210

Vicente, leaving behind second-tier forces which "reverted to the

same kind of behavior that the Americans say had cost them the ini

tiative in the past, digging in rather than advancing by small

night patrols and often giving up weapons in the face of unexpec

tedly fierce guerilla attacks." (_m) U.S.—financed civic action

projects, including the reopening of schools and roads, continued

to go forward in a number of areas, but largely at the sufferance

of rebel commanders also trying to win the loyalty of the peasants.

(31) By December of 1981, only three of the 33 municipalities in

El Salvador asked to form civil defense units had complied with

the order. (32)

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering assessed Operation Well

Being in December, 1983, in these words: "The Army has not shown

the capacity to deal with the counteroffensive and the area of the

plan. We had said that was a clear test." (33)

The floundering program in San Vicente led to another shift

in Salvadoran war—fighting tactics. Salvadoran commanders turned

away from the small units proposed by U.S. strategists, and re

verted to more conventional "sweep" operations through rebel

zones involving large numbers of government troops. At the same

time, the aerial bombing of rebel-contested zones surged. The

stepped—up air war appeared to have two complementary objectives:

to disrupt the rebels‘ ability to mass for attack, and to drive

civilians out of areas in the countryside that the rebels controlled

or contested, thereby denying the rebels a base of logistical

support. (34

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