Foreign and Military Policy

Kinds of Foreign Policy• Majoritarian Politics- widespread benefits and costs

(Pres has most power, public opinion supports but doesn’t guide)– Ex. Wars, military alliances, nuclear test ban,

• Interest Group Politics-groups pitted against one another for benefits/costs (larger Congressional role)– Ex. Tariffs: Japan vs. the Steel industry

• Client Politics- benefits to identifiable group w/o costs to any distinct group (Congress is central)– Ex. Israel policy (may be changing!)

Constitutional/Legal Context• Constitution creates “invitation to struggle”

between President and Congress– Pres Commander-in-Chief, Congress appropriates $– Pres appoints, Senate confirms– Pres negotiates treaties, Senate ratifies

Americans perceive President as being in charge, which history confirms

President’s Power• President is stronger in foreign policy than domestic– Pres can send troops w/o declaration of war

• Probably stronger power than framers intended

• But…president is weaker when compared to other heads of state– Wilson, FDR couldn’t get ally with Britain– Wilson couldn’t join League of Nations– HW Bush debated Congress on Iraq war

• Supreme Court gives wide powers– Reluctant to intervene in Pres-Congress disputesEx. FDR and Japanese internment camps, Nixon enlarging

Vietnam war, Carter’s freezing of Iranian assets

Checks on President’s Power• Political rather than constitutional• Congress controls the $$$• War Powers Act of 1973- restricts the president– If Pres commits troops he must report it to Congress

within 48 hours– Only 60 day commitment w/o declaring war– Previously, Congress could use legislative veto to bring

troops home Has had very little influence, politically impossible

(Congress will of course support successful military action)

Effects of War Powers Act• Congress rarely invokes it– Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton all sent troops

w/o authorization• Politically impossible– Congress wouldn’t challenge successful military

action (even Vietnam)• Constitutionality is questionable (so they don’t

push it)

Machinery of Foreign Policy

• Post-WWII major power status consequences:– President more involved in foreign affairs (top of

agenda)– More agencies shape foreign policy• Too many and too big to really be coordinated (Sec. of

State is only 1 person, agencies owe no loyalty to him)

• National Security Council created to coordinate

National Security Council (NSC)• Created by law, chaired by the president– Includes VP and secretaries of state and defense

• National Security Advisor heads the staff– Goal of staff is balanced view

• Grown in influence since JFK but downgraded by Reagan

• NSC rivals Secretary of State• Consequences of multi-centered decision-making:– “it’s never over”- rivalry between branches for foreign

policy power– Agency positions influence their interests and policy

Foreign Policy and Public Opinion• Before WWII public opposed US involvement• Attack on Pearl Harbor shifted opinion• WWII– Universally popular war– Successful– US emerged as dominant power in the world

• Public opinion varies, is highly general, and is dependent on:– polling questions– opinions expressed by leaders– impact of world events

Backing the President • Public tends to support the president during crisis

(approval ratings go up!)• Support does not decrease with casualties– Body bag fallacy: soldiers come home in coffins– Support for escalation and victory

• Most wars do have public opposition– Highest among Democrats, African Americans, and

those with post-grad degrees*In sum: People are leery of wars until they start, then

they support them and want to win.

Mass vs. Elite Opinion• Mass Opinion:– Generally poorly informed– Generally supportive of the president– Conservative, less internationalist

• Elite Opinion:– Better informed– Opinions change more rapidly (Vietnam)– Protest on moral/philosophical grounds– More liberal and internationalist– Even more so in leaders active in politics, academia,

media, or other organizations concerned with foreign affairs

Cleavages among Foreign Policy Elites

• Events have no meaning until interpreted by people who must react to them

• Who are the elites?– Administrative position in foreign policy field(State

dept, NSC), key congressional committees, various private organizations, editors of relevant publications

How a Worldview Shapes Foreign Policy

• Definition: comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing the US and ways of responding (sometimes called a paradigm)– Mr. X’s article on containment of USSR

