None hazardous

None

40. More More flow More supply of petroleum product in the truck tank.

Overflow of petroleum product from the tanker.

Digital Control Valve is provided to control the quantity/supply for the tanker.

Position of man hole of truck tank and filling arm is not correct.

Over spill of petroleum products on the floor and possibility of fire, if, source of ignition is available

Provision should be kept for over spill sensors to prevent the overflow

Spillage of petroleum product on the floor and fire, if, source of ignition is available.

Provision of adequate fire fighting facilities.

55

ERDMP document for Foreshore Terminal, Chennai, Tamilnadu

IRPA

10-3/yr

10-4/yr

10-5/yr

10-6/yr

Intolerable

The ALARP or Tolerable

region (Risk is tolerated only)

Broadly Acceptable region

(no need for detailed working todemonstrate ALARP)

Fundamental improvements needed.Only to be considered if there are no

alternatives and people are well informed

Too high, significant effort required toimprove

High, investigate alternatives

Low, consider cost-effective alternatives

Negligible, maintain normal precautions

Risk Assessment

IRPA (Individual Risk per Annum)

Note: A risk of 10 per million per year, or 10-5/Year, effectively means that any person standing at a point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured per year.

56


Table - 6

Criteria for Tolerable Individual Risk

Land Use

Maximum Tolerable Risk (pmpy1)

Fatality risk criteria: Hospitals, Schools, etc 0.5

Residential areas, hotels, etc 1

Offices, retail centres, etc 5s Open space, recreation areas etc 10

Neighbouring industrial areas 50

Overpressure for Safety Distances:

Property damage and accident 14 k Pa propagation

50 Adjacent potentially hazardous installation, land zoned to accommodate such installations, or nearest public building

Injury risk levels 7 k Pa 50 At residential areas

Maximum Heat Radiation:

Injury risk levels 4.7 kW/m2 50 At residential areas

Property damage and accident 23 kW/m2

propagation

50 Adjacent potentially hazardous installation or land zoned to accommodate such installations

In order to put these risks into perspective, published information on the level of risk to which each of us may be exposed from day to day due to a variety of activities has been shown in Table 7 below. Some of these are voluntary, for which we may accept a higher level of risk due to a perceived benefit, while some are involuntary. Generally, we tend to expect a lower level of imposed or involuntary risk especially if we do not perceive a direct benefit.

57


Table – 7 Risk to Individuals

Activity / Type of Risk Published levels of risk

(pmpy1) VOLUNTARY RISKS (AVERAGED OVER ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS)

Smoking 5,000 Drinking alcohol 380

Swimming 50

Playing rugby 30

Travelling by car 145

Travelling by train 30

Travelling by aero plane 10

INVOLUNTARY RISKS (AVERAGED OVER WHOLE POPULATION)

Cancer 1,800 Accidents at home 110

Struck by motor vehicle 35

Fires 10

Electrocution (non industrial) 3

Falling objects 3

Storms and floods 0.2

Lightning strikes 0.1

Table- 8 Criteria for Tolerable Societal Risk

Number of fatalities (N) [-]

Acceptable limit of N or more fatalities per year

Unacceptable limit of N or more fatalities per year

1 3 x 10-5 3 x 10-3

10 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-4

100 3 x 10-8 3 x 10-6

1000 1 x 10-9 1 x 10-7

58


The societal risk criteria specify levels of societal risk which must not be exceeded by a particular activity. The same criteria are currently used for existing and new developments. Two societal risk criteria are used, defining acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk due to a particular activity. The criteria in Table 6 above are represented on the societal risk (f-N) curve as two parallel lines. Three zones are thus defined:

Above the unacceptable/intolerable limit the societal risk is not acceptable

whatever the perceived benefits of the development.

The area between the unacceptable and the acceptable limits is known as the ALARP (as low as reasonably possible) region. Risk reduction may be required for potential incidents in this area.

Below the acceptable limit, the societal risk level is negligible regardless of

the perceived value of the activity.

59


Risk Analysis ACCEPABILITY CRITERIA Thermal radiation due to pool fire may cause various degrees of burns on human bodies. Moreover their effects on inanimate objects like piping equipment or vegetation also need to be evaluated to assess their impact. The following table show the damage effects due to thermal radiation intensities.

TABLE 9

DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT RADIATION INTENSITY

Incident Radiation Intensity (kw/m2)

Type of Damage

62.0 Spontaneous ignition of wood

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at infinitely long exposure (non –piloted)

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic etc.

4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 sec., however blistering of skin (1st degree burn) is likely.

1.6 Cause no discomfort on long exposure

0.7 Equipment to solar radiation

TABLE 10 HEAT RADIATION AND ESCAPE TIME

Radiation Intensity (Btu/hr/ft2) Time to pain Threshold (Seconds)

440 60

550 (1.6 kw/m2) 40

740 30

920 16

1500 (4.7 kw/m2) 9

2200 6

3000 (9.5 kw/m2) 5

3700 4

6300 2

For continuous presence of persons, the following thermal radiation intensity levels are usually adopted :

- 1.6 kw/m2 for population outside - 4.5 kw/m2 for terminal operators

The effect of incident radiation intensity and exposure time on lethality is given in the following table.

foreshore terminal g.m. pettai road, harbour …€¦ · petroleum industry plays a crucial role in...

Documents