• Not unanimously accepted but consistent with public’s mood, events, and experience

4 Worldviews

• Isolationism: opposes involvement in world affairs– Adopted after WWI after little accomplished– Ended with Pearl Harbor

• Containment: (anti-appeasement) US should resist the expansion of aggressive nations– Successful in that it didn’t harm US interests, proved

welcome to allies, prevented military conquest

4 Worldviews• Disengagement: (“Vietnam”) belief that US was

harmed by its war with Vietnam(defeat and political disaster) so it should avoid similar events

• Crisis interpreted 3 ways:1. Correct worldview, but failed to try hard enough2. Correct worldview but applied in the wrong place3. Worldview itself was wrong• Critics believed world view wrong (#3) and new one

should be based on isolationism

4 Worldviews

• Human Rights: we should try to improve the lives of people in other countries (Kosovo viewed as similar to Nazi genocide)– But what about Rwanda, China, USSR??

• New Question post 9/11: should the US “go it alone” or build a coalition?

Use of Military Force• Military power more important after collapse of

USSR/end of Cold War– Used in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan– Threats from rogues (Iran, N. Korea) and others (China,

India, Pakistan, Israel, Russia)• 2 Views:– Majoritarian View: all benefit, all pay– Client View: military-industrial complex shapes what is

spent• All pay, but some benefit more than others• Generals, big corporations, congressional districts that get

big defense contracts

The Defense Budget• Total Spending– Very low spending in peacetime until 1950– Driven up by Containment policy for USSR

• Changes in spending tend to reflect changes in public opinion

• Debate once USSR fell:– Liberals: cut defense, we aren’t world’s “police officer”– Conservatives: some cuts ok, but world is still dangerous

and we must be ready• Saddam Hussein soon proved them right• Involvement in war in Bosnia proved military had been cut too

much…Clinton increased spending

What do we get with our money?• People- most expensive– From draft to all volunteer since 1973– More women, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” recently overruled

• “Readiness” –Training, supplies, food, fuel, etc 1st to get cut due to client politics (no constituents to get mad)

• Bases- at one time many opened and few closed due to client politics– Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created

to take client politics out of the decision

What do we get with our money?• Hardware: big ticket items and small ticket itemsCost overruns: actual cost is more than estimated

cost. Why?:– Unpredictability of cost of new item– Incentive for contractor to underestimate cost at 1st

– Military chiefs want only the best • “Gold plating”- ask for everything at once

– Sole-searching- new weapons are purchased from a single contractor…so no competition

– When cutting defense budget Congress will not cut but stretch (start and stop production drives up the cost)

Structure of Defense Decision Making• National Security Act of 1947- created Dept of

Defense– Headed by Sec. of Defense (must be civilian)- command

authority over defense on behalf of pres– Sec. of Army, Air Force, Navy, (also civilians)

• manage daily functions– Joint Chiefs of Staff (military)

• Branches of military kept separate- Why?– Fear if unified they would become too powerful– Desire of services to preserve autonomy– Inter-service rivalries intended by Congress to increase

info

Structure of Defense Decision Making• Joint Chiefs of Staff- committee of heads of 4 military

branches, chairman, vice chair, and military officers appointed by the pres./confirmed by Senate

• No command authority over troops• Key to national defense planning• Since 1986 reorganization, Chairman of JCS has been president’s

principal military advisor

• Chain of Command: Pres Sec. Defense various specified commands (these can go through JCS, but they have no command power)

• Civilians head the military to protect from concentration of power

New Problem of Terrorism• Transition from Bipolar world to uni-polar• Doctrine of preemption- address threats before they are

fully formed– Act alone if necessary – support of UN sometimes

sought/received (Korea, Kuwait), sometimes not (Vietnam, Iraq)• Rebuilding Nations– Positive experience: Germany, Japan– Negative experience: Somalia, Haiti– Questionable: Iraq, Afghanistan

• Lessons Learned: Don’t leave too quickly, organize agencies, learn from mistakes, carefully coordinate civilian and military operations